

1 **Characterising Climate Change Discourse on Social Media During Extreme Weather**
2 **Events**

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Keywords: twitter; climate change; extreme weather; social media; public perception.

6 **Abstract**

7 When extreme weather events occur, people often turn to social media platforms to share
8 information, opinions and experiences. One of the topics commonly discussed is the role
9 climate change may or may not have played in influencing an event. Here, we examine
10 Twitter posts that mentioned climate change in the context of three high-magnitude extreme
11 weather events – Hurricane Irene, Hurricane Sandy and Snowstorm Jonas – in order to assess
12 how the framing of the topic and the attention paid to it can vary between events. We also
13 examine the role that contextual factors can play in shaping climate change coverage on the
14 platform. We find that criticism of climate change denial dominated during Irene, while
15 political and ideological struggle frames dominated during Sandy. Discourse during Jonas
16 was, in contrast, more divided between posts about the scientific links between climate change
17 and the events, and posts contesting climate science in general. The focus on political and
18 ideological struggle frames during Sandy reflects the event’s occurrence at a time when the
19 Occupy movement was active and the 2012 US Presidential Election was nearing. These
20 factors, we suggest, also contributed to climate change being a more prominent discussion
21 point during Sandy than during Irene or Jonas. The Jonas frames, meanwhile, hint at lesser
22 public understanding of how climate change may influence cold weather events when
23 compared with tropical storms. Overall, our findings demonstrate how event characteristics
24 and short-term socio-political context can play a critical role in determining the lenses through
25 which climate change is viewed.

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37 **Introduction**


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39 In recent years, the East Coast of the United States has played host to a succession of high-
40 magnitude extreme weather events including Hurricane Irene in 2011, Hurricane Sandy in
41 2012 and Snowstorm Jonas in 2016. While these events cannot be singularly attributed to
42 climate change (1, 2), the apparent upswing in the frequency of large storms in the region is
43 consistent with scientific expectations in a warming world (1, 3-7). Consequently, the storms
44 have stimulated renewed debate on climate change amongst the American public and within
45 the country's media and political spheres.

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47 Changes in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather will likely be the most prominent,
48 near-term way in which many people experience the effects of climate change (7-9). Several
49 studies have suggested that personal experience of extreme weather events that are associated
50 with climate change has the potential to boost climate change belief, risk perception, and
51 willingness to act (10-14). Therefore, when they occur, such events represent politically
52 important moments for those wishing to influence popular perceptions around climate
53 change. They offer the opportunity to discuss one of the most significant effects of climate
54 change - increasingly severe extreme weather - while public attention is high and while the
55 science has an elevated newsworthiness. However, the extent and manner of influence on
56 public perception will in large part depend on whether the links between extreme events and
57 climate change enter the public consciousness, and on how the links are framed.

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60 Figure 1. Areas for which Major Disaster Declarations or Emergency Declarations were issued in relation to each
61 event and the best track estimates for Irene and Sandy (15-17). As Jonas was an extratropical cyclone, its track was
62 less clearly defined so a discrete best path estimate is not available.

63 Television, newspaper, and radio outlets have traditionally been important mediators of the
64 climate change discourse (18), determining whether the potential connections between climate
65 change and the events will be discussed, and how. This has historically made the so-called
66 legacy media hugely influential when it comes to shaping public understanding of climate
67 change and the new era of extreme weather that it may be ushering in. The supremacy of the
68 legacy media as an arbitrator of news is, however, now being challenged by the rise of online
69 social media with potentially important repercussions for coverage of climate change. Over
70 the past decade, social media platforms have emerged as an alternative medium through

71 which people can access news and commentaries, and engage in debate. A 2016 Pew Research
72 Center survey found that 62% of American adults now get news on social media sites, with
73 18% doing so regularly (19). The growth of social media as a source of news means platforms
74 like Facebook and Twitter are joining legacy media as important mediators of discourse on
75 climate change. This may be especially true during extreme weather events when use of social
76 media and interest in climate change tend to simultaneously spike (20). However, the
77 implications of this are yet to be fully understood and the nature of social media discourse
78 around climate change during times of extreme weather is yet to be thoroughly characterised.
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80 This paper makes a contribution to filling this gap in understanding by analysing Twitter
81 posts that mentioned climate change in relation to Hurricane Irene, Hurricane Sandy and
82 Snowstorm Jonas (see Fig. 1 for an overview of the areas affected; see *SI Appendix A* for
83 descriptions of how each event may have been influenced by climate change). The study
84 considers the prominence of climate change as a topic during each event; the spatial and
85 temporal distribution of posts; and the ways in which the issue was framed. The potential
86 implications of the findings for our understanding of public perceptions around the
87 relationship between climate change and extreme weather are then discussed. Further details
88 on each event are provided in the *SI Appendix A*.
89

90 **Background**

91 *Extreme weather and climate change perception*

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94 Despite the international scientific community repeatedly affirming the existence of climate
95 change and warning of the significant impacts it may entail (21), only 48% of American adults
96 believe climate change is mostly due to human activity, and a mere 36% say they care a great
97 deal about the issue (22). This discrepancy between scientific understanding and public
98 sentiment has motivated a range of studies looking into the factors that shape perceptions of
99 climate change – factors that may help to explain such polling (23). Several papers have cited
100 the sense that climate change is a distant and intangible phenomenon as perhaps being
101 particularly important in curtailing concern (10, 24, 25). Intangibility and psychological
102 distancing, it is argued, may assuage concern around climate change risks, while the former
103 might also create scope for (erroneous) doubt about the very existence of global warming (10,
104 23).
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106 Several studies have hypothesised that personal experience of climate change associated
107 weather conditions – particularly weather extremes – might make climate change feel more
108 visceral and less psychologically distant (10, 24, 26). It follows that after exposure to such
109 events, climate change belief is likely to be strengthened and concern is likely to rise (25, 26).
110 This, of course, assumes that people first make the link between the conditions they
111 experience and climate change, and as Weber (25) notes, there is also the possibility that
112 exposure without adverse consequences may lower perceptions of risk. A further caveat is
113 that experiential learning processes tend to show a strong recency bias (25, 26). As Taylor *et*
114 *al.* (26) explain, “experiencing a highly negative event increases its availability from memory,
115 which in turn increases the perceived likelihood of its re-occurrence”. This can lead to
116 overestimation of climate change risks following recent experiences and, conversely,
117 underestimation once memories have faded (24–26). When there is a rapid succession of

118 extremes – as when Sandy struck the United States Northeast just a year after Irene struck the
119 same region – the tendency to overestimate may be particularly high.

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121 The implication of the learning-from-experience theory is that by accentuating the links
122 between climate change and events, such as Irene, Sandy and Jonas, it may be possible to
123 better engage the affected populations with climate change issues and build support for
124 mitigation and adaptation measures – at least while the events remain fresh in people’s minds
125 (10). Indeed, a study by Rudman *et al.* (11) found that New Jersey residents were more likely
126 to vote for pro-environmental politicians following Hurricane Irene and Hurricane Sandy,
127 compared with before. This is important because the literature suggests there are few other
128 ways of readily generating the popular support necessary to facilitate large scale collective
129 action on the issue (25). However, there are also warnings in the literature as to how
130 generating strong emotional responses can become counterproductive by overwhelming
131 people, leading to defeatism, avoidant behaviour, denial and apathy (26).

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133 Evidence suggesting that personal experience of anomalous weather conditions can affect
134 climate change perception is growing. Multiple studies in the United States have found a
135 positive association (12–14, 27–29), as have several studies elsewhere in the world (10, 30, 31).
136 However, extreme winter weather, such as Snowstorm Jonas, can be something of a
137 complicating factor. A study by Shao and Goidel (32), looking at the effect of local weather
138 conditions on climate belief in the Gulf Coast Region of the United States found that the
139 downward trend in winter temperatures in recent years had negatively affected climate
140 change belief. However, Capstick and Pidgeon, (30) in contrast, discovered that following a
141 period of severe cold weather in the UK, three times as many people believed the event to be
142 indicative of climate change than felt it to be disconfirming it.

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144 Besides psychological distancing and intangibility, it should be recognised that there are
145 multiple other factors which can affect perception and therefore potentially offset, bolster or
146 act in *lieu* of the influence of personal experience in shaping perceptions; for example,
147 confirmation bias is believed to be prevalent (32). This refers to the tendency to interpreting
148 new information in a way that aligns with pre-existing beliefs. Motivated reasoning is also
149 known to be important (23, 25). Shao and Goidel (32), for instance, found that partisan
150 affiliation had the strongest influence on perceptions of local weather along the United States
151 Gulf Coast of any factor. They show that Democratic voters were not only more likely to be
152 concerned about climate change than Republican voters in the region, but also more likely to
153 perceive changes in the local climate, including changes in the frequency and intensity of
154 hurricanes, droughts and floods (32).

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156 Given climate change may have contributed to the intensity of Irene, Sandy and Jonas, and
157 given many of those who tweeted about the events were likely to have been residing in
158 affected areas, the datasets explored in this paper are very probably reflective of the influence
159 of personal experience. Similarly, other factors shaping interpretation of the events, such as
160 the previously mentioned confirmation bias and motivated reasoning, are likely to be evident.

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162 *Twitter and climate change*

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164 While the legacy media have traditionally been the focus of much of the scholarship around
165 climate change communication, there is growing interest in the insights that data from Twitter
166 can provide (33, 34). One of the most relevant studies in the context of this paper is a United
167 States focussed investigation by Kirilenko *et al.* (20) that sought to establish whether personal
168 experience of anomalous weather conditions affected engagement in climate change discourse
169 on Twitter. They found that substantial local temperature anomalies did tend to result in a
170 discernible increase in Twitter posts referring to climate change. The authors also identified
171 significant spikes in tweeting activity during the timeframe of their data that corresponded to
172 a number of high profile national and international climate change and weather-related
173 events. The study did not, however, explore the nature of the climate change discourse, nor
174 did it seek to examine specific events in depth. Sisco *et al.* (35) similarly used Twitter posts to
175 examine the effect of various weather events that occurred in the United States on attention
176 to climate change, assessing, in particular, the effect of different types of weather event. They
177 found that a relatively wide range of weather events had detectable effects including coastal
178 flooding, strong winds, excessive heat, droughts, extreme cold and heavy snow (35).

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180 An earlier paper by Kirilenko and Stepchenkova (36) conducted a more globally oriented
181 investigation of climate change posts on Twitter. In addition to also finding that certain news
182 events catalysed discussion around climate change, they discovered that the flow of
183 information on Twitter tended to be highly centralised, with “few media outlets, celebrities,
184 and prominent bloggers leading the debate” (36). Pearce *et al.* (37), meanwhile, studied Twitter
185 dynamics in relation to the release of the IPCC Working Group 1 report, finding that users
186 were more likely to make “conversational connections with those who broadly share their
187 views on climate change” (37). This provides some weight to the idea that social media can
188 sometimes act like an echo chamber, repeating and reinforcing peoples pre-existing beliefs
189 due to the self-curated nature of users’ feeds. Williams *et al.* (38) similarly identified a
190 tendency for users to interact with like-minded others, with polarised “sceptic” and “activist”
191 communities forming as a result. However, as with Pearce *et al.* (37), they also found mixed-
192 attitude groups were present, though less common.

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194 Taking a different approach, Jang and Hart (39) examined how Twitter posts on climate
195 change were framed, finding that within the United States, there was a particular tendency to
196 “approach climate change issues in terms of whether global climate change is real or a lie”
197 (39) – the “hoax” framing being much more frequently invoked than the “real” framing,
198 especially in conservative leaning states. The study also found discussion around cause,
199 impact, and solutions to be relatively niche. Jacques and Knox (40) also examined the frames
200 through which climate change is viewed on Twitter, focusing very specifically on tweets
201 posted during Hurricane Sandy that rejected the “orthodox climate consensus” – a topic
202 highly pertinent to the study set out in this paper. The authors found that this rejection
203 discourse largely drew on political rationale, rather than scientific rationale, and they further
204 noted that the discourse tended to express certainty that climate science was a “wholesale
205 fraud” (40).

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Of additional note in the context of this study is research that has looked at the use of Twitter during other types of emergency event. An early study by Palen *et al.* (41), for example, examined the spatio-temporal distribution of Twitter posts during the 2009 Red River Valley floods which affected an area spanning the US-Canadian border. They found that the types of information shared about the event changed with distance from the affected area and showed that attention to the event is sustained over time primarily by those who are local to the event (41). In another crisis focused study, Bruns and Burgess (42) examined tweeting activity following the 2011 earthquake that struck Christchurch, New Zealand. They documented the role Twitter played in the disseminating information and noted how the rate of posting slowed over time.

While the collective Twitter literature does provide a number of interesting insights into several facets of climate change discourse on Twitter, important gaps remain. In particular, there is a lack of knowledge about the particular nature of climate change discourse during extreme weather events. Few evaluations have so far been done of specific extreme weather events and where studies have been done, the focus has often been either on using the volume of Twitter posts as a proxy for attention paid to the subject or on exploring the dynamics of information flow. The content of climate change related tweets posted during extreme weather events has yet to be systematically explored.

Changes to the Twitter ecosystem and society over time

Less than two weeks after Irene dissipated (16), Twitter announced that its active user base had reached 100 million (43). Shortly after Sandy occurred, it announced that this figure had grown to 200 million (44) and by the time Jonas struck, the figure had risen yet further to 310 million (45). However, much of this growth came from outside of the United States (46). A Pew Research Center survey found that in August 2011, 12% of American adults who were online used Twitter, by December 2012 this figure had risen to 16% and by early 2016 it had reached 24% (47) - growth that, while substantial, is some way below the platforms headline growth.

In addition to changes in the size of the user base, analysis by Liu *et al.* (46) shows that the Twitter ecosystem also evolved in several other ways in the time between the events. In particular, there was a substantial rise in the median follower count; there was an increase in the rate of retweeting and a decline in replies; new tweeting conventions emerged; cross-posting practices grew; spam and malicious behaviour became more prevalent; the platform was increasingly adopted by celebrities, companies and organisations; and there was a shift from desktop to mobile usage (46). Paralleling these changes, it is likely that there were also shifts in societal attitudes towards climate change and extreme weather (48) - shifts that the events themselves did not necessarily contribute to. Each of these changes affects the comparability of the datasets, though the precise nature of the affect cannot be readily determined. It is important, therefore, that the temporal context of the events is recognised when interpreting the results.

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Materials and methods

Data source. For each of the extreme weather events under consideration we collected datasets of related tweets along with their associated metadata. The Irene and Jonas datasets were gathered using the Twitter Streaming API in near real-time, while the Sandy tweets were acquired *post hoc* using Gnip’s Historical PowerTrack API. The latter tool provides paid-for access to the entire historical archive of public Twitter data and was necessary because the huge volume of Sandy related tweets that were posted as the storm made landfall exceeded our capacity to collect the complete population of posts using the Twitter Streaming API.

The World Meteorological Organization’s practice of giving tropical cyclones short, distinctive names aids the identification of specific tropical cyclone events by keyword searches on Twitter as these names quickly become the predominant means by which individuals and organisations refer to the events. For Hurricane Irene, we therefore used the terms *irene* and *hurricane* as our keywords, while for Hurricane Sandy we simply used the term *sandy*. Traditionally, the tropical cyclone nomenclature has not been applied to other types of extreme weather system which makes identification of tweets citing non-tropical cyclone weather events more challenging. However, in recent years the Weather Channel (49) has begun unofficially naming major winter storms in the United States and a small number of winter storm related hashtags have gained prominence in the affected region. Together these developments aided our choice of keywords in the case of the January 2016 Winter Storm. We used The Weather Channel’s name for the event, *jonas*, along with the following hashtags: *winterstormjonas*, *blizzard2016*, *stormjonas*, *snowzilla*, *jonasblizzard*, *snowmageddon*, and *snowpocalypse*.

For each dataset, visual inspection of samples indicates that the keywords predominantly returned true positives for the storms. A relatively small number of false positives were seen where our keywords represented a substring of a different word, where keywords were part of existing Twitter user names, and where the keywords were used in entirely different contexts. However, the infrequency of these cases and the subsequent methods used in the analysis means their impact on the overall results should be negligible. In each case, the datasets cover periods before, during, and after the storms passed over the East Coast of the United States. *Table 1* provides details of the search periods and the number of posts returned.

Table 1. Search period and tweets returned in the case of each event.

<i>Event</i>	<i>Search period</i>	<i>Tweets returned</i>
Irene	26 Aug 2011 – 12 Sep 2011	3.29 million
Sandy	24 Oct 2012 – 5 Nov 2012	11.60 million
Jonas	22 Jan 2016 – 30 Jan 2016	1.71 million

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Identification of climate change related posts. Once the event datasets were gathered, some basic cleaning was performed. This included removal of non-alphanumeric characters and URLs, conversion of all text to lowercase, and correction of common spelling mistakes. The

291 climate change related tweets contained within the datasets were then identified, using
 292 keyword matches as before. It was found that simply using the search terms climate change
 293 and global warming (with and without the space) resulted in a substantial number of false
 294 negatives. However, it was also found that broadening the search to also include any post
 295 containing the terms climate led to a substantial number of false positives. Consequently, a
 296 more sophisticated set of search rules was designed in which the terms climate or global had
 297 to occur along with one of a number of secondary terms for a match to be made – in some
 298 cases, these words needed to occur in order, while in other cases order did not matter (see
 299 Table 2). This approach appears to substantially reduce the overall number of false results.
 300 Pure substring matches were used to account for words being potentially concatenated in
 301 hashtags and to allow for a variety of potential suffixes. Throughout the paper, we refer to
 302 tweets identified using these rules as climate change tweets.

304 Table 2. Search rules used to identify climate change related posts. The vertical bar is used to symbolise the *or*
 305 operator.

The following terms can occur in any order:	
Term 1	Term 2
climate	chang denial denier deny carbon connect link new normal pearl harbour science scientist sea level sceptic skeptic wakeup call wakeupcall warming
global	cooling warming
The following terms must occur in the order specified, either with or without a space:	
Term 1	Term 2
climate	silence crisis action

306
 307 **Basic data attributes.** Once the climate change related tweets were extracted from the main
 308 event datasets, the basic attributes of the climate change posts were explored. Firstly, the
 309 relative composition of retweets to non-retweets was calculated both at an aggregate level and
 310 temporally. The retweets were identified through the presence of the character string “RT” at
 311 the start of posts. Secondly, the number of times each retweeted post was shared was
 312 analysed. This was done through calculating the frequency of occurrence of each unique
 313 string in the subset of posts previously identified as retweets. This means that only retweets
 314 made during the timeframe of the dataset are considered. It should be noted that modified
 315 retweets and retweets of retweets will be counted as distinct from unmodified retweets of the
 316 original as they will not return string matches. Thirdly, the number of unique users who
 317 posted tweets was calculated using the user IDs provided in the metadata.

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 319 **Spatial distribution of posts.** The geographical origin of posts was also assessed by analysing
 320 the geolocation metadata that is included in the datasets. As providing geolocation data with
 321 posts is optional for users of the Twitter platform, this geolocation data is not available for all
 322 posts. In fact, less than 2% of the event posts are geotagged. Consequently, geolocation data
 323 is distinctly sparse for the Irene and Jonas climate change posts. Geographical analysis was
 324 therefore performed on the event datasets as a whole rather than being restricted to the subset
 325 of climate change posts. We assume that the spatial distribution of climate change posts will
 326 hold similarities with the spatial distribution of event posts, though a degree of deviation is
 327 likely. In order to assess the cumulative percentage of geotagged posts by distance from areas
 328 where Major Disaster Declarations were issued, shapefiles showing areas where Major

329 Disasters had been declared for each event were downloaded from the FEMA website (15)
 330 and merged. The distance of the geotagged posts from the merged shapefiles was then
 331 calculated. This was done with the aid of the 'gBuffer' function from the R package 'rgeos'
 332 (50) and the 'over' function from the R package 'sp' (51).

333
 334 **Climate change discourse.** The discourse in the climate change posts was explored using a
 335 method developed by O'Neill *et al.* (52) for assessing how climate change is framed in media
 336 reports. Climate change related posts that were retweeted sufficiently frequently as to
 337 collectively exceed 0.1% of total climate change related tweets were assessed against a frame
 338 coding schema and assigned to the frame category that best matched the content of the post.
 339 Twenty-four retweets met the threshold conditions for assessment in the case of Irene, sixty-
 340 four in the case of Sandy, and ninety-six in the case of Jonas. The frame coding schema
 341 included eleven frames (see Table 3). These were derived, for the most part, from the schema
 342 set out in O'Neill *et al.* (52), although supplemental frames were added and the definitions of
 343 others were adjusted to better reflect the nature of the frames we identified in the datasets
 344 when piloting the schema (details of the alterations made are provided in *SI Appendix B*). The
 345 coding process followed the guidance provided in O'Neill *et al.* (52). Frames were
 346 independently assigned to posts by two coders who considered the presence (or absence) of
 347 narrative themes, quoted sources, user mentions, keywords, hashtags, metaphors and URLs.
 348 Where coders judged posts to be ambiguous after considering the presence or absence of these
 349 features, past tweets and the Twitter "bio" of the post's author was also taken into
 350 consideration. In cases where ambiguity still remained after this, posts were assigned "NA"
 351 in the coding datasheet. After frames had been assigned to all of the posts, the two coders
 352 datasheets were compared with the initial inter-coder reliability assessed using Cohen's
 353 kappa. This yielded a score of 0.891 which indicates substantial agreement. Where different
 354 codes were found to have been assigned to a post, coders discussed the reasoning behind their
 355 choice and agreed on a single principal code.

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 357 Table 3. The climate change frames considered in the study (adapted from O'Neill, 2015, p.381).


Frame	Brief description
Settled Science (SS)	Focus on the broad expert consensus around the science of climate change. SS1: Affirming that the fundamental science of climate change is settled. SS2: Criticism of those promoting contrarian views.
Extremes (EX)	Emphasis on the links between climate change and extreme weather events. Climate change may lead to an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events. Climate change may exacerbate the impacts of extreme weather events.
Uncertain Science (US)	The existence of climate change is not explicitly questioned, but uncertainty in the science, impacts, and solutions may be raised. Attribution claims are treated with scepticism.
Contested Science (CS)	Climate science is explicitly contested. The idea that climate change is occurring or is primarily driven by anthropogenic actions is challenged. The idea that climate change may be having an influence on the frequency or nature of extreme weather events is challenged.
Political or Ideological Struggle (PIS)	Links are made between climate change, the ongoing extreme weather events, and the happenings in the political and media spheres.
Economic (E)	Emphasis on the economic implications of climate change or climate change action. E1: The economic case for acting is made. Reference may be made to the cost of climate change exacerbated extreme weather. E2: Climate change mitigation and adaptation will be hugely expensive. Other issues should take priority.
Role of Science (ROS)	Focuses on the role science and scientists should play in society, rather than on the science itself. May also discuss transparency, science funding, and the role of scientists in raising awareness.
Opportunity (O)	Climate change as an opportunity. O1: Acting on climate change offers potential co-benefits for society and the environment. O2: The impacts of climate change may themselves create new opportunities.

Morality and Ethics (ME)	Moral, religious, or ethical arguments are invoked, either ME1: for action or ME2: for no action.
Health (H)	Focuses on the potential implications of climate change for human health.
Security (S)	Emphasis is placed on the risks climate change poses to human security. Issues around energy, water, and food security may be raised, as may mass migration.
Unclear (UN)	The principal frame cannot be determine with reasonable confidence or does not align with any of the above definitions.

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Results

In all, the Irene dataset contains 3.29 million posts, the Sandy dataset contains 11.60 million posts and the Jonas dataset contains 1.71 million posts. Terms pertaining to climate change were identified in 6,286 of the Irene posts, 99,823 of the Sandy posts and 5,326 of the Jonas posts. The total number of users who posted about climate change was 6,000 in the case of Irene, 67,613 in the case of Sandy, and 4,520 in the case of Jonas. Of those who posted about climate change, 3.43% did so more than once in the case of Irene, 19.34% did so more than once in the case of Sandy, and 10.97% did so more than once in the case of Jonas.



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
Figure 2. Cumulative percentage of geotagged posts by distance from areas where Major Disaster Declarations were issued.

373 **Spatial distribution of posts.** The geographical origin of a small proportion of the event posts
374 (~1%) is included in the post metadata. A total of 59.62% of the geotagged Irene posts, 45.80%
375 of the geotagged Sandy posts and 76.28% of the geotagged Jonas posts have coordinates that
376 lie within 10 kilometres of areas where Major Disasters were declared during the respective
377 events (Fig. 2). This suggests that a large proportion of the tweets are likely to have been
378 posted by people who personally experienced the storms, with interest being particularly
379 localised to the affected areas in the case of Jonas and relatively widespread in the case of
380 Sandy.

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Temporal dynamics of posts. The temporal dynamics of the climate change posts are shown
in Fig. 3. The dashed line, t , represents the moment of the New Jersey landfall in the case of
Irene and Sandy, and the approximate midpoint of the snowfall over the Atlantic states in the
case of Jonas. The average hourly number of climate change posts prior to t was 24.25 for
Irene, 113.39 for Sandy and 76.86 for Jonas. Over the 72-hour period following t , the average
climbed to 68.22 for Irene and 938.88 for Sandy but fell to 32.29 for Jonas - very substantial
shifts in each instance. The proportion of event posts that the climate change tweets


389 constituted also varied over time, with the relative significance of climate change as a
 390 discussion point increasing after t in each instance. Prior to t , climate change posts constituted
 391 0.07% of all Irene posts, 0.26% of all Sandy posts and 0.30% of all Jonas posts, while after t the
 392 figures rose to 0.38%, 1.16% and 0.35% respectively. Notably, these averages mask numerous
 393 short-lived fluctuations, the most dramatic of which are driven by the retweeting of particular
 394 posts rather than by surges in the creation of original content.
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396
 397 Figure 3. The leftmost charts show the absolute frequency of posts that mentioned climate change during each
 398 event on an hourly basis, while the rightmost charts show the proportion of all posts during each hour that
 399 mentioned climate change. The dashed line, t , represents the moment of the New Jersey landfall in the case of Irene
 400 and Sandy, and the approximate midpoint of the snowfall over the Atlantic states in the case of Jonas. Dates and
 401 times are in accordance with the Eastern Time Zone.

402 **Retweets.** On Twitter, re-posted tweets are known as retweets. The practice of retweeting is
 403 commonly employed by users to share with their own followers a tweet that another user has
 404 posted. Such posts constitute 76.2% of the Irene climate change tweets, 54.9% of the Sandy
 405 climate change tweets, and 66.8% of the Jonas climate change tweets. The proportion of posts
 406 that are retweets in the unfiltered Sandy and Jonas datasets is slightly lower at 48.9% and
 407 64.9% respectively. However, in the case of Irene, the difference in retweeting rates between
 408 the unfiltered dataset and the climate change subset is very substantial as only 29.5% of the
 409 posts in the unfiltered Irene dataset are retweets. As Fig. 4 shows, the distribution of retweets
 410 across climate change posts is heavily skewed, with a long-tail – a small proportion of the
 411 posts attracted a large proportion of the retweets. The unequal distribution is particularly

412 pronounced in the case of Irene with retweets of a single post ultimately constituting 57.8% of
 413 the entire climate change posts.
 414



415 Figure 4. Number of times the top twenty climate change retweets from each event were shared, ordered by
 416 frequency.
 417

418 **Frames invoked in the most frequently retweeted posts.** In order to identify the main frames
 419 through which climate change was viewed during the events, we assessed the most frequently
 420 retweeted climate change posts in each dataset against a frame coding schema (Table 3) and
 421 assigned each post to the frame that best matched the content of the post (see *Materials and*
 422 *Methods* for more detail). As the assessed posts constituted a substantial portion of the total
 423 climate change posts – 67.47% in the case of Irene, 20.46% in the case of Sandy and 57.04% in
 424 the case of Jonas – the findings provide a good sense of the frames through which many users
 425 will have viewed the topic.
 426

427 As illustrated in Fig. 5, each dataset is characterised by notably different principal climate
 428 change frames. For Irene, the retweet discourse was dominated by a post that engaged in
 429 criticism of climate change denial and affirmed the existence of climate change (SS2). This post
 430 also had a secondary frame of a political dimension, as it specifically cited a Republican
 431 politician known for having described climate change as a “hoax”. In the case of Sandy,
 432 meanwhile, the political or ideological struggle frame (PIS) was the most prevalent. Many of
 433 the posts that fall within this frame referred to the 2012 presidential campaign which was
 434 drawing towards a conclusion around the time that Sandy struck. Criticism of the media was
 435 also a common theme within the PIS frame. In particular, a perceived lack of airtime and
 436 column inches given to the topic of climate change when Hurricane Sandy and the
 437 Presidential Election were being discussed was frequently raised as an issue. Criticism of
 438 those promoting contrarian views (SS2) and posts emphasising the links between climate
 439 change and extreme weather events (EX) also had a notable presence. In the case of Jonas, two
 440 frames were dominant, rather than one. Marginally leading the way in total retweets was the
 441 extremes frame (EX), with many of the posts highlighting the ways in which climate change
 442 could exacerbate snowstorms such as Jonas. The second frame, however, was the contested
 443 science frame (CS). The posts that fell within this category tended to cite the snowstorm as
 444 evidence that climate change was not occurring.
 445

446 Only one of the retweets we considered appealed directly to economic arguments (E). Posted
 447 during Irene, it raised concerns about damages that will be incurred from increasingly intense
 448 storms. Notably, none of the retweets that met our consideration threshold invoked health
 449 (H), morality and ethics (ME), opportunity (O) or role of science (ROS) as principal frames.
 450




Figure 5. The total number of retweets by principal frame used in the original posts. Only the frames that were identified within the posts are included in the charts.

451
452
453

454 Discussion

455

456 The overall attention that each event drew on Twitter appears to reflect, at least in part, the
 457 socio-economic impact the storms had in the Northeastern region of the United States. Sandy
 458 caused the greatest damage, resulted in the most fatalities and attracted the most posts, while
 459 Jonas caused the least damage, resulted in the fewest fatalities and attracted the fewest posts
 460 (53, 54). Irene, meanwhile, lay somewhere in between on each count (55). These differences in
 461 the overall impact of the events are likely to have contributed to the differing number of
 462 climate change tweets posted during each storm. However, discrepancies in the proportion of
 463 posts that mention climate change across the events suggest other factors were also important
 464 in determining the attention paid to the topic. Sandy, in particular, stands out with 0.86% of
 465 all event posts mentioning climate change – a figure far in excess of the 0.19% of Irene posts
 466 and 0.31% of Jonas posts that raised the subject. The depth of user engagement in talking
 467 about climate change is also somewhat greater in the case of Sandy, with more users posting
 468 multiple climate change tweets.

469

470 **Sandy.** The politically charged context in which Sandy occurred seems to have been an
 471 important factor in spurring much of the attention paid to climate change during the event.
 472 The Occupy movement, which began shortly after Irene had struck in 2011, was well
 473 established by the time Sandy rode up the East Coast and the United States presidential
 474 election of 2012 was drawing to a climax – election day was the 6 November, while the storm
 475 made landfall on the evening of 29 October. The most frequently retweeted post was written
 476 by @YourAnonNews, an account controlled by the hactivist group Anonymous – a group that
 477 was closely entwined with the Occupy movement at the time. The post implied links between
 478 the storm and climate change, while arguing that climate change was not being adequately
 479 discussed in the public and political spheres. The second most retweeted post was written by
 480 Al Gore, the former Vice President of the United States and prominent environmentalist. He
 481 called for people to work together to “solve the climate crisis,” stating that “Sandy is a
 482 warning”. Common topics in the other widely retweeted posts included the perceived lack of
 483 media coverage of the climate change issue, its lack of prominence in the election campaigns,
 484 and the endorsement of Barack Obama by the then Mayor of New York City because of the
 485 president’s support for action on climate change. Although some of these posts represented
 486 little more than news reports, a substantial number of them seem to have been implicitly or

487 explicitly using Sandy as a means to push climate change up the political agenda and to raise
488 public consciousness of the issue.

489
490 Notably, the news outlets that have traditionally been influential in shaping the popular
491 discourse in the United States were among the most frequently retweeted and referenced
492 during Sandy. Among the 30 most retweeted climate change posts in the Sandy dataset were
493 tweets from NBC News,¹ CBS News, Time, the New York Times, and then CNN host, Piers
494 Morgan (see *SI Appendix C2*). This demonstrates, as Bruns and Burgess (56) note, that Twitter
495 is not separate from, but increasingly embedded into the larger media landscape,
496 complementing rather than replacing traditional information sources. Interestingly, during
497 Irene and Jonas, traditional mainstream news outlets were much less prominent. This was
498 typically because they were not posting about climate change in relation to the events, rather
499 than because they were not being retweeted. Seventeen tweets linking Sandy to climate
500 change were identified as having been posted by major newspapers² from the Northeastern
501 United States. The number was just four in the case of Irene and zero in the case of Jonas.
502 Lower profile groups and non-affiliated individuals were therefore more important in driving
503 climate change discussion during Irene and Jonas.

504
505 As previously mentioned, discussion of climate change within the Sandy dataset increased
506 dramatically in both relative and absolute terms following the storm's New Jersey landfall –
507 an increase which was largely sustained in the days immediately afterwards. This indicates
508 that landfall was something of a catalyst for climate change discussion and it shows that
509 climate change as a discussion point had greater longevity than many other discussion points.
510 This relatively greater longevity, we hypothesise, was because climate change discussions
511 were largely a product of reflection on the meaning and implications of the event. To a degree,
512 this theory also holds for Irene and Jonas. In both absolute and relative terms, climate change
513 posts increased after Irene's New Jersey landfall, although much of this was down to a single
514 post. While climate change posts only increased in relative terms following Jonas, many of the
515 Jonas posts that did not fall under the contested science (CS) frame were posted after the
516 midpoint of the event.

517
518 **Irene.** In both absolute and relative terms, there were substantially fewer posts pertaining to
519 climate change within the Irene dataset, compared to the Sandy dataset – this despite both
520 storms being tropical cyclones and both making landfall in the Northeastern United States
521 within 430 days of one another. Several factors may have contributed to this. Firstly, the storm
522 occurred during a less politically charged period. Secondly, while Irene caused substantial
523 damage and disruption in places, its overall impact was not as historically notable as Sandy's.
524 We therefore speculate that it may not have been regarded as so historically anomalous and
525 therefore suggestive of climate change. Thirdly, given major tropical cyclone landfalls are
526 relatively unusual in the Northeastern United States, Sandy had the additional notability over
527 Irene of having occurred so soon after another major storm. Fourthly, discussion of climate
528 change during Sandy was boosted by numerous high-profile public figures speaking out on
529 the issue. For example, posts by Al Gore, Ian Somerhalder, Ricky Gervais and Naomi Klein
530 were all widely retweeted. Similarly, statements by the likes of the Mayor of New York City
531 and articles by news organisations and campaign groups helped draw attention to the subject

¹ Under the handle: @BreakingNews.

² Major newspapers are defined here as newspapers with a circulation of 250,000+. The accounts included in the analysis were restricted to the principal news and science accounts used by the newspapers. These were: @wsj, @wsjscience, @nytimes, @nytscience, @usatoday, @nydailynews, @newyorkpost, @washingtonpost, @postthehealthsci, @newsday, @starledger, @phillyinquirer, @bostonglobe and @globedatadesk.

532 as evidenced by their presence in the lists of top retweets (see *SI Appendix C2*). Much of this
533 was lacking during Irene. Growth in Twitter’s user base in the time between Irene and Sandy
534 is also likely to have swelled the number of posts in the latter case – the number of online
535 adults using Twitter in the United States increased by 33% between August 2011 and
536 December 2012 (47). However, this user base growth cannot explain the greater relative
537 importance of the climate change topic in the Sandy dataset.

538

539 Another notable difference between the Irene and Sandy climate change data is that the Irene
540 data is characterised by proportionally greater numbers of retweets and fewer examples of
541 multiple postings by users – features that point to lesser user engagement in the topic of
542 climate change. Consequently, not only did Sandy generate broader interest in the subject, it
543 also seems to have generated deeper interest. The post that dominates the retweets in the Irene
544 climate change data shares an affinity with the political and ideological frame that
545 characterises many of the Sandy posts, even though its primary focus is on criticising climate
546 change denial. However, other frames noted in the Sandy and Jonas tweets are notable only
547 by their relative or absolute absence from the top Irene retweets.

548

549 **Jonas.** Like Irene, Jonas attracted far fewer climate change tweets than Sandy did, both in
550 absolute and relative terms. The gulf in the number of posts is especially large if growth in
551 the user base is considered – the number of online adults in the United States using Twitter
552 grew by 50% in the interval between Sandy and Jonas. However, in relative terms, climate
553 change was a more prominent topic within the Jonas dataset when compared with the Irene
554 dataset. This may be partially explained by larger numbers of climate change sceptics posting
555 on the topic during Jonas than in the case of Irene. As individuals and groups concerned with
556 climate change were also active, the posts by sceptics served to bolster the total number of
557 climate change posts. While Jonas occurred in a presidential election year like Sandy did, it
558 struck earlier in the campaign cycle. Reflecting this, the election campaigns did not feature
559 prominently in the posts. The Occupy movement had also waned in the time since Sandy.
560 Notably, the Jonas climate change posts also contained few references to the Paris climate
561 accord which was adopted just a month prior to the storm. “Paris” was mentioned in just
562 0.19% of the climate change posts. Indeed, contextual references to contemporary socio-
563 political events were less common in the Jonas climate change posts than in the other event
564 datasets.

565

566 The two main framings seen in the Jonas retweets – the extremes frame (EX) and the contested
567 science frame (CS) – are distinct from those seen in the Irene and Sandy retweets. The greater
568 presence of the contested science frame in the Jonas posts is unsurprising given extreme cold
569 weather events are not likely to fit with many people’s image of what might be expected to
570 happen in a warming world. Consistent with previous research (40), we find that the posts
571 contesting climate science typically expressed certainty that anthropogenic climate change is
572 a hoax and we find that such posts tended to focus on politics rather than science. Indeed,
573 many of them utilised hashtags associated with right wing groups (e.g. #RedNationRising
574 and #TCOT) and characterised those who believe in climate change as liberals while invoking
575 contemptuous language (see *SI Appendix C3*). This indicates that the authors of these posts
576 view climate change at least in part as a left-wing machination. In this respect, the political or
577 ideological struggle frame (PIS) may be considered an important secondary frame. Notably,
578 these posts tend not to explain why they cite Jonas as evidence against climate change. These
579 reasons must be inferred by the reader which indicates that the authors assume their logic
580 will be intuitively obvious to their audience. By contrast, the extremes (EX) frame posts were
581 very much focused on articulating the scientific links between Jonas and climate change. We
582 suggest that by sharing these posts users hoped to inform others of the possible links between

583 climate change and the storm, recognising that potential links between climate change and
584 cold weather events are not necessarily intuitive or well-known. Users may also have wanted
585 to close down speculation that Jonas disproved climate change. That the extremes (EX) frame
586 was, in relative terms, used less frequently in the case of Irene and Sandy suggests the links
587 between climate change and tropical cyclones are thought to be better known and therefore
588 in less need of articulating.

589
590 Given Jang and Hart (39) found that hoax frames typically prevail in the Twitter discourse
591 within the United States, the parity of hoax and non-hoax frames during Jonas and the
592 dominance of non-hoax frames during Irene and Sandy, represents a departure from the
593 norm. It suggests that extreme weather events not only increase the profile of climate change
594 as a topic on Twitter, they tangibly alter the balance of frames used to discuss the issue, at
595 least for a short while. The relative absence of the political or ideological struggle (PIS) frame
596 and relative lack of criticism of those promoting contrarian views (SS2) is notable in the Jonas
597 data. One of the consequences of this is that the adversarial language invoked during Irene
598 and Sandy by supporters of action on climate change has largely been replaced by factual
599 argument. This, we suggest, may reflect a belief that factual argument is needed to contest
600 climate change denial when seemingly counterintuitive evidence is encountered and used to
601 contest the science.

602
603

604 **Conclusions**

605
606 In this study, we examined the nature of climate change discussions on Twitter during
607 Hurricane Irene, Hurricane Sandy and Snowstorm Jonas. We found that the degree of
608 attention the topic received varied, both in absolute and relative terms, between the events.
609 Furthermore, the way the topic tended to be framed also differed in each case.

610
611 When the growth of the Twitter user base is accounted for, it is clear that Sandy garnered by
612 far the greatest attention, followed at a distance by Irene and then Jonas. This sequence reflects
613 the relative socio-economic impact each storm had in the Northeastern region of the United
614 States. However, the magnitude of the difference between Irene and Sandy in terms of climate
615 change posts is more than would be expected based on impact alone. Instead, it seems that
616 the socio-political context in which the Sandy occurred helped draw particularly substantial
617 attention to the topic. That said, factors such as the storms exceptional size (57) and its ranking
618 as the second-costliest cyclone to hit the United States since 1990 (17) will likely also have
619 contributed to the tweet tally. The role the mainstream media played in focusing attention on
620 the subject during Sandy appears to have been important as well. Several news outlets posted
621 tweets that were widely shared, and content that news outlets posted elsewhere on the
622 internet was also frequently cited - something which points to the continued importance of
623 the legacy media. During Irene and Jonas, few mainstream news outlets posted on the subject.
624 While this may help explain the smaller number of climate change posts the events generated
625 in both relative and absolute terms, it is notable that thousands of tweets were still posted on
626 the topic in each case. This shows how non-traditional actors are still able to give the issue
627 voice through posting on the platform.

628
629 In respect to frames, we found that the meteorological characteristics of the storms and the
630 socio-political context in which they occurred both played an important role in shaping the
631 lenses through which climate change was viewed during each event. Particularly notable was
632 the relative absence of the contested science (CS) and uncertain science (US) frames within the
633 top Irene and Sandy retweets given that hoax frames have been found to normally prevail in

634 the Twitter discourse within the United States (39). Even during Jonas, the contested science
635 (CS) frame trailed behind the extremes (EX) frame. This suggests that extreme weather events
636 cause a substantial shift in the balance of climate change coverage on Twitter towards non-
637 hoax perspectives.

638
639 An important caveat to our findings is that the events we have considered occurred at
640 different points over a four-and-a-half-year period. As we discuss in greater depth earlier,
641 both the Twitter ecosystem and societal attitudes towards climate change evolved over this
642 period with implications for the comparability of the events. Consequently, it is important to
643 recognise the events as situated in time. With this in mind, we recommend that future studies
644 consider how the frames used in climate change posts have changed over the years. We also
645 suggest research be done to assess whether extreme weather events have a discernible lasting
646 impact on the frames used to discuss the topic.

647
648 As Weber and Stern note (58), accurate or not, media reports have the capacity to influence
649 people's thoughts and feelings. Although they were referring to traditional media reports,
650 what they say is also applicable to social media posts – a 2016 Pew Research Center survey
651 found that 20% of social media users in the United States had changed their views on a
652 political or social issue because of something they saw on social media (47). This makes the
653 rise in the number of posts expressing concern about climate change during extreme weather
654 events important. The more posts there are that express concern, the more people are likely
655 to see them, and so the greater the potential for building support for action on the issue. Even
656 if the posts do not influence the views of other users, the elevated profile they give to the issue
657 can still be politically important and can feedback into future coverage of extreme weather
658 events through raising awareness of potential links between weather extremes and climate
659 change.

660
661

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