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ToolsLeaver, Clare, Ozier, Owen, Serneels, Pieter and Zeitlin, Andrew (2021) Recruitment, effort, and retention effects of performance contracts for civil servants: Experimental evidence from Rwandan primary schools. American Economic Review, 111 (7). 2213–2246. ISSN 0002-8282
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Abstract
This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile' or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive- compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of International Development |
| Related URLs: | |
| Depositing User: | LivePure Connector |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Sep 2020 00:07 |
| Last Modified: | 22 Oct 2022 07:06 |
| URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/76974 |
| DOI: | 10.1257/aer.20191972 |
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