"Japan Still Has Cadres Remaining":

Japanese in the USSR and China from World War II to Cold War, 1945-1956[1]

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Hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians, soldiers, and prisoners of war (POWs) were detained or living in the Soviet Union and Communist-controlled parts of China in the turbulent decade from the end of World War II to the early years of the Cold War. But there were significant differences in how Soviet and Chinese authorities made use of, communicated with, and conceptualized the Japanese under their control. The Soviet Union treated Japanese internees with a higher degree of neglect and mistrust, and employed them as a mass labor force on large-scale Soviet infrastructure and industrial projects. In contrast, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was far more magnanimous in its treatment, valuing the Japanese POWs and civilians for their skilled labor and military contribution to the Chinese civil war, and using them as a means of demonstrating the CCP's credentials as an effective and legitimate governing party. The way in which Japanese were treated by the CCP and Soviet Union offers an innovative means of comparing how these communist nations differently navigated the changing international order from WWII to Cold War. In so doing, we find that CCP and Soviet policies towards the Japanese during this decade were shaped less by ideological alignment or the formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1950, and more by the legacies of East Asia's recent wars: the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), WWII, and the Chinese civil war (1946-1949).

The very fact of these differences in Chinese and Soviet conceptions and treatment of Japanese

under their control is puzzling from the perspective of the existing literature on attitudes toward Japan within the wider Sino-Soviet relationship. This literature emphasizes *similarities* in the policies of these two communist states toward Japan, and argues that *shared* anti-Japanese sentiment helped to bind the CCP and the Soviet Union as new allies in the unfolding Cold War. David Wolff, for instance, suggests that shared enmity toward Japan helped to coordinate negotiations between Stalin and Mao in 1949-1950.[2] Similarly, Adam Cathcart and Patricia Nash show that the two communist states "stoked" hostility toward Japanese war criminals as a means of demonstrating Sino-Soviet solidarity and building domestic Chinese support for the new Sino-Soviet alliance.[3]

In this article we come to an alternative conclusion that instead emphasizes *differences* in Soviet and CCP conceptions and treatment of the Japanese in their territories. We reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, this article takes an explicitly comparative approach, studying how the Soviet Union and CCP each managed the welfare and day-to-day lives of the Japanese, the methods of propaganda they adopted to instill key messages among their charges, and how the two authorities dealt with the question of repatriation. While an extensive literature has explored separately the Japanese experience in either the Soviet Union or China, few have directly compared how the two communist allies dealt with the Japanese under their control.[4] To take this comparative approach, we draw on a range of Soviet, Chinese and Japanese sources, including new materials from the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, and survivor memoirs of Japanese interned in both the Soviet Union and China. We also consult American and British archives from the period to locate the problem in broader international contexts. To the best of our knowledge, currently available Chinese and Soviet archives provide only glimpses of direct discussion between the CCP and Soviet Union about how to deal with the issue of postwar Japan, and the thousands

of Japanese in territories under their control.[5] Subsequently, we adopt an approach that compares and contrasts CCP and Soviet policies, attitudes and behavior toward these Japanese. While Japanese memoirs provide valuable source material about the day-to-day experiences of internment, in their majority they tend to portray the Japanese subjects as victims of (in particular) Soviet brutality, and often fail to recognize Japan's own imperial role in China and elsewhere in Asia.[6] Where possible, we therefore triangulate these Japanese sources with surveys and other reports produced by the Soviet and Chinese authorities. Relations between the communist parties of the three countries, while important, are not directly relevant to the topic of this article and so are not examined here.

The second reason to emphasize differences is in the article's temporal focus that connects the end of WWII in September 1945, to the immediate resumption of the Chinese civil war between the CCP and Nationalist government, to the onset and early years of the Cold War in Asia, concluding in 1956 with the end of Japanese internment in the Soviet Union. Examining this continuous eleven-year period reveals how distinct circumstances in China and the Soviet Union, and their discrete pathways from WWII to Cold War, produced different conceptions of, and approaches toward, Japanese under their control and, by extension, postwar Japan. This article therefore emphasizes not ruptures but rather continuities that bridge world war and Cold War, and highlights the complex negotiations between superpowers and other nations, in which Japanese often served as bargaining chips or vehicles of propaganda. By expanding our temporal focus, we show that the early Cold War in East Asia did not represent a neat division between two ideological or geopolitical camps, but was instead a fluid period in which the contours of the new international order had yet to be settled. Comparing Soviet and CCP treatment of the Japanese allows us to observe the uncertain and unsettled period of the early Cold War in East Asia, and the ways in which it was embedded in East Asia's recent wars.

This comparison reveals a new layer in the Sino-Soviet-Japanese triangle where historical and regional realities and relationships often trumped ideological alliances. In what follows, we integrate this comparative and chronological approach to explore Soviet and CCP treatment of Japanese over four discrete periods between 1945 and 1956.

The World at War's end

More than 6.5 million Japanese military personnel and civilians were based in Japanese colonies and occupied regions around Asia at the end of World War II.[7] How to unravel the vast Japanese empire became a matter of pressing concern for the governments of the Allied forces. In the wartime conferences at Cairo (1943), Yalta (1945) and Potsdam (1945), the leaders of the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and the Republic of China made plans for the winding back of Japan's colonies and the repatriation of millions of Japanese come the end of the war.[8] The Allied governments were concerned not only with ensuring that Japan was effectively demobilized and demilitarized, but also with preventing the mass slaughter of Japanese nationals by their erstwhile colonial subjects.[9] As the war drew to a close in the late summer of 1945, millions of Japanese nationals were repatriated to Japan from colonies in China, Korea, Taiwan and Southeast Asia.[10] Yet the repatriation process was complicated and delayed by three factors that changed the fate of hundreds of thousands of Japanese nationals: first, the Soviet Union's late entry into the war against Japan in August 1945; second, the resumption of the civil war between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists in April 1946; and third, the gradual erosion of wartime allied solidarity and its replacement by Cold War adversarial relations between the United States, Soviet Union, and the newly established (in 1949) People's Republic of China.

In August 1945, the Soviet Red Army engaged in a short but highly destructive war against the

Imperial Japanese Army in the puppet-state of Manchukuo, Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. Soviet reports estimate that more than 80,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians were killed by the Red Army, with tens of thousands more fleeing to the Korean peninsula as refugees.[11] On August 23, just three days after the Kwantung Army agreed the terms of its surrender with the Soviet leadership, Josif Stalin, in his capacity as Chairman of the Soviet State Defense Committee, signed a secret decree entitled "On Receiving and Accommodating the Japanese Army Prisoners of War and Utilizing Them for Labor."[12] This decree initiated a process of detaining, at the final count, a total of over 600,000 Japanese nationals and forcibly removing them to labor camps in Siberia and other parts of the Soviet Union.[13] This number included soldiers of the Japanese Kwantung Army, officials who had served in Japan's Manchukuo government, military-age men who had been called up from Japanese settler communities in Northeast China in the late stages of the war, and civilians employed by the military and the South Manchuria Railway.[14]

Day-to-day life for most Japanese in Soviet camps was defined by physically demanding labor, extreme cold, and hunger, three themes that formed "the Siberian trinity of suffering" in the Japanese recollections of the period. For example, internee Iitsuka Toshio recalled how he spent his days trying to meet the daily work quota of digging one cubic metre of earth. However, the Siberian soil was so hard and stony that "it was impossible to complete one day's work even in a week."[15] Sawatari Hideo faced the far more dangerous job of felling and sawing trees. Though he survived the ordeal, many others did not, and Sawatari's memoir provides an account of the illness and death caused by this and other forms of hard labor. Felling trees was, in his words, a job that caused internees to die "one after another."[16] Moreover, despite the hard manual labor they performed, the food rations the Japanese received were hardly sufficient, especially during the first two years of the internment when the food situation in the Soviet

Union was disastrous. The typical daily diet consisted of black bread, a bowl of *balanda*, or thin soup made with cabbage, grain and other cheap ingredients, and a mug of thin tea. In this respect, Iitsuka's memoir is representative of many internee recollections about food, which "was the foremost matter of concern of our lives in Siberia." Because both its quality and quantity were extremely poor during the first months of captivity, the internees often ate "whatever they could find." Many died from eating poisonous mushrooms and herbs until camp authorities banned gathering wild food. While at most camps internees received a daily ration of 100 grams of meat, it was often not meat they fished out of their soup bowls. It was not unusual to find "goats' feet, hooves, [fragments of animal] heads chopped up with an axe. I can imagine the genuine surprise of somebody who found a goat's eyeball in his soup," wrote Iitsuka.[17]

Ultimately, however, it was the harsh and unfamiliar Siberian climate and the shortage of adequate quarters and clothing that most contributed to the day-to-day suffering of the Japanese in the Soviet labor camps in the early years of internment. During the first winter, close to 10,000 Japanese internees died of cold, bad sanitation and illness, onerous working conditions, and a lack of food and clothing suitable for the climate.[18] To the internees' (and their captors') bad luck, the winter of 1945-46 was one of the coldest on record. More than 7,300 internees died in December 1945 and January 1946 alone, while a further 25,000 became ill and unable to work.[19] In a February 1946 dispatch addressed to the Deputy Premier Lavrentii Beria on "Receiving and Accommodating Japanese POWs in the Soviet Union," the People's Commissar (Minister) of the Interior Sergei Kruglov reported that of around 300,000 POWs who had been medically examined, 19.5% were "weakened" and 5.9% were ill. Furthermore, about a third (29.7%) of all internees suffered from marasmus – severe malnutrition caused by the deficiency of proteins in the body. Kruglov candidly outlined the reasons for the high

number of deaths and illnesses: “insufficient daily food quotas, which do not compensate for the energy spent, especially for the POWs working at physically demanding duties in severe environmental conditions.”[20]

The bitter experience Japanese POWs faced in Soviet labor camps was primarily the product of economic and climatic conditions beyond the control of Soviet authorities, but it also resulted from labor mismanagement and shortages in the USSR. In the 1930s under Stalin, the Soviet Union had expanded the system of employing prisoners in forced labor camps, better known by the shorthand “Gulag,” for the Soviet government agency that administered the camps.[21] For the camp chiefs, the foreign captives’ most immediate role was to provide labor; the mission of Lavrentii Beria, Kruglov's predecessor as interior minister, was to use them in alleviating the Soviet’s Union drastic shortage of manpower, although recent research by Russian historians has demonstrated the inefficiencies of the Soviet forced labor system for foreign POWs.[22] Paragraph 2 of the decree that initiated the internment stipulated the selection of “up to 500,000 Japanese *physically fit to work in the conditions of the Far East and Siberia.*”[23] By late 1945, the Japanese were being put to work in priority sectors of the Soviet economy where postwar reconstruction was nearly impossible without substantial human resources. Tens of thousands of Japanese worked on Soviet construction projects such as the ports of Nakhodka and Vladivostok, coalmines and lumber sites, railway construction, and in collective farms across the USSR. Perhaps the largest project to which the Japanese contributed was the Baikal-Amur Railway Mainline (BAM). 150,000 Japanese—almost one-third of the total number of Japanese initially transported to the Soviet Union—served alongside Soviet citizens in the backbreaking work of building this new railway, described later by Leonid Brezhnev as “the construction project of the century.”[24]

As early as September 1945, the Japanese government began lobbying US occupying authorities to recognize the plight of Japanese detained in the Soviet Union, and the issue quickly became caught up in growing geopolitical tensions between the two superpowers. The Soviet Union's decision to seize 600,000 Japanese in August 1945 was made just days after US President Harry Truman rejected Stalin's request to land troops on Hokkaido, Japan's northernmost island. Full archival evidence behind Stalin's decision to intern the Japanese remains unavailable, but the internment of the Japanese might well have served as Stalin's attempt to preserve a lever of influence over postwar Japan, which, unlike Germany, had fallen completely into US hands.[25] The United States was similarly determined to limit Soviet influence in Japan. Leveling criticism at the Soviet detention of Japanese in Siberia thus became a convenient way for the United States to diminish the USSR in Japanese eyes.[26] In response to US criticism, Soviet authorities started efforts to monitor and improve living and working conditions of the Japanese POWs. Between 1945 and 1947, Minister Kruglov and his deputy Vasilii Chernyshov issued numerous regulations stipulating, for instance, that local officials take care to "avoid the degradation of [the POWs'] physical condition" and that the Japanese internees receive "eight hours of uninterrupted night-time rest," and "hot meals three times a day." [27] Furthermore, after discovering the dire state of Japanese internees' health, Minister Kruglov decided that, in order "to preserve the pool of labor and to effectively utilize the POWs in industry," it was necessary to increase the daily food allowance for the "weakened" and those involved in the hardest forms of labor; to create special food quotas for the malnourished; to move POWs from Siberia and the Far East to regions with "more customary climatic conditions" (such as Soviet Central Asia); and to "free and repatriate Japanese POWs who are ill, weakened and unable to work."[28]

Yet these regulations could do little to alleviate the fact that in the early postwar months the

Soviet economy was simply not up to the task of feeding its own citizens, let alone sustaining several million POWs.[29] As reports by the Chief Officer for the Rear of Red Army Far Eastern Headquarters, Vinogradov, suggest, many camps early in the internment,

> [were] not supplied with fuel and food. Bread [was] substituted with [raw] flour. There [was] no rice, vegetables, and fats. The [detainees'] main diet consist[ed] of millet and sorghum. The incoming POWs [were often] accommodated under open skies.[30]

Ultimately, while the conditions in labor camps for Japanese were demanding, they were no worse than those faced by Soviet citizens in forced labor camps around the country.[31] Indeed, the suffering of Japanese in the USSR would not have been all that surprising were it not for the striking contrast in how China's Communist leaders dealt with the Japanese POWs and other civilians under their control.

From the Ashes of Civil War to the Creation of New China

For those Japanese nationals who had not been killed or captured by the Soviet Red Army, life in postwar China was governed by either the Chinese Nationalist government or the CCP, depending on where they happened to be living at the time of Japan's surrender. The vast majority of Japanese fell under the authority of the Nationalist government which, in the immediate aftermath of WWII, established a "Management Office for Japanese Civilians and Prisoners of War" to assist in the Allied repatriation of some three million Japanese in August-September 1946.[32] This figure included 200,000-300,000 Japanese living in the CCP-controlled parts of northern and western Manchuria at the end of the war, who had been dispatched by the CCP to the Nationalist-led repatriation sites in Harbin, Qiqihar and other major cities.[33] However, many Japanese failed to be repatriated that summer. Some slipped through the cracks because of illness, residence in remote areas of Northeast China and failure

to travel to repatriation sites, or because they were lost in the chaos of the early postwar. Other Japanese elected to remain because they now viewed China as their home, or feared what they might find in Japan.[34] The biggest disruption, however, occurred with the resumption of civil war between Communist and Nationalist forces in April 1946 (a war that had commenced in 1927, but had ceased temporarily as the two sides pursued a "united front" during the eight-year war with Japan). Tens of thousands of Japanese were intentionally "kept back" by the Nationalist government and the CCP's "Northeast Democratic Allied Forces," both of which viewed Japanese civilians and soldiers as important in rebuilding China's war-torn economy, and in boosting the ranks of their armies in the unfolding civil war.[35]

Even before the onset of the civil war, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government had recognized the need for Japanese technical expertise in helping to rebuild the major industrial sites across China that had been damaged during WWII, and in running the facilities established in Japanese-occupied regions and cities such as Manchuria, Shanghai and Tianjin. In late 1945, the Nationalists issued a set of "Temporary Regulations Concerning the Use of Japanese Personnel in China", which decreed that Japanese with particular technical expertise could be "retained" in China rather than repatriated. Subsequently, following the first major wave of repatriation in 1946, more than 90,000 Japanese remained in Nationalist-controlled parts of China, including 14,000 engineers, doctors, scientists and researchers deployed to run Chinese mines, industrial facilities, research laboratories and hospitals.[36] As the civil war escalated in late 1946 and into 1947, the Nationalist government repatriated many civilians but continued to make use of Japanese military personnel. Gillin and Etter suggest that up to 80,000 Japanese troops were operating under Nationalist military control in Manchuria until January 1947, while Nationalist-aligned warlords such as Yan Xishan skillfully used a corps of 15,000 Japanese soldiers to defend Shanxi against the Communists until 1949.[37]

In a similar turning of the tables, the CCP also shifted from fighting alongside the Nationalists against the Japanese during WWII, to fighting alongside the Japanese against Nationalist forces in the Chinese civil war. Between 8,000 and 10,000 Japanese served with the CCP during the civil war, of whom around 3,000 fought on the front line.[38] Many of these were soldiers and low-ranking officers imprisoned by the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army, the two main Communist military forces, during the War of Resistance against Japan.[39] These POWs had undergone a program of ideological "training and education" led by Nosaka Sanzō, one of the founders of the Japanese Communist Party. In 1940, Nosaka had travelled to China from the USSR to work with the CCP in establishing a series of "Japanese Workers and Peasants Schools" across China to train Japanese POWs into "revolutionary cadres" who could support the CCP's military campaign against the Imperial Japanese Army.[40] Although the majority of these Japanese POWs were sent home at the end of WWII, a "few hundred" were kept back by the CCP to train additional Japanese soldiers to fight against Nationalist forces in Northeast China.[41] In 1951, the CCP would describe these Japanese as "international class brothers" who had been "heroic in the battle against Chiang Kai-shek's forces."[42]

As the CCP consolidated its control over Northeast China in 1947 and 1948, it also began to recognize the valuable role that Japanese civilians might play in rebuilding the Northeast's economy. In addition to those Japanese civilians who had been working in CCP military units, hospitals and industrial sites since the end of WWII, thousands more Japanese who had previously been "kept back" by the Nationalists now found themselves in CCP-controlled parts of the Northeast.[43] In October 1948, the CCP therefore established the "Committee for the Management of Japanese in Northeast China" as a way of collecting information on the numbers of Japanese living in the region and managing their day-to-day lives.[44] Though

difficult to determine precise numbers, the Committee's first survey in September 1949 made a rough estimate of 34,000 Japanese living in the Northeast. Later surveys taken in 1950 and 1951, after the establishment of the PRC, revised those figures to between 20,797 and 21,063.[45] 14,026 of these worked in hospitals, industrial enterprises, and provincial and city government offices, with the majority based in the Ministry of Industry (6,883) and Northeast Railways department (2,005), and in cities such as Shenyang, Harbin, Hegang and Andong (present-day Dandong).[46]

A crucial explanation for the relatively better treatment of Japanese in China as compared to the Soviet Union was that the CCP viewed the Japanese as a particularly valuable form of skilled labor. In August 1945, the Soviet Union had seized 600,000 Japanese nationals from Northeast China, along with most of the region's valuable industrial equipment and technology, as a form of compensation for its short-lived war with Japan. Yet the Soviet authorities had left behind in Northeast China many of the most skilled Japanese technicians and industrial experts, choosing instead to detain as priorities Japanese military personnel who they deemed fit for manual labor.[47] In a country desperately short of industrial, scientific and medical expertise, CCP officials viewed these Japanese engineers, doctors, nurses and scientists—all of whom had long-term experience running the industries and public services in Japan's informal colony of Manchukuo—as vitally important in ensuring that Northeast China flourish under CCP control. Starving, exhausting through physical labor, or otherwise breaking the spirit of these Japanese would not have allowed the CCP to make use of their expertise. Instead, skilled Japanese in Northeast China received highly favorable treatment. The Committee reported that work units in the city of Shenyang, where the majority of Japanese were based, paid a total of 183,629 "fen" each month to the 108 Japanese households across the city. This worked out to around 103 fen per person, which was deemed sufficient to meet average monthly living costs

in Shenyang of around 60 fen per person.[48] But the most skilled Japanese, such as senior technicians working in the Ministry of Industry, earned up to 765 fen per month, and were thus considered "relatively well off."[49] Even those Japanese who were deeply critical of the Chinese Communists still acknowledged that the CCP had afforded good treatment toward skilled Japanese. One Japanese national, Yoshida Atsushi, who was detained by the CCP and made to work as a medical officer for the Communists during the civil war, argued that because of the Communists' dire need for technical expertise, "practically all the Japanese technicians and engineers detained by the Chinese Communists are fully employed with special good treatment [*sic*] given to technicians working in war arsenal."[50]

Perhaps even more important than skilled labor in explaining the difference in CCP and Soviet treatment of the Japanese, however, was that the CCP viewed Japanese under its authority as a marker of the Party's efficacy and legitimacy as a future governing force. Indeed, they regarded Japanese willingness to remain living in China as a sign of the success of the Communist project. Thus, using ideological work and "self-criticism" campaigns, the Committee for the Management of Japanese in Northeast China sought to improve the Japanese "state of mind" by teaching Japanese to "recognize the evil of the Japanese emperor" and "to understand U.S. imperialists' conspiracy to make Japan its colony."[51] These same officials also paid close attention to Japanese living and working conditions, studying Japanese pay rates, levels of unemployment, and quality of food. The Committee was pleased to report that conditions had improved significantly since the CCP's "liberation" of Northeast China in the autumn of 1948. Compared with the previous three to four years, Japanese employment had become "relatively secure" and they were now "mainly eating white rice" rather than sorghum.[52] Moreover, Northeast officials publicly recognized Japanese contributions to Communist military and civilian efforts during the civil war. In 1948 and 1949, more than 2,400 Japanese were

recognized as "meritorious" or "model workers" by their Chinese work units. In March 1949, for example, the PLA praised three "heroic" Japanese soldiers for their "meritorious achievement," including Tanaka Isamu of the Northeast Field Army's Seventh Column.[53] Two months later, at the Chinese May Day celebrations, the Health Unit of the Northeast Military also commended thirty-three Japanese doctors and nurses who had provided "outstanding service" in Chinese hospitals.[54] One such nurse was twenty-year-old Mochizuki, who worked at the Number 15 Hospital in Northeast China.[55] The Committee reported that when a small child came into the hospital seriously ill with tuberculosis, Mochizuki volunteered to look after the child day and night until he became well.[56] As a result of their ideological work and efforts to recognize Japan's contributions in this way, Northeast officials reported to the CCP Central Committee that the Japanese "feeling of wanting to return to Japan has subsided".[57]

While the Committee's work reports are not objective measures of the Japanese state of mind or living conditions, the reports do elicit a degree of objectivity because they also include reflections on the Committee's self-perceived failings with regard to the Japanese. For instance, Northeast officials acknowledged that the improvement in Japanese "class consciousness" had not been uniformly successful. They argued that the months between August 1945 and the end of 1946 had been a "period of despair" for many Japanese in the region; Japan had been defeated in war, they felt that there was no hope for their own futures, and many longed to return home and did not wish to work for the CCP.[58] Japanese had also been caught up in the CCP's mass mobilization and land reform political campaigns in 1947 and 1948. An unintended consequence of the confession and self-criticism meetings that accompanied the Party's ideological campaigns had been the stirring up of bad feelings between "ultra-leftist" young Japanese and older, more conservative Japanese technicians.[59] Growing unhappiness had led a group of Japanese to present a petition to CCP authorities in Harbin in August 1948 demanding

that they be allowed to return home. In response, the CCP arrested the "bad elements" who were leading the petition, "suppressed" the movement for repatriation, and attempted to dampen the ultra-leftist tendencies among young Japanese. Yet the Committee warned that these methods had been only partially successful, and that there could be further examples of "backwardness" in future.[60] Despite these exceptions, however, the CCP took much greater care than its Soviet counterparts to treat the Japanese hospitably in the years immediately following WWII. As the Chinese civil war ground to an end, and the CCP founded its new People's Republic, it would continue to use overseas Japanese as a critical plank in its efforts to demonstrate the legitimacy and success of the Communist project.

Onset of the Cold War

With the onset of the Korean War in June 1950, WWII allied goodwill was replaced by Cold War animosity between the major powers in Asia. The CCP and the Soviet Union now viewed the Japanese detained or left behind in their territories as a means to prosecute their wider goals vis-à-vis Japan. Both governments considered the US-occupied Japan as a bastion of American capitalism and imperialism in East Asia. The Soviet representatives at the Allied Council for Japan and the Far East Commission, as well as the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS), dispatched regular reports to Moscow lamenting the "mass dismissals for political purposes" of left-leaning Japanese workers, and police crackdowns and arrests of leftist political groups.[61] In China, *Xinhua* news agency and the *People's Daily* published regular articles in 1949 and 1950 condemning the US "imperialists' efforts" to turn Japan into a military base, US "interference" in the unfolding Korean War, and the policies of "terror" being implemented by MacArthur and his "running dog" Yoshida Shigeru.[62]

In this international political climate, Moscow and Beijing believed that they could use

propaganda to educate Japanese so that they might "lead the struggle" for Japan's "democracy" and "independence" upon repatriation.[63] To do so, both governments published Japanese-language newspapers and magazines and distributed them among Japanese civilians and POWs. In China, the Northeast People's Government subsidized the publication of the daily *Democracy News* (*Minshu Shimbun*), which carried translations of *People's Daily* articles about Japanese suffering under the US occupation, and notices about political activities for Japanese in the Northeast.[64] In the USSR, the newspaper was simply called the *Japan Newspaper* (*Nihon Shimbun*), established by the Red Army's Political Department and published in Khabarovsk.[65] The *Nihon Shimbun* not only introduced the rules of conduct in the camps to the Japanese POWs, but became a crucial vehicle of propaganda: justifying Soviet entry into war against Japan, pointing out injustices of the capitalist system in Japan, and criticizing the US occupation of postwar Japan.[66] It became the fulcrum of the indoctrination program in subsequent years, and "societies of friends of the newspaper" were established in camps where regular readings and discussions took place.[67]

But beyond these broad similarities, there were important differences in the two states' visions for postwar Japan and the methods of propaganda they adopted. In the USSR, propaganda toward the Japanese reflected Soviet aims of achieving a change of government in Japan and general suspicion that the country continued to pose a political and security threat to Soviet interests as a newly established US ally. Soviet officials struck a reproachful note when they instructed camp officers to use propaganda as a way to ensure that "the POWs acknowledge their responsibility for the destruction inflicted by their armies on the territory of the USSR," and "work wholeheartedly in the camps [to compensate for this destruction]."[68] It did not matter that the Japanese had never actually invaded the USSR, nor caused any destruction on Soviet territory during WWII. Apparently "destruction" referred not only to the Soviet-

Japanese War of August 1945, but stemmed as far back as Japanese victory over Russia in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, and Japan's "intervention in the Far East" between 1918-1922, when it occupied Vladivostok and other parts of the Russian Far East.[69] The sentiment expressed in Soviet propaganda toward Japanese POWs reflected official Soviet views that Japan posed "a constant threat to the Far East of the USSR," owing to its long history of aggression in Asia and the rehabilitation of its military and heavy industry under US occupation.[70]

Furthermore, Soviet officials used camp propaganda networks to conduct surveillance on and stay abreast of the day-to-day activities of the Japanese internees. A key platform in the Soviet ideological work were "anti-fascist democratic activist groups" (*aktiv*). To join the *aktiv*, Japanese internees had to demonstrate left-leaning ideological credentials. Incentives for joining the *aktiv* were numerous, from easier work assignments and better food to the highly persuasive promise of early repatriation. These privileges encouraged *aktiv* members to push the Soviet line among themselves and to inform on the fellow Japanese. Soviet camp officers demanded to be informed of the political mood within the camps, especially any "hostile" or "subversive" elements that could threaten the order in the camps.[71] Soviet documents reveal that subversive practices included not only incorrect political ideology, but also refusing to work (sabotage), or secretly campaigning against work quotas, bad food, or delays in repatriation. Those guilty of such "subversive acts" risked receiving a sentence of up to twenty-five years of hard labor in the camps.[72] Given this environment of constant surveillance, the evidence on whether these Japanese "activists" were actually converted into ideological supporters of socialism and the Soviet Union is mixed. On the one hand, the Soviet Union kept records of more than 15,000 letters written by Japanese internees who thanked the Soviet government for their "good treatment, good food, [and] exceptional humaneness," and argued

the USSR was "steadfast in its fight for the establishment of peace among the peoples of the world."[73] Soviet reports also note that once the Japanese were aboard the repatriation ships bound for Japan, they shouted: "Hurrah! Soviet Union *Banzai* (Long Live)! Comrade Stalin *Banzai*!"[74] On the other hand, Japanese memoirs written after repatriation suggest that many of these so-called anti-fascist "activists" were motivated less by ideological support for the Soviet Union than by other factors: many were "forced" by their Soviet superiors and some opportunistically hoped to achieve early repatriation.[75] Regardless of whether the Japanese were converted into "genuine antifascists" or not, the key point to elicit here is that Soviet propaganda toward the Japanese was never solely about political ideology. It also had a corrective element to it, designed to punish the Japanese for their country's past wartime atrocities, to redress the injustices inflicted on the USSR by motivating the Japanese to increase production, and to prevent Japan from posing a future threat to the Soviet Union by using the Siberian internees as vehicles for delivering pro-Soviet ideas to US-occupied Japan.

In China, rather than punishing Japanese POWs and civilians for their colonization of Manchukuo and wartime aggression in China, CCP propaganda struck a more positive note, viewing Japanese not as subversive elements as in the Soviet Union, but rather as "our allies," united in a common struggle against US imperialism.[76] This view of Japan came directly from the top CCP leadership, with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai determined to strengthen people-to-people ties with Japan in order to 'drive a wedge' between Washington and Tokyo, and to persuade the Japanese government to remove US military bases in Japan. In contrast to the Soviet emphasis on past wars with Japan, Mao and Zhou instead informed delegations of Japanese politicians, businesspeople, musicians and artists visiting China in the 1950s and 1960s that Japan need not continue apologizing for its war of aggression in China.[77] Indeed, in 1961, Mao went as far as to express gratitude for Japan's invasion of China, without which, he

argued the CCP would never have come to power.[78] Beyond high-level Japanese delegations, the CCP saw Japanese POWs and civilians as a key plank in their efforts to unite with Japan against the United States. Many Japanese in the Northeast had begun receiving letters from home containing stories of the US occupation, including the "atrocities of MacArthur's suppression of the Japanese communists." While CCP officials acknowledged that Japanese in China were not necessarily supporters of the Japanese Communist Party or of communism more generally, they recognized that growing anti-American sentiment among Japanese could be "very valuable" to the CCP in its propaganda efforts.[79] Between January-April 1950, therefore, the Committee for the Management of Japanese in Northeast China sought to harness this sentiment and installed a series of photographic exhibitions at government departments and industrial sites where large numbers of Japanese worked. The exhibitions were centred around the theme of the US occupation of Japan and, in particular, the way in which Japanese citizens and leftists had suffered under that occupation.[80] Eager to demonstrate the success of this propaganda work, the Committee reported to the Foreign Ministry in Beijing that 75,000 people had visited the exhibitions, including nearly 10,000 Japanese living and working in the region.[81]

Like the Soviet Union, the CCP did acknowledge the possibility that Japanese living in the Northeast could represent a threat to China in the unfolding Cold War. In April and May 1949, for instance, the Shenyang Public Security Bureau acknowledged that there were around 400 Japanese "reactionaries" who might be potential spies of the KMT or US government.[82] Yet the Committee's reports again illustrate how the CCP's conceptualization of overseas Japanese differed from that of the Soviet Union. In contrast to the USSR, the CCP argued that only a small minority of the Japanese in Northeast China posed any kind of threat to China.[83] Rather, the Committee argued that these "few bad elements" could be isolated, and remained optimistic

that, by using education and a more unified approach to issues of work, travel and funding restrictions, it would be possible to "transform" any adverse thinking among Japanese in Northeast China.[84]

More broadly, CCP propaganda toward Japanese differed fundamentally from Soviet propaganda because the CCP saw the "formidable task" of transforming Japanese thinking as deeply connected to the entire Japanese experience in China. Treating the Japanese "boorishly," CCP officials argued, would undermine the "prestige" of the CCP and PRC in Japanese eyes, and "jeopardize" their ability to unite with the Japanese people.[85] Instead, the CCP disseminated its propaganda via a range of Japanese-led civil society organizations that were designed not only to instil anti-imperialist ideology, but also to enhance the Japanese lived experience in China. Originating as Nosaka Sanzō's "Japanese Workers and Peasants Schools" established during WWII, by 1949 there were more than one hundred different civil society groups for Japanese in the Northeast, including twenty-four different Japanese People's New Democracy Youth Alliances and seventeen Japanese Workers Small Groups.[86] These organizations provided the Japanese with some semblance of community and cultural life. Japanese People's Associations and Cooperatives in Shenyang and Harbin held sporting events and sold food that was "suitable to Japanese tastes," while Japanese monthly magazines like *Advance* and *Learning* offered cultural articles and political writings by Japanese activists. The Committee also provided funding and textbooks for twenty-nine primary schools for 300 Japanese children in the Northeast so that they could continue their Japanese language education before entering Chinese middle schools.[87] Ultimately, the CCP believed that the Communist project would be received much more favorably if Japanese felt that their lives under Communist rule were comfortable.

The difference between the CCP and Soviet approaches in this regard is thrown into particularly stark relief when we compare how the two governments dealt with Japanese POWs. In July 1950, the Soviet Union sent 969 Japanese POWs from the Soviet Union to Fushun prison in Northeast China so that China and the Soviet Union could begin cooperating on the process of investigating and prosecuting Japanese war criminals.[88] Although the Japanese prisoners feared they would become victims of violent reprisals in Chinese jails, their experience at the Fushun prison was, in fact, far more comfortable than life in the Soviet Union. They were well-fed, able to bathe once a week, and could even use the services of a "well-skilled" Chinese barber. Indeed, to the great surprise of the Japanese internees who had become accustomed to the "painful hell of starvation" in the Soviet Union, the Chinese guards at the Fushun prison asked at the end of every meal whether the prisoners had had enough to eat. One Japanese internee recalled that they quickly learned to say "No!" to make the most of the additional servings of rice, vegetables, and meat.[89] Another internee, Furumi Tadayuki, remarked that at Fushun, "I even received 200 cigarettes a month…and though we were not given alcohol, it was a comfortable life."[90] Furumi, who spent a combined eighteen years imprisoned in Soviet labor camps and at the Fushun prison, later wrote that although the Japanese had to work in the Chinese prison, "the work was nowhere near as brutal as in the Soviet Union."[91] Japanese convicts in China were typically put to work in agriculture, such as poultry farming or growing vegetables, and the fruits of their labor were made available to them. This not only provided a varied diet to the Japanese internees, but also gave them a sense of reward for their work. For this relatively fortunate handful of Japanese who were transferred from the harsh internment camps of the Soviet Union, the contrast of life in Northeast China was very clear.

The CCP's generous treatment of Japanese POWs was, as has been argued elsewhere in the

literature, seen as the best way of getting former Japanese soldiers to reflect on the atrocities they had committed in China, as well as a way of getting them to become future messengers promoting friendly relations between Japan and the PRC.[92] At the same time, it was also seen as a way of convincing the Japanese government, with whom the CCP badly wanted diplomatic relations, that the CCP was a benign government that had made great achievements in China since 1949. In the early 1950s, Beijing welcomed Japanese parliamentarians to China on "unofficial" tours, which included visits to Fushun prison where they could observe the excellent conditions experienced by Japanese POWs. One such tour was made in 1954 by Aoyanagi Ichirō, a member of the Japanese National Diet (parliament) House of Representatives, who spent almost a month in China as part of a parliamentary "study group." Aoyanagi claimed in his later testimony to the Diet that the Japanese parliamentarians viewed the invitation from the Chinese as a goodwill gesture and strove to take this opportunity "to achieve the settlement of various issues" between the nations. After spending days in negotiations with Chinese officials and touring the country, the delegation was allowed to spend one hour observing a prison for Japanese war criminals. Arriving at Fushun prison, Aoyanagi was pleased to meet his high-school friend Furumi Tadayuki, who looked "very healthy." Aoyanagi thus described the prison:

> It was an ordinary prison, relatively new and clean… In smaller rooms I saw four to five Japanese prisoners, and in a big room fifteen to twenty of them were studying something – one could see they were receiving some sort of instruction… These Japanese did not really have to work; they had only to take part in various activities for four hours a day… The prison hospital was also very clean and extremely well-equipped.[93]

Another visitor to Fushun from Japan was Furumi Ken'ichi, Furumi Tadayuki's son, who travelled in August 1956 with family members of other Fushun detainees on a trip mediated by

the ICRC. Though Ken'ichi's superiors at the Bank of Tokyo frowned upon the prospect of their young charge to Communist China, he was surprised at the treatment he received on the mainland. "We were treated as guests of honor," he remembered with some gratitude. The CCP covered the costs of their stay in China; a special train took the visitors from Tianjin to Fushun and back, and meals and rooms were provided gratis. Like Aoyagani, Ken'ichi was pleasantly surprised with the conditions at Fushun.[94]

Unfortunately for the CCP, their efforts to provide this positive experience could not staunch the growing demand for repatriation among Japanese in Northeast China. As the 1950s unfolded, both governments confronted the challenge of whether and how to send the Japanese home.

Returning home

Repatriation of the Japanese from the USSR and PRC represents a final point of divergence in how the Soviet Union and CCP navigated the changing international order, and the position of Japan within it. Differences in approaches to repatriation were not necessarily conspicuous; both nations tried to use the Japanese in their custody in achieving favorable outcomes in diplomatic negotiations with Japan, and the Soviet Union's treatment of Japanese internees began to converge with the CCP's more magnanimous approach after Stalin's death in 1953. However, as we argue in this section, the way in which the two nations used repatriation as a diplomatic bargaining chip reveals the precarious international status of the CCP relative to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the post-Stalin convergence in Soviet and CCP treatment of the Japanese further underscores just how different the two governments' approaches had been *before* 1953.

In 1951, the Japanese government appealed to the United Nations General Assembly with a request to assist in achieving the early return of Japanese captives still held in the Soviet Union.[95] The government was aided in these efforts by Japanese civil society groups, such as the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS), who lobbied their Soviet counterparts to assist in expediting the return of internees to their homeland. In October 1953, a few months after Stalin's death, a delegation from the JRCS visited the Soviet Union and began facilitating the repatriation of both civilians and POWs.[96] Yet throughout the postwar decade and especially in the period of 1945-1953, the Soviet Union blatantly refused to comply with continuous Japanese requests for contact, information, and repatriation of the Siberian internees. Reasons for this reluctance to repatriate Japanese tied directly to reasons outlined above. Soviet officials regarded Japanese (and other foreign POWs) as vital in providing a crude workforce on industrial and infrastructure projects, and in meeting their production plans. Local officials therefore lobbied the NKVD, and engaged in protracted bureaucratic battles with repatriation authorities, to prevent the repatriation of POWs.[97] Reluctance to repatriate Japanese was also driven by the Soviet leadership's fear that returnees would help the US remilitarize Japan as Cold War tensions in Asia reached an apogee during the Korean War. This worry was observed in a February 1951 UK Foreign Office special report: "It is reasonable to assume that the Soviets are afraid that these former military leaders might form the nucleus of future Japanese ministry groups for operations against the USSR."[98]

In China, CCP officials, too, were reluctant to repatriate the most skilled Japanese, seeing them as valuable forms of technical expertise and vital to rebuilding Northeast China.[99] Yet the Committee for the Management of Japanese in Northeast China balanced this position against the simultaneous view that keeping Japanese against their will would only detract from the Party's efforts to enhance the legitimacy and attractiveness of its ideology and governing

ability. Official reports in 1950-1951 acknowledged that, despite the CCP's efforts to improve the lived experience of Japanese in Northeast China, there was a sense of growing unhappiness among Japanese in the region. The reasons for this unhappiness were varied, officials noted. Young Japanese and those with limited skills increasingly thought that they had limited prospects in China, and "thus they long[ed] to return home." Other Japanese had become depressed or even suicidal because of love affairs that had broken down; because they missed their families in Japan; because they were subjected to particularly strict application of travel and work permits by security bureaus in the Northeast; or because they were based in work units that refused to release funds for Japanese-language books, newspapers and study groups.[100] Many skilled technicians were also increasingly restive out of frustration with the growing presence of rival Soviet technicians in Northeast China, whose skills they felt were inferior to their own.[101] The arrest of the instigators of the 1948 Japanese repatriation petition meant that the Japanese did not dare to publicly campaign for repatriation. Nevertheless, the Committee began in late 1951 to allocate resources and ships to repatriate nearly 1,500 Japanese whose lives seemed particularly difficult.[102]

Less than twelve months later, the question of repatriation took on renewed significance for the CCP. In August 1952, Japan entered into formal diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government on Taiwan.[103] This represented a further diminishing of the CCP's international status as the sole, legitimate government of China, and undermined its efforts to restore relations with Japan. CCP officials now began to view the repatriation issue as a useful way to establish unofficial channels of communication with Japanese civil society groups who were lobbying for repatriation of overseas Japanese, and who frequently shared CCP views about the desirability of restoring diplomatic relations between Japan and mainland China. In December 1952, the *Xinhua* news agency announced that China would work with three

organizations in Japan – the JRCS, the Japan-China Friendship Association, and the Japanese Peace Liaison Committee – to negotiate the repatriation of thousands of Japanese civilians from China.[104] The latter two organisations were comprised of left-wing Japanese intellectuals, politicians and business people supportive of closer Japan-PRC relations. Many among them felt remorse for Japan's aggressive role in China during WWII, and were highly critical of what they saw as US attempts to 'remilitarize' Japan.[105] At the same time, the CCP sought to use the repatriation of Japanese to further underscore its magnanimity and effectiveness as a government. A statement released by the Central Government to *Xinhua* that month highlighted China's generous treatment of overseas Japanese, as well as the effective functioning of the Chinese state:

> Although the militaristic Japanese government waged an eight-year war of aggression and committed unforgettable and heinous criminal acts, the Chinese people clearly distinguish between the Japanese militarists who were once and continue to be the enemy of our country, and the Japanese people who are our friends. The Chinese people hold a friendly attitude to the law-abiding overseas Japanese in China. They and all law-abiding foreign nationals receive the same protection of the Chinese people's government. The Japanese who work in our public and private enterprises enjoy the protection of our labor laws and labor insurance benefits. Their lifestyles are growing more and more abundant, and one example of this is that in recent months they have remitted large sums of money to provide for their wives and children in Japan.[106]

Over the following six months, as more than 26,000 Japanese were repatriated to Japan, dozens of similar articles appeared in the pages of the *People's Daily*, all emphasizing to potential supporters in Japan that the CCP was a responsible, effective government that respected the rights of Japanese citizens and treated them with dignity.[107]

Since the end of WWII, the CCP's concern for the happiness and welfare of overseas Japanese, and its desire to be seen as a legitimate government at home and internationally, had stood in stark contrast to the Soviet neglect of and mistrust toward Japanese citizens. But this divergence in position came to an abrupt end following the death of Stalin in 1953. Stalin's demise offered an opening to the successive Khrushchev government to mend relations with Japan, and the Soviet national interest dictated that the whims of even its former enemies be honored. The Khrushchev government used the approximately 1,500 Japanese still in Soviet custody to facilitate the restoration of diplomatic relations with Japan, making last-ditch attempts to soften the Japanese image of the USSR in ways highly reminiscent of the approach long taken by the CCP.

"We should coexist as friends. We are convinced – if the USSR, Japan and China treat each other well, there will be peace everywhere. Please come to visit us in Japan!" These were the words of an unnamed Japanese major quoted in a December 1956 Soviet report on the attitudes and moods among the last group of Japanese officers before repatriation.[108] The major's musings were recorded at a Khabarovsk banquet organized by the Soviets, who had painstakingly prepared the occasion. A group of high-ranking officials from the Armed Forces General Staff, the interior ministry (MVD) and the KGB arrived from Moscow to gauge Japanese moods before repatriation. In a change unthinkable a few years earlier, the Japanese "war criminals" went on city tours accompanied by Soviet officers, who were tasked with "showing the Japanese the city, and helping them buy gifts for their families."[109] Almost every whim of the Japanese officers on the eve of repatriation was considered and often fulfilled. The December 20 banquet ended with an operetta, received well by the audience. Former Kwantung Army General Ushiroku Jun – perhaps the highest ranking Japanese in Soviet custody at the time – made a speech addressed to his host, Khabarovsk Garrison Chief, Lt Gen Nikolai Gagen.

Ushiroku expressed thanks "for the opportunity to listen to good music, watch beautiful dance performances, and taste exquisite fare."[110] It was as if the eleven bitter years of internment had never happened, and those at the banquet were honored guests of the Soviets and not "war criminals" sentenced years earlier to lengthy terms in camps and prisons.

While the horrors of the Siberian Internment would not be forgotten by the Japanese, the year they finally ended – 1956 – marked a new beginning. By the time the Japanese were treated as honored guests at the Khabarovsk banquet, the man who had ordered their imprisonment, Josif Stalin, had been dead for more than three years, and the Soviet Union had finally started its move "away from a regime of terror and ideological orthodoxy" he had bequeathed.[111] The surreal episode of the banquet demonstrates a deep change in Soviet policy in the post-Stalinist era that ultimately resulted in the restoration of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1956. Yet the Soviet efforts to improve its image in the eyes of the Japanese were too little and too late. Moscow's use of the Japanese as forced labor and refusal throughout the internment to provide accurate information about the internees' names, numbers, wellbeing and the time of repatriation ensured that the USSR held a persistently negative image in Japan long after the final internee had been repatriated.[112] The CCP, by contrast, went on to be viewed with far less hostility in Japan because of its relatively generous treatment of Japanese civilians and POWs. Groups of returned Japanese POWs from China played an important role throughout the Cold War in working for reconciliation between Japan and the PRC, and in educating Japanese society about their country's wartime atrocities in China.[113] Yet for all its concern about the welfare of overseas Japanese, and its creative attempts to use overseas Japanese and their repatriation as vehicles of propaganda, the CCP would have far less success than the Soviet Union in actually normalizing diplomatic relations with Japan. The CCP's protracted path to government and statehood left it in a precarious international position, one in which the United

States, Japan and much of the international community would not formally acknowledge its status as the legitimate government of China until 1972.

Conclusion

The standard narrative in the literature depicts the stoking of hostility toward Japanese war criminals as cementing the foundation of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1949-1950. Yet this narrative, focused as it is on the formation of the alliance and the onset of the Cold War, obscures the long and diverse history of CCP and Soviet interactions with the Japanese in their territories, and the unsettled and uncertain nature of the fluid decade from the end of World War II to the early Cold War. By adopting a wider temporal scope and taking an explicitly comparative approach, this article has highlighted instead the contrast in CCP and Soviet approaches toward the Japanese in their territories, and situated the origins of these differences in the major transformations in international order from WWII to Cold War; in the legacies of East Asia's recent interstate and civil wars; and in the evolving relationships between the Soviet Union, United States, Japan, and both the CCP- and Nationalist-led China during this decade.

The differences in how the CCP and the Soviet Union treated the Japanese civilians and POWs under their authority were clearly shaped by the distinct concerns facing either country in the turbulent international environment from WWII to Cold War. The Soviets aimed to force "former enemy soldiers" to compensate for half a century of perceived Japanese aggression against the USSR, and to ensure that defeated soldiers did not threaten Soviet borders upon repatriation but instead helped to advance Soviet interests there. The treatment received by the Japanese in the Soviet Union was also conditioned by the institution that administered them: the Chief Directorate for POWs and Internees (GUPVI) of the NKVD/MVD, which made them part of a large army of enemy POWs tasked with redressing the damage caused by their nations

with their labor. China's direct experience of Japanese colonialism and its highly destructive eight-year war with Japan (1937-1945) gave China much stronger grounds than the Soviet Union for postwar hostility toward remaining Japanese. The CCP, however, could not afford to focus only on Japan's past military atrocities in China. With the resumption of the civil war following the end of WWII, the CCP drew on the legacy of Japan's colonial presence in China, using Japanese soldiers in battle against the Nationalists, and Japanese skilled civilians to rebuild hospitals, factories and mines in the areas it controlled. Though the CCP eventually claimed victory over the Nationalists and established the new state, its experience of the early Cold War was one of struggle for international recognition. In this context, the CCP chose to treat China's former imperialist occupiers magnanimously, and sought to recruit them into building the foundations of a new, egalitarian, inclusive and successfully modernizing People's Republic of China.

The three-sided entanglement between China, the Soviet Union, and Japan (with the fourth side, the United States, a constant presence in the background), offers two broad and interrelated lessons about the early Cold War in East Asia. First, traditional analytical frameworks used to explain the Cold War obscure the influences of earlier, longer-term historical interactions between China, Japan and the two superpowers. These interactions do not easily lend themselves to the traditional dichotomies of ally/rival, communist/capitalist, East/West, which are typically used to analyse the Cold War superpower confrontation. As a result, differences in CCP and Soviet approaches toward the Japanese in their territories during the Cold War appear puzzling from the perspective of the extant Cold War literature. By exploring the influence of the Russo-Japanese War, Siberian Intervention, China's War of Resistance against Japan, and the Chinese civil war on Cold War-era Soviet-Japanese relations and China-Japan relations, respectively, this article has demonstrated the importance of

expanding the temporal dimension in analyzing these relationships, and exploring the influences of earlier historical interactions *alongside* Cold War circumstances.

Second, within this many-sided Cold War entanglement, the China-Japan relationship is usually viewed as secondary to the relationships between the United States and Soviet Union, Soviet Union and China and, in the later Cold War, the US and China, largely as a result of the "junior" status of China and Japan within their respective Cold War "camps." Indeed, while vast literature exists on these latter relationships, the early Cold War China-Japan relationship has received far less attention in the Cold War Studies literature.[114] Yet as we have shown here, CCP policy toward Japan and overseas Japanese during this period was not merely a function of China's position within the Soviet "camp". Instead, our analysis helps to challenge the conventional hierarchies of Cold War relationships and interactions by demonstrating that the historical relationship between China and Japan, coupled with the CCP's civil war experience, was far more revealing in explaining CCP policy, conceptions and behavior toward the Japanese in its territory. In his recent world history of the Cold War, Odd Arne Westad has called attention to the role of "events that were in origin local and specific [but which] metamorphosed into manifestations of a global struggle."[115] In line with this argument, we too have sought to shift our gaze from the "manifestations of a global struggle" to the local and specific historical conflicts, colonial legacies, and domestic contexts that shaped CCP and Soviet policies toward the Japanese in their territories, and the ways in which the two countries navigated the fluid international order from WWII to Cold War.

[1] The quote in the title comes from Josif Stalin's remark during a January 1950 conversation with Mao Zedong. "Record of Talks between I.V. Stalin and Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China Mao Zedong," January 22, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), fond (f.) 45, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 329, listy (ll). 29-38. Translated by Danny Rozas. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111245, accessed January 29, 2018.

[2] David Wolff, "Japan and Stalin's Policy toward Northeast Asia after World War II," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2013), pp. 5, 9-12.

[3] Adam Cathcart, "'Against Invisible Enemies': Japanese Bacteriological Weapons in China's Cold War, 1949-1952," *Chinese Historical Review*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2009), pp. 101-129; Adam Cathcart and Patricia Nash, "'To Serve Revenge for the Dead': Chinese Communist Responses to Japanese War Crimes in the PRC Foreign Ministry Archive, 1949-1956," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 200 (December 2009), pp. 1053-1069; Adam Cathcart and Patricia Nash, "War Criminals and the Road to Sino-Japanese Normalization: Zhou Enlai and the Shenyang Trials, 1954-1956," *Twentieth Century China*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (April 2009), pp. 89-111.

[4] See, for example, Lori Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009); Yang Daqing, "Resurrecting the Empire? Japanese Technicians in Postwar China, 1945-49," in Harald Fuess, ed., *The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Postwar Legacy* (Munich: Iudicium, 1998); Rowena Ward, "Delaying Repatriation: Japanese Technicians in Early Postwar China," *Japan Forum*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (2011), pp. 471-483; Chan Yeeshan, *Abandoned Japanese in Postwar Manchuria: The Lives of War Orphans and Wives in Two Countries* (New York: Routledge, 2011); William F. Nimmo, *Behind a Curtain of Silence: Japanese in Soviet Custody 1945-1956* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988); and more recently Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Homecomings: The Belated Return of Japan's Lost Soldiers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016); Andrew E. Barshay, *The Gods Left First: The Captivity and Repatriation of Japanese POWs in Northeast Asia, 1945-1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013); and Yokote Shinji, "Soviet Repatriation Policy, U.S. Occupation Authorities, and Japan's Entry into the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2013), pp. 30-50; Donald G. Gillin and Charles Etter, "Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945-1949," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1983), pp. 497-518; Araragi Shinzō, "The Collapse of the Japanese Empire, Human Migrations and Repatriation", in Barak Kushner and Sherzod Muminov, eds., *The Dismantling of Japan's Empire in East Asia: Deimperialization, Postwar Legitimation and Imperial Afterlife* (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 66-83; and Park Jung-jin, "North Korean Nation Building and Japanese Imperialism: People's Nation, 'People's Diplomacy' and the Japanese Technicians," in Barak Kushner and Sherzod Muminov, eds., *The Dismantling of Japan's Empire in East Asia: Deimperialization, Postwar Legitimation and Imperial Afterlife* (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 199-219. For Japanese language sources, see, among many others, Takeshi Tomita, *Shiberia yokuryūsha tachi no sengo: reisenka no seron to undō, 1945-56* nen (Jinbun Shoin, 2013); Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Haisen to sengo no aida de: okurete kaerishi mono tachi* (Chikuma Sensho, 2012); Yasuo Wakatsuki, *Shiberia horyo shūyōjo: Soren to nihonjin* (Saimaru Shuppankai, 1979).

[5] There is evidence of discussion between the PRC and Soviet Union on the issue of Japanese war criminals and the Soviet decision to transfer 971 (eventually 969) Japanese POWs to Chinese custody in July 1950. See "Conversation between A. Vyshinsky and Mao Zedong, Moscow," January 6, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 43, d. 43, papka 302, ll. 1-5. Obtained by Odd Arne Westad and Daniel Rozas. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112676, accessed January 29, 2018. However, on the whole, scholars emphasize the lack of coordination between Moscow and Beijing on the war criminals issue, and the fact that Beijing was at times frustrated or surprised by Moscow's spontaneous policy decisions. See, for example, Cathcart, "Against Invisible Enemies," pp. 64-66, 74-77; Cathcart and Nash, "War Criminals and the Road to Sino-Japanese Normalization," p. 93; Cathcart and Nash, "To Serve Revenge for the Dead," pp. 1063-1066; and Barak Kushner, *Men to Devils, Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), pp. 261-262.

[6] For more on this point, see Sherzod Muminov, "From Imperial Revenants to Cold War Victims: 'Red Repatriates' from the Soviet Union and the Making of the New Japan, 1949-1952," *Cold War History*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (2017), pp. 425-442.

[7] Kobayashi Hideo, "The Post-War Treatment of Japanese Overseas Nationals," in P. Towle, M. Kosuge and Yoichi Kibata, eds., *Japanese Prisoners of War* (London: Hambledon Press, 2000), pp. 163-172.

[8] For example, Barak Kushner and Sherzod Muminov, eds, *Overcoming Empire in Post-Imperial East Asia: Repatriation, Redress and Rebuilding* (London: Bloomsbury, 2020).

[9] Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, p. 4.

[10] Lori Watt estimates that between September 1945 and December 1946 over 5 million Japanese nationals were

repatriated. Ibid., pp. 1, 135-137.
[11] Shinji Yokote, "Soviet Repatriation Policy, U.S. Occupation Authorities, and Japan's Entry into the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies,* Vol. 15, No. 2 (2013), pp. 33-36. For more on the war and the toll inflicted on Japanese civilians in Manchukuo, see Chan, *Abandoned Japanese in Postwar Manchuria*, pp. 20-21.
[12] "Postanovlenie GKO SSSR o priiome, razmeshchenii i trudovom ispol'zovanii voennoplennykh Iaponskoi armii," August 23, 1945, Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (TsAMO RF), f.66, op.178499, d.1, l. 593-598.
[13] The exact number ranges from 574,000 to 640,000 Japanese captives, with 600,000 most widely cited by both Russian and Japanese historians.
[14] Chan estimates that up to 50,000 military-age men were called up to join forces with the Kwantung Army in 1945. Chan, *Abandoned Japanese in Postwar Manchuria*, p. 19.
[15] Iitsuka Toshio, "Watashi no shiberia yokuryūki," in Public Foundation for Peace and Consolation, ed., *Heiwa no ishizue: shiberia kyōsei yokuryūsha ga kataritsugu rōku,* in nineteen volumes (hereinafter *Heiwa no ishizue: shiberia*), (Heiwa kinen jigyō tokubetsu kikin: 1991-2012), Vol. 9, p. 294.
[16] Sawatari Hideo, "Watashi no shiberia yokuryūki," in *Heiwa no ishizue: shiberia,* Vol. 6, p. 318.
[17] The amount differed from camp to camp and in the first two years of internment many received as little as thirty grams of meat a day. Iitsuka, "Watashi no shiberia yokuryūki," p. 295. 1946-1947 were the years of extreme food shortages in the Soviet Union that resulted in famines across the country. See V.F. Zima, "Golod v Rossii 1946-1947 gg.," *Otechestvennaia istoriia,* No. 1, 1993.
[18] "Donesenie Narkoma vnutrennikh del v SNK SSSR o khode priioma i razmeshcheniia iaponskikh voennoplennykh v Sovetskom Soiuze," February 1946, Centre for Preserving Historic-Documentary Collections (TsKhIDK), f.1/p, op.01e, d.40, l. 53-61.
[19] Iitsuka, "Watashi no shiberia yokuryūki."
[20] "Donesenie Narkoma," TsKhIDK, f.1/p, op.01e, d.40, l. 37-41. The People's Commissariat of Interior Affairs is better known by the acronym NKVD (*Narodnyi Komissariat vnutrennikh del*).
[21] GULAG stands for *Glavnoie Upravleniie ispravitel'no-trudovykh LAGerey i koloniy,* the Chief Directorate (of the NKVD) for Correctional-Labor Camps and Colonies.
[22] Natalia Surzhikova, "Ekonomika sovetskogo plena: administrirovanie, proizvodstvo, potreblenie," in L. I. Borodkin, S. A. Krasil'nikov and O.V. Khlevniuk, eds., *Istoriia stalinizma: prinuditel'nyi trud v SSSR: ekonomika, politika, pamiat'* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2013), pp. 78-87.
[23] "Postanovlenie GKO SSSR," TsAMO RF, f.66, op.178499, d.1, l. 593-598 (emphasis added).
[24] Soviet propaganda hailed the Baikal-Amur Railway Mainline (BAM) as a feat of the *Komsomol* (Soviet youth organization), but the railway was completed using significant POW and prisoner labor. See S.V. Kalugina, "Faktory ideologicheskoi "obrabotki" iaponskikh voennoplennykh i internirovannykh v period stroitel'stva BAMa 1945-1956 gg," *Vestnik Tikhookeanskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta,* Vol. 13, no. 2 (2009), pp. 177-182.
[25] "Translation of Message from Harry S. Truman to Joseph Stalin," August 19, 1945, History and PublicPolicy Program Digital Archive, RGASPI Fond 558, Opis 11, Delo 372, Listy 112-113. Translated bySergey Radchenko. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/122333.
[26] CIA documents from the period demonstrate this strategy. For example, CIA, "Strategic Importance of Japan," ORE 43-48, May, 24, 1948, CIA-RDP78-01617A003200190001-5, CIA Library online: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-01617a003200190001-5. See also Yokote, Soviet Repatriation Policy,", p. 48.
[27] "Polozhenie NKVD SSSR o trudovom ispol'zovanii voennoplennykh," September 29, 1945, GARF f. 9401, op. 1, d. 737, l. 180-214; "Direktiva Narodnogo Komissara vnutrennikh del SSSR No. 175…," GARF, f.9401, op.12, d.205, t.13, 53.
[28] "Donesenie Narkoma," TsKhIDK, f.1/p, op.01e, d.40, l. 37-41.
[29] An NKVD memo dated January 28, 1949, puts the total number of foreign soldiers taken prisoner by the USSR during WWII at 3,899,397. Close to 2 million POWs still remained in the Soviet camps at war's end. "Spravka GUPVI NKVD SSSR o voennoplennykh …," January 28, 1949, TsKhIDK, f. 1/p, op.01e, d. 15a, l. 92-95.
[30] Ibid.
[31] L.I. Borodkin et al., *Istoriia stalinizma*; Anne Applebaum, *Gulag: A History* (London: Penguin, 2004).
[32] Yang, "Resurrecting the Empire?," p. 194.
[33] Foreign Ministry Archive of the People's Republic of China [hereafter "FMA"] File No. 118-00118-02, August 1-November 30, 1951, "Dongbei Ribenren qingkuang he chuli yijian," p. 6.
[34] Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, p. 104; FMA File No. 105-00224-02, "Guanyu dui Dongbei Riben ren gongzuo de zongjie baogao," August 11, 1949, p. 16; FMA File No. 118-00118-02, p. 3.
[35] FMA File No. 118-00118-02, p. 6.
[36] Yang, "Resurrecting the Empire?," pp. 190, 194, 205. On the Nationalist government's use of Japanese technicians, see also Ward, "Delaying Repatriation," pp. 471-483.
[37] Gillin and Etter, "Staying on," pp. 499-500, 507.

[38] Furukawa Mantarō, *Chūgoku zanryū nihonhei no kiroku*, (Iwanami shoten, 1994), p. iv.
[39] FMA File No. 118-00086-02, "Guanyu Dongbei Riben ren de qingkuang baogao," June 1-30, 1950, p. 16; Gillin and Etter, "Staying on," pp. 511-515.
[40] The Japanese People's Liberation Alliance was initially known as the "Japanese People's Anti-War Alliance" (*Ribenren fanzhan tongmen*), see FMA File No. 118-00086-02, p. 16.
[41] FMA File No. 118-00118-02, p. 6-7; FMA File No. 118-00086-02, p. 16-18. On the history of the Japanese Communist Party, see Robert A. Scalapino*, The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).
[42] FMA File No. 118-00118-02, pp. 7, 14-15.
[43] FMA File 118-00086-02; FMA File 105-00224-02, pp. 4-5. See also Amy King, "Reconstructing China: Japanese Technicians and Industrialization in the Early People's Republic of China," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (2016), pp. 141-174; and Christian A. Hess, "From Colonial Port to Socialist Metropolis: Imperialist Legacies and the Making of 'New Dalian'," *Urban History,* Vol. 38, No. 3 (2011), pp. 373-390.
[44] The Committee included representatives from Department of Industry (*gongyebu*), Public Security Bureau (*gong'anbu*), the Northeast Railway headquarters (*tielu zongju*), the Political Affairs Unit of the Northeast Military (*junqu zhengzhibu*), the Foreign Affairs Bureau (*waishiju*), the Northeast People's Government (*Dongbei renmin zhengfu*), and the Harbin and Shenyang Municipal Governments (*Ha'erbin shizhengfu, Shenyang shizhengfu*). FMA File No. 105-00224-02, p. 10.
[45] FMA File No. 105-00224-02, p. 1, 16; FMA File No. 118-00118-02, p. 1; Liang Zhikou, "Jianguo Chuqi Waiqiao Guanli Gongzuo Shuping," *Dangdai Zhongguo Shi Yanjiu,* Vol. 13, No. 4 (2006), p. 48.
[46] FMA File No. 118-00118-02, p. 5.
[47] King, "Reconstructing China," pp. 167-168.
[48] In May 1950 each "fen" was worth 13,200 "*Dongbei* dollars" (*Dongbei bi*), which was the name given to the local currency issued by the CCP-run Northeast Bank between November 1945 and December 1951. According to statistics from Shenyang, therefore, each person's monthly living costs were approximately 792,000 *Dongbei* (Northeast) dollars. FMA File No. 118-00086-02, p. 3.
[49] Ibid.
[50] "Japanese national describes Red China," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Nanjing, January 17, 1949.
[51] FMA File No. 105-00224-02, pp. 4-5.
[52] FMA File No. 118-00086-02, p. 3.
[53] FMA File No. 118-00118-02, p. 14-15.
[54] FMA File No. 105-00224-02, p. 7; FMA File 118-00086-02, p. 5.
[55] It is not clear from this file whether the Committee referred to this Japanese nurse using the Japanese reading of her name, "Mochizuki," or whether it used the Chinese reading, "Wang Yue."
[56] FMA File 105-00224-02, pp. 7-8.
[57] FMA File No. 105-00224-02, pp. 4-5.
[58] FMA File No. 105-00224-02, p. 4.
[59] On the CCP's use of land reform as a form of political mobilization, see Suzanne Peper, *Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
[60] FMA File No. FMA File No. 105-00224-02, p. 4-5; FMA File No. 118-00086-02, p. 18.
[61] "O iaponskikh voennoplennykh…," August 26 – December 8, 1949, RGASPI, f.17, op.3, d.1078, p. 561; also, Appendices to p. 597 and p. 799 in the same fond, opis' and delo; "Iaponiia – fashizatsiia i militarizatsiia. Voennye prestupniki," January 1 – May 29, 1951, GARF, f.4459, op.27, d.13176.
[62] Sun Pinghua, Xiao Xiangqian, and Wang Xiaoxian, *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, 1945-1970*, (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1996), pp. 60, 78-84.
[63] Russian State Military Archive (RGVA), f.1/p, op.9a, l.17, quoted in Elena Katasonova, *Poslednie plenniki Vtoroi mirovoi voiny: maloizvestnye stranitsy rossisko-iaponskikh otnoshenii* (Moscow: IVRAN, 2005), pp. 64-65; FMA File No. 105-00224-02, pp. 11-12; FMA File No. 118-00086-01, pp. 1-3.
[64] FMA File No. 118-00086-01; FMA File No. 105-00224-02, p. 11.
[65] "Ob izdanii 'Iaponskoi gazety'…," September 1, 1945, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1053, p. 231. Also, Katasonova, *Poslednie plenniki,* p. 50.
[66] Katasonova, *Poslednie plenniki*, pp. 68-69
[67] MacArthur Memorial Archive (MMA) 18 Reel #13, Modern Japanese Political History Materials Room (*Kensei shiryō shitsu),* National Diet Library, Tokyo, Japan.
[68] RGVA, f.1/p, op.9a, l.17, quoted in Katasonova, *Poslednie plenniki,* pp. 64-65.
[69] Kathryn Weathersby, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives," *Cold War International History Project Working Paper* No. 8 (1993), p. 20.
[70] Ibid., pp. 11, 17-18, 20.
[71] RGVA, f.1/p, op.9a, l.17, quoted in Katasonova, *Poslednie plenniki,* pp. 64-65.
[72] "Dokladnaia zapiska S.N. Kruglova...," May 27, 1949, GARF, f.9401, op.2, d.235, l.37-41.

[73] TsAMO RF, f.142, op.419632, d.11, l.75-78.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Inomata Kunio, "Sennō kyōiku mo noruma," in *Heiwa no ishizue: shiberia,* Vol. 1, pp. 23-26.
[76] FMA File No. 118-00118-02, p. 18.
[77] Zhang Shu Guang, *Beijing's Economic Statecraft during the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2014), pp. 136-140.
[78] Richard McGregor, *Asia's Reckoning: China, Japan, and the Fate of U.S. Power in the Pacific Century* (New York: Viking, 2017), p. 28; Bruce Elleman and S.C.M. Paine, *Modern China: Continuity and Change, 1644 to the Present* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), p. 368.
[79] FMA File No. 118-00118-02, pp. 11-12.
[80] Ibid., pp. 11-12; FMA File No. 118-00086-01.
[81] FMA File No. 118-00086-01.
[82] FMA File No. 105-00224-02, p.10.
[83] Ibid.
[84] FMA File No. 118-00086-01.
[85] FMA File No. 118-00118-02, pp. 10, 18-19.
[86] FMA File No. 118-00086-02, pp. 11-14; FMA File No. 105-00224-02, pp. 12-13.
[87] FMA File No. 105-00224-02, pp. 11-13; FMA File No. 118-00086-01; FMA File No. 118-00086-02, pp 11-16.
[88] Cathcart and Nash, "'To Serve Revenge for the Dead,'" pp. 1063-1066.
[89] Chūkiren, *Watakushitachi,* p. 25.
[90] Furumi Tadayuki, "Manshūkoku no saigo o mite," in Handō Kazutoshi, ed., *"Bungei shunjū" ni miru shōwashi,"* Part 2 (Bunshun bunko, 1995), pp. 153-154.
[91] Furumi, *Manshūkoku no saigo,* p. 154.
[92] Kushner, *Men to Devils,* p. 264.
[93] National Diet of Japan, The House of Representatives, Session #17, "Kaigai dōhō hikiage oyobi ikazoku engo ni kansuru chōsa tokubetsu iinkai," October 30, 1954.
[94] Interview with Furumi Ken'ichi, October 29, 2014, Tokyo.
[95] "Announcement of Japanese Foreign Ministry and Letters of Foreign Minister to President of United Nations General Assembly, on Repatriation Problem", July 25, 1951, Public Information Division, Japanese Foreign Ministry. Reel K'0001, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (*Gaikōshiryōkan*), Tokyo, Japan.
[96] Correspondence between Shimazu and his Soviet counterparts in the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of the USSR, the JRCS played an active part in negotiating the dates of repatriation with the Soviet authorities; requesting registers with the names of the internees, including deaths; and establishing correspondence between the internees and families. "Ispolkom Soiuza obshchestv Krasnogo Kresta i Krasnogo Polumesiatsa SSSR…," April 1953 – May 1955, GARF, f.9501, op.5, d.84, l.65-120.
[97] Iu. I. Din, "Problema repatriatsii koreitsev Iuzhnogo Sakhalina v 1945-1950 gg.," *Voprosy istorii* 8 (2013), pp. 72-81. A 1946 folder from the Russian State Archive of Economics (RGAE) contains correspondence of Ministry of Cellulose and Paper Industry officials who cite the need to improve conditions of Japanese POWs to persuade NKVD/MVD to allocate these POWs to the ministry. RGAE, f. 7647, op. 4, d. 26, January-December 1946.
[98] UKNA, Special Intelligence Report No. 379, February 23, 1951, Folder FO 371/92691, "Repatriation of Japanese Prisoners-of-War still detained in colonial territories and the USSR…," p. 36.
[99] FMA File No. 105-00224-02, pp. 13-14; FMA File No. 118-00086-02, p. 22.
[100] FMA File No. 105-00224-02, pp. 9-10; FMA File No. 118-00086-02, p.10; FMA File No. 118-00086-01.
[101] FMA File No. 118-00086-02, p. 8.
[102] FMA File No. 118-00118-02, p. 20.
[103] Japan and the ROC entered diplomatic relations following the signing of a Peace Treaty in April 1952, which entered into force in August that year.
[104] Liang, "Jianguo chuqi waiqiao guanli gongzuo shuping," p. 52; K.W. Radtke, *China's Relations with Japan, 1945-1983: The Role of Liao Chengzhi* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), pp. 99-100.
[105] Franziska Seraphim, "People's Diplomacy: the Japan-China Friendship Association and Critical War Memory in the 1950s," *Japan Focus,* Vol. 5, No. 8 (2007).
[106] "Zhongyang renmin zhengfu youguan fangmian jiu zai Zhongguo de Riben qiaomin de ge xiang wenti da Xinhuashe jizhe wen," December 1, 1952, in Sun et al., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, pp. 139-140.
[107] The *People's Daily* printed 26 articles on the issue of overseas Japanese in the first half of 1953.
[108] "Spravka-doklad Ministru Vnutrennikh Del SSSR o peredache…," RGVA, f 1p, op. 32a, d. 1, ll. 1-25, quoted in Gavrilov and Katasonova, pp. 486-497, here p. 495.
[109] Ibid., p. 490.
[110] Ibid., p. 493.

[111] Kathleen E. Smith, *Moscow 1956: The Silenced Spring* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), p. 6.
[112] Tomita, *Shiberia yokuryūsha*; Sherzod Muminov, "The 'Siberian Internment' and the Transnational History of the Early Cold War Japan, 1945-56," in Pedro Iacobelli, Danton Leary, and Shinnusoke Takahashi, eds., *Transnational Japan as History: Empire, Migration, and Social Movements* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 71-95.
[113] Kushner, *Men to Devils,* p. 264. For more on the Japanese organizations' role in postwar Japanese attitudes toward the war and the PRC, see Franziska Seraphim, *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006).
[114] Important exceptions here are Yinan He, *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish relations since World War II* (New York and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Amy King, *China-Japan Relations after World War Two: Empire, Industry and War, 1949-1971* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); and Yoshihide Soeya, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
[115] Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War: A World History* (London: Allen Lane, 2017), p. 99.