UK utility regulation: licences, commitment and judicial review

Harker, Michael ORCID: (2005) UK utility regulation: licences, commitment and judicial review. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 76 (1). pp. 5-33. ISSN 1370-4788

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his paper analyses critically the claim made by Levy and Spiller that, in the context of UK utility regulation, licences operate as a ‘technology of commitment’. The functional logic of delegation which underpins much principal–agent analyses is discussed, together with the credibility problem emerging from a divergence between a principal's long-term and short-term policies. Levy and Spiller contend that the UK has a successful model of utility regulation in part because of the use of licences which restrict the regulator from deviating from the broad substantive principles settled at the time of vesting. This contention is examined through the detailed consideration of five judicial review cases which have cast light on how, and to what extent, the licences restrict regulatory discretion.

Item Type: Article
Faculty \ School: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
UEA Research Groups: Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Competition, Markets and Regulation
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Groups > Media, Information Technology and Intellectual Property Law
Faculty of Social Sciences > Research Centres > Centre for Competition Policy
Depositing User: Julie Frith
Date Deposited: 16 Nov 2010 09:24
Last Modified: 22 Apr 2023 01:39
DOI: 10.1111/j.1370-4788.2005.00269.x

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