

The Cyprus Problem and Anglo-Turkish Relations 1967-1980

by

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Abstract

This study analyses the British and Turkish policies on the Cyprus issue from 1967 to 1980 and investigates whether there was any cooperation between the British and Turkish governments, as had previously occurred in the 1950s. The thesis shows that while Britain saw Turkey as an ally in its struggle to retain control of the island, and Anglo-Turkish relations were strong because their policies on Cyprus were very similar in the 1950s, this Anglo-Turkish cooperation diminished because of the divergence in their interests in the Cyprus problem within this timeframe.

The thesis also demonstrates that there were different phases in Anglo-Turkish relations concerning the Cyprus problem between 1967 and 1980. In particular, relations between Britain and Turkey were extremely tense in 1974 because of the Turkish government's decision to launch a military operation in Cyprus. The British and Turkish perspectives on the events in the Cyprus issue then diverged significantly. This situation also continued in the later period of the Cyprus problem which had a negative effect on the diplomatic relations between Britain and Turkey.

The thesis also broadly analyses the Cyprus dispute between the years of 1967-1980. The policies of other important international actors, such as the United Nations and the United States, are also examined, because British and Turkish reactions to the policies of other actors upon the Cyprus issue also had an effect on Anglo-Turkish relations. In particular, the American position at the time of the major crises on the island, such as occurred in 1967 and 1974, had a significant impact on the British approach towards the Turkish policy on the Cyprus problem, and this is also examined in this study.

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Lists of Abbreviations

| | |
|---------|---|
| AKEL | <i>Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou</i> (Progressive Party of Working People) |
| CAB | Cabinet |
| CO | Colonial Office |
| DEFE | Records of the British Minister of Defence |
| EOKA | Ethnikí Orgánosis Kipriakou Agónos (National Organisation of Cypriot Struggle) |
| FCO | Foreign and Commonwealth Office |
| FO | Foreign Office |
| HMSO | Her Majesty's Stationery Office |
| MOD | Ministry of Defence |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation |
| PREM | Prime Minister's Office |
| PRO | Public Record Office, National Archives, United Kingdom |
| SBAs | Sovereign Base Areas |
| SEED | South East European Department, FCO |
| SED | Southern European Department, FCO |
| SWED | South West European Department, FCO |
| TSO | The Stationery Office |
| TMT | Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (Turkish Resistance Organisation) |
| TCPA | Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration |
| TRNC | Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus |
| UNFICYP | United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus |
| UKMIS | United Kingdom Mission |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |

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Introduction

Historically, the Cyprus problem has not simply been a local issue between the Greek and Turkish communities on the island. Cyprus, in the past, has faced many events which have had a significant impact on the international arena and been widely reported. In particular, the Cyprus problem has had a significant impact on diplomatic relations between Britain, Greece, Turkey and the United States. This work will examine British and Turkish policies on Cyprus between 1967 and 1980. By concentrating on these crucial years and the important events in both international and local arenas, the thesis will also analyse the effect of both British and Turkish policies upon Anglo-Turkish relations.

First of all, it should be pointed out that one of the most important factors in choosing 1967 as a starting point for this study was the large amount of research that has already been undertaken into British and Turkish involvement in the Cyprus dispute up to this period. Despite the fact that most of this research was not specifically entitled ‘Anglo-Turkish relations and the Cyprus question’, this work offers a useful quantity of complementary sources and ideas on this topic. In this respect, research mainly indicates that British and Turkish ‘collaboration’ against the Greek demand for *Enosis* (i.e. unification of Cyprus with Greece) did exist in the 1950s. Essentially, this is an important topic because formerly in the struggles between Greeks and Turks, Britain tended to favour the Greeks. As the historian Andreas Constandinos stated, because of ‘Britain’s contribution to the emergence of an independent Greek state in the early 19th century’,¹ there was sympathy towards Britain extant among the Greek Cypriots. However, by that time, the strategic importance of the island for the British caused trouble between the two ‘natural allies’.

Firstly, it is essential to look at the previous British and Turkish policies on Cyprus, in order to broadly understand the shift in their approach to the Cyprus question by 1967. The British historian, Perry Anderson, stated that after the Greek campaign for *Enosis* intensified in the 1950s, Britain started planning to use the Turkish community on the island as ‘counterweight’ to the Greek Cypriots.² The significance

¹ Andreas Constandinos, *America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: Calculated Conspiracy or Foreign Policy Failure?*, (Central Milton Keynes: Author House, 2009), p. 21.

² Perry Anderson, *The New Old World*, (London: Verso Books, 2011), p. 361.

of the British going to such lengths to stop the Greeks lay in the island's strategic importance to them. The historians Faruk Sönmezoğlu and Cihat Göktepe have underlined the fact that after signing the agreement with Egypt in 1954 concerning the evacuation of British forces from Egypt,³ Cyprus became a more important military base for the British.⁴ In 1955, the British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, emphasised the strategic importance of the island for Britain: 'No Cyprus, no certain facilities to protect our supply of oil. No oil, unemployment and hunger in Britain. It is simple as that.'⁵

Furthermore, in his book, *Britain and Decolonisation: the Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World*, the British historian, John Darwin, indicated what the island's strategic location meant to Britain. He expressed the opinion that Cyprus was 'to play an active role in any operations related to the Suez Canal and other British interests in the oil-rich region.'⁶ Therefore, it was deemed essential to develop the existing military facilities in Cyprus.⁷ For this purpose, 'Britain established base facilities for the RAF and land forces and installed data gathering equipment. The new development in Cyprus would cost Britain £40-50 million in the five years from 1954 to 1959.'⁸ As a result of this situation, Britain warned the Greeks many times that the island would not be permitted to unite with Greece. In this context, in a private discussion on 22 September 1953, the British Secretary State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, told the Greek Prime Minister Alexander Papagos about the negative attitude of the British Government towards *Enosis*.⁹ Furthermore, the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, Henry Hopkinson, used the word "never" as a response to the question of the independence of the island, on 28 July 1954.¹⁰ However, Britain knew that their efforts alone would not be enough to thwart the

³ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Tarafların Tutumları ve Tezleri Açısından Kıbrıs Sorunu*, (İstanbul: İ.Ü. Basımevi ve Film Merkezi, 1991), p. 18., Cihat Göktepe, *British Foreign Policy towards Turkey 1959-1965*, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 94.

⁴ John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation the Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education 1988), p. 216., Also see: Ronald Hyam (ed.), *Series A, Vol. II, Part III: 'The Labour government and the End of Empire 1945-51'*, published by HMSO for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in London, 1992, document no: 246, p 117.

⁵ John Reddaway, *Burdened with Cyprus: the British Connection*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986), p. 11.

⁶ Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation*, p. 94.

⁷ Michael Carver, *Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy since 1945*, (London: Hutchinson 1992), p. 29.

⁸ Darwin, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

⁹ PRO: FCO 51/47, 'the Turkish Attitude to Cyprus 1945-1967', Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs's Research Department Memorandum, 4 December 1968.

¹⁰ Ibid., Sönmezoğlu, *Tarafların Tutumları*, p. 18.

Greeks' ambitions. Clearly, as the historian Robert Holland stated in the beginning of the 1950s, the British Government was already planning to use the Turks against the Greeks. He indicates that in London in 1950, the British ambassador to Turkey advised the British Government thus: 'the Turkish card is a tricky one, but useful in the pass to which we have come.'¹¹

The British strategy of dragging the Turks into the Cyprus conflict would eventually succeed. Initially, however, at the beginning of the 1950s, the Turkish Government was reluctant to become involved in the Cyprus question at all. The Turkish historian, Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, pointed out that Turkish foreign policy was in favour of British administration continuing on the island.¹² In this respect, The Turkish Foreign Minister, Necmettin Sadak, stated on 25 January 1950:

*There is no such problem as a Cyprus problem. I also told this to a journalist quite explicitly before. Currently, Cyprus is under the control of Britain, and we think that Britain does not have any intention to hand over the island. Therefore, there are no grounds for our young people's excitement about the island.*¹³

However, Perry Anderson argued that the policy of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir John Harding, who had been sent by London to restore order on the island, actually increased the tension between the two communities there. Anderson states that although the Greek leader General Grivas, who was the founder of EOKA, ('National Organisation of Cypriot Struggle'),¹⁴ strictly ordered EOKA members not to attack Turks, whom he had no wish to provoke, Harding's replacement of the Greeks in the police service by recruiting Turks, helped augment the rising level of hostilities between the two communities. Oliver Richmond also emphasizes that 'Turkish Cypriot nationalism became more prominent as a result of British policy to counter the *Enosis* movement.'¹⁵ Anderson points out that after the news of the bombing of Atatürk's former house in Thessaloniki (Selanik) in September 1955, the anti-Greek feeling escalated in Turkey and the Greek minority

¹¹ Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 41.

¹² Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, 'Turco-British Relations Since the 1920s', in William Hale and Ali İhsan Bağış (eds.), *For Centuries of Turco-British Relations: studies in diplomatic economic and cultural affairs*, (Beverly: The Eothen Press 1984), p. 96.

¹³ Mehmet Hasgüler, *Kıbrıs'ta Enosis ve Taksim Politikalarını Sonu*, 5th editions, (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2007), p. 40.

¹⁴ Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics from Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997), pp. 19-20.

¹⁵ Oliver P. Richmond, 'Decolonisation and Post-Independence Causes of Conflict: Mapping the Case of Cyprus', in H. Faustmann & N. Peristianis (eds.), *Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism, 1878-2006*, (Mannheim und Möhnesee: Peleus, Studien zur Archaeologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns, Band 19, Bibliopolis, 2006), p. 546.

was targeted in Istanbul.¹⁶ William Mallinson also highlights the fact that that this event worsened the relationship between Turkey and Greece.¹⁷ In the end, Ankara found itself taking an active part in the Cyprus problem and working together with Britain to prevent the Greek Cypriots' demand for *Enosis*. Thereafter, the Turkish Cypriots took action against *Enosis*, and the Turkish Resistance Organisation (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı TMT) was established to struggle against EOKA. Also, a partition (*Taksim*) policy, which meant division of the island between Greeks and Turks,¹⁸ started to be advocated by Ankara. Tozun Bahcheli argues that this policy was first suggested by the British Colonial Secretary in 1956 in order to deflect the campaign for *Enosis*.¹⁹

| Description | Imports from U.K. As Percentage of All Imports | | | Remarks |
|---------------------------------|--|------|------------------------------------|---|
| | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 Sept./November 3 months | |
| Fish and fish preparations | 22% | 26% | 18% | No great change |
| Biscuits | 47 | 50 | 17 | Shift to continental |
| Sugar | 95 | 100 | 94 | No alternative sources |
| Chocolate | 97 | 94 | 62 | Shift to continental and local |
| Cigarettes | 99 | 99 | 94 | Quantity reduced: Shift to local |
| Lubricating oils | 45 | 49 | 62 | No effect. Importers not Greek |
| Paints | 86 | 83 | 59 | Shift to continental |
| Medicines | 59 | 56 | 47 | Shift to continental |
| Perfumery and cosmetics | 95 | 91 | 45 | Reduced imports. Shift to continental and local |
| Detergents | 95 | 92 | 40 | Reduced imports. Shift to continental and local |
| Tyres | 85 | 78 | 36 | Reduced imports. Shift to continental |
| Cotton fabrics | 68 | 70 | 48 | Much reduced imports |
| Woollen fabrics | 98 | 97 | 75 | Much reduced imports |
| Synthetic fabrics | 93 | 90 | 60 | Much reduced imports |
| Iron and Steel Structural Goods | 29 | 38 | 25 | Little change |
| Hand tools | 36 | 33 | 23 | Shift to continental |
| Household utensils | 49 | 48 | 40 | Little change |
| Agricultural machinery | 67 | 59 | 37 | Much reduced imports |
| Industrial & Mining machinery | 37 | 53 | 42 | Reduced imports |
| Motor Vehicles | 79 | 76 | 61 | Much reduced imports |
| Clothing | 53 | 50 | 32 | - |
| Footwear | 74 | 81 | 43 | - |
| Refrigerators | 78 | 79 | 67 | Reduced imports |

Table shows the effect of the Greek Cypriots' boycott on the British trade on the island.

Source: PRO: FCO 141/3362, 'Cyprus: passive resistance; boycotting of UK goods'.

In the later period, the Greek Cypriots increased their efforts in the struggle and, by 1958; EOKA launched a 'passive resistance' campaign on the island.²⁰ According to this campaign, EOKA members called on the Greek Cypriots to boycott British

¹⁶ Anderson, *The New Old World*, p. 362.

¹⁷ William Mallinson, *Britain and Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents Since World War II*, (London: I.B.Tauris, 2011), p. 5.

¹⁸ Ronald J. Fisher, 'Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 3, Special Issue on Conflict Resolution in Identity-Based Disputes (May, 2001), p. 310.

¹⁹ Tozun Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, (London: Westview Press, 1990), p. 40.

²⁰ Foley Charles (ed.), *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, (London: Longmans, 1964), p. 133.

goods in Cyprus.²¹ Meanwhile, negotiations were being made between Britain, Greece and Turkey to find a solution to the dispute.

In the end, as indicated by historian Christianne Gates, a Cypriot state came into existence on 16 August 1960, although it was not as a result of British strategies conceived from the negotiations.²² Britain, Greece and Turkey were the guarantor powers of the agreement and British presence on the island also continued through the creation of two Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) at Akrotiri and Dhekelia.²³ Gates underlines the fact that separate negotiations between the Greeks and Turks also contributed to this result. From this perspective, the Greek Prime Minister Konstantin Karamanlis' official visit to Turkey in May 1959 on the invitation of the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes can be regarded as an important occasion.²⁴ During this visit, the two Prime Minister 'reaffirmed their devotion to the application of the agreements reached for the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.'²⁵

After the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, there was a relatively peaceful environment on the island which did not affect the relations between Britain and Turkey. However, after Cyprus' constitutional crisis at the end of 1963, Kürkçüoğlu states that 'Turco-British cooperation on the Cyprus question went through a critical phase.'²⁶ Turkey realised that British and Turkish interests on the island were now different from what they had been in the 1950s. It was true that the Anglo-Turkish relationship went from one of mutual understanding and support, in relation to the Cyprus problem, to one of diverging interests. This was because Britain and Turkey did not share the same interests any more, as they had in the 1950s. This meant that the Greeks were no longer their common 'enemy'. Also, after the 1963 crisis, Britain's main concern was to protect its military bases on the island, while the Turks focused primarily upon protecting the Turkish Cypriots' rights.

²¹ PRO: FCO 141/3362, 'Cyprus: passive resistance; boycotting of UK goods', secret telegram from Governor of Cyprus to Colonial Office, no: 1489, 2 February 1958.

²² See: Christianne Deborah Gates, 'Britain, Turkey and Cyprus, 1950-1959', Ph.D. Thesis, (University of East Anglia: 2012)., Necati Münir Ertekün, *Inter-Communal Talks and The Cyprus Problem*, (Nicosia: Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, 1977), pp. 10-11., Peter Dietz, *The British in the Mediterranean*, (Washington DC: Brassey's, 1994), p. 182.

²³ Klearchos A. Kyriakides, 'The Sovereign Base Areas and British Defence Policy since 1960' in H. Faustmann & N. Peristianis (eds.), *Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism, 1878-2006*. (Mannheim und Möhnese: Peleus, Studien zur Archaeologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns, Band 19, Bibliopolis, 2006), p. 512.

²⁴ PRO: PREM 11/2630, telegram from the British Ambassador in Ankara, Sir Bernard Burrows to Foreign Office, no: 737, 11 May 1959.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Kürkçüoğlu, 'Turco-British Relations, p. 97.

Consequently, the Turks applied a more aggressive policy compared to the British one. Indeed, the protection of the rights of the Turkish community on the island was one of the most important elements in the Turkey's Cyprus policy. Furthermore, the Turkish public was closely following the Turkish Cypriots' situation. As a result, there was a heavy public pressure on the Turkish government to defend the Turkish Cypriots rights. This pressure led the Turkish government to respond more aggressively to the events in Cyprus, as in the crisis of 1967 and 1974. Furthermore, as the Turkish Foreign Minister, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, stated in the Turkish National Assembly in 1967; if the Turkish Cypriots had a strong position on the island, Turkey's hand would be strengthened in the international arena and it would be able put forward its own solutions to the problem more strongly.²⁷ This statement also shows another motivation behind Turkey's policy of protecting the Turkish Cypriots.

The strategic importance of the island was one of the significant elements in Ankara's Cyprus policy. Evidently, and as stated in the British Foreign Office document, Turkey did not want the island to be controlled by the Greeks.²⁸ Turkey was concerned that the annexation of Cyprus from Greece would become a *fait accompli*. Turkey's past experiences provided further important reasons for Turkish concern because in former similar struggles, the Aegean islands of Rhodes and Crete had been too easily lost by the Turks; so Turkey did not want the same end for Cyprus. This situation increased Turkish interest in the Cyprus issue and put public pressure to the Turkish government to take military action in the time of crisis. Clearly, public opinion played an important role in the shaping of the Turkey's Cyprus policy based on the historical problem with the Greeks. On the other hand, when the Turks were ready to use military action to solve the problem, the British avoided worsening their relations with the Greeks by supporting such an action by Ankara instead. This is a significant factor which widened the gap between the British and Turkish policies on Cyprus.

This study, therefore, examines the 'new' British and Turkish approaches towards the Cyprus issue by 1967, and the impact of these approaches on their diplomatic

²⁷ *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, (Official Records of the Turkish National Assembly) term: 2, session: 2, vol. 11, 4 January 1967, pp. 7-8.

²⁸ PRO: FCO 51/47, 'the Turkish Attitude to Cyprus 1945-1967', Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Research Department Memorandum, 4 December 1968.

relationship. This thesis aims to make an original contribution to the existing work on the Cyprus question because, as stated, while existing research generally concentrates on the evaluation of the Anglo-Turkish involvement in the Cyprus dispute in 1950s, little research has been undertaken regarding the effect of the Cyprus dispute on Anglo-Turkish relations after 1967. Because of increasing American influence upon the Cyprus issue, the work of Turkish scholars mainly focuses on the examination of the effects of American and Turkish policies on their mutual relations. The most important reason for this increasing American influence on the Cyprus issue was the growing danger, by 1967, of war between the two NATO allies Greece and Turkey, which would have been an undesirable development for America because of the danger of Soviet influence in the region. Therefore, American intervention at the time of the crisis made the US one of the most significant players in the Cyprus question. In this context, Nasuh Uslu's work *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, and Süha Bölükbaşı's book *Superpowers and the Third world: Turkish American Relations and Cyprus* provide much information on this topic.

Furthermore, Necati Ertekün's book *The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus* and Rauf Denktash's work *The Cyprus Triangle* also have significant information on the Turkish approach to the Cyprus issue, but they tend to look at the events from only the Turkish perspective. As Faruk Sönmezoğlu points out, the general Turkish opinion on the British handling the Cyprus issue after 1974 was that Britain opposed Turkish attempts to assist the Turkish Cypriots on the island,²⁹ which had a negative effect on Anglo-Turkish relations.

The works relating to British involvement in the Cyprus question after the mid-1960's generally present the argument that Britain was becoming less active in the problem. While describing the British policy on Cyprus, Claude Nicolet used the word 'passivity'. She argued that Britain's response to the November crisis in 1967 was not strong, and merely supported American efforts to resolve the crisis.³⁰ On the other hand, Klearchos Kyriakides, points out that the British Government's confrontation with severe economic difficulties at home by the second half of the

²⁹ Sönmezoğlu, *Tarafların Tutumları*, p. 100.

³⁰ Claude Nicolet, 'Lack of Concern, Will and Power: British Policy towards Cyprus, 1961-1974' in H. Faustmann & N. Peristianis (eds.), *Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism, 1878-2006*, (Mannheim und Möhnesee: Peleus, Studien zur Archäologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns, Band 19, Bibliopolis, 2006), p. 500.

1960s affected its policy on Cyprus.³¹ This is a valid point, because during the crisis in Cyprus of November 1967, the British Government also had to deal with the devaluation of sterling.

Another discussion on British policy on Cyprus was over its position on the events of 1974. Keith Kyle mentions that there was some criticism of the British decision not to use its power as one of the guarantor powers to stop the Turks at the time.³² However, Brendan O'Malley argues that America did not want to take military action against the Turks and 'the British did not have enough firepower for military action to be effective without American support.'³³ Mallinson also recognises that the United States had an important influence on Britain's attitude towards Turkish military operations on the island in 1974. He argued that 'British foreign policy – or at least military policy – had become increasingly integrated with that of the US.'³⁴ In general, as can be seen, the studies concentrate more on the evolution of the British and Turkish policies on the Cyprus question and deal with them separately. This thesis provides a comparison between the two policies on Cyprus by 1967 and investigates the mutual impact of their policies.

The archival sources are an important part of this study. Consultation with the Turkish documents was affected to some extent by the limits of the availability of Turkish archives. This limitation problem can also be seen in some Turkish scholar's works. However, other Turkish primary sources such as *Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Degisi* (Official Records of the Turkish Senate of the Republic Records, *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Degisi* (Official Records of the Turkish National Assembly) were consulted in this study. British Foreign Office documents in particular provide important material resources. The reports sent from the British embassy in Ankara to London provide significant evidence of the Turkish approach in Cyprus through the eyes of the British. Also, the correspondence between the British High Commission

³¹ Kyriakides, 'The Sovereign Base Areas', p. 522.

³² Keith Kyle, 'British Policy on Cyprus 1974-2004' in H. Faustmann & N. Peristianis (eds.), *Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism, 1878-2006*, (Mannheim und Möhnese: Peleus, Studien zur Archaeologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns, Band 19, Bibliopolis, 2006), p. 584.

³³ Brendan O'Malley, 'The Impact of British Strategic Interest on the Cyprus problem' in H. Faustmann & N. Peristianis (eds.), *Britain in Cyprus: Colonialism and Post-Colonialism, 1878-2006*, (Mannheim und Möhnese: Peleus, Studien zur Archaeologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns, Band 19, Bibliopolis, 2006), p. 489.

³⁴ William Mallinson, '1976: British Cyprus and the Consolidation of American Desires in the Eastern Mediterranean', *European Rim Policy and Investment Council (ERPIC)*, March 2007, p. 3.

on the island and London gives us vital information for understanding the British High commissioner's approach towards the Turkish Cypriot community on the island. These reports were important because they had a substantial influence both upon the shaping of British policy towards Cyprus and the Turkish attitude to the Cyprus dispute. Furthermore, discussion minutes from inside the Foreign and Commonwealth office about the Cyprus problem were also useful material for learning how much attention was given by the British government to the Cyprus question.

From this point of view, although studies suggest that British interest in Cyprus was declining, Britain had not completely lost interest in the Cyprus issue. Foreign Office documents indicate that Cyprus still held an important place in British foreign policy in 1967. The Foreign Office explains the reasons why Cyprus was important for Britain:

*Cyprus is important to the United Kingdom for three reasons. She is a member of Commonwealth. The Cyprus dispute affects relations with Turkey and Greece. Our sovereign Base Areas in the island play a large part in our CENTO and other commitments and provide the jumping-off point for the CENTO air route through Turkey and Iran to the Persian Gulf and Far East.*³⁵

Also, according to the Foreign Office documents, one of the British interests in Cyprus was 'to maintain the political stability of the south-east flank of NATO by preventing serious friction or war between Turkey and Greece.'³⁶ Although Turkey was a member of NATO, it is difficult to say that NATO's interest in the region had played a leading role in shaping Ankara's Cyprus policy. There were times when the two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, came to the brink of war. On the other hand, when compared with the Greeks and Turks, Britain was much more concerned about NATO's position in the region. A dispute between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus would harm NATO's interests. In other words, conflict between these two NATO allies could strengthen Russia's hand, which was totally unacceptable to the Americans and the British. Therefore, by 1967, Britain was still following political developments pertaining to the island quite closely.

Another vital connection for Britain with the island was its military bases there. There is actually some criticism from scholars that Britain gave more importance to

³⁵ PRO: FCO 9/72, 'Cyprus', 'British Interest in Cyprus', report of the Central Department of Foreign Office, annex A, 28 September 1967.

³⁶ Ibid.

protecting its bases in Cyprus than it did to actively taking part in finding a solution to the Cyprus dispute. Describing the British policy towards its Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in 1970s, Mallinson even used the phrase ‘navel-gazing’³⁷. It is true that Britain concentrated hard on its bases on the island, and even more so by the mid-1960’s. American intervention in the Cyprus dispute made the British role in mediation even less important, giving the impression that Britain’s Cyprus policy was only based on a continuation of the British presence on the island through military bases, thus completely absenting itself from the political scene in Cyprus. However, British concern for their bases ensured they could not be completely passive in their policy. Indeed, it forced them to shape new policies. The bases had a marked effect on British policy towards Turkey. In a Foreign Office report in 1967, it was stated that one of the British interests in Cyprus was ‘to preserve the over-flying facilities granted Britain by Turkey since without these, the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus would be of little use.’³⁸ This indicates the importance of Cyprus for Britain because the island was still affecting its relations with other nations. In this sense, the military bases would also cause a small-scale crisis between Turkey and Britain when Turkish military operations commenced in 1974. Therefore, this study shows that the Cyprus issue still had an impact on Anglo-Turkish relation in 1967, though their approaches then were different from those of the 1950’s.

The period from 1967-1980 was also the part of the Cold War era. As a result of this, apart from the developments in the Cyprus problems, the events in this Cold War era also played a role in shaping of British and Turkish foreign policies. Although it is difficult to say that the Cold War had any significant direct impact on Anglo-Turkish relations in the period of 1967-1980, the international developments and the geopolitical environment in this time period had effects upon British and Turkish policies towards each other. In particular, when Turkey started to improve its relations with the Soviet Union,³⁹ (after the American decision to remove its missiles from Turkey following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and American President Johnson’s threatening letter of 1964 aimed at preventing the Turkish Government from launching a military operation in Cyprus) Britain became cautious over its

³⁷ Mallinson, op. cit., p.2.

³⁸ PRO: FCO 9/72, op. cit.

³⁹ Çağrı Erhan, ‘ABD ve NATO’yla İlişkiler’, Baskın Oran, (ed.), Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Vol. 1, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p. 684-685, 689-690.

policy with Turkey in 1967 because of the danger of a possible Soviet influence on Ankara which would weaken the Southern flank of NATO.

There were other important developments in this year, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict which increased the Soviet threat in the region. As a result of this, Britain also saw communism as an increasing threat within Cyprus. So the British Foreign Office tried to keep Cyprus dominated by the Western World.⁴⁰ The Foreign Office also clearly stated that they ‘certainly did not want to see Cyprus under Soviet or U.A.R. (United Arab Republic) domination.’⁴¹ According to British Foreign Office assessment, ‘maintaining good relations with Turkey (the major power in the area and a comparatively stable one)’⁴² was essential to achieve these aims. Therefore, the developments in the Cold War era of 1967 did not have negative effects on Anglo-Turkish relations. On the contrary, it gave Britain an incentive to keep its relations with Turkey at a good level. The Arab-Israeli war of 1973, and then the Oil Crisis in the same year also had no important direct impact on British-Turkish relations.

However, the British plan to stop Turkish military intervention in Cyprus showed that the effects of the Cold War on British policy towards Turkey had started to decline. In the later period, after the Helsinki Accords in 1975, which helped to reduce the Cold War tension considerably,⁴³ the Cold War atmosphere lost its impact on Anglo-Turkish relations significantly. This situation contributed to the British making open criticisms of Turkey’s policies in Cyprus after 1975.

Finally, there is another reason for taking 1967 as a starting point for this study which should be pointed out. The important developments of this year, such as the meeting of the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers in September, and the November crisis, give us an opportunity to make a broad comparison between the British and Turkish policies on these events.

Starting from this perspective, the thesis consists of six chapters. The first chapter examines the British and Turkish reaction to the important events and developments on the island by 1967. There was no common British and Turkish interest on the island and both sides were trying to implement their own policies. The second

⁴⁰ PRO: FCO 9/72, ‘Cyprus’, ‘British Interest in Cyprus’, report of the Central Department of Foreign Office, annex A, 28 September 1967.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Baskın Oran, ‘Dönemin Bilançosu’, Baskın Oran, (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, Vol. 1, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p. 657.

chapter shows the British position at the time of the crisis between Turkey and Greece. This chapter continues by illustrating the British approach towards Ankara's plans to conduct military operations in Cyprus. Chapter Three looks at the general British reaction to Ankara's move in the Cyprus question. By 1968, there was an intensive dialogue between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots running, to settle the problem. Therefore, this chapter evaluates whether the British attitude towards the Turkish arguments in the negotiations process had an effect on Anglo-Turkish relations. Chapter Four presents how the divergence in their respective Cyprus policies caused a crisis between Britain and Turkey in which Ankara launched a military operation in July 1974 and Britain refused Turkish requests for assistance in their military action. Britain even planned a military counter-intervention to oppose the Turks. Each harboured a distrust of the other's Cyprus policy. As result of this, a harsh verbal discussion took place between the Turkish and British Foreign Ministers in the second Geneva conference, convened in August 1974; Chapter Five focuses on this situation. Ankara came to believe that it would be difficult to reach a solution using British mediation because of the British Foreign Secretary's negative attitude towards Turkish arguments. Chapter Six examines Anglo-Turkish relations over the talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island. There was no subsequent Anglo-Turkish relations crisis as there had been in 1974, but there was a negative stability: the negotiations did not produce a permanent solution for the problem. Mallinson argued that the Turkish 'intransigence' was the main cause of the unresolved Cyprus issue, also asserting that Britain's silent support the Turks was the reason for the Turkish attitude.⁴⁴ However, Britain did not support the Turkish position on the Cyprus issue by 1975, and the British government even protested about the Declaration of a 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus'. Furthermore, the Cyprus British High Commissioner's report generally tended to blame the Turks for the continuation of the problem. This strengthened Ankara's belief that the British favoured the Greeks. Turkish officials would complain about the British policy whenever they came together with their British counterparts. Likewise, the British Embassy's report in Ankara demonstrated that the Turks were unhappy with their attitude towards them. Chapter Six argues that the Turks believed that the British

⁴⁴ William Mallinson, *Partition Through Foreign Aggression: The Case of Turkey in Cyprus*, Minnesota Mediterranean and East European monographs XX, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Modern Greek Studies, University of Minnesota, 2010), p. 35.

approach towards the Cyprus dispute had negative effect on Anglo-Turkish relations by 1980.

1) The Cyprus Problem in 1967: Britain and Turkey Adopting New Policies

Introduction

In the first chapter the evaluation of the Anglo-Turkish relations is based on their reactions towards the developments and events on the island. This method is a significant part of the whole thesis which enables the reader to see of the similarities and differences in Britain's and Turkey's Cyprus policy and its impact on their mutual relations.

In this context, firstly, the Czechoslovak arms dispute is examined. This was a significant development on the island by 1967 and led to tensions in the relations between Athens and Ankara. This issue has not been broadly looked at by the scholars. In particular, there was no sufficient information about British policy on this small scale crisis on the island. In the light new research on archival documents, the British position at this time has been presented which can help the reader make a meaningful comparison with Ankara's reaction. Turkish scholars, such as Fahir Armaoğlu, generally demonstrated that Turkey showed a strong reaction to the decision by Greek Cypriot leader Makarios' to import guns from Czechoslovakia. It was true that Turkey applied an aggressive policy to prevent the importation of arms. The question is therefore how much Britain was concerned about arms importation to the island by the Greek Cypriots and what reaction Britain showed towards the Greek move and, in turn, did its reaction cause some trouble with Ankara? These questions are investigated in the first section.

In the second part of the chapter, the efforts at dialogue for a solution of the problem between Greece and Turkey are examined which were considered as an important development in 1967. The Turkish attitude towards the Cyprus issue while negotiating with the Greeks is also elucidated. Britain was not a part of this process of dialogue, but being one of the guarantor power of the Cyprus state, it was automatically interested in the negotiations between the Greeks and Turks. In particular, Britain's evaluation of the Turkish attitude in this process is shown by using archival resources. In this sense, the reports from the British embassy in Ankara are utilised to see both the attitudes of the Turkish government and

opposition parties within Turkey. Also, the discussions between the British and Turkish officials on the subject of the Greek-Turkish dialogue is one of the significant points in the second part of the chapter and should help to elucidate the approach of both powers towards the Cyprus question.

The talks between Athens and Ankara resulted in meetings between the Greek and Turkish prime ministers in September 1967. This was an important occasion because at the former period of time, the meeting of the Greek, British and Turkish prime ministers had played a vital role in the establishment of the Cypriot State. However, this time, the British prime minister was not at the table and the Greek and Turkish sides were trying to find a compromise with each other. However, the meetings ended with failure and both sides accused each other. Therefore, the third part of the first chapter looks at the discussion at these meetings. It also investigates the British assessment of these meetings and explains how the Turkish argument was regarded by Britain.

The Cyprus Problem at the Beginning of 1967: The Czechoslovak Arms Dispute and the Turkish-British reaction

The Cyprus problem was still unresolved in 1967. As a result of this, tension was at a high level on the island. Even small actions by Turkish or Greek Cypriots were enough to bring the two communities to edge of conflict with each other. Therefore, it is essential to look at the events which made the atmosphere on the island tense and evaluate the Turkish and British positions in relation to these events at the beginning of 1967.

The island entered 1967 in an uneasy atmosphere because of the crisis over weapons imports which 'started in December 1966 when the Turks learned about the 100 rifles and another thousand machine guns Greek Cypriots purchased from Czechoslovakia.'⁴⁵ This action by the Makarios government aroused deep concern in Turkey. It was thought that the guns, which were being imported from Czechoslovakia, would be used against the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey was probably led to think like this by bitter memories of the events of December 1963, a date on

⁴⁵ Fahir Armaoğlu, 'Crisis the Cyprus Question Initiated in Turco-Greek Relations', *International Review of Military History*, No: 67, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), p. 241.

which many Turkish Cypriots lost their lives.⁴⁶ In the Turkish Assembly, deputies questioned the government about ‘Czech guns’ and showed concern over the situation of the Turkish Cypriots on the island. In his talk on 4 January 1967, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, informed the deputies about the actions the government took to stop the arms importation into the island. He also showed the danger of importing weapons into the island by referring to the past:

As we know, after the 1963 December ‘events’, the Greek Cypriot Administration oppressed the Turkish community in Cyprus by increasing her military forces which are much higher than the level foreseen in the Constitution and equipped her army with various guns which were especially imported from Greece. In addition, from July of 1964 a Greek force of ten thousand people had come to the island with full equipment and, in March 1965, the heavy weapons, including tanks, were delivered to the Greek Cypriot Administration. As a result, the power of the Greek Cypriot Military Force increased far beyond the power of the Turkish fighters in the island. And yet, a secret arms deal with Czechoslovakia has been made by the Cyprus administration. In total a delivery of 150 tons of Machine-guns, rifles, cannons and mortars delivery came to the Island on November 27. Our government immediately took action as we learned about the importation of these weapons and appeals were made to the United Nations.⁴⁷

Indeed, the Czechoslovak guns were seen as a vital issue in Turkey. The public and the opposition parties were putting pressure on the government. According to their argument, it was unacceptable to remain silent on this issue. Therefore, the Turkish government had two main demands to prevent the importation of weapons of Czechoslovak origin: ‘First; suspension of the continued weapons consignment, secondly; ensuring the control of the weapons that had so far arrived from Czechoslovakia.’⁴⁸

The first demand of the Turkish government was successful. The Czechoslovak government agreed to stop the weapons delivery to the island. The Turkish Minister of the Interior, Faruk Sükan, reassured the Turkish Senate and said ‘Turkey has warned Czechoslovakia in a note that if the shipments were not stopped Turkey would have to “review relations”’; he continued ‘the Czechoslovak government, expressing that it wanted to develop relations between our countries in every field today informed us officially that the second shipment of arms is not being sent and

⁴⁶ Nasuh Uslu, *The Cyprus Question as an Issue of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish-American Relations 1959-2003*, (New York: Nova Publishers, 2003), p. 21.

⁴⁷ *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, (Official Records of the Turkish National Assembly) term: 2, session: 2, vol. 11, 4 January 1967, p. 6.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.6

will not be sent’⁴⁹ The Turkish Senate of the Republic⁵⁰ praised the government’s action in stopping weapons consignment to the island. The member of Senate of the Republic, Fethi Tevetoglu, stated that ‘we appreciated the government’s immediate action to warn the Czechoslovak government.’⁵¹ The second demand of the Turkish government was also successful. Initially, the Greek government insisted on placing the Czechoslovak weapons in the custody of the Greek Army, but this was unacceptable to the Turkish government because, from their perspective, the Greek government’s demand ‘was no more than to ask the mouse to look after the cheese.’⁵² Therefore, ‘the Turkish ambassador in Athens, Mr. Turan Tuluy, had on Dec. 12 1966 informed the Greek prime minister Stefanos Stephanopoulos about the Turkish government’s demand that the first shipment of 150 tons of small arms, which had arrived in Cyprus, should be placed in the custody of UNFICYP.’⁵³

In another initiative by the Turkish government, Mr. Orhan Eralp, the Turkish delegate at the U.N., told the Secretary-General of the Turkish views that;

*These arms constituted a threat to the Turkish Cypriots and should be placed under the direct control of UNFICYP. Early in February 1967 the Turkish government gave formal notice that unless the arms, said to consist of 1,000 rifles and 1,000 machine-guns, were surrendered to U.N. custody, Turkey would send a similar consignment of arms to the Turkish Cypriots.*⁵⁴

As a result of intensive efforts by the Turkish government, ‘Turkey’s demand was soon granted.’⁵⁵ However, until the agreement between Turkey and Greece at the end of 1967, Turkey was always concerned about the security of the Czech weapons’ control. The import of weapons to the island by the Makarios government evidently provoked deep concern in Turkey and the Turkish government made attempts to stop the importation. After looking at the Turkish reaction as one of the important actors in the Cyprus, the British reaction to the crisis will also be examined to investigate the differences and similarities when compared with Turkish policy.

⁴⁹ *The Times*, 16 December 1966.

⁵⁰ There were two senates in Turkey between 1961-1980: the National Assembly and, as a upper house, The Senate of the Republic.

⁵¹ *Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Degisi* (Official Records of the Turkish Senate of the Republic Records), term: 1, session: 6, vol. 37, 15 December 1966, p. 498.

⁵² Fahir Armaoglu, ‘Crisis the Cyprus Question’, p. 241.

⁵³ *Keesing’s Record of World Events 1960-1994 (CD): with Reuters graphics*, (London: Cartermill Publishing, 1994), Volume 16, March 1967.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Fahir Armaoglu, ‘Crisis the Cyprus Question’, p. 241.

The Czechoslovak arms crisis was monitored closely by the British especially given the sensitivity of arms coming from a Warsaw Pact country during the Cold War. Before the meeting on 25 Jan 1967 with the Greek Cypriot High Commissioner, the British Foreign Secretary prepared to tell the Commissioner that ‘we, ourselves, as contributors to UN Force in Cyprus and as a country with a contingent in it, have been concerned at the increase in tension which has resulted from the importation of Czechoslovak arms into Cyprus by your government.’⁵⁶

The Czechoslovak weapons issue was also discussed in the British cabinet. The Foreign Secretary informed the cabinet about the issue:

*The President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, had recently arranged to import into Cyprus several consignments of both light and heavy arms from Czechoslovakia. This action had probably been taken without the knowledge of the Greek government; and the nature of the consignments was clearly incompatible with the Archbishop's claim that the arms were required only to re-equip the local police force. Action already taken had in fact prevented the export of the second consignment; and we were now engaged in trying to prevent the distribution of the first consignment, which had arrived in Cyprus. The best means of ensuring this would be to secure agreement that the arms in question should be put under United Nations control. If, however, this proved unacceptable to Archbishop Makarios and the weapons were in fact distributed, we must at least try to ensure that they would be inspected at frequent and regular intervals by United Nations representatives in order to prevent any attempt to misappropriate them.*⁵⁷

As the Foreign Secretary indicated in the Cabinet, the British opinion about the weapons importation into Cyprus was essentially the same as Turkey's. From the Turkish and British perspectives, Makarios' claim that the guns were bought for the police force was not convincing. As a result, the importation was prevented. As another issue, as mentioned in the passage, at first, the Makarios also did not inform the Greek government about the Czechoslovak guns. Resembling the Turkish reaction, this also angered Greece but in the end, the Greek and Makarios governments reached agreement that the weapons would be placed in the Custody of the Greek Army.⁵⁸ At this stage, Turkey objected to the Greek demand and wanted the guns to be placed in the Custody of the UN.

In his meeting with the Greek Cyprus High Commissioner, the British Foreign Secretary also underlined this issue;

⁵⁶ PRO: FCO 9/75, ‘Talks with Greece and Turkey on British Sovereign Bases’, brief on the Cyprus problem for the Cyprus High Commissioner's call on the Secretary of State from Middle East, Western and United Nations department, 24 January 1974.

⁵⁷ PRO: Cabinet (CAB) 128/42, ‘Post War Conclusion’, CC (67), 1st conclusion, 12 January 1967

⁵⁸ *Keessing's (CD)*, Volume 16, March 1967

We do not dispute your government's rights to import arms, but it cannot be denied that they have had the effect of increasing tension in the island, as is indicated by the strong international concern that has been shown. As your Excellency will be aware, the British High Commissioner in Cyprus has already expressed our concern to President Makarios. I am glad that he has been able to give an undertaking to the Secretary General of the United Nations not to distribute the Czechoslovak arms for an indefinite period and has invited General Martols (Commander of UN Force in Cyprus) to inspect the crates periodically on behalf of UN.⁵⁹

There was a tense situation in Cyprus at the outset of 1967. The Czech weapon importation crisis once again showed that confidence between the two communities was at very low levels. Even a minor action by one party was enough to bring the two communities to the edge of conflict.

From the perspective of Anglo-Turkish relations, there were no big differences between the Turkish and British policies on the Czechoslovak arms dispute. Therefore, the crisis did not cause any fundamental problems between the two countries. The British, who played a mediating role, approached the crisis more calmly than did Turkey. However, Turkey's reaction was understandable given their experience of past events on the island, such as the events of December 1963 on which many Turkish Cypriots were killed by Greek Cypriot attacks. It was this historical context that led Turkey to act more aggressively when the crisis came. Apart from the arms importation crisis, the talks between the Greeks and Turks for settlement of the problem was another important development in the Cyprus problem in 1967. Therefore, the second section analysed this process the British and Turkish policy on it.

Efforts to find a Solution without Britain: Turkish-Greek Dialogue on the Cyprus Problem and its Representation in British Sources

The dialogue between Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus issue is a significant point to analyse if we are to understand the events which led to the Cyprus Crisis in 1967. The decision to establish an independent Republic of Cyprus was taken by Britain, Greece and Turkey and the Turkish and Greek Cypriots did not have an active role in this agreement. By the constitutional crisis in late 1963, inter-communal strife had restarted on the island. After the failure of the US and UN mediation attempt to solve the problem, the Turkish and Greek governments started bilateral talks to find a

⁵⁹ PRO: FCO 9/75, op. cit.

solution for the Cyprus issue. The US also promoted⁶⁰ the talks because the US mainly did not want any problem between two important NATO members. The point here is that it was believed at the time that the solution of the problem could be primarily found through Turkish and Greek dialogue. Therefore, Turkish and Greek Cypriots did not take place in the dialogue. However, after the unsuccessful Turk-Greek negotiations that were terminated by the 1967 Cyprus crisis, the two communities on the island would start inter-communal talks with each other for the solution of the problem.

‘The bilateral Turkish-Greek talks, without the participation of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, were initiated in late 1965.’⁶¹ A change in government Turkey after the 1965 election had an important effect on starting the talks with the Greece government. ‘Süleyman Demirel, who came to power in November 1965 in a landslide election victory, seemed intent on making a fresh start with a peaceful resolution of the conflict.’⁶² The new Turkish government believed that the solution to the Cyprus problem could be found in Turkish-Greek dialogue. The Turkish Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, also underlined this issue in the National Assembly: ‘In the end, Greece accepted our opinion that the Cyprus problem is a matter between the Turks and the Greeks and agreed to make negotiations with us on the Cyprus issue rather than searching for a solution in the UN.’⁶³

Although the idea of commencing bilateral Turkish-Greek talks had emerged in late 1965, the talks started in June 1966. Both sides tried to understand one another’s approach towards the problem and to find a solution in accordance with their own views. The Turkish Foreign Minister also mentioned this issue in one of his speeches in the National Assembly. He said that: ‘We did not start the talks immediately. We waited to see promising developments on the Greek government’s attitudes towards the Cyprus issue. After that, we agreed to undertake the negotiations.’⁶⁴

Before starting the talks with Greece, the Turkish government determined four important points as vital in dealing with the Greece government. Accordingly,

⁶⁰ Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, pp. 88-90.

⁶¹ Polyvios G. Polyviou, *Cyprus Conflict and Negotiation 1960-1980*, (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1980), p. 44.

⁶² Süha Bölükbaşı, *Superpowers and the Third world: Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1988), p. 129.

⁶³ *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, (Official Records of the Turkish National Assembly), term: 2, session: 2, vol. 11, 25 January 1967, p. 443.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 9.

*'1- Cyprus should not be annexed unilaterally by either Greece or Turkey, 2- neither Cypriot community should dominate the other, 3- the balance of power established by the Lausanne Treaty (1923) in the Mediterranean between Greece and Turkey should be preserved, 4- the 1959 Cyprus Treaties should not be revised unilaterally.'*⁶⁵

First, the talks between Turkey and Greece were made by the respective ambassadors in secret. Süleyman Demirel gave details of the talks in a national Assembly speech. He announced that:

*The dialogue, which was initiated at the end of June 1966, with Greece over the Cyprus issue is still continuing. When our Foreign Minister was in Paris last week for the NATO Council Meeting he had a long meeting with the Greek Foreign Minister Tumbas. In this meeting, the outcome of the negotiations, which have been conducted so far in secret at the level of ambassadors, reviewed mutually and after that, it was decided to conduct the talks at the level of Foreign Ministers rather than ambassadors. The date of the next meeting will be decided subsequently together with the Greek government.*⁶⁶

Although Demirel said that the talks would continue with Greece, after a short period of time 'the confidential talks continued between the Greek and Turkish governments from June to December 1966, were interrupted by the fall of the Stephanopoulos government in Greece on December 21.'⁶⁷

The interruption of the Turkish-Greek dialogue threatened to adversely affect the Cyprus problem. 'Mr. Ionnis Paraskevopoulos, the new Greek Prime Minister, proposed the resumption of the secret talks on Jan. 9, 1967, stating that he considered it advisable that they should be continued "with firmness and sincerity" on both sides'⁶⁸ and then 'he said that on 6 February that the Turkish-Greek dialogue would continue at ministerial level.'⁶⁹ Although the New Greek Prime Minister's statements were urging the resumption of the dialogue between Turkey and Greece, his government was a caretaker one and, therefore, according to the British assessment, the new government in Athens was 'less willing than its predecessor to take decisive action'⁷⁰ in the Cyprus problem. Ankara's response the Greek government's call on revival of the talks was positive. The Turkish ambassador to Athens, Turan Tulay, stated that the Turkish government was ready to resume the dialogue but there were

⁶⁵ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 131., *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, (Official Records of the Turkish National Assembly), op. cit., 4 January 1967, p. 9.

⁶⁶ *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, (Official Records of the Turkish National Assembly) term: 2, session: 2, vol. 11, 25 January 1967, p. 443.

⁶⁷ *Keesing's (CD)*, Volume 16, March 1967.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ FCO 9/75, brief on the Cyprus problem for the Cyprus High Commissioner's call on the Secretary of State from Middle East, Western and United Nations department, 24 January 1974.

some preconditions. Ankara demanded that the talks did not have to be started from the beginning and must be continued where it was left.⁷¹ Also, the Turkish government knew that the caretaker Greek government was not politically strong enough to make a definitive agreement on the Cyprus issue. Hence, it was demanded that 'the dialogue could not be concluded until after the Greek elections and the formation of the new Greek government.'⁷² The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Çağlayangil, also announced that: 'we have made known our views about the principles on which continuation of the talks depend. If agreement on these principles is obtained, the continuation of talks will naturally follow.'⁷³

However, while the discussion was resuming over the resumption of the negotiation process, the Greek army took over the government in Greece on 21 April 1967.⁷⁴ As a result of this military coup, the Turkish-Greek talks could not be reactivated as planned. The military Junta established its own government. The policy of the new government of Greece would shape the fate of the Turkish-Greek dialogue on the Cyprus problem. After the coup in Greece, Turkey waited to see the new military government policy on the Cyprus issue before taking action.

The Turkish-Greek dialogue was followed closely by Britain. In particular, the British Embassy in Ankara reported the debates in the Turkish National Assembly about the talks with Greece. According to the reports, the Turkish government's decision to start the dialogue with Greece was criticised by the opposition parties. In one of the Embassy's reports to London, it was written that:

*On the Cyprus issue, tone of opposition speech was more severe than in recent past. Mr. Erim (Republican People's Party) criticised the government for pinning its hopes on bilateral talks, thereby losing valuable time, instead of working for improvement of the Turkish position on the island.*⁷⁵

Actually, the report showed that the government policy on Cyprus had not gained full support from the opposition parties in Turkey. Talks with Greece were regarded as wasting time. In particular, the government faced accusations of accepting *Enosis* as a solution to the Cyprus problem. In the National Assembly, the Turkish Foreign

⁷¹ PRO: FCO 9/75, telegram (confidential) from the British Ambassador to Athens, Ralph Murray, to FO, no: 187, 21 March 1967.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ PRO: FCO 9/75, telegram from the British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir Roger Allen, to FO, no: 9, 28 March 1967.

⁷⁴ Christopher Hitchens, *Cyprus*, (London: Quartet Books, 1984), p. 64.

⁷⁵ PRO: FCO 9/75, 'Cyprus', telegram from the British Embassy in Turkey to FO, no: 221, 18 February 1967.

Minister, Çağlayangil, responded to these accusations and argued that the government did not accept any solution which provided for *Enosis*. This issue also featured in the British Embassy's report to London which mentioned the Turkish Foreign Minister's speech:

*On bilateral talks, the minister denied they had ever been conducted on the basis of Enosis; The Cyprus problem would be solved not by optimistic speeches in Athens, but according to actual situation between Turkey and Greece. The government had never entertained false hopes about bilateral talks, but time was no longer working against Turkey and the government had thought that talks could not harm Turkey's Interest.*⁷⁶

The Turkish government denied that they had accepted *Enosis*. However, after the talks ceased at the end of 1966, there were some rumours that Turkey had agreed to their resumption on the basis of *Enosis* in return for a NATO base on the island in which Turkey would deploy its own soldiers. This issue also attracted British attention. When Zeki Kuneralp, the Secretary of Turkish Foreign Minister Affairs, visited to Cyprus in March, 1967; the British High Commissioner on the island had an interview with him and asked questions about Turkey's opinion about the resumption of talks. Kuneralp's reply to the Commissioner's question was summarised in the British official document which was sent to London:

*He (Mr. Kuneralp) said he thought that the Turkish government would probably agree to the resumption of the dialogue, but it was apparent that discussions had not been as was alleged on the basis of Enosis with compensations for Turkey. Enosis was just not acceptable to Turkey and he also disparaged the NATO base idea. He said there had been some suggestions of compensation for Turkey in Thrace, but the Greeks were not able to agree to this. The dialogue so far had shown that there was no real prospect of finding a basis of agreement between Turkey and Greece for an overall solution of Cyprus problem.*⁷⁷

The Greek Cypriots were also opposed to the idea of giving military bases to Turkey for the solution of the problem. According to them, *Enosis* had to be achieved without preconditions. The Greek Cypriot leader Clerides, President House of Representatives, said that: 'we shall never accept solution resulting in cession of Cyprus soil to Turkey... we shall not consent to establishment of Turkish bases on island under any form.'⁷⁸ The Foreign Minister Mr. Kyprianou in the Greek Cypriot administration also indicated that 'Cyprus was prepared to union with Greece but

⁷⁶ PRO: FCO 9/75, 'note of conversation with Mr. Kuneralp at Kyrenia, 8 March 1967', sent by the British High commission in Cyprus to FO, 9 March 1967.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ PRO: FCO 9/75, telegram from the British High commission in Cyprus to Commonwealth Office, 19 June 1967.

would never accept partition nor a Turkish base⁷⁹ on the island. The statements of the Turkish official were indicating that Turkey was against any solution which allowed *Enosis*. However, the Greek side insisted on *Enosis*. This was the significant reason that the talks did not provide any solution. In fact, the Greek side knew that the dialogue with Turkey on Cyprus issue would not bring a solution which based on *Enosis*. Georgios Papandreou, the former Prime Minister of Greece, told the British ambassador to Athens, Murray, that he did not think that the Cyprus problem would be solved in the near future and he added that there was ‘certainly no hope obtaining *Enosis* as a result of dialogue.’⁸⁰ Papandreou stated that the reason for the resumption of the dialogue with Ankara was to ‘avoid exacerbation of relations between Greece and Turkey.’⁸¹ The explanation of Clerides was also similar to Papandreou’s. He said that: ‘if we continue to expect that through the method of Greco-Turkish negotiations we shall achieve *Enosis*, we are completely outside of reality...’⁸² After the Greek military coup, there was a New Greek government in Athens and its policy on Cyprus issue would be decisive in the course of the Greece’s dialogue with Turkey for the solution of the problem. In this context, the Greek prime minister’s demand to meet his Turkish counterpart Süleyman Demirel to settle the Cyprus dispute was another significant development in the Cyprus problem in 1967 which investigated in the next chapter.

The Meeting of the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers and the British Assessment

When the military regime came to power on 21 April 1967 in Greece, a first impression might suggest that its policy on the Cyprus problem was aggressive and to orientate towards creating *Enosis* quickly rather than continuing a long-term dialogue with Turkey for the solution of the problem. By uniting Cyprus with Greece immediately, the junta could then show its success in foreign policy to gain popular support in Greece.⁸³

⁷⁹ PRO: FCO 9/73, ‘British Policy on Cyprus part B’, ‘record of a meeting between Mr. Spyros Kyprianou and the Commonwealth Secretary held at the Commonwealth Office’, 23 October 1967.

⁸⁰ PRO: FCO 9/75, ‘negotiations about Cyprus’, letter (confidential) from the British Ambassador to Athens, Ralph Murray, to FO, no: 187, 23 March 1967.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² PRO: FCO 9/75, ‘highlights of a speech by the president of the house of representatives, Mr. Glafkos Clerides, on 11 June 1967’, letter sent by the Brits high Commission in Cyprus to CO, 13 June 1967.

⁸³ Fırat, ‘Yunanistan’la İlişkiler’, p. 735.

The new military government's approach to the Cyprus issue also affected its relations with Makarios. 'The relations between both sides were less than warm from the start.'⁸⁴ There was a power conflict between the military regime and Makarios. The junta wanted to control Makarios. However, he wanted to be free in his actions rather than being dependent on the military regime. This power struggle would become more evident over time.⁸⁵ In fact, since the coup in Athens on 21 April, there were some rumours that the junta was planning to stage a coup against Makarios⁸⁶ to replace him with someone more loyal to their way of thinking. As stated by Makarios, these rumours were damaging relations between the Greek Cypriots and Greece.⁸⁷

The Greek military government's approach to the Cyprus problem was causing worry on the island. Particularly, the possibility of a Greek junta intervention in Cyprus was increasing these concerns. The British Foreign Office was monitoring the situation on the island closely and collecting information about developments. According to this:

*Ever since the Army coup in Greece there have been repeated rumours of an attempt to extend the military regime through the Greek regular officers in Cyprus, in such a way as to bring about Enosis quickly by encouraging the right-wing elements in Cyprus and if necessary displacing President Makarios. The move would probably, though not necessarily, be made through General Grivas on orders from Athens. It appears from these that the intention is that this weekend the Greek regular forces in Cyprus, with or without Grivas, and National Guard, will make some move against the communist(AKEL), probably by arresting their leaders and placing restrictions on the remainder.*⁸⁸

After assessing the situation, the British ambassador in Athens was instructed by London to inform the new Greek government that the British Foreign Secretary 'would take a very serious view of any attempt to spread the Greek coup to Cyprus.'⁸⁹ Additionally, the Soviet Union was also concerned about the new Greek military regime. The Soviets were concerned that the new government in Greece was fiercely anti-communist in part because of a right wing nationalist legacy from

⁸⁴ Thomas Ehrlich, *International Crisis and the Role of Law Cyprus 1958-1967*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 95.

⁸⁵ See: Constandinos, *America, Britain and the Cyprus*, pp. 77-93.

⁸⁶ PRO: FCO 9/70, 'Greece relation with the Greek Cypriots: UK worries about Greek coup and Greek designs on Cyprus', 'Cyprus situation', telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to to Commonwealth office, no: 595, 26 June 1967.

⁸⁷ *The Times*, 23 June 1967.

⁸⁸ PRO: FCO 27/178, 'Greek coup being extended to Greek officers in Cyprus in such a way as to bring about *Enosis*', 'Cyprus', Foreign Office's letter about the situation in Cyprus, 5 May 1967.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

the Greek Civil War in the late 1940s when local Communists were defeated. From the USSR's perspective, through unification of Cyprus with Greece, the island would turn into a NATO base. This was unacceptable to Moscow. The Soviet ambassador to the United Kingdom, Mikhail Smirnovsky, underlined this issue:

*The military government in Greece has in effect decided on a policy to unite Cyprus to Greece by force. Frankly, we have the impression that behind the backs of those who want to resolve the "Cyprus problem" to detriment of the interest of the Cypriot people, there stand certain circles of NATO. The Soviet Union is against any plans for dismembering and at turning the island into a NATO military base.*⁹⁰

While these rumours were continuing, Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos, one of the strong men of the Greek junta visited Cyprus from 9 to 12 August 1967.⁹¹ According to Sir Michael Stewart, the British ambassador in Athens, by making this visit, the junta was actually trying to lessen the tension with Makarios. Stewart also mentioned that in this visit, it was said to Makarios that if Greece reached any agreement on the Cyprus dispute through dialogue with Turkey, Makarios himself would be given a proper chance to examine it.⁹² Therefore, Makarios did not feel that he was completely eliminated from any resolution of the Cyprus problem. According to the British High Commissioner, Sir Norman Costar, although the visit made some positive progress in terms of the relations between the Archbishop and the Greek junta, he said 'there was clearly much room for future dispute'⁹³ because Makarios seemed not to be 'content with a subordinate role over the solution of the Cyprus problem.'⁹⁴

In fact, although there were some rumours about the Greek junta's policy on Cyprus, it was not an easy task for them to speedily unite the island with Greece. An aggressive policy from the Greek junta towards Cyprus would cause problems with Turkey, which in turn would weaken the southern flank of NATO. This could not be approved by the US. In addition, international support was important for the new Greek government. However, like the Soviet Union, 'international reaction to the

⁹⁰ PRO: PREM 13/1370, 'Cyprus: possible coup in Cyprus by General Grivas, Apr-July 1967', letter (confidential) from Foreign Office to Moscow, 5 July 1967.

⁹¹ PRO: FCO 9/70, 'visit of colonel Papadopoulos to Cyprus', report from the British High Commissioner in Cyprus to Secretary of State for Commonwealth affairs, 27 September 1967.

⁹² PRO: FCO 9/70, confidential telegram from the British ambassador in Athens, Sir Michael Stewart, to Foreign Office (FO), no: 917, 14 August 1967.

⁹³ PRO: FCO 9/70, op. cit.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

military takeover in Greece was immediate and adverse'.⁹⁵ It was difficult for an anti-democratic regime to gain the support of other countries. Therefore, 'at this juncture the increasingly isolated Greek junta took the initiative and Prime Minister Konstantinos Kollias invited his Turkish counterpart Süleyman Demirel to hold talks on bilateral issues'⁹⁶ which were mainly about the Cyprus problem. In his statement on 2 September, Kollias also said that the Greek government wanted to solve its problem with Turkey.⁹⁷ 'On the Turkish side, Çağlayangil, the Turkish Foreign Minister, persuaded Prime Minister Demirel'⁹⁸ to meet with his Greek counterpart. On 6 September, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a statement and announced that the Greek and Turkish government agreed to have a meeting to review all relations between the two countries including the Cyprus problem.⁹⁹ Therefore, 'two Prime Ministers heading their respective delegations met on September 9 and 10, 1967, on the Turco-Greek border, first in Keşan in Turkey, and on the next day on Alexandroupolis (Dedeagaç) in Greece.'¹⁰⁰ This was an important event in terms of Greek-Turkish relations. Both countries' Prime Ministers took their own initiative to meet each other to discuss the problems between the both countries without urge or intervention of the UN.

The first meeting in Keşan on September 9 did not produce any solution for the Cyprus problem. The main dispute between the two sides was on the issue of *Enosis*. The Greeks believed that the Turks would accept *Enosis* in return for giving 'minority guarantees for Turkish Cypriots and territorial adjustment on the Greco-Turkish border in favour of Turkey'¹⁰¹. However, it remained unacceptable to Turkey to sign any agreement which led to *Enosis*. Therefore, 'the Turks rejected *Enosis*'¹⁰² and demanded either a return to the 1959 status quo or to double *Enosis*'¹⁰³ (division the island between Turkey and Greece). Zeki Kuneralp, who was the Secretary of

⁹⁵ Ehrlich, *International Crisis*, p. 94

⁹⁶ Zeki Kuneralp, *A Footnote to Turco-Greek History: The Kesan-Alexandroupolis Talks, September 9-10, 1967*, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1988), p. 8

⁹⁷ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni* (The Bulletin of the Foreign Ministry), Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no: 36, September 1967, p. 10.

⁹⁸ Parker T. Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War: Cyprus, a First-hand Account of Crisis Management, 1965-1968*, (London: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 31.

⁹⁹ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, op. cit., p. 12.

¹⁰⁰ Kuneralp, *A Footnote to Turco-Greek History*, p. 8.

¹⁰¹ Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 96.

¹⁰² A. G. Xydis, 'The military regime's foreign policy' in Clogg, Richard. & Yannopoulos, George (eds.). *Greece under Military Rule*, (London: Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd., 1972), p. 201.

¹⁰³ Uslu, op. cit., p. 96.

Turkish Foreign Minister Affairs and attended the meetings with Demirel, stated the situation at the first meeting:

*The Greek Prime Minister Kollias started the discussions as the initiator of the talks. He demanded Enosis (attachment to Greece) for Cyprus and asked for the London-Zurich Agreements to be repudiated. He argued that this would be to the benefit of all countries concerned. Demirel at once rejected Kollias' argumentation and unequivocally stated Turkey's position: Adherence to the London-Zurich agreements only could provide grounds for a solution of the problem.*¹⁰⁴



**Soldiers saluting the Turkish Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, in Keşan.
Source: *Milliyet*, 9 September 1967.**

According to the Greek argument, ‘*Enosis* was also good for the Turks. Seeing a Greek flag flying over the island south of the coast of Turkey would be assurance that the island was in allied hands and therefore safe. Otherwise, there was a great danger that Cyprus would go communist.’¹⁰⁵ The Greek side tried to show the necessity of *Enosis*. However, their argument could not manage to change the Turkish government attitude towards *Enosis*. Therefore, ‘the Turkish reply, which Kollias later explained took him greatly by surprise, was to say flatly that *Enosis* was no solution.’¹⁰⁶ The point is that before the meetings on 9 and 10 September, the Turkish and Greek Foreign ministers met in Luxemburg in June and talked about the Cyprus issue. After the meeting, the Greek side mistakenly thought that the Turks were ready to accept *Enosis* as a solution, but the Turkish side had actually rejected

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁰⁵ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, p. 32.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 33.

this argument. This misunderstanding between the parties adversely affected the frontier meetings on September 9 and 10.¹⁰⁷

A subsequent meeting was held on the next day on Alexandroupolis (Dedeağaç) in Greece. However, this talk also did not produce any solution because both sides continued to disagree.¹⁰⁸ Later, on 13 September, the Greek Prime Minister, Kollias, defended their position in the meetings with the Turkish government and also expressed the view that he could not accept any solution which would damage Greek national interest.¹⁰⁹ In a press conference, the Turkish Prime Minister, Demirel, said that the Greek rejection of acceptance any solution apart from unifying the island with its mainland was the important reason for the fact that the Cyprus problem was still unresolved.¹¹⁰ The Turkish Cypriot leader, Dr Fazıl Küçük, also said that Turkey and Turkish Cypriots would never accept unification of Cyprus with Greece but partition of the island between Turkey and Greece was an acceptable solution for the Turks.¹¹¹ By the end of the frontier meetings, the Turkish-Greek dialogue, ongoing since June 1966 was effectively over without having produced any solution to the problem. However, it was thought that the talks could provide a peaceful solution on which both sides agreed but it is a reality that there were big differences between the approaches of the two sides towards the Cyprus issue which became more clear as a result of the Keşan and Alexandroupolis (Dedeagach) meetings.

The failure of these talks adversely affected the Cyprus problem in subsequent decades and cast a shadow over future attempts to create a working solution. 'The rift between Turkey and Greece grew wider'¹¹² and this led to the second major crisis on the island in November during which two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece, almost went to war with each other. The frontier meetings between Demirel and Kollias were also considered to be an important development by Britain. The meeting features prominently in British documents. In particular, there were significant evaluations of the failure of the talks.

¹⁰⁷ There is no certain explanation how this misunderstanding arose. According to the US ambassador to Turkey (1965-68) Parker Hart; 'in his earlier talks with the Greek counterpart, Çağlayangil, Turkish Foreign Minister, should have made clear that the Turks were willing to explore all sort of alternatives to *Enosis*, but not *Enosis*. (Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, p. 33)., Also, see the quotation 172 for FCO's evaluation on this misunderstanding between both sides.

¹⁰⁸ Kunalalp, *A Footnote to Turco-Greek History*, p. 9.

¹⁰⁹ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, no: 36, September 1967, p. 13.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 9

According to one of British assessments of why the Demirel/Kollias talks failed:

*There was a considerable element of genuine misunderstanding. The Greek government clearly thought that the Turks would be prepared to negotiate on a basis of compensated Enosis. The Greeks may have thought that when they turned down the offer made during the meeting between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers at Luxemburg (in June) of Enosis plus a leased base it was the amount of compensation rather than principle of Enosis which made offer unacceptable. But the Turks made it clear when they turned down the proposal put to them at Luxemburg that it was the principle of Enosis to which they objected.*¹¹³

The British assessment of the failure of the talks also underlined the misunderstanding between both sides. Although the Turkish Foreign Ministers rejected *Enosis* in the meeting in June, the Greek side did not understand how the Turks had been serious about it. Therefore, in the frontier meetings, the Greek side came to offer *Enosis* while the Turks came to prevent it. This incommensurability was the main problem. After the frontier meetings, Britain reviewed its approach towards the Turkish-Greek dialogue:

*Should we urge the Greek and Turks to go on talking?
We know that State Department took prompt action after the Kollias/Demirel talks to urge the Greek and Turkish governments not to be discouraged and to go on talking. We thought that this was the right line to take and we believe that it is important that the Greeks and Turks should remain in regular touch over Cyprus even if whatever kind of dialogue they keep up is unlikely to produce any real progress towards a new settlement.*¹¹⁴

As can be seen, Britain decided to continue to support the dialogue between Turkey and Greece. Britain knew that stopping negotiations between the two sides would adversely affect the Cyprus problem. However, as previously mentioned, both sides approach towards the problem made the resumption of the negotiations almost impossible. As a result, the emergence of a new crisis on the island seemed to be inevitable.

Conclusion

In general, the first chapter showed that Ankara and London were not pursuing the same policy by 1967 and there was no indication of Anglo-Turkish cooperation against the Greeks. However, it is difficult to say that Britain's Cyprus policy completely turned against the Turkish approach on the island. The British

¹¹³ PRO: FCO 9/72, Foreign Office's Central Department Memorandum on the Cyprus Problem, 9 October 1967.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

government tried to give an impression that it was impartial in its Cyprus policy because it did not want to have poor relations with either Turkey or Greece. From this point of view, although the British reaction against the decision by Makarios to import guns from Czechoslovakia was not as strong as Turkey's, they essentially agreed with Ankara that the Greek move could have worsened the situation on the island. Therefore, British official statements were in the same line with Turkey, but they were more cautious and tried to explain to the Greeks why Britain did not support the Greek action. From the Ankara's perspective, the British position in the crisis was satisfactory and it did not have a negative effect on their mutual relations.

Following the end of the arms dispute, Athens and Ankara tried to accelerate the negotiation process in order to settle the Cyprus dispute. Although Britain was not directly involved in the talks, its support of one side's argument for the solution could have had an effect on the course the negotiation. In this sense, while negotiating with the Greeks, Turkey would have been pleased to have received British support for its arguments because, as the Turkish foreign minister, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil stated, one of the important points in the Turkish Government's policy of Cyprus in 1967 was to gain maximum support for Turkey's attitude to the Cyprus issue in the international arena.¹¹⁵ As the Turkish scholar, Ahmet Sözen stated, Turkey was in favour of a bi-communal federation for the solution of the Cyprus problem.¹¹⁶ From the British perspective, while the Greeks and Turks were negotiating with each other, Britain tried to fully understand the Turkish approach to *Enosis*. If the Turks were ready to accept it in return for compensation, Britain could revise its own policy on *Enosis* and openly express that it would not be against a solution that led to it. However, as an important outcome of the beginning of the Greek-Turkish dialogue and after the discussions with Turkish officials, Britain clearly understood that the Turks would never agree to *Enosis*. As the British ambassador to Turkey, Sir Roger Allen stated that the result of the two Prime Minister's meeting made Britain pretty sure about the idea that the Turks would not accept any declaration of *Enosis* or any *fait accompli* in Cyprus.¹¹⁷ As a result of

¹¹⁵ *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, (Official Records of the Turkish National Assembly) term: 2, session: 2, vol. 11, 4 January 1967, pp. 7-8.

¹¹⁶ Ahmet Sözen, 'The Cyprus Negotiations: From the 1963 Inter-Communal Negotiations to the Annan Plan' in Ahmet Sözen (Ed.), *Reflection on the Cyprus Problem: Compilation of Recent Academic Contributions*, (Cyprus Policy Center, 2007), p. 1.

¹¹⁷ PRO: FCO 9/72, 'Cyprus', telegram from the British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir. Roger Allen, to Foreign Office, no: 1540, 18 October 1967.

this, Britain avoided any public mention of *Enosis* as an option not to damage Anglo-Turkish relations.

The failure of the meetings between the Greek and Turkish prime ministers in September 1967 also proved that Britain's assessment of the Turkish attitude towards *Enosis* was accurate. The Greek side offered the Turks a solution based on the unification of the island with Greece which was rejected by Ankara. After the meetings, the Greek side stated that the Turkish attitude towards the situation was responsible for the failure. However, Britain did not think that the Turkish attitude was the only reason for the breakdown of the meetings. According to the British, the Greeks thought that the Turks could accept *Enosis*, which had an important effect on the result of the meetings. Therefore, the British did not criticise Ankara's attitude which made a contribution to reducing possible international criticism on Turkey. From this perspective, the disagreement between Athens and Ankara did not have a negative effect on the Anglo-Turkish relations, but the November crisis on the island, which is examined in the second chapter, would test the impact of the Cyprus problem on bilateral relations between Britain and Turkey in 1967 one more time.

2) The Cyprus Crisis of 1967: The Different British and Turkish Approaches

Introduction

The second chapter analyses the British and Turkish positions on policy at the time of the November crisis in 1967 which was started by the attack by Greek forces against two villages, Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou in Cyprus. This was considered as an important event in the history of the Cyprus problem because of the possible danger of a war between Greece and Turkey.

The first section of this chapter looks at the significant developments prior to the event and the way the Turkish government handled the crisis. This is a substantial point which enabled the author to make a comparison between the policy of Britain and Turkey. Proceeding from this point of view, the second section also concentrates on the British reaction to the crisis in the light of the archival documents. Furthermore, the assessment of the British government on the Turkish government's attitude towards the crisis is also presented at this point. In particular, the evaluation of the British ambassador in Ankara on this issue is evaluated. Also, the discussions inside the British cabinet to prevent a possible Turkish military action on the island have also been investigated.

The increasing American influence on the Cyprus problem by the time of the November crisis is also the subject of the third section. This is a significant issue because Britain was criticised in that it did not make sufficient effort to end the crisis, and this situation effectively forced America to play more active role in the Cyprus question. In this sense, Mallinson also expressed that the view that the increase in US influence was the result of the low British profile.¹¹⁸ Therefore, this section looks at America's negotiations with Athens and Ankara to reach a solution of the crisis and the British approach to the American diplomatic actions in this process.

The last part of the second chapter looks at the British and Turkish assessments after the end of 1967. According to the British, the crisis ended with Turkish victory over

¹¹⁸ William Mallinson, *Cyprus: Diplomatic History and the Clash of Theory in International Relations*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), pp. 64-65.

the Greeks, but there were some criticisms of the Turkish government's policy in Turkey which are shown in this part.

Turkey's second Attempt to intervene on the Island

The unsuccessful attempt of Turkey and Greece to solve the Cyprus issue made the situation worse on the island. In particular, the tough living conditions of the Turkish Cypriots¹¹⁹ were still a major problem and Turkey's negotiations with Greece had not made any positive contribution to their life. From the Greek Cypriot perspective, the failure of the Turkish-Greek dialogue did not affect their situation on the island. Actually, the Greek Cypriots had not been happy with negotiations between Turkey and Greece. According to their general opinion, Turkey and Greece should not have been overly involved in the Cyprus issue. The Cypriot Foreign Minister Mr. Kyprianou stated that 'the Cyprus government had always felt that the problem of Cyprus was not essentially one between Greece and Turkey, but one for the people of Cyprus to decide.'¹²⁰ According to the British Foreign Office's assessment, after the unsuccessful meeting between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers in September, the Greek Cypriots leadership was trying to gain British support for the idea that the Greek-Turkish dialogue for the solution for the problem was 'completely dead.'¹²¹

In this connection, Makarios had also told the British High Commissioner in Cyprus, Sir Norman Costar, that the dialogue between Ankara and Athens on the Cyprus dispute 'was dead and should not be revived.'¹²² According to the Greek Cypriots, they 'could not approve the continuation of discussion of vital concern to them from which they were excluded.'¹²³ In fact, rather than Greece, the Greek Cypriots considered Turkey's involvement in the Cyprus issue as a major problem because Turkey had closely followed the events in Cyprus and threatened to carry out military operations on the island. According to the Greek Cypriot High Commissioner, Mr. Ashiotis, 'the Greek Cypriot government had never expected any

¹¹⁹ Rauf Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, (Nicosia: K. Rustem & Bro, 1982), pp. 45-46.

¹²⁰ PRO: FCO 9/73, 'record of a meeting between Mr. Spyros Kyprianou and the Commonwealth Secretary held at the Commonwealth Office', 23 October 1967.

¹²¹ PRO: FCO 9/73, 'H.M.G.'s attitude to the Greek-Turkish dialogue' report from the Central Department of Foreign Office to John Beith, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the British Foreign Office, 26 October 1967.

¹²² PRO: FCO 9/72, telegram from the British High Commissioner to Cyprus, Sir. Norman Costar, to Commonwealth Office, no: 885, 18 October 1967.

¹²³ Ibid.

result, but had had to contest- albeit with some reluctance- to the discussions being held.¹²⁴

Therefore, the Greek Cypriot government seemed to be pleased with the unsuccessful meetings between Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers. The British Foreign Office Central Department's memorandum in 1967 stated that the Greek Cypriot side's 'main concern at present is probably to gain currency for the idea that the dialogue, which they have never liked, is over.'¹²⁵ Also, according to another British Foreign Office's assessment; 'Makarios was clearly delighted at the breakdown of the Greek-Turkish dialogue. This fitted in well with his policy of paying lip services to *Enosis*.'¹²⁶

Britain did not give support to the ideas of the Greek Cypriot side and made its policy over the Cyprus issue clear: 'Our position is that we hope that the Greek and Turkish governments will have further talks. We should certainly not give the Cyprus government ground for supposing that we share their view that the dialogue should not be resumed.'¹²⁷ However, the events on the island would not develop as Britain hoped and Turkey once again would prepare to launch an attack against the island in the Mediterranean.

The first crisis occurred October 31, 1967, when Rauf Denktash, a Turkish Cypriot communal leader 'exiled from Cyprus since 1966'¹²⁸, was arrested by Greek Cypriot forces while trying to enter the island secretly. Since he was a charismatic leader among the Turkish Cypriots, his intentions were to increase the Turkish Cypriot community's resistance against the Greek Cypriots' demands for *Enosis*.¹²⁹ The situation on the island became tense again. The Greek Cypriots accused Turkey of being responsible for the attempt of Denktash to come back, but Turkey rejected this accusation.¹³⁰ According to the Turkish Prime Minister Demirel's statement, the Turkish government did not have any knowledge of Denktash's action.¹³¹ Turkey's

¹²⁴ PRO: FCO 9/72, 'note a conversation between the Commonwealth Secretary and the Cyprus High Commissioner, Mr. Ashiotis, in the Commonwealth office', 20 September 1967.

¹²⁵ PRO: FCO 9/72, Foreign Office's Central Department memorandum on the Cyprus problem, 9 October 1967.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ PRO: FCO 9/72, 'Cyprus', letter of the Central Department of Foreign Office, 25 September, 1967.

¹²⁸ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, p. 44.

¹²⁹ Melek M. Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1997), p. 221.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, no: 38, November 1967, p. 13.

ambassador on the island, Ercüment Yavuzalp, was also shocked when he was informed about Denktash's arrest. He said that:

*After having my dinner at home, I started to watch Greek Cypriot channel on TV which was the only channel we could watch on the island. Then, I saw picture of Denktash on TV. Because of I could not speak Greek; I did not understand the situation at first. Then, after translation, I understood that Denktash had been arrested by the Greek Cypriot forces. It was a big surprise for me. I immediately informed Ankara but they also did not have any information about Denktash's action.*¹³²

The situation was also difficult for Makarios. There were demonstrations on the island in support of Denktash by the Turkish Cypriots. Putting Denktash on trial and sending him to prison could make the situation worse on the island. Therefore, Makarios was reluctant to take any action against him. Eventually, the crisis was solved after intensive negotiations. Denktash gave an assurance that he would not try to enter the island illegally again and returned to Turkey November 12, 1967.¹³³

This crisis had an important impact on Turkey's Cyprus policy. When Denktash was arrested, the public pressure on the Turkish government to carry out a military operation on the island increased. In particular, the Turkish Cypriots accused the Turkish government of not helping them and, in a demonstration, they even attacked Turkey's Embassy building on the island.¹³⁴ Turkey was being forced to make a military operation in Cyprus. When the Denktash crisis started the President of Turkey, Cevdet Sunay, was in Britain for the official visit. He gave a speech in London on 5 November at the organisation which was arranged by the Turkish Cypriot community in Britain. He said that Turkey was working to solve the Cyprus problem in a peaceful way and added that 'we hope, as a last choice, we would not have to apply the other option for the solution.'¹³⁵ The comment of Sunay implied that the Turks were ready to use the military option in the Cyprus issue.

Shortly after the solution of the Denktash issue, Cyprus faced another dispute which would turn into a major international problem. The crisis started in the region west of Larnaca when Turkish Cypriots of the village of Ayios Theodoros (Boğaziçi) had not allowed passage to Greek Cypriot police patrols through the Turkish part of the

¹³² Ercüment Yazuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993), pp. 47-48.

¹³³ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, p. 44.

¹³⁴ Yazuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*, p. 60.

¹³⁵ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, op. cit., p. 12.

village.¹³⁶ Actually, the Greek Cypriot police was able to patrol once a week on this road without having any problem but ‘after two serious outbreaks of shouting during July in 1967 the Greek Cypriot police suspended the weekly visit.’¹³⁷ By November, the Greek Cypriots wanted to resume patrolling in this road. In a meeting with Makarios and Greek General Grivas, UN Special Representative Bibiano Fernández Osorio y Tafall and UNFICYP Commander Armas-Eino Martola had strongly advised them to not take any action and postpone a resumption of their demands to patrol until an acceptable solution by all sides could be reached.¹³⁸ However, they replied that we ‘might not be in a position to wait any longer.’¹³⁹

The first reaction of Ankara to the Greek Cypriot request was negative. The Turkish Cypriot Leadership also demanded the removal all other Greek Cypriot blockades on the island in return for allowing the Greek police passage through Ayios Theodoros (Boğaziçi) but this argument was rejected by the Greek side.¹⁴⁰ Turkey’s ambassador on the island, Ercüment Yavuzalp, saw no harm in opening road for the Greek police patrolling. He also sent a telegram to Ankara about this issue but his argument was rejected. However, Yavuzalp sent another telegraph to Ankara November 13, 1967, and strongly advised them to allow resumption of patrolling. Afterwards, Ankara replied to Yavuzalp that ‘his suggestion about the issue was under consideration and they would send the last decision of Ankara to him soon.’¹⁴¹ Turkey seemed to concede to the idea of opening Ayios Theodoros (Boğaziçi) for Greek Cypriot patrolling. However, the Greek Cypriots did not wait for the end of the negotiation and, ‘despite UNFICYP’s disclosure that a settlement was in sight and that confirmation was expected very shortly that Turkey had accepted the *status quo*’¹⁴², they started patrolling by armoured cars in Ayios Theodoros (Boğaziçi) on 14 November ‘without the U.N. escort which usually accompanied the forces of the “government” within the Turkish controlled areas’¹⁴³.

¹³⁶ Sharon Anderholm Wiener, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy Decision-Making on the Cyprus Issue: A Comparative Analysis of Three Crises’, Ph.D. Thesis, (Duke University: 1980), p. 153.

¹³⁷ Micheal Harbottle, *The Blue Berets*, (London: Cooper, 1974), p. 95.

¹³⁸ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, pp. 44-45.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

¹⁴⁰ Harbottle, *The Blue Berets*, p. 95.

¹⁴¹ Yazuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*, p. 74.

¹⁴² Harbottle, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

¹⁴³ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 134.

Contrary to expectations, Turkish Cypriots did not take any action against the Greek Cypriot police force. However, it was too early to think that the crisis was over because on the same day and the following day heavily armed Greek Cypriot forces continued their patrolling, which turned into a show of strength. Chief of Staff of the UNFICYP Michael Harbottle criticised this action of the Greek side and accused General Grivas:

*There seems little doubt that General Grivas was determined to provoke the Turks into a fight, for even UN Special Representative Osorio-Tafall and UNFICYP Commander Martola were making strong representations to the "government" to stop this provocative action, Grivas ordered yet another patrol into the village in the early afternoon of the 15th.*¹⁴⁴

The clash in Ayios Theodoros started on 15 November.¹⁴⁵ According to the Greek side, when their heavily armed convoy entered the village, Turkish Cypriots opened fire.¹⁴⁶ After the several hours of battle, the Greeks completely took the control of Ayios Theodoros. Then, on the same day, the Greek Cypriot forces attacked another Turkish village Kophinou (Geçitkale) which was not linked to the original patrol issue.¹⁴⁷ At the end of the day, '22 Turks had been killed; many of them civilians lying in the ruins of their homes, and 9 more had been wounded.'¹⁴⁸ When Ankara heard about the Greek Cypriot attack against the two villages, the Turkish Security Council (NSC) gathered and Turkey sharply warned the Greek government and Makarios¹⁴⁹ on 16 November 1967 that the Turkish Air Force would bomb the Greek Cypriot targets if they continued to occupy the two villages. After Ankara's warning, on the same day, the Greek side agreed to withdraw their forces from Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou.¹⁵⁰

However, Turkey was still frustrated by the Greek action. The Turkish government was in an especially difficult situation because the government had already been strongly criticised in the Denktash crisis by the opposition parties and the public for

¹⁴⁴ Harbottle, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

¹⁴⁵ Christopher Hitchens, *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger*, (New York: Verso, 1999), p. 65.

¹⁴⁶ Bölükbaşı, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

¹⁴⁷ Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 97.

¹⁴⁸ Harbottle, *The Blue Berets*, p. 96., UN Security Council Reports for the period 13 June to 8 December 1967, (S/8286), p. 19., Zeki Kuneralp, *Sadece diplomat: hatırat*, (İstanbul Matbaası, 1981), p. 160.

¹⁴⁹ Cihat Göktepe, 'The Cyprus Crisis of 1967 and its Effects on Turkey's Foreign Relations', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 41: 3, p. 439.

¹⁵⁰ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 135., Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 98., *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, no: 38, November 1967, p. 22.

applying a passive policy against the Greek side. This time the situation was much more serious, twenty-two Turks were killed which provoked a change in the climate of Turkish public opinion.¹⁵¹ The Turkish government was expected to intervene on the island. The Turkish side considered the Greek attack against Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou as a pre-planned action to achieve *Enosis* because the villages were strategically important Turkish 'enclaves on the Nicosia-Limassol motorway and they were controlled by the self-established Turkish Cypriot administration.'¹⁵² The report of United Nations Secretary General U Thant on the incident also supported the Turkish argument: 'The magnitude of the Ayios Theodoros operation and the speed with which it was carried out clearly indicated that the National Guard had planned in advance to carry out this operation in the event of any show of opposition by the Turkish Cypriots.'¹⁵³

Actually, in the first stage, when the Greeks responded to Turkey's demands positively and agreed to withdraw the Greek forces from the two enclaves, the Turkish government was relieved. The Turkish Foreign Minister, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, stated that 'we could exchange congratulations that the crisis was past'¹⁵⁴. Prime Minister Demirel also 'pronounced in a press conference at 11 a.m. on November 16 that the crisis was over.'¹⁵⁵ However, the pressures, even from the inside of the government, affected the Turkish government approach towards the 1967 crisis. The U.S ambassador to Ankara, Parker T. Hart, describes the situation: 'There had been an intense battle of wills on the nights of the 15th and 16th in the Turkish cabinet between the hawks and doves. Later, I was to learn that the line-up was between Demirel, Çağlayangil and Defence Minister Ahmet Topaloğlu, who sought a peaceful solution, and other ministers who occupied secondary position.'¹⁵⁶

The opposition parties in the Turkish National Assembly also heavily criticised the policy of the government in Cyprus. 'The RPP representative Nihat Erim blamed Demirel for reacting slowly to the news of violence on 15 November 1967 and missing a good chance to teach Makarios a lesson.'¹⁵⁷ The Turkish Cypriots also

¹⁵¹ Göktepe, 'The Cyprus Crisis of 1967', p. 439.

¹⁵² Uslu, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

¹⁵³ United Nations, Security Council, 16 November 1967, *Secretary's General Report on the Ayios Theodoros-Kophinou Incident* (S/8248).

¹⁵⁴ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, p. 53.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

¹⁵⁷ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 136.

were not happy with the Turkish government policy. Turkish Cypriot fighters stated that they no longer believed that Turkey would perform a military operation on the island.¹⁵⁸ The pressures on the government led Prime Minister Demirel to apply a more rigid policy on the crisis.

First, 'On 17 November, the Turkish Grand National Assembly authorized the government to use the Turkish armed forces "outside Turkey"'.¹⁵⁹ Then, on the same day, the government was to send a harsh note to Greece stating Turkey's demands for calling off an intervention.¹⁶⁰ These demands were:

1- The recall of General Grivas. 2- The withdrawal of the all Greek troops stationed in Cyprus since 1964(12,000 by Turkish estimates and 6,000 by Greek estimates)¹⁶¹. 3- The disbandment of the National Guard and, under UNFICYP supervision, collecting arms from unauthorised civilians and militants. 4- The removal the pressure from the Turkish community by ensuring freedom of movement. 5- Compensation for the victims and the damage caused to Turkish Cypriots at Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou.¹⁶²

From Ankara's perspective, there was no time to wait anymore and Greece had to give a response to Turkey's demands immediately. However, there was no answer from the Greek side until 22 November. Only the recall of General Grivas to Athens on 19 November could be considered as an important Greek action. In its reply on 22 November, Athens rejected Turkey's requirements.¹⁶³ After this reply, as UN the Secretary General U Thant reported rather starkly that, 'Greece and Turkey are now on the brink of war'.¹⁶⁴ According to the US intelligence report, Turkey would initiate a military action within twenty-four hours.¹⁶⁵ The Turkish military preparations could be observed fairly easily. Turkish aircraft were being loaded with bombs and troop ships were being loaded for the naval landing. In Greece, there were also counter preparations. At this point, the U.S. took an initiative and intervened in the crisis as had happened in 1964. President Lyndon B. Johnson announced that he was sending his personal representative, Cyrus Roberts Vance, to

¹⁵⁸ *Akşam*, 17 November 1967.

¹⁵⁹ Wiener, 'Turkish Foreign Policy', p. 155.

¹⁶⁰ Bölükbaşı, *op. cit.*, p. 136., Wiener, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, p. 155.

¹⁶¹ Wiener, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

¹⁶² Andreas Papandreou, *Democracy at Gunpoint: the Greek Front*, (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1971), pp. 211-212., Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, pp. 60-61., Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 99.

¹⁶³ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 139., Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 100.

¹⁶⁴ Göktepe, 'The Cyprus Crisis of 1967', p. 439.

¹⁶⁵ Bölükbaşı, *op. cit.*, p. 139., Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 100.

Ankara then to Athens for ‘consultations in an effort to assist the governments of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to discover a peaceful way out of the present tension and remove the danger of war from the eastern Mediterranean.’¹⁶⁶ After the U.S. ambassador Hart informed Turkey about the Vance mission on 22 November, the Turkish government decided to wait and see what his actions would be before launching a military operation.¹⁶⁷ As his first destination, Vance was on the way to Ankara to search a solution for the serious crisis that had developed between two NATO allies.

Britain also worried monitored about the situation on the island. In particular, the British government was worried about the possibility of a Turkish military operation in Cyprus. Therefore, the next section explored the British position at the times of crisis and the British approach to the Turkish policy.

The British Reaction to the Crisis

The British position in the 1967 crisis was vital because they had a strong connection with the island. First of all, Britain was one of the guarantor powers in the Treaty of Establishment and held two important military bases on the island. It also had a significant role in UNFICYP. The situation was serious on the island. Turkey was threatening to make a military operation and Britain had to involve in the crisis to prevent a possible war between two NATO allies. Therefore, from the beginning, the Britain Foreign Office observed the crisis closely. The FCO’s Research Department memorandum described the situation:

*The crisis of November 1967 started with an attack led by General Grivas, who had returned to Cyprus in 1964 and become commander of the Defence of Cyprus, on the Turkish inhabitants of two villages and their houses. Over 20 Turkish-Cypriots were killed. Ankara’s reaction was immediate. If the Greek and Greek Cypriots’ forces had not been withdrawn (from the occupied villages) by dawn the next day, Turkish bombers would have gone to action.*¹⁶⁸

After this information, a careful analysis was made of the Turkish demands for ending the crisis. Also, from the perspective of Britain, there was assessment of Turkish public opinion as regards to the crisis:

¹⁶⁶ Wiener, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy’, p. 156.

¹⁶⁷ Bölükbaşı, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140.

¹⁶⁸ PRO: FCO 51/47, ‘the Turkish Attitude to Cyprus 1945-1967’, Foreign And Commonwealth Affairs’ Research Department Memorandum, 4 December 1968.

*The withdrawal gave time for reflection, but by itself it was not enough to satisfy Turkey. Nor even was the prompt removal of General Grivas to Greece. True to their principles they put full responsibility on the Greek government, and demanded the removal of all illegal Greek forces from the island, otherwise Turkey would invade Cyprus. During a week of near war hysteria the Turkish government had the overwhelming support of the army and the people, most of whom would have been glad to see an invasion which they thought, would settle the Cyprus problem once and for all.*¹⁶⁹

The British ambassador to Ankara also provided useful information about the Turkish reaction to the crisis. In a secret message from the British Embassy in Ankara, he reported developments in Turkey and the preparations of the government for a military operation:

*The latest indications are that Turks declared intent on landing in Cyprus may well be to redress imbalance between illegal Greek troops and Turkish troops. I still consider that the Turks will attempt to establish at least two beaches. Kyrenia possibly extending to the area Morphu bay and Famagusta bay area. As far as I know there is virtually no suitable beach head in Cyprus on which the Turks can land without the Greeks knowing. Whatever the Turkish intention I cannot see individual Greek units failing to oppose them. If the Greeks fight, the Turks will attempt to annihilate all opposition in the immediate vicinity of the landing. Of course that will lead to full scale fighting. I believe that as a result of Kophinou military thinking was clear and decisive. The Cyprus problem has to be settled quickly once and for all by immediate negotiation or the Turkish forces must invade and protect the Turkish Cypriots themselves. They were ready to go.*¹⁷⁰

Another insightful assessment by the British ambassador to Turkey about the Turkish feeling about the Cyprus problem showed the reason why the Turks were so eager to intervene on the island in 1967 crisis: ‘Turkish troops will undoubtedly have thoughts of revenge but not only for Kophinou. My belief is that after years of frustrations they feel they have lost face. Their public image is damaged and they must do something drastic to restore it.’¹⁷¹

Britain knew that a Turkish military operation in Cyprus would go beyond the island. According to British Cabinet’s opinion, ‘if Turkey invaded Cyprus it would probably invade Greece as well. The attack on Cyprus would not be against the Cyprus government but against the Greek forces on the island, of whom the Turks alleged that about 12,000 were there illegally.’¹⁷² Britain also considered the situation in terms of the British military bases on the island. In a discussion, ‘the Cabinet was

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ PRO: DEFE 11/539, ‘Cyprus’, telegram (secret) from the British Embassy in Ankara to Foreign Office, no: 1849, 24 November 1967.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² PRO: CAB 128/42, ‘Post War Conclusion’, CC (67), 68th conclusion, 23 November 1967, p. 5.

informed that if Turkey invaded Cyprus, the plan was to concentrate all United Kingdom nationals in the Sovereign Base Areas which were not expected to be involved in a Turkish invasion.¹⁷³ However, 'the stress was so great that England transferred 2400 British citizens on the island to Dhekelia base.'¹⁷⁴

Although it seemed that there was no great danger for the British position on the island, Britain tried to find an answer the question, what is 'position of United Kingdom government in international law in relation to the threatened Turkish action against Cyprus?'¹⁷⁵ This issue was discussed by the Foreign Office Commonwealth Office Legal Adviser in a meeting on Friday 24 November 1967. 'The law officers were asked to advise whether the United Kingdom government were under any obligation under the Treaty of Guarantee to take unilateral action in the current situation against the Turkish attack. The law officers were of the opinion that no such obligation was imposed by Treaty.'¹⁷⁶ According to this opinion, British advocated that:

*Under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee we are obliged to consult with Greece and Turkey, the other guarantor powers, if a breach of the Treaty occurs. The invasion of Cyprus would of course be such a breach. But as Turkey would have caused the breach we obviously could not have the kind of three power consultation envisaged in the Treaty, at least until the fighting had stopped.'*¹⁷⁷

Nevertheless, the British were aware that they had to do something to stop a possible war between the sides. At a meeting in the British cabinet, they discussed this issue:

*We should bring all possible pressure to bear on Turkey, seek to involve the United Nations as deeply as possible and take political action at every level to stop the fighting. We should consider the possible reaction of the Soviet Union. It was also necessary to consider whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) could play a role in bringing to an end a war between two of its members. There was a danger that NATO intervention might lead to a breakup of the Alliance. It might therefore be preferable to act through the United Nations.'*¹⁷⁸

It was announced from Moscow that the Soviet government was carefully observing the development of events in Cyprus and it was indicated that the Soviet government was supporting the peaceful solution all questions of relations between the Greek and

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Armaoğlu, 'Crisis the Cyprus Question', p. 245. Also, see: PRO: FCO 47/156, 'Cyprus: possible Turkish invasion and precautions for British citizens', 1967 Jan 01-1968 Dec 31.

¹⁷⁵ PRO: FCO 27/166, 'position of UK government in international law in relation to threatened Turkish action against Cyprus', 'Advice of Law Officers', 24 November 1967.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Göktepe, 'The Cyprus Crisis of 1967', p. 439.

¹⁷⁸ PRO: CAB 128/42, 'Post War Conclusion', op. cit.

Turkish population on Cyprus ‘without any interference from outside.’¹⁷⁹ Britain wanted the crisis to be solved through negotiations. The UN and NATO were considered as important actors in this process. However, the assessment of the British policy makers about the danger of searching for a solution for the problem over NATO seemed to be correct. When the UK MILREP (Military Representative to NATO) informed London about the message of the Turkish General Staff to NATO, it was understood that if NATO tried to stop the Turks, this intervention could damage relations with Turkey because the Turkish government would be decisive in sorting out the problem at any cost:

*We do not wish to ask your advice. We are the most honoured defendants of peace. But we cannot tolerate cruelty against humankind. What we want from you is that you hinder those who burn and burden our people and destroy their homes, and prevent the cruelty of Greeks and Greek Cypriots who are seeking possession of international waters and airspace (...) It must be clearly understood that, unless the Greek division and Greek Cypriots soldiers equipped with Greek arms are withdrawn from the island, we will have to use our right of intervention granted to us through the agreements with the purpose of safeguarding humankind...*¹⁸⁰

All of the discussions which were made by the British Cabinet and Foreign Office were aimed at trying to find an appropriate reaction to the crisis. Britain wanted to be cautious in its action. It was not happy with the Greek action which had caused death of twenty-two Turks, but it also did not want Turkey to launch a military attack to the island. However, there was no much time left to stop the conflict between the sides. Therefore, as had happened with the 1964 crisis, the U.S would take responsibility to put an end the crisis again.

The Increasing Impact of the USA in the Cyprus Problem

After Greece refused to accept the Turkish demands, (that is according to Turkish government), there was no choice left for Turkey other than attack Cyprus. In particular, the Turks wanted Greece to withdraw its troops from Cyprus. In his press statement on 22 November Dr. Fazıl Küçük said that negotiating with the Archbishop Makarios for the solution of the crisis would be pointless unless the Greek troops who were deployed on the island returned to Greece.¹⁸¹ The British

¹⁷⁹ PRO: Records of the British Minister of Defence (DEFE) 11/539, ‘Cyprus’, telegram from the British ambassador to Moscow, Sir Geoffrey Harrison to Foreign Office, no: 1949, 23 November 1967.

¹⁸⁰ PRO: DEFE 11/539, telegram (secret) from the UK MILREP in Brussels to Ministry of Defence (MOD), reference: TLL/REPCOS 11, 24 November 1967.

¹⁸¹ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, no: 38, November 1967, p. 87.

Foreign Minister ‘had been in touch with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Çağlayangil, and urged restraint. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant was also sending a special representative, the Guatemalan José Rolz Bennett, to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey’¹⁸² to prevent any conflict between the sides. However, there was heavy pressure on the government in Turkey and it seemed that the British effort alone was not enough to dissuade Turkey from its decision. Therefore, as mentioned before, on 22 November, ‘the President of the United States had decided to send to the area a special representative Cyrus Vance’¹⁸³ ‘in order to prevent Turkish military intervention in Cyprus and avert the threat of a war between Greece and Turkey.’¹⁸⁴ The U.S. President gave his full support to Vance and told him: ‘Do what is necessary to stop the war. If you need anything, let me know. Good luck.’¹⁸⁵

However, Vance’s mission seemed to be difficult because, from the Turkish perspective, it could be regarded as another American intervention which just aimed to stop Turkey. In the 1964 crisis, Johnson sent a threatening letter to Turkey to prevent a possible Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. This letter disappointed Turkey and resulted in it revising its relations with the U.S. Therefore, this time, President Johnson wanted to be cautious in his action and ‘he had evidently decided not repeat the mistake of issuing a blunt veto to the Turks, but to try mediation.’¹⁸⁶ This was a right approach for ending the crisis because when the U.S. ambassador to Turkey informed the Turkish government about Vance’s mission, Zeki Kuneralp, the secretary of the Turkish Foreign Minister Affairs, ‘took the position that Vance was a “living Johnson letter” (referring to the letter of June 5, 1964).’¹⁸⁷ Therefore, the Turkish government seemed to be reluctant to accept an American intervention at this stage of the crisis. However, Vance had been already on the way to Ankara and

¹⁸² PRO: CAB 128/42, ‘Post War Conclusion’, CC (67), 68th conclusion, 23 November 1967, p. 4.

¹⁸³ Van Coufoudakis, ‘United States Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: A case study in cold war diplomacy’ in Theodore A. Couloumbis & Sallie M. Hicks (eds.), *Conference Proceedings U.S. Foreign Policy toward Greece and Cyprus, The Calah of Principle and Pragmatism*, (Washington D.C.: The Centre for Mediterranean Studies, 1975), p. 121., Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: US Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), p. 101.

¹⁸⁵ Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices, Critical Years in American Foreign Policy*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 144.

¹⁸⁶ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, (London: Frank Cass 2002), p. 153.

¹⁸⁷ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, p. 69.

the government had to agree to listen to the envoy of the U.S. and give him a chance to persuade the Greeks.¹⁸⁸

On the other hand, the Turkish public did not want to accept the Vance's mission, which was considered to be bringing another "Johnson letter" threatening Turkey.¹⁸⁹ There were anti-American demonstrations everywhere. As a result of these protests, when Vance arrived in Ankara on November 23, his plane landed at a military airport in Ankara rather than the civilian airport Esenboğa.¹⁹⁰ Vance knew that the situation was serious. He was informed that 'Turkish troops were already at the embarkation port and were expected, according to the U.S. intelligence, to invade Cyprus the next morning. This would mean war between Greece and Turkey.'¹⁹¹ In this respect, after he arrived in Ankara, he went without delay to see the Turkish Prime Minister Demirel to determine what kind of measures could be taken to end the crisis. When they met on 23 November, Demirel tried to give an image that Turkey was so determined to launch a military operation in Cyprus. He said the Turkish Cypriots' oppression by 'the Greek Cypriots and the mainland Greek forces had been going for years and had now reached the point at which it could no longer be endured.'¹⁹² The Turkish government was in the position that Greek side had to accept the Turkey's demands for cancellation of the planned Turkish military operation. Otherwise, they would have to attack Cyprus.

After listening to the Turkish demands, Cyrus Vance went to Greece on the same day. In contrast to Turkey, the atmosphere was calm in Athens. The reason for this might be that they did not believe that Turkey would perform a military operation in Cyprus. During the 1964 crisis, Turkey had threatened but nothing happened. Therefore, they thought it would be the same this time. As a result of this, when Vance met the Greek Foreign Minister Panagiotis Pipinelis, his reaction to the Turkish demands was at first very negative,¹⁹³ but gradually Vance 'persuaded the Greek junta to withdraw its troops from Cyprus by 25 November 1967.'¹⁹⁴ However, they were reluctant to withdraw their force in such a short time. They demanded

¹⁸⁸ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 140.

¹⁸⁹ Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

¹⁹⁰ Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975*, (London: C. Hurst for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977), p. 415.

¹⁹¹ Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 144

¹⁹² Hart, *op. cit.* p. 72.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

¹⁹⁴ Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 102.

seven months to complete the recalling process. Turkey did not agree with this demand and ‘insisted on unconditional and immediate withdrawal.’¹⁹⁵ Finally, on 30 November, Greece accepted Turkey’s terms. Then a plan was agreed by the sides which included:

*-Withdrawal of Greek Troops from Cyprus within a fixed time frame. –Dismantling of Turkey’s war preparations. -Dissolution of the Greek-Cypriot National Guard and the handing over of all weapons (including the Czechoslovak arms) to the United Nations peace forces and its commander Grivas be recalled Greece. - A reaffirmation of the independence and integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.*¹⁹⁶

Before reaching a full agreement, Vance went to Cyprus on 29 November to meet Makarios who also accepted the withdrawal of Greek mainland troops but he did not want to agree on the disbandment of the National Guard and ‘Vance was unable to persuade him otherwise.’¹⁹⁷ However, on 3 December, the press reported that Turkey and Greece reached an agreement on a settlement.¹⁹⁸ On the same day both countries stated that ‘they would abide by the appeal of the U.N. Secretary General who called for the withdrawal of foreign troops illegally introduced into Cyprus and disbandment of paramilitary forces on the island.’¹⁹⁹ Vance also announced that his mission was completed. Thus, the second major crisis was over and the danger of a war between the two NATO allies was successfully averted. The Greek acceptance of most of the Turkish demands had a major role in this agreement.

Some assessments suggested that the reasons for the Greek acceptance of the Turkish demands were:

*When the crisis broke out in Cyprus in November 1967, the Greek junta had only been in power for about half a year. It was weak and internationally unpopular. Also given its firm orientation toward NATO and the United States, the Greek regime was susceptible to American pressure to make concessions and avoid a war with Turkey.*²⁰⁰

Furthermore, ‘although Greece accepted the majority of the Turkish demands, this did not mark a complete victory for the Turks, since Makarios later refused to dismantle the National Guard.’²⁰¹ This caused the Turkish government to be heavily

¹⁹⁵ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 142.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 140., *The Times*, 1 December 1967.

¹⁹⁷ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 141.

¹⁹⁸ Wiener, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy’, p. 157.

¹⁹⁹ Bölükbaşı, *op. cit.*, p. 141., Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 102.

²⁰⁰ Tozun Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, p. 74.

²⁰¹ Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, p. 153.

criticised in Turkey. From this point of view, it is important to look at the reactions to the settlement of the crisis from the point of both by British and Turkish sides.

British and Turkish Assessments in the aftermath of 1967 crisis

Britain was pleased that the crisis was ended without any major conflict between the sides. According to British evaluation, the articles of the agreement showed that Turkey succeeded in imposing its demands on Greece. The Foreign Office called this situation as “Greece bows out” and said that ‘one result of the crisis of last November, when war between Turkey and Greece was narrowly averted, has been the evacuation of the “illegal” Greek troops who were in Cyprus and a sharp reduction in Greek involvement in the problem.’²⁰² Immediately after the 1967 crisis, according to Foreign Office’ analysis, ‘*Enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece) is not now being pursued by either the Greek government or the Cyprus government.’²⁰³ This evaluation could be regarded as true for the short term because the agreement between Turkey and Greece had some heavy conditions for the Greeks. Therefore, they might have lost their motivation for *Enosis*. However, it did not mean that the policy of *Enosis* was completely relinquished by the Greeks.

Britain also gave its own support to Vance and regarded his mission as “encouraging”.²⁰⁴ When Vance went to Cyprus to discuss support for the agreement, ‘the British Prime Minister had also sent a message to President Makarios urging him to accept the proposals.’²⁰⁵ American involvement in the Cyprus issue was considered as an important element for the solution of the problem. Britain also took a lesson from the 1967 crisis and wanted to improve its Cyprus policy to prevent any future crisis on the island. As a result of this, in a discussion in the Cabinet the point was made that: ‘It was most important that we should, if necessary, be able to exert our proper influence in the event of a new crisis in Cyprus; and we could do so only if we had contacts with the Greek regime.’²⁰⁶ From this point of view, Britain wanted to improve its relations with the new Greek military regime.

Another discussion was over UNFICYP which was responsible for maintaining peace on the island. However, in the November crisis, twenty two Turkish Cypriots

²⁰² FCO 9/73, ‘Cyprus’, report of the Central Department of Foreign Office, 20 March 1968.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ PRO: CAB 128/42, ‘Post War Conclusion’, CC (67), 69th conclusion, 30 November 1967, p. 4.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

were killed and UNFICYP had failed to prevent this incident. As a result of this, the efficiency of the UN forces started to be questioned by Turkey. Britain was the most important supporter of this UN peace force in Cyprus and had a significant role in it. Chief of staff of this force was also a British General, Michael Harbottle. Therefore, Britain tried to support the necessity of UNFICYP. In his report to the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary George Brown, advocated that:

*It is true that UNFICYP was unable to prevent the outbreak of heavy fighting at Ayios Theodoros on 15 November. But it is not within the existing terms of reference of the Force to oppose a deliberate and large scale assault by one side against the other, as happened there. Nevertheless, UNFICYP's presence was essential for the establishing of a cease-fire and for the operations required to provide immediate succour for victims of the outbreak and to ensure that the embers of the fighting did not flare up again.*²⁰⁷

Overall, Britain welcomed the agreement between Turkey and Greece and thought that the Turks had gained a victory over the Greeks. However, from the Turkish perspective, it was difficult to say that they had the same feeling. In particular, Turkish public opinion seemed to be unhappy with the result. *The Times*' report from Turkey described the Turkish reaction to the agreement. According to this report, 'although the Turks had successfully forced their plan for the settlement of the Cyprus issue upon Makarios, there were no sign of celebrations here, official or otherwise. There is no great feeling of elation among the Turks.'²⁰⁸ The Demirel government believed that it was a good agreement and tried to explain it to the public. However, there were sharp criticisms of the government especially, in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The Deputies of the opposition parties blamed the government for missing a good chance to intervene in Cyprus.

The member of the right-wing Republican Peasants Nation Party, Alparslan Türkeş, was one of the Deputies in the parliament who heavily criticised the government action. He strongly accused the government of deceiving the Turkish Cypriots and called for a vote of confidence on the Demirel government. According to him, during the crisis, although the National Assembly gave the right of use the Turkish armed forces outside Turkey, the government did not have any real intention to intervene in Cyprus and was only bluffing. He also argued that the military preparations should

²⁰⁷ PRO: DEFE 11/539, 'Cyprus: renewal of the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus' confidential letter from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, George Brown, to the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson', 30 November 1967.

²⁰⁸ *The Times*, 1 December 1967.

have been done secretly. However, the government failed to do so. Therefore, the international pressure on Turkey did not allow for an intervention on the island. He also said that the government committed a major offence by not intervening in Cyprus.²⁰⁹ From the same party, Deputy Reşat Özarda also criticised the result of the 1967 crisis. He refused the argument that Turkey had won a victory over Greece and asked questions to the government about the Cyprus issue. According to his view, the agreement between Turkey and Greece did not provide a real improvement in the condition of the Turkish Cypriots situation on the island.²¹⁰ The other opposition parties in the National Assembly did not support the argument of Alpaslan Türkeş of calling for a vote of confidence for the government. However, they also made criticisms on the government's Cyprus policy.

The Deputy of the Nation Party, Seyit Faruk Önder, said that instead of finding a permanent solution for the Cyprus issue, the government had only searched for a surface and temporary one. Therefore, the Cyprus problem still remained unresolved. However, he announced that they would reject the motion about the government.²¹¹ Republican People's Party's speaker, Nihat Erim, also said that his party would not support a vote of confidence in the government. The leader of the Reliance Party, Turhan Feyzioğlu, stated that they would not take any negative or positive action about the motion. Rather than calling for a vote of confidence, he suggested calling for a general debate in the National Assembly about the Cyprus issue.²¹² The Turkish Foreign Minister, İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, rejected the accusations against the government with regards to its Cyprus policy. He defended them arguing that the government had achieved a good result and managed the Turkey's demands in a peaceful way. According to his view, it had to be understood that searching for the best solution for the 1967 crisis and finding a permanent settlement for the Cyprus issue were essentially quite different matters.²¹³

The result of the 1967 crisis was evidently also a disappointment for the Turkish Cypriots. They knew that the agreement between Turkey and Greece would not provide a real solution to the problem. On 30 November, the President of Turkish

²⁰⁹ *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, (Official records of the Turkish National Assembly), term: 2, session: 3, vol. 22, 1 December 1967, pp. 269-270.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 8 Dec. 1967, pp. 383-384.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 4 Dec. 1967, pp. 320-321.

²¹² *Ibid.*, p. 342

²¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 343-348.

Cypriot Administration, Dr. Küçük, told Vance that ‘Turkish Cypriots desired a permanent solution which would eliminate the condition of strife on the island’²¹⁴ and according to his opinion, ‘a federation ... of two autonomous communal administrations’ was a realistic solution for the Cyprus problem.²¹⁵

Conclusion

The November crisis indicated that there were major differences in the reactions showed by Britain and Turkey towards the events on the island. After the death of twenty two Turkish Cypriots, Ankara applied a more aggressive policy and was ready to launch a military intervention on the island. Britain was also aware of the seriousness of the situation. In this respect, they criticised the Greek Cypriot move. However, according to the British opinion, attacking Cyprus would not contribute to the solution of the problem. From this point of view, Turkey and Britain diverged sharply.

Britain was in favour of putting international pressure on the Turkish government to discourage it to not to attack the island. However, Britain knew that this would be a difficult task to achieve alone. Therefore, the U.S. came to the aid of Britain. An important result of the 1967 crisis was that Britain accepted the increasing role of America in the Cyprus issue. However, Britain knew that its position on the island was significant and in any possible future crisis, Britain would be expected to take the initiative to solve the problem.

Britain was happy with the result that a possible Turkish military intervention in Cyprus was stopped. Also, the active American role in this process helped the British not to be seen in a difficult position, such as preventing the Turks from conducting a military operation. As a result of this, the November crisis did not cause trouble in Anglo-Turkish relations. However, Britain understood that Ankara was serious in its military threat. In particular, the public in Turkey was in favour of launching an attack to defend the Turkish Cypriots on the island. Therefore, it was stated in a FCO Research Department memorandum that Ankara’s threats of military intervention to protect Turkish Cypriot rights ‘should never be interpreted as mere

²¹⁴ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 141.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

bluff.’²¹⁶ It also added that if any future crisis occurred on the island similar to that of November 1967, it would be difficult for a government in Turkey to remain in power without sending the Turkish troops into action.²¹⁷ Thus, Britain believed that a permanent solution had to be found to prevent any future military crisis in the Cyprus dispute again.

After the November crisis, the divergence in the British and Turkish policy on the Cyprus issue continued. There were new developments on the island such as the establishment of a separate Turkish administration which were not approved by Britain. Also, a negotiation process was started between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island. Therefore, the next chapter examines this dialogue process and the British assessment on the Turkish approach to the Cyprus question in peace negotiations.

²¹⁶ PRO: FCO 51/47, Foreign And Commonwealth Affairs Research Department Memorandum, 4 December 1968.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

3) The Cyprus Problem after the 1967 Crisis: The Increasing British Criticism on the Turkish Policy on the Cyprus Issue

Introduction

The chapter three looks at the developments in the Cyprus issue up until the Turkish military operation on the island in 1974 and evaluates British and Turkish policy in this time period. The first section investigates the Turkish Cypriot move to set up their own administration on the island and the arguments they used to justify their action. Also, the international reaction towards the Turkish move is analysed in this section. In particular, analyses of British opinion on the idea of a separate Turkish administration are examined, raising the question as to whether the Turkish move actually had British support or whether Britain was against it.

The second part of the chapter three demonstrates the situation in Cyprus by 1968 and British policy. There was no major crisis on the Cyprus problem until 1974 and negotiations took place between the Greeks and Turks for a settlement. There was not a single event which significantly affected Anglo-Turkish relations. However, the British government's assessments of Turkish policy within this process provide information which allow to see both sides view on possible solutions to the Cyprus problem.

After the failure of the attempts by Athens and Ankara, the beginning of the direct talks between the local Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Clerides and Denktash, was an important step in finding a permanent solution to the Cyprus issue. However, the talks were not productive and each side revealed attitudes which helped prolong the ongoing problems. Therefore, apart from evaluating the approaches by both sides, section three also looks at the British assessment of the unproductive talks. This gives the reader an idea about how the Turkish attitude in the talks was regarded by Britain. In this context, the reports by British High Commissioner on the ongoing talks between the two communities on the island are used as primary sources. Furthermore, the British and Turkish fear of Soviet involvement in the Cyprus question is also investigated.

The next section looks at the suspension of the talks and the establishment of “EOKA-B” a terrorist organisation established by the Greek leader Grivas. Its establishment caused fear that inter-communal clashes were going to start again on the island. Therefore, the developments after the negotiation process produced only deadlock are investigated in this section. The final part of the chapter three looks at the Cyprus issue after the restoration of the talks in 1972 through initiatives by the United Nations and the British assessment of these talks. There is also an analysis of the Soviet approach towards the inter-communal talks in Cyprus.

The Establishment of the “Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration” and British Reaction

The solution of the November crisis did not bring a real improvement to the relations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The situation on the island was still fragile and it seemed that any small confrontation between the two communities could possibly turn into a major crisis again. It appeared that the 1967 crisis had an adverse effect on the hope that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots could find a possible way to unite and live under one flag like happened in 1960. Actually, at first, the 1964 Cyprus crisis had played an important role in this separation process but the November crisis accelerated it.

From the Turkish point of view, the establishment of a separate Turkish administration was necessary and unavoidable. The Turks demonstrated some reasons to justify their action. Firstly, they argued that, after the December 1963 crisis, the Turkish Cypriots were obliged to live in a very difficult condition both economically and socially. Moreover, they were not allowed to take part in the Cyprus government.²¹⁸ Therefore, this situation on the island was a significant factor in making the rift wider between the two communities and leading the Turkish Cypriots to form their own administration. Secondly, there was a general Turkish opinion that the 1967 crisis one more time demonstrated that the Turkish Cypriots were unprotected and were significantly damaged by the event. As a result of this, establishing a separate government would provide better protection for the Turkish community on the island. Thirdly, the Turks wanted to unite all of the different Turkish Cypriots groups and gather them under the one administration.²¹⁹ The main

²¹⁸ Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, pp. 34-35.

²¹⁹ Yazuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*, pp. 116-125.

motivations for this action were to prevent any conflict between these groups and make the Turkish position stronger.²²⁰ Overall, these were the general Turkish arguments to demonstrate the necessity of the new Turkish Cypriot Administration. However, the other actors in the Cyprus problem would not consent to this Turkish action of establishing a separate Turkish administration and would not show any support for it.

As mentioned before, the Turks were not fully happy with the result of the 1967 crisis. However, when compared to the Greek side, it seemed that the Turks gained more advantages from the agreement between Greece and Turkey. Moreover, the Greek public opinion felt that Greece accepted 'humiliating conditions imposed by Turkey following the November 1967 Ayios Theodoros-Kophinou clashes in Cyprus'.²²¹ Therefore, Turkish Cypriots decided that this atmosphere was the right time to setup their own management²²² and they declared the establishment of 'Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration' on 28 December 1967.²²³

Actually, since 1964, there had been a separate Turkish administration which had been called a 'general Committee'²²⁴ but it was not fully organised. On the other hand, 'the newly established administrative machinery was to a certain extent a formalization and extension of the ad hoc administration which had existed in the Turkish areas of Cyprus'²²⁵ since 1964. It 'had total control over the Turkish enclaves covering 250 of the 9,251 square kilometres of the island's territory. The major Turkish Cypriot enclave was to the north of Nicosia and accounted for 40,000 Turks, or one-third of the Turkish population.'²²⁶ Dr. Küçük was chosen President, and

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Marios L. Evriviades, 'Greek Policy and Cyprus: An Interpretation', *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol. 14, No. 3-4, (Fall 1987), p. 38.

²²² Fırat, 'Yunanistan'la İlişkiler', p. 738.

²²³ Metin Tamkoç, *The Turkish Cypriot State :The Embodiment of the Right of Self-determination*, (London : K. Rustem & Brother 1988), p. 116., Yavuz Güler, 'Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin Kuruluşuna kadar Kıbrıs Meselesi', *G.Ü. Kırşehir Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. 5, No. 1, (2004), p. 108.

²²⁴ Göktepe, 'The Cyprus Crisis of 1967', p. 441., Nedjatigil, *The Cyprus Conflict*, p.39., Fırat, 'Yunanistan'la İlişkiler', p. 738.

²²⁵ Wiener, 'Turkish Foreign Policy', p. 223.

²²⁶ Süha Bölükbaşı, Süha Bölükbaşı, 'The Cyprus Dispute and the United Nations: Peaceful Non-Settlement between 1954 and 1996', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (August, 1998), p. 420.

Denktash, Vice-President of this administration²²⁷, although he was living in exile at that time.

The Turkish side knew that there would be some reaction to their action. Thus, they wanted to be cautious to minimise international criticism. By putting the phrase of the 'provisional' in front of the name of the new administration, the Turks tried to express the point that this was not a step towards partition of the island²²⁸ and it was announced that the Provisional Administration would operate until the provisions of the 1960 constitution were applied.²²⁹ Despite all of these Turkish efforts, there were strong reaction to the new formation. In particular, the Greek side showed a harsh response. Makarios and Athens protested²³⁰ against the Turkish action and the Greek Cypriot government declared that the new Turkish Administration was unlawful and illegal on 29 December 1967.²³¹ The Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, Kyprianou, 'also issued notes on 28 December 1967 to all embassies in Nicosia forbidding their ambassadors to have any contact with the Turkish Cypriot leadership'.²³² The Greek side seemed to be surprised and frustrated. The basic law of this new Turkish administration also was an important factor in the Greek anxiety. It consisted of 19 provisions which authorized the new Administration to use the legislative, executive and juridical power in the Turkish areas on the island.²³³ Athens also stated that the Turkish action was a partition attempt which 'creates a very serious situation.'²³⁴ According to Athens' opinion, 'Greece and Turkey had agreed to settle the November crisis to disarm and create a better climate in which a permanent solution of the Cyprus problem would be possible. By their action the Turks evidently want to prejudice such a solution and impose their own.'²³⁵

After the Greek reaction, the Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil made a statement and underlined the point that 'this new and provisional formation just aimed to give an end to disorder in the Turkish Cypriots affairs and organise the community to help

²²⁷ Aydın Olgun, *Dünden Bugüne Kıbrıs Sorunu*, (Istanbul, 1999), p. 20., Göktepe, 'The Cyprus Crisis of 1967', p. 441., *Milliyet*, 30 December, 1967., *The Times*, 30 December 1967.

²²⁸ Yazuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*, p. 123.

²²⁹ Nedjatigil, *The Cyprus Conflict*, p. 39., Wiener, 'Turkish Foreign Policy', p. 223.

²³⁰ *Milliyet*, 31 December, 1967.

²³¹ Yazuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*, p. 127.

²³² Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, p. 114.

²³³ Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, p. 35., Nedjatigil, *The Cyprus Conflict*, p.39., *Vatan*, 29 December 1967.

²³⁴ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, no: 39, December 1967, p. 87.

²³⁵ *The Times*, 30 December 1967.

to find a solution for the Cyprus problem. He also stressed that this action should not be interpreted as a Turkish divergence from the pursuit of a peaceful solution to the Cyprus issue'.²³⁶ However, this explanation from the Turkish side was not enough to gain support for their action. Apart from the Greeks, Britain was also discontented with the new Turkish Cypriot Administration on the island. 'First reaction in Whitehall was that the Turkish Cypriot move was an "unwelcome development"'.²³⁷ The Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Research Department's assessment also showed the British attitude towards the Turkish action:

*Unfortunately, (after the 1967 crisis) the first political move by the Turkish-Cypriot community (and by Ankara) was a move backwards, by setting up a Turkish-Cypriot Provisional Administration in December 1967. The Turkish government denied that this meant the establishment of a separate government or Republic, but the Turkish-Cypriot's action produced serious objection from Archbishop Makarios, and his banning of official contacts between Head of Mission and Dr. Fazıl Küçük and his administration caused the Turkish and allied governments to make a great deal of diplomatic effort before the matter was resolved.*²³⁸

In a discussion in the British Cabinet, it was also stated that 'the situation in Cyprus had recently become more critical as a result of the decision of the Turkish Cypriot community to setup their own separate administration.'²³⁹ America also seemed to be surprised by the Turkish move. According to the U.S. ambassador Hart, 'the articles of the basic law of the new Administration resembled a constitution and the move appeared to presage formation of a separate state and diminish the chances of reconciliation and unity.'²⁴⁰ He also protested vigorously about the notion of a 'Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration' when he met the Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil in Ankara.²⁴¹

The Turkish side again made an explanation and emphasized that 'its purpose was not to create a Turkish Cypriot government, but to pull together discordant factions of the community who were at serious crossed purposes and to strengthen leadership in preparation for tough negotiations with the Greek Cypriot community toward pacification and inter-communal political cooperation.'²⁴² Actually, the reactions to the Turkish move left Turkey in a difficult situation. Therefore, Ankara sent a note to

²³⁶ *Milliyet*, 31 December, 1967.

²³⁷ *The Times*, 30 December 1967.

²³⁸ PRO: FCO 51/47, Foreign And Commonwealth Affairs Research Department Memorandum, 4 December 1968.

²³⁹ PRO: CAB 128/43, 'Post War Conclusion', CC (68), 9th conclusion, 18 January 1968, p. 4.

²⁴⁰ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, p.110.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.113.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, p.114.

the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia and complained that the declaration of the new Administration should have been made silently.²⁴³ The broad statement attracted attention to the island and increased the international pressure on the Turkish government. In his report to the Security Council on the establishment of the Turkish administration on the island on 4 January, the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, also criticised the Turkish action and said ‘this move could damage my friendly initiative in the Cyprus problem.’²⁴⁴ As a reply to U Thant, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that they did not share the same concern as him.²⁴⁵ The Vice-President of Cyprus, Dr. Küçük, also sent a letter to U Thant on 10 January in which he mentioned the difficult situation of the Turkish community on the island and tried to explain the necessity of such a move from the Turkish Cypriots.²⁴⁶ Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot leader Makarios increased the amount of opposition to the new Turkish Administration. He ‘prevented any official or member of the Turkish Cypriot administration from entering or leaving the Turkish quarter of Nicosia’²⁴⁷. He later announced that his intention was ‘to restrain the activities of an unlawful administration which are calculated to undermine the unity of the “state”’²⁴⁸.

Britain also closely monitored the developments by getting information from the British High Commission on the island. According to this information:

*The restriction by Makarios covers all members of both committee of the new Administration: this means the eleven members of the Executive Committee and all Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives and of the Turkish Communal Chamber. In addition, the Under-Secretary to the Vice-President, who has no connection with the T.C.P.A. (Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration), is restricted. In explaining the inclusion of the Under-Secretary, the Greek Cypriot official said that, since Küçük was not Vice-President and had no public office except in the T.C.P.A., the Under-Secretary presumably served him in that capacity and must therefore be restricted!*²⁴⁹

The Turkish Cypriot judges were excluded from the restriction by the Makarios government. However, as stated in the British High Commission, ‘this is interpreted to mean that, if the Turkish Cypriots give effect to Articles 16-18 of the Basic

²⁴³ Yazuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*, p. 128.

²⁴⁴ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, no: 40, January 1968, p. 11.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

²⁴⁷ *The Times*, 5 January 1968.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁹ PRO: FCO 9/85, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP): finances and support’, ‘Cyprus’, letter from the British High Commission in Cyprus, 2 February 1968.

provision of the T.C.P.A. the judges will be restricted.²⁵⁰ In particular, Article 17 was allowing the new Turkish Administration to setup separate courts.²⁵¹ Therefore, the Greek side wanted to prevent application of these Articles. According to the British assessment about the situation on the island, it was indicated that:

*We have no indication that the Turkish Cypriots intend to implement Articles 16-18 of the Basic Provisions shortly. Even if they do, as long as they act discreetly, carrying on the same sort of courts set-up that they have operated since 1964, it is unlikely to give rise to trouble. But ostentatious implementation of Articles 16-18 would probably provoke a sharp reaction from the "Cyprus government" including the restriction of the judges to the Nicosia enclave.*²⁵²

On the other hand, the restriction from the Greek side increased the frustrations among the Turkish Cypriots on the island which could trigger another inter-communal conflict between the both sides. As reported by British officials,

*If the restriction were to be thus extended the Turkish Cypriots, who are already making an issue of the restriction, would in turn react badly. They are currently taking the line that "all illegal restrictions must be removed if any real progress is to be made towards a settlement." This line is reflected in the Turkish Cypriot publications such as their daily news bulletin.*²⁵³

Makarios also seemed to understand the seriousness of the situation. Thus, it was announced that, except for the member of the T.C.P.A., 'full freedom of movement would be restored throughout the island for all other members of the Turkish Cypriot community 'by the abolition of all check-points and the lifting of all existing restrictions on the supply of various goods.'²⁵⁴ However, according to the British High Commission's assessment, 'If and when Archbishop Makarios honours his undertaking to lift the economic restrictions on Nicosia after the Presidential election, the Turkish Cypriots will doubtlessly say that it does not really alter the situation since restriction on T.C.P.A. members is maintained.'²⁵⁵

The Greek reaction to the Turkish Administration started to decrease in time. Their call for forbidding any contact with the Turkish Cypriot leadership did not get support from the Embassies in Nicosia.²⁵⁶ This call was also 'protested vigorously by the United States and other governments as unrealistic and extreme. Consequently,

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ *Vatan*, 29 December 1967.

²⁵² PRO: FCO 9/85, op. cit.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ *The Times*, 5 January 1968.

²⁵⁵ PRO: FCO 9/85, op. cit.

²⁵⁶ Yazuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*, p. 130.

Washington decided to refuse the Greek Cypriots' position'.²⁵⁷ As a result of this, the Greek Cypriots withdrew their opposition to the contact with the Turkish Cypriot Leadership in Nicosia.²⁵⁸

After examining the Turkish decision to setup their own administration in Cyprus and the reactions towards this decision, the next section analysed the Cyprus problem by 1968 and the British approach to developments in the problem.

The Situation in Cyprus by 1968 and British Policy

In terms of the Cyprus problem, there were important events in the year of 1967 which drew international attention to the island. First, the Czechoslovak Arm dispute, then, the meeting of the Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers, later, the November Crisis and finally, establishment of 'Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration' on 28 December 1967. Nevertheless, there was no solution for the problem and the Cyprus dispute was still unresolved at the beginning of 1968. As a result of this, the danger of any future conflicts between the two communities continued to remain a serious concern.

When compared to the last three months of the previous year, there was very little tension on the island by 1968. Although the Greek Cypriots still called the Turkish Cypriots move illegal, they adapted themselves to the new situation in Cyprus. The first important event on the island in 1968 was the Presidential election which Makarios announced would be held in Cyprus on 25 February.²⁵⁹ The Turkish Cypriot leadership felt uneasy with the decision of Makarios. According to the Article 39 of the 1960 constitution, the Presidential and Vice-Presidential election needed to be held on the same day. However, Makarios called the Turkish Cypriots leadership "rebels" and did not consult with them while deciding the election day.²⁶⁰ As a result of this, the Turkish side planned to make a surprise move and the Turkish Cypriot leader Dr. Küçük announced that 'there would be a Turkish election for Vice-President of the Republic on February 25, the same day as Greek Cypriots have been warned to be ready for polls to elect a President.'²⁶¹ In addition, 'Dr. Küçük said that the decision had been taken in accordance with the provisions of the 1960

²⁵⁷ Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, p. 114.

²⁵⁸ PRO: FCO 9/73, 'Cyprus', report of the Central Department of Foreign Office, 20 March 1968.

²⁵⁹ *The Times*, 13 January 1968.

²⁶⁰ Yazuzalp, *Kıbrıs Yangınında Büyükelçilik*, p. 133.

²⁶¹ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, no: 40, January 1968, p. 5., *The Times*, 22 January 1968.

constitution which stipulates that Greek Cypriots shall elect a President of the Republic and Turkish Cypriots a Vice-President.’²⁶² The Turks thought that if they did not call for the election this would strengthen the Greek Cypriots’ hand to not recognise the status of a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President.²⁶³ However, from the Greek Cypriots’ perspective, ‘the Turkish decision was considered to be without a legal basis and the proposed election “could not have any validity.”’²⁶⁴ It seemed that Cyprus was facing a new crisis. The trigger was usually a relatively trivial or mundane event which was then interpreted as an issue of status or prestige.

Apart from the Greek Cypriot opposition, another problem for the Turkish side was the choice of the candidate for the Vice-Presidential election. A former Chief Justice of Cyprus, Mr. Zeka, was being shown among the possible candidate on the island.²⁶⁵ He had good relations with the Greek side and his candidacy was also supported by the Greek Cypriots.²⁶⁶ However, Turkey wanted Dr. Küçük to be the Vice-President and was opposed to anyone other than him because, according to the Turkish government’s view, two candidates for the Vice-President position could harm the unity of the Turkish Cypriot community.²⁶⁷ Thus, the Turkish ambassador to Cyprus, Yavuzalp had a meeting with Zeka and explained to him the position of Turkey. Zeka decided not to be a candidate in the election. It was most likely that the most important factor in his this decision was that he did not want to have problem with Turkey. After the elimination of the possible applicants for the position of the Vice-Presidency, the Turkish side did not see any necessity to wait for 25 February and went to the poll before that day on 15 February and Dr. Küçük was chosen as the Vice-President once again.²⁶⁸

Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots were preparing for the upcoming Presidential election. From Makarios’ perspective, this event was vital. He stated that ‘after the failure of the Greco-Turkish dialogue and withdrawal of the Greek military forces, the Cyprus problem had entered a critical stage.’²⁶⁹ He seemed to understand that his

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ Yazuzalp, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-34.

²⁶⁴ *The Times*, 22 January 1968.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Yazuzalp, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

²⁶⁷ A. Richard Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict 1963-1971*, (Canada: Department of Geography, Faculty of Environmental Studies, University of Waterloo, 1976), p. 157.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 142-43., *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, no: 41, February 1968, p. 5.

²⁶⁹ Polyvios G. Polyviou, *Cyprus in Search of a Constitution*, (Nicosia: Nicolaou 1976), p. 73., Nedjatigil, *The Cyprus Conflict- a Lawyer’s View*, p. 40.

role in finding a solution to the problem would increase because the military regime in Athens, by beginning to withdraw their troops after the November 1967 crisis, 'had lost much, but not all, of their influence over the Archbishop Makarios, leaving him more freedom'²⁷⁰ to pursue his own policies. For this reason, the election on 25 February was a significant opportunity to reaffirm his power with the Greek Cypriots which would strengthen his hand to take more initiative and act more independently in the Cyprus issue. The result of the election was satisfactory for Makarios. He 'received an exceptionally strong mandate by winning 95 percent of the votes against Dr. Evdokas, who had campaigned on a platform based on *Enosis*'.²⁷¹ After the election, as he declared before, Makarios started to apply the pacification policy on the island. In this context, he 'lifted restriction on the Turkish Cypriot community on 7 March 1968 and removed the barricades and roadblocks surrounding the Turkish areas.'²⁷² This move was considered to be a significant step towards a "normalisation" process on the island. Britain also seemed to be happy with the developments. The British assessment on 20 March 1968 showed the situation in Cyprus:

*During the past three months Cyprus has been quieter than for a long time. The Cyprus government have been progressively lifting the restrictions which they had imposed on the Turkish Cypriots. The process recently culminated in the removal of roadblocks and checkpoints in Nicosia itself. This will make life considerably easier for the Turkish Cypriots. Their public reaction has been rather reserved so far, but what the Turkish Representative said during the debate in the Security Council suggests that these "normalisation" measures will improve the atmosphere considerably if no unfortunate incidents occur to raise tension again.*²⁷³

Despite all of these, there were still some problems. The UN urged the Turkish Cypriot Leadership to respond to the Greek's move by opening the enclaves to Greek Cypriot travel but the Turkish side expressed their unwillingness to do so.²⁷⁴ Similarly, Britain shared the same idea with the UN. The British Foreign Secretary tried to urge the Turkish Foreign Minister, Çağlayangil, to respond to the Greek

²⁷⁰ PRO: FCO 51/47, Foreign And Commonwealth Affairs Research Department Memorandum, 4 December 1968.

²⁷¹ Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, p. 75., Michael M. Carver, 'The Gordian Knot: American And British Policy Concerning The Cyprus Issue: 1952-1974', M.A. Thesis, (Bowling Green State University, 2006), p. 76.

²⁷² Hart, *Two NATO Allies at the Threshold of War*, p. 117., Theodore A. Couloumbis, *The United States, Greece and Turkey: The troubled triangle*, (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 76., Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 109.

²⁷³ PRO: FCO 9/73, 'Cyprus', report of the Central Department of Foreign Office, 20 March 1968.

²⁷⁴ Hart, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

Cypriots' pacification measures, which were welcomed by the British government.²⁷⁵ However, the British ambassador to Turkey, Sir Roger Allen, indicated that the Turks considered "normalisation" 'as no more than palliative.'²⁷⁶ As a result of this, he said, the Turks would not be likely to regard the notion that 'normalisation would lead to a deal between themselves and Makarios.'²⁷⁷ This situation caused a Greek reaction and another discussion arose after the beginning of the "normalisation" process. In a meeting with the British Commonwealth Secretary, the Greek Cypriot side complained about 'the strict control maintained by Turkish leadership.'²⁷⁸ They also stated that 'the Turks must realise that the restrictions that they were maintaining were not a bargaining factor on their side; the real harm was only to themselves.'²⁷⁹ The Greek Foreign Minister, Pipinellis, also stated that the Turkish Cypriots needed to respond to Makarios' "normalisation" measures.²⁸⁰

However, the Turkish Cypriots defended their position by explaining that 'Turkish Cypriots who travelled on the roads would, in any case, have to submit to the Greek Cypriot police and military control.'²⁸¹ Therefore, the same procedure would be applied to the Greek Cypriots when entering the Turkish Cypriot areas. While the discussion about the "normalisation" process continued, both sides seemed to be eager to make a fresh move for the solution of the problem. The UN was working assiduously to find a peaceful settlement for the Cyprus dispute. Hence, UN Secretary-General U Thant tried to arrange a contact between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Representative under the United Nations chairmanship.²⁸² According to the British, 'the Turkish government was not objecting and it seemed likely that such talks would start soon.'²⁸³

In the meantime, in a secret meeting between the Greek and Turkish Foreign ministers in Switzerland in February, 'they decided that the course to make progress over the Cyprus issue would be to inspire the Canadian government to come forward

²⁷⁵ PRO: FCO 9/73, 'Cyprus', record of conversation between the Commonwealth Secretary and the Cyprus Foreign Minister held at Admiralty House, 28 June 1968.

²⁷⁶ PRO: FCO 9/72, 'Cyprus', telegram from the British Ambassador to Turkey, Sir. Roger Allen, to Foreign Office, 18 October 1967.

²⁷⁷ PRO: FCO 9/73, op. cit.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, no: 43, April 1968, pp. 29-30.

²⁸¹ Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, p. 53.

²⁸² PRO: FCO 9/73, report of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, 20 March 1968.

²⁸³ Ibid.

with a proposal for talks in which the Turkish and Greek governments and the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots would take part, probably under a Canadian chairmanship²⁸⁴. However as the British Foreign Office report stated:

*The Canadians were rather slow to pursue this suggestion (partly because of their internal political difficulties and partly they were unwilling to go ahead without the blessing of U Thant, who was meanwhile working on his own proposal). Therefore, the Greek and Turkish governments now evidently think that the Canadian initiative could most usefully be made when a deadlock develops in the talks between the two communities which the United Nations is to promote. We (British) agree.*²⁸⁵

Actually, the situation on the island was conducive to starting a talk between the two communities. After the election and the withdrawal of the Greek forces from the island, Makarios gained more political power. Turkey was also ready to accept the negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As a result of this, Britain became positive about the future of the Cyprus issue, although there were still some concerns. According to the British evaluation:

*The prospects of progress towards a new settlement in Cyprus are now rather better than they have been for some time, and much better than would have seemed at the time of the crisis last November. But it will be a long haul and the situation is still potentially dangerous. We do not think that the Cyprus government fully realised how perilous their situation was last November. They may well be over-confident about their ability to outmanoeuvre the Turks and to avoid further threat of a Turkish invasion. In Turkey, on the other hand, there is a widespread feeling that it would have been much better if Turkey had invaded Cyprus last year and settled the matter. Given all this, and the fact that the position of Turkish and Cypriot governments are still very far apart as regards the lines of the future settlement, there is a clearly a risk that if the discussion now proposed end in deadlock and if there is a recurrence of serious incidents on the island we will once again have a very tense situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. And we shall have to do our best to see that the discussion do not end in deadlock. But there is no immediate requirement for intervention by H.M.G in pursuance of our present policy over the dispute.*²⁸⁶

After these important developments on the island, Britain wanted to review its policy over the Cyprus issue. As a result of this, in a meeting in the Commonwealth Office at the end of January, British Head of Missions from Nicosia, Ankara and Athens discussed the Cyprus policy and outcome of this meeting was also approved by the Foreign Secretary and the Commonwealth Secretary. According to this, Britain decided that:

In close consultation with our allies, especially the United State and Canada, we should:

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

- a) Plan on the basis of an independent Cyprus in the Commonwealth for the foreseeable future;*
- b) Do everything in our power to keep Cyprus westward-looking and prevent the Soviet Union from increasing its influence on the island;*
- c) Support the efforts of the U.N. Secretary-General.*
- d) Exert our influence on Archbishop Makarios to persuade him to adopt a conciliatory policy towards the Turkish Cypriots;*
- e) encourage the Turkish government to allow the Turkish Cypriots to make a positive response to any conciliatory moves made by the Greek Cypriots; and in the long term once adequate constitutional arrangements have been made for the Turkish Cypriots, to disengage themselves from the internal affair of Cyprus;*
- f) Encourage the Greek government in the short term to continue the realistic policy which they adopted in November and in the long term to give up Enosis altogether;*
- e) Ensure that no agreement contains any provision that might adversely affect the position of the Sovereign Base Areas and our related rights in Cyprus while we still need them.²⁸⁷*

Britain understood that the dialogue, which was going to start soon, between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots communities, would have a significant role in solving the problem. Therefore, Britain was in favour of supporting and encouraging such an initiative while giving importance to protecting and maintaining its rights on the island.

The Beginning of the Inter-Communal Talks

After becoming a stage for years of struggles between the two communities, Cyprus seemed to be ready to start a fresh beginning. The inter-communal talks were a significant measure of the Cyprus question and were ambitious efforts which also gained the international support. From this angle, an analysis of this process has a vital importance while investigating the Cyprus issue. Certainly, it was not easy to attempt to bring the two communities to the negotiating table. The first matter which needed to be tackled was the question of how both sides would negotiate with each other. The Turkish and Greek Cypriot representatives had a chance to talk about the direction of inter-communal talks in the UN Security Council meeting in New York in March 1968.

The Greeks did not demand any precondition to begin the dialogue, but they were reluctant to directly contact the Turkish Cypriot leadership and they wanted a mediator to conduct the negotiations. However, the Turks were in favour of the direct

²⁸⁷ PRO: FCO 9/73, 'Cyprus', 'British policy', report of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, 20 March 1968.

talks with the Greek.²⁸⁸ It seemed that the reason for this Greek Cypriot request was to show that they did not recognise the Turkish Cypriot leadership and by demanding a mediator they tried to avoid giving any chance to the Turkish Cypriot Leadership to legitimise itself internationally. Nevertheless, the Greek concern was unnecessary because when the Turks announced the ‘Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration’ on 28 December 1967, this Turkish move did not manage to get support from the international arena. In the end, the Greek Cypriots accepted to begin direct talks with the Turkish Cypriot Leadership.²⁸⁹

It should also be noted that other factors played important role in the initiation of the talks between the two communities. As mentioned before, one of them was the meeting of the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers. According to a British evaluation, ‘the first move forward came in this secret meeting between Pipinelis and Çağlayangil in Switzerland. Pipinelis persuaded Çağlayangil to allow, and indeed encourage, talks between representatives of the two Communities, mainly on the constitutional question.’²⁹⁰

Meantime, the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, who lived in exile in Ankara, officially returned the island on 13 April 1968²⁹¹ and took the Vice-President position in the Turkish Cypriot Administration. At a press conference, Denktash expressed the view that the Turkish Cypriots were ready to negotiate until they could find a mutual solution.²⁹² He also added that he believed that it was still possible for two communities on the island to live together in an independent Cypriot state.²⁹³ The UN Special Representative in Cyprus, the Mexican Bibiano Fernández Osorio y Tafall, helped the planning for the basis for the talks. The Turkish Cypriot chose Denktash as their representative and the Greeks selected Glafkos Clerides as their negotiator.²⁹⁴

It was a fact that although, at that time, Denktash seemed to be second man within the Turkish Cypriot Community after Vice-President Küçük, he was broadly

²⁸⁸ *Milliyet*, 20 March, 1968.

²⁸⁹ *Milliyet*, 04 May, 1968.

²⁹⁰ PRO: FCO 51/47, Foreign And Commonwealth Affairs Research Department Memorandum, 4 December 1968.

²⁹¹ Fırat, ‘Yunanistan’la İlişkiler’, p. 738., Fırat, *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, p. 227.

²⁹² ²⁹² *Dışişleri Bakanlığı Belleteni*, no: 43, April 1968, p. 23.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁴ Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, p. 76.

regarded by most Turkish Cypriots as a strong defender of their rights and the community's most active leader.²⁹⁵ He would also be an important actor through the inter-communal talks between the two communities.

The first formal contact between the both sides for a procedural discussion took place secretly in Nicosia on 23 May 1968.²⁹⁶ It was a significant event in terms of shaping the course of the negotiations. Eventually, Clerides and Denktash met again in Beirut in early June.²⁹⁷ This was their first official contact publicly.²⁹⁸ The communities on the island were going to discuss for a solution for the problem. Until this time, two major powers, Greece and Turkey had tried to solve this issue, but the attempts were unsuccessful and sometimes brought more problems than they solved. In particular, Turkey had seemed to be ready to involve in the problem in any crisis on the island. Therefore, the question was that how would Turkey look at the inter-communal talks on the island?

From Turkey's angle, as stated before, the initiation of the direct the talks between the two communities did not bother it. After the beginning of the negotiations, the Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil stated that 'the Turkish government insists on solving problem by maintaining the necessary dialogue.'²⁹⁹ Also, according to the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Kyprianou, in a meeting between the Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil, it was confirmed that 'the Turkish government was fully in favour of local talks', but Çağlayangil had also added that 'they (local talks) were only a first stage towards settlement; at a second stage results must be put to the other governments concerned.'³⁰⁰ It seemed that while giving support to the talks and encouraging them, Turkey did not want to fully disconnect from the Cyprus issue.

²⁹⁵ Bahcheli, *op. cit.*, p. 75., Patrick, *Political Geography*, p. 157

²⁹⁶ *The Times*, 27 May 1968.

²⁹⁷ 'Kıbrıs Sorunun Tarihsel süreci', *Araştırma ve Etütler Merkezi*, Turkish Ministry of Interior Affairs, http://www.arem.gov.tr/ortak_icerik/arem/Raporlar/degerlendirme/kibris_tarihsel_surec.pdf, Salahi R. Sonyel, *Why did The Inter-Communal Talks on Cyprus (1968-71) Fail? Revelations in the light of British Official Documents released recently*, (Lefkoşa: Cyrep, 2000), p. 3.

²⁹⁸ Fikret Alasya, *The republic of Cyprus and the events that have come to pass: The aim and the attitude of the Greeks*, (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbası, 1969), p. 17, *The Times*, 3 June 1968.

²⁹⁹ *Milliyet*, 19 July, 1968.

³⁰⁰ PRO: FCO 9/73, 'Cyprus', 'record of conversation between the Commonwealth Secretary and the Cyprus Foreign Minister held at Admiralty House', 28 June 1968.



Glaucos Clerides; the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus, Osorio y Taffall, and Rauf Denktash. Picture from the inter-communal meetings between Clerides and Denktash.

Source: *Milliyet*, 27 June 1968.

There were different stages in the talks which lasted until 1971. The first phase of the talks began after the meeting of Clerides and Denktash. However both sides were unable to reach an agreement. The first stage of the negotiations was 'mainly concerned with a rather untidy preliminary exchange of views and exploration of the attitudes of the two communities.'³⁰¹ As stated by Polyviou, the Turkish side agreed with some of the issues for instance; they accepted 'a reduction of the percentage of its participation in the civil service, the police and the legislature to that of its population ratio.'³⁰² Nevertheless, there were other issues which need to be tackled.

The second phase of the talks took place between 29 June 1968 and 25 July 1968 and the most significant topic of this section was the local authority issue. The Turkish Cypriot side mainly demanded that there would be separate a local authority council for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 'Any coordination between the Turkish local authorities and the central government would be carried on by a Turkish Affairs Ministry, if created, or by the Turkish Vice-President.'³⁰³ The Greek side did not give a positive reply to the Turkish Cypriot idea of the local authority and the second phase of the talks ended without reaching a conclusion.

According to the British evaluation of the Cyprus problem in 1968, it was reported that

The pace of the inter-communal talks is now snail-like, although both sides seem to intent on avoiding a breakdown in the near future. But the tension in the island has

³⁰¹ Polyviou, *Cyprus Conflict*, p.64.

³⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 65.

³⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

*greatly relaxed over the past nine months, helped by Makarios' pacification measures, the meetings between the Cyprus and Turkish Foreign Ministers in the summer and the beginning of the inter-communal talks themselves in June.*³⁰⁴

British and Turkish disagreement on the extension period of UNFICYP and the Soviet Danger

As stated before, the Cyprus issue did not concern just two communities on the island. It also had an international dimension. As a result of this fact, after the beginning of the talks, another discussion arose mainly between Turkey and Britain about the UNFICYP. The mandate of the United Nations Force had been extended for six months on 18 June 1968 and would expire on 16 December. Britain supported a renewal of the UNFICYP mandate on the island. According to the British view:

*The fact that talks are continuing between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots is encouraging. But they now seem to be running out of steam, and early agreement between the two sides is unlikely. UNFICYP has helped to maintain a favourable climate in Cyprus during the inter-communal talks, and whether the talks continue or break down, it will provide an essential stabilising factor.*³⁰⁵

However there was a disagreement between Turkey and Britain about the length of the extension of UNFICYP. When informing the Prime Minister about this issue, the British Foreign Minister argued that

*In my view the mandate should be renewed for only three months this time. Experience has shown that with a longer extension the parties to the inter-communal talks are inclined to dawdle; and shorter renewal periods enable pressure to be kept up on the parties. He also said that 'the Americans and the Canadians have come round to the British view about this.'*³⁰⁶

The British evaluation of the renewal of the UN force in Cyprus seemed to be logical, but the purpose of keeping up the pressure between the Greek and Turkish sides was not the only reason for the British demand of a three month extension. The financial reason also appeared to play important role in the British request. Three month extension of the UNFICYP would cost \$750,000 for Britain³⁰⁷ and any longer extension would increase the amount. All these reasons led Britain to ask for a short

³⁰⁴ PRO: FCO 9/806, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) part A', 'the United Nations Forces in Cyprus', letter from Secretary of State to the Prime Minister about 22 November 1968.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

period renewal of the United Nations Force on the island in the upcoming Security Council meeting in the early December 1968.

However, from Turkey's point of view a three month extension would not make a positive contribution to the situation in Cyprus. In a meeting with John Beith, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the British Foreign Office in London, the Turkish ambassador Haluk Bayülken underlined the point that

*The Turkish government favoured a renewal of six months, not three. Bayülken explained to Beith that: their principal reason for this view that the inter-communal talks in Cyprus were developing into a long haul. There was no prospect that Mr. Denktash and Mr. Clerides would reach an agreement by next March (1969). Both of them favoured a renewal of the mandate for six months. It was important to show confidence in the two negotiators. A Security Council meeting in March (accepting three month extension in December meant that Security Council had to meet again in March for another extension decision) might have the opposite effect.*³⁰⁸

According to the observation of John Beith from the meeting, 'the Turkish ambassador Bayülken understood that the UN Special Representative in Cyprus, Señor Osorio-Tafall, had now come round to the Turkish government's view.' Beith also reported that 'the ambassador, Bayülken, suggested that Security Council meeting with dealing with Cyprus should be kept few and far between because they offered an opportunity for the Soviet government to fish in the troubled waters of the Mediterranean and for Makarios to get up to new tricks.'³⁰⁹ From the British side, there was no certain response to the Turkish view but Britain continued to be in favour of the three month renewal. In the end, by the suggestion of the Secretary of General of the United Nations six month extension of UNFICYP was accepted.³¹⁰

Actually, the evaluation of Bayülken about the Soviet government was important because, in a near future, while the inter-communal talks were continuing, another crisis emerged after a meeting between the Soviet ambassador and Turkish diplomat Eralp. In this meeting, 'the Russians had informed that the Greek side was about the staging a coup d'état in Cyprus and that 600 saboteurs had been sent to Cyprus from Athens. The Soviet ambassador commented that this could not have been done

³⁰⁸ PRO: FCO 9/806, 'speaking notes of the meeting between John Beith and the Turkish Ambassador, Haluk Bayülken', 27 November 1968.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ UN Security Council Resolution, 10 December 1968, Res. 261.

without support from the Greek government. Eralp had replied that if a coup d'état took place Turkish reaction would be immediate.'³¹¹

Britain was not happy with the developments. According to the British view:

*The Russians have been active in stimulating, on the basis of "intelligence reports", rumours to the effect that the Greek government are planning a coup d'état in Cyprus, that they have been sending forces of saboteurs to the island and that their aim is to declare Enosis. From the subsequent conversations which we have had with the Turkish officials in Ankara, it would appear that the Turks realise the dangers of allowing these Russian stories and do not believe them all.*³¹²

This event also showed that the Soviet government had continued to try to get a significant role in the Cyprus issue one more time.

British Assessment on the Peace Talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots

After two unsuccessful phases of the talks, the leaders of both communities were preparing to start the third round of inter-communal negotiations which lasted from 20 January 1969 to 17 August 1970.³¹³ In this period disagreement continued between both sides. As a result of this, some rumours appeared that the talks had deadlocked, but Clerides and Denktash stated that talks were making progress.³¹⁴ However, there were eight week intervals in the negotiation process³¹⁵ and when both leaders resumed the talks in December 1969 'they agreed to shelve temporarily the local government issue and move on to other areas where compromises seemed more likely'.³¹⁶

In his report to the Foreign Secretary, the British High Commissioner informed London about the negotiations between the both communities: 'During the six months the inter-communal talks between Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash have continued. Despite the good will of both representatives and desire to reach agreement, it is now clear, after 12 months of discussion that no inter-communal

³¹¹ PRO: FCO 9/1161, 'Attitude of Turkey towards Inter-Communal Dispute in Cyprus', Information about the 'conversation between Eralp of the Turkish MFA and the USSR Ambassador in Ankara', telegram no: 849, 19 March 1970.

³¹² PRO: FCO 9/1161, 'Secretary of State's Lunch with the Turkish Ambassador' on 23 March 1971.

³¹³ Patrick, *Political Geography*, p. 172.

³¹⁴ *The Times*, 30 June 1969.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.* 2 December 1968.

³¹⁶ Patrick, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

settlement will emerge from their deliberation in the near future.’³¹⁷ The comment of the High Commissioner on the inter-communal negotiations seemed to be hopeless. However, he added that

*Nevertheless, the talks have been partially successful to the extent that have served as a safety valve for the release of inter-communal tension; they have settled some minor but contentious points; they have shown that there are some areas of agreement, although these cannot be implemented in advance of an overall settlement; and they have helped to maintain contact and some degree of co-operation between the two communities.*³¹⁸

Meantime, the inter-communal talks were continuing between the two communities. The negotiators exchanged the proposals. ‘The judiciary was discussed from January 1970 to March 1970 and legislative problems dealt with between April and June.’³¹⁹ However, both sides could not manage to reach an agreement. Therefore, the third phase of the talks also duly broke down.³²⁰

The assessments on the process of the third stage of the talks were also giving a signal that the both negotiators would not be able to bring a solution for the problem. The report of UN Secretary General U Thant to the Security Council for the period June-December (1970) was a good example which described the situation on the island:

*The record of the past six months shows neither progress toward further normalisation nor a return to the tense and explosive situation which existed prior to the commencement of the inter-communal talks in June 1968. The situation now prevailing in Cyprus is one of ‘negative stability’; quiet on the surface, but strained, abnormal and fraught with the serious danger inherent in the continuing close confrontation of well-armed military forces. With the passing time, this situation is threatening to become the way of life of all Cypriots, thus perpetuating the need for UNFICYP’s presence in the island.*³²¹

The report of the British High Commissioner, Peter E. Ramsbotham, in Nicosia also presented the situation of the negotiation in 1970 between the both sides:

In the inter-communal talks, the most notable event was the preparation by Mr Clerides and Mr Denktash of a joint document listing their points of agreement and disagreement on the five major constitutional issues. (...) The two sides remain

³¹⁷ PRO: DEFE 11/638, ‘Cyprus’, ‘Cyprus: Future British Policy’, report from the British High Commissioner in Cyprus to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs’, 16 July 1969.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Patrick, *op. cit.*, p. 173.


³²⁰ Polyviou, *Cyprus Conflict and Negotiation*, p.87.

³²¹ PRO: FCO 9/1358, ‘Cyprus annual review’, Cyprus Annual review for 1970’ report from ‘the British High Commissioner in Cyprus to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs’, 1 January 1971.

*deadlocked between Turkish Cypriot demands for constitutional guarantees of their security, self-administration and “partnership” in the government of Republic, and Greek Cypriot insistence on a unitary State, constitutionally secure from the risk of partition. Toward the end of the year there was a faint glimmer of hope that the two sides were seriously reviewing their position and might at last be moving towards substantive negotiations.*³²²

Although the expectation for the solution of the problem through the negotiations was at a low level, the British High Commissioner in Nicosia again underlined that

*The inter-communal talks are, nevertheless, an important factor in Cyprus. In 1970 they have proved valuable as a forum for discussing practical matters such as the return of the return of Turkish Cypriot displaced persons, providing aid to the Turkish Cypriot community, and economic co-operation between the two communities. (...) Both sides agreed that the talks should continue, and it is at least encouraging that both have turned their faces against the use of force as a way of solving their problem.*³²³



Turkish Cypriot-controlled areas in 1970. Source: A. Richard Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict 1963-1971*, p. 464.

Another important area which needs to be analysed is the British policy in the negotiation process. Claude Nicolet states that, in the early stage of the talks, the Americans and British decided not to involve in substance of talking points but instead encourage both parties to continue the dialogue.³²⁴ It was true that Britain

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Nicolet, 'Lack of Concern, Will and Power', p. 501.

avoided interfering in the talks between the communities. While meeting the Turkish ambassador, Bayülken, the British Permanent Under-Secretary of State, John Beith, explained that they ‘attached great importance to a successful outcome to the inter-communal talks, and will continue to give the encouragement.’ He also said they believe that ‘attempts to achieve full settlement of the constitutional problem can best proceed *pari passu* with attempts to improve the position on the ground. We do not think we should get involved in the detail of the talks, since we doubt whether this would be helpful.’³²⁵ In his report the British High Commissioner, Ramsbotham, indicated the reasons behind their policy:

*The policy of standing back has served us well. Our interest in Cyprus, particularly our position as a Guarantor Power and our military interest in the Sovereign Base Areas, gives us influence but also make us peculiarly vulnerable should any initiative by us misfire. Our general interest in peace and stability is identical with that of our allies but our particular interest may differ. The risk for us of embarking once more on an active Cyprus policy, with the danger of alienating one or other communities and their mainland backers with whom we have relatively little influence, are substantial.*³²⁶

However, the High Commissioner added that the situation in Cyprus was different by 1970. According to him, although, in the early stage of the talks, Britain preferred “standing back”, this strategy seemed not to help in finding a solution to the problem. The inter-communal talks were proceeding slowly and there was danger of termination of the talks. As a result of this, the British High Commissioner on the island, Ramsbotham, wrote a report to the Foreign Secretary and set the scene for the British policy review:

Is a change of policy of required?
*External circumstances are favourable to a Cyprus solution, but differences between the communities within Cyprus probably preclude one.’ Therefore, ‘If policy is to be changed the attempt must be made to promote a new modus vivendi. This should not prejudice the important requirements of both sides under an eventual settlement and should attempt to reconcile the proposals each has made over normalisation. The High Commissioner suggests that the main elements might be devices for keeping the inter-communal talks going, by broadening the agenda introducing a third party to the negotiations; measures of demilitarisation; greater freedom of movement; and some sort of assurance against external attack.*³²⁷

³²⁵ PRO: FCO 9/806, ‘speaking notes of the meeting between John Beith, the British Permanent Under-Secretary of State, and the Turkish Ambassador, Haluk Bayülken’, 27 November 1968.

³²⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1165, ‘Policy of United Kingdom towards Cyprus’, ‘Cyprus Policy for 1970’: ‘report from the British High Commissioner in Cyprus to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs’, 4 March 1970.

³²⁷ Ibid.

Nevertheless, the argument of the High Commissioner did not manage to find support. The answer to the High Commissioner from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was not positive. It was said that:

*We do not believe that promotion by outsiders of a modus vivendi or temporary settlement is a realistic proposition in the immediate future.(...) we should prefer to limit our actions to encouraging progress towards a settlement by the customary gentle pressures in general terms on the main parties to the dispute. We should do what we can to keep Greek and Turkish relations close and we should continue to emphasise the lack of any viable alternative to the inter-communal talks. But we should wish to avoid positive proposal.*³²⁸

Although Britain was applying the “standing back” policy, it appeared to be ready to actively involve in the Cyprus problem when the separation of the island became a matter. As a good illustration of this argument, it can be shown that when the inter-communal talks seemed to fall short of meeting the expectation for the solution of the problem, some rumours started to rise on the island. According to this, the Turkish Cypriots, with the support of the Turkish government, were to declare a separate state in Cyprus.³²⁹ It was a serious issue. From the Britain’s point of view, the Turks were unlikely to take such action.³³⁰ However, in case of any Turkish Cypriots declaration of a separate state, Britain indicated that they would show a reaction such a Turkish move and actively involve in the Cyprus question:

(a) We could not accept the legality of such a unilateral partition. Under Article II of the Treaty of Guarantee, we undertook to guarantee the territorial unity of Cyprus.
(b) We could not accept the effective dismemberment of a member of the Commonwealth, against the wishes of the government of that country.

If the Turkish move presented with a fait accompli our scope for action would probably be limited. The minimum that we should do in the short term would be:

(a) To protest in the strongest terms to the Turkish government and urge them to revoke their decision.
(b) To take action to a similar end in NATO and with the UN Secretary General.
*(c) To condemn the decision publicly and unequivocally and to restate our support for a unified Cyprus.*³³¹

This British reaction indicated that Britain was still in favour of a solution which does not split the two communities on the island but unifying them under the umbrella of the one state. From this point of view, Britain was clearly against any

³²⁸ PRO: FCO 9/1165, ‘Cyprus: Policy’, 10 April 1970.

³²⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1157, ‘Implications of possible double *Enosis* in Cyprus involving union of part of Cyprus with Greece and part with Turkey’, ‘declaration of a separate Turkish Cypriot state’, letter from FCO’s Southern European Department, 10 September 1970.

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ Ibid.

attempts from the Turks to establish their own administration on the island. Meanwhile, the new developments in Cyprus were going to interrupt the peace negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Suspension of the Inter-Communal Talks in 1971 and the establishment of "EOKA-B"

The phase four of the negotiations between both communities' representatives started on 21 September 1970 and lasted until 20 September 1971.³³² In this stage, first movement came from the Greek Cypriot side. They offered a "package deal" which was adjusting the Greek Cypriot position on some issues.³³³ According to this, mainly, it was accepted that the House of Representatives would comprise 60 Greek and 15 Turkish members and there would be a Turkish Vice-President. Also, there were some other arrangements paralleled to the Turkish Cypriots requests.³³⁴ After giving the new proposal, it was announced that there would be no further concessions.³³⁵ Although the Greek Cypriots "package deal" seemed to bring an offer which was more agreeable, the local authority issue appeared to continue as an important obstacle to the settlement because, in return for their offer, the Greek side demanded that the proposal of separate central local government authorities for the both communities on the island should be abandoned by the Turkish Cypriots.³³⁶ Turkey's approach towards the Greek offer was also significant, but meanwhile, Turkey had serious internal problems. There was a political instability in the country. The Justice Party, which came to power with the general election in 1969, was in a difficult situation. Dissident voices against Prime Minister Demirel within his own party caused him to resign. Also, the clash between extreme left-wing and right-wing groups was causing a chaotic environment on the streets.³³⁷ The Turkish Army saw the situation as an opportunity to intervene in politics and the commanders in the army issued a threatening memorandum³³⁸ on 12 March 1971 accused the government of being responsible for the condition of the country and stated that the

³³² Patrick, *Political Geography*, p. 173.

³³³ Nedjatigil, *The Cyprus Conflict*, p. 43, Polyviou, *Cyprus Conflict*, p. 78.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.43, *Ibid.*, p. 79.

³³⁵ Patrick, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

³³⁶ Polyviou, *Cyprus Conflict*, p. 79.

³³⁷ Wiener, 'Turkish Foreign Policy', p. 226.

³³⁸ Kurtuluş Kayalı, *Ordu ve Siyaset 27 Mayıs- 12 Mart*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), p. 182.

army would take over the administration directly if the problems were not solved. As a result of this threat, the Prime Minister Demirel resigned and a new military-backed government was established.³³⁹

The formation of the new government in Turkey was an important development and it was unclear how this situation would affect the course of the Cyprus Problem. Actually, even before the military intervention, the Turkish government made its position clear to Britain. The Turkish ambassador to London gave the enclosed statement on 5 January 1971 which was explaining Turkish demands for a solution of the inter-communal dispute in Cyprus. In general, the Turkish requirements were not different from the past Turkish statements. It was mainly advocating ‘granting local autonomy to the Turkish Cypriot community, in exchange for certain of their rights deriving from the 1960 Constitution.’³⁴⁰ This message seemed to be a signal that the Turkish side would not accept the Greek side “package deal”. The Turkish Cypriots also appeared to find the Greek proposal insufficient because when the Turkish Cypriots leadership had a meeting the British Prime Minister in Nicosia on 7 January 1971. Denktash criticised Makarios by saying that ‘he was not in need of settlement: he had little or nothing to lose by waiting.’³⁴¹ In this meeting the Turkish side also explained that the problem was that the Greek side wanted to give them a minority status by offering what amounted to minority rights to the Turkish Cypriots. According to Turkish opinion, this would enable the possibility of *Enosis* at some point in the future. The British Foreign Office report also indicated the expectations of Archbishop Makarios from the inter-communal talks:

*He sought to ensure Greek Cypriot authority is asserted throughout the island. The Turkish Cypriots, with only eighteen per cent of the population should be treated as an ethnic minority with special privileges but with no more than a proportionate voice in national affairs.*³⁴²

The Turkish side did not answer the Greek offer immediately and it took a bit long. The new military-backed government’s Prime Minister Nihat Erim had meetings with Rauf Denktash between 13 and 16 April 1971. In these meetings, it was said to

³³⁹ Yasin Coşkun, ‘The 1971 Turkish Military Intervention and Its Representation in English Sources’, M.A. Thesis, (University of Leicester: 2010), pp. 24-34.

³⁴⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1367, ‘Attitude of Turkey towards the Inter-Communal Dispute in Cyprus’, ‘Cyprus’, 5 January 1971.

³⁴¹ PRO: FCO 9/1371, ‘Policy of the UK towards Cyprus Part A’, ‘the Prime Minister’s meeting with Dr. Kutchuk (Küçük) in Nicosia’, 7 January 1971.

³⁴² PRO: FCO 9/1371, ‘British Policy towards Cyprus’, FCO’s Southern European Department Report, Annex B: Demands of the Parties, 2 March 1971.

Denktash that Turkey would continue to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community on the island. It mentioned that the Turkish government would work to solve the economic problem of the Turkish Community which was living in a very difficult economic condition since the 1963 events.³⁴³

After the meeting the Turkish Prime Minister, Denktash replied to the Greek proposal on 27 April 1971. According to this, it was accepted that the Turkish Vice-President would no longer have a power of veto, but the Turkish side demanded that 'a local government district which would be autonomous, with such autonomy so written into a constitution and the boundaries of the autonomous districts would be drawn primarily according to communal consideration.'³⁴⁴ By demanding local autonomy, the Turkish Cypriots thought that they could live in a more secure environment. During the fighting in the previous November many Turkish Cypriots lost their life. As a result of this, establishing their security appeared to be most important element for the Turkish Cypriot community. However, the Greek side did not agree with the Turkish Cypriot proposals. According to them, such a government structure would be 'expensive, inefficient and guaranteed to irritate rather than soothe inter-communal feelings'³⁴⁵ In addition, the Greek Cypriots leadership considered the Turkish Cypriot proposal as creating 'a state within a state and the prelude to future partition.'³⁴⁶ Having radically different thoughts about the solution to the problem was making it more difficult to reach an agreement between the both sides.

The new military-backed Turkish government's approach towards inter-communal talks is a significant point to analyse. Although Turkey had internal problems, the Cyprus dispute was still an important agenda in the Turkish government programme. It was said that 'Cyprus was a national cause over which no effort would be spared to attain success. The solution would also help to restore Turkish-Greek relations to their old friendliness.'³⁴⁷ It was a fact that the Cyprus problem was also affecting the relation between Greece and Turkey negatively. In a one statement, Turkish Prime minister, Nihat Erim said that after the solution of the Cyprus dispute, a new period

³⁴³ PRO: FCO 9/1372, 'Policy of the UK towards Cyprus Part B', press release, 17 April 1971.

³⁴⁴ Patrick, *Political Geography*, p.174.

³⁴⁵ Ibid. p.174

³⁴⁶ Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, p. 79.

³⁴⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1367, 'Turkish government Programme', unclassified telegram from the British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, no: 2552, 17 December 1971.

would start in the Greek-Turkish relations.³⁴⁸ Therefore, the aim of improving the friendship with its neighbouring country could be regarded as one of the motivating elements for the new Turkish government in finding a solution for the problem. Furthermore, there were other factors which would prompt Turkey to support reaching an agreement to the dispute. The report of the British Embassy in Ankara about the attitude of the Turkish government towards the inter-communal talks indicated that three elements would urge the Turkish government to take productive action in Cyprus issue which were 'Turkey's internal situation, their counting distrust of Makarios and their understandable impatience at the lack of progress in the inter-communal talks.'³⁴⁹ Indeed, the long negotiation process was economically affecting the Turkish Cypriots in a negative way. The gaps between the both communities were becoming wider and an urgent solution to the problem seemed to be more needed by the Turkish community on the island.

After the Turkish Cypriot answer, the Greek Cypriot negotiator Clerides made a further proposal on 27 June 1971 suggesting some further arrangements. For example, he thought Turkish Cypriots could form several areas of local government by grouping a number of Turkish villages together.³⁵⁰ However, the Greek side continued to be against the Turkish Cypriot request for separate central government authority for the both communities.³⁵¹ As a result of this, once again, the Greek offer did not help towards a compromise with Turkish Cypriots or to meet their expectations.³⁵² The Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash stated that there was no basis for negotiations. According to him, there were vital differences on basic issues which had made further talks pointless but he also said that 'the Turkish side would not take initiative in breaking the inter-communal talks off.'³⁵³ Ankara was not also happy with the course of the negotiations. The Turkish Foreign Minister Osman Olcay announced that 'progress in the Cyprus talks had left him with little hope that they would yield positive results.'³⁵⁴ As a natural consequence of the negative

³⁴⁸ *Milliyet*, 27 July 1971.

³⁴⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1367, 'Turkish government's attitude to Cyprus', confidential letter from the British Ambassador in Ankara, Sir Roderick Sarell to FCO's Southern European Department, 18 May 1971.

³⁵⁰ Polyviou, *Cyprus Conflict*, p. 84.

³⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 84.

³⁵² Nedjatigil, *The Cyprus Conflict*, p. 43.

³⁵³ *The Times*, 21 July 1971.

³⁵⁴ *The Times*, 23 July 1971.

atmosphere on the island, by August 1971, 'both communities publicly recognised that the talks were deadlocked.'³⁵⁵

This situation raised concerns about the future Cyprus problem. Britain was trying to follow the events closely. In a report which was given to Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas Home by the British High Commissioner to Cyprus, Robert Edmonds, on 31 August, 1971, the possible dangerous results of breaking off the inter-communal talks were pointed out. According to this report, if the negotiations between the two communities halted, a crisis could emerge on the island. In particular, the report expressed the view that the newly established Turkish government could use the military card again to increase its popularity among the public in Turkey. Also, as a significant analysis in this report it was said that 'if the Turkish General Staff learnt anything from the November crisis in 1967, it must be that they should invade Cyprus while the going is good, without waiting for the international diplomatic machine to get into gear.'³⁵⁶ By making this assessment, Britain predicted the way in which Turkey would use in any major crisis on the island. This analysis might not be correct for the 1971, but is better suited to the Turkish Military operation in Cyprus in 1974. The last negotiation attempt in 1971 was on 20 September. Both sides had a meeting but it ended with failure.³⁵⁷ Therefore, the talks stalled.³⁵⁸

It is important to analyse the points which led to a halt in the inter-communal talks without producing a successful outcome. Firstly, having different expectations through the negotiation process was an important factor in the failure of the talks. Although having the regional autonomy in their enclaves was a vital target for the Turkish Cypriots, preserving the total control of the government mechanism and a unitary state were two essential criteria for the Greek Cypriots. Another important reason behind the deadlock in the negotiations process was the lack of trust between the two communities. They were generally suspicious of each other's requests.

An event that occurred on the island is an example which highlights the situation between two sides. British troops from the Akrotiri base repaired a road which was between two Turkish Cypriots villages. The road was also being used by the British soldiers and the bad condition of the road was damaging their vehicles. This was

³⁵⁵ Patrick, *Political Geography*, p. 177.

³⁵⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1372, 'The British Stake in the Cyprus game: New rules, new policy?', report from the British High Commissioner to Cyprus, Robert Edmonds, to Secretary of State Sir Alec Douglas Home, 31 August 1971.

³⁵⁷ Patrick, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

³⁵⁸ Ertekün, *The Cyprus dispute*, p. 25.

main reason to repair the road. However, the Greek Cypriot authorities considered the action as a favour to the Turkish Cypriots and complained to London about the action in the SBA³⁵⁹ While such a small incident could be interpreted as a problem, it was difficult to reach agreement on the major issues. Later, Clerides would regret that no solution emerged in his dialogue with Denktash. In his statement on the inter-communal talks, Clerides said that ‘unfortunately, we did not grasp the opportunity which was here from 1968-970.’³⁶⁰

Apart from the deadlock in the talks, there was another important development on the island in terms of the Cyprus Problem. In September 1971, it was understood that the Greek General George Grivas, who had been living in exile in Greece after the crisis in November 1967,³⁶¹ had escaped from Athens and secretly entered Cyprus.³⁶² He set up and started to lead a so-called terrorist organisation EOKA-B to continue the struggle for unification with Greece.³⁶³ According to the British High Commissioner’s assessment Grivas entered Cyprus earlier and he was in hiding.³⁶⁴ Grivas’ return date to the island was on 31 August 1971.³⁶⁵ This was a serious situation that affected the both communities in Cyprus. Grivas’ presence on the island split the Greek Cypriot community.³⁶⁶ He claimed that Makarios was betraying the Greek national cause *Enosis*. He also stated that the Greek Cypriot leadership under Makarios was useless for the Greek community and the main reason for his return was to complete the age-long goal of the Greek community to unite Cyprus with Greece.³⁶⁷ According to British High Commissioner at Nicosia, although Makarios continued to be the most powerful leader among the Greek Cypriots, the reappearance of Grivas ‘has shaken the allegiance of many Greek Cypriots to the Archbishop.’³⁶⁸ The High Commissioner also emphasized the fact that Grivas had the possibility of getting 40 per cent of the vote in a Presidential

³⁵⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1373, ‘Policy of the UK towards Cyprus Part B’, restricted telegram from FCO to the British high Commission in Nicosia, no: 688, 26 October 1971.

³⁶⁰ Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, Vol. 2, (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1992), p. 382.

³⁶¹ Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, p. 60.

³⁶² Clerides, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 15.

³⁶³ Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 108., Stearns, *Entangled Allies*, p. 115.

³⁶⁴ PRO: FCO 9/ 1494, ‘Annual Review of Cyprus for 1971’, report from ‘British High Commission at Nicosia to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs’, 1 January 1971.

³⁶⁵ Constandinos, *America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974*, p. 83.

³⁶⁶ PRO: FCO 9/ 1494, op. cit.

³⁶⁷ Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, pp. 60-61.

³⁶⁸ PRO: FCO 9/1495, ‘General Grivas and the Cyprus Problem’, Makarios versus Grivas, report from British High Commissioner at Nicosia to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 6 December 1971.

election 'if he were politically skilful enough to dodge the question how *Enosis* could be achieved without leading to partition.'³⁶⁹ The effect of Grivas' presence among the Cyprus National Guards, 'whose commander and most of its officers were mainland Greeks who took their orders from Athens and had no love for the Cyprus government',³⁷⁰ was keeping alive the danger of resorting to violence on the island and this situation was causing disturbance in Cyprus. According to supporters of the Grivas, he was planning a coup to take over the control in Cyprus.³⁷¹ Moreover, illegal underground groups were being formed in Cyprus and they were taking an oath of loyalty to Grivas.³⁷²

Greek Cypriot reservist officers, who served formerly in the National Guard, had also taken sides with Grivas and they sent message to Makarios that denounced his policy of reconciliation with the Turkish Cypriots in a unitary political solution by insisting on *Enosis*.³⁷³ Finally, there was the demand of 'new noble national struggle' to unite Cyprus for Greece by a group of sixty-two Greek Cypriots calling itself the 'Coordination Committee for the *Enosis* Struggle'³⁷⁴ which increased the concern over the future of the island. In particular, the concern of the Turkish community was at a high level. In his meeting with Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Osman Olcay, expressed the view that 'the situation was not at all encouraging.'³⁷⁵ According to the British Foreign Secretary, 'Turkey's main concern was that the Turkish community on the island should not lose hope.'³⁷⁶ For this purpose, Turkey was closely following the developments. From this point of view, it is important to look at the Turkish opinion about the struggle between Makarios and Grivas. It can be said that the Turks accepted that Makarios had a reasonable approach towards the Cyprus dispute compared to Grivas because it appeared that while 'Makarios insisted on caution and a low-gear approach, Grivas wanted an immediate military campaign.'³⁷⁷ However, the Turkish side also believed that the both Greek leaders had accepted

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Ibid.

³⁷¹ *The Times*, 11 September 1971.

³⁷² Ibid., 26 October 1971.

³⁷³ Ibid., 30 October 1971.

³⁷⁴ *The Times*, 22 November 1971.

³⁷⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1367, 'Record of conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Turkish Foreign Minister in the Waldorf Towers Hotel in New York', 28 September 1971.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, p. 61.

Enosis as their common goal and their only difference was in the manner of achieving it.³⁷⁸

The return of Grivas to the island was not also welcomed by Britain. The struggle between two communities could damage to Britain's own interest on the island. In the British cabinet, this issue was discussed and it was stated that: 'A deterioration in the situation might have serious implications for our installations there, both inside and outside the Sovereign Base Areas, which were of very considerable importance to us.'³⁷⁹ Apart from this concern, when making the assessment of the year of 1971 for Cyprus, Britain examined the development on the island from two different perspectives. Firstly, from the standpoints of Anglo-Cypriot relations, the British High Commissioner in Nicosia stated that 1971 was a good year. Economic relations increased and Britain managed to remain the biggest trading partner of Cyprus. Secondly, from the angle of the Cyprus dispute, the High Commissioner said that it 'was an unhappy year.'³⁸⁰ It was true that the ending of inter-communal talks without making any remarkable contribution to the Cyprus dispute and the return of the Greek General Grivas to the island increased British concern. It was accepted that the Cyprus problem was at a critical juncture and also stated: 'there is a real risk that the period of negative stability, which has lasted since 1968, maybe coming to an end.'³⁸¹ As mentioned before, a possible Turkish military operation on the island was a significant factor behind the British concern. According to British assessment, the new Turkish government which had come to power in Ankara was impatient with the stalemate in the talks³⁸² and this could lead Turkey to use the military option which would be an unwanted development for Britain. In this context, the British government supported the continuation of the peace negotiations between the Greeks and Turks. Otherwise, a Turkish military operation in Cyprus could tense the relation between Ankara and London.

³⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 61.

³⁷⁹ PRO: CAB 128/49, 'Post War Conclusion', CM (71), 52nd conclusion, 28 October 1971, p.3.

³⁸⁰ PRO: FCO 9/ 1494, Cyprus: Annual Review for 1971, summary, registry no: 16, 10 January 1971.

³⁸¹ PRO: FCO 9/1373, 'the British Stake in Cyprus', secret letter from FCO to the British High Commission in Nicosia, 7 October 1971.

³⁸² Ibid.

Reactivation of the talks 1972-1974

When the two communities on Cyprus failed to reach a settlement, Ankara and Athens tended to take initiative to resume the talks. The Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers met in New York in October 1971 and they agreed to broaden participation in the inter-communal talks by including the Greek ambassador in Nicosia and the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires.³⁸³ Makarios was against this idea³⁸⁴ because he did not want Greece and Turkey to get directly involved in the Cyprus dispute. The attempt of the two Foreign Ministers was a prelude to searching for a way of reactivating the negotiation process. The UN was also worrying about the situation on the island. As a result of this, the UN Secretary-General U Thant, who was in the last month of his tenure of office, circulated an aide-memoire on 18 October 1971.³⁸⁵ According to this, he suggested that his Special Representative, Osorio y Tafall, would take part in the inter-communal talks and the Greek and Turkish governments would each also make available a constitutional expert who would attend the talks in an advisory capacity.³⁸⁶ U Thant's attempt was an encouraging development.

Apart from the UN, the suspension of the talks also caused worry for NATO because any conflict over Cyprus could worsen relations between Turkey and Greece and this, naturally, would weaken the southern flank of NATO and could help the USSR to increase its influence in the Mediterranean region. From this point of view, it is essential to look at the Soviet position when the talks were suspended. According to the British, the Russians always supported maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.³⁸⁷ Therefore, they were in favour of Makarios against any possible attempt either for *Enosis* or double *Enosis*³⁸⁸ which, they believed, would bring the island under the control of NATO. The Soviet Union also was not happy with the presence of the British military bases on the island and, according the Britain, removing the British bases was one of the basic objectives of the Soviet

³⁸³ PRO: FCO 9/1666, 'Inter-communal Talks in Cyprus Part B', 'Cyprus: the Enlarged Inter-communal talks', registry No: 16, Annex B: the enlarged Inter-Communal talks chronology, 29 October 1973.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ Nedjatigil, *The Cyprus Conflict*, p. 43.

³⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 43. Polyviou, *Cyprus in a Search of A Constitution*, pp. 181-185., PRO: FCO 9/1666, op. cit.

³⁸⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1366, 'Relations between Cyprus and the Soviet Union', Soviet Attitude to Cyprus, 15 November 1971.

³⁸⁸ PRO: FCO 9/1366, Op. Cit.

policy on Cyprus.³⁸⁹ Apart from this, ‘preventing the subordination of Cyprus to NATO powers and avoiding antagonising the Turkish government’³⁹⁰ were other important elements in the Soviet policy on Cyprus. As the British report stated, having a common frontier with the Soviet Union and NATO facilities on its territory and, also, controlling of the seaway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean³⁹¹ made Turkey strategically important in the eyes of the Soviet Union.³⁹² As a result of this, while formulating policy over Cyprus the Soviet Union was trying to act cautiously to prevent any resentment from Turkey. However, Makarios’ visit to Moscow in June 1971 was not welcomed by Turkey and the Soviet government needed to make a statement which stressed the rights of the Turkish community on the island.³⁹³ In general, the Soviet Union consented to the idea of a non-aligned Cyprus and avoided risk in its policy on Cyprus. In addition, they gave their support to the inter-communal talks.

Meantime, while the efforts were being made to resume talks, the British Embassy in Ankara voiced another argument in its report about the future of the Cyprus Problem. According to this argument, Turkey would be silent about any attempts by Greece to ‘bring Makarios to heel’, because both mainland powers seemed to believe that Makarios was an obstacle for the reaching settlement since he was not listening to suggestions and acting freely on his own will. The report presented the idea that Ankara and Athens had an ‘agreement on terms for a final settlement, at any rate one involving either double or “compensated” *Enosis*’ and this appeared to go into action after handling the “Makarios issue”.³⁹⁴ However, it was difficult to discard Makarios, and in particular, the discussion over the restarting the inter-communal talks between the two communities. Such an action would most likely result a harsh reaction from the UN. Ankara was also trying to act cautiously to ‘avoid being put in the position of appearing to be responsible for torpedoing the talks.’³⁹⁵ On the other hand, Britain observed that the relations between Makarios and the Greek government continued deteriorating. In particular, ‘the Archbishop’s tendency to rely on Communist

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Ibid.

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Ibid.

³⁹⁴ PRO: FCO 9/1501, ‘Political Relation between Cyprus and Turkey’, ‘Cyprus: Turkish attitude’ letter from the British Embassy in Ankara to FCO’s Southern European Department, 7 March 1972.

³⁹⁵ Ibid.

support both internally and internationally³⁹⁶ was playing an important role in this situation. The Cypriot Communist party, AKEL, gave their support to Makarios. On the one of their conferences, it was stated that ‘the unity of the people could only be maintained under the leadership of the Archbishop.’³⁹⁷ Archbishop Makarios was also protecting the Communist Party.³⁹⁸ Athens was not happy with this situation on the island. The Greek Prime Minister, Papadopoulos, said that “the day after we are rid of him, we will see that Cyprus joins NATO”.³⁹⁹ In addition, the junta in Greece did not want the Cyprus Problem to continue to adversely affect its relations with Ankara and, for this reason; they wanted to settle the Cyprus dispute as soon as possible.⁴⁰⁰ Even so, there was still no solution through negotiations. Therefore, the Greek junta blamed Makarios for not making concessions to the Turkish Cypriots in inter-communal talks.⁴⁰¹

Furthermore, Athens’ reaction to the importation a substantial quantity of Czechoslovak arms to the island, one more time after 1967, in January 1972 by Makarios highlighted tense relations between the both sides. The Greek government issued a note to the Archbishop which was ‘peremptorily demanding that he should put the arms into the United Nations custody’.⁴⁰² Ankara was also felt uneasy with the arms importation. The Prime Minister Erim told the UN Secretary-General on 20 March that the enlarged inter-communal talks could not begin until the full UN control over the arms was provided.⁴⁰³ At the end the crisis was solved. Britain was also ‘played a discreet but an active part in defusing the Czech arms affair.’⁴⁰⁴

All of these, in fact, were making an ironic situation in the Cyprus problem. Although both Greece and Turkey were not in favour of the Archbishop and, as mentioned in the British report, the both powers making the plans in behind closed

³⁹⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1503, ‘the Policy of United Kingdom towards Cyprus’, ‘the present situation in Cyprus’ notes for supplementary, background notes, , 25 February 1972.

³⁹⁷ PRO: FCO 95/227, ‘Cyprus: Communist activities’, ‘Panoyprian conference of AKEL’, 28 January 1968.

³⁹⁸ PRO: FCO 9/784, ‘Cyprus Communist Party (AKEL)’, ‘Cyprus: the Communist threat’, report from ‘British High Commissioner in Cyprus to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs’, 3 November 1969.

³⁹⁹ *The Observer*, 29 October 1972.

⁴⁰⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1503, op. Cit.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Ibid.

⁴⁰³ PRO: FCO 9/1503, ‘call on the Minister of State by HM High Commissioner in Nicosia’, 27 March 1972.

⁴⁰⁴ PRO: FCO 9/1503, background notes for the British Secretary of State before meeting with the Greek Cypriots Foreign Minister, 11 September 1972.

doors for the solution of the problem, Turkey seemed to have some concerns. British Embassy in Ankara reported that Turkey was 'distrustful of the Greeks and queried the sincerity of their intention.'⁴⁰⁵ The reason for this appeared to be Grivas who could take over the administration on the island after any possible elimination scenery of the Archbishop. This should be regarded as a significant factor in Ankara's cautious steps while talking the Cyprus issue with Greece. The British report was also supporting the Turkish position. According to this, Grivas' continuing presence on the island was considered as a danger to stability.⁴⁰⁶

Although the UN Secretary-General's aide-memoire increased the hopes that the talks would resume shortly, bringing both sides back to the negotiating table would actually take nearly nine months. The reason for this delay was the parties' expectations and demands from the inter-communal talks. In particular, the Greeks believed that the Turks had a hardening attitude towards the reactivation of the talks. When Ankara presented some demands for the resumption of the talk. It was generally regarded that Turkey had some 'pre-conditions' and this would adversely affect the process. In fact, the presenting of the 'pre-conditions' from Turkey to restart the inter-communal talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots seemed to surprise Britain and it was regarded as an unwelcome development. When the British ambassador to Ankara met the officials from the Turkish MFA, he said that it was difficult to understand that why the Turkish government adopted a tougher line by presenting some conditions over resuming inter-communal talks.⁴⁰⁷

Actually, Ankara also was not happy with the situation which they had got into. It was explained to the ambassador that it was unfortunate that the six points had been presented world as 'preconditions'.⁴⁰⁸ It was also added that 'this misunderstanding may have come about through misinterpretation of the Turkish government's instruction by the Turkish Mission in New York'. Later, when mentioning these six points, the Turkish Foreign Minister Bayülken, who was the former Turkish

⁴⁰⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1501, letter from British Embassy in Ankara to FCO's Southern European Department, 'Cyprus: Turkish attitude', 21 March 1972.

⁴⁰⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1503, op. cit.

⁴⁰⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1501, 'Cyprus: Turkish attitude', letter from the British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, 16 May 1972.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid.

ambassador to London, preferred to use the word of ‘suggestions’ rather than calling them ‘preconditions’.⁴⁰⁹

After solving this issue, the new UN Secretary-General Dr. Kurt Waldheim submit an aide-memoire on 18 May 1972 which was called upon all parties to resume inter-communal talks without delay and to continue the search for a solution for the long-term problem of Cyprus.⁴¹⁰ The parties showed positive reaction towards this call and, with the attendance of the UN Secretary-General the new Cyprus talks were launched on the island on 8 June 1972.⁴¹¹ Although the enlarged inter-communal talks officially started on 8 June, the first working session of the talks was going to begin on 3 July under the chairmanship of Osorio y Tafall, UN Special representative in Cyprus.⁴¹² According to the British report, the Turkish Cypriot representative, Denktash, would open with a hard line in the talks but it was also stated that his speech at the inaugural session on 8 June: ‘to the need for working arrangement if agreement cannot be reached on principles’, seemed to remain as an encoring sign.⁴¹³ The Greek Cypriot side appeared not to fully agree on their line in the talks but the Greek Cypriot representative, Clerides, said that he thought there could be a chance of progress towards a *modus vivendi*.⁴¹⁴ This first working meeting mainly focused on procedural matters. It was accepted that two meetings would be held in a week in future.⁴¹⁵

The first round of the talks was held on 3-21 July 1972. The Greek and Turkish conductor, Clerides and Denktash, discussed about their points of agreement and disagreement.⁴¹⁶ On 6 October, the Turkish constitutional expert, Orhan Aldıkaçtı, presented a paper in which he argued that the main reason of the Cyprus problem was mutual suspicion. Therefore, it was necessary to reinforce of the existing treaty of guarantees of the 1960 Constitution through a new announcement by the parties

⁴⁰⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1501, ‘Cyprus: Turkish government Programme, confidential telegram from the British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, no: 1125, 1 June 1972.

⁴¹⁰ Polyviou, *Cyprus in a Search of a Constitution*, p. 183.

⁴¹¹ *The Times*, 9 June 1972.

⁴¹² PRO: FCO 9/1492, ‘the Inter-communal talks in Cyprus Part A’, ‘Cyprus on the eve of the Inter-communal talks’, confidential telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 507, 30 June 1972.

⁴¹³ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1492, unclassified telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 517, 4 July 1972.

⁴¹⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1666, ‘the enlarged Inter-communal talks’, registry no: 16, ‘Annex B: the enlarged Inter-Communal talks chronology’, 29 October 1973.

concerned abandoning *Enosis* and *partition*.⁴¹⁷ Then the Greek expert, Decleris, submitted a paper which criticised the 1960 constitution as unworkable for giving too many powers to the Turkish Cypriots.⁴¹⁸ This assessment of the Greek expert disappointed the Turkish side. Dr. Necdet ünöl, the President of Turkish Cypriots Administration Legislative Assembly, told the British High Commissioner on the island that the paper was ‘worse than Makarios’ thirteen points’.⁴¹⁹ After that, two constitutional experts worked to prepare a joint paper but, as Denktash told the American ambassador to Cyprus, the experts failed to agree on their joint paper on the Executive. The two parties had different approaches. The Turkish Cypriots demanded that four independent officers of the Republic (the Attorney General, the Auditor General, the Director of Issuing Bank, and the Account General) should all have Turkish Cypriot deputies.⁴²⁰ However, only a deputy Attorney General was accepted and the other three posts remained unresolved.⁴²¹

While inter-communal talks were proceeding, the meeting of the new British High Commissioner with Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia revealed that how both communities had different opinions about the efficiency of the negotiations. First, the Commissioner met the Greek Cypriots leaderships and their reaction towards the ongoing enlarged talks was positive. Then, he had meeting Denktash and other Turkish Cypriots leading figures on the island and the Commissioner stated that all of the meeting with the Turkish side “drenched me with cold water!”⁴²² He seemed to have a right to make this comment because, in contrast to the Greek Cypriot thought about the talks, the Turkish side was very pessimistic. Denktash said that ‘none of the really crucial questions that were being considered in the inter-communal talks were tackled seriously, let alone solved’.⁴²³ There were some key points which need to be examined to understand why the two communities had the different views. Firstly, after 1963 constitutional crisis the Greek Cypriots started to

⁴¹⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1493, ‘the Inter-communal talks in Cyprus Part B’, confidential telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 782, 20 October 1972.

⁴¹⁸ PRO: FCO 9/1493, ‘Cyprus: Inter-communal talks’, confidential letter from British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, 2 November 1972.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

⁴²⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1493, ‘Inter-communal talks’, confidential letter from British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, 4 December 1972.

⁴²¹ Ibid.

⁴²² PRO: FCO 9/1500, ‘Internal situation of Cyprus’, confidential letter from British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, 11 December 1972.

⁴²³ Ibid.

control the government alone which was recognised by rest of the world. Therefore, the Turkish Cypriots believed that the Greek side was not in a hurry for the solution because they had a “state” to govern and, as mentioned before, they were economically in a very good position when compared with Turkish society. This situation on the island can determine the reason why the Turks had concerns about the course of ongoing talks. The long negotiation process would make the Turkish position more severe with every passing day while it would not sharply affect the Greek Cypriot condition on the island. The British High Commissioner’s opinion differed from the both communities’ approach towards the talks. According to him, ‘whilst Greek optimism was undoubtedly overplayed, Turkish pessimism was equally exaggerated.’ He also said that ‘the truth probably lies somewhere between the two extremes.’⁴²⁴

While the negotiations were continuing, the struggle between Grivas and Makarios was keeping tension in Cyprus at a high level. It was also asserted that the Greek Cypriot interlocutor Clerides would be dismissed by Makarios from his position. Such a movement could cause to breakdown of the talks. However, Clerides made an explanation and said that he would continue his duty. Clerides also criticised the effort of General Grivas’s groups that were trying to resort violence on the island. He underlined that the use of violence would destroy the negotiating position of the Greek Cypriot side.⁴²⁵

From the Turkish Cypriot’ point of view, they were worried that although an agreement reached through the negotiations, the danger of *Enosis* could continue to threaten them. Particularly, Grivas and his supporters’ activities were increasing their concern. As a result of this, the Turkish side wanted guarantees for their security. The Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, stated that “if Cyprus is to remain an independent State, the need for internal and external guarantees to protect Cyprus against those who do not want independence will be felt more strongly”.⁴²⁶

It was true that Ankara was also giving importance to *Enosis* issue. In the Turkish Senate of Republic discussion, the Republican People’s Part’s deputy Hıfzı Ofuz

⁴²⁴ Ibid.

⁴²⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1665, ‘the Inter-communal talks in Cyprus Part A’, Clerides’ statement to the press, 24 April 1973.

⁴²⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1684, ‘the UK policy towards Cyprus, treaties of guarantee and alliance’, ‘Cyprus: Britain’s future as a guarantor power’, report from ‘the acting British High Commissioner at Nicosia to the Head of Southern European Department, Annex E, 8 February 1973.

Bekata showed Denktash speech on 26 January 1973, on which he asserted that the all administrative staffs in the Greek Cypriot side were trying to spread the *Enosis* idea among the public and to make it stronger. This, for him, was a significant evidence of the threat of *Enosis*.⁴²⁷ Another problem for the Turkish Community was the struggle among the supporters of Makarios and Grivas. The Turkish side was concerned that this could also give harm to Turkish society on the island. In his speech at the Turkish Senate of Republic, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Bayülken, underlined that ‘if Greek factional rivalry in Cyprus became a threat to the security or the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community, Turkey were ready and determined to take action to eliminate the threat.’⁴²⁸

Meanwhile, the talks were proceeding slowly and it seemed that reaching an agreement would be difficult. The both sides was criticising each other’s attitude during the talks. When listening to both sides’ arguments, sometimes it is hard to understand which parties were right. This difficulty can also be seen in the British Foreign Office reports. On 10 September, when the both communities were negotiating over the local government issue, the Greek interlocutor Clerides criticised the Turkish Cypriot attitude and complained about it, when he met the British High Commissioner on the island. Clerides told him that the Turkish side raised agricultural elements as new in issue in the talks.⁴²⁹ After speaking to Clerides, the High Commissioner thought that there could be a change in the Ankara’s policy over the talks and asked about the British Embassy in Turkey if they had noticed any change in Turkish policy from pushing on with the talks to playing them slowly. Especially, concerning Denktash’s new demands about agriculture.⁴³⁰ The British ambassador to Turkey replied that they had not detected any change in the Turkish policy. He also spoke to Turkish Foreign Ministry’s officials and he was told that the agricultural problem was about water. The Turks were worrying about discrimination against their villages in any Central government plans.⁴³¹ The ambassador was told that this was not a new issue. On 3 August, Denktash raised this subject in the

⁴²⁷ *Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Degisi* (Official Records of the Turkish Senate of the Republic Records), session: 12, vol. 9, 6 Feb 1973, p. 182.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 220., PRO: FCO 9/1679, ‘Political Relation between Cyprus and Turkey’, ‘Cyprus: Turkish attitude’ confidential letter from British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, 13 February 1973.

⁴²⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1665, ‘Inter-communal talks’, letter from British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, 12 September 1973.

⁴³⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1665, ‘Cyprus: Inter-communal talks’, letter from British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, 24 September 1973.

⁴³¹ *Ibid*

context of negotiations over local autonomy at the meeting of inter-communal talks.⁴³² Denktash also announced that the reason behind the Greek reaction was that ‘they were not ready for final settlement because their bargaining position was weakened by the continuation of intra-communal disorders promoted by Grivas’.⁴³³ Therefore, by using Turkish demands on the agriculture issue, they were trying to imply that the Turkish side were responsible for the impasse in the talks.⁴³⁴ After taking the answer from Ankara, the British High Commission in Nicosia replied that the Turkish side appeared to have a right about the water issue because it was an important problem in Cyprus. However, it was added that the Turkish timing in bringing this issue in the talk was unfortunate and, from here, ‘certainly looked disingenuous’.⁴³⁵ It was also said that ‘Clerides’ version to the High Commissioner flatly contradicts that the agriculture problem was raised as early as 3 August’.⁴³⁶ As can be seen, the statements by the parties involved sometimes could be different from each other which make any judgement difficult.

The eighth rounds of talks started in August 1973.⁴³⁷ More than one year had passed by since the reactivation of the talks, but the communities could not manage to reach a settlement. This situation justified the UN Secretary-General Waldheim’s statement at the beginning of this process when he said that ‘Cyprus was not a problem that could be solved within one week or even a few months.’⁴³⁸

When making an assessment of the year of 1973, the British High Commissioner, Stephen Olver, stated that it was a disappointing year for the talks. He also said that ‘some details had been solved, but the central issue, on which all others depend, was virtually untouched.’⁴³⁹ According to him, it seemed that the negotiations were getting into an impasse once more because there was no constructive thinking about the alternatives.⁴⁴⁰ Although the High Commissioner did not have a positive opinion

⁴³² Ibid.

⁴³³ PRO: FCO 9/1665, ‘Interview with Turkish Cypriot leader’, 31 July 1973.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

⁴³⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1665, Cyprus: Inter-communal talks, report from British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, 5 October 1973.

⁴³⁶ Ibid.

⁴³⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1666, ‘the Enlarged Inter-communal talks’, registry no: 16, ‘Annex B: the enlarged Inter-Communal talks chronology’, 29 October 1973.

⁴³⁸ *The Times*, 10 June 1972.

⁴³⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1883, ‘Cyprus: Annual Review: 1973’, report from ‘the British High Commissioner in Cyprus to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs’, 3 January 1974.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid.

about the future of the talks, it was still hoped that 1974 would be the year in which the Cyprus problem would be solved.

Conclusion

The British response to the establishment of the new Turkish administration on the island showed that there were major differences in the respective approaches towards the Cyprus issue by 1968. Although the Turks tried to explain that their aim at forming a separate administration of the island was to protect the Turkish Cypriots on the island, Britain regarded the Turkish move as an unfortunate development.⁴⁴¹ This British attitude had a negative effect on Anglo-Turkish relations. Ankara started to understand more clearly that British support for Turkish arguments on the Cyprus issue was not forthcoming. Actually, it was very problematic for Britain to formally recognise the new Turkish administration on the island because this would adversely impact upon its relations with Greece and the Greek Cypriot government, which showed a strong aversion to the new Turkish administration. Furthermore, UN criticism of the Turkish action showed that recognising the new Turkish administration would put Britain in a difficult position in the international arena.

Another issue by 1968 was that the British Government seemed to consider the hardening Turkish position as an obstacle to the solution of the Cyprus dispute. Therefore, the British policy makers tried to 'encourage the Turkish government to allow the Turkish Cypriots to make a positive response to any conciliatory moves made by the Greek Cypriots.'⁴⁴² When inter-communal talks were started between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots encouraged by intensive efforts by the United Nations, British officials announced their support for the continuation of the negotiation process between the two sides. However, the representatives of the two communities found it difficult to compromise with each other. Britain avoided publicly criticising any attitude by the involved parties in the talks and applied a policy of 'standing back' in order not to worsen its relations with Athens and Turkey. On the other hand, the Foreign office documents showed that in the event of a declaration of a separate state on the island by the Turkish Cypriots, the Foreign

⁴⁴¹ PRO: FCO 51/47, Foreign And Commonwealth Affairs Research Department Memorandum, 4 December 1968.

⁴⁴² PRO: FCO 9/73, 'Cyprus', 'British policy', report of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, 20 March 1968.

Office was ready 'to protest in the strongest terms to the Turkish government and urge them to revoke their decision.'⁴⁴³ Even though, such a statement would have a negative effect on the Anglo-Turkish relations.

In the meantime, the suspension of the inter-communal talks in 1971, due to the difference of opinions of the Greek and Turkish sides and establishment of the terrorist organisation EOKA-B worsened the general situation on the island. Ankara showed a strong reaction to the activities of Greek General Grivas' on the island. In this sense, the British and Turkish policy was in parallel because Grivas' return to the island was not also welcomed by Britain either.

In general, the developments after the reactivation of the talks in 1972 did not make a positive contribution to the situation on the island. The British High Commissioner did not have a positive opinion about the future of the talks in 1974. From the angle of Anglo-Turkish relations, the developments did not have a great impact on bilateral relations, but their different approaches towards the events of 1974 increased tensions between the British and Turkish governments and adversely affected bilateral relation between Britain and Turkey, which is the subject of the following chapter.

⁴⁴³ PRO: FCO 9/1157, 'Implications of possible double *Enosis* in Cyprus involving union of part of Cyprus with Greece and part with Turkey', 'declaration of a separate Turkish Cypriot state', letter from FCO's Southern European Department, 10 September 1970.

4) A New Period of the Cyprus Problem: Anglo-Turkish Relations in the Critical Phase

Introduction

The first part of the chapter four analyses the developments on the island prior to the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974. In this context, the last attempts of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiators to settle the problem before the Greek military coup on the island on 15 July 1974 is evaluated. Britain's response to the Greek demand to use the British influence to force Ankara to make some concessions in the talks with the Greeks is investigated in this part of the thesis. British and Turkish reactions towards the Greek military coup in Cyprus are looked at in the following section. It was an important event on the island. Turkish official statements at this time were giving the signal that Ankara was ready to launch a military attack on Cyprus to protect the Turkish Cypriots on the island. The Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, visited London with his delegation to discuss the situation on the island with the British government. This was an important occasion in terms of seeing the effect of the British and Turkish approach to the Cyprus question on their mutual relations. Therefore, the discussion in this meeting is examined.

The third section evaluates the developments after the start of the first military operation in Cyprus on 20 July. There were reactions from around the world to Ankara's decision to send the Turkish soldiers to the island. From this point of view, the British government approach to the Turkish military operation is presented. In particular, British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan's attitude towards Turkey's action is one of the important subjects of this part. In addition, his efforts with the US Foreign Secretary Henry Kissinger to ensure a ceasefire between the Greeks and Turks is explored.

The last section looks at the discussions between the British, Greek and Turkish delegations at the first Geneva conference which sought to find a solution to the problem. There were accusations from the Greek side that the Turkish army on the island was breaching the ceasefire agreements. Therefore, Callaghan's position on these allegations is examined in the light of the British archival documents. Also, his

approach to the general Turkish arguments at conference is presented which gives an idea about the impact of the Turkish military operation on Anglo-Turkish relations.

The Cyprus Problem by 1974

The year of 1974 started with an important development on the island which was the death of the Greek General George Grivas after a heart attack on 27 January. He had returned to the island in 1971, established so called EOKA-B and become a significant figure among the Greek Cypriot Community. Grivas' power struggle with Makarios had caused an increase in tension on the island from time to time. The course of EOKA-B after the death of Grivas was also an important issue on the island. It was announced by the leadership of the organisation that they would continue the struggle which Grivas had begun in 1955.⁴⁴⁴ Similarly, at the funeral of Grivas, Nicos Sampson, a former EOKA member sentenced to death by the British in 1957 for killing British soldiers,⁴⁴⁵ declared that 'the ex-fighters had renewed their oath to continue the struggle for *Enosis* at all cost.'⁴⁴⁶ These statements seemed to be giving a signal that EOKA-B would try to increase its position in Cyprus. The report of Olver, the British High Commissioner on the island, also supported this idea. According to him, the death of Grivas should not be interpreted as the end of the *Enosis* because it had existed before Grivas and would continue without him.⁴⁴⁷ Furthermore, after Grivas, the influence of those Greek officers in EOKA-B, who had strong connections with the Greek junta in Athens, would increase dramatically.⁴⁴⁸ In particular, after the replacement of the Greek military regime by a counter-coup by Dimitrios Ioannidis on 25 November 1973, who was the Chief of the Greek Military Police and had been a leading figure in the Greek Junta,⁴⁴⁹ Athens would increase its activity in Cyprus. This in turn would worsen the relationship between Athens and the Archbishop. After the counter-coup, General Phaedon Gizikis became the new President of Greece but real power belonged to Ioannidis. In

⁴⁴⁴ PRO: FCO 9/1886, 'Internal situation of Cyprus', EOKA-B after Grivas, letter from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO's Southern European Department, 31 January 1974.

⁴⁴⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1890, 'Military Coup in Cyprus (Monday 15 July) part A', telegram from the British High Commission in Cyprus, no: 191 of 15 July 1974, 19 July 1974.

⁴⁴⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1886, the death and funeral of General Grivas, letter from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO's Southern European Department, 4 February 1974.

⁴⁴⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1886, Lt. General George Grivas-Dighenis 1898-1974, letter from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia to James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, p. 20.

⁴⁴⁸ Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, p. 64., Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 115.

⁴⁴⁹ Constandinos, *America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974*, pp. 96-101.

fact, the government change in Greece raised some concerns about the new government policy over Cyprus. Therefore, A. Metaxas, the Head of Cyprus Department of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, talked to the British Embassy in Athens and he confirmed that there would be no change in the new Greek government's position over the Cyprus dispute and it would be exactly the same as that of its predecessors.⁴⁵⁰ From Makarios' angle, a British report suggested that his position was strengthened by Grivas' death.⁴⁵¹ The Archbishop made a short declaration upon Grivas' death and praised his 'enormous contribution to the liberation of the Greek Cypriot people'.⁴⁵² Also, Makarios announced the release of many prisoners who had been Grivas supporters.⁴⁵³

In the meantime, the talks were still being held in 1974 between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives but the optimism found in the beginning of the talks was disappearing with each passing day. Actually, it should be pointed out that the both sides seemed to manage to find a way to compromise with each other in issues other than that of the local government, which appeared to continue to be important matter that had the potential to block the whole negotiation process. Denktash and Clerides were submitting their papers on this issue. In the beginning of 1974, they again presented papers about shape of the local government. It was obvious that each side was approaching the issue from their own perspective. The Turks again demanded more autonomy while the Greek tried to protect the authority of the central government. The assessment of the British High Commissioner on the latest Greek and Turkish offer on the local government matters was that 'the papers were in most respects diametrically opposed'.⁴⁵⁴ As can be understood from the Commissioner's comment, the negotiation process was not going well. In fact, the point was that the talks between the two communities started in 1968 and six years had already passed, but both sides still could give papers which were "diametrically"

⁴⁵⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1886, letter from the British Embassy in Athens to FCO's Southern European Department, 16 January 1974.

⁴⁵¹ PRO: FCO 9/1886, Death of Grivas, confidential telegram the British High Commissioner in Nicosia 28 January 1974.

⁴⁵² PRO: FCO 9/1886, EOKA-B after Grivas, letter from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO's Southern European Department, 31 January 1974.

⁴⁵³ PRO: FCO 9/1886, the death and funeral of General Grivas, letter from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO's Southern European Department, 4 February 1974.

⁴⁵⁴ PRO: FCO 9/1884, 'Discussions on Cyprus' inter-communal problems part A', Inter-communal talks: the papers by Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash on local government, memorandum from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Mr. Olver to Sir Alan Goodison, 14 January 1974.

opposed. This can be interpreted a lack of understanding and tolerance between the sides in the negotiation process.

Despite inter-communal negotiations, the Cyprus problem continued to have an uncertain future. As a result of this, other countries showed some interest in the problem and thought that they could help for the solution in the dispute. For instance, the new Libyan ambassador on the island visited the British High Commissioner and told him that Libyan leader, Muammar Qadhafi was unhappy with the situation on the island and wanted to take a personal initiative.⁴⁵⁵ However, there were already many attempts, as the High Commissioner also stated, most importantly from the UN. Therefore, any involvement from other countries seemed to have had only a symbolic effect.

From the Greek perspective, the junta in Athens seemed to be in favour of the idea of putting some pressure to the Turkish side to make some concessions on their local government position. When John Denson, the official in the British Embassy in Athens, met Metaxas, the Head of Cyprus Department of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denson was told that it would be good if the British government “showed more interest” in the talks.⁴⁵⁶ Denson appeared not to be happy with the Greek request and replied that Britain already gave the talks support on all suitable occasions.⁴⁵⁷ In his later comment on the Metaxas’ demand, the ambassador pointed out that if the Greeks wanted Britain to urge the Turkish Cypriots directly, or through the Turkish government, to make concessions, this would not be easy to implement because, he added, on such an occasion, ‘the Turks would think that we had been put up to it by the Greeks.’⁴⁵⁸

In addition to the Metaxas’ request, N. Diamantopoulos, Minister-Counsellor at the Greek Embassy in London, talked about the same issue when he met Sir Alan Goodison, Head of the FCO’s South East European Department (SEED), on 16 January 1974.⁴⁵⁹ Diamantopoulos complained about the Turkish position in the talks

⁴⁵⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1884, letter from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO’s Southern European Department, 17 January 1974.

⁴⁵⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1884, letter from the British Embassy in Athens to FCO’s Southern European Department, 16 January 1974.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁹ Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon (Eds.), *The Southern Flank in Crisis, 1973-1976*, Documents on British Policy Overseas, series III, Volume V, edited by Keith Hamilton and Patrick Salmon (New York: Routledge), 2006, document no: 3, pp. 17-19.

and criticised their “intransigence”.⁴⁶⁰ He also told Goodison that although the Greek government was well aware of the current British Policy, they hoped that Britain would speak to Turkish government to urge them to make some concessions. Goodison replied that it was necessary to see the new Turkish government’s action on the Cyprus policy in Turkey before taking any measurements on the Cyprus issue. He also added: ‘I had no intention of recommending that we should intervene with the Turkish government on the lines the Greek requested.’⁴⁶¹ However, to give some assurance to Diamantopoulos, he sent an instruction to Horace Phillips, the British ambassador in Ankara, to contact with the new Turkish Foreign Minister and, in accordance with British general policy, to stress British anxiety to see a successful conclusion to the talks.

It was true that the government in Turkey had changed in January 1974. This was an important development because after the military intervention in 1971, this was the first government which elected by the votes of the Turkish people. The election had been held on 14 October 1973 and the leader of Republican People’s Party, Bülent Ecevit, who was a Social Democrat, won by gaining 37 per cent of vote in Turkey. However, this was not enough to establish a single-party government. Therefore, after a long negotiation process, Ecevit reached an agreement with Necmettin Erbakan to form a coalition government. Erbakan’s the right-wing National Salvation Party was the third largest part in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey which emerged as the Islamic party of 1970s Turkey.⁴⁶² These two parties had different political views and their government would only manage to last less than a year. However, one of the important decisions in the Turkish Republic’s history would be taken by this coalition.

When the new Turkish government came to power in January, it was speculated just what its policy over the Cyprus issue would be. In the new government programme, it was stated that an appropriate solution for Cyprus would be found in a federal system.⁴⁶³ The Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was in favour of a federal solution in Cyprus. This statement caused some concerns on the Greek side.

⁴⁶⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1884, letter from the FCO’s Southern European Department to the British High Commission in Nicosia, 16 January 1974., Hamilton and Salmon (Eds.), *Ibid.*

⁴⁶¹ PRO: FCO 9/1884, *Ibid.*

⁴⁶² Constandinos, *America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974*, p. 102.

⁴⁶³ PRO: FCO 9/1884, the new Turkish government and Cyprus, letter from the British Embassy in Ankara to FCO’s Southern European Department, 5 February 1974.

Makarios said that this federal policy could end the inter-communal talks.⁴⁶⁴ When the British ambassador to Ankara, Phillips, met Ismail Soysal, Director-General of Political Affairs at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the ambassador asked that what exactly the government statement over Cyprus Soysal meant. From Soysal's answer, the ambassador came to a conclusion that the "federal" statement was mainly to satisfy the public's nationalist feelings. Turkey would be not change policy towards the inter-communal talks.⁴⁶⁵

However, the Greek frustration over Ankara's statement on "federalism" increased. At the inter-communal meeting on 2 April, Clerides asked Denktash about Ecevit's word on the federalism. Denktash explained that the references by Ecevit to federal solution were a political statement for the domestic policy parallel to Makarios' comments in support of *Enosis* from time to time and should be treated as such.⁴⁶⁶ Denktash also underlined that Ecevit's announcements was not related to inter-communal talks and there was no shift in the Turkish support to the talks.⁴⁶⁷ However, Clerides rejected the Turkish arguments and adjourned the talks *sine die*.⁴⁶⁸ The British High Commissioner, Olver, assessed the situation and commented that 'there was some degree of right on both sides'⁴⁶⁹. According to him, the Greek side was responsible for the suspension of the talks but he also said that the Turkish statements on federalism caused anxiety on the Greek side and gave them an excellent pretext for calling a halt.⁴⁷⁰

After representatives of the both communities stopped the negotiations with each other, the UN again started to find a way to reactivate the talks. For this purpose, Roberto Guyer, the UN Secretary-General's Representative was preparing to go to the island on 5 April. Before going to Cyprus however, he stopped by London and he was told that Britain appreciated the UN efforts and diplomatic actions and they were ready to help him in his mission. The British officials believed that such efforts by the UN would bring successful outcome.⁴⁷¹ Although the British were optimistic,

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1884, 'Inter communal talks', letter from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO's Southern European Department, 8 April 1974.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁷¹ PRO: FCO 9/1885, 'Discussions on Cyprus' inter-communal problems part B', Cyprus: Background note, registry no: WSC 1/2.

Guyer became gloomy about the long-term future of the talks when he visited the island. He told the High Commissioner, Olver, that 'if the talks resume we would have done no more than buy time.'⁴⁷² According to him, Makarios seemed to not believe that the talks would bring a solution. Therefore, he used the Turkish announcement to stop the talks. Guyer added that the same situation could happen again in the future.⁴⁷³ The comment of the UN Secretary-General's Representative appeared to have been right because after the Turkish statement on the "federalism", Denktash many times reassured the Greek side that it would not affect the negotiations process. However, the Greek Cypriots refused to continue the talks. The British High commissioner also reported to London that Guyer's opinion about the present situation of the problem had changed. Before he thought that the Turks were mainly to blame for the impasse, he then started to believe that Makarios was responsible to suspension of the talks.⁴⁷⁴ On the Greek side, Diamantopoulos, Minister-Counsellor at the Greek Embassy in London, came again to visit Sir Alan Goodison on 17 April. Goodison stated that Diamantopoulos showed the Turkish government as being responsible for the breakdown of the talks, but Goodison refused to agree that the Turks were mainly to blame by saying that 'the word "federative" had not been introduced into inter-communal talks.'⁴⁷⁵ According to him, as the High Commissioner stated before, both sides were at fault.⁴⁷⁶

It was a fact that the continued status quo on the island was deteriorating as far as the economic position of the Turkish Cypriots was concerned. As a result of this, the Turkish community seemed to face with an emigration problem. The British High Commission in Cyprus reported that it was claimed by the local Turkish newspaper that Turkish Cypriots at the rate of 200-300 per month were leaving from the island to go to Australia mostly via Greece⁴⁷⁷. Denktash also said that emigration was causing a problem.⁴⁷⁸ From this situation, it appeared that a quick solution to the problem was important for maintenance of a Turkish community.

⁴⁷² PRO: FCO 9/1885, confidential telegram from UKMIS New York to FCO, no: 405, 16 April 1974.

⁴⁷³ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁴ PRO: FCO 9/1885, confidential telegram from the British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, no: 377, 10 April 1974.

⁴⁷⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1885, letter from the FCO's Southern European Department to the British Embassy in Athens, 18 April 1974.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1887, 'Turkish Cypriots Affairs in Cyprus', Emigration of Turkish Cypriots, letter from the British High Commission in Nicosia to the British Embassy in Athens, 18 April 1974.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid.

After the efforts of the UN, Osorio y Tafall announced that the talks would resume between both communities.⁴⁷⁹ Although it was hoped that the talks were going to produce a useful outcome was low level, it was good to see that both sides would again come the negotiation table. The talks started again on 11 June. In this meeting, Clerides restated the Greek Cypriot position. He again underlined that settlement of the Cyprus dispute should be based on the principle of a unitary state.⁴⁸⁰ After the meeting, Denktash indicated that he would reply at the next meeting which was on 18 June. In the second meeting, Denktash submitted a statement which was showing the Turkish position. He also talked to the reporters and he said that there was no benefit on trying to give a name to a settlement before ‘the structure and the base of the new order had become completely crystallized.’⁴⁸¹ By making this statement, Denktash showed that he was not happy with Clerides’ speech in the first meeting which presented the unitary state notion as a certain basis for the talks.

After these two meetings which representatives of both communities had, the High Commissioner, Olver, believed that the resumption of talks was unlikely to bring a solution to the problem because both sides had lost faith in each other. According to him, early years of the talks both sides could have made some achievements. He argued that the failure of the Greek Cypriot Administration in removing discrimination against the Turkish Cypriots⁴⁸² aftermath of 1968 alienated them from the idea of living together with the Greek Cypriots. He also defended that ‘a great opportunity was lost by the Greek side between the years of 1969 and 1972.’⁴⁸³ According to his opinion:

*An imaginative directive from Makarios to the Greek Cypriot Administration to end all aspects of administrative discrimination might have won over the Turkish Cypriot Community and tipped the scale towards a settlement. That opportunity has gone and meanwhile, Turkish separatism markedly hardened.*⁴⁸⁴

Parallel to the High Commissioner’s assessment, as an important contributor to the beginning of the inter-communal talks and in making the effort to keep it working,

⁴⁷⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1885, ‘inter-communal talks’ confidential telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 124, 20 May 1974.

⁴⁸⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1885, Inter communal talks, letter from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO’s Southern European Department, 12 June 1974.

⁴⁸¹ PRO: FCO 9/1885, Inter communal talks, letter from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO’s Southern European Department, 19 June 1974.

⁴⁸² PRO: FCO 9/1885, Ibid.

⁴⁸³ PRO: FCO 9/1885, Inter communal talks, letter from the British High Commission in Nicosia to Goodison, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 19 June 1974.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid.

the UN was not also happy with the course of the negotiation process. The United Kingdom Mission to the UN reported that the UN Secretariat accepted that no significant progress would be made.⁴⁸⁵ They were concerned that the situation in Cyprus would worsen Greco-Turkish relations which had been stable since the 1967 crisis.⁴⁸⁶ As a result of this, The UN also made another attempt and replaced Osorio y Tafall with Luis Jesús Weckmann Muñoz as the Secretary General's Special Representative to Cyprus who impressed the UN Secretariat with his performance over the Iran/Iraq dispute.⁴⁸⁷

However, the last meeting between Clerides and Denktash was held on 9 July and ended without achieving anything.⁴⁸⁸ After 6 days, on 15 July, the Greek military coup on the island⁴⁸⁹ ended the talks which had started in 1968 and opened a significant new period in the Cyprus problem.

The 1974 Greek Coup on the island and British and Turkish Responses to the Coup

As mentioned before, the government change in Greece and then, the death of Grivas were important events which helped Athens to increase its activities in Cyprus through the Greek Officers in the National Guard who took orders from Greece and seemed to have close relations with EOKA-B. The Archbishop was closely following developments on the island and he seemed to come to the conclusion that it was essential to act to prevent Cyprus from becoming Athens's playground. Thus, he was planning to send back the Greek officers in the National Guard on the island to achieve his aim. For this purpose, he sent a letter to the President of Greece, General Phaedon Gizikis, on 2 July 1974. In his letter to Athens, Makarios accused Greece of being behind the terrorist activities of EOKA-B.⁴⁹⁰ Therefore, he said that the Greek officers in the National Guard needed to return back to Greece.⁴⁹¹ According to his

⁴⁸⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1885, Cyprus: Inter communal talks, letter from the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations to FCO's Southern European Department, 2 July 1974.

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁸ Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, p. 58.

⁴⁸⁹ Van Coufoudakis, 'Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973-1983: The View from Athens', *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (spring, 1985), p. 191.

⁴⁹⁰ Constandinos, *America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974*, p. 147.

⁴⁹¹ Kemal H. Karpat, 'War on Cyprus: The Tragedy of Enosis', in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition* Kemal H. Karpat, (ed.), Vol. XVII of Social, economic, and political studies of the Middle East (Netherlands: Brill, 1975), p. 195.

plan, '200 of them would leave in July, 200 in August'⁴⁹² and he only accepted that amount of the '100 or 150 Greek officers to stay in Cyprus as instructors and military advisers.'⁴⁹³ Through this demand, Makarios aimed to significantly decrease the Greek junta's influence on the island. Nevertheless, a coup was staged in Cyprus before he got any answer from Athens.

Later, when the Archbishop met the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson in London, he would recall that, in response to his demand, the Greek government had decided to launch a coup against him.⁴⁹⁴ Although it was difficult to say that the Archbishop's letter was the only reason for the coup, it should not be ignored that the junta in Greece used the letter as an excuse for overthrowing Makarios.

After the National Guard launched a coup on 15 July, it was essential to the British government to get fast and accurate information from Cyprus in order to be able to act immediately to control the situation. As a result of this, on the day of the coup, the British High Commissioner, Olver, was trying to keep London informed about the situation on the island and he was sending immediate telegrams for this purpose. However, as he indicated, all telephone lines had been cut in Cyprus⁴⁹⁵ which made difficult to get information. Later, on the same day of the coup, an announcement was made from the junta via the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation which was sent to London by Olver:

*The National Guard intervened today to stop internecine war between the Greeks. The main purpose of the National Guard is to maintain order. The matter is internal between the Greeks alone. The National Guard at this moment is in control of the situation. Makarios is dead. Anybody interfering will be immediately executed.*⁴⁹⁶

After getting the news from Cyprus, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, made a statement in the House of Commons on the same day of the coup and he emphasized that if the report of the death of Makarios was actually true, then whole House and he himself would express their very deep dismay and regret at the death of the

⁴⁹² PRO: FCO 9/1892, 'Military Coup in Cyprus (Wednesday 17 July) part C', 'Record of a conversation between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the President of the Republic of Cyprus, held at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 17 July 1974 at 5.45 pm'.

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁴ PRO: FCO 9/1892, 'Record of a conversation between the prime Minister and President Makarios at 2.30 pm on Wednesday 17 July 1974 at 10 Downing Street.'

⁴⁹⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1890, immediate telegram from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia to FCO, no: 178 of 15 July 1974.

⁴⁹⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1890, flash telegram from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia to FCO, no: 181 of 15 July 1974.

Archbishop.⁴⁹⁷ After the coup, the reaction of the Turkish government was significant. In particular, Ankara might have started a military operation to protect the Turkish community on the island. Therefore, James Callaghan also announced that he had talked to the Greek and Turkish governments and had expressed the necessity for restraint on all sides.⁴⁹⁸ Furthermore, he sent his personal message to the Greek and Turkish Foreign Minister. In his message to the Turkish Foreign Minister, he said that ‘I hope very much that the Turks will avoid any kind of precipitate action or intervention at this stage.’⁴⁹⁹

The British Embassy in Ankara delivered Callaghan’s message to the Turkish Ministry of Defence, Hasan Esat Işık, who was also acting as the Foreign Minister because Turan Güneş, the Foreign Minister, was outside the country at that time. It seemed that Işık was happy with the British interest in the event. He said that Ankara considered intervention an undesirable option but he did not confirm that they had fully disregarded it.⁵⁰⁰ Işık also said that if the British and Turks worked together a reasonable solution could be found.⁵⁰¹ The British Diplomat, Fyjis-Walker, reported that it was not easy to understand the Turkish intentions from the Minister’s talk. However, he reported that:

*The Minister had given the impression of being determined to defend Turkish Cypriot and Turkish rights (under the 1960 treaties) but uncertain as yet of what this would require of Turkey.*⁵⁰²

In fact, although there were some serious intelligence reports, Turkey did not think that the Greek junta would attempt such an action. When the news about the coup in Cyprus reached to Ankara, the Turkish government had a difficulty to assess the situation correctly, because on the day of the coup, the Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, was on the way of his visit to the Turkish province Afyon, the Foreign Minister Turan Güneş, was in China, Turkish ambassador to Athens, Kamuran Gürün, was on ‘yachting cruise in the Mediterranean, and the Chief of the General Staff was in Istanbul.’⁵⁰³

⁴⁹⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1890, ‘Statement on Cyprus’ 15 July 1974.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1890, flash telegram (confidential) from James Callaghan, no: 128 of 15 July 1974.

⁵⁰⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1890, flash telegram (confidential) from British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, no: 747 of 15 July 1974.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid.

⁵⁰² Ibid.

⁵⁰³ M. Ali Birand, *Thirty Hot Days in Cyprus*, (Nicosia: K. Rustem & Brother, 1985), p. 2.

The first statement from Ankara was made by the Turkish Ministry of Defence, Hasan Esat Işık, and it was underlined that the Turkish government was watching the situation carefully and would not fail to take essential precautions.⁵⁰⁴

Later, the Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, stated that: 'Let no one try to profit from the chaotic situation in Cyprus to infringe upon the rights of the Turks. We will never accept a *fait accompli*. We will let no one trample the rights of the Turks.'⁵⁰⁵ After this statement, Soysal, Director-General of Political Affairs at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, contacted the British Embassy in Turkey to get more information and views on the situation in Cyprus. He was given brief information which the British High Commissioner reported earlier.⁵⁰⁶ The British diplomat in the Embassy, Fyjis-Walker, asked about the Turkish response to the coup. Soysal said that it was early to make any decision and they were still at 'the stage of consultation and assessment' to understand the situation. He also added that they were suspicious that Athens was behind the coup.⁵⁰⁷ Furthermore, after getting the news of the coup, the Turkish armed forces were placed on a state of alert.⁵⁰⁸ Also, at a midnight meeting of the Turkish National Security Council, the intervention option was discussed and Ecevit was told by the Generals that the Turkish Army was ready to complete its preparations in a short time to launch a military landing in Cyprus.⁵⁰⁹

The Soviet Union was concerned with the situation on the island, when the Soviet Counsellor in their Embassy in Cyprus met the British High Commissioner to discuss the situation on the day of the coup. He stated that they had strong information on Greek involvement and 'the Soviet government would react strongly'.⁵¹⁰

Meanwhile, there were also important developments on the island. The new military regime in Cyprus announced that they had chosen Nicos Sampson as the President of the new government.⁵¹¹ From the Turkish Cypriot perspective, they were deeply concerned about the situation on the island. Denktash made an announcement and

⁵⁰⁴ PRO: FCO 9/1890, immediate telegram from the British Embassy in Ankara, no: 746 of 15 July 1974.

⁵⁰⁵ *The Times*, 16 July 1974.

⁵⁰⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1890, immediate telegram (confidential) from the British Embassy in Ankara, no: 745 of 15 July 1974.

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰⁸ *The Times*, 16 July 1974.

⁵⁰⁹ Birand, *Thirty Hot Days*, p.4.

⁵¹⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1890, telegram (confidential) from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, no: 184 of 15/7/74.

⁵¹¹ PRO: FCO 9/1890, immediate telegram (confidential) from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, no: 189 of 15 July 74.

requested the Turkish Community to ‘remain calm and avoid any involvement in the conflict between the Greek Cypriots.’⁵¹²

Another significant development was Makarios’ message from a radio station. It had been earlier announced by the junta that he had died. However, he was alive and sent a message from a secret “free Cyprus radio station”:

*I was the target for the Athens military junta, but the military coup by the junta will not succeed...They have been trying to get me for a long time now they have decided to destroy Cyprus and its people. The people of Cyprus will resist and fight.*⁵¹³

From his message, it was clearly understood that Athens was behind the coup and Ankara’s concerns increased. They were concerned that after taking down Makarios, the next step of the junta would be *Enosis*. After hiding for a while on the island, a British helicopter took the Archbishop to Britain’s sovereign base at Akrotiri and then, he went to London via Malta.⁵¹⁴

The situation was serious and Turkey appeared to use all diplomatic actions to settle the crisis before applying a military option. Consequently, Ankara thought that they could have a chance to solve the issue by acting together with another guarantor power Britain. As a result of this, a Turkish Committee lead by the Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, went to London on 17 July to discuss the situation.

This was an important development because any decision was taken from this meeting could directly affect the Cyprus problem. In the meeting, the first speech was given by Ecevit. He said that Ankara was happy with the British decision not to recognise Nicos Sampson.⁵¹⁵ Then, Ecevit stated that ‘the situation in Cyprus was intolerable...because it was a form of unnamed *Enosis*’⁵¹⁶. He drew attention to the danger of Sampson’s regime taking root on the island. He said that if such a thing was allowed ‘it would be the end of the Southern-Eastern flank of NATO.’⁵¹⁷

⁵¹² Ibid.

⁵¹³ ⁵¹³ PRO: FCO 9/1890, immediate telegram (confidential) from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia to FCO, no: 202 of 15 July 74.

⁵¹⁴ Harold Wilson, *Final Term: The Labour government 1974-1976*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979), p. 61.

⁵¹⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1892, ‘Record of conversation between the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, James Callaghan, and the Defence Secretary, Roy Mason, and the Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, the Acting Foreign Minister, Hasan Işık, and the Minister of Interior, Oğuzhan Asiltürk, after dinner at no. 10 Downing street on Wednesday 17 July 1974.

⁵¹⁶ Ibid. p. 2.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid. p. 2.

Furthermore, he stressed that the Turkish government did not have any intention to exploit the situation in Cyprus and they also did not want to take an action alone against the coup. Therefore, Ecevit defended that the British co-operation with Ankara was essential to 'avoid bloodshed and a confrontation between Greece and Turkey.'⁵¹⁸ For this purpose, Ecevit asked the British government permission for using the British SBAs to send the Turkish soldiers to the island.⁵¹⁹

After Bülent Ecevit's speech, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Callaghan, started to talk. He said that they were sharing the same opinion with Ecevit on many points. He agreed that the Sampson regime should not be allowed to take root on the island.⁵²⁰ He also accepted that 'it had not been an internal coup; the offices of the National Guard had been directed, either openly or covertly, from mainland Greece.'⁵²¹ Therefore, Callaghan, stated Britain understood the Turkish government's concern over the *Enosis* issue.

However, in related to the Turkish demand for using the British SBAs, he indicated that 'he could not recommend such a course'⁵²². The British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, also added that 'the Sovereign Base Areas had been established for the benefit of British forces only. The move suggested would not be advisable'⁵²³. Instead of this Turkish request, British suggested a tripartite talk between the British, Greek and Turkish delegations.⁵²⁴

This statement from the British side highlighted the difference between Anglo-Turkish approaches towards the crisis. There were some basic elements which were reason for the difference. Mainly, they were that the Turkish side wanted a quick solution because they believed that talking with Greece would not contribute to the solution of the problem but would give time to the junta to take root on the island. According to Turkish opinion, the long negotiation process before the coup had showed that the talks between the Greek and Turks would not provide a quick solution. Ecevit was worrying about the Turkish populace on the island and he thought that 'redressing the balance of forces on the island by an intervention of

⁵¹⁸ Ibid. p. 3.

⁵¹⁹ Ibid. p. 3.

⁵²⁰ Ibid. p. 5.

⁵²¹ Ibid. p. 5.

⁵²² Ibid. p. 6.

⁵²³ Ibid. p. 8.

⁵²⁴ Ibid. p. 7.

Turkish troops'⁵²⁵ would provide safeguards for them. It was most likely that if the government failed to take such an action and the Turkish Cypriots had been harmed because of this failure, it would be difficult for the Turkish government to explain the situation to the public in Turkey. On the other hand, Britain's position seemed not to be difficult when compared to Ankara's one. First of all, it could be said that the British government did not have much public pressure on it to solve the problem and, it appeared that Britain did not have to worry much about the situation of British citizens on the island when again compared to Turkey. Therefore, as Callaghan stated, 'the British government was in no hurry'⁵²⁶ in seeking a peaceful solution to the problem.

Ecevit did not have a positive outlook on the British offer of a tripartite meeting. He said that Greece was the aggressor, which was also accepted by Callaghan, and Turkey and Greece could not come together.⁵²⁷ However, Ecevit also indicated that 'Turkey would not object if the British government sought to talk to Greece.'⁵²⁸ Furthermore, he talked about the British answers to the Turkish government request to use the British bases on the island. He said that Britain was at liberty to decide how to use its own bases in Cyprus. In contrast to Wilson's statement earlier, Ecevit said that he did not think that there were any restrictions for Britain in the use of the bases.⁵²⁹ Then, he added that 'He feared that the British government might feel a burden on her conscience in future by declining to accept the Turkish proposal.'⁵³⁰

It was obvious that the Turkish government did not get the result what they expected to have from the meeting. However, they were determined to take action. Before this meeting, the Turkish position was explained by the Turkish chargé d'affaires in Cyprus, Asaf İnhan, to the British High Commissioner. İnhan again indicated that 'the highest state bodies of Turkey were alerted.'⁵³¹ He also added that Turkey was inclined to go for military intervention alone if no agreement reached with Britain.⁵³² The High Commissioner replied that it was not likely that the British government

⁵²⁵ Ibid. pp. 7-8.

⁵²⁶ Ibid. p. 5.

⁵²⁷ Ibid. p. 9.

⁵²⁸ Ibid. p. 9.

⁵²⁹ Ibid. p. 10.

⁵³⁰ Ibid. p. 10.

⁵³¹ PRO: FCO 9/1892, 'New Cyprus government', immediate telegram (confidential) from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia to FCO, no: 231, 17 July 74.

⁵³² Ibid.

would use to force the restore the situation, İnhan replied that ‘we are ready to do so.’⁵³³

From the British angle, although they did not agree with Turkey about the way of taking action against the crisis on the island, they knew that they had some responsibility to deal with the issue. Therefore, after the meeting with Turkish committee, the British government evaluated the situation in the cabinet meeting. The Prime Minister, Wilson, underlined the reasons for the necessity of the involvement of Britain in the present crisis. According to him, ‘Britain was inevitably much involved in the problems created by the overthrow of President Makarios.’⁵³⁴ Then, he explained that:

*The existence of our Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus and the presence there of our forces and their families was one aspect of our involvement, and studies were being made urgently of the implications of military intervention, whether or not we participated in it. We also contributed to the United Nations Force in Cyprus. We were fellow members of the Commonwealth and, together with Greece and Turkey, we were guarantors of the 1960 Treaty. A number of countries were pressing us to take the lead. The Soviet ambassador, who had delivered a message to me from Mr Brezhnev earlier in the week which was entirely in accord with our position as guarantors of the Treaty that we should pursue consultations with Turkey and Greece.*⁵³⁵

In the meantime, diplomatic actions were continuing. The efforts of the US were also significant for the solutions of the crisis. James Callaghan was in contact with the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Nevertheless, in the first days of the crisis, both sides approach towards the coup implied that there was a difference between their policies. In the British cabinet meeting, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said that ‘United States policy was not entirely clear.’⁵³⁶ In fact, Britain fully supported the idea of return of Makarios to the island as the President. When Callaghan met with Ecevit on 17 July, he clearly stated that the British government wanted to see Archbishop Makarios restored to power.⁵³⁷

However, Henry Kissinger seemed not to think the same way as Callaghan. After having a phone call with Kissinger, the British ambassador, Peter Ramsbotham,

⁵³³ Ibid.

⁵³⁴ PRO: CAB 128/55, ‘Post War Conclusion’, CC (74) 27th conclusion, 18 July 1974, p. 4.

⁵³⁵ Ibid., p. 4.

⁵³⁶ Ibid., p. 3.

⁵³⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1892, ‘Record of conversation between the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, James Callaghan, and the Defence Secretary, Roy Mason, and the Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, the Acting Foreign Minister, Hasan Işık, and the Minister of Interior, Oğuzhan Asiltürk, after dinner at no. 10 Downing street on Wednesday 17 July 1974.

reported to London that Kissinger appeared to question the British in their absolute support of Makarios.⁵³⁸ Ramsbotham indicated that Kissinger had concerns that if Makarios returned to power he would increase his connection with Russia which allowed the communist influence to increase on the island.⁵³⁹ Therefore, Kissinger avoided making an announcement that the United States continued to recognise Makarios as the legitimate ruler of Cyprus.⁵⁴⁰

However, there were some allegations⁵⁴¹ that the US knew that there would be a coup in Cyprus and failed to prevent it. Actually, taking up a position against the Archbishop was making these allegations stronger. Washington was not happy with these accusations. Later, Kissinger denied the accusations by saying that ‘the information concerning an impending coup was not exactly lying around the street.’⁵⁴²

Meanwhile, there was no a significant attempt to solve the crisis on the island. As a result of this, Ankara was making its final preparations to launch its ‘peace operation’ in Cyprus. This was going to be a turning point in the history of the Cyprus dispute and going to have an important effect on Anglo-Turkish relations.

The first Turkish Intervention on the island and the British Reaction to the Intervention

By 19 July, the crisis was still unresolved. There were strong reports on the Turkish Military preparations in the southern Turkish city of Mersin, which indicates that Ankara would start a military operation very soon. As a result of this, Kissinger instructed Joseph Sisco, the Under Secretary of State, who was in Athens at that time, to go to Ankara to give his message to the Turkish government.⁵⁴³ In fact, the relationship between Kissinger and the Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, dated back to old times. In 1957, Ecevit went to the USA to study at Harvard University

⁵³⁸ PRO: FCO 9/1892, immediate telegram (confidential) from the British Embassy in Washington, no: 2414, 17 July 1974.

⁵³⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁰ Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 120.

⁵⁴¹ See, Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, pp. 182-185., Constandinos, *America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974*, pp. 141-186., Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish invasion*, (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2004), pp. 161-169.,

⁵⁴² Paul Y. Watanabe, *Ethnic Groups, Congress and American Foreign Policy: Politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo*, (London: Greenwood Press, 1984), p. 87., Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 119.

⁵⁴³ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, (Boston: Little Brown, 1999), p. 1191.

and Kissinger was one of his lecturers at the University. Thus, they had known each other in better times. Later, Kissinger stated in his memoirs that ‘I was prepared to use that relationship but not to rely on it, much less to subordinate American policy to it. I am certain that Ecevit was following the same principles in his relation with me.’⁵⁴⁴ In his message to Ankara, Kissinger stressed that the US was extremely concerned about reports on the Turkish military preparations and said America did not approve a military operation in Cyprus. He also underlined there was still a chance to solve the problem by using diplomatic process.⁵⁴⁵

However, Ankara was determined to make an intervention. While Sisco was in Ankara the Turkish navy was heading to Cyprus. When he asked ‘has the operation has been launched already?’ Ecevit replied that ‘it is about to begin. The planes are just about to take off.’⁵⁴⁶ After this answer Sisco left Ankara and what Ecevit called ‘the peace operation’ started at dawn on 20 July⁵⁴⁷ through the landing of Turkish troops near Kyrenia.⁵⁴⁸

The British government was shocked when they heard that the Turkish Military operation had started. Of course, there were intelligence reports on the Turkish military preparations and because of this, the British FCO sent a telegram to the High Commission in Cyprus to contact with Sampson and asked him to allow British civilians to move towards the SBAs in case of a military operation by Turkey.⁵⁴⁹ However, they did not think that Turkey was going to start the operation on 20 July.

According to British assessment, the Turkish Prime Minister just returned from London to Ankara and he would need a time to reach a decision.⁵⁵⁰ The British also thought that Turkey would not start a military operation while Joseph Sisco was in Ankara.⁵⁵¹ Therefore, after the getting the news of the Turkish government’s action

⁵⁴⁴ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1999), p. 217.

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 217

⁵⁴⁶ Birand, *Thirty Hot Days*, p. 19.

⁵⁴⁷ *Akşam* 21 July 1974., Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 195., Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London: I.B. Tauris & Company Limited, 1993), p. 289., Leonard W. Doob, ‘Cypriot Patriotism and Nationalism’ *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (June, 1986), p. 385., *Hürriyet*, 21 July 1974.

⁵⁴⁸ PRO: DEFE 11/907, ‘the Cyprus emergency’, a report from J Hall-Tipping, Lieutenant Colonel, to Lieutenant Colonel, Swinburn, 27 July 1974.

⁵⁴⁹ PRO: DEFE 11/907, ‘Cyprus’, ‘Decisions taken at a meeting between the staffs of the FCO and the MOD to discuss the possible effect of Turkish intervention in Cyprus’, 19 July 74.

⁵⁵⁰ PRO: PREM 16/19, ‘Coup d’état in Cyprus’, a personal note from Commander of British Forces in the Near East(CBFNE) to Ministry of Defence in UK, 22 July 1974.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid.

Callaghan immediately summoned the Turkish ambassador Rıfat Turgut Menemencioğlu to Britain and told him that he very much regretted that the Turkish government had not informed him before their actions and he heard about the Turkish military operation from the radio news.⁵⁵²

Callaghan seemed to be frustrated and added that ‘this was not how relations between co-guarantors should be conducted.’⁵⁵³ According to him, there was no attack against the Turkish Cypriots on the island and there was no necessity for Turkey to conduct a military operation to protect the Turkish community.⁵⁵⁴ Menemencioğlu replied that he also did not know about his government action and heard about it on the BBC. He also said that he would convey Callaghan’s message to his government.⁵⁵⁵ Furthermore, after the news of the Turkish military operation, Callaghan sent a flash message to the British offices and presented his immediate aims of the policy. Some of them were:

- (I) to protect British lives and property in Cyprus*
- (II) to ensure the continued security of the Sovereign Base Areas*
- (III) to put maximum pressure on the Turks to limit the fighting and to bring about a ceasefire at the earliest possible opportunity*
- (IV) to get the Turks to issue a statement of intent that they wish to see the return of constitutional rule in Cyprus*
- (V) to invite immediately the governments Greece and Turkey to hold talks in London.*⁵⁵⁶

Apart from these, Britain had also another immediate objective along with the US which was to ‘prevent a situation developing in which the Soviet Union could intervene.’⁵⁵⁷

⁵⁵² PRO: PREM 16/19, ‘Cyprus’, a confidential telegram from FCO to the British Embassy in Ankara, no: 811, 20 July 1974.

⁵⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁶ PRO: PREM 16/19, a confidential telegram from FCO to the British Offices included in Athens, Ankara, Moscow, no: 151, 20 July 1974.

⁵⁵⁷ PRO: FCO 49/548, ‘British interests and objectives in Cyprus’, a paper was given Sir John Killick, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth, about British objectives in a Cyprus Conference, 22 July 1974.



Bülent Ecevit, Turkish Prime Minister, while talking to the press after the start of the first Turkish military operation in Cyprus.
Source: *Milliyet*, 21 July 1974.

From the angle of the Greco-Turkish relationship, Ankara had threatened military operation before in the 1964 and 1967 crisis but they were prevented by the intervention of the United States. Therefore, the Greek government seemed to think that, as happened in the past, the US would not allow Turkey to use the military option in Cyprus. Even when the Greek Ministry of Information was told about the movement of the Turkish fleet, they replied dismissively: ‘there is nothing to worry about. The Turks have formed a habit of going out the sea every year or two just to breathe Mediterranean air and return home.’⁵⁵⁸ It seemed that the junta in Athens did not take the Ankara’s warnings seriously. Therefore, Greece was shocked when the news of Turkish military intervention on the island was reached to them.

As a reaction to the Turkish move, the US ambassador in Athens had been said by the Greek government that Greece would withdraw from NATO and this decision was going to announce by the Greek Prime Minister.⁵⁵⁹ If Greece left NATO it would weaken southern flank of the organisation. Therefore, the Americans intervened and managed to prevent any announcement from the Athens about

⁵⁵⁸ Birand, *Thirty Hot Days*, p. 16.

⁵⁵⁹ PRO: DEFE 11/907, ‘secret telegram from UK Delegation NATO to FCO, no: 391, 21 July 74.

withdrawing from NATO, but the US did not completely succeed in getting rid of the Greek government's thought about quitting NATO.⁵⁶⁰

Actually, the situation was serious. Apart from the NATO crisis, there was danger of a war between Greece and Turkey. Kissinger telephoned Callaghan and told him that the Greeks had informed him that if the Turkish troops were not withdrawn from the island 'they would declare war on Turkey and also declare *Enosis*.'⁵⁶¹ In that time, the US Under Secretary of State, Sisco, was in Athens and Kissinger told him to warn the Greek government that if they started a war, 'all the US military aid would be cut off immediately.'⁵⁶² After having the conversation with Kissinger, Callaghan sent message to the British Embassy in Athens and instructed them to contact with the Greek government at the highest possible level on behalf of the British government and warned them not to escalate the situation.⁵⁶³

Callaghan also met the Greek Charge and explained that Britain had no prior information about the Turkish military operation⁵⁶⁴ and he stressed that the government should not take any counter action which would make the situation worse.⁵⁶⁵ Although Callaghan said that Britain did not know the Turks would attack on 20 July, the Turkish intervention in Cyprus caused public frustration in Greece towards the British government. It appeared that they were angry with Britain in not preventing the Turkish military operation. There were demonstrations on the streets and some of the protestors attacked the British Embassy in Athens. According to the Embassy reports, they were chanting slogans including *Enosis* and "British out".⁵⁶⁶ The crowd also started to throw stones on the Embassy building.⁵⁶⁷

On the Turkish side, when Ankara decided to conduct a military operation in Cyprus, the Turkish government considered that Greece could respond militarily against the Turkish move. Therefore, the Turkish army closely observed any military movement from Greece. In other words, the Turks seemed to take the possibility of a war with

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁶¹ PRO: PREM 16/19, 'Cyprus' a flash telegram (confidential) from FCO to British Embassy in Athens, no: 153, 20 July 1974.

⁵⁶² Ibid.

⁵⁶³ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁴ PRO: PREM 16/19, 'Cyprus' flash telegram (confidential) from FCO to British Embassy in Athens, no: 152, 20 July 1974.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁶ PRO: FCO 77/248, 'Evacuation of Embassy staff from Cyprus', 'Attack on Embassy', flash telegram from British Embassy in Athens to FCO, no: 278, 22 July 1974.

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid.

Greece into account before starting their action. When Sisco told Ecevit that Athens was ready to embark on war with Ankara in case of a Turkish intervention, Ecevit replied that 'we had no intention of going war with Greece but if we are attacked we shall hit back.'⁵⁶⁸ Ankara used only 30 percent of its landing ships for the military intervention in Cyprus. The rest was on the western shores of Turkey facing Aegean Islands⁵⁶⁹ anticipating the danger of a possible Greek attack on Turkey.

In fact, Ankara's strong belief that Athens would launch an attack on them led to Turkey to hit its own forces mistakenly. On the second day of the operation, the Turkish General Staff got an intelligence report that a convoy of Greek ships was heading towards to Cyprus to help Greek Cypriot troops on the island.⁵⁷⁰ Upon this news, the Turkish naval and air forces attempted to stop the Greek ships which they had learnt about from the intelligence report.

However, there were no Greek ships and the Turkish air force mistakenly attacked Turkish warships. In fact, the pilots saw the warships were flying the Turkish flag but they thought that this was a trick by the Greeks. In the end, the Turkish warship *Kocatepe* was sunk by so-called friendly fire and most of the soldiers lost their lives.

It was true that Britain failed to solve the crisis before the conflict started. Nevertheless, Callaghan continued to work with Kissinger to stop the fighting in Cyprus by using the all available diplomatic means. For this purpose, tripartite talks between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom were considered by him. He called Kissinger and said that he had a conversation the Greek Foreign Minister, Konstantinos Kypraios, and it seemed that the Greeks would not attend the talks until ceasefire had been arranged.⁵⁷¹

Kissinger replied that 'more pressure had to be brought to bear on the Turks'⁵⁷² from different diplomatic channels including the US, the UK and the Secretary General of

⁵⁶⁸ Birand, *Thirty Hot Days*, p. 18.

⁵⁶⁹ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 195.

⁵⁷⁰ PRO: DEFE 69/210, 'Sinking of the Turkish destroyer *KOCATEPE* off Cyprus', a report from Director of Naval Warfare, Captain J. D. E. Fieldhouse to Rear-Admiral J. H. F. Eberle, 27 August 1974.

⁵⁷¹ PRO: FCO 9/1918, 'Tripartite conference in Geneva- record of conversation, part C', 'record of a telephone conversation between Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Dr Kissinger at 8.40 pm, 21 July 1974.

⁵⁷² Ibid.

NATO.⁵⁷³ According to this idea, diplomatic notes to be delivered to Ankara needed to be stiff and to call for ceasefire by 22 July.⁵⁷⁴ He also suggested that Athens also should also receive similar diplomatic notes.⁵⁷⁵ Callaghan knew the seriousness of the situation and replied that ‘he would emphasise the grave consequences for all of any further continuation of hostilities.’⁵⁷⁶

The United Nations was also worried about the situation in Cyprus. Thus, a resolution was issued by the UN which demanded a ceasefire from all parties and called upon Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom enter into negotiations without delay.⁵⁷⁷ The US, Britain and the UN continued to make effort for an immediate ceasefire. As a result of these efforts, Ankara announced that they had accepted a ceasefire in Cyprus on 22 July.⁵⁷⁸ Ecevit also made a statement and said that:

*The great victories of the Turkish Armed Forces in the days would be strengthened by the time the ceasefire came into effect. From now on, there would be peace, liberty and equality in Cyprus, and no one would be able to tamper with Turkish rights there.*⁵⁷⁹

After the ceasefire, Vienna was suggested as a venue for tripartite talks. Later, the Greek government told Callaghan that they preferred Geneva to Vienna.⁵⁸⁰ Callaghan spoke to Ecevit and the Turkish side also accepted Geneva. Callaghan also said that it was important that any talks should begin on the following day, 23 July. Turkey seemed not to show any objection to this idea.⁵⁸¹

⁵⁷³ PRO: CAB 129/178, ‘Cabinet Memoranda’, C (74) 77, ‘the attached report by the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’, 22 July 1974.

⁵⁷⁴ PRO: FCO 9/1918, op. cit.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁷ UN Security Council Resolutions, 20 July 1974, Res. 353.

⁵⁷⁸ PRO: FCO 9/1916, ‘tripartite conference on Cyprus-July 1974 part A’, flash telegram (confidential) from the British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, no: 810, 22 July 1974., Ümit Haluk Bayülken, *Cyprus Question and the United Nations*, (Lefkoşa: Kıbrıs Araştırma ve Yayın Merkezi (CYREP), 1975), p. 61.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1918, ‘notes of conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Prime Minister of Turkey Mr Bulent Ecevit at 13.50 pm on Monday’, 22 July 1974.

⁵⁸¹ Ibid.



**Clerides-Denktaş meeting after the Turkish government's acceptance of the cease-fire.
Source: *Milliyet*, 24 July 1974.**

In the end, the call for a ceasefire was successful and the parties reached an agreement to attend a tripartite conference to find a solution to the Cyprus crisis. However, the ceasefire seemed to be 'slow to take effect and appeared fragile.'⁵⁸² There seemed to be problem in bringing Greece to the negotiating table. The Greek Foreign Minister told the American ambassador in Athens that they would postpone their attendance of the tripartite talks because they asserted that there was a report of a Turkish bombing of the Nicosia airport since the ceasefire.⁵⁸³ Actually, the Nicosia airport was an important place on the island and Ankara wanted to take it under its control. However, Britain did not want the airport to be taken over by the Turkish forces. Therefore, the relation between the Ankara and London was tense. There was a small UNFICYP force at the airport which consisted of British, Canadian and Finnish troops.⁵⁸⁴ However, the Turkish army was so close to the airport and could make attempts to take over its control. As a result of this, the small UNFICYP force was reinforced by 'British armoured cars and infantry from the Sovereign Base Areas.'⁵⁸⁵ Also, Callaghan called and gave an order to the British troops to stand fast

⁵⁸² PRO: FCO 9/1920, 'Geneva conference on Cyprus: stage II', 'Parliamentary Question: Cyprus', background note.

⁵⁸³ PRO: FCO 9/1916, flash telegram (confidential) from British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, no: 817, 22 July 1974.

⁵⁸⁴ PRO: DEFE 11/907, 'the Cyprus emergency', a report from J Hall-Tipping, Lieutenant Colonel, to Lieutenant Colonel, Swinburn, 27 July 1974.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid.

and not allow the Turks to go forward.⁵⁸⁶ In addition, Phantom aircraft were sent from the UK to Cyprus to give the British forces air cover.⁵⁸⁷

In fact, this created the risk that there could be a fight between the British and Turkish soldiers which would make the situation very serious on the island. Callaghan spoke to Ecevit on the phone and they had an acrimonious conversation according to his later recollections.⁵⁸⁸ Callaghan warned the Turkish Prime Minister that the British forces on the island had received an order that 'they would hold their ground and resist any further encroachment. If they were fired on they would respond.'⁵⁸⁹ The British seemed to be determined not to give up control of the airport at all cost. Actually, the situation was a bit complicated because different information was coming from the island. The Turks claimed that they had already taken the airport under their control because the Greeks were using it to send military reinforcements to Cyprus⁵⁹⁰ while the British were saying it was under the control of the UN forces, which mainly consisted of the British soldiers, and the Turkish forces surrounded it to attack.⁵⁹¹ Apart from Callaghan, the British Prime Minister, Wilson, also called Ecevit. In their conversation, Wilson's speech was perceived as threatening. Bülent Ecevit graduated from Robert College in Istanbul, where instructional language was English. Therefore, he could speak English fluently. Ecevit tried to explain the situation on the island to Wilson. It is important to show the some parts of the telephone conversation record to understand the British reaction well:

...

Prime Minister Wilson:

... some very alarming news...? Your people tonight are going to conduct military operations against United Nations forces... which include British Forces who have been reinforced... their responsibility as well as fellow Europeans. I have to tell you that if that happens we cannot stand by.

.....

Prime Minister Ecevit:

Our people have strict orders not to fire and not to cause any confrontation with any UN forces. Either British, Canadian or otherwise.

Prime Minister Wilson:

... Attack on the airport tonight...

⁵⁸⁶ James Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, (London: Collins, 1987), p. 347.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 347.

⁵⁸⁸ Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, p. 347.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 347.

⁵⁹⁰ PRO: PREM 16/19, 'record of a telephone conversation between the Prime Minister and Prime Minister of Turkey', 24 July.

⁵⁹¹ Ibid.

Prime Minister Ecevit:

No. No. I am telling you. Our orders to our people are to the contrary. No attacks to anyone in or around the airport.

Prime Minister Wilson:

... Military operation tonight on the airport by your ground forces...

Prime Minister Ecevit:

No. No.

Prime Minister Wilson:

No??

Prime Minister Ecevit:

No. Because, well you see, ... our information is based on different ... I wish we could both go and see the situation by our own eyes. Our people claim, may be they are too optimistic, that they have already got control of the airport. The UN says "No, we have got control of it". Whichever may be true, our military people are not going to attack at all. They have strict orders not to attack.

Prime Minister Wilson:

Your people have instruction not to attack on the airport tonight??

Prime Minister Ecevit:

No. No. So that is the situation.

Prime Minister Wilson:

Well as long as this clear... just in case of any doubt, because it is difficult to hear one another, I have to say that on so far as any attack on the airport which could involve risk to any of the UN forces, we cannot stand by... Royal Air Force has instructions to prevent the attack.

Prime Minister Ecevit:

Yes.

...

Prime Minister Wilson:

Well that's better; that's all right. As long as there is no attack on the airport tonight

Prime Minister Ecevit:

No. No.

Prime Minister Wilson:

That's what we want to hear...⁵⁹²

Although the Turkish government was not happy with the British government's reaction to the crisis, they did not hold the control of the airport or make any attempt to take the control of it and the airport remained closed.⁵⁹³ Meanwhile, an important negotiation process in Geneva was beginning Geneva to find a solution to the problem.

The First Geneva Conference

*'A gruelling cliff-hanger'*⁵⁹⁴

After intensive Anglo-American efforts, the British, Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers came to Geneva to discuss future of the Cyprus issue on 25 July. The

⁵⁹² Ibid.

⁵⁹³ Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, p. 347.

⁵⁹⁴ James Callaghan's description of the situation in the first Geneva conference: PRO: FCO 9/1920, 'Cyprus: Geneva II', confidential telegram from FCO to certain posts and missions, no: 103, 7 August 1974.

meeting had been planned to be held earlier, but important developments in Greece caused a delay of the date of the Geneva conference.⁵⁹⁵ The Turkish Military operation on the island had shaken the authority of the Greek junta in Athens. The Generals could not take any military measurements against Ankara. As a result of this, the chief of the Greek armed forces called on professional politicians to form a government of national unity.⁵⁹⁶ The junta leaders appeared to think that while the Cyprus issue was in a process of negotiation, it would best to hand over the administration to the people who had sufficient skill to get a successful result from the discussion over Cyprus. In the end, Constantine Karamanlis, who was the former Prime Minister and was living in exile in France, returned to Athens and formed a new civil government.⁵⁹⁷ Apart from Greece, there were also important developments in Cyprus. Nicos Sampson, who came to power after the coup on the island, resigned on 23 July and the New Greek Cypriot government was established by Glafkos Clerides.⁵⁹⁸ The replacement of the junta in Athens was welcomed by Ankara. The Turks thought that their intervention in Cyprus had made a significant contribution to the restoration of democracy in Greece.⁵⁹⁹ Even, the Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, indicated that: 'When our operation began I said it would bring peace and democracy not only to Cyprus, but to Greece as well. My prediction has come true.'⁶⁰⁰ Ecevit also sent a message to Athens and congregated Karamanlis.⁶⁰¹ It seemed that before the Geneva conference the relations between the two governments had shown some improvement.

On the other hand, from the Anglo-Turkish angle, the event which had happened after the Turkish military operation in Cyprus, showed that Britain and Turkey had a different approach towards the Cyprus issue. Firstly, Ecevit's visit to London did not produce enough cooperation to settle the problem. Then, the Turkish military operation was not welcomed by the British government. Later, the Nicosia airport crisis enflamed Anglo-Turkish relations. Finally, when the all sides had agreed on a ceasefire and had started negotiations in Geneva on 25 July another problem

⁵⁹⁵ *The Times*, 24 July 1974.

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁷ Keith Kyle, *Cyprus*, (London: Minority Rights Group Report No. 30, 1984), p. 14., İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil, *Anılarım*, (İstanbul: Güneş Yayınları, 1990), p. 276.

⁵⁹⁸ *The Times*, 24 July 1974.

⁵⁹⁹ *The Times*, 25 July 1974.

⁶⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰¹ *Ibid.*

occurred. This was the allegations of breach of the ceasefire from the Turkish forces on the island. Callaghan appeared to show a strong reaction to it. Before the start of the conference, it was reported from the British Embassy in Athens that the Greek Foreign Minister had said that if the activities of the Turkish forces' continued in Cyprus, 'they would without doubt withdraw' from the conference.⁶⁰² On the first day of the conferences, this issue started the discussion.



1 James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
Source: *Milliyet*, 1 August 1974.

On the following day, Callaghan emphasized that 'the ceasefire had to be implemented with monitoring by UNFICYP of further supplies and the movement of arms.'⁶⁰³ He also asked the Turkish Foreign Minister, Güneş, about the intentions of the Turkish government over the reinforcements in Cyprus.⁶⁰⁴ The Greek Foreign Minister, Mavros, also stated that he was still receiving reports which indicated Ankara's breach of the ceasefire on the island.⁶⁰⁵ After these accusations, Güneş

⁶⁰² PRO: FCO 9/1916, 'Cyprus talks', flash telegram (confidential) from the British Embassy in Athens to FCO, no: 336, 25 July 1974.

⁶⁰³ PRO: FCO 9/1916, 'Cyprus Conference', immediate telegram (confidential) from UKMIS Geneva to FCO, no: 718, 26 July 1974.

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid.

replied that the Turkish Forces were not in Cyprus as an invading army.⁶⁰⁶ The Turkish forces were there to protect to security⁶⁰⁷ as a Guarantor power according to the 1960 Agreements.⁶⁰⁸ He also added that they did not meet to discuss ceasefire allegations and he said that ‘he could produce many such allegations against the Greek National Guards.’⁶⁰⁹ Güneş’s reply showed that according to the Turkish government’s opinion, there was an overreaction against Ankara on the breach of ceasefire issue. In particular, Callaghan’s approach could worsen the British government’s relationship with Ankara because on the first day of the conference he sent a telegram from Geneva to the FCO in which he demanded information about the most up-to-date strength of the Turkish forces on the island. He also asked for an assessment of whether any intervention by the Royal Navy could prevent Turkey from reinforcing its troops in Cyprus and ‘if so, how many ships would be required and whether this could be done within the existing United Nations mandate.’⁶¹⁰ This was a risky move. Later, the British ambassador to Ankara, Horace Phillips, sent a telegram to Callaghan and explained the danger of such a move by the British government. In his assessment, Phillips tried to present the situation in Turkey. After stating that there was great support in the whole country for the government’s decision to intervene in Cyprus, the ambassador underlined that:

*The Turks did the military operation alone. Britain would not help. That is not widely held against us (though it is not forgotten). But that we should not have helped, yet now seem to be trying to stand in the way of Turkish consolidation, which to all Turks is unforgivable.... They are not aiming to annex Cyprus and they cannot understand why in our (as the Turks see it) anxiety to please Greece we should deny Turkey the right of secure its national interest in Cyprus.*⁶¹¹

As an answer to Callaghan’s opinion about taking action to prevent Turkey to supply its forces on the island, Phillips pointed out that:

Her Majesty’s government will, I know, give the deepest thought to the grave consequences of any attempt by the Royal Navy with or without the US sixth fleet to blockade Turkish naval movements. The Turkish forces are on the ground in Cyprus. They need to be supplied. Even if they are reinforced, this cannot be a serious danger unless they are seen to be aiming to take over the whole island. There have been serious breaches of the ceasefire in similar circumstances elsewhere in the world. I

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁸ A. Haluk Ulman, ‘Geneva Conferences, July-August 1974’, *Foreign Policy*, Ankara, Vol. IV, 1974, pp. 49-50.

⁶⁰⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1916, op. cit.

⁶¹⁰ PRO: DEFE 11/907, a telegram (secret) from UKMIS Geneva to FCO, no: 709, 25 July 1974.

⁶¹¹ PRO: PREM 16/19, flash telegram (secret) from the British Embassy in Ankara to UKMIS Geneva, no: 001, 26 July 1974.

*hope we will not get ourselves into a position over the ceasefire here which Turkey would regard as tantamount to war on it.*⁶¹²

In the end, the British government did not use any military option to stop Turkey. However, the issue of the violation of ceasefire continued during the first two days of the conference and appeared to bring the talks to deadlock. Later, when the discussions were continuing in Geneva, Callaghan met William Buffum, the American observer at the conference. Buffum told him that Kissinger had sent messages to the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers, Karamanlis and Ecevit, to urge them to continue the talks at the conference in Geneva. In his message, Kissinger also emphasised the significance of the talks and told that a breakdown of negotiations could have unforeseeable consequences.⁶¹³ Callaghan seemed to appreciate the American efforts. However, he was still thinking about the Turkish Army's activities in Cyprus after the ceasefire was provided. In their conversation, Callaghan suggested that Kissinger might send another note to the Turkish government to ask about the reports on the advance of the Turkish forces in Cyprus. According to Callaghan's opinion, despite the ceasefire, if the Turkish army continued to advance this meant the army 'was in a state of rebellion in defiance of the orders of the Turkish government.'⁶¹⁴ In the end, on 27 July, the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers agreed to the adoption of a new ceasefire line which both sides' forces accepted.⁶¹⁵

In fact, it was expected that the Geneva conference would end the crisis in Cyprus, but when it began, the ceasefire issue between the Greek and Turkey had already shown that it would not be easy to reach a compromise between the parties. As a result of this, Callaghan, who had worked hard to gather this conference, started to believe that it would be a very difficult process. After the first day of the conference, Callaghan stated in his report that 'the tripartite meeting was heavy going.'⁶¹⁶ He also said that 'judging by tonight's performance I am not very optimistic and it will certainly be very hard slog to get anywhere.'⁶¹⁷

⁶¹² Ibid.

⁶¹³ PRO: DEFE 11/907, immediate telegram (confidential) from UKMIS Geneva to FCO, no: 726, 27 July 1974.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid.

⁶¹⁵ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 201.

⁶¹⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1916, immediate telegram (confidential) from UKMIS Geneva to FCO, no: 707, 25 July 1974.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid.

On 28 July, after finding a way to overcome the ceasefire issue, the parties started to focus on searching for a solution to the problem. A meeting was held between the delegations. They were trying to agree on a draft text for the agreement. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Güneş, told Callaghan that he had to send any draft text agreed in Geneva to Ankara to get approval.⁶¹⁸ Güneş explained that ‘the Turkish government was in real difficulties with its Generals.’⁶¹⁹ Therefore, any solution was also accepted by the Turkish Military.⁶²⁰ In that time, it was a fact that the Generals in Turkey were a powerful position and they could intervene in the Turkish political life. As mentioned before, Ecevit’s government was the first elected government after the Army’s intervention on 12 March 1971 but there was still a risk of a military coup in Turkey. Moreover, the military operation was also an important event for Turkey and any agreement in Geneva that would have a possibility to be interpreted by the public as putting the Turkish army into a difficult position in Cyprus could give huge political damage to Ecevit’s government. Therefore, the conference in Geneva was being closely followed by Ankara.

Apart from the talks in Geneva, the leaders of the communities on the island were also stating their own opinion on the solution of the problem. Denktash said that they wanted Cyprus to remain an independent state. Therefore, they did not seek partition. However, it was stated that ‘autonomy for each community’s canton within a federal structure’⁶²¹ was the Turkish community’s aim when searching the solution for the problem.⁶²² This time, according to the British High Commissioner Olver the Greek side appeared to have a similar opinion with the Turkish Cypriot leadership.⁶²³

By 29 July, the negotiations in Geneva had apparently turned into a struggle between Callaghan and the Turkish government. The Greek delegations were objecting to the Turkish government’s demands but there was a new government in Athens and it was not politically strong enough yet. Therefore, Callaghan appeared to find himself in a position of negotiating with Ankara to find a solution. When the three Foreign Ministers in Geneva agreed on a draft text which requested the implementation the

⁶¹⁸ PRO: FCO 9/1916, flash telegram (confidential) from UKMIS Geneva to FCO, no: 748, 29 July 1974.

⁶¹⁹ Ibid.

⁶²⁰ Ibid.

⁶²¹ PRO: DEFE 11/907, confidential telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 451, 27 July 1974.

⁶²² Ibid.

⁶²³ Ibid.

UN resolution 353 within the shortest possible time, Ankara raised an objection because one of the clauses of the resolution was demanding withdrawal of the all foreign military personnel without delay from the island.⁶²⁴ Thus, according to the Turkish government's opinion, accepting such a declaration would put them under an obligation to withdraw their forces from Cyprus which would be regarded as the government's failure in Turkey. Therefore, Ankara sent a slightly different draft to Geneva which did not specifically mention the UN resolution.⁶²⁵ On the phone, Ecevit even told the Turkish delegate, Haluk Ulman, in Geneva that: 'I do not wish to see any mention of withdrawal in this agreement. I would rather you abandon the conference.'⁶²⁶

After Ankara's objection, the Greek Foreign Minister, Mavros, met Callaghan and said that he could not accept the Turkish government's proposal. He was preparing to give a press conference 'at which he would announce the failure of the talks and (his) departure.'⁶²⁷ Callaghan replied that he would give an ultimatum to the Turkish government to produce 'a more reasonable formula on the paragraph relating to withdrawal (by) 30 July.'⁶²⁸ After this answer, Mavros agreed to stay on at the conference. Later, Callaghan met Güneş and delivered his ultimatum.⁶²⁹ One of the reasons for Callaghan's move was that the negotiations had lasted for four days and three Foreign Ministers were in Geneva and it seemed that the time for ending the talks was still uncertain. Callaghan indicated that: 'I cannot stay here much longer. If we are going to issue a statement, let us do it as soon as possible.'⁶³⁰ Consequently, he considered that giving an ultimatum would force Turkey to accept a solution to the problem. Although a quick solution appeared to be important to prevent fighting on the island, it should be pointed out that Britain and Turkey were in a different situation at the negotiating table. The Turkish forces were on the island which made the Turkish government act more cautiously because Ankara did not want to sign any declaration which had the potential to show the Turkish forces in Cyprus as an

⁶²⁴ UN Security Council Resolutions, 20 July 1974, Res. 353.

⁶²⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1916, a flash telegram (confidential) from UKMIS Geneva to FCO, no: 756, 29 July 1974.

⁶²⁶ Birand, *Thirty Hot Days*, p. 72.


⁶²⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1916, flash telegram (confidential) from UKMIS Geneva to FCO, no: 757, 29 July 1974.

⁶²⁸ PRO: FCO 9/1916, immediate telegram (confidential) from UKMIS Geneva to UKMIS New York, no: 13, 29 July 1974.

⁶²⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1916, op. cit.

⁶³⁰ Birand, *Thirty Hot Days*, p. 72.

invasion force. It seemed that Callaghan did not fully understand the Turkish position. In his telegram to David Ennals, Minister of State at the FCO, Callaghan also confessed that he found it ‘hard to fathom Turkish motives and objectives.’⁶³¹ As a result of this, in his conversation with Güneş, he said: ‘I am not here to await your pleasure. I have other things to do’⁶³² In another important development, Callaghan stated in his report that his meeting with Güneş made him understand that ‘the only way they could reach an “agreement” in Geneva was to get rough and put maximum pressure on Ankara.’⁶³³ He also asserted that this idea had been advised by the British official in his party by the Turks.⁶³⁴ After deciding a new strategy, he asked ‘the American to exert maximum pressure on Ankara.’⁶³⁵ Thus, Kissinger spoke to Ecevit and urged him to accept an agreed declaration in Geneva.⁶³⁶



2 Gerogios Mavros, Greek Foreign Minister.
Source: *Milliyet*, 1 August 1974.

⁶³¹ PRO: FCO 9/1916, immediate telegram (confidential) from UKMIS Geneva to FCO, no: 707, 25 July 1974.

⁶³² Birand, *op. cit.*, p 74.

⁶³³ PRO: FCO 9/1916, flash telegram (confidential) from UKMIS Geneva to FCO, no: 757, 29 July 1974.

⁶³⁴ Ibid.

⁶³⁵ Ibid.

⁶³⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1916, flash telegram (confidential) from the British Embassy in Washington to UKMIS Geneva, no: 1, 29 July 1974.

On the other hand, Callaghan's ultimatum to the Turkish government seemed to have a negative effect on the Anglo-Turkish relations. It appeared that there was a perception among the Turks that Britain was on the side of the Greeks in the talks. Therefore, when the British ambassador to Ankara, Phillips, met Işık, the Turkish Minister of Defence and acting Foreign Minister, he needed to explain to Işık that the presumption by the Turkish government that the United Kingdom was favouring Greece was not true.⁶³⁷ In addition, Turkey's Permanent Representative in Geneva, Coşkun Kırca, saw Charles Wiggin, Under-Secretary at the FCO and told him that he was instructed by the Turkish government to issue a formal protest against delivering an ultimatum to Ankara. He said that the Turks had acted with goodwill and 'there was no ground for threatening them with ultimate.'⁶³⁸

In the end, after long discussions, an agreed declaration was signed by three Foreign Ministers on 30 July. Through this declaration, most of the Turkish demands were accepted by Greece. Although the UN resolution was mentioned in the text, there was no specific time for Ankara to withdraw its forces from the island.⁶³⁹ Moreover, by referring to two autonomous administrations on the island, the declaration recognised the Turkish Cypriot Administration which existed since 1964.⁶⁴⁰ As a result, from the Turkish point of view, the result of the first Geneva conference was successful. In his message to the British High Commission in Nicosia, after the declaration, Callaghan also mentioned this situation:

*We do not underestimate the concessions made by the Greek side at Geneva. The fact is that the Turks showed themselves determined to exploit the mistakes made by the present Greek government's predecessors. Both we and Americans have however made great efforts to get Turks to agree to a reasonable package. The declaration represents the best we could do for the time being, but it is only a first step.*⁶⁴¹

Apart from these, it was also accepted that the talks would resume in Geneva on 8 August at the official level to continue to search permanent solution for the problem.⁶⁴² The representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities on the island did not attend the first Geneva conference. This was because the main aim was to

⁶³⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1916, flash telegram (confidential) from the British Embassy in Ankara to UKMIS Geneva, no: 6, 30 July 1974.

⁶³⁸ PRO: FCO 9/1916, immediate telegram (confidential) from UKMIS Geneva to FCO, no: 761, 30 July 1974.

⁶³⁹ *The Times*, 25 July 1974.

⁶⁴⁰ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 202.

⁶⁴¹ PRO: FCO 9/1916, , a flash telegram (confidential) from UKMIS Geneva to the British High Commission in Nicosia, no: 757, 29 July 1974.

⁶⁴² PRO: FCO 9/1920, 'Background note, Parliamentary question: Cyprus'.

restore peace in Cyprus. However, the second talks would include the discussions on the constitutional question and inter-communal relations. Therefore, in the next stage, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives would join the negotiations.⁶⁴³ In a cabinet meeting, Callaghan pointed out that in the first conference the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers expressed the view that they did not seek either *partition* or *Enosis*. Therefore, according to him, a federal solution might be possible.⁶⁴⁴

Conclusion

The negotiations between Greeks and Turkish Cypriots in the first half of 1974 were ended by the Greek coup in Cyprus. Their different approaches to the Cyprus question made almost impossible to reach an agreement with each other. As a result of this, Athens asked British officials to apply some pressure on the Turks to force them to reach an agreement with the Greeks. Although Britain knew that the talks between the communities was not going well, such an action from the British government could adversely affect its relation with Ankara because the Turkish government would assume that Britain was in favour of the Greeks. Therefore, the Greek demands were rejected by the British officials.⁶⁴⁵

Essentially, the British government did not want to have a problem with Turkey over the Cyprus issue. However, the events after the Greek coup on the island did worsen Anglo-Turkish relations. Actually, the first reaction of both the British and Turkish governments to the coup in Cyprus was similar. Both heavily criticised the coup and declared that they would not recognise Greek junta as the legitimate ruler of the island. Nevertheless, there were some major differences in their approach to the situation on the island which affected mutual relations. Ankara seemed to be in favour of applying an aggressive policy for a solution to the crisis which included a military operation against the Greek junta on the island, but Callaghan's message immediately after the coup to the Turkish government to warn the Turks to avoid any kind of intervention⁶⁴⁶ caused a disappointment on the Turkish side. Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit visited London but also did not manage to gain British support for a

⁶⁴³ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁴ PRO: CAB 128/55, 'Post War Conclusion', CC(74) 31st conclusion, 1 August 1974, p. 1.

⁶⁴⁵ ⁶⁴⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1884, letter from the British Embassy in Athens to FCO's Southern European Department, 16 January 1974.

⁶⁴⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1890, flash telegram (confidential) from James Callaghan, no: 128 of 15 July 1974.

joint military action on the island. This widened any existing differences between British and Turkish policy on Cyprus.

As a result of this, Ankara launched a military operation alone. Callaghan's reaction towards the Turkish action was strong because he did not expect Ankara would actually take such an action while Britain and the United States were against it. Therefore, as mentioned, he told the Turkish Ambassador in London Menemencioğlu that he very much regretted that the Turkish government had not informed him before their actions and he heard about the Turkish military operation from the radio news.⁶⁴⁷ Furthermore, the Nicosia airport crisis on the island also negatively affected Anglo-Turkish relations.

After the intensive efforts of Britain, the US and the UN, a ceasefire was reached on the island and a conference gathered in Geneva to settle the problem. However, the differences in the British and Turkish approaches at the conferences led to tension between the two sides. In particular, the Turks believed that Callaghan was supporting Greek allegations against the Turks. In addition, Callaghan's attempts to prevent Ankara from reinforcing its troops on the island was a dangerous move by Britain which was probably only stopped by the British ambassador's warning that such a move could start a war between Britain and Turkey.⁶⁴⁸ Nevertheless, it was a good example to see the poor level that Anglo-Turkish relations. The first Geneva conference ended with an agreement but it was fragile and the sides were resolved to meet again to find a permanent solution to the problem.

⁶⁴⁷ PRO: PREM 16/19, 'Cyprus', a confidential telegram from FCO to the British Embassy in Ankara, no: 811, 20 July 1974.

⁶⁴⁸ PRO: PREM 16/19, flash telegram (secret) from the British Embassy in Ankara to UKMIS Geneva, no: 001, 26 July 1974.

5) The second Turkish Military Action on the Island

Introduction

The first part of the chapter five examines the second Geneva conference and its impact on Anglo-Turkish relations. Developments after the first Geneva session are evaluated and the discussions at the second Geneva meeting are presented. This was an important event for both the solution of the Cyprus problem and the course of relations between London and Ankara. The first Geneva session had a negative effect on the mutual relations between the British and Turkish Governments. Therefore, an examination of the attitude of British and Turkish delegations at the second Geneva conference showed that if there was a change in the British and Turkish positions.

In this context, the second part of the chapter looks at the end of the second Geneva conference and the beginning of the second Turkish military advance on the island. An evaluation of the second Geneva conference is made. The Turkish Foreign Minister's assessment of the British Foreign Secretary Callaghan's attitude towards to Turkish Government's arguments is in this part of the thesis.

The third section examines British and international reactions towards the second Turkish military operation on the island. Britain had stood against the first Turkish military action and clearly stated that it would not support such an action taken from the Ankara. Therefore, there is an assessment of the British government's approach to the second Turkish military operations and its impact on relations between Ankara and London. In particular, the policy of Callaghan and Kissinger is examined. The international reactions towards the Turkish action is also the subject of this part which enables us to see both the similarities and differences of the British and international reactions to Turkey's move on the island.

The last section analyses the Cyprus question after the second Turkish military advance on the island. There were attempts to restart the negotiations between the Greek and Turkish communities. However, there was a new situation on the island. The Turkish side now demanded a federal solution. Therefore, the British government's approach to the Turkish position is explored. Callaghan was one of the important actors in the Geneva peace talks. Therefore, the discussion on his position in future talks between the Greeks and Turks is also examined.

The Second Geneva Conference: Callaghan's Effort to Stop the Turks

*'Ecevit had not sent his troops to Cyprus "to play football"'*⁶⁴⁹

After signing the declaration, the parties left Geneva to prepare the second stage. From the Callaghan's perspective, although he recognised that the declaration was not perfect, he stated it provided three major gains which were:

- (a) a commitment to a steadfast ceasefire;
- (b) an agreement on machinery for delineating the zone controlled by Turkish mainland forces;
- (c) an agreement on the principle of a buffer zone patrolled by UNFICYP.⁶⁵⁰

Callaghan's efforts in Geneva were roundly congratulated.⁶⁵¹ The British Prime Minister Harold Wilson conveyed his gratitude to Callaghan. According to him, although much hard work still remained, Callaghan had provided the essential starting point by the Geneva declaration.⁶⁵² The US Secretary of State, Kissinger, also called Callaghan to offer his personal congratulations on the result of the first phase of the Geneva conference. Callaghan seemed to be pleased with the attitude towards his mission in the conference but he replied that he considered that 'the second stage of the Cyprus talk would be somewhat different and slower moving.'⁶⁵³

From the point of view of Anglo-Turkish relations', the first Geneva talks showed that there was almost no common ground between the two countries on their Cyprus policy. After the end of the conference Callaghan asked Sir Michael Carver, Chief of Defence Staff, to send him a personal report about the future of Cyprus.⁶⁵⁴ After pointing out that it was not easy to reach a solution in the Cyprus issue,⁶⁵⁵ in his final words of the report, Carver presented the Turkish attitude as responsible for the problem on the island. In fact, Callaghan's telegrams from Geneva to London about the process of the talks during the first conference were also generally criticising the

⁶⁴⁹ Words of Denktash in his meeting James Callaghan in Geneva: PRO: FCO 9/1921, 'second Geneva conference on Cyprus: tripartite talks between UK, Greece and Turkey, 9-13 August', confidential telegram from Miss A. M. Warburton, (on behalf of Callaghan), Counsellor and Head of Chancery at UKMIS Geneva, to FCO, no: 808, 10 August 1974.

⁶⁵⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1920, 'Cyprus: Geneva II', immediate telegram (confidential) from FCO to certain posts and missions, no: 103, 7 August 1974.

⁶⁵¹ Constandinos, *America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974*, p. 339.

⁶⁵² PRO: PREM 16/20, 'Coup d'état in Cyprus, part 2', 'Prime Minister's personal minute', no: M105W/74.

⁶⁵³ PRO: FCO 9/1920, 'US representation in Geneva for stage two of the conference', a letter from Anthony Acland, Private Secretary to James Callaghan, to Alan Goodison, 1 August 1974.

⁶⁵⁴ PRO: FCO 9/1886, 'Cyprus', a letter from Sir Michael Carver, Chief of Defence Staff, to James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 2 August 1974.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid.

Turkish side. However, Carver's opinion about the Turkish position in the Cyprus problem was more rigorous which indicated that the Anglo-Turkish relations over the Cyprus dispute were at a poor level. He said that:

*The Turks do not know the meaning of the word compromise. History has taught them that they cannot compete in wits or in argument with the Greeks. Their only hope resides in a stubborn refusal to budge, however long they may have to wait for results and however much they may suffer in the process.*⁶⁵⁶

This comment demonstrated that it would be very difficult for the Turkish government to get its offer of a solution accepted by not only the Greeks but also British at the second part of the Geneva conference.

From the British point of view, because the first Geneva conference needed to be arranged as quickly as possible, it seemed that Britain did not have much chance to prepare. Nonetheless, British Foreign Office was preparing for the second stage. There were two main British aims which were stated as immediate and long term ones. The immediate British objectives were:

- (i) to achieve as much progress as possible towards making ceasefire and buffer zone arrangements stick;*
- (ii) to give impetus, and if possible guidelines, to the constitutional negotiations;*
- (iii) to establish a satisfactory machinery for the continuation of discussion at official level and for periodic ministerial involvement.*⁶⁵⁷

The immediate British objectives mainly aimed to provide and maintain the peace on the island. In this way, Britain would have an opportunity to apply its long term objectives in Cyprus by which the British government had planned to reduce its responsibility on the island. These objectives were:

- (i) to permit the gradual disengagement of HMG from the prominent position accorded to them in the 1960 agreements and the Geneva Declaration;*
- (ii) to avoid perpetuating the work of UNFICYP and Britain's contribution to it- at its present level;*
- (iii) to keep open our options on the Sovereign Base Areas.*⁶⁵⁸

Concerning about the Treaty of Guarantee, the FCO's report indicated that it had often been regarded as a burden to Britain. It was said that:

the Treaty of Guarantee binds us to uphold the state of affairs established by the basic articles of the Constitution which in practice we have been able to enforce. The new

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1920, 'Cyprus: Geneva talks (stage II)', 'steering brief', report from Mr. P.J. Goulden, (First Secretary, Planning Staff), to Mr. Goodison, 7 August 1974.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid.

*constitutional settlement may require either a new Treaty of Guarantee, or amendments to the old. This would give us to slip out of being a Guarantor power.*⁶⁵⁹

The Geneva declaration at the end of the first talks was the outcome of a really tough process. Callaghan expressed the view that ‘both Greeks and Turks were at times inclined to say that they were prepared to face war rather than what they chose to categorise as “retreat” or “humiliation”’.⁶⁶⁰ The British government knew that the second stage could be more difficult than the first one. This time, apart from Athens and Ankara’s delegations, there would be Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives at the negotiation table. It was stated in the FCO’s report that in this situation a danger that the ‘delegations would dig in for a very long session’ could emerge⁶⁶¹ which ‘could enmesh us (Britain) in negotiations until 1974 or beyond’⁶⁶². This would be an undesirable result for the British government. Therefore, Britain had planned to put strong pressure on the parties with the intention of preventing the talks from an impasse. For this purpose, a number of arguments were prepared to deploy to urge the parties to reach an agreement. Some of them were:

- (i) the risk of increasing Soviet interference;*
- (ii) the threat to the economy of island;*
- (iii) growing international criticism of Turkish military occupation;*
- (iv) criticism from the UN about the delay in implementing Resolution 353: risk of a special session of the General Assembly.*⁶⁶³

While the parties were preparing for the stage two of the Cyprus talks, the British High Commissioner on the island, Olver, sent a report to London and described situation in Cyprus briefly and gave his opinion about the second Geneva conference. The first point which he mentioned was the condition of the ceasefire on the island. He stated that there was good progress on the demarcation of the ceasefire line and said that this had prevented the Turkish forces advancing.⁶⁶⁴ However, according to him, this situation was quite fragile because the Turks did not manage to get what they expected and planned. This comment seemed to be a fair point since the Turkish

⁶⁵⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1920, ‘Cyprus: Geneva talks (stage II)’, ‘the re-establishment of constitutional government in Cyprus’, a report from Mr. P.J. Goulden, (First Secretary, Planning Staff), to Mr. Goodison, 7 August 1974.

⁶⁶⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1920, ‘Cyprus: Geneva II’, immediate telegram (confidential) from FCO to certain posts and missions, no: 103, 7 August 1974.

⁶⁶¹ PRO: FCO 9/1920, ‘Cyprus: Geneva talks (stage II)’, ‘steering brief’, report from Mr. P.J. Goulden, (First Secretary, Planning Staff), to Mr. Goodison, 7 August 1974.

⁶⁶² Ibid.

⁶⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁴ PRO: FCO 9/1920, ‘the second Geneva conference’, telegram (confidential) from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Olver, to FCO, no: 627, 5 August 1974.

military operation had just lasted two days and then, the Turkish government had to accept the ceasefire on 22 July. As a result of this, the Turkish forces were simply holding a small part of the island. Another reason for the first Turkish military operation fell short of the Turkish hope was that the strength and number of the Greek Cypriot National Forces was far above the expected level of the Turkish general staff.⁶⁶⁵ Therefore, the High Commissioner suggested that Ankara could use any attack on the Turkish community in Greek-held Cyprus as an excuse to continue its military operation. Thus, he said it was important that the level of the inter-communal temperature should be at a low level. To achieve this, he believed, it was important to avoid any long lapses or interregnum in the Cyprus talks.⁶⁶⁶ From this point of view, the High Commissioner indicated that 'a long stalemate in Geneva would be particularly dangerous.'⁶⁶⁷ His final assessment was on the Treaty of Guarantee (1960). He suggested that Britain should get rid of the agreement because it was an important element in providing the pretext for the Turkish intervention.⁶⁶⁸

Although Olver mentioned that the ceasefire issue was better, in his letter to the Kissinger, Callaghan once more complained about the continuing Turkish military encroachment in Cyprus. He also expressed the view that he would particularly like to talk with Arthur Hartman, the US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian staff, in Geneva about 'how both America and Britain could influence the Turkish government's policies for the better.'⁶⁶⁹

Ankara's position and demands would obviously play an important role in the course of the second Geneva conference. Thus, Hartman spoke to the Turkish Prime Minister, Foreign and Defence Ministers. He did not openly threaten them but said if the Turks wanted America's continued support, they would need to help the Americans by searching reasonable solution for the Cyprus problem. He also said the Greeks 'should not be treated as conquered or humiliated.'⁶⁷⁰ The Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, was not affected by Hartman words and suggested that the United States should be thankful to Turkey for conducting a 'surgical operation' on the

⁶⁶⁵ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 196.

⁶⁶⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1920, op. cit.

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1920, immediate telegram (confidential) from the Secretary of State, James Callaghan, to the British Embassy in Washington, no: 1643, 6 August 1974.

⁶⁷⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1920, immediate telegram (confidential) from the British Ambassador in Ankara, Phillips, to FCO, no: 936, 6 August 1974.

island.⁶⁷¹ Ecevit also said the Turkish solution was an autonomous region for the Turkish Cypriot community amounting to 30 per cent of the island.⁶⁷² The British ambassador to Ankara, Phillips, also summarized the Turkish expectations from the second Geneva talks. He said 'nation-wide there was no variation in the determination to hold on to what has been fought for.'⁶⁷³ According to his assessment, if Greece did not accept the Turkish demands and the talks failed in Geneva, the Turks would not mind. In such a case that the Greeks left the talks, the Turks would be able to present themselves as the blameless party and they would justify 'any continued military activity by the Greek refusal to sit down and talk.'⁶⁷⁴ Phillips was observing the situation in Turkey, and he also reported that:

*Rightly or wrongly, the Turks see themselves as holding the winning cards in Cyprus. They will not be dictated to by anyone, will not yield anything unless on reciprocity and will compromise only in so far as the security achieved by their military superiority is not put at risk.*⁶⁷⁵

The second Geneva conference began on 8 August. Callaghan gave a brief press conference on the first day of the talks. He complained that 'the terms of the Geneva declaration had not been fully carried out.'⁶⁷⁶ Then, he met the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers. In these meetings, both parties criticised each other. First, Mavros accused the Turks of violating the ceasefire and then, Güneş complained about 'the failure of the Greek Cypriot National Guard to evacuate Turkish villages.'⁶⁷⁷ The first two days of the conference, discussion would take between Greece, Turkey and Britain alone and by the 10 August, the representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus would be joining the conference.⁶⁷⁸

From the Greek and Turkish point of view, they continued to have different offers for a solution to the problem in the second stage of the Geneva talks. The Greek Cypriot leader Clerides told Callaghan that 'he could accept functional federation but not

⁶⁷¹ Ibid.

⁶⁷² Ibid.

⁶⁷³ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁶ PRO: PREM 16/20, immediate telegram (confidential) from Miss A.M. Warburton, Counsellor and Head of Chancery at UKMIS Geneva, (on behalf of Callaghan) to FCO, no: 794, 8 August 1974.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁸ PRO: FCO 9/1920, 'Cyprus: Geneva II', immediate telegram (confidential) from FCO to certain posts and missions, no: 103, 7 August 1974.

geographical separation.⁶⁷⁹ However, as the British ambassador in Ankara, Phillips, mentioned that the Turkish government had three principles not open to negotiation:

- (a) *a sovereign independent Cyprus under a central government,*
- (b) *within this, geographic delineation of the two communities,*
- (c) *absolute autonomy for these.*⁶⁸⁰

It was clear that the both sides had made diametrically opposing demands. According to the ambassador, the Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, had met the US ambassador in Ankara to look for American understanding of their case. Although the United Kingdom government was one of the parties in the Geneva conference, Ecevit did not call the British ambassador to talk. Phillips' evaluation of the reason for not being called by the Turkish government to discuss was 'because the government in Turkey felt that the United Kingdom was swinging favour of Greece.'⁶⁸¹

On the third day of the conference, Callaghan had a meeting the UN Secretary General Dr. Waldheim. Callaghan told him that failure of the talks would most likely lead to continuation of the Turkish military action on the island. He said that 'this would be a most serious step and one which would have implication for the UK as a guarantor power.'⁶⁸² In fact, their conversation indicated that they appeared to believe that the second stage of the Geneva talks would not be able to produce a solution. Callaghan predicted that Turkish action might start as early as the week beginning 19 August.⁶⁸³ Dr. Waldheim replied that he would not discard the likelihood of even earlier action.⁶⁸⁴ In point of fact, the Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash's words, in his meeting with Callaghan on the same day, seemed to be indicating the reason behind the Secretary of State, Callaghan and the UN Secretary General, Dr. Waldheim's predictions for the possibility of the Turkish military action. Denktash told Callaghan that the objectives of the Turkish troops on the island were to 'stop *Enosis* and to save the Turks. They had achieved the first but not the second.'⁶⁸⁵ Callaghan did not want the Turks to start another operation in Cyprus.

⁶⁷⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1921, 'Cyprus: Partial round-up for Saturday 10 August', immediate telegram (confidential) from Miss A.M. Warburton (on behalf of Callaghan) to FCO, no: 811, 10 August 1974.

⁶⁸⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1921, immediate telegram (confidential) from the British Ambassador in Ankara, Phillips, to UKMIS Geneva, no: 8, 11 August 1974.

⁶⁸¹ Ibid.

⁶⁸² PRO: FCO 9/1921, immediate telegram (confidential) from Miss A.M. Warburton (on behalf of Callaghan) to FCO, no: 807, 10 August 1974.

⁶⁸³ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid.

This time, he was ready to use the British forces to prevent any Turkish military advance on the condition that The US and UN supported it.⁶⁸⁶ Nevertheless, America had its own internal problems at this time. The President of the United States, Richard Nixon, resigned on 9 August because of the *Watergate Scandal*. As a result of this, Hartman explained the US position to the British officials at the Geneva conference. He emphasised that:

- (a) *if the Turks do take military action, there will be a major US diplomatic effort in NATO and bilaterally to stop them,*
- (b) *the United States could not consider military action against the Turks: it was out of the question at a time when a US administration was taking office,*
- (c) *Kissinger does not consider threats of military action are helpful in present circumstances. Such gestures tend to generate problems for Ecevit with the extremists in Turkey.*⁶⁸⁷

After Hartman's explanation, Callaghan stopped contemplating military action against a possible Turkish military operation and the action of reinforcements of the British forces in Cyprus was also suspended.⁶⁸⁸

Clerides and Denktash met on 12 August. In this meeting, Denktash gave the Turkish proposal which was for two federated states and the Turkish sector to compromise 34 percent of the territory of the island.⁶⁸⁹ Clerides rejected Denktash's proposal. He said that acceptance of this plan was impossible for him. He believed that this would 'divide the island in two and turn it into a concentration camp for the refugees.'⁶⁹⁰ After this reply from the Greek side, the Turks offered a cantonal system for the solution of the problem. According to the proposal, there would be six Turkish Cantons⁶⁹¹ on the island which would cover 34 percent of the island.⁶⁹² After talking with Kissinger and seeing the difficulties of getting a two federated states plan accepted by the Greeks, Ecevit decided to offer this cantonal solution, though the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish Foreign Minister Güneş were not happy with the offer because they believed that it would be difficult to provide security for of the Turkish community.⁶⁹³ Callaghan told Güneş that the Greeks had also rejected this Turkish

⁶⁸⁶ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 196., Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 142.

⁶⁸⁷ PRO: PREM 16/20, a flash telegram (confidential) from Miss A.M. Warburton (on behalf of Callaghan) to FCO, no: 819, 12 August 1974.

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1921, immediate telegram (confidential) from Miss A.M. Warburton (on behalf of Callaghan) to FCO, no: 824, 12 August 1974.

⁶⁹⁰ Birand, *Thirty Hot Days*, p. 96.

⁶⁹¹ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 205.

⁶⁹² Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 142.

⁶⁹³ Bölükbaşı, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

proposal. Ankara was ready to give a start to the second. On 13 August, a plenary session was gathered on which Güneş repeated the Turkish proposals and urged the Greek parties to give their final answer.⁶⁹⁴ Clerides demanded 48 hours to think it over.⁶⁹⁵ Callaghan also told Güneş that: 'if the Greeks and Greek Cypriots were given 48 hours, they would work hard on their respective governments and would possibly return prepared to discuss the broad shape of a single Turkish Cypriot geographical zone.'⁶⁹⁶ Callaghan also spoke to Kissinger and asked him to put maximum pressure on the Turkish Prime Minister not to start military action in Cyprus.⁶⁹⁷ However, the Turkish side did not accept the Greek demand and they interpreted the Greek answer as a delaying tactic.⁶⁹⁸ Meanwhile, Ankara was waiting for a news from the Geneva Conference to start the second military operation in Cyprus.



The Turkish Foreign Minister, Turan Güneş, at Geneva.
Source: *Milliyet*, 15 August 1974.

⁶⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 206.

⁶⁹⁵ Birand, *Thirty Hot Days*, p. 96., Polyvios G. Polyviou, 'Cyprus: What is to be Done?', *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 52, No. 4 (October, 1976), p. 583.

⁶⁹⁶ PRO: PREM 16/20, flash telegram (confidential) from Miss A.M. Warburton (on behalf of Callaghan) to FCO, no: 826, 13 August 1974.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁸ Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 142.

The Failure of the Geneva Talk and the Second Turkish Military Intervention in Cyprus

There was a very serious situation in Geneva. Kissinger again spoke to Ecevit on the phone and told him that the Greeks were insisting on a recess period for consultation. Ecevit replied that: 'I have told you several times that I cannot keep the army waiting any longer. I cannot tolerate these continual delays'⁶⁹⁹ but, Ecevit made a new offer to Kissinger which required the Greek acceptance of the Turkish solution offered in principle at the Geneva conference⁷⁰⁰ and removal of any Greek forces from the area controlled by the Turkish forces 'who occupied seven percent of Cyprus' territory.⁷⁰¹ Ecevit told Kissinger that he was ready to delay several weeks, in case of acceptance of his offer by the Greeks.

After his conversation with Ecevit, Kissinger contacted the parties in the conference and explained the Ecevit's offer.⁷⁰² Nevertheless, he did not manage to gain either Greek or Greek Cypriot support for the plan.⁷⁰³ Callaghan stated that the second Geneva conference did not have a formal end.⁷⁰⁴ On 14 August Wednesday at 02.20 a.m., Callaghan asked the parties if they wanted to continue the talks. Clerides and Mavros replied yes, Denktash said 'if Turkey comes, I shall be here also.'⁷⁰⁵ However Güneş remained silent and did not answer Callaghan's question. When Callaghan described this situation, he used harsh words to describe Güneş's attitude. He said: 'Güneş rose from the table at which we sat, ungracious as ever, and departed, followed by his aides.'⁷⁰⁶ This move by Güneş was the end of the second Geneva talks. The British and Greek delegations also left the conference and Turkey started its second military action on the island.

The Turkish rejection of the Greek request for a delay of the conference to consult their governments about the Turkish proposal was an important cause of the failure of the Geneva talks. Later the Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, explained the reasons for the Turkish objection to an adjournment of the Geneva conference. According to him, the Turks thought that during a recess, 'the Greeks might have

⁶⁹⁹ Birand, *Thirty Hot Days*, p. 104.

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 104.

⁷⁰¹ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 208.

⁷⁰² Birand, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

⁷⁰³ Bölükbaşı, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

⁷⁰⁴ Callaghan, *Time and Chance*, p. 347.

⁷⁰⁵ Birand, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

⁷⁰⁶ Callaghan, *op. cit.*, p. 355.

brought Makarios from London to replace Clerides.⁷⁰⁷ He also said that ‘this was a dreadful prospect for us.’⁷⁰⁸ Secondly, he expressed the view that the Greek National Guard’s fortification on the island and flow of military supplies from Greece was another reason for the Turks to oppose to any delay in the Geneva talks.⁷⁰⁹

In fact, the Geneva conferences were significant events which brought the three guarantor powers to the negotiation table. Therefore, before beginning to look at the second Turkish military operation, it would be beneficial to analyse these conferences in terms of Anglo-Turkish relations. It was a fact that the conferences were unsuccessful efforts that did not manage to bring a permanent solution to the Cyprus issue, but apart from that, the Geneva conferences also had a negative effect on Anglo-Turkish relations. In particular, Callaghan’s attitude towards the Turkish policy on the Cyprus problem was the most important reason for this situation.

After the second Geneva talk, David Hildyard, UK Permanent Representative to the UN and other International Organisations in Geneva, met Turkey’s Permanent Representative in Geneva, Kırca. In this meeting, according to Hildyard’s report, Kırca told him that ‘whatever either side might have said in heat of the moment in Geneva, the Turkish government considered that Britain had been good and impartial mediators and hoped that Britain would continue to play the same role.’⁷¹⁰ Hildyard also added that Kırca pointed out that ‘Britain has always shown understanding of the Turkish case.’⁷¹¹

On the other hand, the Turkish side’s statements after the Geneva conferences did not match with Kırca’s explanations. Kırca might have assessed the situation from his own perspective or tried to use diplomatic language not to worsen the relation with the British government over the Cyprus dispute, especially when Ankara needed more international support while conducting the second military operation on the island because, contrary to Kırca’s words, the Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güneş’s announcements after the second Geneva conference seemed to present a genuine Turkish view on the British government’s attitude at the Geneva talks. In his

⁷⁰⁷ *The Times*, 15 August 1974.

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁷¹⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1921, ‘Cyprus’ letter from D. H. T. Hildyard, UK Permanent Representative to the UN and other International Organisations in Geneva, to the Secretary of State, Callaghan, 23 August 1974.

⁷¹¹ Ibid.

interview with the German newspaper *Die Welt*, Güneş accused the British side and showed them as being responsible for the failure of the talks. David Dain, the First Secretary at the British Embassy in Bonn, reported that:

*'Güneş blamed Callaghan for the breakdown of the conference and accused the UK of making it impossible to reach an understanding at the conference because of the one-sided British attitude over Cyprus which had contributed to the hardening of the Greek position.'*⁷¹²

Another argument by the Turkish Foreign Minister was that Callaghan was against the Turkish military existence on the island because this 'would reduce the value of the British bases and would revive the earlier international discussion about the rights of the British to maintain their military presence in Cyprus.'⁷¹³ It can be said that the personal relations between the Callaghan and Güneş were not on a good level. In particular, as mentioned before, Callaghan's harsh attitude towards Güneş at the first Geneva talks might have led the Turkish Foreign Minister to criticize Callaghan in that respect. According to Dain's letter to London, in the interview, Güneş also defended that during the Geneva conference, 'Callaghan was interested in nothing other than removing Turkish forces from Cyprus.'⁷¹⁴ He also added that the relations between the United States and Turkey were not affected adversely after the breakdown of the Geneva talk because the United States supported the Turkish idea of generating autonomous areas for the Turkish community on the island.⁷¹⁵ Güneş had noticed during the conference distinct differences between British and American approach. He indicated that:

*the American position was essentially more understanding and flexible than London's... not only United States but also the Soviet Union had shown more understanding for the Turkish position than had Mr Wilson's government, whose pro-Greek attitude had become daily more evident after the fall of the military government in Athens. In the United Nations Security Council debates on Cyprus, there had been no criticism of Turkish behaviour by the Americans and Russians. Only Britain and France had made speeches against Turkey.'*⁷¹⁶

From Callaghan's point of view, he, of course, would not accept the allegation that his attitude was in favour of the Greek side but in his telephone conversation with Kissinger, Callaghan admitted that he had not put sufficient pressure on the Greek at

⁷¹² PRO: FCO 9/1921, 'Die Welt interview with the Turkish Foreign Minister', letter from D. J. M. Dain, the First Secretary at the British Embassy in Bonn, to R. F. Cornish, Southern European Department, FCO, 20 August 1974.

⁷¹³ Ibid.

⁷¹⁴ Ibid.

⁷¹⁵ Ibid.

⁷¹⁶ Ibid.

the second Geneva conference. He said that: 'My own very strong view is that if I reproach myself with one thing it is that I did not put more pressure on the Greeks earlier than I did.'⁷¹⁷

On the other hand, while Güneş criticised British attitudes and praised American understanding of the Turkish position in the Geneva conference, the Greek side had a different opinion on the British and American role in the Geneva process. Makarios said that he was disappointed by the American approach to the Cyprus crisis. He expressed the view the view that the United States could have prevented the Turkish military action by exerting pressure on Turkey. Makarios also announced that he was pleased with the efforts of Callaghan and the British government.⁷¹⁸

After the failure of the second Geneva conference, Callaghan returned to Britain. A meeting was arranged in London at 10 Downing Street on 14 August to discuss the existing state of the Cyprus problem. In this meeting, Callaghan said that there would be no diplomatic solution for the Cyprus issue at the present. He indicated that the Turks were going to choose military action as the solution of the problem and he added that 'there was no possibility of stopping the Turks from achieving their military objective.'⁷¹⁹ He again mentioned that American willingness to take military action against Ankara was preventing Britain to act militarily.⁷²⁰ The Prime Minister, Wilson, was against any idea of using British troops without American and the UN help to stop the Turkish military advance in Cyprus. He told Callaghan that 'if he was asked whether Britain was considering a major military role the answer must be no.'⁷²¹ In the meeting, the question of any possible Turkish request of using the British Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus was also discussed. The Minister of State for Defence, Roy Mason, said that the Turks might want to use the SBAs to pass through them. Such permission from Britain would not be welcomed by the Greeks. In the end, it was decided that a diplomatic initiative would be taken with the other

⁷¹⁷ PRO: PREM 16/20, 'record of a telephone conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Dr. Henry Kissinger and the President of the United States at 2. 45 PM on Wednesday,' 14 August 1974.

⁷¹⁸ *The Times*, 15 August 1974.

⁷¹⁹ PRO: PREM 16/20, 'record of a meeting at 10 Downing Street at 3. 00 p.m. on Wednesday', 14 August 1974.

⁷²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷²¹ *Ibid.*

governments included Greece, Turkey to 'ensure that the neutrality of SBAs should be respected.'⁷²²

The second Turkish military intervention in Cyprus started on 14 August. After that, the Turkish government issued a declaration which was aimed to explain that why Turkey decided to take such an action. After mentioning the Greek coup on 15 July on the island and the Turkish reaction to the coup, it was said that from the discussions at the second Geneva conference, Turkey realized once again that Greece would never renounce from its goal to unite the island with the Greece. It was also stated that the Greeks did not want to accept 'the recognition of equal rights and opportunities and well deserved security to the Turkish Community.'⁷²³ The Greek attitude was presented as being responsible the existing situation on the island and it was indicated that:

*...under these circumstances, it has become obvious that all peaceful representations that have been cried out by Turkey with utmost goodwill and patience would not culminate in a positive result. Turkey has been compelled to take unilateral action...*⁷²⁴

Turkey was aware of the fact that there could be some strong international reaction to the second Turkish intervention. Therefore, to reduce any possible reaction, it was also underlined in the declaration that:

*This action is not against Greece. Nor is it against the Greek Cypriot community. This action is aimed at safeguarding the independence of Cyprus, securing peace and tranquillity for the Turkish and Greek communities and establishing a durable peace in the region.*⁷²⁵

On the first day of the military action, Ecevit also made a statement and said that 'the operation will be completed in a very short time.'⁷²⁶ He also again underlined the view that Ankara did not have any intention of invading Cyprus. He indicated that the aim of the operation 'was to save Cyprus and to put an end to the suffering the Turkish Cypriots have had to endure over the years.'⁷²⁷

After the Turks started to conduct their second intervention, Callaghan spoke to Kissinger on the phone to evaluate the situation. When Kissinger asked Callaghan

⁷²² Ibid.

⁷²³ PRO: FCO 9/1921, 'Turkish government Declaration', registry no: 16, 16 August 1974.

⁷²⁴ Ibid.

⁷²⁵ Ibid.

⁷²⁶ *The Times*, 15 August 1974.

⁷²⁷ Ibid.

what his view on what the American and British stand was,⁷²⁸ Callaghan already knew that there was nothing that could be done to change the situation on the island either militarily or diplomatically while the Turkish forces were already advancing. Hence, he replied Kissinger's question that:

*Well, I was just thinking- I think in military terms; obviously the Turks will carry on until they have got this line that they have figured out on the map, let's hope they get it quickly.*⁷²⁹

Kissinger said that he agreed with Callaghan's judgment.⁷³⁰ The United Nations Secretary-General Waldheim's thoughts on the course of the second Turkish military operation were also similar to Callaghan's. On 14 August, he told the British Prime Minister, Wilson, that the Turks would continue their operation until they gained the control of the northern sector of the island.⁷³¹ In fact, it seems that Callaghan was in a difficult position. After the first Geneva conference, an agreement was reached between the parties, though both sides accused each other of violating it. As mentioned before, Callaghan's role in this process was praised by his own Prime Minister, Wilson, and the American Secretary of State, Kissinger. Although it was a fact that there was no great expectation that the second Geneva conference would find a solution to the problem, any possible agreement from this talk would have brought a relaxation to the region. From this point of view, the second Geneva conference was considered as an important event. Therefore, Callaghan might have felt sorry to have missed the chance to end the Cyprus dispute. However, after the second Geneva process had ended in failure, the new American President, Gerald Ford, personally told Callaghan himself⁷³² and Harold Wilson⁷³³ that he was grateful for the efforts made by the British Foreign Secretary in the second Geneva talks.

⁷²⁸ PRO: PREM 16/20, 'record of a telephone conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Dr. Henry Kissinger and the President of the United States at 2. 45 PM on Wednesday,' 14 August 1974.

⁷²⁸ *The Times*, 15 August 1974.

⁷²⁹ Ibid.

⁷³⁰ Ibid.

⁷³¹ PRO: PREM 16/20, 'record of a conversation between the British Prime Minister and the Secretary-General of the United Nations at 4. 00 p.m. on Wednesday at 10 Downing Street,' 14 August 1974.

⁷³² PRO: PREM 16/20, op. cit.

⁷³³ PRO: PREM 16/20, 'record of a telephone conversation between the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States at 5. 00 PM on Wednesday,' 14 August 1974.

Furthermore, the UN Secretary-General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, also told Wilson that he appreciated Callaghan's effort to achieve an acceptable compromise at Geneva.⁷³⁴

Meanwhile, the Turkish military operation was continuing in Cyprus. On the third day of the intervention, Callaghan predicted that the Turks would hope to restart talks soon because economic burdens would lead them to do so. In addition, Callaghan emphasized the fact that that international pressure on the Turkish government would be also an important factor in forcing Turkey to end its military operation in Cyprus and resuming negotiations. In this respect, he thought that Ankara would want to settle before the United Nations General Assembly meeting on 17 September to avoid facing any possible resolution against them.⁷³⁵ In fact, the Turkish government had already planned to end its military operation in Cyprus. The Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, invited the British ambassador, Phillips, on 16 August and told him to confirm to Callaghan that Ankara would be ending its operation by night and then, would be ready to continue talks at any time.⁷³⁶

Callaghan expressed the view that Britain did not approve the Turkish decision of using military option, but he pointed out that the general the Greek Cypriot behaviour towards the Turkish community in the past provided an excuse for the situation on the island.⁷³⁷ Another point that Callaghan had to evaluate was the possible solutions to the Cyprus dispute after Turkish military action. In the second Geneva conference, the Greek side was against the Turkish proposal for the establishment of two different autonomous administrations for the both communities on the island which would be based on geographical separation.

However, Callaghan thought that after the second Turkish military action, the Greek Cypriots might accept a geographical separation because there had already been huge population movements across the island from the both communities⁷³⁸ while the Turkish Cypriots were moving the areas which were seized by the Turkish forces, the Greeks were moving other way round. According to Ecevit's statement, the Turkish

⁷³⁴ PRO: PREM 16/20, 'record of a conversation between the British Prime Minister and the Secretary-General of the United Nations at 4. 00 p.m. on Wednesday at 10 Downing Street,' 14 August 1974.

⁷³⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1921, 'Cyprus', immediate telegram (confidential) from Callaghan to Tehran, no: 346, 16 August 1974.

⁷³⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1927, 'Cyprus problem: stage 3 negotiations between UK, Greece and Turkey', immediate telegram (confidential) from the British Ambassador in Ankara, Phillips, to FCO, no: 1006, 16 August 1974.

⁷³⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1921, op. cit.

⁷³⁸ Ibid.

government already expected high number of voluntary movements of the Turkish Cypriots but he also said that the Greek Cypriots would not be forcibly expelled from the Turkish-held regions.⁷³⁹ As Callaghan remarked, this situation in Cyprus was establishing grounds for the geographical separation. On the other hand, he also argued that the Greek side would not agree with the Turkish request for 34 per cent of the island because this amount was higher than the population percentage of the Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, he believed that the Turks would need to be ready to negotiate on the size of their sector, if they want the Greek to return to the conference table.⁷⁴⁰

However, Ecevit told Phillips that some changes might have made in the Turkish proposals at Geneva if the Greek negotiated with them ‘sincerely’ but he underlined the fact that the second Turkish intervention had removed this possibility.⁷⁴¹ This meant that Turkey would not accept any offer abandoning geographical separation of the two communities. Furthermore, Callaghan also mentioned that because of there was no determination to use force against the Turks, the actions outside Cyprus to stop the Turkish military operation would be confined to the diplomatic field.⁷⁴²

The Turkish intervention ended on 16 August. Besides 30.000 Turkish troops which were accompanied by 200 tanks, the Turkish army also had a strong air support in this operation.⁷⁴³ As a result of this, after three days fighting, the Turks gained control of the northern 36 percent of the island.⁷⁴⁴ Then, a ceasefire call was made by Ankara and it was stated that the Turkish government was ready to return to the conference table.⁷⁴⁵ Clerides replied to Turkey’s offer on behalf the Greek side and announced that the ceasefire had been accepted.⁷⁴⁶

⁷³⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1927, ‘ Turkish objectives in Cyprus’, report sent from P. Mangold, Western and Southern European Section Research Department, to Mr. Miles, South East European Department (SEED), FCO, 28 August 1974.

⁷⁴⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1921, immediate telegram (confidential) from Callaghan to Tehran, no: 346, 16 August 1974.

⁷⁴¹ PRO: FCO 9/1927, immediate telegram (confidential) from the British Ambassador in Ankara, Phillips, to FCO, no: 1006, 16 August 1974.

⁷⁴² PRO: FCO 9/1921, op. cit.

⁷⁴³ PRO: FCO 9/2149, ‘Cyprus: annual review for 1974’, report from ‘the British High Commissioner at Nicosia to the Secretary of State for Foreign and commonwealth Affairs’, 21 February 1975.

⁷⁴⁴ Ibid.; Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 211.

⁷⁴⁵ *The Times*, 17 August 1974.

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid.

The British and International Reaction to the second Turkish movement

There were differences between the reactions showed towards the first and second Turkish intervention. Because the first Turkish military operation was generally considered to be a righteous action against the junta on the island, Ankara had not come in for so much criticism. However, after the second advance, world opinion seemed to turn against the Turkish government. In particular, the fall of the junta in Athens and the establishment of the Karamanlis government increased the international expectation that a solution would come from dialogue between Turkish and Greek governments. Therefore, it appeared to be difficult for Turkey to justify the reason for its second offensive in the international arena. Consequently, it was started to be regarded as an 'occupation'.⁷⁴⁷

As happened after the first Turkish intervention, which had started on 20 July, as a reaction to the second Turkish advance, the United Nations Security Council again adopted a resolution on 16 August by which the organisation recalled its resolution 353 of 20 July and demanded the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cyprus. It was stated that the Security Council was gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation on the island. Furthermore, it was stated that the military action by the Turkish government was formally disapproved of by the United Nations.⁷⁴⁸ The Security Council resolution clearly showed that the United Nations did not recognise the Turkish excuse for conducting of the second advance on the island.

,From Ankara's perspective, Turkey's Permanent Representative in Geneva, Coşkun Kırca, told his British counterpart, Hildyard, that the Turks could not accept the resolution. He also said that 'the Turks could not agree that it should be in the background to any further meeting or that it should be mentioned any new agreement'.⁷⁴⁹ Accepting the resolution as a basis for the further negotiation would force Turkey to withdraw its forces from the island before reaching a settlement. According to Turkish opinion, there was no guarantee that any further negotiation process would bring a solution to the Cyprus dispute in a short time. When taking past negotiation processes between the two communities as a reference, it was most

⁷⁴⁷ Fırat, 'Yunanistan'la İlişkiler', p. 748.

⁷⁴⁸ UN Security Council Resolutions, 16 August 1974, Res. 360.

⁷⁴⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1921, 'Cyprus' letter from D. H. T. Hildyard, to the Secretary of State, Callaghan, 23 August 1974.

likely that any further talks would not be easy. Therefore, the Turks thought that after the withdrawal of their forces, there was a danger that a long negotiation period for a settlement could have worsened the condition of the Turkish Cypriot community again which would render meaningless the purpose the past two Turkish military interventions. Kirca also accused the Greeks of expecting that Turkey would be forced to resign from its demands in the Cyprus issue by the rest of the world, particularly Western powers.⁷⁵⁰ He defended that this idea of the Greek side had led them to be unwilling to accept ‘the need for constitutional changes during the second phase of the Geneva conference.’⁷⁵¹

Apart from the Kirca’s explanation about the situation of the Turkish troops on the island, when Haluk Ulman, Ecevit’s foreign affairs adviser, and the Turkish Senator, Kamuran İnan, met the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, David Ennals, in London, they also gave a similar explanation. Ennals asked about the reduction and withdrawal situation of the Turkish troops by referring to Security Council resolution no. 360. Ulman replied that ‘the sooner an agreement could be reach on Cyprus; the sooner reduction would take place.’⁷⁵² His answer was another example of the Ankara’s determination not to withdraw its forces from the island completely until reaching a settlement.

Actually, the purpose of the visit of Ulman and İnan to London was ‘to explain the Turkish position and to hear the British view’⁷⁵³ on the course of the Cyprus problem. The Turkish side was also hoping that the British could use their influence to help to bring the parties back to the negotiation table. Apart from the withdrawal issue, Ennals also asked the size of the Turkish area in Cyprus. He also mentioned the Turks had previously announced that they requested for 34 percent of the island and added that ‘this was difficult to justify’⁷⁵⁴ because of the population rate of the Turkish community on the island. İnan replied that the Turkish government was not thinking of indicating any percentage at this stage and ‘the size of the territory issue should be subject to negotiation’⁷⁵⁵ between the parties. Although Ennals suggested

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁵¹ Ibid.

⁷⁵² PRO: FCO 9/1927, ‘record of conversation between the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Special advisor for foreign affairs to the Turkish Prime Minister and senator İnan at the Foreign and Commonwealth office at 11.30 am’, 27 August 1974.

⁷⁵³ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid.

that without knowing the specific demand of the Turkish side they could not use their influence on Greek to any effect, the Turkish delegations refrained from giving any specific information about the territory issue.⁷⁵⁶

When the first Turkish military operation started, the British government made it clear that it did not support the Turkish action. After the failure of the second Geneva talks and the beginning of the Turkish offensive, there was no change in the British response to the second intervention. In fact, the reactions of the British government were understandable because it was a general British policy that Britain had been in favour of searching for a solution for the dispute through the inter-communal dialogue and supported any initiatives taken in this perspective.

The failure of the Geneva talks and the Turkish intervention could lead Britain to revise its policy over the Cyprus problem and not to take part in any future negotiation process, but Callaghan's words after the Turkish military operation showed that there would be no major change in the British policy. He said that if the parties did not raise an objection, there would be no problem for him to continue to play a leading role in the search for a solution.⁷⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the only point Callaghan stated that Britain would be ready to continue negotiations 'as soon as there was some assurance that these would be productive.'⁷⁵⁸

The deadlock in the Geneva conferences might have led Callaghan to think like that. He said that before starting any future talks, he wanted to be certain that the Greeks Cypriots were not going to completely reject any offer of a solution based on the geographical separation of the two communities because Callaghan knew that Ankara would insist on its proposals, in particular, after the military operation in Cyprus. Therefore, any rejection from the Greeks (before resuming negotiations) meant that no agreement would appear in negotiations between the two communities.

Callaghan also expressed the view the view that the Turks would need to be ready to 'negotiate seriously to reach a settlement rather than just proceeded by "ultimatum"'⁷⁵⁹

⁷⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1921, 'Cyprus', immediate telegram (confidential) from Callaghan to certain posts and missions, no: 111, 30 August 1974.

⁷⁵⁸ PRO: FCO 9/1921, 'Cyprus', immediate telegram (confidential) from Callaghan to Tehran, no: 346, 16 August 1974.

⁷⁵⁹ Ibid.

This was the Callaghan's new strategy to reach a settlement in further Cyprus negotiations. After meeting with Henry Kissinger the British ambassador to Washington, Ramsbotham, reported to London that Kissinger found Callaghan's ideas for the reopening the negotiation very positive. According to the British ambassador, Kissinger gave the impression that he would surely support it.⁷⁶⁰ He also expressed the view that Kissinger was happy with Callaghan's acceptance of taking role in the further talks for the solution of the dispute.

Sir Alan Goodison, Head of the FCO's South East European Department, also made an assessment on the course of the British policy over the Cyprus dispute after the second Geneva conference. He pointed out the danger of the Soviet influence in the Eastern Mediterranean region and said that continuation of the Cyprus problem was giving greater opportunity to them to intervene in the region.⁷⁶¹ Therefore, he said that the British interests 'must lie in the achievement of a satisfactory settlement.'⁷⁶² Apart from the British government's effort to find a settlement to the Cyprus dispute, there was another issue for the Wilson government to solve which was the evacuation of the Britons from the island.

The Turkish military action also affected the British who were living on the island. Britain had two military bases in Cyprus. As a result of this, there were many British service families across the island and it was difficult to provide protection for them. Thus, the British government took a decision to return these families members, whose number was nearly ten thousand, to the United Kingdom.⁷⁶³

⁷⁶⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1927, 'Cyprus negotiations', immediate telegram (confidential) from the British Ambassador to Washington, Ramsbotham, to FCO, no: 2733, 17 August 1974.

⁷⁶¹ PRO: FCO 9/1927, 'Cyprus: the prospects for the further negotiations', report from A. C. Goodison, SEED, FCO to Sir John Killick, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth, 19 August 1974.

⁷⁶² Ibid.

⁷⁶³ *The Times*, 15 August 1974.

Form to be completed by UK based staff whose families were prematurely repatriated, compulsorily, from Cyprus during July and August, 1974.

1. Name in full
2. Grade 3. Pay No
4. Name of place of duty
5. Salary (gross) per annum
6. Wife's name in full
7. Entitled dependants

| | | |
|-----------|---------------|-----|
| Full name | Date of birth | Age |
|-----------|---------------|-----|
8. Date the above family members left Cyprus for the UK
9. Accommodation occupied by my family in the UK to date

| | | |
|-------------|---------|---|
| Address(es) | Date(s) | Description of Accommodation (see note 1) |
|-------------|---------|---|
10. Do you agree that your wife may be paid the special allowances recently announced to help you meet your family expenses in the UK? If so, and you wish payment made into a bank or giro account, please give address of the bank and account number or giro account number. If you have a joint account, please indicate accordingly.

Certificate. I certify that:

- a. the above statements are correct;
- b. I will report any changes in the circumstances that might affect my entitlement immediately; and
- c. I will notify Acs 5B3 if I return to the UK at the end of my tour of duty before 1 January 1975.

Date Signature

Notes:

1. Insert the appropriate description, eg hotel, guest house, boarding house, friend's or relative's private dwelling, own home, temporary furnished accommodation, temporary unfurnished accommodation.
2. If your family lives in a hotel etc, please ensure that your wife retains all receipts for her expenses on accommodation and food.
3. If your family is in temporary accommodation, please ensure that your wife understands she will be required to produce evidence of rent expenses.

British government was helping the UK staff's families who were evacuated from the island to Britain after the Turkish military operations.

Source: PRO: FCO 77/248, 'Evacuation of Embassy staff from Cyprus'.

The reaction of Greece towards the second Turkish advance was important. Any counter attack from the Greek government could lead to a war between Turkey and Greece. On the second day of the Turkish Intervention, the Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis made a speech addressed to nation on which he said 'Greece would not go to war.'⁷⁶⁴ He also explained that why the Greek government would not launch an attack on the Turks. He said that the distance between Greece and Cyprus,

⁷⁶⁴ *The Times*, 16 August 1974.

and the danger of risking Greece's own defence were some of the important reasons for Greece to not to respond to the Turkish military action.⁷⁶⁵

On the other hand, although Karamanlis's message showed that Greece would not take military action against the Turks, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson sent a personal message to him and said that he heard from the British ambassador to Athens, Sir Robin Hooper, that the possibility of 'sending a military division by convoy to Cyprus was still under discussion in Athens.'⁷⁶⁶ Wilson indicated that:

*This would be a most unwise course...because it would increase risk of further Turkish force being sent to island and those already there moving yet further forward.*⁷⁶⁷

It was also stated that in case of an outbreak of war with Turkey after such an action by Athens, Britain and the United States could not guarantee that they would provide air protection for Greece against the Turkish air force.⁷⁶⁸

Eventually, as Karamanlis stated in his speech, Greece did not use its forces as a response to the Turkish intervention on the island and the Greek Cypriot National Guard Army also did not have enough power to stop the Turks. Therefore, Ankara did not face real difficulty while conducting its second operation. However, it was reported from the British High Commission in Nicosia that there were some rumours that preparations for guerrilla warfare was being made by armed bands in the Greek Cypriot area.⁷⁶⁹ Clerides indicated publicly that 'this might happen, whether his government wished it or not.'⁷⁷⁰ The Turkish reply was strong to those rumours. Denktash expressed the view that in case of any movement of guerrilla warfare against the Turks, the Turkish forces would continue to their advance until they gained control of the island.⁷⁷¹ According to the British High Commission's assessment, it was early to talk about any action from the Greek Cypriots' armed bands against the Turkish forces which it might never happen, though uncertainty in negotiations for the settlement could trigger it. The High Commission reported

⁷⁶⁵ PRO: PREM 16/20, telegram from the British Ambassador to Athens, Hooper, to FCO, no: 460, 16 August 1974.

⁷⁶⁶ PRO: PREM 16/20, the British Prime Minister's message to Karamanlis, 16 August 1974.

⁷⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1889, 'EOKA-B in Cyprus', 'Guerrilla warfare', letter from M. Perceval, First Secretary in the British High Commission in Nicosia, to M. Weston (South East European Department, FCO), 30 August 1974.

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁷¹ Ibid.

that the danger for Britain was in the case of any conflict, 'potential guerrillas might try to use the SBAs as a haven for strikes the Turks or hope to embroil them with British and broaden the conflict'⁷⁷² which could put Britain in a difficult situation. Although the Turkish government indicated many times that the purpose of the operation was to bring "peace" to the island, the Greek side never thought like that. According to the Greek government's evaluation, the Turkish intervention in Cyprus was not a spontaneous decision by Ankara. During his visit to Paris, the Greek Foreign Minister, Mavros, asserted that

*The Turkish operation had been prepared for a year two previously, which demonstrated that the present Turkish regime was motivated by expansionism and shared certain characteristics with the Ottoman Empire.*⁷⁷³

This statement showed that how the Greeks looked at the Turkish military in intervention in Cyprus. There were huge differences between the Greek and Turkish approach. While the Turkish called it as "peace operation" the Greeks regarded it as "invasion".

As stated before, Greece also was not happy with the United States government's reaction to the Turkish military operation. Actually, the American government knew that the Turkish intervention would have some adverse impact on relations between Athens and Washington. Hence, Kissinger sent a compassionate message to the Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis, on 17 August and said that the United States government understood of his difficulties and 'willing to help in finding a reasonable solution'.⁷⁷⁴ It seems that the empathetic message of Kissinger would not be enough to decrease the level of anger against the American government. It was also announced by the Greek Prime Minister that Kissinger also invited the Greek Foreign Minister Mavros, to Washington in order to discuss possible ways to settle the critical situation in Cyprus⁷⁷⁵ which was rejected by the Greek government. Apart from the people in Greece, there was also frustration among the Greek Cypriots on the island against the second Turkish advance. In parallel to Makarios' explanations, which tended to present the American attitude as being responsible for the Turkish action, the Greek Cypriot community was also blaming the United States for what

⁷⁷² Ibid.

⁷⁷³ PRO: FCO 9/1927, 'Greek Foreign Minister's visit to Paris', immediate telegram (confidential) from the British Embassy in Paris to FCO, no: 966, 6 September 1974.

⁷⁷⁴ PRO: FCO 9/1927, 'Cyprus negotiations', immediate telegram (confidential) from the British Ambassador to Washington, Ramsbotham, to FCO, no: 2733, 17 August 1974.

⁷⁷⁵ *The Times*, 16 August 1974.

happened in Cyprus. As a result of this, there were anti-American protests on the island and the American ambassador to Cyprus, Rodger Davies was killed during the anti-American riot on 19 August by the one of the Greek Cypriot protestors.⁷⁷⁶ Henry Kissinger also sent a message to the Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit. In contrast to his message to the Greek Prime Minister, Callaghan sent a tough message to Ecevit. He notified him that the Turks would need to relinquish some of the places in Cyprus which they had taken during the second Turkish advance.⁷⁷⁷ Kissinger had also advised them to 'return to the negotiation table.'⁷⁷⁸

In fact, although there was no major reaction to the British government, it was generally difficult to say that the Greeks were fully content with the British efforts to stop the Turks. The Greek ambassador to London, Stavros Roussos, told the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Roy Hattersley, that 'the Greek government had not been happy with the way Britain had interpreted its responsibilities in Cyprus.'⁷⁷⁹ However, when compared with the American government's approach the crisis, which had strong military relation with Ankara and huge potential to affect the Turkish decision, the Greek side seemed to be pleased with the British government's approach to handling the crisis.

Apart from criticising the United States government, Greece had also complained about NATO's position in the crisis. As mentioned before, after the first Turkish intervention, Athens made a movement to leave from NATO. This attempt was prevented by the United Nations diplomatic intervention. Nevertheless, as a reaction to the second Turkish advance, it was announced by the Greek government that Greek armed forces had been withdrawn from NATO on 14 August. The reason for this action was NATO's failure to prevent the Turks from carrying out a military operation. However, Greece did not completely leave the alliance. There would be Greek participation in the political activities of NATO.⁷⁸⁰ The British government was not happy with the Athens' decision. Callaghan said that 'we hope that the

⁷⁷⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1921, PRO: FCO 9/1921, 'Cyprus', immediate telegram (confidential) from Callaghan to certain posts and missions, no: 111, 30 August 1974.

⁷⁷⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1927, op. cit.

⁷⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1927, 'record of conversation between the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Greek ambassador at the FCO on Thursday', 5 September 1974.

⁷⁸⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1921, 'Cyprus', immediate telegram (confidential) from Callaghan to Tehran, no: 346, 16 August 1974.

Greek decision may not be irrevocable.’⁷⁸¹ Later, the Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis, sent a letter to the British Prime Minister, Wilson, and explained the reasons behind the Athens decision. He said that the events happened in Cyprus showed that there was a ‘grave weakness in the fabric of the alliance.’⁷⁸² He also expressed the view that NATO’s failure in preventing an armed conflict between two its members had given a damage to the Alliance’s credibility and also caused the effectiveness of the alliance against external threats to be questioned.⁷⁸³

The decision by Greece could damage to the southern flank of NATO. Turkey and Greece were regarded as important members of NATO and the deterioration of their relations over the Cyprus issue would not bring any benefit to the organisation. As a result of this, Secretary-General of NATO, Dr. Josef Luns, decided to follow the situation closely. For this purpose, he was thinking of visiting Ankara, but he told Callaghan that the Turkish respond to his request had been negative.⁷⁸⁴ He said that after the Turkish reply, he started to think that Chief of the General Staff was in full control of the Turkish government.⁷⁸⁵ Callaghan indicated that he was not sure about Dr. Luns’ assessment since he suggested that the difficulties at Geneva had been because of the different approaches in the Turkish coalition cabinet between Ecevit’s the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and the National Salvation Party (NSP) rather than because of disagreement between the cabinet and military.⁷⁸⁶ Although the influence of the Turkish army over the Turkish political life was an indisputable fact, Callaghan’s observation had also a point which was correct. Ecevit later explained that his government could not offer concessions to Greece to start the negotiations again after the second offensive because a political struggle inside the coalition cabinet had stopped the government from doing so.⁷⁸⁷

⁷⁸¹ Ibid.

⁷⁸² PRO: PREM 16/21, ‘‘Coup d’état in Cyprus, part 3’’, the Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis’ message to the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson on 28 August 1974, immediate telegram (confidential) from the British Embassy in Athens to London, no: 510, 29 August 1974.

⁷⁸³ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁴ PRO: PREM 16/20, record of a meeting between the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Secretary-General of NATO at FCO on Thursday at 12.45 pm, 15 August 1974.


⁷⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁷ Bölükbaşı, *Turkish American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 211.

The Cyprus problem after the second Turkish military operation

After the end of the second Turkish military advance, the important question in the Cyprus problem was that which measures would be taken to prevent any future conflict between the two sides and to bring a permanent solution to the dispute. From this point of view, the restarting of negotiations was regarded as an important step towards normalisation on the island. Callaghan stated that there was no problem with the Turks in terms of the resumption of talks. He said the Turks declared even before 16 August that they would be ready to continue negotiations immediately.⁷⁸⁸ However, Callaghan also added that the Greek side were most likely not to resume negotiations without any precondition.



The situation on the island after the second Turkish advance.

Source: *The Times*, 17 August 1974.

From the Greek perspective, asking for some concessions from the Turks before taking part in the negotiation table seemed to be understandable because they felt that their national pride was hurt by Turkish actions. In this respect, the Greek Foreign Minister, Mavros, also told the British ambassador, Hooper, on 2 September that

⁷⁸⁸ PRO: FCO 9/1921, 'Cyprus', immediate telegram (confidential) from Callaghan to certain posts and missions, no: 111, 30 August 1974.

there was no possibility of resumption of talks ‘until conditions had been created in which an honourable settlement was possible.’⁷⁸⁹ The Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis, also made a similar statement with Mavros. He said that ‘Greece could not and never would, accept a settlement in Cyprus which would be regarded as a national humiliation.’⁷⁹⁰ However, according to Callaghan, if the Greeks demanded preconditions, such as return of the Turkish troops to the 9 August cease-fire line, it was most likely that negotiations process would not be restarted.⁷⁹¹ Callaghan also started to regard a bi-regional federation option as the basis of a durable solution in the Cyprus problem which was also defended by the Turks but he also said that in this case, the Turks would have to make some gestures, such as ‘the Turkish withdrawal from the formerly Greek part of the city of Famagusta and acceptance of the return of the refugees to their homes throughout the island.’⁷⁹² According to him, these kind of gestures would help the Greeks negotiate on the basis of a bi-regional federation without endangering their domestic position⁷⁹³ because they would have a chance to show their people that not only they, but also the Turks were making some concessions to reach an agreement.

Hildyard reported to London after his talks with Kırca that the Turks seemed to accept the idea to make concessions which ‘could be claimed as a victory by the Greeks, and as a justification for returning to the conference.’⁷⁹⁴ However, Hildyard also mentioned that the Turks would not make concessions on their principle of a Turkish autonomous region and there would be no possibility to leave Famagusta to the Greeks, though the Turks appeared not to raise an objection to the return of the Greek Cypriots to their areas.⁷⁹⁵ The statements of the Turkish officials showed that the Turks were going to make some concessions to begin again negotiations. In his visit to London on 22 October, Denktash would also tell Callaghan that he accepted

⁷⁸⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1927, ‘Cyprus’, immediate telegram (confidential) from the British Ambassador to Athens, Hooper, to FCO, no: 519, 2 September 1974.

⁷⁹⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1927, immediate telegram (confidential) from the British Ambassador to Athens, Hooper, to FCO, no: 520, 2 September 1974.

⁷⁹¹ PRO: FCO 9/1921, op. cit.

⁷⁹² Ibid.

⁷⁹³ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁴ PRO: FCO 9/1921, ‘Cyprus’ letter from D. H. T. Hildyard, to the Secretary of State, Callaghan, 23 August 1974.

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid.

that ‘in order to achieve a settlement he must make some concessions.’⁷⁹⁶ However, the concessions that the Turks would offer were not mostly likely to be as big as the Greek side expected.

Callaghan also indicated that the British government would welcome the political pressures, which aimed to urge the parties to resume negotiations, whether from Western European countries or more broadly General Assembly.⁷⁹⁷ He said that lack of progress in proceeding talks would have its own danger. He explained that if the negotiation did not restart, the Turks could make another military move which would make the resumption of dialogue process much harder. Furthermore, Callaghan also said that the danger for talks could also come from the Greek side, as mentioned before, the risk of guerrilla activities by the Greek Cypriots or the risk of the possible Greek government military action against the Turks could adversely affect the efforts for the continuation of negotiations.⁷⁹⁸

Callaghan appeared to have a point to worry about because by the beginning of September, there was still uncertainty in reactivation of the talks, though the ceasefire was accepted on 16 August. The Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, told the British ambassador, Phillips, that in case of the Greek refusal of restarting talks, the two separate areas on the island would unavoidably consolidate their position without the connection with a central government.⁷⁹⁹ Denktash also suggested that there would be no any other option for him to declare the independence of the area held by the Turkish troops unilaterally in the case of the Greek refusal to start the peace negotiation with them.⁸⁰⁰ Mavros’ reply for the Denktash’s explanations was to say that the majority of the population in Cyprus were Greek and any ‘social upheaval and guerrilla warfare would make life difficult for the Turkish Troops.’⁸⁰¹

Apart from these discussions, there were still differences in the parties’ explanation of the negotiation process. Denktash told the press that he believed that a solution for

⁷⁹⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1956, ‘Visit by Rauf Denktash, Vice President of Cyprus, to London, 22-23 October 1974’, ‘record of conversation between the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Vice-President of Cyprus at the Foreign and Commonwealth office’, 22 October 1974.

⁷⁹⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1921, ‘Cyprus’, immediate telegram (confidential) from Callaghan to certain posts and missions, no: 111, 30 August 1974.

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1927, immediate telegram (confidential) from the British Ambassador to Ankara, Phillips, to FCO, no: 1006, 16 August 1974.

⁸⁰⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1927, ‘translation of Greek Foreign Minister Mavros’ interview with “Corriere della Sera”’, letter from the British Embassy in Italy to FCO’s Southern European Department, 28 August 1974.

⁸⁰¹ Ibid.

the Cyprus problem which was based primarily on geographical separation of the two communities on the island would be accepted by the Greeks. He also added that in less than one month's time, the Greeks would be ready to begin talks with the Turks.⁸⁰² However, the Greek Cypriot acting President, Clerides, made a completely different statement from the Denktash. He said that there would be no negotiations before the return of the refugees to their homes and 'they cannot accept negotiations based only on geographical federation'⁸⁰³

Actually, the Turks did not disagree with the Greeks request for the return of the all Greek Cypriots to their home but Ecevit's foreign affair advisor, Ulman, told the British Foreign Minister, Ennals that this would happen 'when there was agreed solution'⁸⁰⁴ which appeared to mean that the Turks would not accept the Greek demand for the refugees. Ulman also added that they were not planning a forced population exchanged between the two communities on the island.⁸⁰⁵ After the two different announcements by Clerides and Denktash, the British Commissioner on the island, Olver, made a comment on the leaders' explanations but his comment seemed to be one sided and tended to criticise only Denktash' attitude. He thought that the reason behind the Denktash's statement was likely to 'sabotage negotiations by provoking Clerides into a tough counter statement.'⁸⁰⁶ He also suggested that by doing so, Denktash was preparing 'the ground for the proclamation of an independent Turkish Republic of Cyprus.'⁸⁰⁷ Later, when Denktash spoke to Callaghan in London on 22 September, he asserted that Clerides agreed to the establishment of a bi-regional federation privately at Geneva, but he also said Clerides could not simply announce this publicly.⁸⁰⁸ Apart from Clerides, Makarios also indicated that he did not want a solution which would render geographical separation because, he meant that this type of settlement would require huge population transfers which was difficult to do. Also establishing a geographical

⁸⁰² PRO: FCO 9/1927, 'Denktash-Clerides' statements on negotiation', immediate telegram from British High Commissioner in Nicosia to FCO, no: 904, 5 September 1974.

⁸⁰³ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁴ PRO: FCO 9/1927, 'record of conversation between the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Special advisor for foreign affairs to the Turkish Prime Minister and senator İnan at the Foreign and Commonwealth office at 11.30 am', 27 August 1974.

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1927, 'Denktash-Clerides' statements on negotiation'.

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁸ PRO: FCO 9/1956, 'record of conversation between the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Vice-President of Cyprus at the Foreign and Commonwealth office', 22 October 1974.

federation without population transfers would cause many problems for the Cypriot people. Therefore, he believed that rather than being considered as a regional one, the Cyprus problem needed to be internationalised by bringing moral pressure on Turkey through the United Nations.⁸⁰⁹

Callaghan was making plans to bring the parties to the negotiation table. He thought to send a British minister to Nicosia, Ankara and Athens to try to narrow the gap between them but he indicated that this plan would not be applied unless the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, gave his support for it. Thus, Callaghan sent Sir John Killick, Permanent Under-Secretary at FCO, to Washington to assess Kissinger's opinion on his plan.⁸¹⁰ Killick told Kissinger about Callaghan's plan to send the British Minister of State at FCO, Roy Hattersley, to the area to 'undertake shuttle diplomacy between three capitals.'⁸¹¹ However, Kissinger did not want to take part in the British plan by giving the American support but he added that 'if the United Kingdom were to carry out through its initiative on its own, he would give his blessing.'⁸¹² After learning Kissinger's approach towards his proposal, Callaghan decided to cancel his plan. He also informed High Commissioner in Nicosia, Olver, about his decision and he added that other diplomatic means would be searched for so that negotiations could be resumed.⁸¹³

Later David Ennals, Minister of State at the FCO, sent a letter to Callaghan and asked permission to visit Nicosia. He argued that as one of the Guarantor power in the Treaty of Establishment, Britain seemed not to be active publicly in the Cyprus issue as they might have been. He said the main aim of his visit was to explore humanitarian problems. He also added that he would meet the community leaders Clerides and Denktash to talk about the course of further talks. He stated that his visit would demonstrate publicly 'Callaghan's continuing interest and concern in the Cyprus problem.'⁸¹⁴ However, when Hattersley mentioned to the Greek ambassador

⁸⁰⁹ PRO: PREM 16/21, 'record of conversation between the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Archbishop Makarios at the Foreign and Commonwealth office', 11 September 1974.

⁸¹⁰ PRO: PREM 16/21, immediate telegram from Callaghan to the British Embassy in Athens, no: 300, 25 August 1974.

⁸¹¹ *The Southern Flank in Crisis*, record of a meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Sir J. Killick held in the Department of State, Washington, WSC 3/304/2, document no: 84, 27 August 1974, p. 273.

⁸¹² *Ibid.*, p. 276.

⁸¹³ PRO: PREM 16/21, immediate telegram from Callaghan to British High Commission in Nicosia, no: 559, 29 August 1974.

⁸¹⁴ PRO: FCO 9/1927, letter (confidential) from David Ennals to Callaghan, September 1974.

Roussos, about the British plan to send a British minister to Cyprus to look at the humanitarian aspect of the problem,⁸¹⁵ Roussos thought that the plan had some risk for the British government. He believed that 'Britain should keep its prestige intact'⁸¹⁶ and added that: 'if a ministerial visit could bring about results, it could be useful; but if not, Britain would simply incur blame from both sides.'⁸¹⁷

While the efforts were continuing to reach an agreement between the Greek and Turkish sides in order to reopen the dialogue for a permanent solution for the problem, the Cypriot leaders Clerides and Denktash met on 6 September in the Ledra Palace UN conference area, Nicosia. This meeting was not intended to cover negotiations on the whole Cyprus dispute. At this stage, their discussions were mainly on humanitarian issues⁸¹⁸. After the meeting, it was announced that there was an agreement between the two leaders on the certain humanitarian points and some of them were:

1. to set up immediately a scheme for the general release of prisoners and detainees
2. to exchange list of missing persons and to make every effort to trace them
3. to give every assistance to the aged and infirm, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, who have found themselves isolated as a result of the hostilities.⁸¹⁹

It was also decided by Clerides and Denktash that they would held regular weekly meetings.

The Turkish Foreign Minister, Güneş, seemed to be pleased with the start of the meeting between Clerides and Denktash. He said that these meetings were a new element which 'would permit the revival of talks in more general.'⁸²⁰

In his report to London, Derek Day, the Counsellor at British High Commission in Nicosia, also indicated that although some main issues, such as refugee problems, remained untouched, 'this initial meeting had served a valuable purpose.'⁸²¹ He

⁸¹⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1927, record of conversation between the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Greek ambassador at the FCO on Thursday, 5 September 1974.

⁸¹⁶ Ibid.

⁸¹⁷ Ibid.

⁸¹⁸ Polyviou, *Cyprus Conflict*, p. 204.

⁸¹⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1927, 'Denktash-Clerides Meeting', telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to to FCO, no: 918, 7 September 1974.

⁸²⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1927, immediate telegram from John Armstrong Robinson, the British Ambassador in Algeria to FCO, no: 245, 7 September 1974.

⁸²¹ PRO: FCO 9/1927, immediate telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 930, 9 September 1974.

believed that ‘progress of lesser issues might improve the general climate’⁸²² for the solution of the Cyprus problem.

It seemed that it would take some time for Denktash and Clerides to start to deal with the whole Cyprus question because the parties appeared not ready for it yet. The Greek side did not completely focus on the reactivation of negotiations because of the election in November, which was won by Karamanlis in Greece. As a result of this situation, while going to London to discuss the situation in Cyprus, Clerides told in a press conference that he would not start any substantive negotiation unless consulting with the Greek government, and Archbishop Makarios in Athens⁸²³ to get a document presented an agreement on the framework of negotiations to which Clerides would follow while negotiating with the Turks. By requesting such a document, he might have also wanted to make sure about the Greek “red line” in talks before starting it. Thus, he could negotiate with the Turks according to that guideline. He emphasized that ‘he would not accept the role of the negotiator in the absence of a common line put down signed in writing and signed.’⁸²⁴

Meanwhile, while the reactivation process was continuing, there was another important development in the Cyprus problem which was the return of Archbishop Makarios to the island on 7 December. Although “EOKA” had lost its power and influence after the Turkish military operation, before Makarios’ return, some leaflets were circulated signed “EOKA” in which they asserted that Makarios’ reappearance in political life would only bring division and strife between the Greek Cypriots.⁸²⁵ The explanations indicated that the remaining “EOKA” member would continue to be oppose to the Archbishop’s political leadership.

Actually, there had been a struggle between Right and Left wing groups among the Greek Cypriots over the return of Makarios. While the Left wing groups had given their support the Archbishop and politically attacked the acting President Clerides, the extreme Right wing groups preferred Clerides to Makarios.⁸²⁶ The Turkish Foreign Minister, Güneş’ opinion about the return of the Archbishop to Cyprus had

⁸²² Ibid.

⁸²³ PRO: FCO 9/1928, ‘Cyprus problem: stage 3 negotiations between UK, Greece and Turkey’, ‘Cyprus settlement’, immediate telegram from Olver to FCO, no: 1220, 4 November 1974.

⁸²⁴ Ibid.

⁸²⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1886, ‘News Briefs’, ‘EOKA leaflet’, 5 December 1974.

⁸²⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1919, ‘Cyprus: internal affairs following military coup against President Makarios, 15 July 1974’, ‘Greek Cypriot internal scene’, letter from the British High Commission in Cyprus to SEED, FCO, 30 September 1974.

been also asked and he replied that 'if the Greek community wanted Makarios as its head, the Turks would not be opposed'⁸²⁷ but he also added that he personally did not think that 'Makarios was a valuable interlocutor to re-establish peace on the island.'⁸²⁸ The Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit's answer to the question on the return of Makarios was in parallel with Güneş. Ecevit said that: 'we are not interested what the Greeks do with him.'⁸²⁹ On the other hand, the Turkish Senator, İnan told Hattersley that he feared that return of Makarios could negatively affect any chance of finding a peaceful solution on the island. According to him, if Britain did not support his return Makarios would not make such a move. Hattersley replied that the British government was regarding the Archbishop as an elected President and it was impossible for it to prevent Makarios going to Cyprus.⁸³⁰

Another problem on the island was the situation of the Turkish Cypriot refugees in the British Western Sovereign Base Area which put Britain in a very difficult situation politically. After the second Turkish Military operation the Turks who lived southern part of the island took refuge in the British base in this area in order to be safe. When Denktash met Callaghan in London, he asked Callaghan to allow the refugees in the British base to leave in a Turkish ship. The refugees would go firstly Turkey and, then to the north of Cyprus. Callaghan replied that the British government could not permit the refugees to leave without an agreement between the Turkish and Greek side on this issue because the Greek side would be strongly against such an action from the British government. He added that although it was humanitarian problem, the political consequences of such an action could not be ignored.⁸³¹ Makarios explained to Callaghan the reason for the Greek refusal of the evacuation of the Turkish refugees from the British base. He said that if the British government agreed to remove the Turkish refugees, it 'would in effect be helping the Turks to populate the Northern area vacated by Greeks.'⁸³² However, as Callaghan

⁸²⁷ PRO: FCO 9/1927, immediate telegram from John Armstrong Robinson, the British Ambassador in Algeria to FCO, no: 245, 7 September 1974.

⁸²⁸ Ibid.

⁸²⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1928, 'Ecevit's interview in Der Spiegel on 16 September'.

⁸³⁰ PRO: FCO 9/1928, 'record of conversation between the Minister of State, Hattersley, and the Turkish Senator İnan at the Foreign and Commonwealth office', 15 November 1974.

⁸³¹ PRO: FCO 9/1956, 'Visit of Denktash & Turkish Cypriot refugees in the WSBA(Western Sovereign Base Area)', immediate telegram from FCO to British High Commission in Nicosia, no: 896, 23 November 1974.

⁸³² PRO: PREM 16/21, 'record of conversation between the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Archbishop Makarios at the Foreign and Commonwealth office', 11 September 1974.

stated when he met with the Greek Foreign Minister, Mavros, that the British government was subject to strong pressure by Ankara to permit the evacuation.⁸³³ The British ambassador to Turkey, Sir Horace Phillips, was also in a difficult situation. His New Year's Eve party was publicly boycotted by the Turkish government and there were articles against him in the Turkish press. Later, when Sir T. Brimelow, the Permanent under Secretary of State for FCO, met Turgut Menemencioğlu, the Turkish ambassador to the United Kingdom, he criticized the Turkish official's attitude towards the British ambassador in Ankara.⁸³⁴

Furthermore, it was also difficult for Britain to hold thousands of refugees in its own base.⁸³⁵ Callaghan told Kissinger that this issue had become much more serious with the 'onset of winter and the consequent deterioration of the Turkish refugees physical condition.'⁸³⁶ Also, there was still no hope for an agreement between Denktash and Clerides on the refugee problem in a short time. As a result of this, in the end, Britain had to accept to allow Turkish Cypriots to leave⁸³⁷, though it knew that this decision would cause vigorous protests among the Greeks and add further tension its relations with Athens.⁸³⁸

Conclusion

The British government knew that it would not be easy to reach an agreement at the second Geneva conference because of the different expectations of the Greek and Turkish sides. Therefore, British officials made preparations before the conference to ensure that there would be no deadlock in the discussions. However, the conference ended with a failure and this result was a disappointment for Britain. Another disappointment was that the second Geneva conference actually made relations between the British and Turkish governments worse. In particular, Callaghan's attitude at the conference led the Turks to think that Britain was in favour of the Greeks. Furthermore, while the second Geneva conference was continuing,

⁸³³ PRO: PREM 16/21, record of conversation between the Secretary of State and the Greek Foreign Minister at the United Nations, New York, 23 September 1974.

⁸³⁴ PRO: FCO 9/2158, 'Turkish Cypriot Administration: Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC)', 'record of conversation between the permanent under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Turkish ambassador held at FCO' 30 January 1975.

⁸³⁵ PRO: CAB 128/56, 'Post War Conclusion', CC (75) 2nd conclusion, 14 January 1975, p. 1.

⁸³⁶ PRO: PREM 16/21, immediate telegram (confidential) from Callaghan to the British Embassy in Washington, no: 2600, 21 December 1974.

⁸³⁷ *The Times*, 16 January 1975.

⁸³⁸ *Ibid.*, 20 January 1975.

Callaghan's plan to prevent a possible further Turkish advance on the island by using force, which was rejected by the Americans, showed the poor level of mutual relations by 1974.

Additionally, the Turkish Foreign Minister Güneş's statements after the second Geneva conference also demonstrated the distrust between London and Ankara. According to Güneş, the United States' approach to the Turkish arguments on the Cyprus issue demonstrated more understanding than the British approach. As mentioned before, he also advocated that Callaghan's position in the second Geneva conference 'was nothing other than removing Turkish forces from Cyprus.'⁸³⁹ Later, Callaghan's acceptance that he had not put more pressure to the Greek side⁸⁴⁰ was also an example of the British attitude toward the Turkish delegations at Geneva.

Essentially, it was difficult for Britain to persuade Turkey to make significant concessions in the meetings because of Turkey's strong bargaining power at the Geneva conferences. Turkey was also aware of this situation. Even if they refused to make concessions, Britain could not apply any military action against the Turks since Turkey's location was so important to NATO. In such a scenario, NATO would lose an important member thereby strengthening the Soviet position in the region. When the second Turkish military advance started on 14 August, Britain knew that the Turks could not be stopped because America opposed the use of force against the Turkish army. Nevertheless, Britain continued to criticise Ankara and expected that the Turks would end their operation shortly. The United Nations and the United States also stated that they disapproved of the Turkish action.

After the end of the second Turkish military intervention, it was expected that negotiations between the communities would start again. In this context, Callaghan stated that he could be a mediator in future talks between the Greeks and Turks, but there must be a guarantee that both sides would be ready to make some concessions to reach an agreement otherwise there would be no benefit in continuing the talks. On the other hand, it seemed that it was difficult for Ankara to accept him as a mediator because of his performance in the Geneva talks.

⁸³⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1921, 'Die Welt interview with the Turkish Foreign Minister', letter from D. J. M. Dain, the First Secretary at the British Embassy in Bonn, to R. F. Cornish, Southern European Department, FCO, 20 August 1974.

⁸⁴⁰ PRO: PREM 16/20, 'record of a telephone conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and Dr. Henry Kissinger and the President of the United States at 2. 45 PM on Wednesday,' 14 August 1974.

Meanwhile, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots leaders, Clerides and Denktash, started to have meetings and discuss the Cyprus issue. The Turks were holding nearly 34 percent of the island and would not accept a settlement which was not based on a federal solution. Britain did not issue a statement that it was against a federal solution because such a statement would only have made its relations with Turkey even worse. However, the negative British attitude towards the Turks would continue after the restart of inter-communal talks in 1975 which is analysed in following chapter.

6) The period 1975-80 in the Cyprus dispute and Negative Stability in Anglo-Turkish Relations

Introduction

The first section explores the Turkish policy on Cyprus after its military operations on the island in 1974. In this context, the political situation in Turkey is presented. Another significant point, “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” was declared on the island by the Turks in 1975. This was an important development in the future of the Cyprus problem. Therefore, the reasons behind this Turkish decision are also the subject of the first part of the chapter. The Greeks were obviously not happy about the establishment of a new Turkish administration on the island because they regarded this Turkish move as a step towards the partition of the island. Apart from the Greeks, the British and international reaction to the Turkish decision is examined. In particular, the British High Commissioner’s reports on this matter are analysed in order to understand the British response the new Turkish administration.

By 1975, the Vienna talks were started between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots by an initiative of the United Nation. Therefore, the second part of the chapter looks at the discussions between the communities. It should be pointed out that by 1975, while Ankara was still actively involved in the Cyprus dispute, the British government started to be less interested in the dispute. It seemed that because of the failure of the Geneva talks, in which Britain was actively involved, the British government lost its motivation and its belief that the Greeks and Turks would be able to reach an agreement with each other in the near future. However, the negotiations continued to be closely followed by Britain. As a result of this, British assessments of the Turkish position in inter-communal talks are investigated which enable us to compare to the British and Turkish policy on the Cyprus issue.

From this point of view, the British evaluation of the Denktash-Makarios meetings in 1977 and the Denktash-Kyprianou summit in May 1979 are examined in the chapter six. These were important events in the history of the Cyprus dispute because after these meetings, expectations of the solution of the problem increased. Therefore, the impact of these meetings on the Cyprus issue and the discussions between the Greeks and Turks are presented here. In particular, there were Greek complaints about the

Turkish attitude in the negotiations. As a result of this, British opinion on the Turkish position while negotiating with the Greeks is evaluated in order to gauge the similarities and differences between the British and Turkish policy on Cyprus by 1980.

The British Response to the Declaration of a “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus”

By the end of 1974, developments showed that it would not be easy to find a permanent solution to the problem. Although Denktash and Clerides continued the negotiations, which were started in September 1974 to deal with the humanitarian problems on the island, it appeared that the talks would not produce a solution to the Cyprus issue in a near future. The political situations in Greece and Turkey were also making difficult for both countries to take major decisions in this process. The government in Greece, which was formed after the fall of the junta, was not politically strong. After the election in November, a new government came to power in Athens and tried to focus on the Cyprus issue.

In Turkey, disagreements inside the coalition government resulted in the resignation of the Prime Minister, Ecevit, on 18 September, which led to a political crisis in Turkey. The political parties had difficulty in reaching an agreement with each other to form a new government in Ankara. In the end, President Fahri Korutürk, had to ask the Turkish Senator Sadi Irmak to form a government.⁸⁴¹ Irmak became the Turkish Prime Minister on 17 November 1974 but his caretaker government, which remained until 31 March 1975, did not have the political power to take a major decision on Cyprus. Consequently, there seemed no great expectation about the settlement of the Cyprus problem. When Sir Alan Goodison spoke to Ecmel Barutçu, the Director for Cyprus and Greece in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he said that after the election in Greece in November, the negotiations for Cyprus could be accelerated but Barutçu mentioned the government crisis in Turkey and added that ‘real negotiations must await outcome of elections’⁸⁴² The British ambassador to Turkey also expressed the view that, because of the political crisis in Turkey, ‘no major decisions on either internal or external issue could be expected and this would

⁸⁴¹ Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*, (New York: Nova Publishers, 2003), p. 211.

⁸⁴² PRO: FCO 9/1928, ‘Turkish policy on Cyprus’, letter sent by Goodison to Killick, 15 November 1974.

set back prospect for an agreement over Cyprus.⁸⁴³ Furthermore, in its letter to FCO, the British Embassy in Ankara also stated that the Turks 'have urgent problems to solve...in terms of their internal politics.'⁸⁴⁴ On the other hand, an unsuccessful negotiation process could cause other developments in the Cyprus issue. One of his interviews, the Turkish Chief of General staff, Semih Sancar, also 'referred to the possibility of a third military operation if negotiations made no progress.'⁸⁴⁵

In fact, the uncertainty in the negotiations also seemed to lead the Turks to implement their own policy for the settlement. The British High Commissioner, Olver, spoke to Denktash about the future of the island on 14 September. He also tried to understand that if the Turks had an intention to declare an autonomous Turkish Republic. Denktash explained that establishing an autonomous Turkish Republic on the island was his idea. He was planning to use this argument 'as a way of putting pressure on the Greeks to negotiate.'⁸⁴⁶ However, Denktash said that his idea had not got the support of Ankara. Therefore, he assured the High Commissioner that the Turks were not planning to take such an action in the near future.⁸⁴⁷ On the other hand, Olver reported that the Turks continued to consolidate Turkish zone in the north and he added that 'the Turkish lira was about to be introduced alongside the Cyprus pound.'⁸⁴⁸

A new Turkish Republic was not established in Cyprus, but the 'Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration' was declared on 1 October 1974 which took the place of the 'Turkish Cypriot Provisional Administration' on 28 December 1967. This new administration established its own Central Bank and took important financial measurements on the island including local taxation.⁸⁴⁹ At the beginning of January 1975, Olver had a conversation again with Denktash and told him that the measures taken by the Turkish Cypriots in the northern Cyprus was being interpreted as a step towards separation of the island. Denktash replied that they did not have such an intention and their goal remained an independent and sovereign Cyprus

⁸⁴³ PRO: FCO 9/1928, 'call on Mr Hattersley by Senator İnan', SEED's letter, 14 November 1974.

⁸⁴⁴ PRO: FCO 9/1928, 'Turkish intentions on Cyprus', letter from the British Embassy in Ankara to SEED, 15 October 1974.

⁸⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1928, confidential telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 984, 14 September 1974.

⁸⁴⁷ Ibid

⁸⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁹ PRO: FCO 9/2149, 'Cyprus: annual review for 1974', 21 February 1975.

under a federal government⁸⁵⁰ on which the Turkish-controlled area needed to be at least 30 percent of the island.⁸⁵¹

Meanwhile, the negotiations between Clerides and Denktash were continuing. When both negotiators met again on 14 January 1975 with assistance of ambassador Luis Weckmann Muñoz, the special representative of the UN Secretary-General,⁸⁵² they decided to start to discuss other aspects of the Cyprus problem.⁸⁵³ On the other hand, the United States pressure on Turkey was increasing for the solution of the problem. It seemed that the Turkish military operations adversely affected its relations with the US. As a reaction to the Turkey's policy on Cyprus, the American Congress 'passed a cut off of military aid to Turkey.'⁸⁵⁴ This decision was delayed by the president until 5 February 1975 'if the progress could be made in negotiations'⁸⁵⁵ between the two communities. It was also expected that Turkey would not send more troops and equipment to the island.⁸⁵⁶ In his conversation with Sir T. Brimelow, the Permanent under Secretary of State for FCO, Turgut Menemencioğlu, the Turkish ambassador to the United Kingdom also said that the 'Turkish government were under pressure from the United States.'⁸⁵⁷ He added that Ankara was withdrawing a thousand troops from Cyprus and ready to take initiative on the other issues such as reopening of Nicosia airport.⁸⁵⁸

However, the Turks could not make territorial concessions, mainly because of the political situation in Turkey. Therefore, the withdrawal of a thousand troops seemed to be a minor concession⁸⁵⁹ to prompt the negotiation and prevent the American embargo on military aid to Turkey which came into effect 5 February 1975.⁸⁶⁰

⁸⁵⁰ PRO: FCO 9/2158, unclassified telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 184, 14 February 1975.

⁸⁵¹ *Cumhuriyet*, 2 October 1974.

⁸⁵² PRO: FCO 9/2145, 'Discussions between Glafcos Clerides, President of the House of Representatives and Greek Cypriot negotiator, and Rauf Denktash, President of Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) Part A', 'resumption of talks', unclassified telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 047, 14 January 1975.

⁸⁵³ PRO: FCO 9/2144, 'Internal political situation in Cyprus', 'Cyprus chronology 1974/5' prepared by FCO's Information research Department, 28 January 1975.

⁸⁵⁴ Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p. 235.

⁸⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵⁶ Uslu, *The Cyprus Question*, p. 152.

⁸⁵⁷ PRO: FCO 9/2158, 'record of conversation between the permanent under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Turkish ambassador held at FCO' 30 January 1975.

⁸⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵⁹ Oliver P. Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations*, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), p. 139.

⁸⁶⁰ Alaeddin Yalçınkaya, 'Türkiye ile Yunanistan Arasındaki Sorunların Genel Çerçevesi', in Alaeddin Yalçınkaya (ed.), *Türk-Yunan İlişkileri ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, (Sakarya Üniversitesi Basımevi

According to Goodison's assessment, because of Turkey's dependence on the spare parts for aircrafts, the suspension of US military assistance to Ankara would mostly affect the Turkish Air Forces operations. He stated that 'the Pentagon estimated that the Turkish Air Force may run out of spares in the next three months and the Navy in six or seven months.'⁸⁶¹

The Turkish reaction to the American decision was also strong, apart from the closure of American military installations in Turkey⁸⁶², the Turkish attitude towards the Cyprus issue also hardened.⁸⁶³ On 29 January, Denktash told Olver that 'his Council of Ministers was indeed engaged in a plan for an early declaration of independence for the Turkish zone.'⁸⁶⁴ He added that this was a reaction to the American plan to suspend of its military aid to Turkey on 5 February.⁸⁶⁵ Olver also thought that after the American decision, independence for the Turkish zone in Cyprus would follow automatically.⁸⁶⁶ On the first day of the American embargo, Denktash was asked by journalists if he had any intention to declare an independent Turkish Cypriot State. Denktash replied: 'We are already 98 percent in independent existence. So, whether we shall declare the remaining 2 percent today or tomorrow or within the next few months, is a matter for us to decide.'⁸⁶⁷ After this development, the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States, Ford, sent a message the Turkish Prime Minister and the President in which they said that any Turkish action to establish an independent area could cause a renewal of fighting on the island.⁸⁶⁸ Nevertheless, in the end, the 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' was

1998), p. 21., Clement H. Dodd, *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy*, (North Humberside: The Eothen Press, 1983), p. 17., Kissinger, op. cit., p. 238., Farid Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacekeeping*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1998), p. 112.

⁸⁶¹ PRO: FCO 9/2144, 'Cyprus- the year ahead', letter sent by SEED, 28 February 1975.

⁸⁶² James Spain, *American diplomacy in Turkey: Memoirs of an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), p. 50., Kissinger, op. cit., p. 238.

⁸⁶³ PRO: FCO 9/2158, confidential telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 124, 30 January 1975.

⁸⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁶ Ibid., PRO: FCO 9/2158, letter sent from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Olver to Goodison, SEED, 21 January 1975.

⁸⁶⁷ PRO: FCO 9/2158, unclassified telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 145, 5 February 1975.

⁸⁶⁸ PRO: CAB 128/56, 'Post War Conclusion', CC (75) 6th conclusion, 11 February 1975, p. 4.

declared by the autonomous Turkish Cypriot administration⁸⁶⁹ at noon local time on 13 February 1975.⁸⁷⁰

The evaluation by the British ambassador Phillips suggested that, apart from being a reaction against to the American embargo, the Turkish decision on establishing a Turkish Federated state was also a reaction to the Greek side's attitude in the negotiations. He said that the Greeks had ignored or rejected the gestures, such as withdrawal of some Turkish troops and offering to resettle some Greek refugees in the Turkish controlled northern part of the island, which had been made by the Turks to make progress in the inter-communal talks.⁸⁷¹ Denktash also defended that Makarios' unwillingness to solve the problem pushed the Turks to take this step on the island.⁸⁷² The Turkish Prime Minister Irmak's also made parallel statements with Denktash. He said that the decision was inevitable for the Turkish Cypriot community on the island after 'the lack of reasonable response' by the Greek side to their approach.⁸⁷³

Furthermore, Phillips also mentioned that if the Greek hoped that the suspension American aid would force to the Turks to make major concessions in the negotiations, he said, the Turks would not give up their national interest in Cyprus because they regarded it as vital.⁸⁷⁴ In his speech in the Turkish Parliament, Melih Esenbel, the Turkish Foreign Minister, also said that the effect of the American embargo in the Cyprus issue would be contrary to the United States' expectations from it.⁸⁷⁵

⁸⁶⁹ Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, p. 80.

⁸⁷⁰ PRO: FCO 9/2158, 'declaration of Turkish Cypriot State', flash telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 174, 13 February 1975., Tozun Bahcheli, 'Searching for a Cyprus Settlement: Considering Options for Creating a Federation, a Confederation, or Two Independent States', *Publius*, Vol. 30, No. 1, The State of American Federalism, 1999-2000 (Winter, 2000), p. 207., Glen D. Camp, 'Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 95, No. 1 (spring, 1980), p. 47., Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Kıbrıs Sorunu ve Sorunun Çözümüne İlişkin Perspektifler*, in Alaeddin Yalçınkaya. (ed.), *Türk-Yunan İlişkileri ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, (Sakarya Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1998), p. 93.

⁸⁷¹ PRO: FCO 9/2158, confidential telegram from the British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, no: 284, 13 February 1975.

⁸⁷² PRO: FCO 9/2158, confidential telegram from the British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, no: 180, 13 February 1975.

⁸⁷³ PRO: FCO 9/2158, unclassified telegram from the British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, no: 283, 13 February 1975.

⁸⁷⁴ PRO: FCO 9/2158, confidential telegram from the British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, no: 284, 13 February 1975.

⁸⁷⁵ *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, (Official records of the Turkish National Assembly), term: 4, session: 2, vol. 8, 5 February 1975, p. 369.

Upon the declaration of the new Turkish Federated State, Denktash gave a press conference, in which he also talked about the recognition issue. He said that; 'For the moment, I do not need international recognition. I am not a separated state. I am the federated wing of the republic of Cyprus.'⁸⁷⁶ After the Denktash's press conference, Olver expressed the view that the Turks seemed to be cautious 'initially at least to avoid confrontation or provoking too fierce a world reaction.'⁸⁷⁷ Şükrü Elekdağ, the Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also assured the British ambassador Phillips that 'the entity was not a state in the international sense.'⁸⁷⁸ Ankara's reaction to the establishment of the 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' was positive, the Turkish Prime Minister, Sadi Irmak, stated that the Turkish government would respect the decision of the Turkish Cypriot. He added that the decision did not emphasize partition or *Enosis* but independence of the republic.⁸⁷⁹

However, the American reaction to the Turkish Cypriot community's decision was negative. It was announced that the United States was against unilateral actions on the island by either side which would make difficult finding a peaceful solution for the problem. The American statement also emphasised the fact that the United States was regarding the negotiation process between Clerides and Denktash as an important instrument in reaching any eventual settlement of the dispute and fully supported it.⁸⁸⁰

Athens also showed a harsh reaction to the Turkish Cypriot move. The Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis said that the Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash's answer to the Greek Cypriot plan for the peaceful solution was the declaration of a Turkish Federated State which, he expressed the view, 'aimed at making permanent the partition of Cyprus.'⁸⁸¹ He also mentioned that the Greek government considered the Turkish action as 'illegal and contrary to international conventions and decisions.'⁸⁸²

⁸⁷⁶ PRO: FCO 9/2158, confidential telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 180, 13 February 1975.

⁸⁷⁷ PRO: FCO 9/2158, confidential telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 179, 13 February 1975.

⁸⁷⁸ PRO: FCO 9/2158, confidential telegram from the British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, no: 291, 14 February 1975.

⁸⁷⁹ PRO: FCO 9/2158, PRO: FCO 9/2158, unclassified telegram from the British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, no: 283, 13 February 1975.

⁸⁸⁰ PRO: FCO 9/2158, confidential telegram from the British Embassy in Washington to FCO, no: 579, 13 February 1975.

⁸⁸¹ PRO: FCO 9/2158, unclassified telegram from the British Embassy in Athens to FCO, no: 99, 14 February 1975.

⁸⁸² Ibid.

From the British point of view, the Turkish action on the island was regarded as unwelcome development. In his statement in the House of Commons on 14 February, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Hattersley, said that the British government deplored the action taken by Denktash.⁸⁸³ On the same day, Hattersley met the Turkish ambassador Menemencioğlu, and also told him that the British government regretted the Turkish decision. He complained that Denktash had made no formal communication to them prior to issue of his statement. Menemencioğlu replied that his government had instructed him to say that 'Turkey accepted Denktash's statement and supported him.'⁸⁸⁴ Hattersley also informed Menemencioğlu that although he stated in the House of Commons that Denktash's action did not mean establishing a separate state, there was a strong feeling between the members of the Parliament that the situation on the island would lead *de facto* separation in the future.⁸⁸⁵ Hattersley also mentioned their concern for the British families and property in the north of Cyprus. Menemencioğlu said that he would convey the British concerns to the Turkish government.⁸⁸⁶

Another matter for the British government was the official contact with the new Turkish administration. After the announcement of the new administration, British High Commissioner, Olver, asked London about what the British attitude would be towards the Turkish action. He underlined that there was a need for a public statement on this issue because, he said, there was a danger that some Greek Cypriot media would start to accuse the British of being in collusion with the Turks.⁸⁸⁷ It seemed that the British High Commissioner was right to worry about the Greek press campaign against them because the British ambassador in Athens also reported that some of the press in Greece had started to present the Turkish action as 'British and the United States plans for partition.'⁸⁸⁸

Callaghan sent a telegram to Olver and informed him about the British position after the declaration of Turkish Federate State. Callaghan indicated that there would be no

⁸⁸³ PRO: FCO 9/2158, 'Mr Hattersley's statement on Cyprus', unclassified telegram from FCO, Callaghan, to the British High Commission in Nicosia, no: 145, 15 February 1975.

⁸⁸⁴ PRO: FCO 9/2158, 'record of conversation between Roy Hattersley and Turgut Menemencioğlu, the Turkish ambassador', 14 February 1975.

⁸⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁷ PRO: FCO 9/2158, confidential telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 176, 13 February 1975.

⁸⁸⁸ PRO: FCO 9/2158, confidential telegram from the British Embassy in Athens to FCO, no: 101, 14 February 1975.

change in the British High Commissioner relations with the Turkish Cypriot community on the island. He said that because, as Denktash had stated, it was not a unilateral declaration of independence and the new Turkish Federated state considered itself as a part of the Republic, the High Commissioner Olver, 'should continue to conduct business with Denktash as the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus'⁸⁸⁹ In the case of preventing any future initiatives from the Turks to seek formal recognition for their administration from the United Kingdom, Callaghan also instructed Olver to inform Denktash that any kind of formal recognition would cause Britain great difficulty.⁸⁹⁰ Later, the Greek ambassador to Turkey also told the British ambassador Phillips that the Greeks were satisfied with the prompt the British government declaration that they would continue to recognise Makarios as President of the Republic.⁸⁹¹ The Greek ambassador to the United Kingdom, Stavros Roussos, also conveyed a similar message to Hattersley.⁸⁹²

After the declaration of the 'Federated Turkish Cypriot States', Denktash told Olver that he was ready to continue the inter-communal talks, which had been suspended by the Greeks after the Turkish decision, whenever the Greek side wanted.⁸⁹³ The Turkish Cypriot constitutional proposals were announced in which the Turkish side stated that a constitution shall be made for 'a bi-communal and bi-regional federal state.'⁸⁹⁴ The Turkish proposal did not get a support from the Greek side. In particular, the Turkish demand on the bi-regional federalism was criticised by the Greek Cypriots.⁸⁹⁵ However, both sides knew that the inter-communal talks had to be proceeded to reach a permanent settlement. Thus, the communities on the island was going to start the Vienna talks soon.

⁸⁸⁹ PRO: FCO 9/2158, confidential telegram from FCO, Callaghan, to the British High Commission in Nicosia, no: 140, 13 February 1975.

⁸⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁹¹ PRO: FCO 9/2158, confidential telegram from the British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, no: 289, 14 February 1975.

⁸⁹² PRO: FCO 9/2158, 'record of conversation between Roy Hattersley and Stavros Roussos, the Greek ambassador', 14 February 1975.

⁸⁹³ PRO: FCO 9/2158, confidential telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 183, 14 February 1975.

⁸⁹⁴ PRO: FCO 9/2158, unclassified telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 184, 14 February 1975.

⁸⁹⁵ PRO: FCO 9/2158, unclassified telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 185, 14 February 1975.

The Vienna talks and the British Position

The United Nations took an initiative to start a new dialogue between the two communities on the island once again. In this connection, the UN Security Council report on 12 March 1975 called for urgent resumption of the inter-communal negotiation on Cyprus.⁸⁹⁶ It seemed that with each passing day the rift between the parties' solutions was widening. The British Cabinet Office's Joint Intelligence Committee's report on 13 February attempted to convey the general situation in Cyprus. It was stated that the Turks' immediate goal was to strengthen their position in the north of the island 'in which the Turkish Cypriots could live safely.'⁸⁹⁷ The report also suggested that there was a possibility that a solution could be found and the Greek also could accept it. However, the settlement would most likely need the Turkish demand for a bi-regional federation for any peace scenarios to be conceded.⁸⁹⁸

Meanwhile, a right-wing coalition government, which was called as the *first National Front*, was formed in Turkey and Demirel became the Prime Minister on 31 March 1975. The new Turkish government's approach towards the Cyprus question would be important for the solution of the problem. In his interview, the new Foreign Minister Çağlayangil expressed the view on his government policy on Cyprus. He said that it was vital that any solution in Cyprus must be permanent so that 'the problem did not blow up again a few years later.' Therefore, he regarded bi-regional solution in Cyprus as essential to achieve this aim. He also stated that 'Turkey's stand was not rigid and the frontier between the two regions in Cyprus was negotiable.'⁸⁹⁹

After the UN's call for dialogue, efforts were increased to arrange a meeting between the leaders Clerides and Denktash. However, the Greek Cypriot leader, Clerides, told Olver that he was planning to resign his post as a Greek Cypriot negotiator.⁹⁰⁰ Olver reported that the reason for the Clerides' action was his political struggle with

⁸⁹⁶ UN Security Council Resolutions, 12 March 1975, Res. 367.

⁸⁹⁷ *The Southern Flank in Crisis*, report by the Joint Intelligence Committee, document no: 105, 13 February 1975, p. 345

⁸⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 349.

⁸⁹⁹ *Milliyet*, 18 April 1975., PRO: FCO 9/2145, 'Turkey: foreign policy', unclassified telegram from the British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, no: 3, 18 April 1975.

⁹⁰⁰ PRO: FCO 9/2145, confidential telegram from the British High Commission in Nicosia to FCO, no: 307, 8 April 1975.

Makarios who had returned to the island on 7 December 1974. Olver expressed the view that while Makarios talked about ‘a long struggle and resistance to *fait accompli*’, Clerides did not want to take all the blame for any results from inter-communal talks which could show him up as a traitor who made concessions to the Turks.⁹⁰¹

After having been informed about the Clerides’ intention to resign, the British government prepared to take some actions to persuade him to withdraw his resignation. In this connection, the British High Commissioner, Olver, was instructed by the FCO to express the Secretary of State’s ‘regret and deep concern’ to Clerides⁹⁰² but they heard from the UN Secretariat that the UN Special Representative in Nicosia, Luis Weckmann Muñoz, had spoken to Clerides who told Weckmann Muñoz that he would continue to be the negotiator ‘if an announcement were made quickly about the resumption of talks in Vienna.’⁹⁰³ Upon this information, the British decided to suspend their action.⁹⁰⁴ Later, the British ambassador in Athens informed FCO that the Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis, had talked to Clerides and asked him to continue as a negotiator in the inter-communal talks.⁹⁰⁵ Furthermore, in his statement, Makarios also declared his support for Clerides⁹⁰⁶ and said that he ‘would not accept the resignation if it came.’⁹⁰⁷

On 7 April, The UN Secretary-General, Waldheim, expressed the view in a press conference that the negotiations between Clerides and Denktash would resume. He said that there was no exact date for their meeting yet but it would take place in the Vienna at the end of the April.⁹⁰⁸ One day after this statement, the UN Secretariat announced that the talks would begin on 28 April.⁹⁰⁹

⁹⁰¹ Ibid.

⁹⁰² PRO: FCO 9/2144, letter from M.C.S. Weston, the First Secretary and Assistant Head of SEED, FCO to the British High commissioner, Olver, in Nicosia, 10 April 1975.

⁹⁰³ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁵ PRO: FCO 9/2145, confidential telegram from the British Embassy in Athens to FCO, no: 184, 9 April 1975.

⁹⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁷ PRO: FCO 9/2145, confidential telegram from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Olver, to FCO, no: 309, 10 April 1975.

⁹⁰⁸ PRO: FCO 9/2145, unclassified telegram from Sir Denis Laskey, British ambassador in Vienna, to FCO, no: 164, 8 April 1974.

⁹⁰⁹ PRO: FCO 9/2145, ‘Cyprus: resumed Clerides/Denktash talks’, letter from M.C.S. Weston, the First Secretary and Assistant Head of SEED, FCO, to H.T Morgan, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for superintending SEED and South West European Department(SWED), 10 April 1975.

The British government regarded the Vienna talks as an important step towards a solution of the problem. As a result, it was planned that the talks would be closely monitored through the British Embassy in Vienna. However, the embassy had not been closely involved in the talks on Cyprus until that time.⁹¹⁰ Therefore, FCO decided to send Miss Maeve Fort, who was the First Secretary in SEED, to Vienna to help the embassy with observing the talks.⁹¹¹ Callaghan also gave importance to the Vienna talks. He instructed Olver to convey his message to Makarios that 'he regarded these talks as a new opportunity which should not be missed.'⁹¹² Callaghan also sent a similar message to Clerides and Denktash and the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers in which he 'urged a flexibility and serious approach in the Vienna talks.'⁹¹³

On the other hand, although the Vienna talks were regarded as an important development, it was stated by Hugh Travers Morgan, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for superintending SEED and SWED at the FCO, that 'the prospect for the resumed talks was uncertain.'⁹¹⁴ According to the assessment, a bi-regional solution was the major Turkish precondition for the negotiation and it was believed by the British that Clerides was also prepared to discuss this issue in the talks. However, the UN Secretariat sources argued that there was a possibility that Makarios would not allow Clerides to discuss a solution based on a bi-regional federation. Therefore, the UN Secretariat thought that the Greeks might consider the Vienna talks as no more than exploratory which could cause a rapid breakdown.⁹¹⁵ Furthermore, it was also pointed out that there was also no great expectation that the Turks would have a willingness to discuss 'the key question of the extent of the area of Turkish control which could cause the Greek Cypriot reaction.'⁹¹⁶ In his letter, Morgan also mentioned the British position in the Vienna talks and suggested that Britain would

⁹¹⁰ PRO: FCO 9/2145, Ibid.

⁹¹¹ PRO: FCO 9/2145, telegram from James Callaghan to the British Embassy in Vienna, no: 102, 23 April 1975.

⁹¹² PRO: FCO 9/2145, confidential telegram from James Callaghan to the British High Commission in Nicosia, no: 261, 18 April 1975.

⁹¹³ PRO: FCO 9/2145, confidential telegram from James Callaghan to the British Embassy in Vienna, no: 100, 22 April 1975.

⁹¹⁴ PRO: FCO 9/2145, 'Cyprus: resumption of the inter-communal talks in Vienna', letter from M.C.S. Weston, the First Secretary and Assistant Head of SEED, FCO, to H.T Morgan, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for superintending SEED and South West European Department(SWED), 21 April 1975.

⁹¹⁵ Ibid.

⁹¹⁶ Ibid.

continue to send messages of encouragement to the main participants but would not be in the centre of stage in the process.⁹¹⁷

The High Commissioner, Olver, reported that Denktash was also pessimistic about the prospect for Vienna who believed that Clerides did not have real freedom of negotiation and his resignation threat had failed to get this.⁹¹⁸ Furthermore, Denktash mentioned that there was a little common ground between the each side approach to the problem. However, he added that he would continue to negotiate to prevent immediate breakdown of the talks in Vienna.⁹¹⁹

The first round of the Vienna talks was held on 28 April-3 May⁹²⁰ under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General Dr Kurt Waldheim.⁹²¹ In his opening statement, Waldheim expressed the view that he attached very great importance to the talks in making some progress towards settlement of the problem.⁹²² In the first day discussion in Vienna, Denktash said that he could only make a reduction in the extent of the Turkish-controlled area if the Greek Cypriots did not want a powerful central government. Otherwise, he would not agree any reduction in Turkish position on the island.⁹²³

In the session on 2 May, Denktash made an offer that he would agree to ten thousand Greek Cypriots settling in the Greek villages behind the Turkish lines, in return for freedom of movement of the Turkish Cypriots in the south (which meant, in effect that they could go to the north). However, Clerides rejected this offer.⁹²⁴ Sir Denis Laskey, the British ambassador in Vienna, reported that, in this session, Clerides seemed to lose hope that the talks would produce a solution and said that he did not see any point in continuing the negotiations because he believed that in the second round of the talks in June, Denktash would only offer minor adjustment to the

⁹¹⁷ Ibid.

⁹¹⁸ PRO: FCO 9/2145, confidential telegram from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Olver, to FCO, no: 344, 24 April 1975.

⁹¹⁹ Ibid.

⁹²⁰ Farid Mirbagheri, *Historical Dictionary of Cyprus*, (the United States of America: Scarecrow Press, 2009), p. xxxiii.

⁹²¹ Ertekün, *The Cyprus dispute*, p. 38.

⁹²² Glafkos Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, Vol. 4, (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1992), p. 248.

⁹²³ PRO: FCO 9/2145, confidential telegram from Sir Denis Laskey, British ambassador in Vienna, to FCO, no: 198, 29 April 1975.

⁹²⁴ PRO: FCO 9/2146, 'Discussions between Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash', 'Cyprus: Vienna talks', confidential telegram from Sir Denis Laskey, British ambassador in Vienna, to FCO, no: 204, 3 May 1975.

Turkish line.⁹²⁵ However, by the efforts of the UN Secretary-General, Waldheim, Clerides decided to continue the negotiations.⁹²⁶

In his meeting with Miss Fort, who had been sent by the FCO to Vienna on 30 April, Clerides also complained about Denktash's attitude in the talks. He argued that the Secretary-General had made various proposals on the refugee issue but Denktash was simply taking notes and saying that he would refer this matter back to his advisers for advice. Therefore, according to Clerides' evaluation, it appeared that Denktash did not have full authority to negotiate.⁹²⁷ Later, the Greek ambassador in London also called R. Francis Cornish from SEED, FCO and told him that the Greek government was not happy with the Turkish side's attitude in the Vienna talks.⁹²⁸

The first round of the Vienna talks ended on 3 May. The most important outcome of these meetings was the acceptance of the establishment of an expert committee to discuss the power and functions of the central government. The committee would be consisting of three Turkish Cypriot and three Greek Cypriot members.⁹²⁹

In the meantime, after the end of military junta rule in Athens, the Greeks were trying to strengthen the democratic regime in their country. However, the British High Commission informed London that according to the rumours, the danger of a military coup in Greece and Cyprus persisted. In particular, the communist party on the island, AKEL, argued that there were still pro-junta sympathisers in Cyprus among the Greek officers of the Greek Cypriot National Guard forces. Nevertheless, Makarios did not seem to be affected by these rumours. According to him, 'so long as there was no coup in Greece, there was no danger of a coup in Cyprus.'⁹³⁰

While Clerides and Denktash were preparing for the meeting in Vienna on 5 June, Kissinger told Callaghan that the Americans were trying to push the Turkish Prime Minister Demirel to give up some territory in Cyprus in order to reach an agreement with the Greeks. Demirel's reply was that taking such an action without achieving any diplomatic success would put him very difficult situation in Turkey politically. It

⁹²⁵ Ibid.

⁹²⁶ Ibid.

⁹²⁷ Clerides, *Cyprus: My Deposition*, Vol. 4, p. 256.

⁹²⁸ PRO: FCO 9/2146, 'Vienna talks', confidential letter from R. F. Cornish, Southern European Department, FCO, to Miss Fort and Mr Goodison, 5 May 1975.

⁹²⁹ Ertekün, *The Cyprus dispute*, p. 38.

⁹³⁰ PRO: FCO 9/2144, 'coup threats in Cyprus', letter from M. Perceval, First Secretary in the British High Commission in Nicosia, to SEED, FCO, and 7 March 1975.

seemed that Demirel thought that if he gave up some territory, it would be regarded by the public in Turkey as losing what had been gained from the Turkish military operations at the time of Ecevit's government. Callaghan said to Kissinger that the evacuation of the Greek forces from the island could be used by Demirel as a diplomatic success of the government. Kissinger was thinking differently. According to him, the Turks needed the American embargo to be lifted before 'they could begin to move.'⁹³¹

Meanwhile, before the beginning of the second round of the talks, Denktash stated on that the constitutional sub-committee, which was established at the first Vienna talks, needed to present its report on 'the subject of powers and functions of the central government'⁹³² to start the second round of the negotiation in Vienna. He also told Olver that there was no point to the UN Secretary-General's efforts to begin the talks on 5 June because, he said, there would be no achievement without a report from the sub-committee.⁹³³ Nevertheless, he added that 'if the Secretary-General insisted on going ahead, then he would attend the meeting.'⁹³⁴

The second round of the Vienna talks started on 5 June and lasted two days until 7 June.⁹³⁵ When the second round of the talks started, there was no much hope that it would be productive. Furthermore, there seemed danger of an early breakdown because of the parties' pessimistic statements about each other's approach. However, Waldheim was happy with the atmosphere in the second round because, contrary to the expectation both side's attitude appeared to be positive and there was not an early breakdown.⁹³⁶ In this meeting, Denktash offered a joint transitional government which would administer the country's foreign policy, health and finance. There was no certain answer from Clerides, but they have agreed to examine the proposal in detail in Nicosia.⁹³⁷ On the issue of the adjustment the Turkish-controlled area on the island, Denktash again gave an explanation that because of the restraints imposed by

⁹³¹ PRO: FCO 9/2144, letter from S. J. Barrett, Head of South West European Department (SWED), FCO, to Goodison Sir Alan Goodison, Head of the FCO's South East European Department (SEED), FCO, 29 May 1975.

⁹³² PRO: FCO 9/2146, 'inter-communal talks', confidential telegram from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Olver, to FCO, no: 416, 30 May 1975.

⁹³³ Ibid.

⁹³⁴ Ibid.

⁹³⁵ Mirbagheri, *Historical Dictionary of Cyprus*, p. xxxiii.

⁹³⁶ PRO: FCO 9/2146, 'Cyprus Vienna talks round 2', confidential telegram from the British Embassy in Vienna to FCO, no: 236, 9 June 1975.

⁹³⁷ Ibid.

the internal political situation in Turkey, 'he was not in a position to put forward territorial proposals.'⁹³⁸ Archbishop Makarios was pessimistic about the prospect of the talks. In his meeting with the High Commissioner, Olver, he indicated that it was not possible to make arrangements over the central government without 'some knowledge of what the Turks would offer over territory and refugees.'⁹³⁹

The third round of the Vienna talks was held on 31 July-2 August.⁹⁴⁰ There were some discussion on the transitional joint government but the parties could not make a progress on this matter.⁹⁴¹ The most important result of these meetings was the acceptance of voluntary exchange of the population between the two communities 'under the organised programme and with the assistance of UNFICYP.'⁹⁴² On 1 August, Denktash told that agreement had been reached in the talks that nine thousand Turkish Cypriots were going to move the north Cyprus while eight hundred Greek Cypriots could return back to the Turkish-controlled north of the island and 'ten thousand Greeks already in the north would be allowed to stay.'⁹⁴³ The United Nations Secretary-General stated that: 'there was an important step forward in the talks of representatives of the Greek and Turkish population groups of the Mediterranean island.'⁹⁴⁴

The fourth round of the talks was held in New York on 8-10 September⁹⁴⁵ which resulted in complete failure. On the first day of the meetings, it was announced that the talks was delayed to provide more preparatory discussions between the both sides. Waldheim was going to meet Clerides and Denktash and it was expected that the talks would start on the next day.⁹⁴⁶ On 9 September, the negotiations again could not be started because of the different approach between the two communities' representatives. It was stated by the UN officials that the talks would begin on the next day but 'there was little optimism about the chances of progress.'⁹⁴⁷ It appeared that the main problem was that lack of the Turkish proposal on 'territorial

⁹³⁸ PRO: FCO 9/2146, Ibid.

⁹³⁹ PRO: FCO 9/2146, 'inter-communal talks', confidential telegram from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Olver, to FCO, no: 435, 6 June 1975.

⁹⁴⁰ Mirbagheri, *Historical Dictionary of Cyprus*, p. xxxiii.

⁹⁴¹ Ertekün, *The Cyprus dispute*, p. 39.

⁹⁴² Ibid.

⁹⁴³ *The Times*, 2 August 1975.

⁹⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁴⁵ Mirbagheri, *op. cit.*

⁹⁴⁶ *The Times*, 9 September 1975.

⁹⁴⁷ Ibid. 10 September 1975.

withdrawals as expected by the Greek Cypriots.⁹⁴⁸ As mentioned before, it seemed that American embargo and the political situation in Turkey was making the Turkish government reluctant to make new solution offers in the negotiations.⁹⁴⁹ On 10 September, there was a brief meeting between the two sides. The disagreement continued and the Cyprus peace talks were suspended in deadlock. After the meeting, in his statement to reporters, the Greek Cypriot negotiator, Clerides accused the Turkish side of not submitting a proposal for the Turkish soldiers' withdrawal. He also stated that 'the fault was not with the Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash, but with the Turkish government.'⁹⁵⁰ According to him, without the proposals, there would be no discussion of the substance of the Cyprus issue. Therefore, the Greek Cypriots did not see any point to attend the further round of the talks whose possibility was left uncertain.⁹⁵¹

Denktash-Makarios meetings and "the Four-Guideline" agreement

*'A solution would take at least weeks or months.'*⁹⁵²

The failure of the meeting in New York had increased tension in the Cyprus problem. Denktash told press that a unilateral declaration of independence would be declared by the Turkish Cypriots without making any territorial concessions in the Turkish position on the island if he was not allowed to speak at the United Nations and any resolution passed from the General Assembly against the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.⁹⁵³ Later, Denktash continued his argument and stated that the independence of the Turkish administration on the island was 'seriously under review.'⁹⁵⁴

Apart from the Greek side, the announcements of Denktash also worried the British. The Secretary of State, James Callaghan, sent a telegram to the British Embassy in Ankara and instructed them to contact with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

⁹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 9 September 1975.

⁹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 11 September 1975.

⁹⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵² Comment made by Dr Waldheim Kurt, the United Nations Secretary-General, after the second Denktash-Makarios meeting: PRO: FCO 9/2538, 'Negotiations concerning future of Cyprus part B', 'Waldheim-Makarios-Denktash meeting', unclassified telegram from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Donald McDonald Gordon, to FCO, no: 070, 14 February 1977.

⁹⁵³ PRO: FCO 9/2167, 'Possible Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC)', unclassified telegram from the British Ambassador in Ankara, Phillips, to FCO, no: 1347, 15 September 1975.

⁹⁵⁴ PRO: FCO 9/2167, unclassified telegram from the British Counsellor in the British Embassy Ankara, Lane, to FCO, no: 1350, 16 September 1975.

to have an interview with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Çağlayangil, or in his absence at the highest possible level and say that Callaghan 'was deeply concerned over the statement of Denktash on the unilateral declaration of independence.'⁹⁵⁵ He also wanted the Turkish government to be informed that he regretted the breakdown of the inter-communal talks without an appointed day for resumption between the two communities. According to him, a declaration of the independence of the north of the island would 'render negotiation process for the solution of the problem far more difficult.' Therefore, the Turkish government needed to make every effort to prevent such an action from the Turkish Cypriots on the island.⁹⁵⁶ Callaghan also instructed the British officials in Cyprus and Athens to inform the Greeks that he issued a grave warning to the Turkish government.⁹⁵⁷ The Greek Foreign Minister, Bitsios, was content with Callaghan's attitude and asked the British ambassador in Athens, Richard, to convey his gratitude to the Secretary of State for his 'prompt and helpful response.'⁹⁵⁸ Similarly, the Greek Cypriot side also expressed 'deep appreciation'⁹⁵⁹ to the British reaction to the Denktash statement. Callaghan's reaction to the possibility of declaration of independence of the Turkish administration on the island showed that there was a huge difference between the British and Turkish Cypriot policies on the Cyprus issue while the British policy was standing closer to the Greek Cypriot arguments.

When the British Counsellor in the British Embassy in Ankara, Lane, saw Şükrü Elekdağ, the Under-Secretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he conveyed Callaghan's message to him. Elekedag seemed to be cautious, when he was talking with the ambassador about the Denktash's statement. He said that 'there was no change in the Turkish government's policy'⁹⁶⁰ which supported 'the independence and territorial integrity of the island.'⁹⁶¹ Elekdağ also expressed the view that Denktash was never encouraged by Ankara to make his announcement.⁹⁶²

⁹⁵⁵ PRO: FCO 9/2167, confidential telegram from James Callaghan to the British Embassy in Ankara, no: 1172, 18 September 1975.

⁹⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁵⁸ PRO: FCO 9/2167, confidential telegram from the British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Brooks Richards, to FCO, no: 453, 19 September 1975.

⁹⁵⁹ PRO: FCO 9/2167, confidential telegram from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Olver, to FCO, no: 667, 19 September 1975.

⁹⁶⁰ PRO: FCO 9/2167, confidential telegram from the British Ambassador in Ankara, Phillips, to FCO, no: 1377, 19 September 1975.

⁹⁶¹ Ibid.

⁹⁶² Ibid.

After this conversation, Lane reported that there was 'no sign of enthusiasm in Turkey at the prospect of a Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence.'⁹⁶³

On the other hand, there were some different opinions inside the coalition government in Turkey. The Deputy Prime Minister and the leader of the National Salvation Party, Necmettin Erbakan, stated that the Turkish Cypriots needed to declare their independence 'if the Greek did not accept the Turkish conditions.'⁹⁶⁴ However, the Turkish Foreign Minister expressed the view that 'the Turkish government would continue to attach great importance to the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus.'⁹⁶⁵ The Turkish ambassador in London also made similar statement to Goodison, Head of SEED, and assured him about the Turkish policy over Cyprus.⁹⁶⁶

Eventually, after the statements of the Turkish official, Morgan, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for superintending SEED and SWED at FCO, accepted that the possibility of a Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence was weak but he also emphasised that in the event of such a proclamation, the British government would 'issue a strong public statement condemning the action.'⁹⁶⁷

In the meantime, the uncertainty in the resumption of the talks was ended after an agreement was reached in Brussels between the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers on 12 December 1975.⁹⁶⁸ In a press conference, it was indicated that the both Ministers would support the United Nations Secretary-General's initiatives for resumption of negotiations.⁹⁶⁹ As a result of the efforts, the fifth round of the Vienna talks between Clerides and Denktash started on 17 February and lasted until 21 February.⁹⁷⁰ Broad discussion was made on both territorial and the constitutional issue during the fifth round of the Vienna talks.⁹⁷¹ Clerides and Denktash agreed that after the meetings, both sides would exchange their written proposals through the

⁹⁶³ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁴ PRO: FCO 9/2167, unclassified telegram from the British Ambassador in Ankara, Phillips, to FCO, no: 1388, 22 September 1975.

⁹⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶⁶ PRO: FCO 9/2167, confidential telegram from James Callaghan to the British Embassy in Ankara, no: 1191, 23 September 1975.

⁹⁶⁷ PRO: FCO 9/2167, confidential telegram from James Callaghan to the British High Commission in Nicosia, no: 496, 26 September 1975.

⁹⁶⁸ Ertekün, *The Cyprus dispute*, p. 39., Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus*, p. 144.

⁹⁶⁹ *Milliyet*, 13 December 1975.

⁹⁷⁰ Mirbagheri, *Historical Dictionary of Cyprus*, p. xxxiii.

⁹⁷¹ Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, p. 82.

Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and the Greek Cypriots were going to submit their proposal ten days before the proposal from Turkish Cypriots one to allow them study on the Greek proposal and then, submit theirs.⁹⁷² However, after Greek Cypriots submitted their proposal, the Turkish Cypriot demand to see it caused a crisis. Clerides admitted that he took his own initiative and agreed that the Greek side was going to submit their proposal ten days before but he did not inform the Greek Cypriot government who thought that two sides were going to submit their proposal simultaneously.⁹⁷³ After this crisis, Clerides resigned from his post as negotiator on 7 April.⁹⁷⁴ After that, Tassos Papadapoulos was appointed as a new representative of the Greek side. Initially, the Turkish Cypriots did want to accept him as a negotiator because he was a former EOKA member and was regarded by the Turks as an extremist.⁹⁷⁵ However, in the end, the Turks accepted him as the negotiator but insisted that the Turkish Cypriots would be presented by a person with the same status.⁹⁷⁶ Later, Ümit Süleyman Onan, the Deputy President of the Turkish Cypriot Constituent Assembly, was appointed as the Turkish Cypriot interlocutor.⁹⁷⁷ After the fifth round of the Vienna talks, the talks could not be resumed and were interrupted for over a year.⁹⁷⁸

The negotiation between two communities restarted after Denktash sent a letter to Makarios on 9 January 1977 via Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Cyprus, Perez de Cuellar, to have a direct meeting under the UN auspices to discuss all aspects of the Cyprus problem.⁹⁷⁹ Denktash also wrote a letter the UN Secretary General to inform him about his proposal⁹⁸⁰ on which he indicated that 'valuable time had been lost and he hoped that a way could be found to hold further inter-communal talks.'⁹⁸¹ According to the United Nations Secretariat, Makarios first reaction to Denktash's offer was fairly positive.⁹⁸² The Archbishop told Perez de Cuellar that he expected that Denktash would have a full authority to take decision if

⁹⁷² Ibid.

⁹⁷³ *The Times*, 8 April 1976.

⁹⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁵ *The Times*, 13 April 1976.

⁹⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷⁷ Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus*, p. 145.

⁹⁷⁸ Ertekün, *The Cyprus dispute*, p. 45.

⁹⁷⁹ Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, p. 83.

⁹⁸⁰ PRO: FCO 9/2537, 'negotiations concerning future of Cyprus part A', confidential telegram from the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations (UKMIS) to FCO, no: 34, 11 January 1977.

⁹⁸¹ PRO: FCO 9/2537, confidential telegram from the British Ambassador in Ankara, Phillips, to FCO, no: 59, 14 January 1977.

⁹⁸² PRO: FCO 9/2537, op. cit.

the talks resumed. The Special Representative expressed the view that Denktash's letter 'was drafted in close consultation with the Turkish Embassy' ⁹⁸³ on the island which meant that the Turkish government also wanted to resume the meetings between the two communities. Furthermore, the Turkish ambassador in London also informed Reginald A. Hibbert, Assistant Under-Secretary of State, on 18 January that the Turkish government welcomed the prospect a meeting between the two communities' leaders and 'hoped that it would soon take place.'⁹⁸⁴ Later, it was announced that the both leaders were going to meet in Nicosia on 27 January at UNFICYP Headquarters.⁹⁸⁵

In fact, in his talks with Turgut Tülümen, Director-General for both Greek and Greek Cypriot Affairs in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the British ambassador Phillips, was told that the Turkish Foreign Ministry was agreeably surprised by Makarios' acceptance of meeting with Denktash. 'Ankara instructed Denktash to be as flexible as possible.'⁹⁸⁶ The reason that why Ankara was surprised by the Makarios's action was because as the British High Commissioner in Cyprus, Donald McDonald Gordon, stated that Denktash had sent similar proposals to Makarios before which had not been replied by the Archbishop. However, Gordon argued that Makarios' positive response to Denktash's latest call seemed that Makarios started to think that 'a reasonable compromise with the Turks would serve his own interest.'⁹⁸⁷ Gordon pointed out that after his election victory in September 1976, Makarios proved that he was the unchallenged political leader of the Greek Cypriot part of the island. Therefore, after strengthening his position in the south, Gordon thought, the Archbishop accepted the invitation to meet Denktash to 'attempt to reach a settlement with the other side of Cyprus.'⁹⁸⁸

The first meeting between Denktash and Makarios took place on 27 January as planned before. According to Perez de Cuellar information, there was a good

⁹⁸³ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁴ PRO: FCO 9/2537, confidential telegram from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Anthony Crosland, to the British Embassy in Ankara, no: 116, 19 January 1977.

⁹⁸⁵ PRO: FCO 9/2537, confidential telegram from the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations(UKMIS) to FCO, no: 70, 20 January 1977.

⁹⁸⁶ PRO: FCO 9/2537, confidential telegram from the British Ambassador in Ankara, Phillips, to FCO, no: 97, 22 January 1977.

⁹⁸⁷ PRO: FCO 9/2501, 'Archbishop Makarios Changes Horses', report from 'British High Commissioner in Nicosia to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 18 May 1977.

⁹⁸⁸ Ibid.

atmosphere in the first meeting but ‘it mainly dealt mainly with generalities and future procedures.’⁹⁸⁹ It was also planned that a further meeting would take place on 12 February under chairmanship of the United Nations Secretary-General Waldheim.⁹⁹⁰ After the first meeting the two leaders issued statements. Makarios’s explanations suggested that ‘the result of meeting justified neither excessive optimism nor great pessimism but there was still a considerable distance between the two sides.’⁹⁹¹ Denktash indicated that ‘the discussion had been constructive in a sincere atmosphere.’⁹⁹² In the meeting, Makarios asked Denktash about the percentage of territory which the Turkish side wanted to have if an agreement was to be reached on a bizonal base. The Turkish Cypriot demand was thirty two percent of the island. Makarios replied that there would be no agreement on such a percentage. Denktash said that this percentage could at least be taken as starting point for talks. Makarios also expressed the view that the Turks could have more territory in a solution based on a multi-regional rather than a bi-zonal one.⁹⁹³ Actually, this meeting was important because after a long interruption, the parties had a new chance to exchange their ideas on the solution of the problem. The following points were mainly discussed in the first meeting:

- a. On the constitution, Makarios accepted the concept of a federation, but not a confederation of two essentially separate states.*
- b. On territory, Denktash said that Turkish Cypriot property amounted to 32.8 percent before 1974 and so the Turkish Cypriot region should be not less than this. Makarios is believed to consider 25 percent as a reasonable starting-point for bargaining.*
- c. Both sides accepted the concept of package deal.*
- d. Denktash accepted in principle freedom of travel, settlement and employment, as long as the requirements of Turkish security were met.*⁹⁹⁴

The UN Secretariat thought that the meeting of the two leaders on 27 January would provide an opportunity to establish future negotiation structures.⁹⁹⁵ Ankara was also content with the atmosphere in the first meeting. The Turkish Ministry of State and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Seyfi Öztürk, issued a statement after the

⁹⁸⁹ PRO: FCO 9/2537, confidential telegram from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Donald McDonald Gordon, to FCO, no: 38, 27 January 1977.

⁹⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁹¹ PRO: FCO 9/2537, unclassified telegram from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Donald McDonald Gordon, to FCO, no: 39, 28 January 1977.

⁹⁹² Ibid.

⁹⁹³ PRO: FCO 9/2537, confidential telegram from the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations(UKMIS) to FCO, no: 99, 28 January 1977.

⁹⁹⁴ PRO: FCO 9/2538, ‘Makarios-Denktash meeting on 27 January’, FCO’s South European Department’s note, 14 February 1977.

⁹⁹⁵ PRO: FCO 9/2537, confidential telegram from the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations(UKMIS) to FCO, no: 100, 28 January 1977.

meeting on which he indicated that the Turkish government was supporting continuation of the Denktash-Makarios talks. It was also pointed out that the proclamation of the further meetings with the attendance of the UN Secretary-General, Waldheim, was welcomed with great satisfaction by Ankara.⁹⁹⁶ The Turkish Foreign Minister, Çağlayangil, also made similar statements and he added that: 'the negotiations being conducted between the two communities at the highest level, with no prior conditions, will provide the shortest path to reaching a positive settlement.'⁹⁹⁷

The second meeting between the two leaders was held on 12 February 1977. In a press conference after the meeting, Waldheim stated that it had been agreed by the parties that the inter-communal negotiations were going to resume between the two communities in Vienna at the end of March under the chairmanship of the United Nations Secretary-General.⁹⁹⁸ The High Commissioner, Gordon, said that although Waldeim did not talk about the details of the meeting, his speech line was optimistic.⁹⁹⁹ Makarios expressed the view that after the meeting, although he maintained his cautious approach, he became more optimistic for a prospect for solution.¹⁰⁰⁰ According to the High Commissioner, Gordon, Denktash showed less optimism who stated that 'a settlement could be reached in a year or eighteen months if all went well.'¹⁰⁰¹ In fact, there was a difference in the parties' meeting place choices. Makarios suggested New York as a meeting place and Denktash, Nicosia. Then, 'Vienna had been a compromise.'¹⁰⁰² In his own evaluation of Denktash-Makarios meeting on 12 February, the High Commissioner Gordon indicated that formalisation of brief ideas, which was discussed on 27 January, was the main

⁹⁹⁶ PRO: FCO 9/2537, 'the statement by Mr Seyfi Öztürk, the Turkish Ministry of State and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the Denktash-Makarios talks', Office of the Press Counsellor, Turkish Embassy in London, 3 February 1977.

⁹⁹⁷ PRO: FCO 9/2537, 'the Turkish Foreign Minister's statement to the press in Strasbourg on the resumption of the Cyprus talks', Office of the Press Counsellor, Turkish Embassy in London, 31 January 1977.

⁹⁹⁸ PRO: FCO 9/2538, unclassified telegram from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Donald McDonald Gordon, to FCO, no: 070, 14 February 1977.

⁹⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰² Ibid.

success of the meeting of the two leaders on 12 February. He added that this would allow the negotiators to move ahead.¹⁰⁰³

Both leaders had agreed on some guidelines which would be a basis for future negotiations between the two communities:

1. *We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, Federal Republic.*
2. *The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.*
3. *Questions of principle like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and the right to property and other specific matters are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties, which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.*
4. *The powers and functions of the Central Federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal character of the state.*¹⁰⁰⁴

The British High Commissioner Gordon called on Candemir Önhon, the Turkish ambassador on the island, to discuss with him Denktash-Makarios meeting on 12 February. Önhon expressed the view he had seen Denktash immediately after the meeting and ‘he had seemed to be content with the outcome.’¹⁰⁰⁵ The ambassador also mentioned that he had urged Denktash to be ‘restrained and moderate at his press conference’¹⁰⁰⁶ after the meeting. At the end of his conversation with the British High Commissioner, Candemir Önhon also again mentioned that although there had been some minor adverse comments, the general reaction in Turkey towards the outcome of the meeting ‘had been quite satisfactory.’¹⁰⁰⁷ The meeting in Vienna between two communities would be an important occasion in terms of the Cyprus problem. However, Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for Special Political Affairs, told David Logan, the British diplomat in the UK mission at the United Nations in New York, that because of the election in Turkey, which would be held in June, it was unreasonable to expect major progress in the meeting in Vienna.¹⁰⁰⁸ Nevertheless, the decision to hold a meeting in Vienna

¹⁰⁰³ PRO: FCO 9/2538, confidential telegram from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Donald McDonald Gordon, to FCO, no: 070, 14 February 1977.

¹⁰⁰⁴ PRO: FCO 9/2538, confidential telegram from the UK Permanent Representatives to NATO, Sir John Killick, to FCO, no: 41, 15 February 1977.

¹⁰⁰⁵ PRO: FCO 9/2538, confidential telegram from the British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Donald McDonald Gordon, to FCO, no: 086, 16 February 1977.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰⁸ PRO: FCO 9/2538, letter from the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations(UKMIS) to SED, FCO, 25 February 1977.

at the end of the March could be regarded as success of the Denktash-Makarios meetings.



The Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktash; The United Nations Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim and Archbishop Makarios. Picture from the High-Level Meetings in Nicosia in February 1977.
Source: *Milliyet*, 14 February 1977.

The Denktash-Kyprianou Summit in May 1979 and the Cyprus problem by 1980

*'This is a crucial moment.'*¹⁰⁰⁹

The Vienna meeting started on 31 March 1977 between two communities under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General Waldheim. Before the meeting, on 10 March, Tassos Papadopoulos, the Greek interlocutor, told Perez de Cuellar that he believed that discussion in Vienna on Guideline four, which was about the power and function of central government and had been drawn in Denktash-Makarios meeting, needed to be made in the latter process after the parties made a significant progress in Vienna on the territorial issue and guideline two and three.¹⁰¹⁰

On the first day of the meeting, Waldheim, stated that the talks would last until 7 April. After this process, negotiations between two communities would continue on the island which would provide an opportunity to discuss the matters in greater details before a further meeting in Vienna.¹⁰¹¹ Waldheim also pointed out that the importance of the Four-Guideline agreement and said that this would provide 'a

¹⁰⁰⁹ Words of Dr Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary-General, at the Opening talks of the Vienna talks on 31 March 1977, quote found in PRO: FCO 9/2542, 'Inter-communal talks on Cyprus (Ümit Süleyman Onan and Tassos Papadopoulos) part A', 'Cyprus inter-communal talks', unclassified telegram from the British Ambassador in Vienna, Hugh Travers Morgan, to FCO, no: 86, 31 March 1977.

¹⁰¹⁰ PRO: FCO 9/2538, confidential telegram from the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations(UKMIS) in New York to FCO, no: 285, 14 March 1977.

¹⁰¹¹ PRO: FCO 9/2542, 'Cyprus inter-communal talks', unclassified telegram from the British Ambassador in Vienna, Hugh Travers Morgan, to FCO, no: 86, 31 March 1977.

sound basis for a new and determined effort'¹⁰¹² for the solution of the problem. On the first day of discussion, the Greek negotiator, Papadopoulos, offered a map which was giving 20 percent of the island to the Turkish Cypriots. Papadopoulos defended that this was a fair proportion 'based on the population ratio and land ownership.'¹⁰¹³ The Turkish interlocutor, Onan, stated that the Greek proposal was unreasonable which did not agree with the four-guideline accord. He said that the offer did not meet the Turkish Cypriot need for 'economic viability and security.'¹⁰¹⁴ He also argued that the Greek offer was designed to make Greek Cypriot domination over the Turkish Cypriot zone possible.¹⁰¹⁵ Nevertheless, the Turkish side did not want the talks to break down. Therefore, the Greek offer was just regarded as a starting bargaining position in the discussion.¹⁰¹⁶ The US Secretary of State, Vance, also thought that the territory offered by the Greeks in Vienna was inadequate¹⁰¹⁷ to reach an agreement with the Turks.

The main discussion at the Vienna conference was to settle the problem between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot but in his conversation with Papadopoulos, the British ambassador in Vienna, Morgan, was also asked that the attitude of the United Kingdom towards being a Guarantor in any future settlement in Cyprus issue. The ambassador replied that Britain did not seek any kind of guarantorship as it had in the 1960 Treaties. He personally expressed the view that Britain would consider being a guarantor 'if this was what the Cypriots wanted or if it would contribute towards a settlement.'¹⁰¹⁸

On 1 April, the Turkish side presented their constitutional proposals. Some the main points of the Turkish proposals were:

- a. Religion to keep out of the affairs of the Federal Republic (secular state)*
- b. each federated state to have its own constitution*
- c. Foreign Affairs to be a federal responsibility 'subject to certain requirements'*

¹⁰¹² Ibid.

¹⁰¹³ PRO: FCO 9/2542, 'Cyprus inter-communal talks', confidential telegram from the British Ambassador in Vienna, Hugh Travers Morgan, to FCO, no: 88, 1 April 1977.

¹⁰¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁷ PRO: FCO 9/2542, 'record of a discussion between Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the US Secretary of State', 1 April 1977.

¹⁰¹⁸ PRO: FCO 9/2542, confidential telegram from the British Ambassador in Vienna, Hugh Travers Morgan, to FCO, no: 88, 1 April 1977.

*d. external defence forces of the Federal Republic to be composed of separate land forces of each.*¹⁰¹⁹

In the session of 2 April, Papadopoulos criticised the Turkish proposals and argued that the function of a Federal government was not defined.¹⁰²⁰ Both sides had difficulty in compromising with each other offers. Brian Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for Special Political Affairs, described the meeting on 2 April as "the worst ever".¹⁰²¹ The discussion resumed on the territorial and constitutional issues in the other sessions. The Vienna meeting was ended on 7 April. The British ambassador Morgan indicated that two sides did not find a way to 'bridge the considerable gap between their views.'¹⁰²² As planned before, it was accepted that the negotiations would continue in Nicosia under the chairmanship of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative, Perez de Cuellar, in preparation for a further round in Vienna.¹⁰²³

The Greek government in Athens was not happy with the outcome of the Vienna meeting. The Greek Foreign Minister, Dimitrios Bitsios, told the British ambassador Richards that the Greek government considered the talks a substantial failure.¹⁰²⁴ He also admitted that an actual breakdown was prevented by his personal intervention in Vienna 'when Papadopoulos had been in favour of walking out.'¹⁰²⁵ Bitsios' statement was showing that there was not much hope that the two sides would reach an agreement in the near future. The new Secretary of State for FCO, David Owen, commented that the Greek Foreign Minister's 'negative line was very discouraging.'¹⁰²⁶

The dialogue between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots' representatives continued in Nicosia in May and June 1977. Both sides were trying to 'overcome their differences

¹⁰¹⁹ PRO: FCO 9/2542, confidential telegram from the British Ambassador in Vienna, Hugh Travers Morgan, to FCO, no: 95, 3 April 1977.

¹⁰²⁰ PRO: FCO 9/2542, 'Cyprus inter-communal talks', confidential telegram from the British Ambassador in Vienna, Hugh Travers Morgan, to FCO, no: 94, 3 April 1977.

¹⁰²¹ Ibid.

¹⁰²² PRO: FCO 9/2542, unclassified telegram from the British Ambassador in Vienna, Hugh Travers Morgan, to FCO, no: 110, 7 April 1977.

¹⁰²³ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁴ PRO: FCO 9/2542, confidential telegram from the British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Brooks Richards, to FCO, no: 164, 15 April 1977.

¹⁰²⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁶ PRO: FCO 9/2542, confidential telegram from the Secretary of State for FCO, David Owen, to the British Embassy in Athens, no: 87, 16 April 1977.

and to prepare the ground for the next round of the Vienna talks.¹⁰²⁷ In his statement, Greek Cypriot Negotiator, Tassos Papadopoulos, seemed to believe that he did not think that the talks would produce a solution. However, the international support for a continuation of the negotiations between the two communities for a settlement left the Greeks no choice but resume the dialogue with the Turks because the Greek Cypriots did not want to ‘give the impression of scuppering them.’

Nevertheless, the death of the Makarios on 3 August 1977 left the process of inter-communal talks in a state of uncertainty. The British Embassy in Ankara reported that the Turkish government did not issue any public statement on Makarios’s death. Ecevit, leader of the opposition, expressed his condolences to the Greek Cypriot community through a short statement on 4 August.¹⁰²⁸ According to the assessment of the British High Commissioner to Cyprus, Donald McDonald Gordon, the death of the Archbishop could affect adversely the possibility of a solution in the Cyprus issue. He argued that although Makarios could not manage to unify Cyprus before his death, he was ‘seriously interested in a realistic settlement with the Turks.’¹⁰²⁹ Gordon also believed that only Makarios, who had a prestige among the Greek community on the island, could sell the idea of a bi-zonal solution to the Greek Cypriots.¹⁰³⁰ Sypros Kyprianou, who was the President of the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives,¹⁰³¹ became the Acting President after the death of Makarios¹⁰³² and on 5 February 1978, he was elected President.¹⁰³³ The UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, went to the island on 15 January 1978¹⁰³⁴ to activate the negotiation process which had been halted by Makarios’ death. After his meeting Denktash and Kyprianou, before resuming talks, ‘each side agreed to submit “concrete and substantial” proposal on the constitutional and territorial aspect of the question.’¹⁰³⁵

¹⁰²⁷ Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, p. 84.

¹⁰²⁸ PRO: FCO 9/2499, ‘Death of Archbishop Makarios, 3 August 1977’, unclassified telegram from the Embassy in Ankara to FCO, no: 339, 8 August 1977.

¹⁰²⁹ PRO: FCO 9/2499, ‘End of an Era: Death of Archbishop Makarios’, ‘report from the British High Commissioner at Nicosia to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs’, 9 August 1977.

¹⁰³⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰³¹ Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle*, p. 86.

¹⁰³² PRO: FCO 9/2709, ‘Cyprus: annual review for 1977’, ‘report from the British High Commissioner at Nicosia to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs’, 3 January 1978.

¹⁰³³ Denktash, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

¹⁰³⁴ Ertekün, *The Cyprus dispute*, p. 56.

¹⁰³⁵ John L. Scherer, *Blocking The Sun: the Cyprus conflict*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997), p 52.

Furthermore, after Ecevit became Prime Minister again in January 1978, he also stated that the Turkish government would make an effort for the solution.¹⁰³⁶

Meanwhile, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün, met Hibbert, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for FCO, on 21 March 1978. In the Cyprus issue, Ökçün told Hibbert that Britain was expected to adopt a policy of equidistance towards the both communities in Cyprus and added that the West was likely to support the Greek Cypriots.¹⁰³⁷ Hibbert replied that the United Kingdom pursued a policy of equidistance between Turkey and Greece.¹⁰³⁸ Ökçün continued his argument and said that after the constitutional crisis in 1963, which had restarted the Cyprus problem, Britain had supported the Greek side and it did not recognise the Turkish administration on the island. Hibbert did not accept the accusation and he defended his view by stating that the Greeks had also made the same complaint when he was in Athens. They said that ‘the UK was supporting the Turkish side.’¹⁰³⁹

The Turkish Cypriot submitted their proposal to Waldheim in Vienna on 13 April 1978.¹⁰⁴⁰ Waldheim said that the ‘Turkish proposals would be sufficient to resume the inter-communal talk.’¹⁰⁴¹ As it was decided in the Denktash-Makarios meeting in 1977, the Turkish constitutional proposals were based on principles of ‘an independent, non-aligned, bi-zonal and bi-communal Federal State of Cyprus’¹⁰⁴² The Turks envisaged a weak central government.¹⁰⁴³ Furthermore, they offered to ‘relinquish control of seven to ten percent of the land they held.’¹⁰⁴⁴ However, Kyprianou rejected the Turkish offer and an agreement could not be reached over the Turkish constitutional proposals.

In his talks with Frank Judd, Minister of State for FCO, Necati Münir Ertekün, adviser to the Turkish Cypriot negotiator at the inter-communal talks, stated that the rejection of the Turkish proposals by the Greek side showed that the Greek Cypriots

¹⁰³⁶ Faruk Ataay, *12 Mart'tan 12 Eylül'e Kriz Kıskaçındaki Türk Siyaseti ve 1978-1979 CHP Hükümeti*, (Ankara: De Ki Basım Yayım, 2006), p. 125.

¹⁰³⁷ PRO: FCO 9/2721, ‘negotiations and discussions concerning the future of Cyprus part A’, ‘record of a meeting between Mr R A Hibbert, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for FCO, and Professor Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs in Ankara’ 21 March 1978.

¹⁰³⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Ertekün, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

¹⁰⁴¹ *The Times*, 13 April 1978.

¹⁰⁴² Ibid, 14 April 1978.

¹⁰⁴³ Scherer, *Blocking The Sun*, p. 53.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Ibid.

did not genuinely want to resume the negotiation with the Turks.¹⁰⁴⁵ According to him, the Greek Cypriots did not want the Americans to think that any progress was being made in talks between two communities because this would provide an excuse for the Americans to lift their embargo on Turkey.¹⁰⁴⁶ At a news conference on 2 May 1978, the Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, also stated that he thought that lift of the American embargo on Turkey would be an important step towards the solution of the Cyprus problem and problems between Turkey and Greece. He believed that 'the Greek Cypriots would block a solution as long as the embargo factor remained.'¹⁰⁴⁷

On 15 May 1978, Ecevit told the British Prime Minister, James Callaghan that the Turkish proposals were 'concrete, substantial, voluminous and timely.' He also added that the proposal could be shown as a valid reason for the resumption of talks.¹⁰⁴⁸ Callaghan replied that he was not sure that the proposals would lead a settlement and Kyprianou could accept them.¹⁰⁴⁹ Although Ecevit said that some of the points in the proposals were open to negotiate, Callaghan asserted that the political structure which the Turks pictured was 'too loose to be constructed as providing for a cohesive state.'¹⁰⁵⁰

The Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis, wanted Callaghan to convince the Turks by using his influence to improve their Cyprus proposals. Callaghan replied that he thought that it was unlikely that the Turks would make any modification in the proposal before the negotiation opened.¹⁰⁵¹ Furthermore, while the Greek Cypriot leader, Kyprianou, was in the UN Headquarters in New York, he wanted to meet Ecevit to discuss the Cyprus issue rather than meeting Denktash.¹⁰⁵² However, Ecevit refused Kyprianou's offer and told the Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis that he

¹⁰⁴⁵ PRO: FCO 9/2721, 'call by Mr Münir Ertekün, adviser to the Turkish Cypriot negotiator at the inter-communal talks, on the Minister of State in the House of Commons', 21 April 1978.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁷ PRO: FCO 9/2721, 'US arms embargo and Cyprus', unclassified telegram from the British Embassy in Ankara, to FCO, no: 1066, 3 May 1978.

¹⁰⁴⁸ PRO: FCO 9/2721, 'record of a discussion between the Prime Minister and Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr Bülent Ecevit, at 10 Downing Street', 15 May 1978.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵¹ PRO: FCO 9/2721, confidential telegram from the Secretary of State for FCO, David Owen, to the British Embassy in Athens, no: 121, 6 June 1978.

¹⁰⁵² Ertekün, *The Cyprus dispute*, p. 62.

could accept a quadripartite meeting between Karamanlis, Kyprianou, Denktash and himself but Kyprianou did not agree with this.¹⁰⁵³

In his conversations with David Owen, the UN Secretary-General Waldheim indicated that although he accepted that a new approach was needed in the Cyprus peace talks, he would not restart the negotiation process without having sure that it would be productive.¹⁰⁵⁴ In November 1978, America, Britain and Canada took an initiative and offer a plan for the solution of the problem. According to this, there would be upper and lower houses in the federal government. While the number of the Greek and Turkish deputies in the upper house would be the same, the 78:18 population ratios would be applied in the lower chamber. 'Both chambers would have to approve a law, but the lower house could overrule the upper with a two-third majority. At least thirty-eight percent of the deputies of each community had to participate in the balloting.'¹⁰⁵⁵ However, the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan. Therefore, it failed to provide an agreement on the Cyprus problem.

On 18 and 19 May, the UN Secretary-General Waldheim managed to arrange a meeting between Kyprianou and Denktash. In this meeting both sides agreed that the inter-communal talks would continue. Moreover, a Ten-Point Agreement was reached on 19 May between the two leaders which were accepted as a basis for further negotiations between two communities. According to this:

1. *It was agreed to resume the inter-communal talks on 15 June 1979.*
2. *The basis of the talks will be the Makarios-Denktash guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the UN resolutions relevant to the Cyprus Question.*
3. *There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all citizens of the Republic.*
4. *The talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects.*
5. *Priority will be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha (Maraş) has been reached it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem.*
6. *It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardise the outcome of the talks, and special importance will be given to the initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions.*

¹⁰⁵³ PRO: FCO 9/2722, 'negotiations and discussions concerning the future of Cyprus part B', 'record of the Prime Minister's conversation (James Callaghan) with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in New York', 2 June 1978.

¹⁰⁵⁴ PRO: FCO 9/2722, 'record of a meeting between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the UN Secretary-General at the United Nations in New York', 26 September 1978.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Scherer, *Blocking The Sun*, p. 54.

7. *The demilitarisation of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, and matters relating thereto will be discussed.*
8. *The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession.*
9. *The inter-communal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding any delay.*
10. *The inter-communal talks will take place in Nicosia.*¹⁰⁵⁶

After the Ten-Point Agreement, the talks resumed on 15 June 1979 in Nicosia but suspended on 22 June because of the different opinions between the two sides. Only four meetings were held and at these meetings, as the British High Commissioner, Peregrine Rhodes, stated that ‘the substance of the problem was hardly touched’¹⁰⁵⁷ by the two sides. Rhodes also indicated that the postponement gave the Greek Cypriots an additional pretext to recourse to international opinion to get support for their case.¹⁰⁵⁸ On the other hand, Rhodes also mentioned that unsuccessful negotiation attempts with the Turks had raised some criticism among the Greek Cypriots against Kyprianou, even if some from his own party for ‘the apparent failure of his policy to produce progress.’¹⁰⁵⁹

In the meantime, the economic gaps between the two communities on the island were growing. The High Commissioner Rhodes stated that the Greek Cypriot economy continued to prosper.¹⁰⁶⁰ It was a fact that international recognition of the Greek part of the island as the legitimate representative of the “Cyprus Republic” was a major factor in this situation. In Turkish-controlled area in the north, although there was a stagnant economy, Denktash was still politically strong among the Turkish Cypriots.¹⁰⁶¹ Another matter was that the constant breakdown in the inter-communal talks appeared to make stronger Denktash’s idea of declaring the independence of the Turkish administration in northern Cyprus. Rhodes mentioned that Ankara was restraining him from doing so. It was most likely because of the possible international reactions towards such a move was preventing the Turks. Rhodes also

¹⁰⁵⁶ Ahmet Sözen, ‘The Cyprus Negotiations and the Basic Parameters: An overview of the Inter-communal Negotiations’ in Ahmet Sözen ed., *The Cyprus Conflict: Looking Ahead*, (Eastern Mediterranean University Printing-House, 2008), p. 76., Ahmet Sözen, *The Cyprus Conflict and The negotiations: A Political and International Law Perspective*, (Ankara: Can Reklam, 1998), pp. 49-50.

¹⁰⁵⁷ PRO: FCO 9/2935, ‘Cyprus: annual reviews for 1979, including Defence Adviser’s report’, ‘Cyprus: annual review for 1979’, ‘report from the British High Commissioner at Nicosia to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs’, 2 January 1980.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶¹ Ibid.

emphasised that Denktash would eventually seem to convince Turkey that ‘no progress was possible in the Cyprus problem unless the Turkish Cypriots are treated as equal negotiating partners.’¹⁰⁶²

Through the efforts of the UN Secretary-General’s new Special Representative in Cyprus Hugo Gobbi, who was a former Argentinian diplomat, inter-communal dialogue resumed between two communities in Cyprus. There was a formal opening session on 9 August 1980 which was followed by the first substantive meeting held on 16 September.¹⁰⁶³ By the winter of 1980, the UN Secretary-General introduced an Interim Agreement proposal.¹⁰⁶⁴ There were some measures in the proposal to ‘promote more positive atmosphere on the island’¹⁰⁶⁵ such as ‘the lifting of the economic embargoes on the Turkish Cypriots, reopening of the Nicosia International Airport.’¹⁰⁶⁶ However, as had happened in the past negotiation processes, the two communities did not managed to reach a settlement again. As a result of this, eventually the Turkish Cypriots would unilaterally declare independence of “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC)¹⁰⁶⁷ on 15 November 1983.

Conclusion

The British Government’s approach to the Turkish decision to establish a “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” within Cyprus showed that Ankara did not manage to change the British attitude towards the Turkish case on Cyprus problem in the time period 1967-1975, because when the “Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration” was established in 1967, Britain criticised this new Turkish formation on the island, and there was also no change in British opinion on the new Turkish organisation in 1975.

¹⁰⁶² Ibid.

¹⁰⁶³ PRO: FCO 9/3145. ‘Cyprus: annual review for 1980 and country assessment paper’, report from ‘the British High Commissioner at Nicosia to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs’, 2 January 1981.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Mirbagheri, *Historical Dictionary of Cyprus*, p. xxxiii.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Hubert Faustmann and James Ker-Lindsay, ‘The Origins and Development of the Cyprus Issue’, in James Ker-Lindsay & Hubert Faustmann (eds.), *The government and Politics of Cyprus*, (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 2009), p. 72.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Tozun Bahcheli, ‘Turkey’s Quest for EU Membership and the Cyprus Problem’ in *Turkey and the European Union: Internal Dynamics and External Challenges*, J.S. Joseph, (ed.), (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 162.

Even so, British criticism increased when compared with its previous reaction in 1967. Apart from the report of the British Ambassador in Ankara,¹⁰⁶⁸ in which he showed some understanding to the new Turkish administration on the island, the British official's general statements heavily criticised the Turkish decision. In particular, the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Roy Hattersley's statements that the British government deplored the action taken by the Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash¹⁰⁶⁹ showed the difference in the British and Turkish approach to the Cyprus question.

This negative British attitude towards the Turkish policy on Cyprus issue continued in the later stage of the Cyprus problem. Britain regarded the Vienna talks 1975-1977, and Denktash-Makarios meetings in 1977, later Denktash-Kyprianou summit in May 1979 as an important step for a solution, but the Greek and Turkish Cypriots failed to reach agreement. The general British official evaluations tended to depict the Turkish attitude in the peace talks as a responsible for the failure of attempts to settle the problem. In particular, assessments by the British High Commissioner on the island on the inter-communal negotiations were likely to criticise the Turkish attitude.¹⁰⁷⁰ Ankara was not happy with this British approach towards its policy on Cyprus which was essentially regarded as Britain favouring the Greeks. As a result of this situation, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün told the British official that Britain was expected to adopt a policy of equidistance towards the both communities in Cyprus.¹⁰⁷¹

In general, in contrast to the year of 1974, there was no major crisis in the Anglo-Turkish relations between the periods of 1975-1980. However, the Cyprus problem continued to have a negative effect on their mutual relations because of different approaches to its solution.

¹⁰⁶⁸ PRO: FCO 9/2158, confidential telegram from the British Embassy in Ankara to FCO, no: 284, 13 February 1975.

¹⁰⁶⁹ PRO: FCO 9/2158, 'Mr Hattersley's statement on Cyprus', unclassified telegram from FCO, Callaghan, to the British High Commission in Nicosia, no: 145, 15 February 1975.

¹⁰⁷⁰ PRO: FCO 9/2709, 'Cyprus: Annual Review for 1977', 'report from the British High Commissioner at Nicosia to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs', 3 January 1978.

¹⁰⁷¹ PRO: FCO 9/2721, 'negotiations and discussions concerning the future of Cyprus part A', 'record of a meeting between Mr R A Hibbert, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for FCO, and Professor Ahmet Gündüz Ökçün, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs in Ankara' 21 March 1978.

Conclusion

The reactions from by Britain and Turkey towards the events in the Cyprus dispute demonstrated that there were three distinct and important stages in Anglo-Turkish relations through the periods 1967-1980. The first one was from 1967 to 1974. In this time period, Britain and Turkey were well aware that each was pursuing a different policy on the island. However, despite each disapproving of the other sides' approach towards the Cyprus problem on many occasions, both generally avoided criticising each other's policy openly so as not to damage their diplomatic relations. One of the significant reasons for this situation was the Cold War. In particular, Britain wanted to maintain good relations with Ankara because there were two British military bases in Cyprus.¹⁰⁷² If their relations were to deteriorate, Turkey could try to establish closer relations with the Soviets which would endanger the functionality of the British bases¹⁰⁷³ and NATO's position in the region. As a result of this, Britain kept restraining itself from heavily criticising Turkey's policies.

However, Britain opposed Turkey's actions at the time of the crisis on the island. In this sense, the November 1967 crisis was an important event on the island; Turkey was about to start military operations there but these were halted by American intervention. Through this event, the Turkish government clearly understood that Britain was against the use of force by the Turks. At the time of crisis, in the Cabinet discussion on 23 November 1967, statements by British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, George Brown, also showed the British position on this issue. According to him 'Britain should bring all possible pressure to bear on Turkey, seek to involve the United Nations as deeply as possible and take political action at every level to stop the fighting.'¹⁰⁷⁴ His words give us an important example which illustrates the divergence in British and Turkish policy on the Cyprus issue.

Actually, the United Kingdom also tried to understand the Turkish policy on Cyprus. According to the FCO's assessment in 1968; the Turkish policy on Cyprus was based

¹⁰⁷² PRO: FCO 9/72, 'Cyprus', 'British Interest in Cyprus', report of the Central Department of Foreign Office, annex A, 28 September 1967.

¹⁰⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷⁴ PRO: CAB 128/42, 'Post War Conclusion', CC (67), 68th conclusion, 23 November 1967, p. 5.

on the following three elements. It also stated that sometimes one was uppermost in arguments and sometimes another:

- (a) emotional dislike of Greeks, opposition to Enosis;*
- (b) determination to support and protect the Turkish-Cypriot Community, many of whom have relatives and friends in Turkey, often in powerful positions;*
- (c) military security, and unwillingness to see one more Greek island added to the ring which surrounds the Turkish coast.¹⁰⁷⁵*

This British effort to understand the motivations of the Turkish policy on the Cyprus question also showed that Britain was trying to approach the Cyprus issue without adversely affecting its relations with Turkey.

Another point was that Britain's relations with Cyprus Government, which was under Greek Cypriot control, had an impact on its relations with Turkey. After the November 1967 crisis, dialogue started between the two communities and Clerides and Denktash had meetings to discuss the Cyprus question in order to find a settlement. Apart from monitoring the inter-communal talks, Britain also focused on its own relations with the island. In this connection, while describing the situation on the island in 1970, the British High Commissioner in Nicosia Peter E. Ramsbotham indicated that 'British interest had prospered.'¹⁰⁷⁶ He also added that 'United Kingdom was still the largest trading partner of Cyprus and British had maintained a satisfactorily high flow of British consultants and had created several useful openings for British Industry.'¹⁰⁷⁷ Therefore, any crisis with the Greek Cypriot administration on the island, such as giving support the Turks in the Cyprus issue, could endanger British interests in Cyprus.

Another British interest in the island was their military bases. The British High Commissioner Ramsbotham also explained that 'relations between the Sovereign Base Areas and the Cyprus Republic had continued to be good.'¹⁰⁷⁸ It was a fact that Britain gave importance to its military bases on the island. Therefore, the United Kingdom was following a cautious policy and did not want its military presence in Cyprus to be questioned by either of the communities on the island. In his assessment report for 1972 to FCO, Derek Day, the Acting British High Commissioner in

¹⁰⁷⁵ PRO: FCO 51/47, 'the Turkish Attitude to Cyprus 1945-1967', Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs's Research Department Memorandum, 4 December 1968.

¹⁰⁷⁶ PRO: FCO 9/1358, 'Cyprus: Annual Review for 1970', report from 'the British High Commissioner in Cyprus to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs', 1 January 1971.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Ibid.

Nicosia, mentioned that ‘there had been relatively little criticism of the bases even from the left-wing press ¹⁰⁷⁹ on the island. He also mentioned the inter-communal talks between the two communities and said that when any agreement, even if a provisional one, was reached in the Cyprus question, the ‘Treaty of Guarantee and Agreement of 1960 might well come up for discussion’¹⁰⁸⁰ and, he added that, ‘this, in turn, could bring status of the Sovereign Base Areas into question.’ Therefore, he recommended that future British policy on Cyprus needed to take into account the situation of the SBAs in time of any agreement on the Cyprus issue.

This British policy to protect its presence in Cyprus had had an impact its approach towards the Turkish stance on the Cyprus question. According to British opinion, any disagreements between the Greek Cypriot administration and Britain over the Cyprus problem and any open support of the British towards the Turks could endanger the British Sovereign Base Areas on the island. The British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Olver, stated in his report for 1973 that he did not believe that Makarios wanted the British to leave the island, but he also emphasised that the Archbishop ‘was well aware that the Sovereign Base Areas depended on local goodwill for their effective functioning.’¹⁰⁸¹ Therefore, the High Commissioner also pointed out ‘if our attitude were considered to be totally negative, the Archbishop’s inevitable tactic would be start press and other campaigns against us.’¹⁰⁸² In addition, Olver remarked that ‘once started, campaigns of this kind against the British presence on the island could rapidly get out of control.’¹⁰⁸³ As a result of this situation, Britain restrained itself from openly supporting any Turkish arguments on the Cyprus problem, because, if Makarios thought that the Turks was favoured by the British in the Cyprus dispute, he would take position against the presence of the British SBAs on the island which would be a unwanted development for Britain.

Overall, although the British and Turkish governments knew that they would not cooperate with each other as had happened in the 1950s and each passing year was widening the gaps in their approach, the Cyprus issue had not caused major problems

¹⁰⁷⁹ PRO: FCO 9/1667, ‘Cyprus: Annual Review for 1972’, report from ‘the Acting British High Commissioner at Nicosia to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs’, 1 January 1971.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸¹ PRO: FCO 9/1883, ‘Cyprus: Annual Review: 1973’, report from ‘the British High Commissioner in Cyprus to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs’, 3 January 1974.

¹⁰⁸² Ibid.

¹⁰⁸³ Ibid.

between the two countries until 1974. When the Turkish military operation started on the island in July 1974, Anglo-Turkish relations entered a new stage.

In fact, before the Turkish military operation, the British and Turkish governments' attitude towards the Greek coup on the island on 15 July 1974 also showed that there were important differences in the British and Turkish approach towards the Cyprus question. After the Greek coup, the Turkish Prime Minister, Ecevit, accompanied by the other Turkish officials met with the British counterparts in London to act together with Britain against the situation in Cyprus. However, 'Turkish and British governments failed to reach a consensus during the meetings.'¹⁰⁸⁴ Apart from the British government rejection of a joint military operation with the Turks against to the Greek junta in Cyprus, the Secretary of State for FCO, Callaghan also did not take a positive approach to the Acting Foreign Minister Hasan Işık's suggestion of issuing a joint declaration against the coup.¹⁰⁸⁵ He told Işık that 'the hope and expectation that the Turkish government were not contemplating resort to unilateral action of a military character.'¹⁰⁸⁶ The Turkish government was not happy with the British government's attitude. Furthermore, Britain's continued recognition of the Greek Cypriot leader, Makarios, as legitimate President of the Republic¹⁰⁸⁷ immediately after his escape from the island following the coup on 15 July also disappointed the Turkish government.

When the British government heard that the Turkish military operation had started on 20 July, a strong reaction to the Turkish action was shown. A counter military operation was also contemplated by the British government to stop the Turkish military advance. Later, James Callaghan said: 'It was the most frightening moment of my career. We nearly went to war with Turkey. But the Americans stopped us.'¹⁰⁸⁸ Essentially, this British reaction demonstrated that the Cold War had started to be a less pressing issue in Anglo-Turkish relations. In particular, Soviet criticism of the Turkish military operation might also have encouraged the British to contemplate such a harsh response to the Turkish military operation since they knew that it would be difficult for Turkey to win Soviet support after launching an attack on Cyprus

¹⁰⁸⁴ Kırkçuoğlu, 'Turco-British since the 1920s', p. 97.

¹⁰⁸⁵ PRO: FCO 9/1922, 'Geneva Conferences on Cyprus: record of tripartite talks between UK, Greece and Turkey, 25-30 July and 9-13 August 1974', 'record of a meeting between the Secretary of State for FCO and the Turkish Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs', 18 July 1974.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Sönmezoglu, *Tarafların Tutumları*, p. 99.

¹⁰⁸⁸ O'Malley and Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy*, p. vii.

which was disapproved of by the Soviet. However, America still considered Turkey as an important ally and member of NATO, so they did not allow Britain to take such an action. All these factors helped Turkey to improve its relationship with America, while the Anglo-Turkish relationship was negatively affected.

In the Geneva conferences, after the first Turkish military intervention on the island, which were attended by British, Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, Callaghan's approach towards the crisis also caused problems with the Turkish delegation. There were also some strong verbal exchanges between him and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Turan Güneş.¹⁰⁸⁹ Furthermore, after the second Turkish military advance on the island, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office again took a position that was clearly against the Turkish action. Therefore, all of these situations significantly damaged the trust between the British and Turkish governments.

After the end of the Turkish military operations on the island, Anglo-Turkish relations again entered a new stage. Although the Cyprus issue did not cause a major crisis between the two countries as it had done in 1974, neither country approved of the other's policy towards Cyprus. Thus, an era of 'negative stability' in Anglo-Turkish relations started after 1974. The FCO perpetuated and prolonged its negative attitude towards the Turkish policy on the Cyprus issue. As mentioned before, When the 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' was declared on 13 February 1975, the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Hattersley, said that the British government deplored the action taken by Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash.¹⁰⁹⁰ This showed that Britain was now more comfortable criticizing Turkey on the Cyprus issue, compared to the 1960s. One of the important factors in this situation was that international conjecture was changing. As mentioned before, after the Helsinki Accords in 1975, the impact of the Cold War upon international relations tended to decrease. This can be also regarded as one of the factors in the British taking this more critical stance towards the Turkish policy on Cyprus after 1975. Furthermore, like the West, the Soviet bloc too refused to recognise the Turkish-controlled area on the island. Turkey never acquired international support for its action in Cyprus. Consequently, it became easier for Britain to continue to

¹⁰⁸⁹ See Birand, *Thirty Hot Days*, pp. 73-75.

¹⁰⁹⁰ PRO: FCO 9/2158, 'Mr Hattersley's statement on Cyprus', unclassified telegram from FCO, Callaghan, to the British High Commission in Nicosia, no: 145, 15 February 1975.

recognise the Greek Cypriot-controlled “Cyprus Government” as the legitimate representative of the island.

The British High Commissioner Olver’s description of the Turkish-held area on the island in 1974 could be regarded as example for how the British government saw the future of the Turkish Cypriot administration on the island. He said: ‘a northern third of Cyprus which, stagnating under the dead hand of the Turkish military, bid fair to degenerate into a third-rate Turkish province.’¹⁰⁹¹ In fact, this description showed that the British government did not have any intention of recognising the Turkish administration, even, in the distant future.

The Geneva conferences were Britain’s last major involvement in the Cyprus question. After that, Britain applied a more passive policy and rather than actively being involved and just chose to express its support of inter-communal talks between the communities to solve the problem. It appeared that British interest on the island continued to focus more on protecting its SBAs and the best way to do this seemed to be to keep its relations with the Greek Cypriot administration at a good level. After the beginning of the substantial negotiations between the two communities in 1975, both sides started accusing each other of being an obstacle in the solution of the problem. Britain tended to regard the Turkish Cypriot attitude in the inter-communal talks as being responsible for the continuation of the Cyprus problem and its lack of resolution. In this connection, in his report to FCO, the British High Commissioner, Donald McDonald Gordon, evaluated the negotiations process in 1977 and expressed the view that the Turkish Cypriot leader ‘Denktash had shown no desire for a settlement.’¹⁰⁹²

On the other hand, by 1979, it was seen that the attitude of both sides in the talks was the responsible for the lack of solution in the Cyprus question. The British High Commissioner, Peregrine Rhodes, indicated that ‘there was no narrowing of the gap between the two sides.’¹⁰⁹³ He also pointed out that ‘neither seemed ready to make the sort of concession which might produce a settlement which the other could

¹⁰⁹¹ PRO: FCO 9/2149, ‘Cyprus: Annual Review for 1974’, 21 February 1975.

¹⁰⁹² PRO: FCO 9/2709, ‘Cyprus: Annual Review for 1977’, ‘report from the British High Commissioner at Nicosia to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs’, 3 January 1978.

¹⁰⁹³ PRO: FCO 9/2935, ‘Cyprus: Annual Review for 1979’, ‘report from the British High Commissioner at Nicosia to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs’, 2 January 1980.

accept.¹⁰⁹⁴ Furthermore, the decision of the Greek Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) to withdraw its support from the Greek Cypriot leader Kyprianou's government in May 1980 because of 'his failure to show results on the inter-communal issue'¹⁰⁹⁵ demonstrated that there was not complete satisfaction among the Greeks in the inter-communal talks .

Another point was that Britain appeared not to want to give the image that it had not made sufficient effort in solving the problem. Therefore, giving support to the United Nations' initiatives for a settlement was regarded as an important opportunity for the British to show that they were still making an effort to settle the dispute. In parallel with this policy, the British High Commissioner, Rhodes, also stated that: 'our support for the United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim's efforts, including our share in preparing the basis for them, has enabled us to be seen to be both interested and reasonably active in working for a Cypriot solution.'¹⁰⁹⁶ In fact, there was a deadlock in the inter-communal talks. Therefore, the High Commissioner also mentioned that he did not believe that an initiative from the United Nations would also be able to break the deadlock and settle the matter between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots because, even if the Secretary-General criticised the Greek and Turkish attitude and called the both sides to resume the dialogue, the High Commissioner claimed that 'it looked much more likely that the aim of each would be build up a case to show that the other was to blame for continued deadlock.'¹⁰⁹⁷

At the end of 1970s, the solution to the Cyprus question seemed to be more complicated. Every attempt which was made since 1975 to reach a settlement through the inter-communal talks ended with failure. Because of this, while talking about the Cyprus problem with the United Nations Secretary-General Waldheim, Foreign Secretary David Owen stated that 'Cyprus was a mess.'¹⁰⁹⁸ As a result of this, the British government also appeared to lose interest in the dialogue between the two communities and the British High Commission on the island became a more important instrument for the government to monitor the development in the Cyprus

¹⁰⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹⁵ PRO: FCO 9/3145, 'Cyprus: Annual Review for 1980 and country assessment paper', report from 'the British High Commissioner at Nicosia to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs', 2 January 1981.

¹⁰⁹⁶ PRO: FCO 9/2935, op. cit.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹⁸ PRO: FCO 9/2722, 'record of a meeting between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Un Secretary-General at the United Nations in New York', 26 September 1978.

question. The reports of the High Commissioner in Nicosia on the situation on the island were also effective in shaping the British government's attitude towards the Turkish Cypriots. The reports also gave information about the relations between Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots. In his report of the assessment of 1980, British High Commissioner on the island, Rhodes, stated that Denktash was still a strong leader among the Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand, he also mentioned there was some pressure from Ankara on Denktash towards greater flexibility in the talks for the solution of the problem.¹⁰⁹⁹ Rhodes indicated that Denktash had difficulty in accepting concessions on the territorial issue.¹¹⁰⁰ However, after the Turkish Generals took over the government in Turkey by the military coup on 12 September 1980, Rhodes thought that it was most likely that Ankara's pressure on Denktash to urge him to be more flexible would decrease.¹¹⁰¹

In general, because of the British passive role in the Cyprus question after 1974, Anglo-Turkish relations did not face a major problem, but the significant differences in their respective Cyprus policy endured. Britain's negative attitude towards Ankara's policy also continued. It was difficult to ignore the impact of Callaghan, who was Foreign Secretary at the time of 1974 events and who became Prime Minister in April 1976, on the Anglo-Turkish relations. His personal position at the time 1974 crisis negatively had affected Ankara's approach towards Britain.

This negative situation between Britain and Turkey also continued after 1980. In this connection, when the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC)¹¹⁰² was declared on 15 November 1983, the United Kingdom gave its support to the United Nations Security Council resolution which heavily criticised the Turkish decision. Furthermore, in his speech at the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe, stated that the British government condemned the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence. Furthermore British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sent a message to the President of Turkey Kenan Evren, stating that she wanted the Turks to withdraw their decision on declaring independence in Cyprus.¹¹⁰³

¹⁰⁹⁹ PRO: FCO 9/3145, op. cit.

¹¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰² Bahçeli, 'Turkey's Quest for EU', p. 162.

¹¹⁰³ Sönmezoglu, *Tarafların Tutumları*, pp. 100-101.

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