Resolving paradoxes in judgment aggregation

Rizza, Davide (2012) Resolving paradoxes in judgment aggregation. The Philosophical Quarterly, 62 (247). pp. 337-354. ISSN 1467-9213

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Abstract

When a law court makes a decision based on the individual deliberation of each judge, a case of judgment aggregation occurs. The possibility that the aggregation's outcome be logically inconsistent, even though it is based on consistent individual judgments, arises relatively easily and has been the subject of several investigations. In this paper I show that this paradoxical behaviour is the effect of decision procedures that are unable to discriminate between logically consistent and logically inconsistent individual judgments. The paradoxes can be resolved by selecting procedures that are not affected by this limitation.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Arts and Humanities > School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies
University of East Anglia > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Research Groups > Philosophy
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Depositing User: Davide Rizza
Date Deposited: 26 Mar 2012 14:02
Last Modified: 21 Apr 2020 16:14
URI: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/38465
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00018.x

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