Hviid, Morten (1998) Relational contracts, repeated interactions and contract modifications. European Journal of Law and Economics, 5 (2). pp. 179-194. ISSN 1572-9990
Full text not available from this repository. (Request a copy)Abstract
The paper uses the theory of repeated games to model relational contracts. It demonstrates that there are cases where it is better to leave a long term contract more incomplete than it needs to be in order to secure optimal renegotiation at every point. In this particular class of contract problems, it may be optimal to allow contract modification even in cases where the buyer could have put the modified terms into the original contract.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | contract modification,incomplete contracts,relational contracts,repeated games |
Faculty \ School: | Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law |
Depositing User: | Julie Frith |
Date Deposited: | 16 Nov 2010 09:31 |
Last Modified: | 15 Dec 2022 02:00 |
URI: | https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/10808 |
DOI: | 10.1023/A:1008644618826 |
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