UNPACKING HEALTH AID EFFECTIVENESS

Jalles D'Orey, Maria Ana (2013) UNPACKING HEALTH AID EFFECTIVENESS. Doctoral thesis, University of East Anglia.

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Abstract

This thesis provides an unpacked analysis of health aid effectiveness using
Mozambique as a case-study. It comprises of three main papers of independent but
related research.
The first paper adds to the literature by employing a new model to study the
impact of health aid on health outcomes. By taking into account the heterogeneity
that exists in the amount of health aid received between Mozambican provinces, a
multilevel model is specified. After recognizing significant variation of health
outcomes between provinces, I found no statistical evidence that health aid was a
cause of those variations.
The second paper provides a systematic analysis of donors’ health aid
disbursement decisions in-country. Using a game theoretic framework and
grounded in qualitative evidence from Mozambique, this paper shows that donors
have allocation tactics other than state-to-state aid to pursue their goals which are
translated into opting for alternative channels of delivery. Simultaneously, this
research acknowledges the non-passive role of the recipient country, i.e., donors’
decisions of how to allocate aid are mediated by the recipient’s response to their
actions. This chapter suggests that recipient-donors’ strategic interactions are
crucial to understand donors’ allocation behaviour and have direct consequences
for aid effectiveness.
The last paper explores empirically and theoretically aid coordination efforts of aid
agencies. After providing an insight into the implementation of coordination in the
health sector in Mozambique, this chapter explores why different agencies differ in
their motivations to coordinate, based on the distinction between public and
private good properties of coordination. Finally, using a collective action theory
framework and aided by Schelling’s (1973) diagrams, this chapter illustrates why
it is so hard to coordinate. My results show that individual incentives to coordinate
are neither strong nor stable. Furthermore, the success of coordination depends,
inter alia, on the number of agencies that perceive coordination as a public versus
private good and the role and involvement of the lead donor and the recipient
country.

Item Type: Thesis (Doctoral)
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of International Development
Depositing User: Mia Reeves
Date Deposited: 13 Jun 2014 09:01
Last Modified: 13 Jun 2014 09:01
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/48790
DOI:

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