Intuitions about cases as evidence (for how we should think)

Andow, James ORCID: (2023) Intuitions about cases as evidence (for how we should think). Inquiry, 66 (6). pp. 1036-1068. ISSN 0020-174X

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Much recent work on philosophical methodology has focused on whether we should accept evidence: the claim that philosophers use intuitive judgments about cases as evidence for/against philosophical theories. This paper outlines a new way of thinking about the philosophical method of appealing to cases such that evidence is true but not as it is typically understood. The idea proposed is that, when philosophers appeal to cases, they are engaged in a project of conceptual engineering and that, within that project, intuitions about cases are used as evidence as to the normative constraints which are relevant within that project. The paper demonstrates that this is a feasible interpretation of the way that cases are appealed to in recent journal issues, and makes the case that this would be a better way to think of what philosophers are doing when they appeal to cases.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: intuitions,conceptual engineering,philosophical methods,philosophy,health policy,sdg 3 - good health and well-being ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1200/1211
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
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Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 12 Mar 2020 10:56
Last Modified: 03 Aug 2023 14:32
DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2020.1767199

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