

1 **Economic impacts of climate-induced crop yield changes: Evidence**
2 **from agri-food industries in six countries**

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13
14 **Abstract**

15 The potential impact of climate change on agriculture has been one of the most discussed
16 topics in the literature on climate change. Although the possible impacts of climate change on
17 crop yields have been widely studied, there remains little quantitative understanding of the
18 heterogeneous economic responses to climate-induced crop yield changes in different
19 economies, particularly at higher levels of warming. This study assesses the economic impacts
20 of eight scenarios of warming, from 1.5° to 4°C, on rice and wheat yields in China, India, Brazil,
21 Egypt, Ghana and Ethiopia. The role of both natural and social factors in crop production are
22 considered by coupling a statistical crop model (ClimaCrop) and a global economic model
23 (GTAP). Changes in economic outputs, consumer and producer prices, and national economic
24 welfare are presented. The study shows marginal benefits of crop yield changes on GDP and
25 welfare in China up to 3.5°C and 3.0°C respectively. This is due to projected increases in rice
26 yields which lower domestic consumer rice prices. Although at higher warming levels these
27 trends begin to reverse. The other countries are negatively impacted due to declining crop
28 yields, with increasing consumer prices of domestic and imported rice and wheat. GDP and
29 welfare declines, with more severe reductions associated with the higher warming levels,
30 particularly in India and Ethiopia. The method is beneficial as the economic outputs reflect a
31 more in-depth picture of the response of global markets and ultimately regional consequences
32 of agricultural impacts that will be of importance to decision makers.

33 **Keywords:** Climate change; Crop yield; Economic effects; CGE modelling

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37 **1 Introduction**

38 Climate change is already reducing crop yields in some parts of the world (IPCC 2014), whilst
39 climate-change related extreme weather events, such as heat-waves, droughts and floods, have
40 highlighted the major challenges such events pose to agricultural production. Later in the 21st
41 century, the production of major cereal crops, such as wheat and rice is projected to decline in
42 tropical and temperate regions due to the combination of changes in temperature, precipitation,
43 extreme weather events, and increasing CO₂ concentrations (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2018).
44 These impacts will be further exacerbated by rapidly rising crop demand and reduced food
45 quality, with developing countries likely to bear the brunt of impacts (IPCC 2014).

46 At a global level, overall impacts are projected to be negative, but this masks variation in the
47 magnitude and direction of change in crop yields at national or regional levels. Impacts can vary
48 depending on the type of crop/s modelled (see section 2) and studies can be strongly influenced
49 by the use of different regional climate change projections, the assumed strength of CO₂
50 fertilization effects, and the choice of crop model (Rosenzweig et al. 2013; Hoegh-Guldberg et
51 al. 2018). Progress in understanding the biophysical impacts of climate change on crops has
52 been significant. However, whilst such studies provide important insights into understanding
53 future changes in the growth and quality of major crops - the productive component of food
54 security - how such agricultural impacts would affect the wider economy and socioeconomic
55 structure of affected countries has, to date, received much less attention (Hertel et al. 2010;
56 Bandara and Cai 2014).

57 Fujimori et al. (2018) review published estimates that report economic losses to agriculture in
58 the range of 0–1% of global GDP but suggest that other metrics such as price changes may be
59 more informative. A review of literature for the IPCC AR5 WG2 (Porter et al. 2014) concluded
60 that it is very likely that changes in temperature and precipitation, without considering the effects
61 of CO₂, will lead to increased global food prices ranging from 3 to 84% by 2050. This wide range
62 reflects many differences in the studies reviewed, including: the level of regional aggregation;
63 inclusion of different crop types and the aggregation of these; the use of different economic
64 models and methods; and the assumed crop yield change, be it from different estimates from
65 the literature or from different coupled crop yield models.

66 Global aggregate economic impacts also overlook substantial differences across countries and
67 regions. Conversely, where individual countries or larger aggregate country regions are studied,
68 they tend to be in isolation of others rather than being connected. This makes comparison of
69 different studies difficult due to differing underlying data, risk assessment methodologies, and
70 the scale of outputs (and hence the wide range in food prices above). This is problematic when
71 considering the economic impacts of climate change on agriculture as direct crop impacts
72 provide only a partial picture of the consequences for human livelihoods, as countries and
73 production systems are interconnected through trade (Hertel et al. 2010). Trade has the
74 potential to alleviate climate-induced scarcity by bridging the differences between demand and
75 supply conditions globally. Conversely, it can also increase climate-induced vulnerability in
76 regions which specialise in the production of certain products in which they have a comparative

77 advantage, while relying on imports to meet demands for other commodities (Ouraich et al.
78 2019).

79 As well as the spatial scale of the study, economic estimates can also differ depending on the
80 climate change projections used (Nelson et al. 2014). Since the publication of the IPCC Special
81 Report on 1.5°C of warming (IPCC 2018) there has been an increased focus on the projections
82 of climate change impacts under such ambitious targets, resulting in a relative dearth of
83 projections relating to warming at higher levels such as 3°C or above. This is an important
84 knowledge gap to fill, particularly for informing policy makers as the Nationally Determined
85 Contributions (NDCs) under the UNFCCC Paris Agreement are estimated to result in global
86 mean temperature rise in the range of 2.7°C to 3.5°C by 2100 (Gütschow et al. 2018).

87 Consequently, to examine the full range of climate change impacts on agriculture, a full range of
88 climate scenarios need to be considered alongside coupled crop and economic models. This
89 type of approach provides a flexible scenario-based framework which can provide a more
90 complete understanding of the impacts of climate change on agriculture and the wider economy.
91 This study provides fresh insights by focusing on a regional comparison of impacts, using a
92 coherent set of climate simulations and crop yield changes estimated via a statistical crop model
93 (ClimaCrop), coupled with a global economic general equilibrium model (Global Trade Analysis
94 Project model, GTAP). Global outputs in terms of yield shocks are incorporated into the GTAP
95 model via changes in land-use efficiency for the land used for agricultural production in each
96 region. The framework is beneficial as it allows distinctions to be made between prices of
97 domestically and internationally produced commodities, capturing the role of international trade
98 when assessing the dynamics of economic impacts at the country level. In particular, this paper
99 focuses on heterogeneities of the socio-economic impacts of climate-induced crop yield change
100 on different regional economies, including on commodity prices and welfare. A second
101 advantage of this study is that it evaluates these impacts under a wide range of global climate
102 change scenarios. Warming levels range from 1.5° to 4°C, critical for national economies to
103 choose appropriate strategies for climate change adaptation.

104 This analysis focuses on wheat and rice, two of the world's most widely cultivated crops, which
105 alongside maize provide the current foundation for world food security (FAO 2016a, 2017). To
106 demonstrate the capability of the method to multiple countries, and ability to facilitate a regional
107 comparison China, India, Brazil, Egypt, Ghana and Ethiopia are included, although the method
108 could be applied to other countries in a similar manner. These countries reflect a range of
109 different climate impacts, geographies, levels of development, and a combination of major
110 wheat and rice producers and major wheat and rice importers. The following section provides a
111 review of current literature. Section 3 outlines the modelling framework, inputs and economic
112 model. Section 4 presents the model results with the discussion and conclusions in section 5.

113 **2 Literature Review**

114 *2.1 Projected risks of climate change upon crop yields in our study countries*

115

116 The potential impacts of climate change on crop yields have been widely studied at global,
117 national, and regional levels. Key methods include the use of statistical models and process-
118 based dynamic crop models. In general, global studies show that Africa is particularly vulnerable
119 to climate change, with agriculture being one of the more vulnerable sectors. Overall, negative
120 impacts on yields are expected, but the extent of the loss is projected to vary between regions
121 and crops (Porter et al. 2014). For example, West Africa is projected to see substantial
122 reductions in wheat yield, of around 13% with 1.5°C and 19% with 2°C warming (Schleussner et
123 al. 2016). Research conducted by AgMIP (Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement
124 Project) projected reductions in maize and wheat yields across much of Africa but increases in
125 rice and soy yields for southern and eastern areas (e.g. Rosenzweig et al. 2013; Ostberg et al.
126 2018).

127 There has been a significant amount of research into changes in crop yield at the national scale
128 for our study countries (see Table S1 for a full synthesis of studies). For India, most published
129 studies used process-based models and projected lower overall crop yields in the future (e.g.
130 Koehler et al. 2013). Challinor et al. (2006) modelled changes to groundnut in India and
131 projected increases in yield in some northern and western areas but reductions in other areas
132 under the SRES A2 scenario by the 2080s. For Brazil, a range of models have been used to
133 project changes to crop yield (e.g. Costa et al. 2009; Margulis and Dubeux 2011). Most of these
134 studies project a reduction in future yield, of around 30% for maize and beans. By contrast,
135 studies focused on China largely project increases in yields in the future (e.g. Chen et al. 2013;
136 Geng et al. 2019). However, some research projects lower crop yields in China as a result of
137 climate change. Erda et al. (2005) suggest climate change will reduce the rice, maize and wheat
138 yields in China by up to 37% in the next 20–80 years without CO₂ fertilisation. Disagreement
139 over the sign in yield change comes, in part, from the model parameterisations. Likewise, Xiao
140 et al. (2018) used the APSIM model with 28 GCMs, forced with the RCP4.5 and RCP8.5
141 scenarios to project changes in wheat yields in China by the 2080s. They reported an increase
142 in yield when CO₂ fertilisation was included and reduction in yield when not.

143 National scale studies for India, China and Brazil generally agree with the results of global
144 studies (Parry et al. 2004; Lobell et al. 2008). However, few national level studies exist for
145 Egypt, Ghana and Ethiopia. Sagoe (2006) analysed changes to cassava and cocoyam in Ghana
146 using a process-based model and projected a reduction in the yield of both crops. Araya et al.
147 (2015) investigated changes to maize yields in Ethiopia under RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5, projecting
148 reductions in yield of up to 20% by the 2050s. Abera et al. (2018) projected reductions in maize
149 yields at some sites in central Ethiopia (Bako and Melkassa) but increases at another site
150 (Hawassa) under RCP 8.5 conditions by the end of the century. Projected increases in yields
151 are linked to higher local rainfall whereas yield reductions are linked to greater rainfall variability
152 and higher temperatures. Regional studies for Africa also project a general reduction in crop
153 yields in Ghana (Jones and Thornton 2003; Parkes et al. 2018), Ethiopia (Jones and Thornton
154 2003; Liu et al. 2008) and Egypt (Jones and Thornton 2003; Liu et al. 2008).

155 2.2. Economic implications of changing crop yields

156 A few global studies have specifically addressed the changes in some of the six countries of
157 interest to this study. Ren et al. (2018) examined the economic impact of climate change on
158 seven crops globally using the iPETS model. For China, a 5-10% reduction in crop price was
159 projected with CO₂ fertilisation and 10-20% increase in prices without CO₂ fertilisation. For India,
160 crop price was projected to decline by 18% to 25% when the effects of CO₂ fertilisation were
161 considered. Increasing by 20-50% when CO₂ effects were not included in the models. Similarly,
162 Bandara and Cai (2014) projected increases in food prices of around 5% (wheat) and 9% (rice)
163 in India by 2030. Calzadilla et al. (2013) used the GTAP-W model with the SRES B2 scenario
164 and found a -0.01% (-667 million USD) change in GDP in China by 2050, which was associated
165 with a 1.14% reduction in agricultural productivity.

166 Relatively few country-level studies of the economic impacts of climate change exist (see Table
167 S2 for a full synthesis of studies). Mideksa (2010) investigated the economic impacts in Ethiopia
168 using a CGE model and projected changes to agriculture would reduce GDP by about 10%.
169 Similarly, Deressa and Hassan (2009) analysed crop net revenue in Ethiopia and projected a
170 reduction per hectare by the end of the century. Arndt et al. (2015) found a similar situation is
171 likely for Ghana, projecting declines in agricultural GDP and reductions in revenues from some
172 major crops. Yates and Strzepek (1998) used two statically coupled economic models to project
173 the economic impacts of climate change on Egypt by 2060 using a pessimistic and optimistic
174 scenario, reporting changes in agricultural GDP of 96% (optimistic scenario) and 135%
175 (pessimistic scenario). Some of these studies factor in trade linkages, including Arndt et al.
176 (2015) which includes trade function elasticities in the model, and Mideksa (2010) who consider
177 other countries as an agent which can demand exports and supply imported goods.

178 3 Methods

179 3.1 Climate Scenarios

180 This study projects the impacts of climate change on crop yields across a range of specific
181 global warming levels from 1.5° to 4°C (Table 1). The scenarios represent a set of mitigation
182 scenarios meeting various climate goals based on Shared Socioeconomic Pathways 2 (SSP2)
183 (Kriegler et al. 2014). The SSPs narratives are characterised by assumptions on future
184 economic growth, population change, and urbanization. SSP2 depicts the 'Middle of the Road'
185 whereby social, economic, and technological trends do not shift markedly from historical
186 patterns (Riahi et al. 2017).

187 The crop model was driven by monthly climate change variables on a spatial grid of resolution
188 0.5 x 0.5 degrees, obtained by pattern-scaling Global Circulation Model (GCM) projections. To
189 sample uncertainty in regional climate change projections, patterns of change simulated by
190 twenty-three CMIP5 GCMs were used. The pattern-scaling technique assumes there is an
191 approximately linear relationship between the change in a climate variable in a grid cell and the
192 change in the global-mean surface temperature, and that this relationship is invariant under the
193 range of climate changes being considered here (Osborn et al. 2016). This is a commonly used

194 method with Osborn et al. (2018) showing it emulates the underlying GCM projections well with
195 errors that are small relative to the climate change signal. Tebaldi and Arblaster (2014) show that
196 errors are small relative to the spread in results between different GCMs.

197 To obtain monthly time-series we combined the observational mean climate, the pattern-scaled
198 change in mean climate, and observed monthly anomalies superimposed to provide realistic
199 climate variability. Observed mean and anomalies were taken from the CRU TS3.00 dataset, for
200 the years 1961-1990, on a 0.5° latitude by 0.5° longitude grid (Harris et al. 2014). For future
201 precipitation, the observed monthly anomalies were first transformed so that their probability
202 distribution is consistent with the changes in monthly precipitation variability projected by each
203 GCM (Osborn et al. 2016). Monthly evapotranspiration (ET) was calculated using the Penman–
204 Monteith formula from ClimGen data for minimum, maximum and mean temperature, vapour
205 pressure, cloud cover, and the CRU CL 2.0 wind speed climatology.

206
207 [Table 1 here]
208

209 3.2 Crop yield data and method

210 Impacts of climate change on crop yields of wheat and rice are modelled using the statistical
211 crop yield model, ClimaCrop, underpinned by 23 GCMs, for each of the eight climate scenarios
212 (Warren et al. 2017). National annual yields were obtained from the FAO (2016b) for the years
213 1961-2012 and matched with CRU TS 3.22 climate data (Harris et al. 2014) for the same period.
214 The annual average temperature and precipitation in a country were calculated as the mean
215 across all 0.5 x 0.5 degree grid cells and months in which the respective crop is grown under
216 rain fed conditions as given in the MIRCA2000 data set, a global data set of monthly irrigated
217 and rainfed crop areas around the year 2000 with a spatial resolution of 5 arcmin (about 9.2 km
218 at the equator) (Portmann et al. 2010). It was assumed that optimal weather conditions exist for
219 each crop resulting in maximum obtainable yield and that any deviation from this optimum will
220 result in reduced crop yield. Following Schlenker and Lobell (2010), the natural logarithm of crop
221 yield was regressed with quadratic specifications in temperature and precipitation (see SM table
222 S3) and a quadratic time trend was used to account for technological process over the time
223 period (Equation 1):
224

$$225 \quad \log(Y_{c,t}) = (\alpha + \alpha_c) + \beta_1 T_{c,t} + \beta_2 T_{c,t}^2 + \beta_3 P_{c,t} + \beta_4 P_{c,t}^2 + (\beta_5 + u_{5,c})t + (\beta_6 + u_{6,c})t^2 \\ 226 \quad \quad \quad + \epsilon_{c,t}$$

227 Eq. 1
228

229 For country c and time t where α is a global intercept, β represents estimated coefficients, T
230 and P are the average temperature and precipitation during growing season, and ϵ is an error
231 term. In all cases, the country specific intercepts α_c , error term $\epsilon_{c,t}$ and the coefficients were
232 assumed to be normally distributed. To create spatially explicit projections of future crop yield
233 changes for each country the equation is then applied at the grid cell level. To quantify the

234 impacts of climate change on crop yields, we limited the crop growing area to locations given in
235 Monfreda et al. (2008), keeping both the area and the crops grown constant over time. In each
236 grid cell, we calculated predicted yield for all warming levels as

$$237 \quad \text{Yield}_{c,t} = e^{\log(Y_{c,t}) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}}$$

238 Eq. 2

239
240 where we included the variance of the error term, σ^2 , of each model to account for Jensen's
241 inequality (Schlenker and Lobell 2010). All yields were then transformed to country totals by
242 calculating an area-weighted sum and a 30-year average was determined to represent
243 production under long-term conditions. To enable coupling with the economic model these
244 country totals were provided for the 140 countries and aggregated country regions of the GTAP
245 database version 9 (see section 3.3 below). Finally, predicted changes in crop production (and
246 thus crop yield) were estimated using equation 3 where p_0 represents production under baseline
247 conditions and p_1 represents production for any other warming level.

$$249 \quad \Delta p = \frac{p_1}{p_0}$$

250 Eq. 3

252 3.3. Economic Modelling

253 GTAP is a well-known multi-region and multi-sector global general equilibrium economic model
254 (Hertel and Tsigas 1997; Corong et al. 2017). It tracks bilateral trade flows between countries
255 and models the consumption and production of commodities of national or aggregated regional
256 economies. Producers are assumed to maximise profits and consumers are assumed to
257 maximise utility. Product and factor market clearing requires that supply equals demand in each
258 market (Xie et al. 2018). The standard GTAP model has been widely used for policy analysis
259 and due to its generic, modularised framework has also been modified and extended for use in
260 specific research areas, including climate change and food security policy (Corong et al. 2017).
261 It is beneficial here given countries may be directly affected by climate change impacting on
262 domestic crop yields, as well as indirectly through trade and changing commodity prices. In
263 assessing the potential socio-economic impacts of crop yield change on the six countries it is
264 important to capture both direct and indirect components to provide a robust estimate. As such,
265 the study uses the standard GTAP version 7 and associated GTAP database 9, which includes
266 140 regions and 57 sectors, aggregated into eleven sector groups for the analysis (Table 2).
267 The model is run for all 140 regions so that both domestic impacts on the six countries and
268 global implications are captured.

269 [Table 2 here]

270
271 Yield shocks for rice and wheat are incorporated into the GTAP model via changes in land-use
272 efficiency for the land used by rice and wheat production in each GTAP region (parameter *afe* in

273 equation 4). This is the conventional method for translating yield perturbations into economic
 274 models (e.g., Iglesias et al. 2012; Xie et al. 2018). Changes in crop productivity are interpreted
 275 in the model as affecting both price and demand for land, as expressed as a percentage in
 276 equations (4) and (5). This causes a price increase in agricultural goods causing higher costs in
 277 the sector and affecting input markets. The reallocation of resources due to these direct effects
 278 will indirectly affect other sectors of the economy and can affect household decisions on
 279 consumption (Iglesias et al. 2012). The composite price of primary factors (i.e. land, labour,
 280 enterprise and capital goods) in each sector and region is calculated following Corong et al.
 281 (2017):

$$pva_{j,r} = \sum_{k=1}^n (SVA_{k,j,r} \times (pfe_{k,j,r} - afe_{k,j,r}))$$

Eq. 4

286 where j is the production commodity (industry), r is the region, k is the endowment commodity,
 287 pva is the firm's price of value added, pfe is the firm's price for endowment commodity k , SVA is
 288 the share of endowment commodity k in total value added and afe is the primary factor
 289 augmenting technology change, specific to each sector of each region. The input of the
 290 endowment commodities to each region/industry is calculated by:

$$qfe_{k,j,r} = -afe_{k,j,r} + qva_{j,r} - ESUBVA_j(pfe_{k,j,r} - afe_{k,j,r} - pva_{j,r})$$

Eq. 5

295 where qfe is the demand, qva is the value added and $ESUBVA$ is the elasticity of substitution
 296 between capital, labour and land in industry j . To reflect the difficulty of substitution between
 297 land and other key inputs such as labour and capital in the context of global warming the
 298 elasticity of substitution between endowments ($ESUBVA$) of crop production sectors is changed
 299 to 10% of the original value. This is in line with guidance from previous literature (e.g., Rose and
 300 Liao 2005).

302 In the model, capital and labour can move freely between production activities, while for land
 303 and natural resources movement is largely restricted (equations 6 and 7). Following Corong et
 304 al. (2017) the allocation of the sluggish endowments across sectors is:

$$qoes_{k,j,r} = qo_{k,r} + ETRA E_k(pm_{k,r} - pmes_{k,j,r})$$

Eq. 6

308 whereby $qoes$ is the supply of sluggish endowment, qo is the industry output of endowment,
 309 $ETRAE$ is the elasticity of transformation for sluggish primary factor endowments, pm is the
 310 market price of endowment and $pmes$ is the market price of sluggish endowment. By default,
 311 different crops can adjust their demand for land within some margin (transformation elasticity
 312 $ETRAE = -1$). However, in the context of global warming the growth of other competing crops,
 313 e.g., grains and pastures, can also be negatively affected leading to an increase in land demand

314 in these sectors. Given this study does not consider changes in yields of other cereals and
 315 pastures, nor alternative demands for land (e.g. for BECCS), the transformation elasticity is
 316 reduced to 10% of the default value, to increase the difficulty of land transfer between different
 317 sectors.

318 The composite price for sluggish endowments is shown in equation 7, where *REVSHR* is the
 319 share of endowment used by different industries.

$$320 \quad pm_{k,r} = \sum_{j=1}^n (REVSHR_{k,j,r} - pmes_{k,j,r})$$

321 Eq. 7

322 Allocation of mobile endowments across sectors is shown in equation 8, where *SHREM* is the
 323 share of mobile endowments at market prices.

$$324 \quad qo_{k,r} = \sum_{j=1}^n (SHREM_{k,j,r} \times qfe_{k,j,r})$$

325 Eq. 8

326 The composite price for mobile endowments is:

$$327 \quad pm_{k,r} = VFM_{k,j,r} / qfe_{k,j,r}$$

328 Eq. 9

329 where *VFM* is the producer expenditure on endowment valued at market prices. This study has
 330 further included changes in crop foreign trade to production for each country, thereby simulating
 331 the changes in crop supply. For other modules, we use the default GTAP model settings
 332 (Corong et al. 2017).

333 As GTAP is a comparative static model each simulation represents the variance between
 334 different possible states of the global economy with respect to two points in time, the base
 335 period vs. the future projection period. It is assumed that climate change only affects land
 336 productivity, ignoring other potential impacts of climate change such as on human health, which
 337 can affect labour productivity, and capital productivity. Productivity changes in agriculture in
 338 other sectors are not considered. Global population and socio-economic conditions are held
 339 constant in the model, focusing results on the influences of climate change (e.g., Xie et al.
 340 2018).

341 **4. Results**

342 *4.1 Crop yield change*

343 The impact of the climate scenarios on rice and wheat yields were modelled for each of the 140
 344 GTAP regions. There is large regional variation in the direction and magnitude of changes,

345 however, at a global level mean rice yields are projected to decrease marginally under the
346 future scenarios, reaching ~4% under scenario 6. Implications for wheat are more significant,
347 with average global yield reductions of ~2.5 to 12.5% for scenarios 1 to 6 (full results are
348 displayed in Supplementary Material (SM) figures S1 and S2).

349

350 At a country level, except for China, rice yields generally decrease under the future scenarios,
351 with more severe reductions associated with higher warming levels (figure 1). Changes in rice
352 yields are initially slightly positive for Ethiopia (0.5%) and Egypt (0.1%) with little change
353 between scenarios 1 to 4. However, at higher warming levels, crop yield changes become
354 negative, reducing by 2.75% and 1.5% under scenario 6 for Egypt and Ethiopia respectively.
355 India and Ghana are projected to suffer more severe reductions, with an average reduction of
356 ~14% under scenario 6 in Ghana. In contrast, an increase in rice yield is projected for China,
357 ranging from 2.2% to 5.25% for scenario 1 and 6 respectively, although incremental benefits
358 become more marginal at the higher levels of warming.

359 [Figure 1 here]

360 Figure 2 highlights that for all countries wheat yields decrease from the baseline under the
361 future scenarios, with more severe reductions associated with the higher warming levels, and
362 particularly for India and Egypt. Average reductions range from 2.5% to 5% across the countries
363 under scenario 1, increasing to 12.5% to 20% under scenario 6.

364 [Figure 2 here]

365

366 The results for wheat and rice reflect projections of declining crop yields due to climate change
367 reported in the literature for India, Brazil, Egypt, Ghana and Ethiopia (section 2). For China the
368 direction and magnitude of change differs for wheat and rice but given the larger scale of rice
369 production would result in an overall yield increase.

370 *4.2 Production and price changes*

371 The yield changes for the 140 regions provide input to the GTAP model facilitating an
372 investigation of how global changes in rice and wheat yields will translate into economic
373 impacts. The most immediate impacts are on the sectoral value added and production of the
374 rice and wheat sectors. Figure 3 highlights that the modelled changes in regional rice yields
375 corresponds to a decrease in global production ranging from 1.5 to 8.5Mt, with a decline in
376 sectoral value added of 0.25% to 1.4%. For wheat, the change in modelled yields corresponds
377 to a decrease in global production of 1.25 to 5.5Mt, with a decline in sectoral value added of
378 0.2% to 0.95%. Impacts are also shown to increase non-linearly under scenarios 1 to 6.

379

380 [Figure 3 here]

381

382 At the country level production and value added generally reflect the trends seen in crop yields,
383 declining or increasing alike (with estimates for India comparable to those of Bandara and Cai
384 (2014)). All countries see an increasing decline in wheat production and value added under

385 scenarios 1 to 6. For rice, China is shown to benefit from increased yields, with an increase in
386 production and value added, although reflecting the trend in figure 1 the additional benefits
387 become more marginal for scenarios 5 and 6, and do not reflect the expected decline in rice
388 nutrient content that occurs concurrently with climate change responses (Myers et al 2017).
389 Production and value added in India, Egypt and Ghana are negatively affected. Ethiopia's rice
390 relies heavily on imports, i.e., domestic production only accounts for about 20% of consumption
391 of rice. When the price of imported rice increases significantly (see Fig. 4), the compensation of
392 input factors in domestic rice production also increases.

393
394 These trends occur as productive output is affected by both natural factors (e.g. change in
395 yields) and social factors (e.g. commodity prices). In general, the more land efficiency declines
396 due to reduced crop yields the more crop production will decrease. For example, if rice
397 production declines (both domestically and internationally) consumption of domestically
398 produced rice can increase significantly, alongside a rise in the price of rice produced abroad.
399 Distinguishing between domestically and internationally produced commodities such as rice and
400 wheat for each region in the model is important when estimating price changes. For instance,
401 rice produced in India and China have very different tastes with Indian consumers preferring to
402 buy Indian-produced rice at higher prices than imported Chinese-produced rice at relatively low
403 prices. By capturing this imperfect substitution in the model prices of rice and wheat can vary
404 greatly across different regions. Even with inefficient land for production, producers are still
405 profitable when product prices are high, and in this case can rent more land for production. As
406 such international trade plays an important role in determining supply and price changes for
407 countries. Rice or wheat exporting countries may conserve domestic production by reducing net
408 exports, or profit from increasing net exports to meet demands of other countries whose
409 domestic production has declined. Consequently, changes in regional export prices (shown in
410 SM figure S3) will have consequences on importing countries.

411
412 Figure 4 shows the percentage change in the price of both domestic and imported rice and
413 wheat for the six countries under scenarios 1 and 6 (which are in line with the estimated
414 magnitude of results presented in Hertel et al. (2010)). In China the price of domestic rice
415 declines by up to 10% under scenario 6, in line with increased crop yields, whilst import prices
416 increase. The increase in import prices reflects an increase in export prices of China's major
417 import partners for rice (Vietnam, Thailand and Pakistan, see SM figure S4). In the case of
418 Ethiopia, the natural effects on rice yields are small (figure 1), but price effects are large (figure
419 4) driving the increase in production of rice highlighted in figure 3 above. For India domestic
420 prices of rice and wheat increase significantly from scenario 1 to scenario 6, with domestic
421 prices far exceeding imported prices.

422
423 [Fig 4 here]

424 The consequences of changing rice and wheat yields on both domestic and imported consumer
425 prices can also propagate to other economic sectors, particularly related sectors such as other
426 crops and food manufacturing. Whilst not shown here (see SM tables S4 and S5) the model
427 highlights increasing prices for domestic and imported food manufacturing commodities across

428 the countries, with the largest increases seen in India and Egypt under scenario 6. The
429 exception is China, where domestic prices for food manufacturing commodities decline.

430 As well as impacts on consumers, producers will also be affected by price changes to primary
431 factors such as land and labour, determined by supply and demand. In countries with declining
432 crop yields the subsequent changes in land efficiency drive additional demand for more land to
433 produce food, which leads to higher land prices. For all countries except China, the price of land
434 rents increase (see SM table S6). In China land rents fall under scenario 1 due to the projected
435 increase in rice yields which offset the impact of declining wheat yields. However, marginal
436 increases are seen under scenario 6. The price change of other primary factors such as labour
437 and capital are less significant, and generally opposite to the land price changes. There are two
438 opposing channels through which price changes can occur here. One, where land efficiency
439 declines more labour or capital can be required to enhance productive output, increasing the
440 demand for these factors. Two, declines in land efficiency can also make such factors surplus,
441 such as labour, which can cause the price to fall.

442 Figure 5 encapsulates the above information, presenting the impacts at a macroeconomic level
443 in terms of the percentage change in real GDP. GDP is marginally higher in China under
444 scenarios 1 to 5, however begins to transition from scenario 3 onwards (2.5°C) becoming
445 negative under scenario 6 (4.0°C). For the remaining countries changing rice and wheat yields
446 have a negative impact, with losses increasing with warming levels. The most serious
447 consequences are reported for India, with a decline in GDP of 0.015 and 0.75% for scenarios 1
448 and 6 respectively.

449 [Fig 5 here]

450

451 *4.3 Welfare change*

452 In this study, changes in welfare are represented in monetary terms. Equivalent variation (EV) is
453 used as a proxy for welfare change of regional households, which compares the cost of pre and
454 post-shock levels of consumer utility, both valued at base year prices (Huff and Hertel 2000). It
455 can be affected by changes in production of rice and wheat and subsequently consumer prices
456 (as in section 4.2). Such a measure is useful because it allows for the unambiguous
457 comparisons of alternative policies or other shocks. Figure 6 shows that for China benefits to
458 welfare are initially projected to be positive, increasing by up to \$400 million US dollars.
459 However, as above a transition begins from scenario 3 onwards with reductions in welfare
460 estimated under scenarios 5 and 6. Despite negative impacts on real GDP welfare changes are
461 also positive for Brazil, increasing between \$41 million to \$488 million US dollars under the six
462 scenarios. This reflects the focus of the metric on price changes. In Brazil rice and wheat
463 production are less significant compared to other agricultural products it produces (FAO 2019).
464 It is therefore less vulnerable overall to increasing prices of domestic and imported rice and
465 increasing prices of exports of rice and wheat. In parallel, Brazil imports many other
466 manufacturing products where prices are declining (SM Table 4) whilst also exporting large

467 quantities of legumes and food manufacturing products where prices increase under the
468 scenarios.

469 [Fig 6 here]

470
471 India, Egypt, Ghana and Ethiopia are projected to suffer negative impacts on welfare due to
472 effects of climate change on rice and wheat yields. India is particularly affected with losses
473 ranging from \$606 million to \$2,523 million under the six scenarios. These trends reflect the
474 impacts of changes in land efficiency on factors such as labour and commodity prices which can
475 affect the income of residents and in turn welfare. Secondly, if the country is a rice or wheat
476 importer then higher export prices from major import partners will raise prices for consumers
477 and reduce welfare. Thirdly, if the country is a rice exporter then benefits to welfare can reflect
478 the decline in global supply and rising demand and prices for their exports.
479

480 **5. Discussion and conclusions**

481 The above analysis examines the direct impacts of climate change on global yields of rice and
482 wheat, and economic consequences in terms of changes in production, commodity prices and
483 welfare. The climate scenarios represent both ambitious targets as well as the potential for
484 higher levels of warming, ranging from 1.5 to 4°C. This allows a comparison of economic
485 impacts, highlighting the potential benefits in terms of avoided damages for more stringent
486 climate change goals, and can also indicate potential tipping points as in the case of GDP and
487 welfare in China (figures 5 and 6).

488 At the macroeconomic level changes to GDP in China, although minimal, are initially positive
489 but begin to transition from scenario 3 onwards becoming negative under scenario 6. For the
490 remaining countries GDP is projected to decline with the largest impacts reported for India.
491 Consumer prices for both domestic and imported rice and wheat were projected to increase
492 under scenarios 1 to 6 for all countries except China. In the case of China there was a decline in
493 the price of domestic rice, in line with increased crop yields and production. Indirect price effects
494 were also reported for related sectors such as food manufacturing. The results also illustrated
495 the potential impact on producers of price changes to primary factors such as land and labour.
496 These combined factors will be important when considering the impacts on welfare. The study
497 suggests that the impact of rising temperatures on crop yields could reduce overall welfare
498 levels in some countries, such as India and Ethiopia, even under more stringent climate change
499 goals, whilst benefits were projected for Brazil.

500 The paper also highlights how trade can mitigate impacts of decreasing agricultural production
501 at a country level. Conversely, it may act as less of a buffer for major food importing countries
502 such as Egypt or Ethiopia, who will face the impacts of declines in domestic production
503 alongside increasing global food prices. These types of market effects can be hidden in more
504 aggregated multi-region or global analyses or underrepresented in studies that focus on
505 countries independently (Islam et al. 2016).

506 The findings of the study are generally in line with the direction of trends reported in the
507 literature (section 2). However, none of these studies include the potential for climate change to
508 reduce the nutrient content of crops (Myers et al 2017) so in terms of food security, effects might
509 be underestimated. Furthermore, for several of the countries analysed here there are relatively
510 few country-level studies on the economic consequences of climate change on agriculture, with
511 this paper contributing to evidence in this area. However, as with other economic impact studies
512 of climate change it is difficult to capture all aspects of the subject within a single, concise
513 framework. Other agricultural risks from climate change include changes in the intensity and
514 frequency of extreme weather events, and altered weather patterns can also increase the
515 vulnerability of crops to disease and pest infestation (Rosenzweig et al. 2001). The focus here is
516 on changes in mean temperature and precipitation in line with other modelling studies, allowing
517 some comparison, and providing a useful output in terms of how the agricultural system may
518 change over the longer-term to 2100. Whilst extremes are not directly modelled, extreme
519 climate conditions are partially considered given that as the extremes over the growing period
520 increase the mean conditions also increase. By creating annual yield projections prior to taking
521 the 30-year average these annual changes in extreme conditions are captured.

522 The study excludes the possibility of adaptation under future warming scenarios, such as
523 increased farm productivity due to the new use of technology or different or more heat-tolerant
524 cultivars, a potential area of future research. While some studies do aim to gauge the potential
525 effects of adaptations on crop yields under scenarios of climate change (e.g. Xiong et al 2014),
526 these tend to be more detailed farm level studies, with less uptake in how this would translate
527 into economic impacts. Rosenzweig and Tubiello (2007) note that at the national level economic
528 based studies focus on benefits of higher adaptation potential, albeit with less agronomic detail.
529 These studies tend to suggest small overall benefits at the global scale, for climate change up to
530 2050 of about 3°C. Howden et al (2007) also note that implementation of various adaptation
531 options is likely to have benefits under moderate climate change for some cropping systems.
532 However, there are limits to their effectiveness under more severe climate changes.

533 The study also relies on outputs from a single crop model, which does not consider CO₂
534 fertilization effects, which can have implications for crop yield estimates and subsequent
535 economic estimates. The literature review (see also Table SM-1) illustrates that there is no
536 current consistency in the incorporation of CO₂ fertilisation, although it can affect the magnitude
537 and potentially direction of change in crop yields. Studies that exclude CO₂ fertilization effects
538 may overestimate negative impacts of reduced yields. This conservative approach, owing to the
539 wide range of issues surrounding CO₂ fertilisation effects, can be interpreted as focusing on
540 direct impacts of climate change only, and justified by the fact that CO₂ fertilisation may be
541 countered by other factors such as pest and diseases, or the role of O₃ and nitrogen use
542 efficiency excluded from studies (Vanuytrecht and Thorburn, 2017). In contrast, studies that do
543 include CO₂ fertilization may have a positive bias as plants grown in experimental settings, on
544 which model parameterisation is based, are not fully representative of farmers' fields
545 (Rosenzweig and Parry 1994), adding uncertainty to impact assessments (Vanuytrecht and
546 Thorburn, 2017).

547 Output is also provided for two crops only and does not consider changes in yields of other
548 cereals and pastures, nor alternative demands for land (e.g., for BECCS). In the case of Brazil if
549 the model were also to consider changes in soybean yield then given projections from other
550 studies (e.g. Margulis and Dubeux 2011) benefits to welfare may weaken or potentially become
551 negative. There is also the issue of scalability in terms of how crop yield data is integrated with
552 the GTAP model. Gridded data has been aggregated to the 140 GTAP regions, however this
553 means that regional differences can be averaged out (e.g. SM figures 1 and 2). This will be
554 important given potential distributional differences in the direction and magnitude of crop yield
555 change across countries such as China. Consideration of these issues will be important in future
556 research agendas.

557
558 However, the method presented here is beneficial as it heeds calls to consider the role of both
559 natural and social factors in crop production when estimating the impact of climate-induced crop
560 yield changes in different economies under a wide range of warming scenarios. It contributes to
561 current country specific case studies and could be applied to other regions in the future. As
562 noted by Challinor et al., (2010) such an approach will provide a deeper and broader
563 understanding of future climate change impacts, provides a more realistic picture of the
564 response of global markets and ultimately regional consequences. This information will be key
565 to decision makers. For example, by providing more information on the potential economic risks
566 of agricultural impacts, or benefits of avoided damages, of different climate change goals; to
567 help inform government or industry investment decisions such as purchasing or selling land; or
568 in weighing potential costs against benefits of adaptive policy responses.

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573

574

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Tables:

Scenario	Description
Scenario 1 (S1)	<1.5°C (aiming to stay below 1.5°C in 2100 with 66% probability)
Scenario 1E (S1E)	1.5°C
Scenario 2 (S2)	<2.0°C (aiming to stay below 2.0°C in 2100 with 66% probability)
Scenario 2E (S2E)	2.0°C
Scenario 3 (S3)	2.5°C
Scenario 4 (S4)	3.0°C
Scenario 5 (S5)	3.5°C

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Table 1: Climate change scenarios

Sector Code	Description	GTAP sectors
pdr	Paddy rice	pdr
wht	Wheat	wht
ocr	Crops not elsewhere classified (n.e.c)	gro, v_f, osd, c_b, pfb, ocr
lsf	Livestock	ctl, oap, rmk, wol, frs, fsh
mng	Mining	coa, oil, gas, omn
fdm	Food manufacturing	cmt, omt, vol, mil, pcr, sgr, ofd, b_t
omf	Other manufacturing	tex, wap, lea, lum, ppp, p_c, crp, nmm, i_s, nfm, fmp, mvh, otn, ele, ome, omf, ely, gdt, wtr
cns	Construction	cns
trd	Trade	trd
tps	Transportation	otp, wtp, atp
sev	Services	cmn, ofi, isr, obs, ros, osg, dwe

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Table 2: Sector aggregation scheme. For the full list of 140 regions and 57 sectors and abbreviations in GTAP see Aguiar et al. (2016).

Figure Captions:

788 Figure 1: Change in rice yield under eight climate scenarios. (Box and whisker plots illustrate
789 climate model uncertainty. Insets provide data relative to the last ten years, 2008-2017, on the
790 yield, area and production of rice in each country).

791 Figure 2: Change in wheat yield under eight climate scenarios (There is no cultivation of wheat
792 in Ghana). (Box and whisker plots illustrate climate model uncertainty. Insets provide data
793 relative to the last ten years, 2008-2017, on the yield, area and production of wheat in each
794 country).

795
796 Figure 3: Production change of rice and wheat globally and in the six study countries under the
797 different warming scenarios (*CoVA denotes percentage change in value-added; CoP denotes*
798 *change in production in Million tonnes*)

799 Figure 4: Comparison in the change in price (%) to households of domestic and imported rice
800 and wheat commodities in the six selected countries. Results are shown for scenario 1 and
801 scenario 6.

802 Figure 5: Percentage change in real GDP under the eight warming scenarios

803 Figure 6: Change in welfare of households under the eight warming scenarios