The effect of CEO power on bank risk: do boards and institutional investors matter?

Altunbaş, Yener, Thornton, John and Uymaz, Yurtsev (2020) The effect of CEO power on bank risk: do boards and institutional investors matter? Finance Research Letters, 33. ISSN 1544-6123

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Abstract

We test for a link between CEO power and risk-taking in US banks. Banks are more likely to take risks if they have powerful CEOs and relatively poor balance sheets. There is little evidence that executive board size and independence have a dampening effect on the channels through which powerful CEOs influence risk-taking and some evidence that institutional investors reinforce the risk-taking preferences of powerful CEOs.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: banks,boards of directors,ceo power,governance,institutional investors,risk,finance ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2003
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > Norwich Business School
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Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 23 May 2019 12:30
Last Modified: 08 Aug 2020 23:44
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/71113
DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2019.05.020

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