The Technology of Communicative Resistance in Wartime: The Example of Ukraine in 2022
Olga Sovenko, Honorary Lecturer, University of East Anglia
Abstract
The war in Ukraine, which broke out in 2014 and entered the full-scale stage in 2022, has its own long history, mythology and symbolism. As we know, the presence of an external enemy brings people together and actively consolidates the masses, and this is exactly what is happening in Ukraine. Starting from February 2022, the Ukrainian state and the broad mass of Ukrainian people unequivocally chose a position of resistance to Russian invasion, Russian propaganda and manipulative communicative technologies that are happening in parallel with the physical war itself.
In a conflict situation, communication can be used by conflicting parties, if not for the purposes of diplomacy, then in order to increase their own power or reduce the power of the enemy. Watching the informal communicative space in Ukraine in 2022, we can discover a special element that has appeared and could be named the technology of communicative resistance. We analyse its nature and conclude that the main two factors – the development of institutions and networks of civil society actors, and the development of mass communication technologies in Ukraine – make it possible to effectively confront the enemy in communicative fields during the wartime.
“The European Parliament decided to award the Sakharov Prize – the EU's main award in the field of human rights – ‘to the brave people of Ukraine represented by President Zelenskyi, elected leaders and civil society.”
The brave people of Ukraine received the Sakharov Prize of the European Parliament, NewsUA.one, 19 October 20221

T
he globalized world is becoming more and more tightly connected, and not the least role in this process is played by common narratives introduced into modern communication networks through many different channels. One person's pain becomes the shared pain of millions if the story reaches a mass audience: feelings of joy, admiration, fear, aggression – everything is endlessly divided and multiplied, multiplied and divided, if it gets into the web of modern communication tools through the appropriate messaging technology. Communication technology owns the world. We ourselves become someone's technology much more often than we know. This essay will explore the technology of resistance, which is becoming ever more relevant as informational wars play out alongside physical ones.
The communicative practices of wartime are, of course, a specific and long-established area of academic interest. The degree of propaganda’s influence, the specifics of manipulative technologies, government censorship and moral censorship – these, and other topics, are the subject of study by a wide variety of scholars from an equally wide variety of disciplines (for example, H. Lasswell 1927, H. Arendt 1958, H. M. McLuhan 1964, J. Habermas 1978, M. Castells 2009, H. Pocheptsov 2022, C. W. Walldorf Jr. 2022, and many others).2 Nevertheless, from the position of an active observer of the current informal communication of the Ukrainian people, one can draw non-trivial conclusions about how mass communication turns into mass resistance. Originating from within the mass of the people, being an intuitive continuation of everyday practices, the technologies of popular resistance become a separate front in the fight against a real and informational enemy.
Using the example of informal internal and external communications of Ukrainian society in 2022, we will try to highlight practices that are naive, because they were not developed by professional communicators, and systematize them with regard to the sphere of life, ways of existence and their distribution through mass communication channels. We will rely on the methodology of narratives and actor-network theory (social objects as dynamic units of social relations), using the methods of general scientific

analysis plus qualitative analysis of documents (sources of information) and observation (in the sense of inclusion in the communicative field that is subject to analysis).
The war in Ukraine, which broke out in 2014 and entered the full-scale stage in 2022, has its own long history, its own mythology and symbolism. As we know, the presence of an external enemy brings people together and actively consolidates the masses, and this is exactly what is happening in Ukraine. However, the introduction of an extensive and pervasive number of Russian communication technologies in Ukrainian communicative fields for a significant period of time stood in the way of the homogenization of public opinion of Ukrainians. Thus, the progress in the selfidentification and determination of the majority of the population of Ukraine as “Ukrainians,” as well as the desire to speak the Ukrainian language (instead of Russian) was constantly restrained by the infusion of various false stories. Taking historical facts and narratives and perverting their meanings, Russia’s political technology sought influence through its agents in Ukrainian society, fostering the narrative of Ukrainian unification with Russia – politically, economically, socially and culturally. Thus, proRussian politicians in Ukraine and their television channels did their job, strengthening such communication by forming paid branches of political parties throughout the country (“Party of Regions,” “Opposition Platform – For Life” and others) – as did the Moscow Patriarchate church in Ukraine.3 Starting from February 2022, however, the Ukrainian state and the broad mass of Ukrainian people unequivocally chose a position of resistance to this approach.
In a conflict situation, communication is used by conflicting parties, if not for the purposes of diplomacy, then in order to increase their own power or reduce the power of the enemy. It is obvious that informal communication, which we consider in the Ukrainian communication space, is aimed in particular at the implementation of tasks including:
1)		Increasing the physical power of the Ukrainian side: the number of soldiers, territorial defence fighters, improving ammunition, weapons, and other necessary resources.

2)		Building up and using informational power: gathering and spreading arguments “for” themselves and “against” the enemy, trying to convince the enemy to end the conflict, lowering the enemy's moral and psychological level, intensifying the circulation of information beneficial to one side, using as many information channels as possible, involving all possible communication methods to broadcast the necessary information.
3)		Involvement of social strength – the largest possible number of supporters, authorities, opinion leaders, influencers, high-status and prestigious figures, effective symbols, influential events, etc.
4)		Development of concepts of moral strength – universal human values of goodness, justice, humanity, mutual support and mutual trust among Ukrainians etc.
5)		Accumulation and usage of other resources – such as time, territory, space (physical and symbolic), finances, technologies, possibilities of planning, organization and management of certain events, projects, etc.
All of these communicative actions are taking place on any possible informal platform – social media platforms, messaging apps like Facebook, Viber, Telegram etc. – and have been connected to a social net with more and less active players, covering the networks of the Ukrainian diaspora and connecting refugees as well.
Researchers note that Russian anti-Ukrainian propaganda began to be particularly active in 2013, and still imprints narratives favourable to their government on the minds of Russians – that’s what political technologists and other experts like Borys Tiesenhausen confirm (Military propaganda of the Russian Federation — mechanisms of influence and methods of protection: a detailed analysis by Tiesenhausen, Kanaldom.tv, 20 July 2022).4 The Ukrainian pluralistic communicative space and the critical thinking of the people, the level of which has been actively growing in recent years, allow even ordinary Ukrainians to analyse false messages from the Russian side and draw their own conclusions, thereby neutralizing the impact of fake hostile information attacks. Below is an example of Russian propaganda messages and ways to overcome them by the Ukrainian audience.

Table 1: Russian false arguments and Ukrainian responses (an indicative list):
Messages of the “Russian world”5	The Ukrainian response	
“Ukrainians do not have their own history”
“Ukrainian lands should belong to Russia”6	An evidentiary historical source base with a mention of the existence of Ukrainian statehood and signs of its formation and development is provided and distributed in all affordable formats, in both short and extended form – memes, posts, infographics, articles, experts’ interviews etc.7	
“the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine is oppressed and must be freed from it”
the “army of liberators” came to Ukraine
“Ukrainians will sincerely welcome the Russian army”	Results of public opinion polls are provided, with the true percentage of people who feel nostalgia for the Soviet Union (5-15%) or who feel discriminated with their Russian language in Ukraine, supported by a factual base, research and journalistic interviews, news reports reflecting the opinion of the population of Ukraine including photos and video materials of ordinary citizens.8	
“Ukrainians were planning to attack Russia, so Russia is carrying out preemptive strikes”	Investigation of facts, refutation of false arguments.9	
“Ukrainians are developing a special biological weapon to attack Russia's border territories”	Non-profit organizations conduct anti-fake research, dispel fakes, create memes to ridicule information declared by the enemy (for example, StopFake, Armyinform).10	
“the Russian army is powerful, it is the second army in the world”	In the first days of the war, the chronicle of events indicated the defeat of the Russian side, and numerous communications from witnesses proved that the enemy army was poorly prepared and extremely poorly organized, which led to Russian propaganda inventing excuses for its failures, and Ukrainian activists dispelling these	

	justifications and arguments; accordingly, this topic became one of the leading ones, including the informal communication of Ukrainians.11	
“the Ukrainian nationalist movement in modern Ukraine, led by Stepan Bandera, turned into a fascist one thanks to the broad support of the West”	Simple verification and dissemination of facts that Stepan Bandera, the ideologist of the national liberation movement in Ukraine in the middle of the 20th century was killed in 1959, his movement fought against German fascists and Soviet communists for the independence of Ukraine, and the number of supporters of nationalist movements in Ukraine today is tiny (about 2%).12	
“a couple of pigeons are sitting and Javelin “Fighting birds of Ukraine”
is being warmed” (reworked Ukrainian “From the Volga to the Yenisei, …” (two song)13	main Russian rivers)
“Ukrainian war tit - Russian water will become poisonous”14
***

“Such mass reordering of reality, obliteration of memory and history feels far beyond mere ‘war crimes’. It can even sound closer to Lemkin’s original concept of genocide, where he spoke of different kinds of genocide: ‘political, social, cultural, economic, biological and physical.’ He also listed the techniques which could be used to commit genocide, including among them the desecration of cultural symbols and the destruction of cultural centres such as churches and schools.
But his final legal definition was reduced to attacks on ethnic and ‘biological’ groups.”15
- Peter Pomerantsev, Time Magazine, April 2022
So what directions and elements of communicative resistance can be identified in the Ukrainian space today? The activity of the information technology front in Ukraine has become well-known and effective: groups of anonymous IT specialists who, not being in the service of the state, block and disrupt new information infusions of the Russian occupiers, both in the territory of Ukraine and in the Russian mass media. For example, instead of new reports from the Russian authorities about their success in the “demilitarization” and their “special operation” being introduced in Ukraine, reports about the number of real casualties among Russian soldiers during this invasion have been broadcast, or the appeal of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyi about the facts of the “military operation” has been transmitted, including advice on surrender for the Russian military and pictures of the bombing of Kharkov and other Ukrainian cities. The speeches of Ukrainian artists have also been broadcast by the informal Ukrainian IT- army on Russian television channels and electronic platforms.16
Similarly, conversations of Russian soldiers with their relatives have been intercepted and distributed on various communication networks, providing direct examples of the torture, murder and robbery of Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war by the Russian army. In the same way, videos from social networks taken by ordinary citizens are added to the evidence of war crimes. This becomes important not only to help the recording of crimes and their investigation, but also to shape the image of the enemy in an extremely

negative light, as a force which fights with debased and dishonest methods against a defenceless civilian population.17
In contrast humorous videos and photographic reports of ordinary Ukrainians are regularly posted on social networks to highlight the weakness, incompetence and lack of organization in the Russian army. This has had a massive impact on the public mood of both sides of the conflict. Mocking the enemy has long been an effective path to resistance, because humour is known to be a powerful tool in mass communication.18 In 2022, folk legends arose about a Russian tank stolen by Ukrainian gypsies19, a Russian drone shot down by an old lady with a can of preserves20, Ukrainian bees stinging several Russian soldiers to death, and Ukrainian troops repelling an enemy attack on the village of Chornobayivka around 30 times.21 These situations of popular resistance become legends and subjects of artistic works, and are then retold in various types of communication as examples of resistance and as calls for new forms of resistance.
Military folk songs have also appeared, as well as fables of Ukrainian artists working on the cultural front, which emphasize the weakness of the enemy and sound the hope for the earliest victory of the Ukrainian army. Sometimes the army men themselves sing and play music, because many of them have musical abilities, and their ranks include professional musicians.22 Stories from the battlefields instantly turn into epics, heroic fables and ballads about the successes of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, inspiring the people to further resistance. Heroization takes place not only at the level of the state, but also at the level of local communities: every district, small village, street, social group, and labour collective is constantly active in the support of its soldiers, organizing aid and assistance to soldiers and celebrating their exploits. It should be remembered that during the first weeks of the war each community in Ukraine organized its own territorial defence unit, and only from April 2022 were they recognized as participants in the national resistance on the same terms as military groups.23
Mass fundraising for the needs of the army, displaced people, people affected by hostilities, and especially children, became a very powerful element of the popular

resistance of Ukrainians. Volunteer organizations and various foundations have organized numerous events with the involvement of domestic and international donors to collect funds, aid items or equipment: ammunition, transport, medicine, food, etc.24 At charity auctions, for example, athletes’ medals and artists’ awards have been sold at the request of their owners (perhaps most famously, the Kalush Orchestra, the winners of Eurovision 2022).25 Postage stamps painted by artists on the theme of famous war scenes (“Russian warship – go to the ... bottom”) and issued by Ukrposhta with a circulation of 1 million copies, became not just charity auction lots, but also symbols of the heroism, stability and steadfastness of both the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian people.26 Thus, we can see a combination of public, private and state initiatives working together in a collaborative process of communicative resistance that follows this pattern:
•		the creation of a painting by an artist
•		its popularization amongst the Ukrainian population through various communication channels
•		the development and implementation of a project to issue a postage stamp by the state as a joint-stock enterprise by Ukrposhta
•		voting for the image on the stamp among the population on the state platform Diia (diia.gov.ua)
•		promotion and calls for participation in the auction on official and unofficial platforms
•		purchase of stamps by private individuals, domestic and foreign funds, etc.
Through processes like these, such images become symbols of the unity of the people. It is a productive step of mass resistance which moves directly from communicative practices to the implementation of specific humanitarian tasks.27
Other symbolic messages have been actively commercialised, replicated and distributed by diverse types of businesses as patriotic goods. Various souvenirs and items of memorabilia have been produced and sold with a part of

the profit going to support the Armed Forces. For example, patriotic prints on T-shirts and other types of clothing, patriotic decorations, table games, drawings on cars, murals and more.28

The infamous blogs of children who are witnesses of the war have also been published by foreign publishers and sold to raise funds to support the war effort. Children, as a certain category of volunteers, have become active characters on television and in social networks, due to the fact that they actively help adults or organize their own methods of indirect participation in popular resistance. This includes creativity, charity, activity in relation to helping victims and involves child-musicians, child-artists, child-cooks etc.
These actions have their own deeper history: the volunteer movement in Ukraine actively developed in 2013, during the Revolution of Dignity, when the “Yanukovych regime” was overthrown and political movement towards European integration was determined. It manifests even more massively now. It has expanded to include the provision of humanitarian, legal, and medical aid, and the evacuation of people from dangerous zones and occupied territories. This is risky, hard work that ordinary people carry on their shoulders. Often, such volunteer organizations find support from famous people and foundations located abroad and become more effective and efficient.29 Important elements of mass resistance in Ukraine can be found in the expansion of the circle of supporters of Ukraine thanks to the establishment of communication with international organizations, the organization of various actions and projects – for example, mass speeches, rallies, petitions, letters to opinion leaders and specialized international organizations (i.e. the wives of Azovstal’s defenders united into the “Women of Steel” organization and undertook various activities to secure the return of their husbands).30

Sometimes, such actions and communications are organized and supported from within, sometimes from outside of Ukraine, by refugees and activists located abroad. They are often joined by representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora and various foundations and charitable organizations. Active cooperation of volunteers from Ukraine and other countries take place, and thanks to developed networks of contacts and resources actions are numerous and successful. Often closely related is the organization of cultural and sports charity events. Support of artists and artists’ support of Ukrainian resistance, as well as spreading awareness of Ukrainian culture and the current situation in Ukraine among Ukrainians and foreign citizens is an important element of resistance to enemy narratives. The organization and holding of cultural events including festivals, exhibitions, film screenings and charity fairs, etc. – enables communication with mass audiences.31
Ukrainian artists now often act as “megaphones” of the Motherland's glaring problems through their works and their active civic stances. It is possible to single out war works, both naive and professional, into a separate category: “resistance creativity” (“art of resistance”).32 These range from war newsreels and art films to poetry, prose, sculptures, photos, murals and handmade products. They are cultural products which are inspired by war and which, in turn, inspire others to make their own choices, to take an active position to resist this war.33 A further important contribution is made by domestic and foreign bloggers and opinion leaders who shape the agenda in their communicative fields, and who support purposeful communication among their audiences, shift their psychological state, and provide motivation for constructive actions. Some famous artists, cultural figures and sportsmen went to defend the country and continue to run video blogs, report news from the front, and support the spirit of fighters and citizens.34 According to the laws of network interactions, new messages and ideas spread, are interpreted and take on new forms in forums and discussions in social networks. All important messages receive prompt dissemination and calls for specific actions and decisions; that is, such communication is more immediate and effective during wartime. It makes a significant difference to how Ukrainians can use their media space, unlike Russians who, Sviderska (2022) comments, “appl[y] strict censorship, using a progovernment vertical, at a time when Ukrainian citizens act according to the scheme of a network, nodal method of information dissemination.”35

The agenda of current informal communications is not only pain and suffering and calls for help, but also includes a significant number of “success stories” – both from heroes on the battlefield, and from government agencies and ordinary citizens. These might be the moments when separated families are reunited, the liberation of Ukrainians from captivity, the results of the work of public and volunteer organizations, or simple acts of kindness, support and compassion.36 A separate, extremely important link in the implementation of the technology of communicative resistance is the maintenance of safe communication with the residents of the occupied territories. The underground resistance of the captured Ukrainian cities of Mariupol, Melitopol, Kherson (de-occupied in November 2022), Energodar and elsewhere gives a sense of unity and the indomitability of the Ukrainian spirit.37 The guerrilla movement and individual resistance initiatives in these territories prove that, despite the difficulty of being under occupation, there is a huge potential for comprehensive resistance, and it is important to support it with continuous and sophisticated communication for the sake of citizens’ safety.
In general, the war situation, which affects all spheres of Ukrainian life, forms a whole series of new communicative practices, a separate “language.” For example, children born in 2022 are named by their parents after the weapons that save Ukrainians from enemy attacks, like Javelina and Bayraktar.38 The names of military equipment are also used when naming new or rescued pets. Such symbolic acts fit into the trend of “military fashion”: to be ready for resistance, to fight for your own, to be proud of the successes of your army and government, to use your domestic production, to speak your language, to help your fellow citizens. That is an entire semantic seria of identification and symbolization of the war era, expressed in the cultural-communicative space and everyday practices of Ukrainians today.
Conclusions
The communication of mass resistance is characterized by promptness, pervasiveness, clear monosemantic rhetoric, structured messages, ease and ambiguity of perception, a

significant degree of visualization (photos, videos, infographics, drawings, memes, etc.), practical orientation. It is also defined by the presence of specific communicative limitations: censorship, self-censorship, time or technical restrictions, security restrictions, etc., due to the specifics of the military situation in the country. There is also a specific wartime language emerging, filled with symbols and images of wartime life, wartime slogans and metaphors. For example, a certain “war slang” has emerged from mistranslation and misunderstanding of Ukrainian words by Russians. At the very beginning of war, a large number of Russian agents – “collaborants” – were exposed in different regions of Ukraine pretending to be pro-Ukrainian. Ukrainian territorial selfdefense units invented a way to check suspicious indviduals: they asked them to pronounce “palianytsia” – that is, “loaf” in Ukrainian – a difficult word for nonUkrainians to say. In turn, a story on Russian television, claimed that Ukrainian nationalists made suspects say “pOlianytsia” (which they claimed meant “strawberry” in Ukrainian) and imprisoned those who couldn’t say it. So there was a double mistake in the translation: “strawberry” is “pOlUnytsia” (two different letters from “palianytsia”) and Russians could not really pronounce and translate this word. Still, their propaganda got hooked on this story to frighten their audience with the image of “cruel Ukrainian nationalists,” but really it was just a preliminary way to discover the enemies in Ukraine at the start of the war. So “palianytsia” became a real symbol of difference between our understanding of each other: Ukrainians can understand Russian, but Russians don’t understand Ukrainian at all; even their television journalists make mistakes. The other example is connected with the word “bavovna” which in Russian is “hlopok” and means “cotton” if you put the stress on the first syllable, and “clap” if the second syllable is stressed. The Russian government didn’t want to admit defeats and tried to hide their army losses: when there were explosions in warehouses of their hidden military equipment they often interviewed witnesses who heard “a clap” – and it was repeated so many times that their “claps” made Ukrainian people laugh – yet somehow the media transformed that word to “cotton,” a mistranslation that became popular in communication channels, including official ones. It became a symbol of how Russians misunderstand Ukrainians and Ukrainians try to do the same; it was also a mockery of how Russian propaganda works: they hear “claps” instead of ammunition explosions. It

became so ubiquitous that even Melinda Simmons, a British Ambassador of the United Kingdom in Ukraine, used cotton stems in her flower bouquet congratulating Ukraine on its Independence Day.39
Therefore, without taking into account the centralized narrative of combating the enemy embodied by the state, it can be observed that the consolidation of the Ukrainian people, which finds expression in the communicative space and has a very specific practical implementation in each case, is successfully overcoming the elements of the enemy imperative. It can therefore become a new subject of further analysis as a “technology of resistance.”
Several contextual features of the operation of this technology in Ukraine can be singled out:
1)		The civil society of Ukraine mobilized its comprehensive resources in a very short time: the civilian population of Ukraine intensified its social activities, each on its own front: entrepreneurs, food industry workers, clothing manufacturers, car manufacturers and repairers, etc., scientists, educators, journalists, doctors, athletes and cultural figures. There is no sphere left that has not organized its resistance front, using one or another communication technology.
2)		The spread of technologies, an increase in active information players among the population and an increase in the level of information literacy: more and more people in Ukraine have joined modern communication channels. Representatives of older generations have mastered the consumption of information from verified sources, how to communicate in messenger, and the use of mobile applications that actually save lives or help to save lives of others.
3)		The all-pervading volunteerism, the mutual support of the population to each other, which takes on very different forms and manifestations and carries calls for good and light and draws a sharp contrast to the darkness carried by the enemy force. This also aspires to give hope and faith to those who are going through difficult times, offering targeted help and spiritual revival to those in need. It is

very important that such acts of kindness are widely covered in various media, and contrasted with the huge negative burden of other media messages.
4)		The formation of a special culture of communication: repeated appeals (“keep calm,” “we believe in the Armed Forces,” “our strength is in unity,” “all the guilty will be punished,” “we will restore and rebuild everything,” etc.), messages, aphorisms, thanks to which rapid identification, determination of the reference group, circumstances and conditions of communication (wartime, danger, need for mutual assistance, etc.) is achieved. In this way, the ordinary everyday communication of Ukrainians turns into a way of achieving certain goals: prompt involvement of additional resources, search and transfer of verified and useful information, formation of working groups to solve tasks, etc.
5)		All observed wartime communicative practices in Ukraine have a clear purpose, a link to action, and therefore, elements of not only mental, intellectual, but also purely practical resistance. So, the time from the launch of technologies to the implementation of their results is significantly reduced.
6)		The stimulus and strong driver of anti-enemy communication in Ukraine in 2022 will be the feeling of aggression, hatred, the need to take revenge on the enemy for wrong done, as well as the feeling of the need for unity, mutual help, mutual salvation, pride for your people, a sense of neo-patriotism. These will be augmented with an increased self-awareness about belonging to the Ukrainian nation, the Ukrainian state, Ukrainian territory, history, culture, etc. Despite such an emotional component, the rate of rationally determined communication is quite high, because, as mentioned, such communication has a mostly practical orientation. Emotions become a background and an additional motive for successful communication practices.
Examining, in detail, the informal communication of Ukrainians in 2022, we discover some main characteristics of such a technology: efficiency, pervasiveness, ease and variability of implementation (main and alternative channels and audiences, clear rhetoric, often short and unambiguous forms, a significant degree of visualization for quick perception), practical orientation. We also note the presence of specific

communicative restrictions: censorship, self-censorship, time or technical restrictions, security restrictions, etc., due to the specifics of the military situation in the country. Also, during the implementation of this technology, a specific wartime language appears, filled with symbols and images of wartime life, slogans and wartime metaphors.
Thus, the main two factors – the development of institutions and networks of civil society actors, and the development of mass communication technologies in Ukraine – make possible the operational accumulation of resources and the development of successful communication practices aimed at confronting the enemy during the period of martial law. They can be characterized in general as a technology of communicative resistance.

1		“The brave people of Ukraine received the Sakharov Prize of the European Parliament,” NewsUA.one, 19 October 2022, https://newsua.one/news-politics/73744.html (accessed 12 December 2022).
2		Harold D. Lasswell, “The Theory of Political Propaganda,” The American Political Science Review, vol. 21, no. 3, 1927, pp. 627–31, https://doi.org/10.2307/1945515; Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism [2D enl. ed.] ed, New York: Meridian Books, 1958; Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man [1st ed.], New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964; Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, Boston, Beacon Press, 1979; Manuel Castells, Communication and power, Alianza Editorial Sa; MADRID edition, 2009; Pocheptsov Heorhiy, “Don't read others narratives / Не читайте чужих наративів,” Ukrinform.ua, 10 October 2022 (accessed 12 December 2022); Pocheptsov Heorhiy, “There is one step between a narrative war and a real war / Между войной нарративной и войной настоящей — один шаг,” Rezonans.asia, 11 October 2022 (accessed 12 December 2022); C. William Walldorf Jr., “Narratives and War: Explaining the Length and End of U.S. Military Operations in Afghanistan,” International Security, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Summer 2022), pp. 93–138.
3		Evhenia Nakonechna, “The Security Service of Ukraine found anti-Ukrainian materials in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate seminary,” Deutsche Welle, DW.com, 28 November 2022, https://www.dw.com/uk/sbu-znajsla-antiukrainski-materiali-v-duhovnij-seminarii- upc-mp/a-63916464 (accessed 12 December 2022).
4		“Military propaganda of the Russian Federation — mechanisms of influence and methods of protection: a detailed analysis by Tiesenhausen,” Kanaldom.tv, 20 July 2022, kanaldom.tv/voyenna- propaganda-rf-mehanizmy-vplyvu-ta-sposoby-zahystu-detalnyj-rozbir-vid-tyzengauzena/ (accessed 12 December 2022).
5		The concept of the “Russian world” supposes not only the forcible expansion of the territories of Russia, but also the strict obedience and genocide of neighboring peoples. Some historians consider the history of Ukraine as a long-term genocide, including its various forms – mass famine (Holodomor 1932-1933), repressions of cultural figures, scientists, suppression of free thought in 1930-1950, and so on.
6		Television address by Russian President Vladimir Putin to the citizens of Russia, 21 February 2022, where he called the Ukrainian state an artificial formation of the communist era and announced the decision to introduce troops into the DPR and LPR – Мир24, https://www.youtube.com/@Mir24tv (accessed 12 December 2022).
7		Aliona Ivanova, Facebook post with some significant and meaningful facts about Ukraine, Facebook.com, 25 March 2022, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0oZUY9YiWAcVZeKZhXhqKpktrbZH6v1 WtVDob6B8R1abiEcZ2S6AMfpBkzervuqHnl&id=100018213151538&__cft__[0]=AZVBw9a3Jom4-- RczSXtjt-gwS_ARAUVqUey5MbCVz28-

noe3xDQp1xhASFZqujtQ4UQf9LaK4d8LvqlyUWc8n3jARTb4lSE7DNgNYo_sHmJoaJHG0hub_ms6YTa zA6OqXU&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R (accessed 12 December 2022).
8		Svyatoslav Khomenko, “Password ‘Palyanytsia.’ What is happening to the Russian language in Ukraine,” BBC News Ukraine, 13 April 2022,https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-61045496 (accessed 12 December 2022); “A question of identity for Russian speakers in Ukraine in the context of the armed conflict on the East of the country, the research results of International Alert,” March 2017, international-alert.org, https://www.international-alert.org/wp- content/uploads/2021/08/Ukraine-Russophone-Identity-UK-2017.pdf (accessed 12 December 2022); Iryna Balachuk, “90% of Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine say that they were not oppressed because of language – survey,” Pravda.com.ua, 27 May 2022, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/05/27/7348847/ (accessed 12 December 2022).
9		Dmytro Gorbunov, “How the Kremlin is trying to wash itself away from the resolution of this war,” Armyinform.com.ua, 19 March 2022, https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/03/19/yak-kreml- namagayetsya-vidmytysya-vid-rozvyazannya-cziyeyi-vijny/ (accessed 12 December 2022).
10		Nazar Voloshyn, “The frenzy is getting stronger: in Russia, they are already afraid of Ukrainian pigeons, ‘infected in biolaboratories,’” Armyinform.com.ua, 18 March 2022, https://armyinform.com.ua/2022/03/18/v-odnomu-z-naselenyh-punktiv-rosijskoyi-federacziyi- zhyteli-odniyeyi-iz-bagatopoverhivok-pry-vhodi-v-pidyizd-na-dveryah-rozmistyly-ogoloshennya/ (accessed 12 December 2022).
11		Ksenia Kirillova, “Save scraps and stop stealing: the top of the most bizarre explanations of war,” Stopfake.org, 11 October 2022, stopfake.org/uk/zberegti-skrepi-i-perestati-krasti-top-najhimernishih- poyasnen-vijni/ (accessed 12 December 2022).
12		Mariana Tsymbalyuk, “Who are the ‘Banderians’ and why is Russia so afraid of them?” Genevasolutions.news, 27 June 2022, https://genevasolutions.news/ukraine-stories/%D1%85%D1%82%D0%BE-
%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%96- %D0%B1%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%96%D0%B2%D1%86%D1%96- %D1%96-%D1%87%D0%BE%D0%BC%D1%83-%D1%96%D1%85-%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BA-
%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%96%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%81%D1%8F- %D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%96%D1%8F (accessed 12 December 2022); Albina Kozlova, “Who would Ukrainians vote for: a study of ratings of parties and presidential candidates,” Comments.ua, 29 June 2022, https://politics.comments.ua/ua/news/domestic-policy/za-kogo-b-golosuvali-ukrainci- doslidzhennya-reytingiv-partiy-ta-kandidativ-v-prezidenti-699823.html (accessed 12 December 2022). In all the national political ratings nationalistic parties in Ukraine come among the last, and this electoratal support is reflected in the composition of the Ukrainian Parliament: the nationalists don’t have their meaningful representation there since 2014. Since 2020 the most popular nationalistic party “Svoboda” has its representatives in only 6 regional councils of Ukraine.

13		Marta Leshak, “a couple of pigeons are sitting and Javelin is being warmed,” Instagram, 29 May 2022, https://www.instagram.com/p/CeIqaQENCUz/?igshid=MDJmNzVkMjY%3D (accessed 6 March 2023).
14		“How in Ukraine they joke about Russian propaganda and are proud of their defenders,” Drohobych.city, 27 March 2022, https://drohobych.city/blogs/201347/yak-v-ukraini-zhartuyut-z-rosijskoi-propagandi-ta- pishayutsya-svoimi-zahisnikami (accessed 31 January 2023).
15		Peter Pomerantsev, “Ukraine Is Our Past and Our Future,” Time.com, 6 April 2022, https://time.com/6164810/ukraine-is-our-past-and-our- future/?fbclid=IwAR1bG1GZSoHd819WhINq7zsCOC7YcXTk34eQuJVaPWZwsKPdrdz_Q3CQfGo (accessed 12 December 2022).
16		“Anonymous hacked Russian TV channels, but Russia denies it,” Mil.in.ua, 26 February 2022, https://mil.in.ua/uk/news/anonymous-zlamaly-rosijski-derzhkanaly-i-pokazuyut-rolyky-z-pravdoyu- pro-ukrayinu (accessed 12 December 2022); Lidia Franko, “Anonymous hackers intercepted the communications of the occupiers,” Lviv.media, 27 February 2022, https://lviv.media/viyna/17974-khakery-anonymous-perekhopyv-komunikatsiiu-okupantiv/ (accessed 12 December 2022).
17		“The occupier complains of COMMANDING (intercepted conversation),” https://www.youtube.com/@FaktyICTVchannel 9 October 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=csT6-OmohX8 (accessed 12 December 2022); New interceptions of conversations of Russian soldiers, https://www.youtube.com/@telecastsk 9 July 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E6vc67cGm6U (accessed 12 December 2022).
18		Olha Sviderska, “The role of political memes in information wars”/ О. І. Свідерська, “Роль політичного мему в інформаційних війнах,” Актуальні проблеми філософії та соціології #36 (2022): 136-140; Anna Oropaj, Yulia Koval, and Mykola Nazarov, “Memes as a socio-communicative technology in the media space” / Анна Оропай, Юлія Коваль, and Микола Назаров, Меми як соціокомунікативна технологія в медіапросторі, Diss., Сумський державний університет, 2022.
19		Violetta Orlova, “Near Kakhovka, Ukrainian Roma stole a tank from the Russian occupiers - local Ukrainians continue to repel the invaders,” UNIAN.ua, 27 February 2022, https://www.unian.ua/war/pid-kahovkoyu-ukrajinski-romi-vkrali-u-rosiyskih-okupantiv-tank- novini-vtorgnennya-rosiji-v-ukrajinu-11720335.html (accessed 12 December 2022).
20		“‘It was tomatoes!’ LIGA.Life found the Kyiv lady who knocked out an enemy drone with a can of canning,” Life.liga.net, 7 March 2022, https://life.liga.net/istoriyi/article/eto-byli-pomidory-ligalife-nashla-kievlyanku-sbivshuyu- vrajeskiy-dron-bankoy-konservatsii (accessed 12 December 2022).
21		CHORNOBAIVKA - SCORE 29:0, Nova.net.ua, 2 July 2022, http://nova.net.ua/chornobaivka-rakhunok-29-0/ (accessed 12 December 2022).
22		“A hit from the Armed Forces of Ukraine - The military sang ‘Bayraktar,’” https://www.youtube.com/@news24tvua, 24 May 2022,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c38IE_bm6sk (accessed 12 December 2022).
23		“LAW OF UKRAINE On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the Basics of National Resistance’ regarding the improvement of the order of staffing and social security of the Territorial Defense Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and voluntary formations of territorial communities,” Zakon.rada.gov.ua, 1 April 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2170-20#n2 (accessed 12 December 2022).
24		Yuriy Tarasovskyi, “Serhiy Prytula's charity fund collected UAH 600 million for four Bayraktar TB2 in three days,” Forbes.ua, 24 June 2022, https://forbes.ua/news/blagodiyniy-fond-sergiya-prituli-zibrav-500-mln-grn-na-tri-bayraktar-tb2- 24062022-6797 (accessed 12 December 2022).
25		“Eurovision winners Kalush Orchestra sold the award at an auction for $900,000,” Radiosvoboda.org, 30 May 2022, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-nagoroda-euribachennia- prodazh/31874733.html (accessed 12 December 2022).
26		“The position of Ukrposhta regarding the stamp ‘Russian warship, go...!’” Ukrposhta.ua, 23 April 2022, https://www.ukrposhta.ua/ua/news/57633-pozicija-ukrposhti-shodo-marki-russkij-vonnij-korabl- idi- (accessed 12 December 2022); Ivanna Gordiychuk, “‘Ukrposhta’ presented the design of the next patriotic stamp,” Glavcom.ua, 15 June 2022, https://glavcom.ua/country/society/ukrposhta-predstavila-dizayn-nastupnoji-patriotichnoji-marki- 853165.html (accessed 12 December 2022).
27		Taisa Melnyk, “Ukrposhta sold stamps at an auction for UAH 5 million. The price increased 200 times during the auction,” Forbes.ua, 22 April 2022, https://forbes.ua/news/ukrposhta-prodala-marki-na-auktsioni-za-5-mln-grn-tsina-pid-chas-torgiv- zrosla-u-200-raziv-22042022-5618 (accessed 12 December 2022).
28		An example of patriotic print: Men's T-shirt with a stylish Home print, Odega.com.ua, https://odega.com.ua/11500309_129 (accessed 12 December 2022); An example of patriotic print: Russian Ship... (3D T-Shirt) Full Print Men's T-Shirt, https://prostomayki.com.ua/components/com_virtuemart/shop_image/product/1661544181- 325955-0.jpg (accessed 12 December 2022); An example of patriotic print: T-shirt with a print “Mriya never dies,” http://www.facturno.com.ua/product/tshirt-mriya (accessed 12 December 2022); An example of patriotic print: Girl’s dress “I am free,” https://images.prom.ua/3772955587_w640_h640_suknya-tunika-patriotichna.jpg (accessed 12 December 2022); An example of patriotic print: Patriotic jewelry, blue and yellow brooch bird blue heart, https://ukrainart.com.ua/ua/brooches/patriotuchni-prukrasu-suno-govta-broshka-ptashka- sune-sertse-lavt11.html (accessed 12 December 2022); Angelina Golovach, “A gift for Independence Day. Patriotic jewelry from Ukrainian brands,” Life.nv.ua, 23 August 2022, https://life.nv.ua/ukr/krasota-i-moda/ukrajinski-brendi-prikras-de-kupiti-prikrasi-z-patriotichnim- dizaynom-na-den-nezalezhnosti-2022-50263579.html (accessed 12 December 2022); “Board game Strateg Russian warship go to the bottom,” https://strateg.ua/nastolnaia-yhra-ruskii-voiennyi-korabl-

idy-nadno-zhovto-blakytnyi-1 (accessed 12 December 2022); A mural dedicated to the “Ghost of Kyiv” was opened in the capital, Ukrinform.ua, 27 August 2022, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric- kyiv/3559310-u-stolici-vidkrili-mural-prisvacenij-prividu-kieva.html (accessed 12 December 2022); “The ‘Saint Javelin’ mural was completed in Kyiv,” Bykvu.com, 24 May 2022, https://bykvu.com/ua/foto/v-kyievi-zavershyly-mural-sviata-dzhavelina (accessed 12 December 2022); Ruth Comerford, “Keira Knightley to narrate Ukrainian schoolgirl's ‘extraordinary’ diary for Bloomsbury,” Thebookseller.com, 19 October 2022, https://www.thebookseller.com/news/keira- knightley-to-narrate-ukrainian-schoolgirls-extraordinary-diary-for-bloomsbury (accessed 12 December 2022).
29		«Diaspora raised funds for Ukraine in the capital of Australia,” Ukrinform.ua, 20 March 2022, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-diaspora/3443799-diaspora-zibrala-kosti-dla-ukraini-u-stolici- avstralii.html (accessed 12 December 2022); “The Ukrainian diaspora in Chicago bought 3,000 body armor for the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” UApost.us, 19 July 2022, www.uapost.us/news/ukrayinsjka-diaspora-v-chykago-zakupyla-ta-peredala-u-ljviv-3000- bronezhyletiv-dlya-zsu/ (accessed 12 December 2022).
30		Iryna Gamalii, “Ukrainians abroad will go to mass protests due to Russian shelling,” LB.ua, 12 October 2022, https://lb.ua/society/2022/10/12/532378_ukraintsi_kordonom_viydut.html (accessed 12 December 2022); Tonya Tumanova, “Save the lives of Ukrainian prisoners of war: ‘Women of Steel’ call to sign the petition,” UNN.com.ua, 11 August 2022, https://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1989580-vryatuy-zhittya-ukrayinskikh-viyskovopolonenikh- zhinki-zi-stali-zaklikayut-pidpisati-petitsiyu (accessed 12 December 2022).
31		Marathon Festival “ARTISTIC HUNDRED,” https://artsotnya.com (accessed 12 December 2022); “A charity art exhibition in support of Ukraine opened in Canada,” Ukrinform.ua, 14 March 2022, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-diaspora/3429221-u-kanadi-vidkrilasa-blagodijna-hudozna- vistavka-na-pidtrimku-ukraini.html (accessed 12 December 2022).
32		Svitlana Biedarieva, “The Ukrainian artists making work as acts of resistance,” Financial Times, FT.com, 28 March 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/870f753b-2a6a-4dd3-878a-facddda9d8c9 (accessed 12 December 2022).
33		Denis Bobkov & Maria Savytska, “‘I paint my feelings’: the artist from Mykolaiv created a series of works about cities suffering from war,” Suspilne.media, 25 April 2022, https://suspilne.media/232561-maluu-svoi-pocutta-hudoznica-z-mikolaeva-stvorila-seriu-robit-pro- mista-so-poterpaut-vid-vijni (accessed 12 December 2022); «Women's faces of war: who is the author of the drawings about Mariupol and Chornobayivka that flew around the world...,” Novy.tv, 14 April 2022, https://novy.tv/ua/news/2022/04/14/zhinochi-oblychchya-vijny-hto-ye-avtorom-malyunkiv-pro- mariupol-i-chornobayivku-shho-obletily-ves-svit (accessed 12 December 2022).
34		“Ukrainian celebrities at the war front: Taras Topolia, Antytila band solist, war diaries,”

https://www.instagram.com/stories/highlights/17860085918809557 (accessed 12 December 2022); Nikita Melnikov, “Stars in the trenches. These artists exchanged show business for service in the Armed Forces,” RBC.ua, 24 August 2022, https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/styler/zvezdy-okopah-artisty-promenyali-shou-biznes-1661183508.html (accessed 12 December 2022).
35		Olha Sviderska, “The role of political memes in information wars” / О. І. Свідерська, “Роль політичного мему в інформаційних війнах,” Актуальні проблеми філософії та соціології №36 (2022): 136-140.
36		“Good will win the war. This is our spring — morally difficult, painful, sometimes only black and white. However, it also has happy moments,” 27 April 2022, https://fb.watch/h4uNBoo1Tl (accessed 12 December 2022); “Good versus war,” 3 April 2022, https://fb.watch/h4uliOErCD (accessed 12 December 2022).
37		“In captured Mariupol, a man unfurled the flag of Ukraine on the roof of a house,” Ukrinform.ua, 29 August 2022, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3560300-u-zahoplenomu-mariupoli-colovik-rozgornuv- na-dahu-budinku-prapor-ukraini.html (accessed 12 December 2022); “Army of Shadows: how in occupied Kherson partisans terrorize enemies and fight for Ukraine,” Bilyayivka.city, 24 August 2022, https://bilyayivka.city/articles/232455/armiya-tinej-yak-v-okupovanomu-hersoni-partizani- koshmaryat-vorogiv-ta-boryutsya-za-ukrainu (accessed 12 December 2022).
38		Evhenia Lutsenko, “Javelina, Bayraktar and Prince: the most popular and original names of children for the beginning of 2022,” Hromadske.ua, 28 July 2022, https://hromadske.ua/posts/dzhavelina-bajraktar-i-knyaz-najpopulyarnishi-ta-najoriginalnishi- imena-ditej-za-pochatok-2022-roku (accessed 12 December 2022).
39		“A bouquet of COTTON and sincere words: Happy Independence Day from MELINDA SIMMONS,” https://www.youtube.com/@FaktyICTVchannel, 24 August 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-YHN8V0VT7U (accessed 12 December 2022).