The Paradox of Territorial Autonomy:How Subnational Representation Leads to Secessionist Preferences

Dinas, Elias and Skoutaris, Nikos (2020) The Paradox of Territorial Autonomy:How Subnational Representation Leads to Secessionist Preferences. In: Constitutionalism Under Extreme Conditions. Ius Gentium . Springer, pp. 267-290. ISBN 978-3-030-48999-1

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Abstract

The quest for peace, democracy and political stability has led a number of divided societies in Europe to opt for arrangements that entail segmental autonomy in order to accommodate ethnic diversity, avoid secession or even civil war. Although there are various institutional devices through which this idea can be implemented, in practice, one of its typical manifestations involves the devolution of legislative competences to the regional level. This process is in turn accompanied by the establishment of subnational representative institutions: governments, parliaments and elections. Although, such decentralization of political authority aims at accommodating the centrifugal tendencies existing in a given plurinational State, it may also have long-term unintended consequences. By focusing on Spain, the paper examines how subnational elections strengthen subnational identity, disseminate views in favour of further decentralization and may potentially cultivate secessionist preferences.

Item Type:	Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords:	law ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3300/3308
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
UEA Research Groups:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > International Law
Related URLs:	http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?...
Depositing User:	LivePure Connector
Date Deposited:	16 Sep 2020 00:09
Last Modified:	28 Mar 2025 02:09
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/76897
DOI:	10.1007/978-3-030-49000-3_17

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