Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol

Cardona, Daniel and Polanski, Arnold (2013) Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol. Social Choice and Welfare, 41. pp. 217-240. ISSN 0176-1714

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Abstract

We analyze a rent-seeking contest that determines the bargaining protocol in a onedimensional bargaining game where agents preferences over social outcomes are single-peaked. We relate the incentives of the agents to make unproductive and costly efforts/investments to the quota rules that are required to implement agreements. When the contest assigns persistent recognition probabilities, we find that simple majority reduces the total investments and, hence, inefficiency. In case that the contest recurs each period, multiple equilibria are obtained, with the particularity that only one agent controls the agenda of the bargaining process.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Julie Frith
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2013 14:06
Last Modified: 06 Nov 2018 15:34
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/40859
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0681-3

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