"I want to say the nude": The Philosophical Contribution of Cubism

Marián Arribas-Tomé & Heikki Kirjavainen

Abstract

In this paper we examine the nature of the alleged realism of Cubism. We start by referring to the unsatisfactory characterisations of the so-called analytic and synthetic periods of Cubism. In our view, a fruitful clue for at least philosophically better understanding of Cubism is found in connecting the efforts of the Cubists to the aims of phenomenology and semantics. For the Cubists this implied creating a method of showing the conceptual (intensional) elements of the picture in the picture itself. Philosophically this entailed a close connection to the problems of intensionality and “inner truth” of any representation. Furthermore, we try to show that the efforts of the Cubists can be seen in the light of the Wittgensteinian distinction between “showing” and “saying”. Realising a parallelism in this connection reveals the specific contribution of the Cubists, viz., their explicit assimilation of “saying” by showing visually the conceptual conditions concerning the subject of a painting. Interestingly enough, Picasso too seems to have used the very same words explicitly (as is seen in our title), if not being fully or at all aware of their role in philosophical discussions. Anyway, the clarification of the philosophical contribution of Cubism will be aided by both of our source ideas: noematic conceptualisation, on the one hand, and the distinction between showing – saying for semantics, on the other.

1. How To Approach Cubism?

If we consider the roots of postmodernism originating in the first half of the last century, we might easily think that such a current in art as Cubism expresses tendencies familiar to postmodern thinking, or that it is one of the roots of postmodernism. One of the main postmodern doctrines is the belief that the notion of truth is relativistic in an inflationary way. In fact many of the sayings of Cubists seem, at first, to confirm this view. Picasso says: “Truth cannot exist” (see Parmelin 1965 / Picasso on Art: A Selection of Views [from now on P4]
Our succinct thesis, hopefully a surprising one too, is that in a certain sense nothing can be farther from Cubistic aims than postmodernism with its doctrine of non-realism and the inflation of truth. Naturally we owe an explanation and we are willing to give one in the course of the discussion in this paper. We hope to be able to confirm the assertion that Cubism is a strongly realistic art, although at the same time, it is non-naturalist, non-impressionist and rejects non-figurative ideas as well.

Let us start with a simple, but basic observation. If you concentrate on the early pictures made by Picasso, it is not at all difficult to anticipate his later interests in realism that surface in his Cubistic period. The way he focused on real individual objects in the world already in his early stage gives to his subjects a certain solidity; it is this solidity which continues in the Cubistic period. Therefore, it is quite easy to see that Picasso had, from the very beginning, an enormous interest, not only in all sorts of concrete material objects, but also in the question of the criteria of their identifiability as material objects, not to say, toward their individual essences. This inclination is confirmed by a number of statements made later by Picasso himself and the other Cubists. They were not approaching objects primarily from the point of view of their aesthetic qualities, nor from the point of view of “delight and beauty” as Braque said; they were trying to reach things “as they are”. Accordingly, concerning Picasso, it might seem rash to maintain that, in a certain sense, one of the greatest painters of the twentieth century was not much of an ordinary artist at all, that he was rather a reformer making a philosophical contribution through his art. This bold statement is not, however, as fantastic as it might seem. On the contrary, there is a lot of truth in it. Furthermore, statements like these direct our attention to fascinating questions concerning the relationship between the Cubistic art and twentieth century philosophical thought.

1. However, as Sabatés has documented, Picasso also said: “Thus when we ... used to make our constructions, we produced ‘pure truth’, without pretensions, without tricks, without malice” (see P4 1972, p. 60).
2. Compare Picasso’s words: “There is no abstract art”. “Nor is there any ‘figurative’ and ‘non-figurative’ art.” See how ridiculous it is then to think of painting without ‘figuration’” (Zervos’ report in P4 1972, p. 9; “I’m not a surrealist” in Seekler’s interview / P4 1972, p. 137).
3. According to Jerome Seekler’s interview (1945 / P4 1972, p. 140), Picasso said: “I paint the objects for what they are”; similarly according to Gertrude Stein, Picasso said: “I’m not painting objects as I see them but as I know them to be” (cf. Hintikka 1982, p. 16).
We want to mention here at the outset our two main sources supporting our view. In his book *The Cubist Epoch* (Cooper 1971), Douglas Cooper characterises Cubism as revealing “a new spirit of realism,” as giving “an impulse toward realism,” and as aiming at “an accurate representation of reality” (see Cooper 1971, pp. 18, 30, 38). At first, these sorts of expressions might seem to be contrary to the aforementioned, widely-adopted view, which links Cubism with relativistic currents like postmodernism. Cooper, however, failed to give a plausible explanation of the alleged realism of Cubism. Therefore, those who spoke about Cubism as a realistic art thus might seem to offer implausible suggestions about what Cubism is. In our view, this is not the case, as is aptly demonstrated in our second main source, Jaakko Hintikka’s article ‘Conception et vision’ (Hintikka 1982). There the author examines Cubistic art by comparing the aims of Cubists to those of phenomenologists (Husserl). This way the author succeeds in arguing not only for the obvious realism of Cubism, but also for its new ways of pictorial representation. The key notion, then, is that of a *noema*. We consider this a valuable point. We will return to this source in due course.

If Cubism is attached to realism, as Cooper, Hintikka, and some other scholars say, then we have to try to clarify what sort of realism is present in Cubistic art. This is our main task. Furthermore, since the problem of realism always requires exploring the limits of the tools of representation, we have to question in what sense the Cubists renewed the language of art. In order to answer this question we will make use of Hintikka’s contribution. In addition, however, we think that there is another possible contribution to be utilised, *viz.*, to acknowledge a certain distinction, which is as illuminating as the phenomenological parallelism. This distinction is that between “showing and saying” in the analysis of meaning. As is well known this distinction was crucial for Wittgenstein in his philosophy. Interestingly enough, Picasso too seems to have used the very same words explicitly (as is seen in our title), if not being fully or at all aware of their role in philosophical discussions. Anyway, the clarification of the philosophical contribution of Cubism will be aided by both of our source ideas: noematic conceptualisation, on the one hand, and the distinction between showing – saying for semantics, on the other.

4. [Our references are to the Finnish version of Hintikka’s article].
Another aspect of interpretation could be mentioned: in order to achieve a clear view on the aims of the Cubists, we have to examine what the Cubists said and how they interpreted their paintings. This entails reminding ourselves of a certain important feature concerning the nature of their parlance: what they say is not a part and parcel of an analysed systematic theory, but consists of spontaneous responses on sundry occasions. This is the reason for the apparent inconsistency and vagueness of many of the Cubists’ statements. It is typical that quite often the Cubists express themselves very strongly and with pathos for or against something; in the next turn they might say something totally different or opposite. Therefore, their comments cannot always be taken at face value; their expressions have to be carefully evaluated in the light of the context, not forgetting their inevitable background presuppositions. On the other hand, in many cases, if you try alternative ways of explaining the Cubists statements, you can usually find an explanation which fits well into the larger philosophical setting of the problem. Often the explanation sought takes wing if embedded in a suitable philosophical environment. Obviously then, the question of realism in Cubism has to be explored by trying to determine what sort of critical conclusions can be drawn from the attitudes the Cubists had and from the views they opposed and criticised. This introduces the basic methodological objective of this article. If we can conclude with warranted interpretations concerning the sometimes blurry pathos and confusing utterances of the Cubists, and if we succeed in connecting what they say correctly to their paintings, then we might also succeed in shedding some light in a more systematic sense on our stated thesis of realism. In order to do this we have taken Dore Ashton’s selection Picasso on Art (1972) as the main test material for our systematic aims, realizing, though, the considerable difficulties of using that selection for achieving the correct systematic reading.

**In sum, we will analyse Cubism in the light of its parallelism to phenomenology. This helps us, we hope, to understand the Cubistic way of expressing the identifiability of things and subjects.** Likewise we will analyse Cubism in the light of the semantics of pictorial representation; this enables us to understand Cubism as a sort of renewed language of art. The latter perspective composes, we believe, the frames for testing the core case of the philosophical contribution of Cubism, namely, whether pictorial meanings can be explicitly defined, that is, whether they can be “said”, and not only “shown”. Obviously certain other points concerning the logic of pictorial representation will be helpful for our purposes. Since our presentation will to some extent reflect the chronological order of Cubistic material we will start by considering some points seen
problematic to that order. The problem is not so much temporal as substantial; it leads to what has been debated concerning the “analytic” and “synthetic” period of Cubism.

2. Scattering With Epochs

The terms “analytic” and “synthetic”, as Cooper has pointed out (1999, pp. 18, 30), are not easy to define. The establishment of phases and dates within Cubism has caused great controversy, and to this date there are discrepancies. Scholars are not unanimous about how to clarify the pictorial examples of the work of Cubism’s most outstanding artists: Picasso, Braque and Gris. We are going to centre our attention on what Cooper (1999, p. 13) calls “The Cubist Epoch”, that is, the years from 1907 to 1921. This “epoch” has been characterised as a transition from the “analytic” to the “synthetic” period of Cubism. Therefore, let us review at what the critics have said about the terms ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’. In what follows we shall just have an overview of the extent to which seems to resist a strict categorisation.

We can see, for instance, that Golding writes as follows by commenting on Carl Einstein, a German writer and poet, who had distinguished three successive phases in Cubist painting in an article entitled ‘Notes sur le Cubisme’, which appeared in Documents in 1929. Golding first quotes Einstein’s three-partition of Cubism: “first a period of simplistic distortion, then a period of analysis and fragmentation, and finally a period of synthesis.” Then he continues:

In actual fact, however, during the period of ‘analysis’ to which these writers refer, Picasso and Braque had already broken with traditional perspective and were combining or ‘synthesizing’ various views of an object into a single image. The development of a more abstract technique during 1910 only enabled them to effect this kind of synthesis in a freer, more suggestive manner. (1988, p. 118).

Here Golding seems to point out that ‘synthetic’ elements were part of Cubism already at the outset. What Cooper does not tell is of what exactly these elements consist. We will try to expose the original nucleus of ‘synthetic’ in sections four and ten. Here we will simply collect some sundry opinions of

5. Art scholars commonly say that the analytic period from 1907 to 1912 consisted of analysing human forms by reconstructing particular separate “views” which overlapped and intersected. The synthetic period began by genuine constructions instead of reconstructions.
scholars, when they have tried to answer the question of whether or not the terms ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ can totally succeed in creating some kind of hermeneutic order that helps to classify the Cubist’s works, or if those terms can still be used in any fruitful way.

Some of the explanations offered for ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ have no apparent philosophical merit. For someone like Bob Chew, ‘synthetic’ and ‘analytical’ are terms attached to a list of visual characteristics, which would help us to identify the works as belonging to a certain category by looking at some external clues. For example, Analytic Cubism would “have a limited use of colour (usually brown, green, black, grey), objects and spaces are destroyed and rebuilt…,” whereas in Synthetic Cubism “colour is introduced much widely, the space is much flatter and there is an extensive use of bare canvas” (Chew 2004). Some other interpretators seem to be quite sceptical about the significance of the terms ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’. Cox suggests that those terms “while handy for the purpose of labelling and historical reference, can lead to a misunderstanding of the subtleties of Cubist art.” (2000, pp. 145-46). Also Cooper is of the opinion that “the currently accepted division of Cubism into phases labelled ‘analytical’, ‘hermetic’, ‘synthetic’ and ‘rococo’ is largely meaningless, since these words apply exclusively to stylistic methods – often found together in a single work – used by only certain artists and having no general application” (1999, p. 13). In light of such opinions the need for a more secure basis of assessment of ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ becomes clear. Finding such a ground may change the assessment considerably.

Moreover, ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ are not the only conceptual tools that have been used. Ozenfant and Jeanneret, in La Peinture Moderne, used the terms ‘hermetic’ or ‘collective’ to differentiate the early period from 1908 to 1912 from the succeeding phase. Kahnweiler talks also of the ‘hermetic period’ of Picasso and Braque in his book Juan Gris, between the years 1909 and 1913. Golding suggests that “some people have seen a ‘hermetic’ phase coinciding with an analytical one. Other critics have used the term ‘hermetic’ simply to describe the extremely complex, rather abstract appearance of Picasso’s and Braque’s paintings of 1911 and 1912” (1988, p. 118). Schwartz adds:

The terms Analytical and Synthetic are generally used but are at best approximate. The Synthetic works incorporate analytical processes, and the earlier Cubist works incorporated syntheses of form and conception. Pierre Daix prefers the terms Geometrical and Creative Cubism; these avoid the original confusion but are equally interchangeable. (1971, p. 9).
These slightly differing opinions show that there is something problematic in the use of the terms ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ to explain the significant changes and development occurring in Cubism. Clearly we need to distinguish between how we can use those terms, on the one hand, for historical purposes and systematic understanding of Cubism, on the other. In our view, it would be better to apply, with Cooper, a much simpler historical or time-related criteria, as he says: “I prefer to borrow the terminology which is generally used in discussing the evolution of Renaissance art, that is to say ‘early’, ‘high’ and ‘late’” (1999, p. 13), where those terms apply more to the maturity, the achievements, and the impact of Cubism being gained over the years than to the particular ways the artists put together this work or the other. This view allows for the organic spirit of this movement to flow better, but it brings about the challenge of specification of the movement’s heart.

Various events happened in the intervening years, between 1907 and 1921, but not in a clear-cut way; there is overlapping, there is movement backwards and forwards. This being so, one might easily conclude as Schwartz did: “Cubism, however rational, was by no means systematic; its theoretical basis, tempered and serious as it was, could not obscure the life force that gives it meaning” (1971, p. 13). However, here too, we are inclined to state that even through Schwartz’s description of the “life force” may be correct on the everyday historical level, nevertheless, there is more continuity and substance in Cubism below the surface. Above all, there is an intense drive to express reality.

3. The Input of Jean Gris
A further complication is to be taken into account. Even Golding and Cooper make it clear that “it was in the writings of Gris that the difference between the analytical and synthetic approach was elaborated” (Cooper 1999, p. 13). Thus, evidence of a more systematic view seems to appear in the work of Juan Gris, but describing it is another matter. Much of what the Cubists say seems, at first, like a slap in the face.

For example, Gris seems to increase the turbulence since his way of looking at and working with reality moves progressively towards a more apparent conceptual approach. His constant effort is to achieve a piece of work where “it is not picture ‘X’ which manages to correspond with my subject, but subject ‘X’ which manages to correspond to my picture” (citation according to Golding 1988, p. 143; italics added). He seems to say that he was not interested in painting the reality in front of him but in creating a new one in his picture.
Constructing a picture is primary; correspondence to some object is secondary. This, however, seems to entail the emphasis that in concentrating on the methods of construction Gris is disentangling them from the subjects he is painting, since, if any object in the real world is supposed to resemble his work, it may be just by chance, not intentionally or internally so. Even more turbulence appears when Gris continues:

I call this method a _deductive method_ because the pictorial relationships between the coloured forms suggest to me certain private relationships between the elements of an imaginary reality. The mathematics of picture-making lead me to the _physics of representation_. (Ibid.; italics added).\(^6\)

Gris may seem inscrutable. What does he mean by “pictorial relationships between the coloured forms” suggesting to him “certain private relationships between the elements of an imaginary reality”? We will soon propose an answer to this. According to the above quotation, there was no doubt some sort of methodological thinking among the Cubists. If this is true, then admittedly, as Golding says: “the terms ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ may have a real and more precise and systematic meaning.” But he adds: “On the other hand the terms cannot be used in quite the same way in relation to Picasso and Braque [as in relation to Gris]” (1988, p. 120).

Having said all this, it is clear that the story can go on only if we unravel the cords of ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’. So far we have only a faint impression that some methodological or systematic change may have happened between the ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ period. Apparently, the Cubists seem to have matured step by step during the so-called analytic period. To grasp more firmly what was going on presupposes that we recognise the deeper level of the problem the Cubists faced at that time. Both Braque and Picasso offer several clues for us to acknowledge what their basic interest was.\(^7\) They first concentrated on the most obvious spatial features in determining the coordinates of _what, where_, and _when_.

4. Putting Right the "Analytic"

What we have to do, according to the Cubists, is to imagine that, instead of

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6. It is rather interesting that approximately at the same time some avant-garde Russian painters (Tatlin, Malevich, Popova and others) gathered in St. Petersburg and Terijoki and used similar allusions to physics (see Bird 1987; Bowlt 1988).

7. Compare Golding’s anticipative view on “synthesizing” in quote on p. 49 above.
drawing a picture on a single two-dimensional sheet of paper, we could make several pictures of the same object on several sheets of paper, every one of the drawings made from a slightly different angle. Then we could, as it were, put each one of those sheets on top of the other, so that they partly merge into each other, but are also a bit distanced from each other. Then we could look at them in one glance as to see the wholeness of what they compose. What we get is a sort of three-dimensional conglomeration of sheets giving us a three-dimensional, as it were, conglomeration of the object. What follows next is the crucial step for the emergence of Cubism: instead of trying to deal with all those sheets simultaneously we could draw on only one sheet, what we see in all the sheets put together. This method seems to solve the problem of how to represent a three-dimensional object on a two-dimensional surface. Interestingly enough, the Cubists in fact left clear traces of their basic idea directly on the canvas; the different “sheets” can be seen as composing different spatial levels on one surface, a sort of partially constructed three-dimensional space on the two-dimensional surface, thus producing the illusion of three-dimensionality, “a cubic” that is. The basic intention here is to show the spatial determinants by showing the spatial coordinates in one and the same picture. Here we begin to grasp the real meaning of Gris’ mysterious words, which at first might seem to speak for an arbitrary creation of a method but which in the last analysis has to be taken as speaking for an important discovery dealing with pictorial representation. Before trying to interpret Gris’ words let us turn to Picasso and Braque.

Since a similar multiplication, which can be performed with the painter’s change of angles and picking up multiple sheets, (referred to as the “material” tools by the Cubists), can also be made with the proper theoretical tools, that is, with “spaces, lines, masses and weights,” as Braque said, the result will be a more complete representation of the object. This is the way of painting the object such as it is in itself. In a sense this was nothing other than an effort to deal with three-dimensional objects as if they were to be represented as sculptures on the two-dimensional canvas. This pursuit is confirmed in so many words of the Cubists. Kahnweiler seems to have realised this when he, in a conversation with Picasso, referred to Picasso’s early paintings as “imitating”

8. Picasso called the sum of the fragmentations the “sum of destructions”. Cf. Picasso: “I made myself go towards the new movement. The problem is now to pass, to go around the object, and give a plastic expression to the result. … All of this is my struggle to break with the two-dimensional aspect” (Liberman, 1956 / PA, 1972, 61).
three-dimensional objects, by saying: “Even the superimposed areas (plans) of 1913 evidently were nothing but imitations of sculpture, *your sculptures at the time*” (see Kahnweiler 1952 / *PA* 1972, p. 115 [italics added]).

Picasso agrees with this opinion. Similarly, according to Gonzales, Picasso had the following typical idea already around 1908. Gonzales writes:

> These paintings – all you would have to do is to cut them apart, the colors being only indications of different perspectives, of inclined planes from one side or the other. Then you could assemble them according to the indications given by the color and find yourself in the presence of ‘sculpture’ (see Gonzales 1936 / *PA* 1972, p. 60).

What is now crucial? First, the word ‘sculpture’ has to be taken precisely as it is written in the quotation, in inverted commas, hinting at the extended or slightly metaphoric content of this word. This wider content will be discussed in the last section of our paper. More importantly, we have to realise that the basic insight of the Cubists was already present in their early works, albeit restricted by paying attention mostly to spatial features only. Their great discovery, however, (not invention) was that the *representational relation itself could also be represented in the picture by drawing or painting it on the canvas.*

This fits well with the realism of the early Cubists and with their interest in ordinary, solid, material things: to represent an object in its entire substance you have to make your drawing as extensional as possible, to draw it, not only in its *one* phenomenal *Gestalt*, but to try to make its *other* phenomenal appearances visible as well. This manoeuvre, however, is bound to lead to a sum of appearances showing the whole way of spatial being of the object. This is like instantiating the object in a series of different spatial situations, which can be taken as a process of forming a singular *spatial concept* of a material object. Obviously then, at the same time, the spatial determinants are no longer only intensionally captured in the picture but extensionally shown. Therefore, for a proper representation, the thing should be drawn in such a way that its spatial coordinates are shown as well. This suggests that Gris’ “imaginary reality” is nothing less than an effort to visualise the representational relation itself. If we accept this, it is easy to achieve a sensible interpretation of Gris’ words. What

9. Hintikka also emphasises this when he says: “Perhaps the most interesting and theoretically most actual side of it is in fact … the insight that the representational relation itself … is man made, and therefore variable for the free, creative artist” (see Hintikka, 1982, p. 23).
he means by his “deductive method” is the following: as an artist he is not wandering without a “geometry”. Rather he is dealing with how the “coloured forms” as pictorial forms can be used (“suggest”) as tools for representing something spatially. That he calls this “private” map “an imaginary reality” does not seem to us as if he is speaking of something purely arbitrary or fictional detached from outer reality. The presentation may be subjective but not unrealistic. On the contrary, the reality is “imaginary” only in the sense that it shows on the canvas its own making, viz. the tools needed for representation, in other words, how the artist sets up the elements he needs for representing something.

Concentrating on questions of artistic tools does not, in Gris’ view, lead to an emphasis on the nature of a peculiar sort of truth of art, nor is art created merely for the artist himself or herself. Moreover, ‘deduction’ does not concern factual inferences needed to interpret the picture. Since ‘deduction’ on any occasion concerns the privately used tools of pictorial representation, it is like physics, which tries to set up mathematical laws in order to apply them to explain matter and the universe. Parallel to mathematical equations in physics are here what Gris calls “private relationships between the elements of an imaginary reality” (see Golding 1988, 143). These relationships reveal the “mathematics of picture-making”. This is not phenomenal painting. In order to see how revolutionary this idea was we need a short exercise where we connect the urge of the Cubists to the reduction of intensionality by the notion of “inner truth”. First some remarks on intensionality.

5. Intensionality of Pictures

If you intend to take something as a picture, you have to understand it as a “visual substitute” of the thing represented in the picture. Understanding something as a picture thus implies understanding it as a representational relation (‘a represents b’ = ‘R(a,b)’) or simply (RR). While talking specifically about pictorial representation itself we can render it in the form (f)A telling us that something (A) is pictured (f). (RR) again contains various suppositions: first, that you can see something, for instance b, in the picture, i.e., that you can identify b in the picture; secondly, that you can locate something in the

10. Picasso sometimes speaks about the forms in the sense of representational forms: “In painting everything is sign” (Jakovsky 1946 / PA 1972, p. 98); “… is an art dealing primarily with forms, and when a form is realised it is there to live its own life” (De Zayas 1923 / PA 1972, p. 59).
picture, i.e., that you can distinguish between your *visual space* and *pictorial space*. It follows that in order to see something as a picture you have to relate the coordinates of your visual point of view to the coordinates establishing the pictorial space and the point of view implied by that. In a sense this amounts to embedding a certain possible world into one’s perceptual world. This has to be kept in mind, if we want to understand the aims of the Cubists. Let us list some points concerning the identification of things in a pictorial possible world in relation to our visual space.\(^\text{11}\)

Normally, when three-dimensional objects are represented on a two-dimensional surface, such as on a canvas, there needs to be a projection method at hand, perspectival tricks, shades, etc. The Cubists in their early period mostly rejected all the standard ways of doing this. Instead they tried to find ways of spatial projection such that they could make visible various *intensional* (conceptual) ingredients entailed in the standard projection of spatial objects.\(^\text{12}\) In standard portrait painting, for example, a skilled painter can paint a portrait by projecting the visual scene on the two-dimensional canvas in such a way that the seer might easily observe the intensional features of the object: that the object is three-dimensional, that it is identifiable with a certain person, that it has certain public attributes, e.g., that certain luminous surroundings imply a certain moment of time, and that it now has a certain location in the pictorial space. All these features are pursued in *trompe-l’œil* painting by relying on what can be represented on the basis of *phenomenal* images of a normal perception. Nevertheless, however skilful the painter might be, just by relying on the phenomenal images given in perception, he could never find such a projection method with which he or she could express all the intensional features concerning the whole subject, i.e., the whole geometry of the spatial thing. Therefore, what is painted on the canvas remains always incomplete as showing all the intensional (conceptual) features that are implied in the picture. The painter’s problem, then, reflects a lemma in the logic of pictorial representation. Intensional features bearing on identifying things in a pictorial

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11. **There are several qualifications to what was said in this passage. One is that sometimes you can realise that some configuration on the canvas is a picture without being able to say what it is a picture of.**

12. **According to Penrose, Picasso had told him that [instead of exact calculations] "… the aim was rather to create space in a convincing way and therefore a new reality" (see Penrose 1958, p. 160 / *PA* 1972, p. 62).**
representation ensure that the so-called Rule of Extensionality (RE) does not generally hold.

(RE) If A and B are compatible, then (ƒ)A and (ƒ)B are compatible.

It further follows that if (RE) does not hold, then the so-called Monotonic Rule (RM) breaks as well.

(RM) If it follows from A that B, then it follows from (ƒ)A that (ƒ)B (cf. Rantala 2003, pp. 155-158).

The breakdown of these logical rules connected to pictorial representation is easy to understand. If a portrait represents a person, it does not necessarily represent everything belonging to that person; some or many of those features are only implied, that is, they are intensionally included to what the picture represents. In all cases the seer must use a huge amount of his own conceptual arsenal in order to interpret what he sees in the picture. For example, in order to see that a picture represents a man, the seer must admit that the man has a back, even when it is not seen in the picture. The same holds true for photographs as well.\[13\] The problem a painter faces is then the following: how to make the intensional features – the features determining what (i.e., how to identify the object/subject), where (i.e., what are the spatial coordinates), and when (i.e., what are the temporal coordinates) of the picture – as explicit as possible? How to show, instead of merely including, all the relevant intensional features to the viewer?

6. (RR) and the “Inner Truth”

It follows from the breakdown of (RE) and (RM) in the context of (RR) that the notion of something being true in the picture has to be qualified accordingly. Without going further with the difficult problem of intensionality we can only say briefly that, semantically speaking, every truth is more or less intensional. This is not to deny extensional truth, the plain truth. Rather we only point out that a plain truth is a limit value of an intensional truth when intensional truth is “purified” from all intensional (conceptual) ingredients as much as possible. What we mean is the following: the phrase ‘it is true that A’ is often to be taken as ‘it is true [in the story S] that A’, or, ‘it is true [in the book B] that A’, or, ‘it is

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13. According to Picasso, even though photographs are similar to paintings in this respect, they express only one aspect of representation: “In any case, a certain aspect of the subject now [when photography has “liberated” all representation from telling a story] belongs to the domain of photography” (Brassai 1966, pp. 46-47 / PA 1972, p. 109).
true [in the picture P] that A’, or, ‘it is true [in the perception C] that A’, etc. All these qualifications in the brackets can be gathered together by saying that the notion of truth is relative to certain contextual conditions, viz. (S, B, P, C), each of them determining a model for the truth of A; each model is thus defined by relevant intensional ingredients (we can call them conceptualisations as well) included in the context at hand. We say, for example, that something is true in a story, or that something exists in the picture. Therefore, the explication of the phrase ‘it is true that A’ (which formally seems to be an extensional plain truth phrase), taken intensionally, always entails some intensional operator linking it to a proper model.

The intensionality of truth can be rendered by the formula ‘[f]A’ which says precisely that A holds true under a certain intensional operator f, that is, A is true in a certain model (story, picture, or perception, etc.). Accordingly, ‘being true in a model’ can be explained as expressing an “inner truth”, a truth holding in some specific context. It is important to realise that the formula ‘[f]A’, expressing an “inner truth”, is not the same as the earlier (f)A, expressing (RR). This is because there is an important difference between representing something and something being true in the picture. The main difference is that not all that is true in the picture is represented in the picture (cf. Rantala 2003, p. 153). Consequently, from [f]A it does not generally follow (f)A but the converse holds: what is represented in the picture is also true in the picture. This is a large problem. 14 We will only point out that in order to realise what is true in the picture we have to be able to see “into” the picture. This in turn presupposes that we have to be able to separate the coordinates of the picture space from those of the visual space. Since in non-Cubistic painting the coordinates of the picture space are not totally shown in the picture (except as implied by the standards of trompe-l’oeil phenomenalism), we do not exactly see what is true in the picture unless we conceive it, that is to say, interpret it by using our conceptual capacity. Therefore, it is more than natural, from the point of view of the semantics of pictorial representation, to ask: how can pictorial representation be reformed in such a way that the doubt as to what is true in the picture is minimised? Obviously this is to opt for getting (f)A as close to [f]A as possible. This option adopted by the Cubists we call the

14. For a wider discussion see (Pitkänen 1981).
extensionalisation\textsuperscript{15} of (RR); it runs as:

\[(E/RR) \quad (f)A \cong [f]A.\]

If we are right in stating (E/RR) to be one of the central ideas in Cubism, then we can ascribe at least one possible sense of ‘realism’ to Cubism: the more extensionally something is painted, the more realistically it is represented. This is to say that already in their early “analytic” period the Cubists tried to make the intensional elements of spatiality as extensional as possible. But in order to do so, they had to show what intensional ingredients were involved when a three-dimensional object was painted on a two-dimensional canvas. They had to make the audience see that when they looked at a picture they in fact used a substantial amount of spatial and other conceptual resources (intensional ingredients) in order to transform the configurations on the surface of the canvas into a picture. By doing so, the Cubists made people see what representational tools were actually used in the paintings; at the same time the Cubists persuaded the viewers to realise how we actually think of things when we see them. The ‘what’ in the picture was represented as the object of thinking, not only as the object of phenomenal perception.\textsuperscript{16} From the point of view of identifiability of things this means that in order to specify the ‘what’ of a thing in the picture space, it is not enough to show the phenomenal data of the thing. It is necessary to show the whole conceptual framework that makes the thing what it is.\textsuperscript{17} If this task would be considered to complete by showing the whole extension, of a tree for example, in a naturalistic way, it would be a tremendous work:

To paint these trees [pointing to the trees in the Avenue de Messine] with all their leaves, one would have to put the whole of the Chinese population to work for a thousand years. It is essential that the world we see is nothing. (Picasso according to Kahnweiler 1957 / PA 1972, p. 163).

Consequently, naturalistic tools of expressing the whole conceptual content of a picture will not do; subjects have to be painted in another way. By pursuing (E/RR) the Cubists, almost paradoxically, were turning the pictorial language into an extensionally explicit conceptual language, even into a symbol-lan-

\textsuperscript{15} Compare a parallel process in setting up a legal text: you try to make a legal norm cover a case extensionally as well as possible.

\textsuperscript{16} Picasso: “I paint this way, because it’s a result of my thought” (Seckler 1945 / PA 1972, p. 137).

\textsuperscript{17} Picasso: “To see a thing you have to see all of it” (Trombadori 1964 / PA 1972, p. 108).
guage. This is a very remarkable observation. It reveals the new and deep sense of realism in Cubism: What all has to be shown in the picture to make the representation more realistic than is the case when an object is painted in a non-Cubist way? We will turn to this topic in section 10. The deep structure of realism can be clarified to some extent by exploring the views of thinking and representation evoked by Husserl and Wittgenstein.

7. Calling Aid From Husserl and Wittgenstein

Hintikka states that we can profile Cubism to some extent as the “art of noemata”. It turns out that this suggestion offers an ingenious key to understanding Cubism. Let us observe how it happens. In Husserl’s phenomenology, the crucial distinction is between the conceptual tool (noema) for reaching the object and the external object itself. By applying noema we rely on something that we expect to hold for the object. This is to say that we treat the things in the world, not purely as they are given to us in perception (as phaenomena), but as they are represented to our understanding (as noemata). Our mind is intentionally directed towards the objects through noemata, which sum up what we expect the objects to be. Thus intentionality, “directedness” toward objects, is equated with noemata. This is a well-known common good of phenomenology. What is not widely acknowledged is the following: Husserl’s “inten-tionality” is nothing less than inten-sionality in general. Since noemata, as tools of thinking, can be understood as tools of representing external things to the mind, they resemble semantic tools, viz., the meaning of terms or concepts (intensions) which represent things. For Husserl this seems to produce serious trouble, when he tries to show that we can in fact define noemata by using the method of “eidetic reduction”. The dilemma is similar to the one revealed by the question of whether we can describe or define meanings. Accordingly, connected to that problem, a certain effort for a positive solution can be detected in the background of Cubism. If Cubism is the “art of noemata”, the crucial question will be whether we can express noemata by painting. What

18. In phenomenology it is admitted that intentions [with ‘t’] can be assimilated with noemata. If noemata are equal to intensions [with ‘s’] we are allowed to assimilate inten-tions with inten-sions. This would yield an argument for linking what the Cubists say of intentions and what Husserl has in mind in speaking about noemata.


20. There are in fact two basic and opposing answers given to this question: according to the first one we cannot do this because we are always already inside the language, therefore, we
would it mean to paint *noemata*?

The simple answer is precisely the one already given in this paper: we can paint a *noema* by not only painting a picture of the phenomenal object, but also by painting the very *recipe* of how we are going to represent the object as conceived. This recipe is not achieved by painting only what we perceive in a single perception, but by trying to paint what is presupposed when we *think* about the object. This means to assimilate *noemata* with concepts and concepts with recipes. Now, what is this kind of an assimilation? The simple answer is that we must give the meaning conditions, that is, the semantic conditions, of a pictorial representation.

Here further questions appear: (1) How can one paint a recipe? (2) What different sorts of recipes are there? And close to this latter question: Are there any necessary limits on the elements of a recipe? When are we completely acquainted with it? The answer to the first question links Cubism to semantics, *viz.*, to the Wittgensteinian distinction between “showing” and “saying”. The answer to the second reveals the essential nature of “synthetic” Cubism and its close resemblance to the phenomenological method, even success thereupon. Let us deal with these questions in this order.

8. Painting as “Showing”

Wittgenstein who in one characterisation was “a semantician without semantics” did not believe that we could explicate semantical (representational) relations except by giving an example of how a “language game” is played. Philosophy can only “show” semantical relations but can not explicitly define them or “say” them. This view is partly due to Wittgenstein’s conviction that a language game is prior to its linguistic explication. Consequently, when a language game is “shown” by a given example, everything is done that is needed in philosophy; the semantical analysis “leaves everything as it is” (see Wittgenstein 1963, I, sect. 124). It would take us too far to explain how we could in fact define (“say”) semantical links between language and the world, and how Wittgenstein, hermeneutics, deconstructivism and several

cannot define meanings *in* a language. This view is called “Logic and Language as Universal Medium”. The other answer is called “The Calculus View”. According to this view the non-logical terms of any language are always reinterpretable. This allows so-called Possible Worlds Semantics. The former view instead supports the “ineffability thesis” according to which the semantics for natural language is undefinable (see Kusch 1989).
other representatives of linguistic philosophy could be criticised at this point by relying on possible world semantics. It suffices to point out here that for turning “showing” into “saying” it is enough that we can explicate the function available from the language game. Since this function equals the recipe we mentioned above and since the function can be explicated separately from the game, it is in fact possible to “say” meanings.\(^\text{21}\)

In logic we customarily make a distinction between \textit{using} an expression and \textit{mentioning} it. When we use an expression we speak of a world in the first order sense. When we mention an expression we speak about its representational ties as from a metalevel point of view; for this point of view the term is normally put into inverted commas to show that now we are considering the representational (semantical) ties between the term and world. This metalevel activity concerns the set up of the meaning of the term, not directly an assertion about the world. Accordingly, if someone is in a position to see visually, not only what is there in the picture, but also how he should, by painting, represent what is in the picture as, e.g., spatially understood, he or she is not only seeing something in the picture but also how the representational ties must be set up in order to describe what is in the picture in its actual substantiality. Therefore, his point of view is not only that of a first order, but also that of a metalevel determination. In this sense he or she is “saying”, defining that is, the representational conditions for a certain language/pictorial use. This gives us a clue to interpret the quotation of the title of our article: according to Picasso we have to really see (“say”) in the picture how a ‘nude’ (a configuration) is to be made in order that we conceive what it is to be a nude (the real thing).\(^\text{22}\) But in order for us to see this, the very same thing has to be shown in the picture.

\(^{21}\) The basic problem here tackles Tarski’s truth definition: ‘p’ is true if and only if p, where ‘p’ is the name of p, and p is taken as implying an interpretation function on a set of possible worlds, on a \textit{model} that is. If (E/RR) holds, then it can be proved that in a Cubistic painting this model is always more definite than the model for a naturalistic painting.

\(^{22}\) Wittgenstein thought that saying cannot be completed, except by letting the linguistic expressions be as they are within a certain language game. Thus he renounced the explicit metalinguage considerations. In his early view language was to be approached as a sort of picture. Linguistic meaning is explained on the basis of isomorphic picture-relation. How the picture is made can be seen in the picture but it cannot be defined from outside. Even later Wittgenstein held the conviction that basic semantical relations could not be defined in the language itself. They could only be “shown” by giving examples of how a language game is played. In this sense Wittgenstein never gave up the “mirroring” idea of language, in other words, how its semantical relationships “show” themselves in using the language.
There are very good reasons to claim that the representational ties between a picture and what it is a picture of, or the semantical ties between a linguistic expression and its subject, are closely parallel. This means that if the semantical ties are not set up with constant, permanent ties, but rather with game-like ties based on human practices, then in the same vein the representational ties in pictures are set up by the “game” the painter uses and the seer is prompted by. In this sense pictures can be taken as “examples” of how a representational game is played in painting. In doing this we see that Cubistic paintings involve a bit more than being mere examples of “showing” and “leaving everything as it is”. Clearly, in terms of “saying” and “showing”, they purport to say the conditions of pictorial representation in each case. However, at the same time, they very much resemble the Wittgensteinian approach because the only way they can perform the “saying” is to literally show the representational conditions via painting. We should then ask which is at stake, “showing” or “saying”?

For Wittgenstein it is an example of a language-game that shows the representational relationships between language and the world; for Picasso those relationships are shown by making it explicit in the picture how the pictorial representation is set up. This is actually very much the same as what Wittgenstein was doing in trying to get us understand meanings by showing examples of certain language practices. But precisely in doing this he always introduced a number of verbal points in order to make the example to show its own semantical settings. Therefore, we suggest that taking any of the Wittgensteinian examples together with the auxiliary points he made we get a similar procedure as what the Cubists did: a picture says its representational settings by showing them in the very same picture. Consequently, what we actually see in the Cubist picture is the interaction between first order representation (showing) and metalevel determination (saying). It is this which comes very close to the paradoxical Wittgensteinian “semantics without semantics”. The oddity often linked to Wittgenstein’s philosophical points is of the same family as the oddity of Cubist paintings seen from a phenomenal point of view. This deserves an additional remark.

The more a Cubist painter can show of saying-determinants, the less there is a correspondence between, on the one hand, how one visually sees an object in perception, and, on the other hand, how one sees it in the picture. This is due to the actual difference between seeing visually the configuration on the canvas and seeing visually the original object. However, at the same time, the more the Cubist painter can show the conditions of pictorial representation in
the picture, the more there is a correspondence between how one is supposed to conceive the object and what one sees in the picture. This goes nicely for (E/RR) because in front of a Cubistic painting we are led to conceive the real thing by seeing visually the conditions of conceiving. Thus, ‘showing’ in Cubism amounts to this: the Cubist painter simply tries to help us to see visually the recipe used to represent an object pictorially. But this, obviously, is not merely ‘showing’ in the Wittgensteinian sense; it is also ‘saying’ since the conditions of pictorial representations are made visible. Let us see whether we can find any textual evidence concerning the interplay between “saying” and “showing”.

9. “Saying” in Cubism?

Picasso seems to have been uneasy about his “saying”. He admits that the intention, implying the conceptual framework for representation, cannot be painted.

On the other hand, there are numerous expressions in which Picasso uses the word ‘say’ somewhat startlingly. He asserts for example:

I want to say the nude. I do not want to do a nude as a nude. I want only to say breast, say foot, say hand or belly. To find a way to say it – that’s enough.

I don’t want to paint the nude from head to foot, but succeed in saying. That’s what I want. (See Parmelin 1965, pp. 15-16 / PA 1972, p. 101).

There is obviously a distinction between “saying” and “doing” in Picasso’s thinking. His mysterious ‘saying’ begins to make more sense when we hear Picasso explain:

We must find the way to paint the nude as she is [italics in original]. We must enable the viewer to paint the nude himself with his eyes. … We must see to it that the man looking at the picture has at hand everything he needs to paint a nude [italics added]. … What I should like to do is paint Woman as she is, or your head as it is … And that’s what I’ve got to do. (Parmelin 1965, pp. 15-16 / PA 1972, p. 101; Parmelin 1969, p. 114 / PA 1972, p. 101).

23. Compare quote, p. 59 above (Picasso according to Kanweiler 1957 / PA 1972, p. 163). Picasso confirms the link by saying: “Braque always said that the only thing that counts, in painting, is the intention,” … ”and it’s true. … in, … what was important is what one wanted to do, the intention one had. And that one cannot paint.” [Italics are Picasso’s according to Parmelin’s report.] (See Parmelin 1965 / PA 1972, p. 32).

24. The italics here are Picasso’s own emphasis, at least according to Parmelin’s quotation.

25. In many other places Picasso speaks about his painting as “writing” or as “inscription” in...
Here one begins to see, we hope, both the width of the Cubistic semantical
discovery and the depth of Hintikka’s comparison between Cubism and phe-
nomenology: A Cubist paints things “as they are” when he shows to the viewer
as much as he can of the tools of representation. “I paint this way because
it’s the result of my thought” (Seckler 1945 / PA 1972, p. 137; italics added).
Showing the tools of representation is explicating the semantics of pictorial
representation. Thus, to “do” a nude is to paint a nude superficially, to “say”
the nude is to express the nude in its “nudity”; it is like telling a story about
what it is to be a nude; telling that story in such a way that the listener can
pick up a recipe or instruction for “fabricating” a nude as she is in her actual
reality. This is simply that a seer has “at hand everything he needs to paint
a nude,” that he masters a singular concept of a nude. Therefore, the basic
meaning problems for pictorial representation are the same as they are for
linguistic meaning. In the end they concern “saying”: how to define meaning
relations in such a way that others can grasp the criteria of meaning? Similarly:
how to define the meaning relations, for example in the case of a nude, with
the help of the tools of pictorial representation in such a way that the viewer
will conceive what a nude is? To help the spectator to literally see this is what
“saying” is in Cubism.

Picasso confirms this by explaining how he understands “resemblance” be-
tween the painting and the object: “I always aim at the resemblance. An artist
should observe nature but never confuse it with painting. It is only translatable
into painting by signs” (Brassaï 1966, p. 162 / PA 1972, p. 67). ‘Sign’ is here
clearly taken as an alphabet for the language of art; it is something which can
bear on the “symbolic”, that is, on the meaning relation. Picasso also refers in
this context to “conventional” and “photographic” likeness as being only “a
However, the meaning of ‘symbolic’ is most important for Picasso.

Art is language of symbols. When I pronounce the word ‘man’, I call up a
picture of man; the word has become the symbol of man. It does not represent
as photography could. Two holes – that’s the symbol for the face, enough to
evoke it without representing it. … But isn’t it strange that it can be done

the style of Chinese or as “symbols”; “After all, the arts are all the same; you can write a picture
in words just as you can paint sensations in a poem”; “If I were born Chinese, I would not be
a painter but a writer. I’d write my pictures”. [Picasso’s italics according to Roy 1956, p. 112
/ PA 1972, p. 131].
through such simple means? Two holes: that’s abstract enough if you consider
the *complexity* of man. … Whatever is most abstract may perhaps be the sum-
mit of reality. (*Brassaï* 1966, p. 162 / *PA* 1972, p. 68.; *italics added*).\textsuperscript{26}

There could hardly be clearer evidence for maintaining that Picasso is here
speaking about *internal*, that is, *meaning relation* between a picture and what it
represents: making visible this very relation (“symbolic” relation) is “saying”.
Internal meaning relations are based on how we *conceive* things, not how we
see them visually. Furthermore, it is very important to realise that conceiving
presupposes that one masters what we can call the picture-aspect (*Pitkänen*
1980, pp. 150-170). The *picture-aspect* is the ability to take a picture as a picture
of something. But this aspect can vary being more or less symbolic, that, e.g.,
“two holes” are set up to represent a man. Accordingly, in order to understand
a Cubist painting correctly, one has to grasp how the painter has constructed
the fundaments of the picture-aspect, that is to say, the tools and framework of
representation. The framework of representation is not exactly the same as the
picture-aspect since we can take something as a picture without understanding
what it is a picture of. However, the framework of representation is an aspect
in the sense that it is a partial representation of a thing. Now, to explicate *that*
aspect is like telling the viewer what categorical tools, concepts and postulates
you are going to use in order to “say” the conditions of the representation in
question. Hereby we have an answer to the first question: to paint a recipe is to
visualise the “saying”. It was a central Cubist trend to turn a pictorial scene into
a symbolic representation, painting a picture into “saying” a sentence. This is
very much the same as what Wittgenstein was doing in his *Tractatus*. Question
two however remains. What elements can be used to constitute a recipe?

\textbf{10. What is ‘Synthetic’ in Cubism?}

There are two intertwined topics to be taken up in order to get to grips with
the answer to second question, which concerned what different sorts of recipes
there could be. In our view the answer is to be found by clarifying the dialectical
tension between the supply of conditions of representation and the status of the
painter in this dialectical process. We have said so far that in the “analytic”
period of Cubism the emphasis on how to represent objects conceivably was
in the immediate spatial and physical coordinates of the objects. We will now
discuss what seems to extend this emphasis during the “synthetic” period.

26. The word ‘complexity’ betrays a huge number of intensional ingredients involved in any
simple (= “two holes”) “symbolic” (= meaning) relation. It is important to realise that Picasso
“Synthetic” Cubism emerged from the increasing awareness that there was no obligation for the Cubist painter to ignore other sides of reality than the physical one; reality can be considered from whatever point of view. “In art there is room for all possibilities,” said Picasso (Del Pomar 1932, p. 118 / PA 1972, p. 121). Objects can be seen, not only from different spatial aspects, but also as being linked to many other meaning-providing categories as well. With the help of the appropriate tools the Cubist painter constructs the pictorial space, not only as a physical space (as in “analytic” Cubism), but also as an extended logical “space” for bringing to the fore some extended tools of pictorial representation. The basic question remains: what has to be fulfilled in order, not only to identify the individual material objects by their material determinants, but to express whatever information is conveyed by the picture in its proper meaning-creating aspect?

Logically speaking, the question concerns whether pictures are extended from pictures of objects to pictorial propositions. The synthetic aspect of Cubist paintings then goes along with the effort to “say”, not only how things have to be understood in pictures, but also what propositional information is transmitted. That pictures are not only atomic, but also complex propositions is probably one of the most interesting features of Cubist art; it is the core of synthesis. What, then, are the limits for representing an object realistically or even essentially in Cubist synthesis?

It seems that the Cubists developed a moderately tolerant attitude, in that the meaning-giving categories attached to objects may vary considerably. Consequently, like concerning conceptualisations, there is often no final telling, which of the all possible meaning aspects is the most convenient. However, it is clear that to identify an object, a nude, a violin, an emotionally-tense situation, or whatever, relying on what we think of it, is to transcend what we perceive; it is to conceive the object under all the aspects we can grasp it in uses the word ‘symbol’ in two different senses: non-representatively (as in “My work is not symbolic, ... only the Guernica mural is symbolic”) and representatively (as above). In the former sense Picasso says: “It isn’t up to the painter to create the symbols; otherwise, it would be better if he wrote them out in so many words instead of painting them” (see Barr 1947 / PA 1972, p. 155). Typically there is a surface inconsistency in Picasso’s utterances: “My work is not symbolic” (Seckler 1945 / PA 1972, p. 137); “In painting everything is sign” (see Jakovsky 1946 / PA 1972, p. 98); “I certainly did not intend to paint symbols, I simply painted images...” (Vallentin 1957 / PA 1972, p. 97).
its real being. As every statement is a partial representation of reality, likewise every Cubist picture tends to become a complex but partial proposition about the world. It is this non-atomic nature of Cubist paintings as propositions, which leaves them open for multifarious realism. Still, even when you have to choose your simultaneous points of view for a complex representation, reality itself has not vanished. Despite their tolerance in representations the Cubists never denied reality.

Now we see immediately that the role of the artist comes to the fore. As a free agent the artist determines which traits of the object are worthy of consideration and what story is to be told. The aspect of the substantiality of an object may change according to the painter’s will to emphasise something in the object. The painter is free to pinpoint the traits he considers to be realistic. He or she can choose whatever recipe he or she wants to use, while trying to give the identity conditions for any subject he or she confronts. But in no way does it follow that the painter is allowed to forget or hide the conditions of representation. In explaining how the paper is wrapped for representing one of the cut metal sculptures Picasso says:

> It’s a chair, and you see that it is an explanation of Cubism! Imagine a chair passed under the rollers of a compressor – it would turn out just about like that. (Prejger 1961, p. 29 / PA 1972, p. 63).

Thus, in addition to the identity conditions there is a story. Furthermore, explaining his famous sculpture of a bull, made of an old bicycle, he says: “It’s the same bull only seen in a different way.” The point is that in describing reality a painter always has to “say” the conditions by “showing” them; it does not matter which tools of “showing” are used.

Likewise, there is no restriction whatsoever concerning the ontology of entities. In this sense “anything goes”, as Picasso once insinuated. He continued ambiguously: “Where things [as possible objects for a painter] are concerned there are no class distinctions” (cf. Zervos 1935 / PA 1972, p. 51), probably

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27. This can be detected also from Picasso’s prising Velazquez’ Las Meninas: “What realism” (Kahnweiler 1955 / PA 1972, p. 170). The conditions of representation may also be historical or chronological having an affinity to Leibnizian metaphysics. See Picasso’s resolution about Michelangelo’s Last Judgement (PA 1972, p. 170).
hinting at his aversion to any idea of ontologically devaluated “class struggle”. The interest of the painter might be directed to empirical or fictitious objects, violins as well as Minotaurs. Religious subjects were perhaps not specifically favoured by Picasso, but not excluded either.

However, we should not be misled here; there is a sense in which “anything goes” does not apply. If what we said about “saying” is true, then obviously the Cubists did not support postmodern thinking so that the process of interpretation of a picture would be totally arbitrary. On the contrary, they wanted to point out that “seeing into” a picture entails conceiving the picture as a picture of a real thing. This, undoubtedly, presupposes that the seer uses the notion of a picture, that is, the seer realises that the picture-aspect is what distinguishes the picture from the mere configuration on the canvas. Moreover, to become aware of this is to implement all those tools which we need in order to conceive what is in the picture. According to Picasso conceiving is thus not merely interpreting a configuration as something in the sense of “seeing as”. It is interpretation, to be sure, but always bringing to the fore the tools needed to conceive the real object.

There is no other point of departure than reality. … What I have to do is to utilize as best I can the ideas which objects suggest to me … my painting will interpret things in an entirely different manner [than someone else would do]; Fundamentally one always interprets the real, and everything is grist to the artist’s mill. Everything is a starting point. (Souchère 1960, pp. 5-6 / PA 1972, p. 43).

Thus, the recipes can vary. It is important, however, that whatever recipe an artist chooses, he or she does not arbitrarily make up the recipe; rather, as in a “laboratory” an artist experiments. Such an experiment is perhaps led by “inventing” the material tools, but it is a discovery in the sense of finding the appropriate tools to expressing the truth. The bipolarity of an artist’s free construction of tools and their application for our conceiving we found already in Gris’ “deductive method” is thus verified.

28. Political propaganda was the only topic Picasso refused to paint. (See Seckler 1945 / PA 1972, p. 140).
29. “I have discovered many methods of expression” (Del Pomar 1932, p. 125 / PA 1972, p. 98).
30. “A painter’s atelier should be a laboratory. One doesn’t do a monkey’s job here; one invents. Painting is a jeu d’esprit” (Warnod 1945 / PA 1972, p. 51). Compare: “I like discovering too
11. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have examined the nature of the alleged realism of Cubism. We started by referring to the unsatisfactory characterisations of the so-called analytic and synthetic periods of Cubism. In our view, a fruitful clue for at least a philosophically better understanding of Cubism was found in connecting the efforts of the Cubists to the aims of phenomenology and semantics. For the Cubists there appeared a parallelism to these aims when they tried to create a method of showing the intensional (conceptual) elements of the picture in the picture itself. Philosophically this entailed a close connection to the problems of intensionality and “inner truth”. Furthermore, we tried to show that the efforts of the Cubists can be seen in the light of the Wittgensteinian distinction between “showing” and “saying”. Realising a parallelism in this connection reveals the specific contribution of the Cubists, viz., their explicit assimilation of “saying” and “showing” by making visually explicit the conceptual conditions concerning the subject of a painting.

We hope that our discussion in this paper justifies the view that, seen from a philosophical point of view, Cubism is not only an artistic school in the stylistic sense, but also a reformation of the artistic language of representation. This conclusion is not trivial. It does not rest on the argument according to which every artistic movement, in so far as artistic expression is concerned, is an example of a reform of some sort. Cubism is not like that. As in literature, not every literary style is a paradigm shift in the history of literature. However, such shifts occur. In art, Cubism was one. It brought to the fore what is perhaps the most profound feature in the language of art: that art can be a realistic representation of the world despite the fact that the tools of representation are “man-made”. That the best of the Cubist painters, most notably Picasso, achieved marvellous results enabling us to really see how to conceive certain objects in their real substantiality, is perhaps best evidenced by the fantastic “likeness” observable in most of his portraits. It is sometimes quite easy to recognise the subject of the painting, even when the visual likeness is far removed from it. The reason behind this is clear: we always recognise objects on the basis of their intensional features which greatly transgress the sense data we have of them. By trying to paint a picture in such a way that the seer can literally grasp

much” (Georges-Michel 1965, p. 100 / PA 1972, p. 52). Picasso also refers to pictorial metaphors by saying that one could paint “a swan in the scorpions manner” (see Bell 1936, p. 533 / PA 1972, p. 128).
the rules which express the relevant intensional features, significant for the painter’s aims, the Cubists turned intensions into extensions [(our (E/RR)) thus, not so much changing the classical idea of art as an representative enterprise, as deepening the idea of the dynamics of pictorial representation.

Marián Arribas-Tomé
Language, Linguistics and Translation Studies
University of East Anglia
mayomay03@yahoo.co.uk

Heikki Kirjavainen
Department of Systematic Theology
University of Helsinki
heikki.v.kirjavainen@helsinki.fi

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