Collusion between non-differentiated two-sided platforms

Peitz, Martin and Samkharadze, Lily (2022) Collusion between non-differentiated two-sided platforms. Economics Letters, 215. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

Platform competition can be intense when offering non-differentiated services. However, competition is somewhat relaxed if platforms cannot set negative prices. If platforms collude they may be able to implement the outcome that maximizes industry profits. In an infinitely repeated game with perfect monitoring, this is feasible if the discount factor is sufficiently large. When this is not possible, under some condition, a collusive outcome with one-sided rent extraction along the equilibrium path can be sustained that leads to higher profits than the non-cooperative outcome.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	Publisher Copyright: © 2022
Uncontrolled Keywords:	cartelization,platform competition,price structure,tacit collusion,two-sided markets,finance,economics and econometrics ,/dk/atira/pure/subjectarea/asjc/2000/2003
Faculty \ School:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Norwich Business School
Related URLs:	https://www.scopus.com/pages/publication...
Depositing User:	LivePure Connector
Date Deposited:	29 Apr 2026 15:24
Last Modified:	29 Apr 2026 15:24
URI:	https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/102834
DOI:	10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110506

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