Coordinating Lot Sizing Decisions Under Bilateral Information Asymmetry

Zissis, Dimitris, Ioannou, George and Burnetas, Apostolos (2020) Coordinating Lot Sizing Decisions Under Bilateral Information Asymmetry. Production and Operations Management, 29 (2). pp. 371-387. ISSN 1059-1478

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Abstract

We consider inventory management decisions when manufacturing and warehousing are controlled by independent entities. The latter possess private information that affects their choices and are allowed to communicate via a mediator who attempts to streamline their decisions without restricting their freedom. The mediator designs a mechanism based on quantity discounts to minimize the overall system costs, attempting to reach a win‐win situation for both entities. Using the Revelation Principle we show that it is in the entities’ self‐interest to reveal their information and we prove that coordination is attainable even under bilateral information asymmetry. The acceptable cost allocation is not unique, providing adequate flexibility to the mediator during mechanism design; the flexibility may reflect the relative power of the entities and is quantified in our work by a series of computational experiments. Our approach is motivated by inventory management practices in a manufacturing group and, thus, it is directly applicable to real‐life cases.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: 2-sided incomplete information,complexity,contracts,management,mechanisms,performance,policy,quantity discounts,supply chain coordination,system,adverse selection,communication,mechanism design,mediator,type-dependent reservation levels,voluntary participation
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > Norwich Business School
Related URLs:
Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 24 Sep 2019 13:30
Last Modified: 29 May 2020 00:17
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/72361
DOI: 10.1111/poms.13106

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