Why don't we trust Moral Testimony?

Andow, James (2020) Why don't we trust Moral Testimony? Mind and Language, 35 (4). pp. 456-474. ISSN 0268-1064

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Abstract

Is there a problem with believing based on moral testimony? The intuition that there is a problem is a starting point for much research on moral testimony. To arbitrate between various attempts to account for intuitions about moral testimony, we need to know the exact nature of those intuitions. The current study investigates this empirically. The study confirms an asymmetry in the way we think about testimony about moral and descriptive matters and explores the extent to which this asymmetry is explained by different metaphysical beliefs about the relevant domains, or beliefs about the relative background levels of deception or disagreement.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: deference,experimental philosophy,moral,moral deference,testimony,language and linguistics,philosophy,linguistics and language ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/1200/1203
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies
University of East Anglia > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
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Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 25 Feb 2019 14:30
Last Modified: 28 Sep 2020 23:52
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/70000
DOI: 10.1111/mila.12255

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