Lam, Wing Man Wynne (2016) Attack-prevention and damage-control investments in cybersecurity. Information Economics and Policy, 37. pp. 42-51. ISSN 0167-6245

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Abstract

This paper examines investments in cybersecurity made by users and software providers with a focus on the latter's concerning attack prevention and damage control. I show that full liability, whereby the provider is liable for all damage, is inefficient, owing namely to underinvestment in attack prevention and overinvestment in damage control. On the other hand, the joint use of an optimal standard, which establishes a minimum compliance framework, and partial liability can restore efficiency. Implications for cybersecurity regulation and software versioning are discussed.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	cybersecurity,investment,standard,liability,bilateral care
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Norwich Business School
Depositing User:	Pure Connector
Date Deposited:	15 Sep 2017 05:07
Last Modified:	16 Apr 2021 23:43
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/64881
DOI:	10.1016/j.infoecopol.2016.10.003

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