Meta-scientific eliminativism: A reconsideration of Chomsky's review of Skinner

Collins, John (2007) Meta-scientific eliminativism: A reconsideration of Chomsky's review of Skinner. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58. pp. 625-658. ISSN 1464-3537

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The paper considers our ordinary mentalistic discourse in relation to what we should expect from any genuine science of the mind. A meta-scientific eliminativism is commended and distinguished from the more familiar eliminativism of Skinner and the Churchlands. Meta-scientific eliminativism views folk psychology qua folksy as unsuited to offer insight into the structure of cognition, although it might otherwise be indispensable for our social commerce and self-understanding. This position flows from a general thesis that scientific advance is marked by an eschewal of folk understanding. The latter half of the paper argues that, contrary to the received view, Chomsky's review of Skinner offers not just an argument against Skinner's eliminativism, but, more centrally, one in favour of the second eliminativism.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Philosophy (former - to 2014)
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
Depositing User: EPrints Services
Date Deposited: 01 Oct 2010 13:56
Last Modified: 27 Oct 2023 00:37
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/axm041

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