Strategically Equivalent Contests

Modak Chowdhury, Subhasish and Sheremeta, Roman M (2015) Strategically Equivalent Contests. Theory and Decision, 78 (4). pp. 587-601. ISSN 0040-5833

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    Abstract

    Using a two-player Tullock-type contest, we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent contests may yield different equilibrium payoffs. We propose a simple two-step procedure to identify strategically equivalent contests. Using this procedure, we identify contests that are strategically equivalent to the original Tullock contest, and provide new examples of strategically equivalent contests. Finally, we discuss possible contest design applications and avenues for future theoretical and empirical research.

    Item Type: Article
    Additional Information: Available under Open Access
    Uncontrolled Keywords: rent-seeking,contest,equivalence,contest design
    Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
    Depositing User: Pure Connector
    Date Deposited: 13 Oct 2014 15:00
    Last Modified: 21 Mar 2019 11:12
    URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/50477
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-014-9440-5

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