Who Controls the Wealth?:Electoral System Design and Ethnic War in Resource-Rich Countries

Neudorfer, Natascha S. and Theuerkauf, Ulrike G. (2014) Who Controls the Wealth?:Electoral System Design and Ethnic War in Resource-Rich Countries. Electoral Studies, 35 (3). pp. 171-187. ISSN 0261-3794

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Abstract

Both natural resource wealth and electoral system design are frequently investigated factors in the civil wars literature. So far, however, there is no well-known study which explicitly considers the interaction effect between these two factors on the risk of violent ethnic conflict. We argue that resource-rich countries with a proportional electoral system for the legislature are less prone to ethnic civil war than resource-rich countries with a majoritarian or mixed electoral system, as proportional electoral systems tend to increase the effective number of parliamentary parties and thus the number of groups who can share state control over resource wealth. We find empirical support for this argument using binary time-series-cross-section analysis covering 83 to 140 countries between 1984 and 2007.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: electoral formula,proportional representation,civil war,resource wealth
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of International Development
Depositing User: Pure Connector
Date Deposited: 20 Jan 2015 10:26
Last Modified: 21 Apr 2020 23:45
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/51780
DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2014.06.002

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