Article

Andow, James (2018) Why don’t philosophers do their intuition practice? Acta Analytica. ISSN 0353-5150

Grindrod, Jumbly, Andow, James and Hansen, Nat (2018) Third‐person knowledge ascriptions: A crucial experiment for contextualism. Mind and Language. ISSN 0268-1064

Roberts, Pendaran, Andow, James and Schmidtke, Kelly Ann (2018) Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity. Synthese, 195 (7). 3267–3287. ISSN 0039-7857

Cova, Florian, Strickland, Brent, Abatista, Angela, Allard, Aurélien, Andow, James, Attie, Mario, Beebe, James, Berniūnas, Renatas, Boudesseul, Jordane, Colombo, Matteo, Cushman, Fiery, Diaz, Rodrigo, van Dongen, Noah N’Djaye Nikolai, Dranseika, Vilius, Earp, Brian, Torres, Antonio Gaitán, Hannikainen, Ivar, Hernández-Conde, José V., Hu, Wenjia, Jaquet, François, Khalifa, Kareem, Kim, Hanna, Kneer, Markus, Knobe, Joshua, Kurthy, Miklos, Lantian, Anthony, Liao, Shen-yi, Machery, Edouard, Moerenhout, Tania, Mott, Christian, Phelan, Mark, Phillips, Jonathan, Rambharose, Navin, Reuter, Kevin, Romero, Felipe, Sousa, Paulo, Sprenger, Jan, Thalabard, Emile, Tobia, Kevin, Viciana, Hugo, Wilkenfeld, Daniel and Zhou, Xiang (2018) Estimating the Reproducibility of Experimental Philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. ISSN 1878-5158

Andow, James (2018) Are Intuitions About Moral Relevance Susceptible to Framing Effects? Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 9 (1). 115–141. ISSN 1878-5158

Andow, James (2017) Book Review: Philosophy Within its Proper Bounds by Edouard Machery. LSE Review of Books. pp. 1-3.

Andow, James (2017) Epistemic Consequentialism, Truth Fairies and Worse Fairies. Philosophia, 45 (3). pp. 987-993. ISSN 0048-3893

Andow, James (2017) Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive? Synthese, 194 (7). pp. 2631-2643. ISSN 0039-7857

Andow, James (2017) Intuition-Talk: Virus or Virtue? Philosophia, 45 (2). pp. 523-531. ISSN 0048-3893

Andow, James (2017) A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism About Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux. Metaphilosophy, 48 (1-2). pp. 183-195. ISSN 0026-1068

Andow, James (2016) Abduction by Philosophers: Reorienting Philosophical Methodology. Metaphilosophy, 47 (3). pp. 353-370. ISSN 0026-1068

Andow, James (2016) Intuitions. Analysis, 76 (2). pp. 232-246. ISSN 0003-2638

Andow, James (2016) Zebras, Intransigence & Semantic Apocalypse:Problems for Dispositional Metasemantics. Philosophia, 44 (1). pp. 53-62. ISSN 0048-3893

Andow, James (2016) Thin, Fine and with Sensitivity: A Metamethodology of Intuitions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7 (1). pp. 105-125. ISSN 1878-5158

Andow, James (2016) Qualitative tools and experimental philosophy. Philosophical Psychology, 29 (8). pp. 1128-1141. ISSN 0951-5089

Andow, James (2016) Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions. Philosophical Psychology, 29 (6). pp. 904-911. ISSN 0951-5089

Andow, James and Cova, Florian (2016) Why compatibilist intuitions are not mistaken: A reply to Feltz and Millan. Philosophical Psychology, 29 (4). pp. 550-566. ISSN 0951-5089

Andow, James (2015) How Distinctive Is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk? Metaphilosophy, 46 (4-5). pp. 515-538. ISSN 0026-1068

Andow, James (2015) A Semantic Solution to the Problem with Aesthetic Testimony. Acta Analytica, 30 (2). pp. 211-218. ISSN 0353-5150

Andow, James (2015) Expecting Moral Philosophers to be Reliable. Dialectica, 69 (2). pp. 205-220. ISSN 0012-2017

Andow, James (2015) How “Intuition” Exploded. Metaphilosophy, 46 (2). pp. 189-212. ISSN 0026-1068

Roberts, Pendaran, Andow, James and Schmidtke, Kelly (2014) Colour Relationalism and the Real Deliverances of Introspection. Erkenntnis, 79 (5). pp. 1173-1189. ISSN 0165-0106

Andow, James (2014) Intuitions, Disagreement and Referential Pluralism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5 (2). pp. 223-239. ISSN 1878-5158

Book Section

Andow, James (2018) Aesthetic Testimony and Experimental Philosophy. In: Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics. Advances in Experimental Philosophy (1). Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN 9781350038844