Expecting Moral Philosophers to be Reliable

Andow, James (2015) Expecting Moral Philosophers to be Reliable. Dialectica, 69 (2). pp. 205-220. ISSN 0012-2017

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Abstract

Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryberg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and that philosophers’ experience in philosophy plausibly affects their intuitions. Consequently, the type of argument Ryberg offers fails to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies
University of East Anglia > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
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Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 23 Jan 2018 14:30
Last Modified: 22 Jul 2020 01:56
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66043
DOI: 10.1111/1746-8361.12092

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