Relational contracts, repeated interactions and contract modifications

Hviid, Morten (1998) Relational contracts, repeated interactions and contract modifications. European Journal of Law and Economics, 5 (2). pp. 179-194. ISSN 1572-9990

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The paper uses the theory of repeated games to model relational contracts. It demonstrates that there are cases where it is better to leave a long term contract more incomplete than it needs to be in order to secure optimal renegotiation at every point. In this particular class of contract problems, it may be optimal to allow contract modification even in cases where the buyer could have put the modified terms into the original contract.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: contract modification,incomplete contracts,relational contracts,repeated games
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
Depositing User: Julie Frith
Date Deposited: 16 Nov 2010 09:31
Last Modified: 15 Dec 2022 02:00
DOI: 10.1023/A:1008644618826

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