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
# Party Ideology and Clientelistic Linkage[*]

Eitan Tzelgov[†]        Yi-Ting Wang[‡]

## Abstract

How does parties' ideology affect their linkage strategies? While scholars maintain that economically right wing parties are more clientelistic, there has been no systematic study testing this argument. We examine the conservative ideology-clientelism nexus with multi-level quantitative analyses of parties' clientelistic appeals. Our analysis reveals a robust, yet nuanced relationship between ideology and clientelism. Specifically, right wing parties are more clientelistic than left wing parties, but only with regard to providing broad economic rents to clients. In contrast, economically conservative parties are not more likely to engage in individual targeted clientelism. Moreover, parties' ties with economic interests mediate the relationship between ideology and clientelism. Finally, the association between parties' linkage to business interests and rents clientelism is attenuated by country-level economic liberalism.

# 1 Introduction

While programmatic politics, in which politicians offer broad policy packages, has frequently been seen as the normatively most adequate form of democratic party competition, scholars have realized for some time it is not the only game politicians and voters may play. The literature has pointed to clientelism as an alternative to the programmatic mode of accountability strategy (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). In contrast to political competition characterized by parties providing programmatic platforms of policy bundles, clientelism involves the provision of targeted goods or services by politicians to individuals or small groups of voters, in exchange for their support. While the benefits offered to voters in a programmatic accountability relationship are broad public policies, voters in a clientelistic relationship expect to obtain targeted benefits delivered only to party supporters.

To understand why parties tend to rely on a particular accountability strategy to attract votes, scholars have examined the effects of various features of party organization (Kitschelt and Kselman, 2011; Kitschelt and Wang, 2013), electoral competitiveness (Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Geddes, 1991; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Schady, 2000), political institutions (Cox and Rosenbluth, 1995; Linz and Valenzuela, 1994; Ordeshook, 1995), levels of development (Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno and Brusco, 2013), and democratic experience (Keefer, 1992). While the existing research has provided ideas about the conditions under which parties invest in either programmatic or clientelistic strategy, there has been little discussion on whether and how parties combine these two linkage mechanisms. Is diversifying and utilizing both linkage mechanisms a winning strategy for some parties? Under what ideological conditions are parties more likely to establish clientelistic networks? Extant findings imply that right wing parties may be associated with higher levels of clientelism (Middlebrook, 2000; Hicks and Swank, 1992). However, scholars have not reached a system-

atic understanding of this association, and thus, important and general questions remain unanswered. First, why is right wing politics more likely to be combined with clientelistic exchanges? Second, are all types of clientelistic goods similarly compatible with right wing ideology? Third, is this association contingent on certain structural conditions?

To answer these questions, we first address the challenging task of defining and measuring clientelism (Hicken, 2011). Thus, we follow Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), who move beyond a narrow definition of clientelism,[1] to a definition incorporating the provision of targeted and conditional economic favors by parties. We argue that parties, who are constrained by their (economic) ideology, can provide different types of clientelistic goods to attract different groups of voters. Potential voters vary in their preferences for types of clientelism. We therefore disaggregate clientelism into two categories, based on the type of the clientelistic benefit. Specifically, we separate rents (economic efforts aimed at small groups of voters and economic interests) from private clientelism (narrow and direct efforts, aimed at unorganized individual voters).[2]

Further, we posit that ideology and clientelism are not mutually exclusive (Singer and Kitschelt, 2011; Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013). Rather, ideology can serve vote-maximizing parties to generate affinity with voters/clients (Dixit and Londregan, 1996). This affinity enables clientelistic transactions, but the type of transaction is conditional on the specific combination of party ideology and voter group. Specifically, it allows left wing parties to target low-income voters with narrow based clientelism, and right wing parties to focus on providing rents to economic interests, especially when these parties enjoy strong contacts with business associations. However, due to parties' vote-maximization strategy and the

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[1] That is, a definition capturing only dyadic exchanges between the individual voter and the party.

[2] A full discussion of rents is beyond the scope of this paper. Rents are created when the state restricts the operations of the market in favor of its clients (Hutchcroft, 1997; Krueger, 1974). When these restrictions, such as licensing some aspect of economic activity, providing a contract to a specific firm or intervening with bureaucracy to obtain a favor for a firm, are contingent and direct, they fall under the rubric of clientelism.

fact that unorganized, low-income voters are 'cheap', right wing parties utilize a cross-class coalition strategy, in which they also approach low-income voters with narrow clientelistic appeals (Gibson, 1992; Luna, 2010). Moving to structural conditions at the country level, we argue that liberal and transparent economic environments limit the ability of right wing parties to utilize their connections with business for clientelistic transactions.

We test our argument with data provided by the Democratic Accountability and Linkage Project (DALP), which is the most comprehensive cross-national dataset of parties' programmatic and clientelistic strategies. We utilize hierarchical models to examine the effects of parties' characteristics, as well as country-level political and economic features. The analysis provides support for our theoretical expectations. First, right wing parties are more likely to employ clientelistic linkage tactics, but only when it comes to benefits provided to economic interests. In contrast, the political ideology of a party is a non-factor when it comes to private clientelism, which targets individuals more directly. Second, the results show that much of the relationship between right wing ideology and clientelism is mediated by the fact that these parties have strong ties to business associations. Finally, as expected, the party-business nexus has a weaker effect on clientelism in more transparent and liberal economies.

These findings have clear implications for the study of party politics, electoral competition, and clientelism. By disaggregating the concept of clientelism and demonstrating that some facets of clientelism go hand in hand with right wing ideology while others do not, this analysis offers a novel explanation for a central feature of electoral competition, one that has yet to be studied in a comprehensive fashion. While demonstrating that there exists a relationship between business and politics is not novel, the analysis highlights the mediating role of business interests, as they serve as a channel of voter recruitment for economically conservative parties. Finally, establishing the contingent effects of economic openness has clear

implications on the interaction between state level contextual factors and parties' linkage effort.

# 2 Variation within Accountability Mechanisms

The concept of democratic accountability encompasses the relationship between voters as the principals and politicians as the agents. In election, citizens can cast their votes based on the linkage mechanism by which politicians attempt to attract the electorate. Based on the experience of advanced democracies, the existing research on party competition has assumed 'policies' and ideologies – the broad principles underlying policy positions – as the most conventional appeal politicians offer. In this conventional programmatic accountability relationship, parties respond to electorates by advertising and implementing policies that align with the interests of a subset of the constituency. Voters then compare the policies proffered by parties and make their decision. Under programmatism, policy packages are usually in the form of large-scale 'club' or collective goods. Importantly, the provisions of such goods are not contingent on citizens' voting decisions or their ties to parties.

In contrary to the programmatic linkage strategy, voters in a clientelistic relationship expect to obtain a particular party-sponsored benefit targeting potential supporters only. The distributed benefits are tailored to a specific constituency and may take a variety of forms, such as consumer goods, preferential access to social policy, and influence over the application of economic regulations. Clientelistic exchange presupposes that parties are able to identify voter groups that would be amenable to the provision of benefits, and have the organizational infrastructure necessary to facilitate the distribution and delivery of goods. In addition, parties may also have the capacity to monitor the voting behavior of the

beneficiaries.

While the distinction between programmatic and clientelistic politics is generally clear,[3] it is insufficient for the purpose of disentangling the relationship between parties' ideology and clientelistic tactics. Therefore, following Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), who move beyond the conceptualization of clientelism as encapsulating only direct, dyadic relationships between individual clients and patrons, we posit that economic goods (rents) that are aimed at groups of individuals and organized economic interests, and can be withheld from other groups but not from group members, fall under the rubric of clientelism. Our motivation for differentiating between rents and private clientelism hinges on the assumption that various social groups have demands for different types of clientelistic exchange. For example, as individuals become more affluent and well-organized, their demand for private gifts should be lower than that of low-income, isolated voters. Second, it is evident that parties' economic ideology is intertwined with the type of social groups it can attract, and thus with the choice of a specific clientelistic tactic. Thus, a measure that does not differentiate between various types of clientelism would not enable us to unpack the relationship between political ideology and clientelism.

We break the overall concept of clientelism into two mutually exclusive categories. The first one, which we dub *rent clientelism* (RC), captures a situation where a political party commits to change/restrict the operation of the market in favor of the client. These rents can include the provision of contracts, regulatory codes, and business environments that favor the clients as a group. These inducements are given directly to groups of citizens or businesses in order to get their votes, as well as their employees'. The second category, *private clientelism* (PC) is based on direct, narrow exchange between parties and unorganized individual voters.

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[3]See Appendix 1 for a detailed discussion of the differences between clientelistic and programmatic policies.

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These, for example, can be food, gifts, jobs, or access to public services[4].

# 3 Parties' Ideology and the Types of Clientelistic Tactics

The relationship between parties' ideology and clientelism has not been studied systematically in the literature.[5] Scholars have either solely focused on one linkage mechanism, or tended to assume that parties face a trade-off between adopting programmatism or engaging in clientelistic effort. Indeed, scholars have pointed out due to the different features of ideological and clientelistic linkage strategies, it is difficult for parties to combine both appeals (Kitschelt, 2000; Singer and Kitschelt, 2011).

Our approach is different, since we view parties as agents trying to maximize votes using both programmatic and clientelistic linkages. Clientelistic exchanges demand resources from the patron in terms of recruiting brokers, approaching clients and providing the material goods. In order to maximize votes, we assume parties will allocate a substantive part of their clientelistic appeals to target their 'core' group of voters.[6] Our definition of 'core' is broad, and is related to the concept of 'affinity' as used by Schady (2000, 289):"[A]ffinity could include voter $i$'s perception of the incumbent's character, or the ideological proximity between voter $i$ and the incumbent." Thus, ideological proximity serves as one of the elements that generate a sense of affinity between patron and client, and increases the efficiency of the clientelistic transaction. Indeed, as Weghorst and Lindberg (2013) argue, program-

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[4]In the *Data and Variables* section we outline this demarcation in terms of measurement.

[5]See Middlebrook (2000), who examines right wing Latin-American parties, and Hicks and Swank (1992).

[6]Note that this does not imply that 'swing' voters are not part of parties' calculus. The rich literature debating whether parties target 'core' of 'swing' voters finds that both mechanisms are in play.

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matic and clientelistic politics are not mutually exclusive. Seen through these lenses, ideology serves as a facilitator of clientelistic exchange, as it enhances a "party's advantage over its competitors at swaying voters in a group with offers of particularistic benefits."(Dixit and Londregan, 1996, 1134)

Ideological affinity therefore facilitates clientelistic exchange by allowing parties to efficiently target voter groups.[7] A left wing party that supports redistribution would find it easier to form a clientelistic relationship with low-income voters. On the other hand, an economically conservative party will be hard pressed to establish clientelistic exchanges with poor voters. Similarly, in general, left wing parties will find it difficult to establish clientelistic networks with groups of affluent voters. Thus, ideology will play a pivotal role in parties' calculus regarding whom to target.

This argument is supported by the data; we find a negative correlation ($r = -0.53$) between parties' economic position and whether they attempt to attract poor voters, implying that left parties target poor voters to a higher extent. We also find a strong positive ($r = 0.5$) relationship between right wing ideology and the targeting of rich voters with clientelistic practices.

Following the distinction made in the previous section between different clientelistic benefits, we argue that parties face another important choice. This entails selecting the type of clientelistic goods to provide to voters. Parties can provide prospective voters with PC goods such as gifts, jobs, or preferential access to medical treatments. Alternatively, they can provide RC such as government contracts, or preferable applications of regulations that would benefit a group of supporters. Generally, parties are much more likely to engage

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[7] Stokes (2005) emphasizes the futility of targeting ideological voters since they would have voted for the party even in the absence of clientelism. However as Cox (2006); Nichter (2010) note, parties also use clientelistic inducements to mobilize their supporters and increase turnout among ideological voters, and thus, clientelistic effort is at least marginally helpful with ideological voters.

voters who are less well-off with PC tactics. This is because these voters are in need of day-to-day assistance rather than broad economic benefits. In addition, poor voters are less likely to be organized in formal business networks, and thus the use of rents may not be a viable commodity in the party-voter exchange. In contrast, well-off voters have demands for clientelistic tactics that move beyond overcoming daily hardships. In addition, these voters are better organized, and thus offering rents could attract a larger number of supporters.

To preliminarily assess the degree to which this argument is consistent with the data, Table 1 presents the bi-variate correlations between types of clientelism and targeted groups. Inspection of this table in isolation would lead to the conclusion that both types of clientelistic appeals are correlated with targeting of both groups. However, these relationships do not take into account the overall associations among types of clientelism. Once we examine the partial correlations in Table 2, it becomes evident that once the variance of PC is purged, the relationship between RC and targeting of the poor is negative. Similarly, controlling for RC demonstrates that the relationship between PC and targeting of the rich is negative. This preliminary examination supports the argument. To reiterate, because of differences in the demands of different social groups, parties choose the type of clientelism strategically, using mostly RC to target the rich, and PC to target the poor.

Table 1: Correlations: group targeting and clientelistic appeal

|  | Poor | Rich |
|---|---|---|
| Rent Clientelism | 0.24 | 0.26 |
| Private Clientelism | 0.39 | 0.16 |

Table 2: Partial correlations: group targeting and clientelistic appeal

|  | Poor | rich |
|---|---|---|
| Rent Clientelism | **-0.27** | 0.26 |
| Private Clientelism | 0.41 | **-0.16** |

Thus far we have argued that parties' ideology affects the affinity between patron and client, and thus the degree to which parties target certain social groups. In addition, our contention is that there exists a relationship between the type of the clientelistic appeal used by the patron and the socio-economic class of clients. Combining the two parts of the

argument might lead to the conclusion that left wing parties are more clientelistic when it comes to the use of PC, and right wing parties are more clientelistic in terms of RC. However, there are a number of reasons to believe that the association between left wing ideology and PC might not be as robust as the relationship between right wing ideology and RC. First, poor voters have been shown to be essential to the political economy of clientelistic appeals in a variety of qualitative, formal, and empirical literature (Baland and Robinson, 2012; Banfield and Wilson, 1963; Calvo and Murrilo, 2004; Chubb, 1982; Malagoni, Diaz-Cayeros and Estèvez, 2007; Stokes et al., 2013). While the exact causal mechanisms may differ, scholars agree that the 'price' of these voters is relatively low, and thus they serve as an easy target for parties. Given parties' limited resources, all parties are expected to devote resources to utilizing PC to attract poor voting blocs.

Second, vote-maximizing parties may need to expand beyond their 'core' constituencies. Based on the size of these constituencies, economically conservative parties have a stronger incentive than left parties to create cross-class coalitions, because the sheer size of their 'core' constituency is small relative to left parties' 'core' supporters (Gibson, 1992). Conservative parties will therefore also use PC to attract less well-off voters. These attempts are part of a linkage segmentation (Luna, 2010). According to this theory, conservative parties can use a two-pronged electoral strategy, whereby they maintain their ideological affinity with upper-class voters, while constructing clientelistic networks with poor voters. However, the left wing parallel of this bifurcated strategy –targeting left leaning voters with ideology and right leaning voters with RC –is not a preferred strategy for left parties. There are a number of reasons for this: First, as noted, left wing parties' constituency tends to be larger than that of right wing parties, and therefore the creation of a cross-class coalition is less of a necessity. Second, establishing clientelistic relationships with right leaning voters is more costly (when compared to the 'price' of poor voters). In conclusion, both the size of 'core'

constituencies and their price dictate that right wing parties can offer clientelistic benefits that go beyond their 'core' constituency, but left parties cannot.[8] Bearing this discussion in mind, we expect that the relationship between right wing ideology and RC to be a robust one. On the other hand, we expect the relationship between ideological propensity and PC to be weak. These expectations are formalized in the following hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 1: Right wing parties should use more Rent Clientelism than left wing parties.*
*Hypothesis 2: There should not be a relationship between ideology and Private Clientelism.*

# 4  The Effect of Party Organization and Economic Institutions

Parties have to rely on intermediaries to target and transfer particularistic inducements to voters (Koter, 2013; Szwarcberg, 2012). Kitschelt and Kselman (2011) have found that civic associations can serve as intermediaries, because they can coordinate members and establish group consensus, and their "special interest" character is likely to make them more amenable to engage with clientelistic political parties. In addition, the network structure of organized groups can assume the burden of transmitting benefits to the targeted constituencies and possibly monitoring opportunistic voter conduct. Overall, civic associations enable the provision of particularistic benefits to members of organized, internally networked groups "in

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[8]In Appendix 4 we offer a statistical test of the implications of this argument. We find that left wing parties tend to target only their loyalists (more likely to be poor), while right wing parties are more likely to target both loyalists and strategic voters. In addition, left wing parties use PC to attract these loyalists, but right wing parties are likely to utilize both PC and RC to appeal to loyalists as well as strategic voters.

bulk" at minimum costs.[9]

While a variety of civic associations can be utilized for clientelistic politics, business associations have an affinity with right wing ideology. That is, business associations may sympathize with right wing parties' ideological promises while being amenable to the provision of group-based directed benefits. In addition, these associations have the organizational capacities to help implement clientelistic transactions. Extensive and regular ties to business associations provide right wing parties with an efficient venue that can be used to distribute broad clientelistic goods to groups of voters. Thus, in many cases of right wing RC, the mechanism enabling the exchange is not direct, but transmitted by a network organization.[10] Based on these arguments, we hypothesize that right parties' ties to business associations mediates the use of RC strategies is proposed:

*Hypothesis 3: Right wing parties are more likely to rely on rent clientelism when they have built ties with business associations to facilitate clientelistic exchange. That is, the positive relationship between parties' right wing ideology and rent clientelistic effort is mediated through their linkages to business groups.*

Finally, we expect the effects of ties to economic associations on parties' RC use to be conditional on countries' general regulatory environment. While transparency varies across different clientelistic and programmatic practices, democratic norms dictate that in general, clientelistic linkage practices are less open to scrutiny than their programmatic counterparts.

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[9]In a sense, business leaders' role in these exchanges is akin to that of a broker in Stokes et al. (2013), but they do not pose the same level of informational problems as brokers in Stokes et al.'s account.

[10]The DALP questionnaire asks only about votes as the commodity received by the party in the clientelistic exchange. Thus, we are unable to test the degree to which other important forms of support, such as financial contributions and bribes, constitute a part of the party-business nexus. With regards to votes, there are ample examples of this type of relationship in a variety of economic sectors (Baland and Robinson, 2012; Bendix, 1964; Della Porta and Vannucci, 1999; Scheiner, 2007).

As Singer and Kitschelt (2011); Stokes et al. (2013); Wantchekon (2003) have argued, clientelistic competition works better when legislation is vague that allows wide discretion and particularistic implementation. Similarly, clientelism becomes less effective when patrons' ability to monopolize economic resources is weaker, allowing a higher degree of competition (Medina and Stokes, 2007). From the demand-side point of view, in a less liberalized and transparent setting, where the state takes a more active role in the mobilization and allocation of economic resources, electorate tend to find clientelistic network an important channel to get side-payments. On the other hand, if the economic process follows generalized rules and is based on impersonally institutionalized procedures, citizens do not expect to get particularistic benefits. Furthermore, in a transitional or newly-liberalized economy, the state can take the opportunity of economic reforms to patronize key economic groups (Shleifer and Treisman, 2001; Snyder, 1999). Under such conditions, members of business associations, who share the parties' right wing ideology, can obtain access to contracts or preferential applications of regulatory rules through clientelistic exchange. That is, in less-liberalized or transitional settings, right wing parties have greater chances to combine both clientelistic and ideological effort to attract business groups. Based on this, a hypothesis is proposed:

*Hypothesis 4: The positive relationship between parties' ties to business associations and rent clientelistic effort is strengthened in countries where the economic regulations are less liberal.*

# 5  Illustrative Cases

Below we present two motivating cases that serve to illustrate the main points of the theoretical argument. Specifically, the Taiwanese and Turkish cases demonstrate the importance

of ties between right wing ideology and business interests as a facilitator of RC exchange, the relevance of economic transparency to clientelistic exchanges, and the ability of right wing parties to utilize a bifurcated, cross-class linkage strategy. The article then proceeds to the empirical testing sections.

## 5.1 Taiwan

Since the 1990s, democratic elections in Taiwan have been characterized by a stable pattern of confrontations between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Since democratization, DPP has promoted several policies of welfare state expansion, including universal health insurance, subsidized housing, and universal pensions (Lin, 2006). KMT takes a more right wing stance. It initiated economic liberalization in the late 1980s, and pushed for free trade agreements, especially those with China in the late 2000s. Clientelism has also constituted an important strategy of KMT.[11] In terms of PC, KMT has retained extensive broker systems established in the authoritarian era, which have remained resilient after democratization (Bosco, 1994; Wang and Kurzman, 2007). Utilizing the extensive local networks, the distribution of targeted services, consumer goods, and small amounts of money has constituted an important electoral strategy, particularly in areas with large agricultural populations (Chang and Lu, 2011; Wang, 2004). With regard to RC, KMT's capacity to combine the appeals of both right wing ideology and rent clientelism partly originated in its enormous financial resources and the process of economic liberalization.[12] Since

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[11]Based on the DALP data, KMT was rated as 6.35 on the rent clientelism scale. Overall, the rent clientelism indicator has a mean of 4.8 and a standard deviation of 1.52. In 2009, Taiwan had per capita GDP (PPP) of USD 32,000 and Polity score of 9.8. According to the DALP dataset, the average rent clientelism ratings for parties in countries with per capita GDP between USD 32,000 - USD 35,000 or Polity score above 9 are 3.12 or 4.39, respectively.

[12]KMTs fortune mainly comes from its party-owned enterprises (POEs) as a legacy of its single-party authoritarian rule. In 1998, the net assets of POEs were still over NTD 200 billion (around USD 6.5 billion), accounting for more than 2% of GNP (Matsumoto, 2002)

the late 1980s, utilizing the opportunities of privatizing state-owned enterprises, deregularizing certain industries, and legalizing the POEs, KMT was able to patronize key business groups (Chang, 2008). For example, allowing selected key firms to operate in the newly deregularized industries, opening certain industries for trade with China, and having POEs investing in these firms have aligned their economic interests with KMT (Chang, 2008; Matsumoto, 2002). The firms selected by KMT are generally big business groups that play an important role in business associations of different sectors (Chang, 2008; Matsumoto, 2002). CEOs of these firms have organized support groups in their firms/industries and spoken in campaigns to mobilize support for KMT (Chang, 2008; Tao, 2015).

In the past twenty years since democratization, KMT has combined both programmatic and clientelistic accountability strategies. Although better democratic quality and more competitive elections have raised the costs of clientelism, KMT has still largely provided targeted benefits to key business groups, and mobilized electoral support by establishing an alliance with key firms and utilizing their influence in professional associations and the industries. The clientelistic strategy has materialized in the context of less transparent economic regulatory environment, including the process of liberalizing some sectors and establishing new institutions for market governance, and the sphere of cross-Taiwan strait trade.[13] The rhetoric used by business leaders in the campaigns for KMT has further strengthened the party's right wing image.

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[13]In the Taiwanese Constitutions and laws, the mainland China is not treated as a foreign country. Thus the opening of trade and investment in any sector with China requires special legislation, which enables the ruling party opportunities to patronize selected firms when regulating the market.

## 5.2 Turkey

In 1983, the Motherland Party (MP) began implementing neo-liberal economic revisions. The changes paved the way to the rise of new economic forces in the early 1990s. Among those was a new business group, composed of small and medium sized export-driven Islamic businessmen, who organized their own business association, the MÜSIAD[14]. The rise of an Islamic business class was related to a growing Islamic presence in party politics. In 1996, the Islamist Welfare Party (WP) formed the government coalition. The WP and MÜSIAD had an ideological affinity on cultural and economic aspects. WP's clientelistic strategy would prove to be typical of Islamic parties in Turkish politics. On the one hand, it established a network of grassroots organizations that maintained ties with small businesses. On the other hand, it approached the poor to increase its electoral support.

Since 2002, the moderate, Islamic JDP has emerged as the dominant party in Turkish politics. Programmatically, the party is committed to free markets, privatization, and foreign investment (Ozbudun, 2006). The party also utilizes RC and PC strategies[15]. In essence, one of the keys to the success of JDP is its ability "to create a cross-class coalition between the rising Muslim bourgeoisie and the poor."(Zencirci, 2014, 38). In terms of PC, JDP's neoliberal welfare regime has allowed party activists and Islamic business to form a network of charity organizations, and assist the party during its electoral efforts. For example, evidence of distribution of consumer goods prior to elections have surfaced in areas in which conservative parties have had low electoral support in the past (Bugra and Candas, 2013). In addition, Eligur (2009) shows that the government had used gifts such as appliances, coal and food baskets for electoral means. The JDP has also used a variety of state-controlled

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[14]MÜSİAD – Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamlar Derneği. The "Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association."

[15]Indeed, both in terms of private and rent clientelism, the party is ranked the most clientelistic party in our data. The party is also the most right wing party in Turkey.

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assistance programs to establish its electoral position among the poor (Aytac, 2014). The party has also used the Mass Housing Development Authority (TOKI) to deliver rents to business interests. In charge of building 450,000 units of hosing, the TOKI program has been moved directly under the authority of the Prime Minister by the JDP. This provides construction companies a strong incentive to support the party. In addition, decisions pertaining to large housing projects have an effect on local economies, as government investments can stimulate the regional economy. Performing a quantitative analysis of TOKI expenditures, Marshall, Abdullah and Alper (2015) demonstrate that TOKI is used as a means to enhance the party's electoral support. Finally, the construction boom has been used by the JDP to further the interests of Islamic business groups associated with MÜSIAD, as construction companies associated with the Islamic organization and the JDP have been favorably treated by TOKI (Karatepe, 2013).

The JDP therefore exemplifies a cross-class, bifurcated strategy. The party is able to establish clientelistic networks with the rising Islamic business class by utilizing the ideological/cultural affinity it shares with Islamic entrepreneurs. In addition, the party establishes itself as a provider of PC goods for low-income voters. In order to increase its PC and RC clout, the party has taken measures to ensure the politization of massive economic resources such as TOKI, which provide them with significant resources that can be used as part of its RC strategy.

# 6    Data and Measures

We utilize the data provided by the DALP, which is based on an expert survey focusing on various party characteristics, including the extent to which parties utilize different linkage

mechanisms. The data covers all polities of at least two million inhabitants with a "minimum of two rounds of national electoral competition under at least semi-democratic conditions (Kitschelt, 2013)." For each country, the project contains expert judgements for all politically relevant parties as of the last elections prior to 2009. Altogether, the survey covers a total of 508 parties in 88 countries, with broad geographic spread.

In order to distinguish between rent and private clientelism, we construct two dependent variables. We generate the RC variable by summing experts' responses for two questions from the survey (b4 and b5). These questions capture a type of clientelistic exchange that aims at establishing clientelistic exchanges with clients organized in more formal business networks, such as employers, unions and business interests, by providing an array of contracts, regulatory codes, and business environments favoring the clients. Specifically, these questions focus on: (1) Preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities, and (2) Application of regulatory rules issued by government agencies. Our second dependent variable, PC, is a summation of experts' responses to three questions (b1-b3). This type of clientelism includes one-time handouts of gifts, jobs, and preferential access to material advantages in public policy schemes (e.g. disability pensions, access to public housing, and access to public health facilities) to private voters.

As for operationalizing parties' ideology, the DALP survey includes a number of questions tapping into parties' ideological positions. Among those are parties' positions on (1) social spending on the disadvantaged, (2) state role in governing the economy, (3) public spending, (4) national identity, and (5) traditional authority, institutions, and customs. To construct our measure of economic left-right position, we use factor analysis. The results, presented in Table 3, show that the responses to these questions load onto two distinct dimensions. Specifically, responses to the first three questions construct an economic ideology dimension. Since we are interested in the relationship between economic position and clientelism, we

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use the party-level scores derived from this procedure as our measure of parties' economic positions.

We highlight three additional variables that play a role in our argument. The first variable is *Strength of Linkages: Business*. This is an binary variable, based on the question: "Do the following parties have strong linkages to business associations and professional associations?" Second, to gauge market liberalism, we use two variables. The first is *Economic Freedom*, provided by the Heritage Foundation. This index is based on measurement of four categories: (1) Rule of Law (property rights, freedom from corruption), (2) Limited Government (fiscal freedom, government spending), (3) Regulatory Efficiency (business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom), and (4) Open Markets (trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom). A country's overall score is derived by averaging all of these, yielding a score ranging from of 0 to 100. The other variable used to capture market liberalism is the *Regulatory Quality* index. This measure is one of World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, and aims at capturing incidence of market-unfriendly policies, such as price controls, inadequate bank supervision, and excessive regulation on foreign trade. The measure is based on 32 existing data sources that report the experiences of citizens, entrepreneurs, and experts in NGOs and the public sector about relevant concepts. The scores are in the -2.5 to 2.5 range.

## 6.1 Additional Variables and Statistical Model

Our statistical models include a number of control variables, which have been shown to be correlated with clientelism. First, two aspects of democracy co-vary with clientelism, namely its quality and age (Keefer, 2007; Kitschelt and Kselman, 2013). We use Polity2 scores to measure the former, and Gerring, Bond, Barndt and Moreno (2005)'s Democratic

Table 3: Factor Analysis Results: Left-Right Position

|                                                   | Dimension 1 | Dimension 2 |
|---------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Social spending on the disadvantaged              | 0.902       |             |
| State role in governing the economy               | 0.921       |             |
| Public spending                                   | 0.916       |             |
| National identity                                 |             | 0.965       |
| Traditional authority, institutions, and customs  |             | 0.683       |
| Proportion of variation                           | 0.511       | 0.299       |

*Note:* Factors obtained using Varimax rotation.

Stock variable to gauge the accumulation of democratic experience. We also account for the levels of economic development. The literature has suggested that voters in wealthy societies might be more difficult to be enticed with particularistic benefits, or that the relationship is curvilinear. We therefore include also a quadratic term of economic development in the models.

Political institutions also exert influence over the use of clientelism. Scholars have suggested that multiple electoral mechanisms may affect the propensity to use clientelism, such as personalist arrangements (Ames, 1999) and specific electoral rules such as SNTV systems (Cox and Rosenbluth, 1995). Accordingly, our models include variables capturing the mean district magnitude. In addition, following the literature discussing the relationship between presidentialism and clientelism (Linz and Valenzuela, 1994; Ordeshook, 1995), we use a variable capturing whether a country is a presidential system. Next, based on research on socio-economic factors and parties' clientelism (Kolev and Wang, 2014; Thomas, 2011), our analysis includes two measures of inequality, the GINI coefficient and a *between group inequality* measure[16], as well as a measure of a country's reliance on oil exports.

At the party level, our analysis incorporates two variables that gauge parties' organiza-

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[16]For a detailed description of this variables see Kolev and Wang (2014).

tional features. The indicator of *local notables* measures the extent to which parties have local intermediaries such as neighborhood leaders, local notables, or religious leaders who operate in local constituencies on the parties' behalf. It is assumed that the network of local intermediaries facilitates the distribution of targeted goods. In addition, *selection centralization* captures the degree to which national party leaders control the process of party candidate selections. It is expected that centralized parties are better able to invest in clientelistic strategy (Kitschelt and Kselman, 2011). Both variables are taken from the DALP dataset. Next, since the ability to use clientelistic practices is related to a party's share of power in decision-making institutions, we include measures of a party's vote share and whether it has had a cabinet minister when the DALP survey was implemented.[17].

To test both party and country-level effects, we model parties' reliance on RC and PC by utilizing a Bayesian hierarchical model containing party and country-level components (Gelman and Hill, 2007). We incorporate country-level covariates along with responses from the DALP survey, which are at the party level. Hierarchical models are suitable for capturing the "causal heterogeneity" (Western, 1998) that is likely to be present in the data, since the relationship between party level attributes and the dependent variable might differ based on the country-level characteristics. The description of the basic model and a model with cross-level interaction is included in Appendix 3.

# 7    Analysis

We begin our analysis by estimating the statistical relationship between parties' economic ideology and their use of rent and private clientelism. Models 1 and 2 of Table 4 present

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[17]Descriptive statistics are listed in the Appendix 2

the results when rent clientelism is the dependent variable. In Model 1, we include party level-variables, as well as institutional variables at the country-level, while in Model 2 we introduce country-level economic and social factors, as well as regional indicators. Before turning to our variables of interest, we review the coefficients on the possible confounding variables. The results of Model 1 indicate the democratic stock of a country exerts a negative effect on RC levels. In addition, in line with previous literature, in Model 1, the results point to a positive impact of presidentialism and a negative impact of the mean district magnitude in a country on parties' RC usage. However, once we introduce economic variables and regional indicators in Model 2,[18] the coefficients on presidentialism and democratic stock are no longer significant. The effects of these country-level variables on private clientelism (Models 3 and 4) are similar to the results of Models 1 and 2.

In terms of party-level characteristics, the results presented in the Table are also in line with previous studies. Specifically, regardless of model specification and types of clientelism, the results indicate that both parties' reliance on local notables and centralization of candidates' selection procedures yield a positive effect on clientelism.[19] Unsurprisingly, the two variables capturing political powers (i.e. government membership and vote share) indicate that larger and governmental parties are more likely to use clientelism.

Moving to the variable of interest, the results indicate that a party's economic position matters when it comes to RC usage. Specifically, and as expected in Hypothesis 1, moving from left to right in terms of economic ideology yields a higher degree of reliance on RC. A graphical illustration of this result is presented in Figure 1. The figure demonstrates that moving from the extreme left to right on the economic ideological scale leads to a significant

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[18]We include politico-regional indicators for Advanced Capitalist, Post-Communist Latin American, African and Asian/Middle East countries. The reference category is Advanced Capitalist group of countries. Estimates are not reported in the Table.

[19]We maintained the original coding of these variables in the DALP dataset, and hence the negative coefficients.

Table 4: Disaggregating Clientelism

| | Dependent variable: | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | rent clientelism | | private clientelism | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Constant | 6.645*** | 8.743 | 10.397*** | −7.825 |
| | (0.413) | (9.605) | (0.608) | (13.709) |
| polity2 | 0.036 | 0.044 | 0.029 | 0.096** |
| | (0.032) | (0.033) | (0.046) | (0.046) |
| democratic stock | −0.002*** | −0.001 | −0.002*** | −0.001 |
| | (0.0004) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| presidentialism | 0.502** | 0.057 | 1.098*** | 0.372 |
| | (0.215) | (0.229) | (0.314) | (0.326) |
| mean district magnitude | −0.007** | −0.006** | −0.011** | −0.009** |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.004) |
| between group inequality | | 8.216** | | 9.571* |
| | | (3.635) | | (5.167) |
| GINI | | 0.016 | | −0.002 |
| | | (0.016) | | (0.023) |
| GDP per capita | | −0.252 | | 4.783 |
| | | (2.310) | | (3.296) |
| GDP per capita$^2$ | | −0.012 | | −0.317* |
| | | (0.132) | | (0.188) |
| local notable | −0.833*** | −0.729*** | −1.268*** | −1.047*** |
| | (0.107) | (0.106) | (0.159) | (0.156) |
| selection centralization | −0.549*** | −0.463*** | −0.863*** | −0.664*** |
| | (0.084) | (0.081) | (0.124) | (0.118) |
| government membership | 0.306*** | 0.252*** | 0.361*** | 0.288*** |
| | (0.051) | (0.051) | (0.076) | (0.076) |
| vote share | 0.012*** | 0.015*** | 0.011** | 0.015*** |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| right-left position | 0.250*** | 0.250*** | 0.061 | 0.053 |
| | (0.036) | (0.036) | (0.053) | (0.053) |
| Observations | 497, 87 clusters | 453, 79 clusters | 497, 87 clusters | 453, 79 clusters |
| Log Likelihood | -641.656 | -553.375 | -83.781 | -722.035 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 1,307.312 | 1,146.750 | 1,691.561 | 1,484.070 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 1,357.815 | 1,229.068 | 1,742.065 | 1,566.815 |
| $\hat{\sigma_y}$ | 0.68 | 0.67 | 1.02 | 0.99 |
| $\hat{\sigma_\alpha}$ | 0.86 | 0.59 | 1.25 | 0.83 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Models 2, 4 include regional indicator variables. Country-level variables at the top of the table.

increase in the usage of RC tactics, which equals to a full unit or two-third standard deviation increase (from 4.2 to 5.2) in our measure of RC. In contrast to the significant relationship between ideology and RC, and as outlined in hypothesis 2, we fail to find a relationship between economic ideology at the party level and PC, i.e., the effect of ideology on private clientelism is negligible and indistinguishable from zero.



**Note:** Predicted values of rent clientelism as a function of left-right economic position. Other variables are at their mean values.

Figure 1: Predicted Values of Rent Clientelism Across the Ideological Scale

Having established that right wing ideology matters with respect to the use of RC, but not PC, we now shift our attention to the mechanisms underlying the relationship between ideology and RC. Recall that in Hypothesis 3 we specify a relationship in which parties' ties to business association mediate the relationship between right wing ideology and the use of RC. In order to test this hypothesis, we include a variable capturing parties' strength of

linkages with business associations in the models. The results are presented in Table 5. In the Table, Model 1 serves as a baseline, which does not include the "business association linkage" variable. In Models 2 and 3 the variables is introduced. In terms of model specification, in Model 2 the coefficient for business associations is constant across countries, and in Model 3 we fit a hierarchical model in which the coefficient on that variable is allowed to vary across countries.

Examination of the results entails comparing Models 2 and 3 with Model 1. This comparison reveals that while the inclusion of the mediating variable has a negligible effect on other coefficients, the magnitude of the coefficient on the right-left position is decreased from 0.25 in Model 1 to 0.176 and 0.156 in Models 2 and 3, respectively (a decrease of 30%-40%). In addition, the business association linkage has a significant direct effect on the use of RC.

To establish our claim that parties' ties to business associations mediate the relationship between ideology and RC usage, we conduct a multi-level mediation analysis, which aims at investigating whether there are intermediate variables that lie in the causal pathway between the independent and the dependent variable. A mediating effect is established if the mediator has significant effects on the dependent variable, and the association between the independent and the dependent variables is substantially reduced once the mediator is included. Figure 2 shows the results of the analysis based on the method proposed by Krull and MacKinnon (2001). Here, the independent variable of interest is parties' left-right ideology, the mediator is parties' ties to business associations, and the dependent variable is parties' RC effort. For simplicity, the figure only lists the effects of the main independent variable on the mediator, the effects of the mediator on the dependent variable, and the direct effects of the main independent variable on the dependent variable. The results suggest that right wing parties have more regularized linkages to business associations. In addition, right wing parties with extensive ties to business associations are more likely to rely on rent

Table 5: Business Associations and Parties' Clientelistic Practices

| | Dependent variable: | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | rent clientelism | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Constant | 8.734 | 9.061 | 9.262 |
| | (9.605) | (9.485) | (9.402) |
| polity2 | 0.044 | 0.044 | 0.048 |
| | (0.033) | (0.032) | (0.032) |
| democratic stock | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| presidentialism | 0.057 | 0.061 | 0.072 |
| | (0.229) | (0.226) | (0.226) |
| mean district magnitude | −0.005** | −0.005** | −0.005** |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| between group inequality | 8.216** | 8.275** | 8.433** |
| | (3.635) | (3.586) | (3.625) |
| GINI | 0.016 | 0.015 | 0.016 |
| | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| GDP per capita | −0.252 | −0.396 | −0.495 |
| | (2.310) | (2.281) | (2.263) |
| GDP per capita$^2$ | −0.012 | −0.003 | 0.004 |
| | (0.132) | (0.130) | (0.129) |
| local notable | −0.729*** | −0.694*** | −0.681*** |
| | (0.106) | (0.106) | (0.102) |
| selection centralization | −0.463*** | −0.452*** | −0.470*** |
| | (0.081) | (0.080) | (0.078) |
| government membership | 0.252*** | 0.246*** | 0.245*** |
| | (0.051) | (0.051) | (0.049) |
| vote share | 0.015*** | 0.014*** | 0.014*** |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| left-right position | 0.250*** | 0.176*** | 0.156*** |
| | (0.036) | (0.049) | (0.048) |
| business association linkage | | 0.342** | 0.513*** |
| | | (0.157) | (0.188) |
| Observations | 453, 79 clusters | 453, 79 clusters | 453, 79 clusters |
| Log Likelihood | -553.375 | -551.938 | -542.239 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 1,146.750 | 1,145.875 | 1,130.479 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 1,229.068 | 1,232.309 | 1,225.144 |
| $\hat{\sigma_y}$ | 0.67 | 0.66 | 0.60 |
| $\hat{\sigma_\alpha}$ | 0.59 | 0.58 | 0.76 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Country-level variables at the top of the table. Model 1 serves as a benchmark model before including business association linkages. In model 3 the effect of business associations linkage varies across countries.

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clientetelism appeals. The mediating effect of the business association variable is significant, as this variable transmits around thirty percent of the total impacts of parties' ideology on their levels of RC usage. Along with the results presented in Table 5, these results support for the contention that a significant part of right wing parties' reliance on RC is contingent upon their ties with business associations.

Figure 2: Mediation Analysis

The final part of the empirical analysis centers on the contingent effect of the regulatory environment in a country over the use of RC tactics. Recall that our Hypothesis 4 states that in liberal regulatory environments, the effect of parties' linkage with business associations will be diminished. To test this, we create a cross-level interaction term between business association linkage (at the party-level) and two variables that capture the regulatory environment (three-year lagged economic freedom and regulatory quality indicators, both at the country-level). Table 6 presents the results. First, Models 1 and 3 in the Table include the regulatory environment variables additively without interactions, and Models 2 and 4 include the relevant interactions. In Model 1, the coefficient on economic freedom does not reach statistical significance. In Model 2, the coefficient on regulatory quality is statistically significant and negative, indicating that poor regulatory quality result in higher levels of RC

use.

More importantly, however, the effects on the interaction terms in Models 2 and 4 are significant and in the expected direction, indicating that more liberalized environments hinder parties' reliance on business associations as a channel for RC. Figures 3 and 4 display the interactive effect, specifically, the slope on the business associations linkage variable, as a function of the moderating regulatory environment variables. Both figures demonstrate that as the regulatory environment becomes more open and transparent, the ability of parties to utilize their business associations linkage as a RC distributive mechanisms is reduced[20].

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[20]We also conduct robustness checks, including simple OLS models, regression models with clustered errors, and models with country fixed effects, for the four hypotheses. These robustness check models all show consistent results.

Table 6: Economic Environment and Clientelism

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | rent clientelism | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Constant | 10.373 | 10.453 | 9.819 | 10.611 |
| | (9.697) | (9.016) | (9.819) | (9.130) |
| polity2 | 0.050 | 0.061$^*$ | 0.051 | 0.062$^*$ |
| | (0.034) | (0.032) | (0.035) | (0.033) |
| democratic stock | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| presidentialism | 0.031 | −0.009 | 0.037 | 0.005 |
| | (0.235) | (0.218) | (0.238) | (0.221) |
| mean district magnitude | −0.006$^{**}$ | −0.006$^{***}$ | −0.006$^{**}$ | −0.006$^{***}$ |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| between group inequality | 7.510$^{**}$ | 7.876$^{**}$ | 7.509$^{**}$ | 8.168$^{**}$ |
| | (3.727) | (3.446) | (3.771) | (3.476) |
| GINI | 0.019 | 0.014 | 0.018 | 0.012 |
| | (0.017) | (0.015) | (0.017) | (0.016) |
| GDP per capita | −0.675 | −1.144 | −0.799 | −1.250 |
| | (2.319) | (2.177) | (2.348) | (2.205) |
| GDP per capita$^2$ | 0.016 | 0.064 | 0.024 | 0.072 |
| | (0.133) | (0.125) | (0.134) | (0.127) |
| economic freedom | −0.009 | | 0.006 | |
| | (0.009) | | (0.010) | |
| regulatory quality | | −0.772$^{***}$ | | −0.576$^{**}$ |
| | | (0.254) | | (0.263) |
| oil export | 0.133 | −2.104 | 0.196 | −2.155 |
| | (1.280) | (1.421) | (1.291) | (1.433) |
| government membership | 0.244$^{***}$ | 0.253$^{***}$ | 0.258$^{***}$ | 0.261$^{***}$ |
| | (0.049) | (0.049) | (0.049) | (0.049) |
| vote share | 0.014$^{***}$ | 0.014$^{***}$ | 0.013$^{***}$ | 0.013$^{***}$ |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| right-left position | 0.158$^{***}$ | 0.163$^{***}$ | 0.162$^{***}$ | 0.181$^{***}$ |
| | (0.048) | (0.048) | (0.048) | (0.048) |
| business association linkage | 0.509$^{***}$ | 0.506$^{***}$ | 2.673$^{***}$ | 0.788$^{***}$ |
| | (0.188) | (0.187) | (0.674) | (0.205) |
| local notable | −0.678$^{***}$ | −0.659$^{***}$ | −0.672$^{***}$ | −0.672$^{***}$ |
| | (0.102) | (0.101) | (0.101) | (0.101) |
| selection centralization | −0.469$^{***}$ | −0.457$^{***}$ | −0.463$^{***}$ | −0.450$^{***}$ |
| | (0.078) | (0.077) | (0.078) | (0.077) |
| business association linkage×economic freedom | | | −0.030$^{***}$ | |
| | | | (0.009) | |
| business association linkage×regulatory quality | | | | −0.513$^{***}$ |
| | | | | (0.169) |
| Observations | 453, 79 clusters | 453, 79 clusters | 453, 79 clusters | 453, 79 clusters |
| Log Likelihood | -544.446 | -537.167 | -543.051 | -533.974 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 1,138.891 | 1,124.334 | 1,138.101 | 1,119.948 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 1,241.789 | 1,227.231 | 1,245.114 | 1,226.961 |
| $\hat{\sigma_y}$ | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.68 |
| $\hat{\sigma_\alpha}$ | 0.79 | 0.74 | 0.61 | 0.56 |

*Note:* $^*$p<0.1; $^{**}$p<0.05; $^{***}$p<0.01. Country level variables at the top of the table. Models 3, 4 include cross-level interactions between business associations linkages and economic freedom (3), regulatory quality (4).

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moderating effect of market openness



**Note:** Slope of business association linkage for various level of market openness.

Figure 3: Moderating Effect of Market Openness

**Note:** Slope of business association linkage for various level of regulatory quality.

Figure 4: Moderating Effect of Regulatory Quality

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# 8   Conclusion

In this paper we offer the first comprehensive and cross-national analysis of the oft-mentioned relationship between right wing ideology and the use of clientelism. In addition, we explore the role of business associations as one of the mechanisms through which right wing parties channel clientelistic goods to voters. Finally, we incorporate the level of economic liberalism and transparency in a country as a factor that moderates the effect of those associations on clientelism.

We find that right wing parties are more clientelistic, but only when it comes to using what we define as rent clientelism, i.e, a type of clientelistic effort that is aimed at groups of voters organized especially in more formal business networks. We argue that this is because right wing parties are more likely to offer clientelistic inducements to these groups relative to left leaning parties, who are limited in their ability to offer clientelistic goods to well-off groups. This is in contrast to private clientelism, which we find to be a tactic used by all parties, regardless of their ideological position. Second, our analysis shows that a large degree (approximately 30%) of the relationship between right wing ideology and rent clientelism is mediated by parties' relationship with business associations. Finally, we demonstrate that, other things being equal, the level of economic liberalism at the country level moderates the effect of business associations on rent clientelism. Specifically, our results imply that right wing parties are less able to use their linkage to business associations to provide clientelistic benefits in economically liberal environment.

The results have a number of implications. First, they answer a set of important questions in the study of party politics, namely, which parties are better able to use clientelistic appeals. What type of clientelism are they more likely to pursue? And, what mechanisms enable or hinder these exchanges between patron and client? Second, the results strongly

suggest that both conceptually and empirically, it is better to disaggregate parties' clientelistic efforts. In our view, it is evident that efforts such as gifts to private voters, on the one hand, and application of regulatory rules issued by government agencies, on the other, are distinct in many aspects (for example, the type of resources needed to employ the strategy, the targeted groups, and the organizational capacity of the patron). Third, while scholars have thus far focused on studying ideological and clientelistic appeals separately, our analysis indicates that there exists a nuanced relationship between parties' ideology and clientelism. Fourth, the ability of right wing parties to diversify their appeal –combine ideological with clientelistic strategy–suggests a future line of inquiry, focusing on the trade-off and the appeal-diversification strategies available for parties. Finally, our findings regarding the role of political economy in mediating and moderating clientelistic efforts highlight the importance of incorporating these aspects into analysis on clientelistic strategies.

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# Appendix 1: Distinguishing Clientelistic and Programmatic Politics

While in most cases, the distinction between clientelistic and programmatic linkage is clear cut,[21] when the clientelistic linkage involves expansive benefits to a group of people (e.g. intervention with bureaucracy to obtain a favor for a firm), the difference is not obvious. We therefore elaborate on a number of dimensions that serve as criteria for differentiation. First, clientelistic and programmatic tactics differ in terms of the contingency of exchanges. By this we mean that clientelistic exchanges generally involve an implicit agreement between the patron (be it a high level party personnel, or a local party broker), and prospective voters and that the provision of benefits is conditional on voters' support.

In clientelism, the group of beneficiaries is much better delineated and defined than in programmatic exchange. As a result, if the party is able to monitor the voting of its clients, or when voters are sufficiently committed to the clientelistic relationship, uncertainty levels regarding the electoral gains for the party are low.[22] In contrast, identifiability is low and uncertainty is high in the case of programmatic linkage. For example, while the implementation of a progressive tax scheme is likely to improve the economic well-being of middle and lower income voters, it is difficult to predict with accuracy its effect on their voting calculus. In addition, clients' expectations differ across linkage mechanisms. In clientelism, voters expect the provision of goods with a high degree of certainty, while voters choosing among policy bundles are less certain about the implementation and effects of policies. Finally,

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[21]For example, a speedy referral to a medical specialist in exchange for a vote compared to endorsing universal health care an election manifesto.

[22]This is akin to (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007, 13:14) notions of 'predictability, elasticity, and competition.' In other words, the clientelistic benefits provided by the party have a strong impact on the voting calculus of the recipients, such that absent its provision, the patron can expect to lose their votes with a high degree of certainty.

clientelistic and programmatic linkages also differ in terms of transparency. While transparency varies across different clientelistic and programmatic practices, democratic norms dictate that in general, clientelistic linkage practices are less open to scrutiny than their programmatic counterparts.

# Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics

| | Min | 1st Qu. | Median | Mean | 3rd Qu. | Max | SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| variable | | | | | | | |
| right-left position | -2.1 | -0.73 | -0.082 | 0.0016 | 0.710 | 3.10 | 0.97 |
| rent clientelism | 2.0 | 3.5 | 5 | 4.8 | 6.1 | 7.90 | 1.52 |
| private clientelism | 3.2 | 5.5 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 9.1 | 12 | 2.25 |
| between group inequality | 0 | 0.002 | 0.011 | 0.02 | 0.029 | 0.15 | 0.03 |
| GDP per capita | 6.4 | 8.5 | 9.3 | 9.2 | 10 | 11 | 1.05 |
| polity2 | -6.0 | 7 | 9 | 7.8 | 10 | 10 | 3.09 |
| democratic stock | -350 | -190 | 9.8 | 90 | 340 | 640 | 311.47 |
| electoral system proportionality | 0 | 1 | 3 | 2.2 | 3 | 3 | 0.91 |
| presidentialism | 0.0 | 0 | 0 | 0.48 | 1 | 1 | 0.5 |
| mean district magnitude | 0 | 1.9 | 7.5 | 19 | 17 | 150 | 34.46 |
| government membership | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.68 | 1 | 2 | 0.77 |
| vote share | 0 | 4.10 | 8.8 | 15 | 23 | 82 | 15.72 |
| GINI | 25 | 32 | 36 | 39 | 44 | 74 | 9.97 |
| oil export | 0 | 0.006 | 0.014 | 0.039 | 0.030 | 0.73 | 0.08 |
| business association linkage | 0 | 0.16 | 0.46 | 0.47 | 0.75 | 1 | 0.33 |
| economic freedom | 30 | 54 | 64 | 63 | 75 | 84 | 12.89 |
| business friendly | 2 | 26 | 60 | 69 | 110 | 170 | 47.46 |
| local notable | 1 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 3 | 0.45 |
| selection centralization | 1 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 4 | 0.64 |

Table 7: Descriptive Statistics

# Appendix 3: A Hierarchical Model of Clientelism

The basic varying intercept hierarchical model we use to test the relationship between right-left ideology and clientelism practices is the following:

$$y_i \sim N(\alpha_{[j]i} + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \beta x_{ki}, \sigma^2{}_y), \text{for } i = 1, ..., n \tag{1}$$

With each $\beta_x$ capturing the effects of party-level covariates $(1,\ldots,K)$ on the dependent variable. In these models, on average, country-level clientelism is estimated as a linear function of country-level variables:

$$\alpha_j \sim N(\gamma_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{M} \gamma x_{mj}, \sigma^2{}_\alpha), \text{for } j = 1, ..., J \tag{2}$$

With each $\gamma_x$ representing the effects of country-level covariates $(1,\ldots,M)$ on the dependent variable.

Second, we are interested in the degree to which country-level factors affect the association between party-level variables and clientelism. Specifically, we hypothesize that the effect of parties' links with business associations on clientelism is conditional on economic variables such as the regulatory environment. To test this hypothesis, we use an interaction term in which the slope of the business association variable varies across levels of economic freedom and regulatory quality. This cross-level interaction can be written as:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \alpha_j \\ \beta_j \end{pmatrix} \sim N \begin{pmatrix} \Gamma_0^\alpha + \gamma_1^\alpha \text{economic liberalism} \\ \Gamma_0^\beta + \gamma_1^\beta \text{economic liberalism} \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} \sigma^2{}_\alpha & \rho\sigma_\alpha\sigma_\beta \\ \rho\sigma_\alpha\sigma_\beta & \sigma^2{}_\beta \end{pmatrix}$$

Where, $\Gamma_0^\alpha$ and $\Gamma_0^\beta$ represent vectors of country and party-level coefficients, respectively. In addition, the $\gamma_1^\alpha$ is the constituent term representing the direct effect of economic liberalism, and the interactive effect of economic liberalism and business association linkage is captured by $\gamma_1^\beta$.

# Appendix 4: Parties' Ideologies and the Targeted Groups

We use Bayesian hierarchical models to examine the arguments specified in the *Parties Ideology and Types of Clientelistic Tactics* section. That is, left wing parties rely mainly on PC to attract their 'core' constituencies (more likely to be poor), while right wing parties use RC to target their 'core' constituencies and PC to buy off low-income voters. The dependent variables in the analysis are based on the DALP survey question: "If parties provide preferential benefits in order to receive votes, which of the following groups of voters do they primarily target? 1) Primarily to its partisan loyalists; 2) Primarily to strategic voters; 3) Both loyal and strategic voters." The dependent variables in Table 8 are the percentages of experts who answered that the party primarily targets one of the three groups. In addition to parties' economic ideology as the main independent variable to explore whether left and right wing parties tend to target different groups of voters, we also control for other covariates included in the models presented in Table 4. In Table 8, the coefficients on parties' left-right position are significant but in opposite directions when we compare Model 1 (targeting loyalists) with Models 2 (targeting both groups of voters) and 3 (targeting strategic voters). The coefficient on parties' left-right position in Model 1 is negative, suggesting that left wing parties tend to target party loyalists as the beneficiaries of their clientelistic spending; the coefficients in Models 2 and 3 are positive, showing that right wing parties are more likely to distribute clientelistic benefits to both party loyalists and strategic voters.

To further examine the types of clientelistic goods utilized by parties in order to attract different groups of voters, we include interaction terms between parties' ideological positions and their RC/PC usages (Table 9). As can be seen in Model 2, the coefficient on the interaction term between parties' economic ideology and their RC usage is positive and significant. This suggests that right wing parties are more likely to rely on RC to target both their loyalists and strategic voters. Further, in order to explore whether parties deliver PC to target only loyalists or both groups of voters, we include the interaction term between parties' left-right position and their PC effort (Models 3 and 4). The effects of the interaction terms are found to be significant and in opposite directions, implying that left wing parties use PC to primarily target their loyalists, while right wing parties deliver PC to both loyalists and strategic voters.

Overall, the results suggest that left wing parties tend to only utilize PC to attract their party loyalists, while right wing parties are more likely to spend on both RC and PC to target both loyalists and strategic voters. broadly, these analyses validate the implications of the theory, i.e. that left wing parties rely on PC to attract their 'core' constituencies, and right wing parties tend to adopt a two-pronged strategy. A detailed analysis on parties' choice of target group is left for future research.

Table 8: Parties' Ideologies and Targeted Groups

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | targeting loyalists | targeting both | targeting strategic voters |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Constant | −0.539 (1.289) | 1.729* (1.046) | −0.233 (0.925) |
| polity2 | 0.003 (0.005) | −0.006 (0.004) | 0.003 (0.004) |
| democratic stock | −0.0001 (0.0001) | 0.0001 (0.0001) | 0.00003 (0.0001) |
| electoral formula proportionality | −0.012 (0.018) | 0.007 (0.015) | 0.005 (0.013) |
| presidentialism | −0.003 (0.038) | −0.00004 (0.031) | 0.004 (0.028) |
| mean district magnitude | 0.0002 (0.0004) | −0.001** (0.0004) | 0.001* (0.0003) |
| between group inequality | −0.327 (0.622) | 0.836 (0.509) | −0.491 (0.451) |
| GINI | −0.001 (0.002) | 0.003* (0.002) | −0.002 (0.002) |
| GDP per capita | 0.235 (0.310) | −0.301 (0.252) | 0.077 (0.223) |
| GDP per capita$^2$ | −0.011 (0.018) | 0.016 (0.015) | −0.006 (0.013) |
| local notable | −0.063** (0.027) | −0.055*** (0.021) | 0.118*** (0.019) |
| selection centralization | −0.056*** (0.020) | 0.034** (0.015) | 0.021 (0.014) |
| government membership | 0.018 (0.014) | 0.002 (0.011) | −0.020** (0.009) |
| vote share | −0.005*** (0.001) | 0.004*** (0.001) | 0.001* (0.001) |
| right-left positions | −0.067*** (0.010) | 0.028*** (0.008) | 0.039*** (0.007) |
| Observations | 455 | 455 | 455 |
| Log Likelihood | 33.462 | 144.101 | 198.824 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | -32.925 | -254.202 | -363.648 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 37.120 | -184.157 | -293.603 |

*Note:* $^*$p<0.1; $^{**}$p<0.05; $^{***}$p<0.01

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Table 9: Parties' Ideologies, Clientelism, and Targeted Groups

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | loyalists | both | loyalists | both |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Constant | −0.803 | 2.098** | −0.691 | 2.146** |
| | (1.304) | (1.066) | (1.295) | (1.059) |
| polity2 | 0.004 | −0.007 | 0.003 | −0.007 |
| | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.004) |
| democratic stock | −0.0001 | 0.0001 | −0.0001 | 0.0001 |
| | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | (0.0001) |
| electoral formula proportionality | −0.010 | 0.004 | −0.010 | 0.006 |
| | (0.018) | (0.015) | (0.018) | (0.015) |
| presidentialism | 0.002 | −0.008 | −0.001 | −0.010 |
| | (0.039) | (0.032) | (0.038) | (0.032) |
| mean district magnitude | 0.0001 | −0.001 | 0.0001 | −0.001 |
| | (0.0004) | (0.0004) | (0.0004) | (0.0004) |
| between group inequality | −0.219 | 0.651 | −0.298 | 0.658 |
| | (0.635) | (0.525) | (0.626) | (0.519) |
| GINI | −0.001 | 0.003* | −0.001 | 0.003 |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| GDP per capita | 0.318 | −0.422 | 0.276 | −0.436* |
| | (0.317) | (0.260) | (0.316) | (0.259) |
| GDP per capita$^2$ | −0.016 | 0.024 | −0.014 | 0.025 |
| | (0.018) | (0.015) | (0.018) | (0.015) |
| local notable | −0.073** | −0.040* | −0.067** | −0.040* |
| | (0.029) | (0.022) | (0.028) | (0.022) |
| selection centralization | −0.062*** | 0.044*** | −0.059*** | 0.044*** |
| | (0.020) | (0.016) | (0.020) | (0.016) |
| government membership | 0.019 | −0.001 | 0.016 | 0.001 |
| | (0.014) | (0.011) | (0.014) | (0.011) |
| vote share | −0.005*** | 0.004*** | −0.005*** | 0.004*** |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| left-right positions | −0.021 | −0.018 | −0.0001 | −0.037 |
| | (0.031) | (0.024) | (0.031) | (0.023) |
| rent clientelism | −0.012 | 0.020** | | |
| | (0.012) | (0.009) | | |
| private clientelism | | | −0.002 | 0.013** |
| | | | (0.008) | (0.006) |
| rent clientelism × left-right positions | −0.010 | 0.010* | | |
| | (0.007) | (0.005) | | |
| private clientelism × left-right positions | | | −0.011** | 0.010*** |
| | | | (0.005) | (0.004) |
| Observations | 455 | 455 | 455 | 455 |
| Log Likelihood | 27.545 | 140.020 | 27.810 | 141.628 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | -17.091 | -242.040 | -17.620 | -245.257 |
| Bayesian Inf. Crit. | 61.195 | -163.755 | 60.666 | -166.971 |

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*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01