Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence

Luhan, Wolfgang, Poulsen, Anders and Roos, Michael (2017) Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 102. 687–699. ISSN 0899-8256

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      Abstract

      We conduct a bargaining experiment where interaction is tacit and payoffs are earned and cumulated in real time. We test hypotheses about the interaction between the focal properties of payoffs and the complexity of coordinating on an intertemporal behavior that achieves them. The general finding is that when a payoff focal outcome requires a complicated coordination scheme bargainers tend to settle on a simpler and sometimes inefficient behavior.

      Item Type: Article
      Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
      Depositing User: Pure Connector
      Date Deposited: 14 Mar 2017 01:41
      Last Modified: 09 Apr 2019 12:02
      URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/62950
      DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.016

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