A norm of aesthetic assertion and its semantic (in)significance

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Collins, John (2021) A norm of aesthetic assertion and its semantic (in)significance. Inquiry, 64 (10). pp. 973-1003. ISSN 0020-174X

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Abstract

The paper proposes that the distinctive features of aesthetic assertion are due to a special norm governing such assertion rather than any semantic features of aesthetic predication. The norm is elaborated as a (more or less faithful) reading of Kant’s analysis of aesthetic judgment. Apart from the proposed norm capturing various features of aesthetic assertion, it is supported by various linguistic considerations that point to the semantic profile of predicates of personal taste and aesthetic predicates being in fact alike with respect to the role of a judge or experiencer in the interpretation of the respective kinds of assertions. The difference between the two, therefore, must have a different source than the understood role of an agent, viz. the advertised norm. In particular, it is argued that the role of an explicit agent in both predicates acts to signal a presupposition of another agent having a different experience or judgment from the speaker rather than an articulation of the content of the predicate itself or a determination of its truth value.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: aesthetic assertion,kant,norm of assertion,predicates of personal taste,philosophy,health policy,sdg 3 - good health and well-being ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1200/1211
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies (former - to 2024)
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
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Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 04 Sep 2020 23:57
Last Modified: 28 Mar 2025 10:11
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/76769
DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2020.1809515

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