Ideas, coalitions and compromise: reinterpreting EU-ETS lobbying through discursive institutionalism

Fitch-Roy, Oscar, Fairbrass, Jenny and Benson, David (2020) Ideas, coalitions and compromise: reinterpreting EU-ETS lobbying through discursive institutionalism. Journal of European Public Policy, 27 (1). pp. 82-101. ISSN 1350-1763

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Abstract

Collective political action among divergent interest groups is not always easy. It requires coordination, compromise and, often, the persuasive action of a policy entrepreneur. Coalition strategies are often shaped by participants’ skill in mobilising ideas. Business-environmental coalitions – often considered ‘strange bedfellows’ – have proved to be important in emissions trading policy-making. In 2013, chronically low emissions prices meant that the EU’s climate policy flagship, the EU-ETS, was holed beneath the waterline. But, within two years and against the odds, ambitious reforms were agreed to steady the ship. Crucial to the rescue were the actions of a pro-ETS business lobby, orchestrated by environmentalists. We draw on thirty-two in-depth interviews to construct a discursive institutionalist account of collective interest representation in relation to the reforms. We highlight the ability of policy entrepreneurs to fashion a ‘change-but-no-change’ pro-reform narrative attractive to businesses, despite the fact that such discursive strategies risked marginalising alternative and more disruptive ideas.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: emissions trading,strange bedfellow coalitions,policy entrepreneurship,climate policy,interest representation,energy policy,social sciences(all) ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/3300
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > Norwich Business School
Related URLs:
Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 04 Jan 2019 16:30
Last Modified: 04 Aug 2020 23:42
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/69449
DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2019.1567573

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