An individualistic approach to institution formation in public good games

Ramalingam, Abhijit, Godoy, Sara, Morales, Antonio J. and Walker, James M. (2016) An individualistic approach to institution formation in public good games. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 129. 18–36. ISSN 0167-2681

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    Abstract

    In a repeated public goods setting, we explore whether individuals, acting unilaterally, will provide an effective sanctioning institution. Subjects first choose independently whether they will participate in a sanctioning stage that follows a contribution stage. Only those who gave themselves the “right” to sanction can do so. We find that the effectiveness of the institution may not require provision of the institution at the level of the group. Individuals acting unilaterally are able to provide sanctioning institutions that effectively raise cooperation. The effectiveness of the institution, however, depends on whether the “right” to sanction entails a monetary cost or not.

    Item Type: Article
    Uncontrolled Keywords: public goods, experiment,punishment,institution formation,unilateral provision,cooperation
    Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
    Depositing User: Pure Connector
    Date Deposited: 13 Jun 2016 13:04
    Last Modified: 09 Apr 2019 11:17
    URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/59310
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.06.003

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