Incomplete Punishment Networks in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence

Leibbrandt, Andreas, Ramalingam, Abhijit, Sääksvuori, Lauri and Walker, James M. (2015) Incomplete Punishment Networks in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence. Experimental Economics, 18 (1). pp. 15-37. ISSN 1573-6938

[img]
Preview
PDF (LRSW-ExpEcon-JournalVersion) - Published Version
Download (742kB) | Preview

    Abstract

    Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctioning. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions in alternative punishment networks. Our results show that the structure of punishment network significantly affects allocations to the public good. In addition, we observe that network configurations are more important than punishment capacities for the levels of public good provision, imposed sanctions and economic efficiency. Lastly, we show that targeted revenge is a major driver of anti-social punishment.

    Item Type: Article
    Additional Information: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source are credited.
    Uncontrolled Keywords: public goods experiment,punishment,cooperation,networks
    Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
    Depositing User: Pure Connector
    Date Deposited: 28 Nov 2013 14:20
    Last Modified: 21 Mar 2019 11:16
    URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/44772
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-014-9402-3

    Actions (login required)

    View Item