Public goods and decay in networks

Fatas, Enrique, Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A., Morales, Antonio J. and Solaz, Hector (2015) Public goods and decay in networks. SERIEs, 6 (1). pp. 73-90. ISSN 1869-4195

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    Abstract

    We propose a simple behavioral model to analyze situations where (1) a group of agents repeatedly plays a public goods game within a network structure and (2) each agent only observes the past behavior of her neighbors, but is affected by the decisions of the whole group. The model assumes that agents are imperfect conditional cooperators, that they infer unobserved contributions assuming imperfect conditional cooperation by others, and that they have some degree of bounded rationality. We show that our model approximates quite accurately regularities derived from public goods game experiments.

    Item Type: Article
    Additional Information: Available under Open Access
    Uncontrolled Keywords: decay,networks,public good
    Faculty \ School: ?? UEA ??
    Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
    University of East Anglia > Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Applied and Financial Economics
    University of East Anglia > Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Experimental Economics
    University of East Anglia > Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Industrial Economics
    Related URLs:
    Depositing User: Pure Connector
    Date Deposited: 10 Oct 2014 12:32
    Last Modified: 25 Jul 2018 10:07
    URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/50479
    DOI: 10.1007/s13209-014-0114-x

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