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ToolsVasilakis, Chrysovalantis and Thornton, John (2024) Interpersonal population diversity in the Bank Boardroom and corporate misconduct. Journal of Accounting Literature. ISSN 0737-4607
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Abstract
Purpose: This research empirically establishes that the interpersonal population diversity of executive board members partly explains the differences in financial misconduct across US banks. It advances the hypothesis that heterogeneity in the composition of an interpersonal population and diverse traits of board members, originating from the prehistoric course of the exodus of Homo sapiens from East Africa tens of thousands of years ago, is an important factor explaining the effectiveness of executive board monitoring with respect to a bank engaging in financial misconduct. The underlying intuition is that population-fragmented societies, characterized by mistrust, preference heterogeneity and corruption, find it difficult to sustain collective integrity action. Design/methodology/approach: Employing a panel of US banks from 1998 to 2019 we find that adding directors from countries with different levels of interpersonal population diversity is positively associated with financial misconduct as measured by enforcement and class action litigation against banks by the main regulatory agencies. Furthermore, we document that the more population-diverse bank boards are more likely to commit misconduct, consistent with a mechanism of inter-generational transmission of cultural norms of mistrust and non-cooperation. Findings: We find that adding directors from countries with different levels of interpersonal population diversity is positively associated with financial misconduct as measured by enforcement and class action litigation against banks by the main regulatory agencies. These results are robust to controlling for bank-specific variables, including other board characteristics, and to the use of instrumental variables. Practical implications: The findings suggest that reducing financial misconduct by banks likely requires reducing the interpersonal population diversity of banks’ executive boards. Originality/value: We show how bank boards with different interpersonal population diversity impact the likelihood of engaging in misconduct provides evidence of the microeconomic effects of interpersonal population diversity. We show the negative results of diversity that they can have on the management of a firm given that populated diverse boards are more likely to lead to higher levels of misconduct. Our evidence reveals that banks having interpersonal population fragmented boards are more likely to commit misconduct given the cultural norms of mistrust and the lack of societal cohesiveness.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | interpersonal population diversity,bank misconduct,us banks,interpersonal population diversity,accounting,economics, econometrics and finance (miscellaneous),3* ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1400/1402 |
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Norwich Business School |
| Related URLs: | |
| Depositing User: | LivePure Connector |
| Date Deposited: | 03 Jun 2024 11:31 |
| Last Modified: | 23 Jul 2024 02:22 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/95368 |
| DOI: | 10.1108/JAL-07-2023-0114 |
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