Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Andow, James (2016) Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions. Philosophical Psychology, 29 (6). pp. 904-911. ISSN 0951-5089

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Abstract

Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have an unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we have, the effect of framing on the strength of those intuitions still needs to be taken into account. I argue that this by itself poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies
University of East Anglia > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
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Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2018 15:30
Last Modified: 23 Oct 2019 00:12
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66006
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1168794

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