Transcendental arguments and the problem of dogmatism

Kuusela, Oskari ORCID: (2008) Transcendental arguments and the problem of dogmatism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 16 (1). pp. 57-75. ISSN 1466-4542

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Transcendental arguments have been described as undogmatic or non-dogmatic arguments. This paper examines this contention critically and addresses the question of what is required from an argument for which the characterization is valid. I shall argue that although transcendental arguments do in certain respects meet what one should require from non-dogmatic arguments, they - or more specifically, what I shall call 'general transcendental arguments' - involve an assumption about conceptual unity that constitutes a reason for not attributing to them the status of non-dogmatic arguments. As a solution to this problem I distinguish general transcendental arguments from what I shall call 'specific transcendental arguments' and seek to explain how by limiting the use of transcendental arguments to the latter type it would be possible to avoid dogmatism. This methodological adjustment also opens up a possibility of re-interpreting transcendental arguments from the past in a novel non-dogmatic fashion.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: conceptual unity,dogmatism,necessary condition,philosophical method,transcendental argument
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Philosophy
University of East Anglia > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
Depositing User: EPrints Services
Date Deposited: 01 Oct 2010 13:55
Last Modified: 16 Jan 2023 12:30
DOI: 10.1080/09672550701667083

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