Ex ante governance controls on non-executive director self-interest: Empirical evidence on multiple directorships 2006-2010 in the United Kingdom

Gibbs, David (2016) Ex ante governance controls on non-executive director self-interest: Empirical evidence on multiple directorships 2006-2010 in the United Kingdom. International Company and Commercial Law Review, 27 (9). pp. 287-298. ISSN 0958-5214

[img]
Preview
PDF (Accepted manuscript) - Submitted Version
Download (365kB) | Preview

Abstract

Formal independence of non-executive directors should not be used as a mask for a potential problem of self-interest, as it can occur in many forms. While laws regulate more severe forms of self-interest, little attention is given to subtle governance controls that can seek to align a non-executive’s interests with the company’s. The increased role non-executives have on a board of directors exacerbates this problem with little consideration or evidence to support improved governance. This article is an empirical analysis seeking to identify if self-interest is a problem for non-executive directors and whether there are any available governance controls or if regulation is required. It also endeavours to inform a larger empirical study that seeks to hone in on the problem of self-interest for non-executives. This article provides evidence that self-interest is a potential problem if left unchecked.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: corporate governance,directors,non-executive,remuneration,agency
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > Norwich Business School
Depositing User: LivePure Connector
Date Deposited: 26 Sep 2018 10:30
Last Modified: 10 Sep 2020 23:51
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/68354
DOI:

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item