Doyle, Suzanne ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4803-4782
(2017)
A foregone conclusion? The United States, Britain and the Trident D5 agreement.
Journal of Strategic Studies, 40 (6).
pp. 867-894.
ISSN 0140-2390
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Abstract
Existing studies of the United Kingdom’s purchase of Trident D5 missiles have simplified the Reagan administration’s sale. Using previously classified documentation, this article highlights the potential political and financial ramifications of a sale agreement, which led to complex deliberations within the Thatcher government up until the final day of negotiations. The White House viewed the sale as a means to strengthen Western nuclear and conventional forces to counter the perceived Soviet threat. However, even within this conducive environment, US officials still drove a hard bargain with their British counterparts, in order to support US strategic interests. Indeed, the White House utilised the sale to influence British defence policy. In this way, the Trident agreement was not a foregone conclusion but rather a continuation of the friendly, but not preordained, nature of US-UK nuclear relations, that has been renegotiated, according to the varying interests of both parties, throughout its existence.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | nuclear weapons,thatcher,reagan,anglo-american,nato |
Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies (former - to 2024) |
UEA Research Groups: | Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Critical Global Politics Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Political, Social and International Studies |
Depositing User: | Pure Connector |
Date Deposited: | 24 Sep 2016 00:12 |
Last Modified: | 28 Aug 2024 00:20 |
URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/59912 |
DOI: | 10.1080/01402390.2016.1220366 |
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