Antisocial punishment in two social dilemmas

Fatas, Enrique and Mateu, Guillermo (2015) Antisocial punishment in two social dilemmas. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 9. ISSN 1662-5153

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    Abstract

    The effect of sanctions on cooperation depends on social and cultural norms. While free riding is kept at bay by altruistic punishment in certain cultures, antisocial punishment carried out by free riders pushes back cooperation in others. In this paper we analyze sanctions in both a standard public goods game with a linear production function and an otherwise identical social dilemma in which the minimum contribution determines the group outcome. Experiments were run in a culture with traditionally high antisocial punishment (Southern Europe). We replicate the detrimental effect of antisocial sanctions on cooperation in the linear case. However, we find that punishment is still widely effective when actions are complementary: the provision of the public good significantly and substantially increases with sanctions, participants punish significantly less and sanctions radically transform conditional cooperation patterns to generate significant welfare gains.

    Item Type: Article
    Additional Information: © 2015 Fatas and Mateu. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
    Uncontrolled Keywords: anti social behavior,coordination,experiments jel classification numbers: c92,public goods,punishment
    Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
    Related URLs:
    Depositing User: Pure Connector
    Date Deposited: 29 Apr 2015 16:24
    Last Modified: 21 Mar 2019 11:18
    URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/53320
    DOI: 10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00107

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