Why compatibilist intuitions are not mistaken: A reply to Feltz and Millan

Andow, James and Cova, Florian (2016) Why compatibilist intuitions are not mistaken: A reply to Feltz and Millan. Philosophical Psychology, 29 (4). pp. 550-566. ISSN 0951-5089

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Abstract

In the past decade, a number of empirical researchers have suggested that laypeople have compatibilist intuitions. In a recent paper, Feltz and Millan (2015 Feltz, A., & Millan, M. (2015). An error theory for compatibilist intuitions. Philosophical Psychology, 28(4), 529–555. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar] ) have challenged this conclusion by claiming that most laypeople are only compatibilists in appearance and are in fact willing to attribute free will to people no matter what. As evidence for this claim, they have shown that an important proportion of laypeople still attribute free will to agents in fatalistic universes. In this paper, we first argue that Feltz and Millan’s error-theory rests on a conceptual confusion: it is perfectly acceptable for a certain brand of compatibilist to judge free will and fatalism to be compatible, as long as fatalism does not prevent agents from being the source of their actions. We then present the results of two studies showing that laypeople’s intuitions are best understood as following a certain brand of source compatibilism rather than a “free-will-no-matter-what” strategy.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: compatibilism,determinism,experimental philosophy,fatalism,free will,moral responsibility
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies
University of East Anglia > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
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Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2018 14:30
Last Modified: 25 Jul 2019 00:42
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/66002
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2015.1082542

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