

MIGRATIONS OF DECOLONIZATION, WELFARE, AND THE UNEVENNESS OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE UK, FRANCE AND PORTUGAL*

In 1956, when Israel, the United Kingdom and France invaded Egypt, their military expedition ended with a humiliating defeat. Under pressure from the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Nations they quickly withdrew. This denouement of the Suez crisis was widely seen as a sign that old-style imperialism had become indefensible, that Europe's two foremost colonial empires were in irreversible decline, and that global politics would from now on be dominated by the Cold War superpowers and international organizations.¹ Confirming the collapse of European empires, in 1962, Algerians and their National Liberation Front (FLN) celebrated their hard-won independence from France, marking a victory that was hailed across the Global South as a beacon of Third World liberation. Despite the use of immense resources and brutal force, France's attempt to retain control over the colony had failed, and in the process the country lost much of its international leverage and prestige.² In 1975, Portugal was the last European power to bow to the forces of decolonization. The independence of its colonies came after thirteen years of a costly colonial war on three fronts — Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau — which had left

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¹ Simon Hall, *1956: The World in Revolt* (London, 2016).

² James McDougall, 'The Impossible Republic: The Reconquest of Algeria and the Decolonization of France, 1945–1962', *Journal of Modern History*, lxxxix, 4 (2017); Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order* (New York, 2016).

Portugal increasingly isolated and seen as a rogue state. The dissolution of its African empire marked no less than the end of an era. All over the world, decolonization was complete, and empire was over.³

But, of course, it wasn't. Not only were places such as Hong Kong, New Caledonia or Macau still formally tied to European metropolises, but across the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa, empire and its ending continued to have myriad and significant effects. Such effects, however, were felt not only in postcolonial nation states themselves, but also, as a dynamic field of historical inquiry has demonstrated in the last two decades, in western Europe's post-imperial societies.⁴ There, the increasing physical presence of people from formerly colonized spaces, whose numbers included hundreds of thousands of 'immigrants' or 'guest workers' of colour, was only one of the most obvious legacies of empire. But decolonization triggered another migration stream: several million 'repatriates' also arrived, that is, white settlers or others associated with the imperial power, who left Europe's crumbling empires in Asia and Africa. In what often were movements of chaotic flight, most of them 'returned' to their 'motherlands', even though some, as we shall see, had never previously set foot in Europe.⁵

This movement included seven thousand Anglo-Egyptians who arrived in Britain in the cold and gloomy January and February of 1957, fleeing the aftermath of the Suez invasion. Although as likely to speak Spanish, Italian or Arabic as English, and commonly of Jewish and/or Maltese origin, the Anglo-Egyptians were nevertheless British citizens who looked to the metropole in this time of crisis.⁶ Five years later their movement was to be mirrored, but multiplied many times in scale, as

³ Norrie MacQueen, 'Portugal', in Martin Thomas and Andrew S. Thompson (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Ends of Empire* (Oxford, 2017–18); Bruno Cardoso Reis, 'Portugal and the UN: A Rogue State Resisting the Norm of Decolonization (1956–1974)', *Portuguese Studies*, xxix, 2 (2013).

⁴ As an entry point, see the excellent Elizabeth Buettner, *Europe after Empire: Decolonization, Society and Culture* (Cambridge, 2016).

⁵ Andrea L. Smith (ed.), *Europe's Invisible Migrants* (Amsterdam, 2003), editor's intro.

⁶ Alexandre G. A. De Aranjó, 'Assets and Liabilities: Refugees from Hungary and Egypt in France and in Britain, 1956–1960' (University of Nottingham Ph.D. thesis, 2013). For the position of Egypt's Jewish population specifically, see Michael M. Laskier, 'Egyptian Jewry under the Nasser regime, 1956–70', *Middle Eastern Studies*, xxxi, 3 (1995).

Algerian independence was accompanied by the mass migration of around one million European settlers, or *pieds-noirs*, 80 per cent of whom had been born in the North African territory. Fleeing to France across the Mediterranean over the summer of 1962, they claimed that intercommunal strife and the policies of the new FLN regime had left them with a stark choice between ‘the suitcase or the coffin’.⁷ This migration also included one hundred and twenty thousand non-European Jews and tens of thousands of Muslims who had served the colonial power in some capacity. More than a decade later, in 1975, over half a million *retornados* came to Portugal. Most of those arriving in Lisbon were white soldiers, administrators, engineers and settlers from Angola and Mozambique fleeing Black majority-rule and civil war in their colonies, often arriving destitute in a country hit hard by economic recession and in the midst of the political turmoil of Portugal’s Carnation Revolution.⁸ Some of them came with their Black housemaids, servants, spouses and mixed-race children. But the new arrivals also included Black Africans who had served in Portugal’s army, or Cape Verdeans who had worked as manual labourers or civil servants in different parts of the empire.

Comparing 1956, 1962 and 1975 as key moments of decolonization in terms of the migrations they triggered, this article discusses the unevenness of citizenship and belonging in (post-)imperial Britain, France and Portugal. We are not arguing that these countries were exceptional — Japan, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands all faced similar migrations.⁹ Instead,

⁷ Claire Eldridge, *From Empire to Exile: History and Memory within the Pied-Noir and Harki Communities, 1962–2012* (Manchester, 2016). That their migration was unequivocally ‘forced’ has been challenged by Pierre Daum, *Ni valise, ni cercueil: Les pieds-noirs restés en Algérie après l’indépendance* (Arles and Paris, 2012).

⁸ Rui Pena Pires, Morgane Delaunay and João Peixoto, ‘Trauma and the Portuguese Repatriation: A Confined Collective Identity’, in Ron Eyerman and Giuseppe Sciortino (eds.), *The Cultural Trauma of Decolonization: Colonial Returnees in the National Imagination* (Cham, 2020); Elsa Peralta, ‘The Return from Africa: Illegitimacy, Concealment, and the Non-memory of Portugal’s Imperial Collapse’, *Memory Studies* (May 2019); Isabel dos Santos Lourenço and Alexander Keese, ‘Questioning Portugal’s Social Cohesion and Preparing Post-Imperial Memory: Returned Settlers (*retornados*) and Portuguese Society, 1975–80’, in Berny Sèbe and Matthew G. Stanard (eds.), *Decolonising Europe? Popular Responses to the End of Empire* (Abingdon and New York, 2020).

⁹ Buettner, *Europe after Empire*. For Japan, see Lori Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge, MA, 2010).

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extending Elizabeth Buettner's comparative insights regarding the remaking of western Europe in the wake of decolonization, our aim is to demonstrate that across three decades and three countries, we can acknowledge national specificities while nonetheless tracking significant similarities and continuities in behaviours of European states and publics as well as among returnees.¹⁰ This is important. All too often these migrations have been subsequently narrated as distinct national histories, where the character of the returnees — often depicted as being in some way too foreign, too excitable, too permissive, or too demanding — became the explanatory tool for the success or otherwise of their subsequent (re-)entry into the metropole. An integrated analysis of three countries together, by contrast, allows us to step back from these narrow characterizations to unpick national particularities from shared broader processes at work so as to better embed all these movements within the wider phenomenon of the end of empire in Europe.

Central to our discussion is citizenship and the role it played in facilitating or hindering migrations of decolonization as well as the settling-in that followed. For, through a quasi-rule of automatism in international law most colonized people lost their imperial citizenship at the moment of independence and acquired the nationality of their new nations. This process barred many from freely entering their former metropolises although, as we shall see, Britain initially proved an exception to this.¹¹ Settlers and other 'white' minorities, including Jews, by contradistinction, maintained their European citizenship beyond independence. This fact predestined their routes of migration and, crucially, the modalities of their (re)insertion into national life. As incoming citizens, they not only received emergency aid but were entitled to, and effectively provided with,

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For Italy, see Pamela Ballinger, *The World Refugees Made: Decolonisation and the Foundation of Postwar Italy* (Ithaca, NY, 2020). For the Netherlands, see Gert Oostindie, *Postcolonial Netherlands: Sixty-Five Years of Forgetting, Commemorating, Silencing*, trans. Annabel Howland (Amsterdam, 2011).

¹⁰ Buettner, *Europe after Empire*.

¹¹ Władysław Czapliński, 'A Note on Decolonization and Nationality', *Verfassung und Recht in Übersee/Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America*, xviii, 3 (1985); Randall Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain: The Institutional Origins of a Multicultural Nation* (Oxford, 2000).

comprehensive state support including favoured access to housing, the labour market, education and credit.

Jordanna Bailkin and Pamela Ballinger have shown how thinking about the relationship between citizenship and the colonies can shine an important light on the workings of western European welfare states in the era of decolonization.¹² Extending the existing literature further, this article argues that, across different national contexts, we need to understand citizenship as an unevenly applied category. Although holding the same rights as everybody else, returnee-citizens were discriminated against by resident citizens in subtle and sometimes less subtle ways. Moreover, subgroups of returnee-citizens were treated differently by the state itself in a process that amounted at times to their physical and social segregation and a racialization of welfare. This unevenness of treatment in turn illuminates how the British, French and Portuguese national communities were reimagined in the era of decolonization, and the crucial role repatriated migrants came to play in the process.

By bringing together the cases of the Anglo-Egyptians, *piets-noirs* and *retornados*, this article contributes to three fields of research. First, looking at citizenship in a moment of historical transition provides a fresh understanding of how it functioned beyond a legal category. In addition to regulating specific rights, citizenship existed as a social practice and a tool of political communication that helped shape notions of national (un-)belonging. It is undoubtedly the case that the maintenance or loss of imperial citizenship was a crucial dimension of decolonization, one that could — as in the case of the Portuguese citizenship reforms of 1975, or in the gradual exclusion of non-British heritage UK passport holders from automatic entry to Britain — be read as a racialized ‘unmixing of peoples’ in the aftermath of empire.¹³ Yet while such unmixing by the force of law is central to histories of postcolonial mobilities, we argue that we should not restrict our gaze to the ‘hard’ fact of who maintained and who lost their citizenship

¹² Jordanna Bailkin, *The Afterlife of Empire* (Berkeley, 2012); Ballinger, *The World Refugees Made*.

¹³ Rogers Brubaker, ‘Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples: Historical and Comparative Perspectives’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, xviii, 2 (1995).

status. Rather we suggest that looking at how migrants with the same citizenship status came to have starkly different experiences of inclusion or exclusion — in what we might think of as ‘soft’ experiences of citizenship — adds an extra dimension to our understanding of how nations were remade after empire.

Second, the cases presented here further the discussion about migrations of decolonization, adding knowledge about Anglo-Egyptians and *retornados* (both of whom have received little attention so far), but also shifting the field’s entrenched focus from memories towards the material histories of returnees’ arrival and subsequent integration.¹⁴ Our approach to these histories is comparative, highlighting similarities and differences across national cases. It is also relational in that it argues we must understand the experience of Anglo-Egyptians, *pieds-noirs* and *retornados* not only in relation to residents and institutions of the receiving societies, but also in relation to their various ‘migrant Others’.¹⁵ And in an indication of the diversity of Europe in these decades, these ‘Others’ were drawn not only from the bigger postcolonial moves to the continent of these years, but also generated from Europe’s own turbulent Cold War reckonings. Thus these could be, like the *harkis* in France, citizens themselves; foreigners or stateless persons from Mozambique, Angola and Cape Verde in Portugal; or refugees, such as the twenty thousand exiles from the Soviet-crushed 1956 Hungarian uprising that arrived in the UK almost contemporaneously with the Anglo-Egyptians.

Third, through its focus on migrations, this article contributes more broadly to the study of decolonization. Europeans had irrevocably lost control over the territories and peoples they had believed they would still be dominating for decades, and the influx of (white) citizen-refugees from the colonies epitomized this loss. Yet, as we show, governments and media tried to

¹⁴ Most repatriates, but especially the *pieds-noirs*, have been the focus of intense debates surrounding controversial memorial legacies of empire: see Eldridge, *From Empire to Exile*; Eyerman and Sciortino (eds.), *Cultural Trauma of Decolonization*.

¹⁵ For inspiring reflections on how to do relational migration histories (with further literature), see Anne Friedrichs, ‘Placing Migration in Perspective: Neue Wege einer relationalen Geschichtsschreibung’, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, xlv, 2 (2018).

dedramatize this process, in effect attempting to sweep under the carpet the oftentimes violent rupture that the end of empire meant not only for European settlers, but for British, French and Portuguese societies more widely.¹⁶ States' claims that repatriations from the colonies were nothing more than a simple return to the motherland and their concerted efforts to deal with returnees' needs as efficiently as possible can be read as an attempt to underplay the enormity of decolonization. The hope here was to hide decolonization's ramifications in plain sight or, at the very least, to present it as the natural course of history.¹⁷

In order to explore the interplay of national specificities and general patterns, the first section of this article analyses the role played by legal citizenship as a 'hard' factor in the migration and reinsertion of Anglo-Egyptians, *pieds-noirs* and *retornados* in their respective 'home' countries. In the second section we turn our gaze to the role of 'soft' citizenship in mediating the reception of the decolonization migrants and in rebuilding national communities after the end of empire. Finally, the third section focuses on the ways in which citizenship and (non-) belonging affected welfare practices on the ground. It shows how returnees — citizens from overseas resettling in the mother country, irrespective of whether or not they had ever set foot there — found that they were often accorded more than basic welfare rights. Drawing together three countries and three distinct time periods is not to deny the significant political, social, cultural, economic and geopolitical differences between them. But placing groups and historical contexts as seemingly incongruent as the Anglo-Egyptians of 1956 and the Portuguese *retornados* of 1975 in the same analytical frame allows us to highlight the multiple, hitherto under-appreciated, common undercurrents which tie migrations of decolonization both together *and* to key trends within European history.

¹⁶ Mo Moulton's *Ireland and the Irish in Interwar England* (Cambridge, 2014) compellingly makes a similar point for the depoliticization of the Irish in English society following independence.

¹⁷ On the European invention of decolonization as a way of clothing this loss of power in the language of historical determinism, see Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War and the Remaking of France* (Ithaca, NY, 2006); Stuart Ward, 'The European Provenance of Decolonization', *Past and Present*, no. 230 (Feb. 2016).

I

‘HARD’ CITIZENSHIP

Changes of nationality, the creation of statelessness, and migration were major consequences of twentieth-century imperial disintegration.¹⁸ When decolonization prompted individual settlers to move, their nationality commonly shaped their migration routes: it was easier to leave (and to know where to go) if you knew you would be accorded full citizenship rights — including welfare rights — in the place where you landed.¹⁹ Citizenship therefore mattered for individual migrants of decolonization. As we shall see, however, the benefits that came with it were neither automatic nor equally applied to all but offered most freely to citizens with European heritage and connections.

This general trend was inflected by national specificities. The British government’s public avowal of a non-racialized notion of Britishness via the 1948 British Nationality Act, meant that all (ex-)colonial citizens had the right to freely enter, settle and work in the UK. As Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, the Conservative spokesman on home affairs proudly declared, there were ‘no colour bar restrictions’ in Britain.²⁰ The immigration laws of 1962, 1968 and 1971 incrementally replaced this open-door approach with an increasingly restrictive and racialized immigration policy.²¹ But even before this, while Maxwell Fyfe’s statement was true in law, it was only ever part of the story. As Kathleen Paul and others have pointed out, the 1948 legislation did not stop, for example, the entry of European aliens from being shaped by racialized ideas around promoting ‘healthy’ Anglo-Saxon Protestants at the expense of Jewish Holocaust

¹⁸ For discussions of this in the European inter-war context see Brubaker, ‘Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples’; Matthew Frank, *Making Minorities History: Population Transfer in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Oxford, 2017).

¹⁹ Andrea L. Smith, ‘Coerced or Free? Considering Post-Colonial Returns’, in Richard Bessel and Claudia B. Haake (eds.), *Removing Peoples: Forced Removal in the Modern World* (Oxford, 2009).

²⁰ House of Commons Debates, 7 July 1948, vol. 453, cols. 403 and 411. Although he argued vehemently against the concept of ‘citizenship’, preferring instead ‘subject’.

²¹ Dallal Stevens, *UK Asylum Law and Policy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives* (London, 2004); Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain*.

survivors.²² Indeed it is important here to appreciate just how racialized British taxonomies of Europeaness remained in the post-war decades, with the populations of north-western Europe — designated ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and Nordic and Protestant — granted an approval that was withheld from Jews and Catholics and those from the ‘Celtic fringe’, ‘Slavs’ and the Mediterranean rim.²³

We can see how these two threads informing immigration practices — official equality towards all British subjects in law, and racialized ideas over who might best fit an idealized vision of Britishness in some practices — came together in debates surrounding the entry to Britain of Anglo-Egyptians after the Suez crisis. For all that Maxwell Fyfe was keen to flaunt Britain’s colour-blind credentials, it is clear that government officials covertly operated a racialized hierarchy of citizenship.²⁴ As early as July 1956, when the Foreign Office first discussed the possibility of evacuation of Anglo-Egyptians, it divided them into ‘Anglo-Saxons’ and citizens of ‘Old Commonwealth’ countries on the one hand, and ‘Maltese’ on the other.²⁵ Put crudely, this categorization made a distinction between British subjects racialized as white, and those deemed by civil servants to be ‘Mediterranean’ and/or Jewish. Following this taxonomy, Lord Killearn calculated that of the twelve thousand British subjects in Egypt before November 1956, five thousand were ‘Anglo-Saxons’ with the remainder being ‘Maltese and others’. Yet even this was not a true reflection of the numbers, as Killearn’s calculation excluded five thousand Cypriots who also held passports as citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKCs). Killearn’s studied haziness over their status — ‘[w]e do not know quite what happened about the Cypriots . . . there was some talk of their being regarded as Greek citizens’ — was illustrative of an endemic attitude of British civil servants

²² Kathleen Paul, *Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Post-war Era* (Ithaca, NY, 1997).

²³ Becky Taylor, *Refugees in Twentieth-Century Britain: A History* (Cambridge, 2021), esp. ch. 1. For a contemporary and satirical exposure of these prejudices, see George Mikes, *How to be an Alien* (London, 1946).

²⁴ For Britain’s racialized post-war immigration policies, see Paul, *Whitewashing Britain*.

²⁵ The National Archives, London (hereafter TNA), FO 371/118892, Memorandum on Evacuation of British Nationals, 28 July 1956.

towards certain British passport holders.²⁶ Behind the facade of a unified imperial citizenship there were (racialized) gradations within the apparently unitary category of CUKCs informally operating well before the legislative changes set in train by the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act.

These distinctions had material implications. In August 1956, the National Assistance Board formulated a plan for an emergency evacuation from Egypt. It decided that all evacuees would be sent immediately to Cyprus where they would be divided into two categories. 'Anglo-Saxons' and those from the 'Old Commonwealth' would be given temporary accommodation until they moved to the UK or found employment elsewhere. The second category was made up of Maltese-origin CUKCs as well as stateless Jews whom Britain had agreed to accept if they had relatives already in the UK. As non-English speakers with no direct connection to the UK this group was considered a potential long-term problem. Indeed, their North African and Mediterranean origins saw them being categorized by officials as part of the 'southern races', an attitude which fed into the decision that they would be held in Cyprus for as long as possible, and only sent to Britain once all other potential destinations had been exhausted. In the event the Board found itself bypassed, as most of the 'Maltese' Anglo-Egyptians went directly to Britain under their own initiative. However, the Board's plans made clear the British government's discomfort over accepting into Britain those without natal or linguistic ties to the metropole, even as it publicly accepted that it had a formal responsibility towards all CUKCs.²⁷

If in Britain, where the numbers involved were small, the political ramifications of the Anglo-Egyptians' entry were, ultimately, slight, in France it was a different matter. There the tensions between citizenship, entry and welfare support were writ large as the French state confronted its loss of Algeria. The one million people on the move in 1962 primarily consisted of European settlers, or *pieds-noirs*, but also contained significant minorities of naturalized Jews and tens of thousands of Muslims, particularly *harkis* who had been enrolled as auxiliaries in the

²⁶ House of Lords Debates, 28 February 1957, vol. 202, cols. 128–9.

²⁷ TNA, CAB 134/1210, Meeting of Committee on Colonial Immigrants, 17 May 1956; De Aranjó, 'Assets and Liabilities', 277–8 and 280.

French army.²⁸ Surveying these men, women and children, one French journalist wrote: 'Repatriates, migrants, evacuees, the destitute, the dispossessed, they're a bit of everything'.²⁹ Yet although they were a heterogeneous mix of ethnicities, religions, ages, occupations and political persuasions, and had had a variety of relationships to the recently ended colonial regime, legally speaking they were not 'a bit of everything', but overwhelmingly French citizens. They may have acquired this status at different times and in different ways depending on their racial or religious identity, but by 1962 their citizenship overwrote these historical nuances to create the legally homogenous category of 'returning' French citizen or 'repatriate', despite most having never previously lived in metropolitan France.³⁰ Citizenship granted the *pièds-noirs* and Jewish repatriates clearly defined and tangible benefits, not least the unquestioned right to enter France. Citizenship also underpinned their unconditional access to a superior level of governmental support to that granted either to the sixty thousand non-French individuals who migrated from Algeria in 1962, or to the 1.3 million French citizens who had migrated 'back' to metropolitan France prior to 1961 as a result of decolonization in French Indochina, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Guinea.³¹

²⁸ For a detailed breakdown of these statistics, see Jean-Jacques Jordi, 'L'été 62 à Marseille: tensions et incompréhensions', in Jean-Jacques Jordi and Emile Temime (eds.), *Marseille et le choc des décolonisations: les rapatriements, 1954-1964. Actes du colloque, Marseille, 11-13 mai 1995* (Aix-en-Provence, 1996), 66.

²⁹ 'Le temps de retour', *Le Monde*, 16 May 1962.

³⁰ For details about citizenship categories and laws in Algeria, see Saliha Belmessous, *Assimilation and Empire: Uniformity in French and British Colonies, 1541-1954* (Oxford, 2013), 128-44. For a discussion of the complexities of the 'repatriate' label, see Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain: Politique d'intégration et parcours de rapatriés d'Algérie en métropole (1954-2005)* (Paris, 2010), 91-131.

³¹ The former group were entitled to the same benefits as repatriates for three months before these were reduced to the same levels of assistance provided to other non-French immigrants. The latter group pre-dated the standardized repatriation policy applied to returnees in 1962 and instead had to make do with piecemeal emergency aid and charities to fill the many gaps; this included a hundred thousand settlers who left Algeria prior to 1962. Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain*, 198; Colette Dubois, 'La Nation et les Français d'outre-mer: Rapatriés ou sinistrés de la décolonisation?', in Jean-Louis Miège and Colette Dubois (eds.), *L'Europe retrouvée: Les migrations de la décolonisation* (Paris, 1994), 76; 98-9.

The importance of citizenship is further illustrated by considering the fate of French Muslim repatriates, especially the *harkis* and their families. Principally of rural origin, illiterate and unskilled, many *harkis* had enrolled as auxiliaries in the French army, leaving them vulnerable at independence to revenge violence which killed some sixty to seventy thousand people.³² Seeking refuge in France should have been relatively straightforward since the *harkis*, like all indigenous Algerians, had technically been French citizens since 1944 and had possessed the same rights and duties as citizens within the metropole since 1958.³³ Moreover, the March 1962 Evian ceasefire accords promised no French person would be deprived of their citizenship against their wishes, while an April 1962 decree further stipulated that ‘anyone in Algeria wishing to return to metropolitan France, will be able to benefit from repatriate status’.³⁴ *Harkis* who came to France should therefore have been entitled to the same rights of entry and types of aid as any other repatriated citizen. Yet, over the summer of 1962, the French government deliberately muddied the legal waters surrounding their citizenship.³⁵ After May, for example, government documents increasingly referred to them by the labels ‘*harkis*’ or ‘refugees’, as opposed to ‘citizens’ or ‘*rapatriés*’. In July, President Charles de Gaulle declared that ‘obviously’ the term ‘repatriate’ did not apply to ‘Muslims’, adding ‘in their case, we are dealing only with refugees’.³⁶ This political statement reinforced a legal distinction which had been created the previous month between ‘French of European origin’ (FSE) — the settler and Jewish communities — who were allowed to keep their French status after Algerian independence, and ‘French of North African origin’ (FSNA) — or Muslims. These latter were stripped of their citizenship and informed that if they wished to reclaim it, they would need to make a formal request

³² William B. Cohen, ‘The *Harkis*: History and Memory’, in Patricia M. E. Lorcin (ed.), *Algeria and France 1800–2000: Identity, Memory, Nostalgia* (New York, 2006), 168.

³³ See Todd Shepard, ‘La République face aux harkis: questions aux historiens’, *Les Temps modernes*, no. 666 (Nov.–Dec. 2011), 57.

³⁴ Dubois, ‘La Nation et les Français d’outre-mer’, 99.

³⁵ Shepard, ‘La République face aux harkis’, 57; Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, ‘Les harkis sont-ils des rapatriés comme les autres?’, *Les Temps modernes*, no. 666 (Nov.–Dec. 2011), 90–8.

³⁶ Alain Peyrefitte, *C’était de Gaulle*, 3 vols., (Paris, 1994–2000), i; *La France redevient la France* (Paris, 1994), 209; Shepard, *Invention of Decolonization*, 231.

before a judge, in France.³⁷ This last stipulation represented a significant barrier for *harkis* since, unlike their settler and Jewish compatriots, they had to obtain explicit permission to cross the Mediterranean and transit via army holding camps. When deciding whose travel to sanction, officials took into account factors such as age, fitness and perceived ability to assimilate, a process of selection that was not applied to other communities.³⁸ Once in France, the state reserved the right to reject *harkis'* requests for citizenship upon registration or at any point for three years afterwards for 'reasons of unworthiness'.³⁹ Even if, in practice, this process turned out to be largely a formality with 68 per cent of the approximately seventy thousand applications made between 1962 and 1970 approved, the law and the preceding manoeuvres cast the *harkis* not as 'returning' citizens possessed of equal rights but, as Todd Shepard explains, 'outsiders whom the French Republic would assist, but only out of charity and only in unavoidable circumstances'.⁴⁰

The maintenance of legal citizenship was even more difficult for some of the migrants fleeing Portugal's crumbling empire. The status of repatriate or returnee became codified through a number of Portuguese legal texts in 1975 and 1976 that defined a *retornado* as a Portuguese national who had returned from an (ex-)colony and was temporarily in need of assistance.⁴¹ However, in contrast to the French case, the Portuguese government not only defined which citizens could be considered returnees, but at the same time redefined which migrants could be considered citizens. Decree-Law 308-A/75 from 24 June 1975 stripped most people from or in the colonies of their Portuguese citizenship, stating that the independence of their

³⁷ François-Xavier Hautreux, *La guerre d'Algérie des harkis, 1954–1962* (Paris, 2013), 367–8; Todd Shepard, 'Excluding the *Harkis* from Repatriate Status, Excluding Muslim Algerians from French Identity', in Hafid Gafaïti, Patricia M. E. Lorcin and David G. Troyansky (eds.), *Transnational Spaces and Identities in the Francophone World* (Lincoln, NE, 2009), 103.

³⁸ Hautreux, *La guerre d'Algérie des harkis*, 321.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 367–8; Shepard, 'Excluding the *Harkis* from Repatriate Status', 103.

⁴⁰ For the figures quoted, see Jeannette E. Miller, 'A Camp for Foreigners and "Aliens": The *Harkis'* Exile at the Rivesaltes Camp (1962–1964)', *French Politics, Culture and Society*, xxxi, 3 (2013), 27; Shepard, 'Excluding the *Harkis* from Repatriate Status', 101.

⁴¹ Decreto-Lei 169/75, 31 Mar. 1975; Decreto-Lei 584-B/75, 16 Oct. 1975; Resolução do Conselho de Ministros, DR 105/76, série I, 1^o suplemento, 5 May 1976.

territories nullified the ‘Portuguese nationality’ they had held ‘until that date’.⁴² The legislators now defined citizenship essentially in terms of descent (*ius sanguinis*), maintaining it almost exclusively for those born in the metropole and those born in the colonies who had a Portuguese parent or grandparent, while simultaneously reserving *retornado* status for citizens. Gone were the days of the racially inclusive *ius soli* nationality and the lusotropicalist propaganda of Portuguese empire. In its place, the new post-imperial nation explicitly equated returnees with Portugueseness, and implicitly associated both with whiteness.⁴³

In 2014, António de Almeida Santos, who had written the 1975 nationality law as Minister for Interterritorial Affairs, admitted that its timing at the onset of what would become the largest immigration event in Portuguese history was no coincidence. In an echo of how the French had dealt with the *harkis*, the 1975 law’s purpose, he explained, had been to give Portuguese nationality ‘only to some in order to prevent that they come all’.⁴⁴ This purposeful retraction of citizenship combined with the greater distance between colonies and motherland effectively reduced the influx of Africans, and there was no recognizable group of ‘Portuguese *harkis*’ after 1975.⁴⁵ Even so, not only white people made their way to Portugal: the combined number of non-white *retornados* who maintained citizenship and of African immigrants who successfully claimed citizenship between 1976 and 1981 is put at between thirty and fifty thousand, out of an estimated total of five hundred thousand to eight hundred thousand.⁴⁶

The timing of the citizenship restrictions is certainly important, as the arrival of ever more destitute, disoriented and

⁴² Decreto-Lei 308-A/75, 24 Jun. 1975.

⁴³ See also Bernd Reiter, ‘The Perils of Empire: Nationhood and Citizenship in Portugal’, *Citizenship Studies*, xii, 4 (2008).

⁴⁴ Quoted in São José Almeida, ‘Retornados: Uma história de sucesso para contar’, *Revista 2—Público* (20 April 2014), 17.

⁴⁵ Although many colonized men were incorporated in the regular forces during the colonial wars, the literature on them is scarce. See João Paulo Borges Coelho, ‘African Troops in the Portuguese Colonial Army, 1961–1974: Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique’, *Portuguese Studies Review*, x, 1 (2002); Pedro Aires Oliveira, ‘Saved by the Civil War: African “Loyalists” in the Portuguese Armed Forces and Angola’s Transition to Independence’, *International History Review*, xxxix, 1 (2017).

⁴⁶ Fernando Luís Machado, ‘Luso-africanos em Portugal: nas margens da etnicidade’, *Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas*, xvi (1994), 115.

disgruntled people, mainly from Angola and Mozambique, coincided with a plunge in economic activity, a spike in unemployment, a housing crisis, a state crisis and an increasingly dangerous polarization of domestic politics in the wake of the 1974 revolution.⁴⁷ Yet there is good reason to assume that pairing returnee status with an ethno-national redefinition of citizenship was not only meant to reduce the influx of migrants, or to cut down welfare spending. We can also read the nationality law as an attempt by the new political elite symbolically to sever the ties with Portugal's Atlantic and imperial past and to reorient the country towards a future as a fully European country — one that imagined itself not as multiracial any longer, but as a nation where (non-white) migrants constituted the permanent Other of (white) citizens.⁴⁸

Collectively these three examples expose the messy reality behind the seemingly clear-cut status of being a British, French or Portuguese citizen. They demonstrate how these supposedly 'hard' legal categories could be manipulated and differentially applied by governments to sort individuals, who should have been indistinguishable in terms of their rights and of the duty of care owed to them as citizens, into groups considered more or less desirable by the state, often to the considerable surprise and distress of the migrants themselves. The inconsistent application of citizenship was, of course, a long-standing feature of the European empires. Alongside the transplantation of the returnees as physical remnants of empire to the metropole, the simultaneous migration of colonial-era, racially based ideas and practices underscores the persistence of the imperial past into the postcolonial present. The next section extends this discussion by focusing on the post-arrival period and the insertion of migrants into their home societies, shifting our attention to citizenship as a social practice facilitating inclusion or exclusion. Unpacking how 'soft' citizenship was mobilized in everyday, media and political

⁴⁷ On the Carnation Revolution and Portugal's 'hot summer' of 1975, see Kenneth Maxwell, *The Making of Portuguese Democracy* (Cambridge, 1995); Diego Palacios Cerezales, 'Um caso de violência política: o "Verão quente" de 1975', *Análise Social*, xxxvii, no. 165 (2003).

⁴⁸ Nuno Severiano Teixeira and António Costa Pinto (eds.), *The Europeanization of Portuguese Democracy* (Boulder, Colo., 2012); Reiter, 'Perils of Empire'; Keshia Fikes, *Managing African Portugal: The Citizen-Migrant Distinction* (Durham, NC, 2009).

discourses, our analysis exposes the unevenness and instability of the links between citizenship, belonging and welfare entitlement.

II

‘SOFT’ CITIZENSHIP

Possessing citizenship was important, but the experience of settlement was informed by far more than a person’s legal status — not least because there was a myriad of ways in which someone’s ‘paper identity’ might not accord either with how they viewed themselves or how they were perceived by others. Indeed, the people and organizations responsible for receiving and accommodating repatriates, from the state to social workers to the press to their next-door neighbours, all made judgements about the extent to which they did or did not belong. Such assessments were based on a host of factors, from the very obvious — appearance, language or accent — to subtle, even unspoken, ideas about fit and deserving, which in turn influenced how collectively and individually these men and women were treated.

In public debates surrounding the arrival of Anglo-Egyptians in Britain over the winter of 1956–7, for example, it is striking how the British media rendered Anglo-Egyptians’ portrayals of themselves as thoroughly British. Such accounts chimed with the experiences of New Commonwealth migrants who had similarly been steeped in English literature and culture as part of their education.⁴⁹ In this way, even for those who had never been to Britain, publicly, and perhaps also privately, their arrival could be understood as something natural, a return to the mother country, rather than as a rupture. And yet, as with those reaching Britain from the Caribbean or South Asia, the Anglo-Egyptians found it a very different place from the one they had learned about at school. The *Manchester Guardian* carried reports of Anglo-Egyptians quoting Robert Browning’s ‘Oh to be in England’, hoping to see the white cliffs of Dover, or Wordsworth’s daffodils on their arrival. Instead, they found utilitarian National Assistance or Ministry of Labour hostels and the harsh reality of a British winter. As one newspaper report put it: ‘Their British passports may have got them out of the grips of

⁴⁹ Kennetta Hammond Perry, *London is the Place for Me: Black Britons, Citizenship and the Politics of Race* (New York, 2015).

the Egyptians but are no protection against the English weather, English cooking, and what some of them take to be the indifference of their fellow Britons in favour of the Hungarian refugees'.⁵⁰ Even on arrival then, we see cracks between an ideal of Britishness, as propagated across the schools of the empire for decades, and the reality of reception, in what Bill Schwartz has described in another context as the 'unhomeliness of the homeland'.⁵¹

This mention of the Hungarian refugees was significant. Hungarians had been leaving their country in their thousands ever since the first week of November 1956, after the Soviet army had moved in to crush their uprising against externally imposed communist rule. The British public, in common with broad popular opinion across western Europe, had enthusiastically embraced first the cause of these 'freedom fighters' standing up to Soviet imperialism, and then their plight as refugees as they streamed over the border into Austria in their tens of thousands. By the time Anglo-Egyptian refugees began arriving in significant numbers in January 1957, over fifteen thousand Hungarians had already been brought to Britain as part of its contribution to the UNHCR-led resettlement programme.⁵² And here they, at least initially, found an enthusiastic welcome, with people opening their homes to them, donating money and clothes and making offers of housing and work.⁵³ This was often in direct contrast to public responses to the arrival of the Anglo-Egyptians:

The expellees could hardly be other than an embarrassment. The Hungarian refugees were a national political asset: the Anglo-Egyptians a considerable liability. A fairly general reaction was that the government should be responsible for helping those who had suffered, in some measure at least, as a result of their own policies.⁵⁴

These attitudes were baldly reflected in monetary terms: in contrast to the £2.3 million raised through the Lord Mayor's

⁵⁰ 'The England of Shakespeare, Dickens — and Indifference', *The Manchester Guardian*, 11 Feb. 1957.

⁵¹ Bill Schwarz (ed.), *West Indian Intellectuals in Britain* (Manchester, 2003), editor's intro., 8.

⁵² For more on the general background to the Hungarian revolution and the political fallout, see Charles Gati, *Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt* (Stanford, CA, 2006).

⁵³ Becky Taylor, "'Their Only Words of English Were 'Thank You'": Rights, Gratitude and "Deserving" Hungarian Refugees to Britain in 1956', *Journal of British Studies*, lv, 1 (2016); Jordanna Bailkin, *Unsettled: Refugee Camps and the Making of Multicultural Britain* (New York, 2018).

⁵⁴ TNA, AST7/1621, Political and Economic Planning, draft report, 'Refugees in Britain', 8 Jan 1958, para. 39.

Fund for the Hungarians, the Anglo-Egyptian appeal only attracted £100,000.⁵⁵ This highlights the importance of looking beyond simple citizen status when thinking about the reception of different groups arriving in western European countries in this period. Over the winter of 1956–7 the alien status of Hungarians was to trump the British citizenship of the Anglo-Egyptians, as it came combined with British understandings of the Hungarians as active, and indeed heroic, allies in the Cold War. By contrast the Anglo-Egyptians seemed to embody little more than the failed act of an outdated empire.

We get a sense of the ways that the ‘hard’ fact of Anglo-Egyptian citizenship collided with the ‘soft’ parameters of citizenship in a poem by ‘Mercutio’ printed in the *Manchester Guardian* in February 1957. This piece tried to argue that the Anglo-Egyptians were British and, as such, should have been welcomed with open arms by the wider public when they sought refuge in Britain. Instead, the author lamented, ‘[C]ompatriots from Egypt rouse no charitable zeal . . . The public is indifferent to all official pleas/To welcome as *kith and kin* the British refugees’.⁵⁶ Such a claim of ‘kith and kin’ was not unproblematic, and Mercutio got into something of a tangle trying to position the Anglo-Egyptians as blood kin to the wider British population: ‘Britons out of Egypt thrown quite destitute of means/(Except for British Cypriots, since naturalized Hellenes)/Although not Anglo-Saxon born but actually Maltese’.⁵⁷ As much as Mercutio worked to make the case for the Anglo-Egyptians’ innate Britishness, such belabouring of the point worked only to emphasize their foreignness. And given the endemic nature of anti-Semitism in British society, it was perhaps unsurprising that Mercutio did not dwell on the one section of the Anglo-Egyptians who did have kin in Britain — stateless Jews who had been living in Egypt and for whom the government had taken responsibility, if they could prove that they had relations living in the United Kingdom.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Mercutio, ‘The British Refugees’, *The Manchester Guardian*, 2 Feb. 1957. Emphasis added.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Leonard Cohen, Honorary Treasurer, Manchester Jewish Refugee Committee, *Manchester Guardian*, 30 Jan. 1957, letter to the editor. More generally on anti-Semitism in post-war Britain see Graham Macklin, “‘A Quite Natural and Moderate Defensive Feeling’? The 1945 Hampstead “Anti-Alien”

Consequently, although Mercutio tried to claim natural blood-like ties between the Anglo-Egyptians and the wider British population, the poem also accepted the reality of the situation on the ground. The grudging nature of the British public's response to the plight of their 'fellow Britons' — that is the gulf between the Anglo-Egyptians' 'hard' citizenship and popular, 'soft', perceptions of their citizenship status — had a material consequence: 'And since the British public will not rally to their aid/This Suez supplementary must by the State be paid'.⁵⁹ Mercutio may have been idiosyncratic in expressing his or her feelings through verse, but the sentiment articulated — that as the British government had precipitated the crisis, it should be responsible for any fallout from the illegal Suez invasion — had wider resonance. The foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, similarly argued in Cabinet that 'we should treat [the Anglo-Egyptians] generously because their misfortunes are due to our own act'.⁶⁰ Although, as we will see in the final section of this article, Selwyn Lloyd's reasoning prevailed, it was never uncontested. It sat at odds, first, with civil servants' mistrust of Maltese, 'Mediterranean', 'southern types' and Jews; and second, with the gulf in public legitimacy between Anglo-Egyptians' claims and those of the Hungarian refugees, who were able to tap into a different and more powerful narrative of deserving, provided by their status as Cold War heroes.

Such ambivalence was not unique to the Anglo-Egyptians and to Britain: we find similar dynamics present within both France and Portugal as they sought to articulate respectively the implications of the arrival of the *pieds-noirs* and *retornados*. Sometimes this was embedded within the very words chosen to label the returnees. In Portugal, the word *retornados* designated a migrant citizen defined by legal texts, but it was also a

(n. 58 cont.)

Petition', *Patterns of Prejudice*, xxxvii, 3 (2003); Hannah Ewence, "Hands Across the Tea": Re-negotiating Jewish Identity and Belonging in Post-war Suburban Britain', in Maria Diemling and Larry Ray (eds.), *Boundaries, Identity and belonging in Modern Judaism* (London, 2015), 153–6.

⁵⁹ Mercutio, 'The British Refugees'.

⁶⁰ TNA, CAB 195/16/7, Cabinet notes, 29 Jan 1957. In the final printed version, his words were rendered differently, as 'the Government had a more general duty towards these people, since their misfortunes were directly attributable to the action which the Government had felt obliged to take against Egypt'. See TNA, CAB 128/31/4, Conclusions of meeting of the Cabinet held at Downing Street, 29 Jan 1957.

colloquialism used by politicians, NGOs, the media, and in everyday conversations. Often it was used pejoratively, and it soon became a stigma. Many migrants felt the word *retornados* was not only insulting, but also inappropriate, as about a third of them had been born in the colonies and were entering Portugal for the first time in their lives — thus not returning home, but rather forced to flee their African home. But even as many of them identified themselves as refugees, they were not considered as such either by the Portuguese state or the UNHCR under the terms of the 1951 Geneva convention, insofar as they held Portuguese citizenship.⁶¹ At the same time, however, their ‘hard’ legal citizenship did not translate neatly or swiftly into the ‘soft’ citizenship of unquestioned belonging to the imagined national community either.

Many resident Portuguese saw the returnees as competitors in a tight housing and job market, and they begrudged them the government’s special aid programme that supported their integration. Additionally, after the revolution had ended Portugal’s authoritarian dictatorship and empire simultaneously while also shifting politics to the left, many associated the *retornados* with conservative and far-right political circles. More specifically still, many resented the former settlers because they felt that it had been for their sake, and their sake only, that sons, brothers, fathers and uncles had been forced to fight, as conscripted soldiers, in a politically unwinnable and extremely violent war against the national liberation movements in the colonies.⁶² Thus the returning settlers became convenient scapegoats who were blamed almost exclusively for a system of colonial and racial domination when in reality, of course, most Portuguese people had been complicit in one way or the other. Finally, in the minds of the resident Portuguese, the *retornados* were associated not only politically with a colonial world fallen into disgrace through decolonization, but also culturally. Their clothes were perceived to be too colourful and revealing, they were associated with prostitution and the spread of marijuana, in

⁶¹ Christoph Kalter, ‘Rückkehr oder Flucht? Dekolonisierung, Zwangsmigration und Portugals *retornados*’, *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, xlv, 2 (2018).

⁶² Ângela Campos, *An Oral History of the Portuguese Colonial War: Conscripted Generation* (Cham, 2017); Maria José Lobo Antunes, *Regressos quase perfeitos: Memórias da guerra em Angola* (Lisbon, 2015).

short, with social transgression and an 'African' permissiveness.⁶³ Decolonization, in the metropole itself, thus played out as a form of cultural clash between citizens of the same nation. In this clash, residents accepted the legal status and corresponding rights of their fellow citizens who were migrants, but disputed their social and cultural Portuguese-ness, treating them instead as 'internal strangers' even as some of them literally returned to the tight-knit rural communities from where they had emigrated to the African colonies earlier.⁶⁴

Not only villagers, but even some high-ranking officials in Lisbon viewed the returnees as threatening or undeserving strangers. In an internal memo from July 1975, Fernando Cardoso do Amaral, the first director of the Institute for the Support of the Return of the Nationals (IARN), the public body created to facilitate the migrants' reinsertion, associated the *retornados* with 'exotic' diseases, a liberal sexuality, shady economic activities and a 'reactionary' threat to the revolution.⁶⁵ Some also contributed to the negative stereotyping publicly: in April 1976, for example, Secretary of State for the Returnees Amândio de Azevedo spoke on national television about 'exorbitant sums' of 'public money' being expended on the returnees' restaurant coupons and housing in hotels, and declared that these 'privileges' needed to be abolished.⁶⁶

Most of the time, however, officials insisted in public on the idea that the *retornados* were people in distress, but otherwise Portuguese just like everybody else. They exhorted the resident population to support those they presented as brothers from overseas, in an effort of 'national solidarity', an idea that politicians and migrant associations alike invoked time and again as the moral basis for the swift integration that they wanted to achieve. Such insistence on this re-imagined community of the Portuguese people in official statements, media and migrant

⁶³ See, for example, the testimonies in Sarah Adamopoulos, *Voltar: Memória do Colonialismo e da Descolonização* (Lisbon, 2012).

⁶⁴ Stephen C. Lubkemann, 'The Moral Economy of Portuguese Postcolonial Return', *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies*, xi, 2 (2002).

⁶⁵ Fernando Cardoso do Amaral, *Informação*, Lisboa, 16.07.1975, Portugal, Arquivo da Cruz Vermelha Portuguesa, folder 'Ofícios e Circulares recebidos do IARN'.

⁶⁶ Portugal/Rádio e Televisão de Portugal/Direção de Emissão e Arquivo, Broadcast 'Declarações de Amândio de Azevedo-Noticiário nacional', 1976-04-30.

activism sought to legitimize the considerable resources mobilized for these newcomers in the eyes of the resident population. At the same time, this rhetoric was meant to appease those returnees — that is, nearly all of them — who fundamentally lost something through decolonization, be it material goods, social privileges, friends and family, or a sense of home. The reconciliatory melody of national integration afforded the warm caress of ‘soft’ citizenship, and, as such, it effectively prepared, framed, advanced and helped to interpret the processes of migrant incorporation, while at the same time normalizing or seeking to undo the disruption that decolonization had brought to the settlers.

A similar story had unfolded a decade previously in France. Like their Portuguese counterparts, many *pieds-noirs* rejected the ‘repatriate’ label assigned to them by the government, even while availing themselves of the significant protections and material assistance the designation entitled them to: ‘I don’t use the term “repatriates”’, explained one *pied-noir*, ‘because we are not repatriates, we are the de-patriated and refugees’.⁶⁷ The interviewee’s choice of words reflected the keen sense of trauma and victimhood experienced within the wider *pied-noir* community. Such linguistic resistance was also a way to disavow government attempts to use the terminology of repatriation to downplay the enormity of the catastrophe they had experienced, which reduced what *pieds-noirs* viewed as their forcible ‘exile’ from Algeria to ‘the logical integration of a population into its country of origin’.⁶⁸

Trying to assuage their grief regarding their displacement, many *pieds-noirs* looked to their metropolitan French compatriots for support. The welcome they received was not warm, however, especially in places such as Marseille which bore the migratory brunt, receiving 60 per cent of the arrivals.⁶⁹ Suddenly forced to compete with many thousands of additional people for access to shops and services, residents of Marseille resented the disruption caused by the repatriates, especially

⁶⁷ Nicole Giraud interviewed in Dominique Fargues, *Mémoires de Pieds-Noirs* (Paris, 2008), 201.

⁶⁸ Yann Scioldo-Zürcher, ‘Reflections on Return and the “Migratory Projects” of the *Français d’Algérie*’, in Scott Soo and Sharif Gemie (eds.), *Coming Home? Vol. 2, Conflict and Postcolonial Return Migration in the Context of France and North Africa, 1962–2009* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 2013), 53.

⁶⁹ Smith (ed.), *Europe’s Invisible Migrants*, editor’s intro., 20.

when this was manifested through rising prices and crime rates. *Pieds-noirs* were also deemed liable for the costly and messy Algerian War which had seen around one million metropolitan Frenchmen reluctantly conscripted, some twenty-five thousand of whom were killed.⁷⁰ Negative feelings towards a group held responsible for embroiling their sons, brothers and fathers in this now-lost conflict were further exacerbated by the strong association in metropolitan minds between the settlers and the Secret Army Organization (OAS). Several high-profile members of this clandestine group of dissident French soldiers and settlers, who had committed a series of terrorist acts in Algeria and France in a bid to derail independence negotiations, were still being brought to justice in the summer of 1962.⁷¹ And so, as in Portugal, *pieds-noirs* were suspected of harbouring reactionary and radical political views that posed a threat to the Republic.⁷²

The vocal expression of these various views and resentments left *pieds-noirs* feeling distinctly unwelcome, if not actively victimized. In a bid to ameliorate tensions, the local press reportedly suppressed stories of clashes between the two communities, while national newspapers, at the behest of a government keen both to promote rapid assimilation and to legitimate the vast sums of money being spent on the recent arrivals, stressed the plight of the *pieds-noirs* in an attempt to engender feelings of sympathy and solidarity. Yet government and press exhortations to welcome the European repatriates as fellow countrymen only went so far; as the newspaper *France Observateur* noted, they did not stop the inhabitants of areas most directly affected, such as Provence and the Languedoc, 'passing on by word of mouth stories about the cheeky, loud, rude, always dissatisfied "pieds-noirs"'.⁷³ Like the Anglo-Egyptians and the *retornados*, what *pieds-noirs* were forced to confront was the dissonance between hard and soft notions of belonging, and with it the realization that legally being French was not the same as being accepted as such by your fellow

⁷⁰ Martin Evans, *Algeria: France's Undeclared War* (Oxford, 2012), 336–8.

⁷¹ Philippe Bouba, *L'Arrivée des pieds-noirs en Roussillon en 1962* (Canet, 2009), 145.

⁷² Sung E. Choi, 'From Colonial Settler to Postcolonial Repatriate: The Integration of the French from Algeria, 1962 to the Present' (University of California, Los Angeles, Ph.D. thesis, 2007), 117; Shepard, *Invention of Decolonization*, 239.

⁷³ 'L'isolement des pieds-noirs', *France-Observateur*, 643 (30 August 1962).

countrymen.⁷⁴ Fully cognizant of this gap and its potential negative consequences, the British, French and Portuguese governments took a range of concrete steps to address the situation, focusing above all on welfare provision. Such measures were intended to minimize any sense of grievance while ensuring a smooth and, crucially, face-saving integration process. Yet welfare practices, particularly through the continuation of their long-standing imbrication with colonial coercion and control, also remind us of the conditionality of state responses to their own citizens.

III WELFARE

Coupled with the ‘soft’ citizenship rhetoric of governmental duty or national solidarity, the legal rights granted to migrants by virtue of their ‘hard’ citizenship corresponded to a promise of inclusion. This promise, however, was in tension with those practices of ‘soft’ citizenship through which neighbours, the media, or even officials, across the different national contexts, painted the returnees as outsiders. Governments typically strove to resolve this tension, gain credibility in the eyes of the migrants (who, as citizens, were also potential voters), and ease the social conflicts provoked or exacerbated by their arrival. This required closing the gap between the promise of inclusion and its incomplete realization or, worse, the outright disdain many resident citizens showed for the newly arrived ‘internal strangers’. To understand how this was attempted at both the national and the local, grass-roots level, we now explore how returnees were dealt with in material, rather than discursive terms, within the institutions and practices of the welfare state. As we will see, the workings of public welfare over the years were crucial in making returnees’ inclusion a social reality, while at the same time producing new discrimination and a racialization of state support.

Initially, the British government made no acknowledgement of the gap between the Anglo-Egyptians’ ‘hard’ and ‘soft’

⁷⁴ For discussion of the historical lineage regarding doubts over the ‘Frenchness’ of the settler, see Emmanuel Sivan, ‘Colonialism and Popular Culture in Algeria’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, xiv, 1 (1979); Ali Yedes, ‘Social Dynamics in Colonial Algeria: The Question of *Pieds-Noirs* Identity’, in Tyler Stovall and Georges Van den Abbeele (eds.), *French Civilization and its Discontents: Nationalism, Colonialism, Race* (Lanham, MD, 2003), 235–49.

citizenship status, a position which was reflected in how they were first treated. Once in Britain, many of the arrivals went, initially at least, to hostels run by the National Assistance Board, the government department which managed all non-contributory welfare benefits and supplementary welfare payments. They also immediately had access to all standard non-contributory welfare benefits, health care via the NHS and education. So far so simple: the Anglo-Egyptians gained entry to Britain by virtue of their citizenship and, once there, had access to the same benefits and services as others living in the United Kingdom.

But once we scratch the surface, things were not so simple. This is not the place to discuss the shortcomings of the National Assistance Board's pay-scales, although its rates were to become the subject of attack by the late 1950s, while its inability to meet the complex needs of refugees had long been recognized.⁷⁵ Officials dealing with the reception and resettlement of the Anglo-Egyptians were quick to grasp that the Board was ill-equipped to cope with the sudden arrival and multiple needs of seven thousand Anglo-Egyptians, most of whom had left all but their barest possessions behind. As we have seen, a broad spectrum of the British public saw no reason to support the Anglo-Egyptians. Unlike the Hungarian resettlement effort which was largely financed through the non-state Lord Mayor's Fund, the Anglo-Egyptian Aid Society, through which the limited funds which had been collected through public donations were channelled, was in no position to cover anything more than a tiny fraction of the costs of Anglo-Egyptian resettlement in Britain.

Consequently, the government bridged the gap via the mechanism of a bespoke body, the Anglo-Egyptian Resettlement Board (AERB), formed in February 1957, funded directly by a central government grant and staffed by seconded civil servants. Creating this new administrative machinery allowed government to circumvent the strictures of National Assistance pay-rates, as the AERB was empowered to use its discretion in making

⁷⁵ John Veit-Wilson, 'The National Assistance Board and the "Rediscovery" of Poverty', in Helen Fawcett and Rodney Lowe (eds.), *Welfare Policy in Britain: The Road from 1945* (Basingstoke, 1999). On problems with the Assistance Board and National Assistance Board meeting the needs of refugees, see Taylor, *Refugees in Twentieth-Century Britain*.

payments and loans to the Anglo-Egyptians. As the summary report put it, ‘the Government decided that these British expatriates should be treated *in a special manner*, and that it was inappropriate that the National Assistance Board, which was tied to the normal scale of relief payments, should continue to look after them’.⁷⁶ Its activities were wide-ranging, covering grants for clothing and personal needs, deposits on houses, purchases of bulky items such as furniture and tools, and loans to enable the refugees to establish new businesses. The Board worked closely with the Ministry of Labour and National Service to find jobs for refugees, and also paid the cost of passage of the approximately 1,300 refugees who decided they wanted to re-emigrate, most commonly to Australia.⁷⁷

The benefits to the refugees of creating the AERB were clear as, unlike the National Assistance Board, it was able to take an expansive view of what constituted need, or a reasonable payment: ‘[I]n all their work the provision has been generous . . . some of the refugees have been living in furnished flats, with the rent paid by the Board . . . resettlement grants . . . are generous, for example, £50 for clothing, and £750–£1000 for furniture and the deposit for a house. These grants are not repayable, but are free gifts’.⁷⁸ In contrast to the Hungarians still remaining in reception camps who, when the £2.5 million Lord Mayor’s Fund money ran out, found themselves maintained by the National Assistance Board, Anglo-Egyptians continued to be supported by their dedicated Board up to its dissolution in 1960. By the end of 1957, the Anglo-Egyptian Resettlement Board had already spent £3.5 million in the support of six thousand Anglo-Egyptians who had turned to it for aid, a far larger sum than ever went on the reception and resettlement of some nineteen thousand Hungarian refugees.⁷⁹

We do find lingering traces among civil servants of the racialized attitudes expressed in the early days of the Suez crisis as they sought to place the Anglo-Egyptians in work. Recalcitrant job-seekers were described as ‘gregarious’, ‘accompanied by various relatives’, ‘full of charm’, having a

⁷⁶ TNA, AST7/1621, Political and Economic Planning, draft report, ‘Refugees in Britain’, 8 Jan. 1958, para. 29. Emphasis added.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 31.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 29.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 36.

'leisurely approach to life', or as putting more effort into establishing business contacts than in finding waged labour.⁸⁰ These descriptions revealed an impatience over 'Mediterranean' attitudes failing to adapt to new 'Anglo-Saxon' realities. But such low-level griping could not undermine the political imperative which had driven the creation of the AERB. Thus, what we see is a significant evolution of policy in treatment of the Anglo-Egyptians in the months following the Suez invasion. If the British government had been initially reluctant to honour the citizenship of some of the Anglo-Egyptians, it ultimately decided to apply what we might think of as a 'post-colonial citizenship bonus', in the form of unrestricted payments and grants, once they had entered the country's shores. Given Britain's hand in precipitating the Anglo-Egyptians' flight, and the government's desire to downplay the extent of calamity in the Suez, it was imperative that the refugees' situation once in Britain caused the government no further embarrassment. Indeed, through being seen to honour their citizenship and respond to their needs apparently fully and effectively, government might demonstrate that it had full mastery of the post-Suez situation.

These issues were also at stake with respect to the migration of European settlers from Algeria, although the size of the population movement placed the French government under significantly more stress. In the early 1960s, as Algerian independence seemed ever more likely, it became equally clear that the existing mechanisms for dealing with citizens displaced by decolonization, already showing serious signs of strain, would not be sufficient. Consequently, in December 1961, a new and comprehensive welfare regime — the Boulin Law — was announced. Named after the first dedicated Secretary of State for Repatriates, Robert Boulin, the law substantially expanded the type of assistance available, and simplified and broadened the definition of those able to benefit from state aid. Now it was to include all French men and women 'having or expecting to have to leave, as a result of political events, a land where they

⁸⁰ See, for example, TNA, LAB 12/933, A. Y. W. Cowie and J. Oates, Confidential Summary Report of an Enquiry during February 1957 into the arrangements for placing Hungarian and Anglo-Egyptian Refugees, 28 Feb 1957; TNA, LAB 8/2339, Frobisher Hall Hostel, Co-ordinating Committee meeting, 29 May 1957, and Hammersmith Employment Exchange, British Subjects from Egypt: Registrants Proving Difficult to Place, 30 Dec. 1957.

were settled and which was previously placed under the sovereignty, protectorate or administration of France'.⁸¹ These measures were spelled out by a decree on 10 March 1962 and then supplemented by a further 323 legal texts between 1962 and 1970.⁸² Cumulatively, they represented the French government's new and consciously interventionist approach, one centred on integrating the repatriates into the nation's social and economic structures as quickly and comprehensively as possible. Policies included accelerated social housing programmes and the reservation of 20 to 30 per cent of these dwellings for repatriates; subsidized loans to facilitate purchases of homes, businesses or agricultural land; access to all regular forms of social aid without the usual stipulations regarding residency periods and documentation; a monthly cash subsidy of 350 francs, slightly above the minimum wage, for up to one year while repatriates searched for employment commensurate with their skills and experience; and additional financial support for those unable to work or in other vulnerable situations. By 1970, an estimated 26 billion francs had been spent on various forms of aid.⁸³ Although there were shortcomings and certain groups and individuals did fall through the cracks, the state, assisted by a booming economy and an unusual degree of cross-party political support, succeeded in its fundamental aim of avoiding the socio-economic marginalization of the repatriates.

These exceptional measures were predicated on the citizenship of the repatriates and the concomitant government determination to protect them from the socio-economic disadvantages that usually accompanied mass displacement. The policies enacted were not intended to promote social mobility, nor to erase socio-economic differences, but rather to ensure integration on comparable terms. When drafting the Boulin Law, its namesake insisted that the text centre on the principle of 'national solidarity', rather than compensation, which was what many repatriates were pressing for. By anchoring the law in the concept of national solidarity, officials were able to claim that

⁸¹ Loi 61-1429, *Journal Officiel de la République française*, 28 December 1961. Paradoxically, the generosity of these provisions was meant to encourage the settler community to remain in Algeria by reassuring them that, if the worst came to pass, they would be taken care of.

⁸² Scioldo-Zürcher, *Devenir métropolitain*, 181.

⁸³ *Ibid.* 300.

this unprecedented aid was something all citizens could expect from the state, and to obscure the extent to which it was, in fact, a specific set of measures directed at a particular group.⁸⁴ As well as a duty owed by the state to its citizens, integration was also viewed as a way of effecting national reconciliation, with the successful insertion of the repatriates into French society enabling the page to be turned on the previous eight years of conflict.

Indeed, it is worth noting that the initial hostility to the *pied-noir* presence and their supposedly ‘un-French’ behaviour, outlined in section II above, was primarily connected to the scale and suddenness of their arrival and the associated disruption. Government and press exhortations to welcome the European repatriates as fellow countrymen notwithstanding, there were sufficient ethnic, religious, linguistic and other cultural similarities for assimilation to never really be in doubt. Consequently, as material strains eased, aided in no small part by the booming French economy and the increasing visibility of a *pied-noir* contribution to that process, so too did resentment towards the community. This enabled the state to claim, with justification, that their carefully managed process of socio-economic integration, and the efforts to align ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ notions of citizenship that underpinned this, had been a success, even if many *pieds-noirs* did not agree with this assessment as evidenced by the campaigns they would lead over subsequent decades for ever-greater levels of material compensation and commemorative recognition.

Despite their very vocal protestations to the contrary, for *pieds-noirs* state welfare was one arena in which ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ categories of citizenship overlapped. In contrast, for the *harkis*, welfare highlighted the considerable gap between these two articulations of citizenship, confirming both the racialized nature of state aid and the ‘otherness’ of this postcolonial community. Whereas the goal for repatriates in general was to integrate them into the wider French population as quickly as possible, *harkis* and their families were funnelled through various institutional environments, notably a series of camps in isolated, rural areas, several of which had long histories of housing those the Republic deemed undesirable, often foreign populations that the state

⁸⁴ Shepard, *Invention of Decolonization*, 234.

wished to separate from the rest of society. Kept together, away from the mainstream population, *harkis* were subjected to intrusive levels of oversight: set times for meals, showers and electricity; their post opened and read by camp staff; permission required to leave the camps, even temporarily, which were in some cases surrounded by barbed wire.⁸⁵ These measures were justified as necessary to allow the community time to acculturate to life in France.

Such logic perpetuated the close association between welfare and colonial ideologies.⁸⁶ It was also used to defend the fact that although *harkis* were entitled to the same financial aid as other repatriates, rather than distribute this directly to individuals or families, the state instead used the money to cover the costs of running the camps.⁸⁷ Rudimentary facilities, overcrowding, constant surveillance and interference from state agents, including the military, served as constant reminders to the *harkis* and their families that they were not like other repatriates, irrespective of what it might say on their *carte d'identité*.⁸⁸ As Dalila Kerchouche sarcastically noted, becoming French citizens for the second time in December 1962 did nothing to improve the practical situation of her *harki* father and his family: 'The identity card does not warm them up, does not feed their children and changes nothing about their living conditions [in the Bourg-Lastic camp]'.⁸⁹ In total, an estimated 42,500 people passed through *harki* camps between 1962 and 1969.⁹⁰ Although most camps closed in the mid 1960s, some remained open longer: in 1974, more than a decade after arriving in

⁸⁵ See Miller, 'A Camp for Foreigners and "Aliens" '.

⁸⁶ See, for example, Amelia H. Lyons, *The Civilizing Mission in the Metropole: Algerian Families and the French Welfare State During Decolonization* (Stanford, CA, 2013); Ed Naylor (ed.), *France's Modernising Mission: Citizenship, Welfare and the Ends of Empire* (Basingstoke, 2018).

⁸⁷ Saliha Abdellatif, 'Le Français musulman ou une entité préfabriqué', *Hommes et migrations*, no. 1135 (Sept. 1990), *Les harkis et leurs enfants*, 32; Joël Mettay, *L'Archipel du mépris: histoire du camp de Rivesaltes de 1939 à nos jours* (Canet, 2001), 120–2.

⁸⁸ Abderahmen Moumen, 'Camp de Rivesaltes, Camp Saint-Maurice-l'Ardoise: L'accueil et le reclassement des harkis en France', *Les Temps modernes*, no. 666 (Nov.–Dec. 2011), 107; Miller, 'A Camp for Foreigners and "Aliens"', 30; Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, 'Harkis: le paradoxe identitaire', *Regards sur l'actualité*, no. 175 (Nov. 1991), 36.

⁸⁹ Dalila Kerchouche, *Mon père, ce harki* (Paris, 2003), 62.

⁹⁰ Wihtol de Wenden, 'Harkis', 36.

France, sixteen thousand people were still resident on two sites.⁹¹

Furthermore, departure often simply signalled a transfer to alternative institutional environments such as forest hamlets, temporary estates or purpose-built social housing which replicated the basic living conditions and strict monitoring of the camps. Indeed, the Kerchouche family spent time in the camps of Bourg-Lastic, Rivesaltes and Bias, followed by a forest hamlet in the Lozère department before eventually moving into their own home in 1974, twelve years after they initially arrived in France.⁹² As Jeanette Miller has eloquently argued, the repercussions of these initial exilic and isolated years in France continue to this day, particularly among descendants of *harkis* who have struggled to integrate in spite of their (reclaimed) French citizenship.⁹³ This explains the sustained campaigns waged by descendants of *harkis* who have demanded material assistance alongside official recognition of the history of their community, particularly the sacrifices made by their fathers for France.⁹⁴

In the case of Portugal, a new administrative infrastructure was also created to manage the needs of the *retornados*. Qualifying for returnee status meant being entitled to the help of the IARN, which was set up in March 1975 and found its activities expanding until it was disbanded in 1981 when the government deemed the returnees' integration complete. Towering in popular memories of the return, the IARN became infamous for interminable queues, overworked functionaries, chaotic paperwork, occasional corruption and a heated

⁹¹ Miller, 'A Camp for Foreigners and "Aliens"', 37.

⁹² Kerchouche, *Mon père, ce harki*.

⁹³ Miller, 'A Camp for Foreigners and "Aliens"', 36–7.

⁹⁴ Among the rapidly growing body of literature on this topic see Stéphanie Abrial, *Les enfants de harkis: de la révolte à l'intégration* (Paris, 2001); Claire Eldridge, "'We've never had a voice": Memory Construction and the Children of the Harkis, 1962–1991', *French History*, xxiii, 1 (2009); Régis Pierret, *Les filles et fils de Harkis: entre double rejet et triple appartenance* (Paris, 2008); Saliha Telali, *Les enfants des harkis: Entre silence et assimilation subie* (Paris, 2009). This remains a live political issue in France, with President Emmanuel Macron publicly, and not uncontroversially, requesting 'forgiveness' and promising recognition for the contribution made to France by *harkis*, in September 2021. 'Discours du Président de la République à l'occasion de la réception consacrée à la mémoire des harkis', 20 September 2021. Available at : <<https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2021/09/20/reception-consacree-a-la-memoire-des-harkis>> (accessed 25 Jan. 2022).

atmosphere kindled by the frustrations of those who spent entire days there, desperately trying to have their cases attended to. But it is also remembered as the institution that embodied the state's comprehensive effort to mitigate the debilitating effect of decolonization on the former settlers and Portuguese society as a whole. As novelist Dulce Maria Cardoso had her main character explain:

In almost every answer there was one word we had never heard before, the I.A.R.N., the I.A.R.N., the I.A.R.N. The I.A.R.N. had paid our air fares, the I.A.R.N. would put us up in hotels, the I.A.R.N. would pay for the transport to the hotels, the I.A.R.N. would give us food, the I.A.R.N. would give us money, the I.A.R.N. would help us, the I.A.R.N. would advise us, the I.A.R.N. would give us further information. I had never heard a single word repeated so many times, the I.A.R.N. seemed to be more important and generous than God.⁹⁵

Historians remove God from the equation, but corroborate the IARN's importance, not only in the initial emergency relief effort comprising foodstuff, clothing, transportation and cash payments, but also the rapid extension of the agency's activities into housing, employment, education, health, credit and pensions.⁹⁶ Scholars see the IARN, and the Portuguese state more broadly, as important drivers of the overall successful and fairly rapid socio-economic reinsertion of most returnees, but they also stress the long-term consequences of the state's engagement.⁹⁷ Before the 1974 Carnation Revolution, public welfare had been rudimentary in Portugal. The IARN, then, was the first concerted attempt to address the social vulnerability of a recognizable segment of the Portuguese population so as to make them, through the state aid provided, invisible again. Many benefits of Portugal's post-1977 social security system — including pensions, housing, family allowances and medical assistance — were first granted to the *retornados* via the IARN. In this sense, the return from the colonies not only prompted a

⁹⁵ Dulce Maria Cardoso, *The Return*, trans. Ángel Gurría-Quintana (London, 2016), 78.

⁹⁶ For the extent of this aid, see the official documentation in Comissariado para os Desalojados, *Relatório de actividades, Capítulo 1: Comissariado* (1979); Comissariado para os Desalojados, *Relatório de actividades, Capítulo 2: IARN* (1979); Comissariado para os Desalojados, *Relatório de actividades, Capítulo 3: Legislação* (1979).

⁹⁷ Christoph Kalter, 'Traumatic Loss, Successful Integration: The Agitated and the Soothing Memory of the Return from Portugal's African Empire', in Elsa Peralta (ed.), *The Retornados from the Portuguese Colonies in Africa: Memory, Narrative, and History* (New York, 2021).

momentous change in citizenship law and the ethnonational conception of the nation. It also served as a laboratory for a new welfare state aligned with the western European model that Portuguese elites wished to espouse.⁹⁸

While important in short- and long-term perspectives, the welfare benefits for decolonization migrants also had their limits, not least because the Portuguese authorities spent far less on the *retornados* than the French had on the *pièds-noirs*. Here historical timing was crucial: Portugal's already structurally weak economy was further debilitated by the fact that the return migration occurred in the midst of a global and national recession. Additionally, and in striking contrast to the French case where indemnification expanded from the 1970s, no Portuguese government ever agreed to pay any financial compensation for the material losses incurred by the returnees' departure from the colonies.

Furthermore, central state support depended on official *retornados* status, itself contingent on Portuguese nationality. Those who were newly excluded from Portuguese citizenship were also excluded from the IARN's remit, and the state tried to shift responsibility for these non-Portuguese to the UNHCR in the hope of reducing costs. Therefore, thousands of decolonization migrants, fleeing the same situations of single-party rule and civil war as the Portuguese settlers, but deprived of their citizenship through the 1975 nationality law, lived in a legal limbo for years. Some were now foreigners or stateless persons awaiting regularization; others were candidates for a refugee status that the authorities were painfully slow to legally implement.⁹⁹ None of them were entitled to the national solidarity expressed through welfare provisions that the state reserved for its citizens.

But even some migrants who retained their citizenship struggled. Settling into the metropole was particularly hard for

⁹⁸ Júlia Cardoso, 'Retornados e IARN: Um experimento no rumo de um Estado Providência em Portugal', *Intervenção Social*, xxiii/xxiv (2001); Nuno Dias, 'Remigrate and Return. History and State in the Architecture of Postcolonial Ethnicities in Portugal', *Cidades, Comunidades e Territórios*, xxvii (2013), <<https://revistas.rcaap.pt/cct/article/view/9307>> (accessed 2 Feb. 2020).

⁹⁹ Through Lei 38/80 de 1 de Agosto 1980, Direito de Asile e Estatuto do Refugiado, the Right to Asylum and the Statute of the Refugee was finally proclaimed in 1980. The UNHCR's representatives in Portugal had urged Portuguese lawmakers to take this step for years.

those who lacked family ties as well as economic, social or cultural capital and/or who, as Portuguese of colour, found it harder than the white *retornados* to overcome their status as ‘internal strangers’.¹⁰⁰ The state-paid emergency housing offers one window onto these difficult situations. Placed in a variety of facilities, ranging from luxury hotels to smaller boarding houses to holiday camps, in December 1976, 71,658 *retornados* (or some 15 per cent) were housed at the state’s expense.¹⁰¹ Because this proved too costly, by 1977–8 the state began emptying the hotels and relocating the occupants to cheaper facilities, often encountering much resistance and occasionally having to use physical force. These Temporary Accommodation Centres (CTAs) or Centres of Collective Accommodation (CACs) were frequently inadequate, as the conservative politician Ângelo Vieira, himself a *retornado*, pointed out in parliament:

From prisons, still functioning — which is the case of Tires (Cascais) and of Custóias (Porto) — to ancient prisons that are long since disused owing to insufficient conditions, and to military barracks (which is the case of the Leiria quarter), from ancient prisons for political prisoners (which is the case of the Forte de Peniche) to improvised agglomerations of barracks made of canvas or pre-fabricated components (which is the case of the Vale do Jamor), all [CACs] serve to lock away the displaced and the refugees, who, as it were, are new Jews or pariahs being relegated to ghettos. And do not think that what I have described here is shallow sensationalism — it was a representative of the IARN . . . himself who recognized the ‘highly precarious conditions of hygiene and salubrity’ of these CACs.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Stephen C. Lubkemann, ‘Race, Class, and Kin in the Negotiation of “Internal Strangerhood” among Portuguese Retornados, 1975–2000’, in Smith (ed.), *Europe’s Invisible Migrants*; Lubkemann, ‘The Moral Economy of Portuguese Postcolonial Return’; Stephen C. Lubkemann, ‘Unsettling the Metropole: Race and Settler Reincorporation in Postcolonial Portugal’, in Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen (eds.), *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies* (New York, 2005); Ricardo E. Ovalle-Bahamón, ‘The Wrinkles of Decolonisation and Nationness: White Angolans as Retornados in Portugal’, in Smith (ed.), *Europe’s Invisible Migrants*.

¹⁰¹ This statistic is from Comissariado para os Desalojados, *Relatório de actividades, Capítulo 2: IARN* (1979), 35. Percentage based on the conservative estimate of 500,000 *retornados*. See also Christoph Kalter, ‘Hotels for Refugees: Colonialism, Migration, and Tourism in Lisbon’, *Global Urban History Blog*, updated 2 March 2016, available at <<http://globalurbanhistory.com/2016/03/02/hotels-for-refugees-colonialism-migration-and-tourism-in-lisbon/>> (accessed 25 Jan. 2022).

¹⁰² Ângelo Vieira (CDS), *Diário da Assembleia da República, I Série I, II Legislatura*, no. 45, 02.03.1978, p. 1662.

Most CACs were not only unhygienic and uncomfortable, but were situated in sparsely populated areas, poor in natural resources and scarce in economic opportunities, especially for the many occupants whose educational credentials often sat somewhere between illiteracy and four years of basic schooling. These disadvantages were compounded by the classist and racist biases revealed in the comments of social workers or in the occasional confrontations with residents outside the CACs, some of which turned into brawls.¹⁰³ On the whole, foreigners and Portuguese of colour seem to have been over-represented in locales where housing conditions were worst and where they lived at the margins of society. To be clear, there was no intentional policy of racially segregated resettlement, and locales with particularly difficult living conditions such as the Vale do Jamor camp were less numerous and were dismantled sooner than in France. Nonetheless, the state's active integration policy for most *retornados*, globally successful although replete with hardships for many, was inseparable from the segregation of a minority, a situation which the state did nothing to prevent and which it often reinforced.¹⁰⁴ The intersectional discrimination some migrants suffered because of their citizenship, class, race and gender in a system that organized all support around the male head of household, was the Janus-face of generous welfare measures.

Attentive to the grass-roots dynamics that at times were in tension with the top-down approaches and the rhetoric of solidarity from national governments, this section has shown how, as much as governments promoted the reception of their returning citizens as the logical expression of their citizenship status, the reality was less clean. Although returnees in all three countries benefited from extra welfare support, over and above what resident citizens might receive, to varying degrees this support came in a racialized package. The small scale of the Anglo-Egyptian arrival meant that in Britain this was only ever

¹⁰³ See, for example, Manuel S., Relatório da equipe que se deslocou ao Distrito de Vila Real, 2 Feb.1976, PT/ADPRT/AC/IARN, pt. 86651; Albino F., Letter to Chefe do Departamento de Fiscalização no Porto, 23 May 1977, PT/ADPRT/AC/IARN, pt. 86723; Vermelho C., Relatório de Serviço Externo—Confidencial, no date, PT/CVP/AH, pt. P.a 82 C.A.C. Jamor II—1979.

¹⁰⁴ See Christoph Kalter, *Postcolonial People: The Return from Africa and the Remaking of Portugal* (Cambridge, 2022), esp. ch. 2. A similar conclusion is made in Lynn Hoefgen, *The Integration of Returnees from the Colonies into Portugal's Social and Economic Life* (Univ. of Florida Ph.D. thesis, 1985).

expressed in officials' grumblings over difficulties in placing certain Anglo-Egyptians in employment or housing. But in both France and Portugal, where the scale of arrivals was far more significant, such racialization of welfare support was hard-wired into practice, from the segregation of *harkis* in rural camps to the exclusion of the least privileged *retornados* in the CACs.

IV

CONCLUSION

This article has spanned three decades, three European empires, and three migrations vastly different in scale — the seven thousand Anglo-Egyptians pale into numerical insignificance when set against the over half a million *retornados* and one million *pieds-noirs*. In light of such disparities, what can we gain from this exercise? If nothing else, focusing on repatriates is a reminder of how, as Elizabeth Buettner has pointed out, decolonization involved not just the relinquishing of formal control over territory, but also coming to terms with the loss of an order which had privileged those identified as Europeans over others.¹⁰⁵ Erstwhile colonial space could no longer be taken for granted as European stamping-grounds, any more than those of European heritage could assume that they might continue to feel at home in the place of their birth. While such insight was not as widespread in 1956 as it was in 1975, the disordered arrival of returnees signalled to European societies, often in more tangible and dramatic ways than the hoisting of new flags in newly independent nations ever could, that the era of overseas empire was over.

What wasn't over, by contrast, was the impact colonialism exerted on metropolises that had to reinvent themselves as post-imperial nations. Part of the way this was done was through their treatment of returnees. Repatriates in 1956, 1962 and 1975 — whether or not they were actually returning — enjoyed, in comparison to other migrants, a 'postcolonial bonus' stemming directly from their citizen status that allowed them to access both regular and additional benefits in the metropole.¹⁰⁶ 'Hard' and 'soft' citizenship — the legal status of returnees and their

¹⁰⁵ Buettner, *Europe After Empire*, 5.

¹⁰⁶ On the notion of a postcolonial bonus, see Oostindie, *Postcolonial Netherlands*.

symbolic inclusion into the nation through the rhetoric of solidarity — thus mattered for individual repatriates. But both were also tools through which governments sought to cushion and obscure the disruptive changes brought by decolonization. Speaking of a ‘return’ of ‘repatriates’ or ‘fellow citizens’ toned down the notion of flight and forced migration, even though this was how many migrants themselves interpreted their journey. This discursive strategy enabled European powers to save face and downplay the significance of the geopolitical shift that was occurring and its implications for their own status within the world order.

While privileged in some respects, migrants of decolonization, including the bulk of these who still qualified as citizens, also carried a ‘postcolonial burden’.¹⁰⁷ Because they had lived in the colonies, their ‘hard’ legal citizenship did not always translate neatly or swiftly into the ‘soft’ citizenship of unquestioned belonging to the imagined national community. They were seen variously as too reactionary and as harbingers of moral laxity; blamed for having caused and sustained damaging and costly colonial wars; seen as loud, uncouth and as putting pressure on local housing, services and employment; or as embarrassing proof of imperial misadventures. But even while this might have been true for all repatriates, it is crucial to stress that full acceptance as citizens was most difficult to achieve for those who, due to their physical appearance, language skills, socio-cultural capital, place of residence, or other markers, were perceived as non-white. We first saw glimmers of this in how the expectations surrounding Anglo-Egyptians’ suitable work opportunities reinscribed the ways in which they were still viewed as ‘Others’, but far more distinctly for both the *harkis* and non-white *retornados*. For as the *harkis*’ experiences illustrated, citizenship — needing to be (re)claimed before a judge after 1962 — did not afford the equality of treatment promised by the supposedly ‘colour-blind’ French Republic. Instead, they became positioned as refugees who merited support only as an exceptional act of charity, rather than because

¹⁰⁷ For a critical discussion of Oostindie’s notion of a postcolonial bonus and for the argument of a ‘postcolonial burden’, Jennifer Reichelt, ‘Bonus or Burden? Understanding Postcolonial Migration to the Netherlands in the Twentieth Century’, unpublished term paper, MA Global History, Freie Universität Berlin, 2020.

of any kind of legal or moral obligation on the part of the state. And although they were afforded the same benefits as *pieds-noirs*, financial and other support was channelled through those running the camps rather than disbursed individually, thus replicating the deeply unequal power dynamics and dependencies of the colonial era. In Portugal, we similarly find a contraction in the state's reformulated definition of 'Portugueseness', creating in the process a permanent 'Other' out of non-white migrants. Although, in contrast to France, this was not reflected in a state-mandated physical separation of returnees, those of colour ended up in the poorest quality housing and granted only the most basic forms of benefits. Through a vicious circle of racialization, these populations' poorer socio-economic position served to reinforce the idea among both state agents such as social workers, as well as among the general population, that their predicament was due to their race and not to external structural factors. Thus, it was those returnees racialized as non-white who ultimately carried the heaviest postcolonial burden.


Exploring how 'hard' and 'soft' forms of citizenship were applied through welfare services can expose the importance of less codified formulations of citizenship in returnees' experiences of settlement across western European nations. Bringing the British, French and Portuguese migrations of decolonization into conversation highlights significant commonalities across nations, thus challenging reductive national narratives which attribute the success or failure of resettlement and integration to the character of the migrants themselves or the virtues of the receiving state and society. In turn, this opens the way to joining up the experiences of returnees with those of other migrants who often also found their day-to-day experiences of life at odds with their formal immigration status, thus creating more agile and holistic understanding of mobility and belonging within Europe's recent history.

Finally, comparisons not only reveal historical patterns that debunk the entrenched exceptionalism typical of French, British and Portuguese national narratives — or of national narratives *tout court*. At the level of historiographical practice, comparisons equally point towards novel forms of working together. If we want to go beyond scratching the surface, the global turn in history writing, with its focus on comparisons, connections and

global contexts, is truly challenging.¹⁰⁸ It often requires more place-specific historical knowledge, including of primary sources and historiographies, than one scholar alone can muster. Writing collaboratively, as we have done for this article, is one obvious solution to this problem. While moving beyond ‘the “lone-scholar” model’ is perhaps most urgent when researching wide-ranging multi-continental histories, it can, as we hope to have demonstrated here, prove effective for the history of migration and decolonization within Europe too.¹⁰⁹

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¹⁰⁸ Sebastian Conrad, *What is Global History?* (Princeton, 2016).

¹⁰⁹ For further thoughts on this, see the Afro-Asian Networks Research Collective, ‘Manifesto: Networks of Decolonisation in Asia and Africa’, *Radical History Review*, cxxxi (2018); Su Lin Lewis and Carlien Stolte, ‘Other Bandungs: Afro-Asian Internationalisms in the Early Cold War’, *Journal of World History*, xxx, 1 (2019); Alys Eve Weinbaum *et al.* (eds.), *The Modern Girl Around the World: Consumption, Modernity, and Globalization* (Durham, NC, 2008).

ABSTRACT

Among its many global impacts, decolonization triggered the migration of several million ‘repatriates’ — white settlers or others associated with the imperial power — who left Asia and Africa and ‘returned’ to their European ‘motherlands’. This article explores the arrival of several thousand Anglo-Egyptians into Britain in 1957 following the Suez crisis, the one million *piets-noirs* who left Algeria for France in 1962, and the 500,000 *retornados* who entered Portugal amidst the 1975 Carnation Revolution. Offering an integrated comparison of these three key moments of decolonization via the migrations they triggered, it underscores the importance of citizenship, understood here as both a ‘hard’ legal category and a set of ‘soft’ social practices. The comparison equally demonstrates how, across different national contexts, citizenship was unevenly applied. Despite holding the same rights, returnee-citizens faced discrimination from resident-citizens in subtle (and sometimes less subtle) ways. Moreover, subgroups of returnee-citizens were treated differently by the state, in a process that amounted at times to their physical and social segregation and a racialization of welfare. This unevenness of treatment illuminates how the British, French, and Portuguese national communities were reimagined in the era of decolonization, and the crucial role ‘repatriated’ citizens played in that process.