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ToolsSugden, Robert (2008) Why incoherent preferences do not justify paternalism. Constitutional Political Economy, 19 (3). pp. 226-248.
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
A variety of recent arguments emerging from behavioural economics claim to undermine the credibility, and even the conceptual coherence, of the economist’s traditional rejection of paternalism. Indeed, some suggest that the incoherent nature of preferences inevitably implies a form of paternalism, since some basis for officiating between expressed preferences is required, and some preferences will be over-ridden in favour of others. This paper reviews and contests these arguments. It argues that markets operate according to a normatively defensible and non-paternalistic principle of mutual advantage, and that this principle does not require preferences to be coherent.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | paternalism,preferences,behavioural economics |
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Economic Theory Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Behavioural Economics |
| Depositing User: | Gina Neff |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Jan 2011 11:09 |
| Last Modified: | 22 Apr 2023 01:09 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/18412 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10602-008-9043-7 |
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