Leniency Decision-Making from a Corporate Perspective: Complex Realities

Stephan, Andreas and Nikpay, Ali (2015) Leniency Decision-Making from a Corporate Perspective: Complex Realities. In: Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary Age. Hart Publishing, Oxford, p. 139. ISBN 978-1-84946-690-5

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Abstract

This chapter seeks to assess the robustness of the assumptions made by much of the theoretical literature on leniency programs, giving a glimpse of the uncertainties and complexities that apply in practice. First, sanctions are hard to estimate and the decision to form a cartel is not generally made by the firm as a rational monolith. Second, empirical evidence from the EU suggests an over-reliance on leniency, with only a weak threat of detection through investigations alone. Most leniency reporting may be occurring where a cartel has already ceased to operate or is very likely to be caught. Finally, the decision to come forward is not one that is taken lightly by the firm; it is fraught with uncertainties and dangers, including the challenges of ensuring cooperation from employees. The paper concludes with three recommendations for the strengthening of leniency policies

Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: antitrust,leniency,competition law,cartels
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2016 12:03
Last Modified: 08 Jul 2020 23:32
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/56406
DOI:

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