Characterising competitive equilibrium in terms of opportunity

Sugden, Robert (2017) Characterising competitive equilibrium in terms of opportunity. Social Choice and Welfare, 48 (3). 487–503. ISSN 0176-1714

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Abstract

This paper analyses alternative profiles of opportunity sets for individuals in an exchange economy, without assuming that individuals’ choices reveal coherent preferences. It introduces the concept of a ‘market-clearing single-price regime’, representing a profile of opportunity sets consistent with competitive equilibrium. It also proposes an opportunity-based normative criterion, the Strong Opportunity Criterion, which is analogous with the core in preference-based analysis. It shows that every market-clearing single-price regime satisfies the Strong Opportunity Criterion and that, in the limit as an economy is replicated, only such regimes have this property.

Item Type: Article
Additional Information: © The Author(s) 2016. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Uncontrolled Keywords: opportunity criterion,competitive equilibrium,behavioural welfare economics
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 15 Dec 2016 00:06
Last Modified: 19 Apr 2023 18:34
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/61735
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-1015-7

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