Logic and Phenomenology: Wittgenstein/Ramsey/Schlick in Colour-Exclusion

Ometiţă, Mihai (2017) Logic and Phenomenology: Wittgenstein/Ramsey/Schlick in Colour-Exclusion. In: Colours in the development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy. Springer, pp. 127-158. ISBN 978-3-319-56918-5

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The chapter argues that a motivation of middle Wittgenstein’s concern with phenomenology is his dissatisfaction with the content-neutral account of logical syntax provided in the Tractatus. His approaches to the problem of colour-exclusion throughout his development are elucidatory in this respect. In early Wittgenstein’s view, propositions like “This cannot be of two colours [uniformly and coincidently]” express logical impossibility and involve contradiction. In 1930 Schlick presents a mirror-image of that view. For Schlick, propositions like “This is of two colours [uniformly and coincidently]” would express logical necessity and would involve tautology; such propositions are thus not synthetic a priori truths and, according to Schlick, are inadequately regarded by phenomenologists as groundings of their approach. In order to show why both early Wittgenstein’s and Schlick’s views on colour-exclusion are inconclusive, I draw on Ramsey’s critical review of the Tractatus and on middle Wittgenstein’s article “Some Remarks on Logical Form”. In light of Wittgenstein’s article, I then clarify the rationale of his subsequent conception of phenomenology as a logic of content.

Item Type: Book Section
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 09 Aug 2017 05:08
Last Modified: 01 Nov 2022 15:32
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/64422
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-56919-2_6

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