Consequential Harms and the Rule of Law: Liberty-limiting Principles in the Context of Transition

Hamilton, Michael (2007) Consequential Harms and the Rule of Law: Liberty-limiting Principles in the Context of Transition. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 27 (1). pp. 75-100. ISSN 1464-3820

Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)

Abstract

The consequences of restricting or not restricting the right to freedom of assembly are potentially magnified in transitional societies. Yet determining whether such consequences are indeed ‘harmful’, and whether their cost should be borne despite the harms caused, requires the elaboration of criteria which define what are valid and relevant harms. While a human rights framework can perform this task, open-textured rights standards prescribe neither the threshold of legal intervention nor the goals of transition. By extension, the rule of law - underpinned by this rights discourse - is silent about whether liberal or communitarian ideals should inform the reconstruction of public space in conflicted or nascent democracies. Illustrated by analysis of legal interventions in parade disputes in Northern Ireland, this article argues that the rule of law is necessarily orientated by ethical consensus about its scope. Furthermore, this consensus operates as a restraint upon the degree of normative discontinuity permitted during transitional compromises. The article frames the ethical options in terms of three liberty-limiting principles - the argument from democracy, the argument for toleration, and the argument for recognition. Each suggests different parameters for the transitional project and for the role of law within it.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
Related URLs:
Depositing User: Michael Hamilton
Date Deposited: 28 Feb 2013 11:04
Last Modified: 21 Apr 2020 19:24
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/41748
DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqi038

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item