- **Convergence and Club Convergence of CO₂ Emissions at State Levels:** 1 A Nonlinear Analysis of the USA 2 3 Aviral Kumar Tiwari[^], Muhammad Ali Nasir^γ, Muhammad Shahbaz^{*α} and Ibrahim 4 **D.** Raheem^{Ω} 5 6 7 [^]Rajagiri Business School, Rajagiri Valley Campus, Kochi, India * Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, China & *Department of Land Economy, 8 University of Cambridge, UK 9 ^yHuddersfield Business School, University of Huddersfield, UK 10 ^ΩFaculty of Management Sciences, ILMA University, Karachi, Pakistan 11 12 13 14 Abstract: This study examined the convergence of CO_2 emissions at state-level in the USA, for 15 the period from 1976 to 2014, based on a nonlinear and novel empirical framework. In so doing, we have applied Pesaran's (2007) test of pair-wise approach to testing convergence which gives in 16 general what are the rejection frequencies and thus provides evidence of convergence. At the 17 18 aggregate level, we also applied Chi-Young et al. (2006) half-life convergence test and the KPSS test with Fourier transformation which states are converging towards a cross-section average. 19 20 Finally, we also adopted club convergence approach developed by Phillips and Sul (2007) to 21 identify if the states are converging towards a club and last but not least we applied Schnurbus et al. (2016) test to find if there is possible evidence if club merging. We make two contributions to 22 23 the literature: (i) we conduct a country-specific analysis by focusing on the US; (ii) we consider both convergence and club convergence. Our overall results from the Pesaran's (2007) pair-wise 24 approach of convergence indicates that about 35% of the time the null of a unit root is rejected 25 26 when ADF test is used and about 22% of the time null is rejected when ADF-GLS is used 27 (irrespective of AIC or SBIC criterion). These results are also supported by KPSS stationary test 28 which shows that null is rejected about 70 to 80% times. However, when Fourier function is 29 incorporated in the KPSS test we find that the null hypothesis of stationarity is rejected only for 30 Florida, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Texas indicating that only 31 these states are non-convergent. Our overall results from club convergence (after club merging) show that USA states are forming 4 clubs. Our findings provide new insight into the convergence 32 33 of CO₂ emissions at the state level in the USA and thus have profound implications in terms of 34 environmental policy setting and Per Capita Emission (PCE) allocations. 35 36
- Keywords: CO₂ Emissions, Environmental Management, Convergence, Energy Policy, Club
 Convergence
- **JEL Classification:** Q51, Q52, Q54, Q57, Q58, R11
- 40

1 **1. Introduction**

2 Over the past few decades, two issues have conspicuously stood out: (i) unprecedented growth in 3 the global economy and (ii) increasing rate of pollution. The statistics on carbon dioxide (CO_2) 4 emissions related to energy consumption suggest an increase of over 100% from 15.51 gigaton in 5 1975 to 32.1 gigaton in 2016 (IEA, 2017). Among the attendant effects of emission is the threat of 6 global warming and climate change. The general position in the literature is that global warming is predominantly caused by the emissions of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) due to excessive 7 8 consumption and dependence on the fossil energy sources to fuel economic development (Chiu, 9 $2017)^{1}$.

10 There have been international concerted efforts to tame the rising wave of GHGs. For instance, a number of treaties and accords have signed by governments of sovereign nations, which include 11 12 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) founded in 1988, the Kyoto protocol initiated in Kyoto, Japan in 1997 and more recently, the Paris Climate Conference Agreement 2015 13 14 (COP21). Three factors have been identified to aid in the reduction of GHGs: mobilization and 15 provision of financial resources; new technology adoption; and enhanced capacity building. The 16 financial requirements to achieve these goals are enormous, thus serves as a discouraging factor. 17 Other factors that can potentially impede the progress of this agreement include no legal bindings 18 on emission targets; no specific financial supports; no change in specific policy premise; and no 19 liability provision linked to financial compensation (Clemencon, 2016; Isa and Ganda, 2018).

Convergence in CO₂ emissions has been identified as an important tool that could help reduce
GHGs. The fundamental problem of this approach related to the anticipated international policy
agreement and allocation rules. For instance, countries with a relatively lower level of Per Capita

¹ EAP (2020) reveals that a total of 6,677 Million Metric Tons of CO_2 was emitted in the US between 1990 and 2018. The five contributors are: Transportation (28%), Electricity (27%), Industry (22%), Commercial and Residential (12%) and Agriculture (10%).

Emissions (PCE), usually the developing countries, will favour egalitarian policy agreements 1 2 because the allocation rule asserts that countries with higher PCE will carry a broader burden of 3 the mitigation cost (Apergis and Payne, 2017; Rios and Gianmoena, 2018). This allocation problem 4 becomes obvious and acute in a decentralized, developed and fiscal federalism practising countries-5 such as the United States- because of the concern over equitable and fair schemes of emissions 6 allocation associated with the ongoing discussion at the Framework Convention on Climate 7 Change. Although the fair share and contributions by each country (or state) to deal with the 8 emissions is a debatable subject with a crucial political dimension, an important aspect to note at 9 this juncture is that some scholars in the recent past (for instance, Aldy 2006, Barassi et al. 2008, Barassi et al. 2011 and Payne et al. 2014) have posited that PCE allocation schemes could cause 10 11 limited concerns if emissions tend to converge over the passage of time. In fact, Apergis and Payne 12 (2017) argue that the convergence of CO₂ emissions is the key conjecture to postulate many climate 13 change models and thus policies. Achieving equilibrium in CO₂ emissions using such earlier cited 14 approaches may resort to costly trade-offs i.e. higher adjustment costs and wealth transfers. Thus, 15 it becomes imperative that CO_2 emissions must converge to specific target levels to meet the 16 objective of curbing down the emissions level.

17 Hence, unravelling the convergence dynamics of CO_2 emissions, PCE has gained considerable 18 interest in the recent literature. Furthermore, understanding the CO₂ emissions stochastic dynamics 19 has also become inevitable to aid policymakers in designing the climate change proposals in the 20 most efficient way (Panopoulou and Pantelidis, 2009). Acknowledging the importance of this issue 21 in a recent study, Burnett (2016) argued that understanding the CO_2 emissions dynamics is of 22 paramount importance to formulate an optimal mitigation policy. It implies that even in the case of 23 persisting differences in regional emissions, a mitigation policy could be framed in a way that the 24 underlying economic structure is least adversely impacted and abatement costs could also be 25 optimized.

Digging deeper, a strand of the literature had shown that there is the need to account for the importance of club convergence. There is a need to look at the source and distribution of emission within a country to formulate new or ratify existing international agreements (Burnett, 2016). Hence, policymakers are interested in seeing the changing dynamics of the distribution of emission at the state level. The essence of this disaggregation is to determine whether the tail of the distribution of emission is widening or shrinking. It will also provide information on whether the policy has been effective or there is a need to make changes to it.

8 Based on the foregoing, the broad objective of this study is to examine the existence of convergence 9 in CO₂ emissions for the United States of America. Also, we are investigating if there is 10 convergence at club levels where the states can be grouped together in clubs. To empirically support 11 our endeavour we are employing a very rich and novel set of empirical approaches. This is a major 12 theoretical as well empirical contribution to the existing literature on the subject. Specifically, in 13 this study, we are applying Pesaran's (2007) test of a pair-wise approach to testing convergence. 14 Furthermore, the half-life convergence test suggested by Choi et al. (2004) is applied. At the 15 aggregate level, we use the KPSS test with Fourier transformation as proposed by Becker et al. 16 (2006). Thereafter, in order to identify the club convergence phenomenon, the approach developed 17 by Phillips and Sul (2007) is adopted.

18 This literature adds two main innovations to the literature on CO_2 emissions. First, we conduct a 19 country-specific analysis by focusing on the US. The need to account for country analysis stems 20 from the failure to achieve convergence at a wider and larger scope. In fact the COP21 agreement 21 proposes that member countries adopt a "Nationally Determined Contribution" to CO₂ emissions 22 reduction based on countries specific characteristics, circumstance and nature. This exercise is in 23 sharp contrast to Rios and Gianmoena (2018) who focused on 141 countries. Second, we consider 24 both convergence and club convergence. Existing studies have individually analyses both 25 convergence and club-convergence. In this study, we take a more comprehensive and rigorous approach by examining convergence and club-convergence simultaneously. The club convergence
 adopted in this study is applied with states in America. This is in contrast to club convergence
 obtained along regional lines (e.g. Caramero et al., 2014; Morales-Lage et al., 2019 for EU
 countries).

5 The choice of the US is based fact that the country is a major emitter of carbon. Statistics show that 6 as of 2013, US's CO_2 emissions in the world with per capita emission of 16.40 metric tons (see 7 Figure-1). The propelling American industrial growth, coupled up with its natural endowment of 8 fossil fuels such as coal reserves (27% of the world's aggregate) besides petroleum and natural 9 gases have led to emissions on a massive scale. The Federal government has expressed deep 10 concerns over the issue in the recent past and commitment to curb CO₂ emissions to 26-28% below 11 2005 levels by the year 2025(Whitehouse, 2015). Moreover, academics and scholars have also 12 repeatedly voiced the legitimate and reasonable concerns while analysing the dynamics of CO₂ 13 emissions in the USA (see, for instance, Aldy 2006, Payne et al. 2014, Li et al. 2014, Burnett 2016).



14

Figure-1. Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions around the world in 2013 (in per capita metric tons)

- 16 *Note:* The area highlighted with red borders represents the USA, **Source:** The World Bank
- 17

Our key findings suggested that the result of Pesaran's (2007) test depicts an impending state of convergence. The half-life convergence test showed a point estimate of the unbiased half-life of 5.8 years with a 95% confidence interval of 4.8-7.2 years. The KPSS stationary test shows that the null of a unit root is rejected about 70-80% times. Overall, Phillips and Sul's (2007) approach identifies 4 clubs and the rest of the states are put together into another single club, in total five clubs. Concomitantly, these findings have profound implications for the formulation of climate policy based on per capita emissions.

8 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The section 2 briefly reflect on the existing evidence 9 on the subject to contextualise the argument and in the existing debate on the subject, section 3 sets 10 out the empirical methodology and data employed as a mean to test the convergence and club 11 convergence in the USA. The section 4 will present the findings which will lead us to conclude in 12 the section 5.

2. Existing Literature on CO₂ Emission Convergence

14 There are various alternative forms of convergence concepts which have been discussed in the 15 recent literature to unveil CO₂ emissions convergence pattern. The use of convergence concepts 16 such as Beta Convergence (Baumol, 1986), Sigma Convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1990; 17 Sala-i-Martin, 1996), Stochastic Convergence (Quah, 1990; Quah, 1990; Carlino and Mills, 1993; 18 Carlino and Mills, 1996), Club Convergence (Apergis and Payne, 2017; Panopoulou and 19 Pantelidis, 2009; Phillips and Sul, 2007) is prevalent in past and recent literature besides several 20 econometric techniques (such as clustering algorithms, cross-sectional and distributional analysis, 21 unit root tests etc.).

The broad base of scholarly contributions is complementary and overlapping in nature; however,
an attempt has been made to segregate the studies based on their central themes. The segregation
of literature closely follows, Apergis and Payne, (2017). However, a detailed review is presented

1 in this study. The existing evidence on the subject can be classified into two categories. The first 2 strand of literature focuses on the convergence of CO₂ emissions across countries using parametric 3 approaches, most often, using variants of unit root tests. These studies primarily use unit root tests 4 to draw conclusions on the convergence in respective countries. Overall, the literature offers 5 contradicting evidence on the subject. For instance, some studies (Strazicich and List, 2003; Chang 6 and Lee, 2008; Romero-Ávila. 2008; Westerlund and Basher, 2008; Christidou et al., 2013) have 7 argued in favour of stochastic convergence of CO₂ emissions, on the other hand, some studies 8 contradicted (Barassi et al., 2008) and while others have come up with rather mixed and 9 inconclusive results (contrast, for instance, Aldy, 2006; Barassi et al., 2011; Lee and Chang 2008; Yavuz and Yilanci, 2013; Nguyen, 2005; Ezcurra, 2007; Criado and Grether, 2011). 10

11 Among the noteworthy studies on the CO_2 convergence, Strazicich and List (2003) employed a 12 panel unit root tests and cross-section regressions on a rich dataset of 21 developed (OECD) 13 countries, their findings suggested that there exists evidence of considerable convergence of CO_2 14 emissions among the under analysis countries. Their findings were supported by the later study by 15 Chang and Lee (2008) which employed a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit root test which also provided significant evidence that CO₂ emissions in the 21 OECD countries converged 16 17 stochastically when the structural breaks were controlled for. Further support to findings by 18 Strazicich and List (2003) was provided by an empirical study by Romero-Avila (2008) which 19 employed a unit root test using panel stationary test proposed by Lluís Carrion-i-Silvestre (2005). 20 It was concluded that there is a stochastic and deterministic convergence of CO_2 emissions in the 21 sample of OECD countries. A study by Westerlund and Basher (2008) employed an extended data-22 set of 27 countries from 1870-2002 and employed a Panel unit root test. They reported that report 23 the evidence of CO_2 emissions convergence for the developed and developing countries in the 24 sample set. Their findings were supported by a later study by Christidou et al. (2013) as they 25 employed even a longer data-set ranking from 1870-2006 and used a nonlinear panel unit root test to account for the nonlinearities. They strongly argued for the existence convergence of CO₂
emissions for a sample period of over a hundred years. In a nutshell, the findings of the studies
acknowledged in this para are complementary and in a broader sense, they conclude on the presence
of CO₂ convergence.

5 Despite the considerable amount of evidence reported on the convergence of CO_2 emissions by a 6 number of studies acknowledged in the above para, there are also a number of studies which 7 reported contradictory and mixed results. For instance, Barassi et al. (2008) on 21 developed 8 (OECD) countries, employing a panel unit root test reported non-convergence of CO_2 emissions. 9 They critiqued the methodological inaccuracies in the previous studies and attempted to address them (see Barassi, et al., 2008; for details). Similarly, a study by Aldy (2006) employing an 10 11 Augmented Dickey-Fuller- Generalized least square unit root test, found mixed results. It was 12 reported that although there is evidence of converging CO₂ emissions for the 23 OECD countries, 13 however, on the global scale of 88 countries, the emissions appear to diverge. Perhaps, one 14 implication of the finding was country and development level heterogeneity. Nevertheless, the 15 divergence is not limited to the OECD and None-OECD countries, Lee and Chang (2008) employing at panel seemingly unrelated regressions augmented Dickey-Fuller (SURADF) unit-16 17 root tests reported that 14 out of 21 OECD countries exhibit divergence. They argued that these 18 results are more robust than the results of the conventional panel unit root tests. Similarly, Barassi 19 et al. (2011) using a unit root test, Local Whittle estimator and its variants suggested that 13 out of 20 the 18 developed countries in their sample exhibit impending signs of convergence. A study by 21 Yavuz and Yilanci (2013) on G-7 countries employed a Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) panel 22 unit root test and which involved splitting the data into two regimes using TAR. Interesting, their 23 results showed the evidence of convergence in the first regime and divergence in the second regime. 24 In evidence from the US and specifically on the regional/states level, a study by Bult (2007) 25 analysing the emissions of Sulphur Dioxides (SO_2) and Nitrogen Oxides (NO_x) , they reported stronger evidence of converging emissions rates during the federal pollution control years (1970–
1999) than during the local control years (1929–1969). In an earlier study on US List (1999) which
was also focusing on SO₂ and NO₂ emissions in 10 US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
regions reported some convergence. However, in this study we are focusing on Co2 emissions
which are a big proportion of GHGs in the US, constituting around 82% of total annual GHG
emissions (EPA, 2018).

7 In terms of empirical approaches to analyse the convergence, there is a strand of literature that employed non-parametric approaches. For instance, a study by Nguyen (2005) employed a rich 8 9 dataset of 100 industrial countries and Conditional Distribution Estimation and Cross-Sectional 10 Panel Regression. However, reported very limited evidence of CO₂ emissions convergence. 11 Similarly, in another endeavour with even a richer data set (140 countries), a study by Ezcurra 12 (2007) using the Stochastic kernel and Ergodic distribution documented some evidence of 13 reductions in disparities of CO₂ emissions around the world. However, it was argued that such 14 convergences may not persist indefinitely. In another study by Ezcurra (2007b) on 100 countries 15 employing Stochastic Kernel and Ergodic distribution, it was claimed that there is some evidence of CO₂ emissions convergence. Later analysis by Criado and Grether (2011) employed the 16 17 empirical approach but an extended dataset of 166 countries. They concluded that countries with 18 higher PCE tend to exhibit more divergences. Furthermore, that before the oil price shocks of 19 1970's the spatial distribution of CO_2 emissions exhibit a flattening, right-skewed and non-20 stationary pattern. The pattern becomes more stable after the 1970s. In evidence from 25 European 21 countries, a study by Herrerias (2007) employed at Distribution Dynamics and Asymptotic half-22 life convergence approach. Furthermore, they complemented their analysis by investigating the 23 asymptotic half-life of convergence, mobility indices and the continuous version of the Ergodic 24 distributions. Their results supported the convergence hypothesis among the EU countries although 25 they also observed differences between sub-periods. The existing evidence on the subject discussed

- 1 in this section is summarised in the following Table-1:-

Study	Period	Sample	Methodology	Key Findings
(a) Studies using Unit Root T	<i>Tests</i>			
Strazicich and List (2003)	1960-1997	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK) and the USA.	Panel unit root tests and cross-section regressions.	The study concludes an evidence of considerable convergence of CO_2 emissions among the sample countries.
Chang and Lee (2008)	1960-2000	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.	Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit root test.	The results of the study provide significant evidence that CO_2 emission in the 21 OECD countries convergence stochastically when the structural breaks are controlled for.
Romero-Avila (2008)	1960-2002	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.	Unit root test using panel stationary test of Lluís Carrion-i- Silvestre (2005).	The results support both stochastic and deterministic convergence of CO_2 emissions over the sample counties.
Westerlund and Basher (2008) [22]	1870-2002	Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the USA.	Panel unit root test.	The authors report the evidence of CO_2 emissions convergence for the developed and developing countries in the sample set.
Christidou, Panagiotidis and Sharma (2013)	1870-2006	Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany,	Nonlinear Panel unit root test.	The authors strongly argue convergence of CO_2 emissions for a sample period of over

Table 1: Literature on Cross-country CO2 emissions

		Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, UK, USA and Venezuela.		hundred years.
Barassi, Cole and Elliot (2008)	1950-2002	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and USA.	Panel unit root test.	The study concludes a non- convergence of CO_2 emissions taking into account the methodological inaccuracies in the previous studies.
Aldy (2006)	1960-2000	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and USA.	Augmented Dickey- Fuller- Generalized least square unit root test.	The study confirms the evidence of converging CO_2 emissions for the 23 OECD countries. However, on the global scale of 88 countries, the emissions appear to diverge.
Lee and Chang (2008)	1960-2000	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.	Panel seemingly unrelated regressions augmented Dickey- Fuller (SURADF) unit-root tests.	The study reports that 14 out of 21 OECD countries exhibit divergence. The authors argue these results to be more robust over the results of the conventional panel unit root tests.
Barassi et al. (2011)	1870-2004	Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, UK and USA.	Unit root test, Local Whittle estimator and its variants.	The result suggests that 13 out of 18 developed country sample exhibit impending signs of convergence.
Yavuz and Yilanci (2013)	1960-2005	Canada, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, UK and USA.	Threshold Autoregressive (TAR)	The study split the data into two regimes using TAR. The results

			panel unit root test.	show the evidence of convergence in the first regime and divergence in the second regime.
Bulte et al (2017)	1929 to 1999	USA	Minimum LM Unit Root Tests for Stochastic Convergence	Found stronger evidence of converging emission (nitrogen oxides and sulphur oxides) rates during the federal pollution control years (1970–1999) than during the local control years (1929–1969).
List (1999)	1929-1994	USA	Unit Root Tests	The unit root test suggests some convergence in the environmental quality (Sulfur dioxide & Nitrogen Oxides).
(b) Studies using Nonpar	rametric Approaches			
Van Nguyen (2005)	1966-1996	100 industrial countries.	Conditional distribution estimation and cross-sectional panel regression.	The study concludes very limited evidence of CO_2 convergence.
Ezcurra (2007)	1960-1999	140 countries.	Stochastic kernel and ergodic distribution.	The study documents some evidence of reductions in disparities of CO ₂ emissions around the world. However, the authors further state that such convergences may not persist indefinitely.

Ezcurra (2007)	1960-1999	87 countries.	Stochastic kernel and ergodic distribution.	The author claims some evidence of CO_2 convergence. In addition, the author also holds per capita income, climatic conditions and trade openness to be essential determinants of CO_2 emissions.
Criado and Grether (2011)	1960-2002	166 countries.	Stochastic kernel and ergodic distribution.	The study concludes that the countries with higher PCE tend to exhibit more divergences. Further, the study also argues that before the oil price shocks of 1970's the spatial distribution of CO_2 emissions exhibit a flattening, right-skewed and non-stationary pattern. The pattern becomes more stable after 1970.
Herrerias (2007)	1920-2007	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, UK.	Distribution dynamics and asymptotic half- life convergence approach.	Results support the convergence hypothesis among the 25 EU countries. It was observed that there were differences between sub periods.

2 While keeping the mixed evidence on the country level studies cited in this section so far, specifically 3 in the subject study we are analysing CO_2 emissions at state-level in the USA. The rationale for doing 4 so is manifested in the earlier discussed importance of USA to the global economy and CO₂ emissions 5 as well as the implications of potential state-level heterogeneity for the climate policy in the USA. 6 Perhaps, the dynamics of CO_2 emissions at state-levels are important to help in the formulation of 7 environmental policy. On this aspect, Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2007) reported that the state-level 8 analysis (disaggregate series and accounting for spatial effects) improved their forecast also helpful in 9 the formulation of environmental policy. As the states with decreasing per capita emissions and a 10 "greener" median voter are more likely to push toward voluntary cutbacks in emissions. Hence, it is 11 vital to consider the convergence of CO_2 emissions at state levels. Nonetheless, we are not only 12 analysing the dynamics of CO₂ emissions and convergence among states of the USA at the national level 13 but also considering the element of club convergence (convergence in the various groups).

14 **3. Methodology**

15 To achieve our objective and to gain a deeper understanding of the convergence, in this study we employed a very novel and rich set of empirical approaches. Our empirical framework entails a number 16 17 of steps. At first step, we will use Pesaran's (2007) test and Pair-wise approach to test for the 18 Convergence which gives in general what are the rejection frequencies and thus provides evidence of 19 convergence. In the second step, we will adopt the approach of Chi et al (2004) and Donggyu Sul in 20 order to understand estimate the Half-Life to CO₂ emissions convergence using the Panel Dataset. This 21 is one of the contribution of this paper as no previous study on this subject has explored the convergence 22 by employing this approach. In the third step, at the aggregate level, we will use the KPSS test with 23 Fourier transformation as proposed by Becker et al. (2006). The notion is to find out the evidence of a 24 country level convergence as the first two steps are based on panel models. At this juncture we use KPSS 25 test with Fourier transformation on data $y = \ln (CO_2i/avgCO_2i.z)$ i.e., CO_2 of one state (in consideration) is divided by the average value of CO_2 from all states and then we take log value of that ratio for our 26 27 testing. In the next step, we adopted Club convergence approach Phillips and Sul (2007) and identified club members. The basic reason to do this is that some states may not be converging on average but they
may be converging within a group (i.e., in their clubs). Lastly, after we have identified the club members
of different clubs we again followed the estimation process discussed in the third step, for each identified
clubs in order to deeper understand about the convergence.

5 **3.1 Methods**

6 Becker et al. (2006)' Fourier stationarity test

7 This section briefly presents the Becker et al. (2006)' KPSS methodology (more information can be 8 found in Chang et al., 2013). Becker et al. (2006) start from the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) stationarity 9 test and propose a test that allows for a deterministic seasonality term in the regression, using a Fourier 10 function. As stated above, the Fourier function can account for unknown forms and/or a number of 11 smooth breaks. Different from the well-known Lee and Strazicich (2003) test, pre-specification of the number and form of structural breaks are not prerequisites of this test, as these are controlled by the test 12 through a selected frequency component of a Fourier function. Let us consider the following data 13 14 generating process (DGP):

15
$$y_t = a_0 + \beta t + \gamma_1 \sin(2\pi kt/T) + \gamma_2 \cos(2\pi kt/T) + x_t + \xi_t$$
, (1)

16 where the x_t process is described as:

17
$$X_t = X_{t-1} + \zeta_t,$$
 (2)

18 where ξ_t are stationary errors and ζ_t are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) with 19 variance σ_{ζ}^2 .

Under the null hypothesis ($H_0: \sigma_{\zeta}^2 = 0$), the process described by equations (1) and (2) is stationary. The rationale for selecting $[\sin(2\pi kt/T), \cos(2\pi kt/T)]$ as the Fourier expression (where *k* is the frequency and *T* is the sample size) is motivated by its ability to approximate absolutely integrable functions to any desired degree of accuracy, where $\gamma = [\gamma_1, \gamma_2]'$ measures the amplitude and displacement of the frequency component, and represents the frequency selected for the approximation.

If $H_0: \gamma_1 = \gamma_2 = 0$, is rejected, the series must have a nonlinear component. In this regard, 1 Testing for the presence of non-linear terms, Becker et al. (2006) propose a F(k) test. However, 2 3 the distribution of F(k) does not have to be non-standard because of the presence of the nuisance 4 parameter. In this paper, we estimate the critical values for all series used by first generating 10,000 random series under the null of linearity, and thereafter, using the optimum frequency 5 6 of all actual series to calculate the F-statistic for all of the 10,000 pseudo series. Lastly, the 7 critical values from the sorted vector of the pseudo-F-statistic are obtained. Using this property 8 of equation (2), Becker et al. (2004) develop a test wherein first, one needs to obtain the residuals from the following equations: 9

10
$$y_t = a_0 + \gamma_1 \sin(2\pi kt/T) + \gamma_2 \cos(2\pi kt/T) + \zeta_t$$
 (3)

12
$$y_t = a_0 + \beta t + \gamma_1 \sin(2\pi kt/T) + \gamma_2 \cos(2\pi kt/T) + \zeta_t.$$
 (4)

where equation (3) tests the null of level stationarity, whereas equation (4) tests the null of trend
stationarity. The test statistic is given by:

where $\tilde{S}_{t}(k) = \sum_{j=1}^{t} \tilde{\zeta}_{j}$ and $\tilde{\zeta}_{j}$ are the OLS residuals from regressions (3) and (4), respectively. Here, Becker et al. (2006) suggest, similar to the KPSS framework and following the PP-type approach, that a nonparametric estimate of σ^{2} can be obtained by choosing a truncation lag parameter l and a set of weights $\overline{\varpi}_{j}, j = 1, 2, ..., l$.

20
$$\sigma^2 = \tilde{\eta}_0 + 2\sum_{j=1}^l \sigma_j \tilde{\eta}_j$$
(6)

21 where \hat{l}_{j} is the *j*th sample autocovariance of the residuals ξ_{i} from equations (3) and (4), 22 respectively.

In this paper, we follow Carrion-i-Silvestre and Sansó (2006) for the choice of the kernel.
On this aspect, for comparing different procedures to establish a boundary rule, Carrion-i-

Silvestre and Sansó (2006) demonstrate that the proposal of Sul et al. (2005) is the best one in terms of size and power. Further, as in Becker et al. (2006), we obtain the frequencies in equations (3) and (4) via the minimization of the sum of squared residuals (SSR). Becker et al. (2006) demonstrate that the loss of power is associated with a large number of frequencies and therefore suggest the use of no more than one or two frequencies. Consequently, we first determine the maximum frequency equal to 5. That is, we estimate the sum of squared residuals for each frequency.

More precisely, in the first step, we estimate equation (3) for each integer k=1,...,5, following the recommendations of Enders and Lee (2012a), who state that a single frequency can capture a wide variety of breaks. A grid-search is performed to find the best frequency, as there is no *a priori* knowledge concerning the shape of the breaks in the data. In the second step, we resort to the stationarity test proposed by Becker et al. (2006), using the obtained best frequency in the first step.

14

15 **3. 2. Data**

16 The USA CO₂ emissions data on the state level for all the states for the period of 1976-2014 was 17 employed. The choice of time horizon is based on the availability of a balanced panel dataset. The 18 annual data was obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). The selected 19 timeframe is induced by the availability of data.

20 4. Analysing and Finding

The starting point of our analysis is to conduct the Pesaran's pair-wise test for CO_2 emissions. To do this, we selected a maximum of 11 lags and show AIC and SBC criteria at 5% and 10% level of significance. Our results are reported based on tests that consider: (i) intercept only; and (ii) intercept and linear trend. These results are presented in Panel A of Table 2.

25

Table 2: Pair	rwise Approach	to Test	Convergence.
---------------	----------------	---------	--------------

Panel A: Below	results obtain	ed using Pesa	ran (2007) F	Pair-Wise te	st.			
Maximum Lag-	11				Maximum Lag-	11		
Order was:					Order was:			
Average Lag-	3.629				Average Lag-	4.781		
Order by AIC: Average Lag-	1.621				Order by AIC: Average Lag-	1.945		
Order by SBC:	1.021				Order by SBC:	1.9 15		
Case II: An Interc	cept Only				Case III: An Inter	cept and a	Linear Trend	1
	AIC	SBC	AIC	SBC	AIC	SBC	AIC	SBC
ADF	0.288**	0.267**	0.348***	0.347***	0.366**	0.353**	0.457***	0.430***
ADF-GLS	0.146**	0.156**	0.229***	0.246***	0.189**	0.227**	0.262***	0.304***
ADF-WS	0.157**	0.158**	0.214***	0.231***	0.197**	0.206**	0.282***	0.313***
KPSS	0.746**		0.808***		0.541**		0.688***	
Panel B: Results	based on app	roach followe	ed by Choi e	et al. (2006)	1			
	No bias corrections	Nickell bias corrected	Time aggre Bias correc		Nickell and Time	Aggregatio	on bias corre	ected
	ρ	ρ	ρ		ρ̂ _{GNTAU}	H _{0.025}	H _{0.5}	H _{0.975}
Alabama	0.892	0.947	0.815		0.883	4.676	5.584	6.892
Alaska	0.892	0.964	0.833		0.906	5.766	7.033	8.958
Arizona	0.888	0.943	0.806		0.877	4.451	5.274	6.436
Arkansas	0.892	0.95	0.815		0.887	4.798	5.754	7.142
California	0.897	0.947	0.812		0.883	4.716	5.584	6.811
Colorado	0.887	0.947	0.812		0.88	4.524	5.425	6.731
Connecticut	0.888	0.954	0.821		0.89	4.913	5.934	7.443
Delaware	0.899	0.906	0.76		0.827	3.11	3.651	4.391
Florida	0.879	0.936	0.8		0.87	4.191	4.997	6.147
Georgia	0.886	0.923	0.786		0.852	3.713	4.315	5.125
Hawaii	0.886	0.95	0.815		0.887	4.794	5.754	7.152
Idaho	0.894	0.947	0.815		0.883	4.662	5.584	6.922
Illinois	0.895	0.964	0.83		0.903	5.533	6.781	8.699
Indiana	0.892	0.95	0.818		0.89	4.948	5.934	7.368
Iowa	0.885	0.919	0.78		0.845	3.521	4.127	4.958
Kansas	0.889	0.947	0.812		0.883	4.683	5.584	6.877
Kentucky	0.899	0.933	0.795		0.864	4.057	4.747	5.69
Louisiana	0.891	0.955	0.83		0.9	5.398	6.547	8.27
Maine	0.896	0.957	0.824		0.896	5.197	6.329	8.04
Maryland	0.893	0.954	0.821		0.893	5.026	6.125	7.785
Massachusetts	0.896	0.964	0.833		0.906	5.689	7.033	9.142
Michigan	0.892	0.954	0.821		0.893	5.038	6.125	7.759
Minnesota	0.891	0.957	0.827		0.896	5.197	6.329	8.04
Mississippi	0.888	0.954	0.818		0.89	4.938	5.934	7.39
Missouri	0.897	0.968	0.836		0.909	5.861	7.303	9.615
Montana	0.885	0.933	0.797		0.864	4.006	4.747	5.788
Nebraska	0.887	0.935	0.803		0.87	4.217	4.997	6.096

Nevada	0.902	0.926	0.786	0.852	3.687	4.315	5.172
New Hampshire	0.896	0.964	0.833	0.906	5.641	7.033	9.263
New Jersey	0.887	0.954	0.818	0.89	4.911	5.934	7.446
New Mexico	0.888	0.954	0.821	0.893	5.081	6.125	7.663
New York	0.891	0.954	0.821	0.893	5.072	6.125	7.684
North Carolina	0.892	0.943	0.806	0.877	4.372	5.274	6.599
North Dakota	0.884	0.867	0.715	0.777	2.366	2.751	3.262
Ohio	0.883	0.95	0.815	0.883	4.762	5.584	6.721
Oklahoma	0.886	0.954	0.818	0.89	4.933	5.934	7.4
Oregon	0.891	0.954	0.821	0.89	4.932	5.934	7.401
Pennsylvania	0.886	0.95	0.815	0.887	4.825	5.754	7.086
Rhode Island	0.897	0.964	0.83	0.903	5.535	6.781	8.694
South Carolina	0.892	0.957	0.824	0.896	5.216	6.329	7.997
South Dakota	0.889	0.95	0.815	0.887	4.802	5.754	7.134
Tennessee	0.906	0.957	0.824	0.896	5.191	6.329	8.053
Texas	0.894	0.906	0.763	0.83	3.225	3.723	4.379
Utah	0.885	0.947	0.812	0.88	4.518	5.425	6.745
Vermont	0.896	0.964	0.833	0.906	5.685	7.033	9.153
Virginia	0.884	0.943	0.809	0.877	4.403	5.274	6.534
Washington	0.883	0.943	0.806	0.877	4.535	5.274	6.275
West Virginia	0.888	0.957	0.824	0.896	5.245	6.329	7.933
Wisconsin	0.891	0.947	0.815	0.883	4.665	5.584	6.914
Wyoming	0.893	0.968	0.836	0.909	5.928	7.303	9.447

Note: In panel A- (1) Each test is conducted at the 5% significance level. (2) In this code, the critical values are
NOT depending on T and lag-order p. (3) Bandwidth for KPSS test is round((T^(1/3))x0.75) (4) **[Fraction of
Rejections, based on 5% nominal level tests] (5) ***[Fraction of Rejections, based on 10% nominal level tests].
In panel B – Results reported in this panel are based on the Choi et al (2006) who employed this approach to test
PPP convergence oriinally.
Source: Authors' computation. Note: the reason for omitting entries in SBC criteria and KPSS test is that Pesaran test does not

Source: Authors' computation. Note: the reason for omitting entries in SBC criteria and KPSS test is that Pesaran test does not report them in their computation

9

18 convergence using the Choi et al. (2016) half-life convergence and these are presented in Panel B of

¹⁰ The results of the ADF test shows that the fraction of the rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root is very small. It takes the value of 0.289(0.367) for the intercept (intercept and trend) using the AIC criteria. 11 There is a noticeable decline in the fractions of rejection when ADF-GLS and ADF-WS tests are 12 13 considered. Overall, the small proportion of the rejection of the null hypothesis points to the fact that PCE, at the state level, is divergent. The high values of fraction of rejection for KPSS test that were 14 15 estimated to be 0.746(0.541) for the intercept (intercept + trend), further reinforce the evidence of 16 divergence in the sample. Studies whose results are similar to ours include Lee and Chang (2008), 17 Herrerias (2013), and El-Montasser et al. (2015). Further to the above, we calculated the speed of

1 Table 2. This gives information on the time required to eliminate half of the initial gap between actual 2 emissions levels and the steady-state. The advantage of this test is that it overcomes the biases induced by inappropriate cross-sectional aggregation of heterogeneous coefficients, small-sample estimation 3 bias of dynamic lag coefficients, and bias induced by time aggregation (See Choi et al 2006 for details). 4 5 The results of the half-life estimation for the CO₂ convergence indicates that the duration from 2.75 6 years (North Dakota) to 7.3 years (Missouri) is required to reduce the level of emission to halve in order 7 to achieve a steady state. The average half-life of convergence was 5.70 with a 95% confidence interval of 5.4 - 5.9 years. This to some extents support earlier results of divergence among PCE at the state 8 9 level. The closet study to our results is Westerlund and Basher (2008) who obtained half-life 10 convergence to range between 3.1 and 6.1 years for both developing and developed countries. 11 The next stage of our empirical strategy is to examine KPSS that accounts for Fourier functions. This 12 test is examined for both constant and constant with the trend. Table 3 has these results in two panels 13 namely Panel A and B for constant and trend models respectively.

14

 Table 3: KPSS test with Fourier function results for entire sample

		Panel A: The re	esults for Con	stant wit	h Fourie	er drift station	narity		
	Optimum		Optimum			Optimum			
	frequency	Optimum ssr.	F-stat.	95%	99%	band	Fourier stat.	95%	99%
Alabama	1	0.0395	22.5079***	3.404	5.465	1	0.101	0.183	0.290
Alaska	1	0.289	18.8008***	3.374	5.355	1	0.225**	0.179	0.326
Arizona	1	0.1478	56.4488***	3.324	5.480	1	0.075	0.182	0.271
Arkansas	1	0.1376	3.3274	3.482	4.996	1	0.096	0.182	0.273
California	1	0.2285	37.5809***	3.173	6.322	3	0.231	0.489	0.669
Colorado	1	0.0202	73.0987***	3.504	5.752	1	0.202**	0.171	0.256
Connecticut	1	0.1447	13.0899***	3.471	5.267	1	0.151	0.165	0.260
Delaware	1	0.4679	40.653***	3.694	6.213	1	0.064	0.179	0.293
Florida	1	0.1151	12.868***	3.419	5.651	4	0.842***	0.511	0.827
Georgia	1	0.0618	40.8632***	3.314	5.661	1	0.024	0.174	0.248
Hawaii	1	0.1664	7.7179***	3.458	5.969	1	0.033	0.169	0.255
Idaho	2	0.2799	8.9681***	3.659	5.595	1	0.438***	0.182	0.283
Illinois	1	0.0846	48.6627***	3.484	5.147	1	0.206**	0.180	0.310
Indiana	2	0.0119	4.1993**	3.293	5.114	1	0.286**	0.185	0.305
Iowa	1	0.1959	17.7594***	3.535	5.473	4	0.269	0.484	0.721
Kansas	1	0.0384	35.4435***	3.575	5.334	2	0.096	0.434	0.700
Kentucky	1	0.0818	26.6459***	3.483	5.927	1	0.104	0.172	0.248
Louisiana	2	0.0768	14.1319***	3.293	5.174	3	0.407	0.472	0.737
Maine	1	0.1979	2.6399	3.019	5.430	1	0.122	0.173	0.255
Maryland	1	0.1373	23.0785***	3.560	5.953	2	0.087	0.410	0.674

Massachusetts 1 0.1919 18.2066*** 3.689 5.364 4 0.182 0.451 0.656 Minesota 1 0.058 9.8012*** 3.13 5.01 2 0.139 0.431 0.659 Minesota 1 0.0454 13.7664*** 3.25 5.43 1 0.1239 0.182 0.319 Missispipi 1 0.0325 54.337** 3.164 4.855 1 0.0161* 0.09 0.228 Missouri 1 0.0325 54.337** 3.164 4.855 1 0.0166 0.170 0.307 Montana 1 0.1246 23.2356** 3.289 5.083 1 0.0168 0.175 0.226 New 1 0.1288 14.8744** 3.582 5.55 2 0.0984 0.434 0.623 New Mersco 1 0.1454 3.261** 3.262 5.505 3 0.2217 0.490 0.775 Nerth Carolina <t< th=""><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th><th></th></t<>										
Minnesota 1 0.045 13.7664*** 3.324 5.180 1 0.1239 0.182 0.319 Mississippi 1 0.0496 40.8844*** 3.265 5.438 1 0.4061** 0.169 0.228 Missouri 1 0.0325 54.337*** 3.164 4.855 1 0.0196 0.183 0.270 Montana 1 0.1246 20.7568*** 3.289 5.083 1 0.0529 0.184 0.270 Nevada 1 0.1246 20.7568*** 3.309 5.58 1 0.1486 0.175 0.297 New 1 0.1248 14.8744*** 3.582 5.55 2 0.0984 0.434 0.628 New Jersey 1 0.0436 41.1981*** 3.628 5.077 3 0.2267** 0.184 0.268 New York 1 0.2025 12.0951*** 3.265 5.596 3 0.2917 0.490 0.735 North Carolina <td>Massachusetts</td> <td>1</td> <td>0.1919</td> <td>18.2066***</td> <td>3.689</td> <td>5.364</td> <td>4</td> <td>0.182</td> <td>0.451</td> <td>0.656</td>	Massachusetts	1	0.1919	18.2066***	3.689	5.364	4	0.182	0.451	0.656
Mississippi 1 0.0496 40.8844*** 3.265 5.438 1 0.4061** 0.169 0.228 Missouri 1 0.0325 54.337*** 3.164 4.855 1 0.0196 0.183 0.270 Montana 1 0.1246 20.7568*** 3.289 5.083 1 0.0529 0.184 0.273 Nevada 1 0.934 23.2356*** 3.289 5.083 1 0.0529 0.184 0.273 Nevada 1 0.934 23.2356*** 3.309 5.589 1 0.1486 0.175 0.297 New 1 0.1288 14.8744*** 3.582 5.355 2 0.0984 0.434 0.623 New Jersey 1 0.0455 3.628 6.037 1 0.2267** 0.184 0.268 New York 1 0.2925 12.0951*** 3.628 6.037 1 0.2216*** 0.169 0.289 North Carolina 2	Michigan	1	0.0588	9.8012***	3.413	5.051	2	0.139	0.431	0.659
Missouri1 0.0325 54.337^{***} 3.164 4.855 1 0.0196 0.183 0.270 Montana1 0.354 12.4944^{***} 3.283 6.402 1 0.056 0.170 0.307 Nebraska1 0.1246 20.7568^{***} 3.289 5.083 1 0.0529 0.184 0.273 Nevada1 0.934 23.2356^{***} 3.309 5.89 1 0.1486 0.175 0.297 New1 0.1288 14.8744^{***} 3.582 5.355 2 0.0984 0.434 0.623 New Jersey1 0.0436 41.1981^{***} 3.622 5.648 1 0.2028^{**} 0.175 0.246 New Mexico1 0.1045 23.61^{***} 3.628 6.037 1 0.2267^{**} 0.184 0.268 New Mexico1 0.1045 23.61^{***} 3.628 5.077 3 0.2835 0.466 0.727 North Carolina2 0.1203 11.3595^{***} 3.255 5.596 3 0.2917 0.490 0.735 Ohio1 0.0716 35.317^{***} 3.544 6.265 1 0.2128^{**} 0.169 0.289 Oklahoma2 0.0639 0.5146 3.308 5.512 1 0.1642 0.172 0.280 Oklahoma1 0.0216 42.3941^{***} 3.215 5.366 1 0.0427 0.171 0.260 Pennsylvania <td>Minnesota</td> <td>1</td> <td>0.045</td> <td>13.7664***</td> <td>3.324</td> <td>5.180</td> <td>1</td> <td>0.1239</td> <td>0.182</td> <td>0.319</td>	Minnesota	1	0.045	13.7664***	3.324	5.180	1	0.1239	0.182	0.319
Montana 1 0.354 12.4944*** 3.283 6.402 1 0.056 0.170 0.307 Nebraska 1 0.1246 20.7568*** 3.289 5.083 1 0.0529 0.184 0.273 Nevada 1 0.934 23.2356*** 3.309 5.589 1 0.1486 0.175 0.297 New 1 0.1288 14.8744*** 3.582 5.355 2 0.0984 0.434 0.623 New Jersey 1 0.0435 41.1981*** 3.622 5.648 1 0.2028** 0.175 0.246 New Mexico 1 0.1045 23.61*** 3.628 6.037 1 0.2267** 0.184 0.668 New York 1 0.2295 12.0951*** 3.265 5.596 3 0.2917 0.490 0.735 North Carolina 2 0.1203 11.3595*** 3.243 5.795 3 1.2936*** 0.454 0.655 Ohio	Mississippi	1	0.0496	40.8844***	3.265	5.438	1	0.4061**	0.169	0.228
Nebraska 1 0.1246 20.7568*** 3.289 5.083 1 0.0529 0.184 0.273 Nevada 1 0.934 23.2356*** 3.309 5.589 1 0.1486 0.175 0.297 New 1 0.0128 14.8744*** 3.582 5.355 2 0.0984 0.434 0.623 New Jersey 1 0.0436 41.1981*** 3.622 5.648 1 0.2028** 0.175 0.246 New Mexico 1 0.2025 12.0951*** 3.266 5.077 3 0.2835 0.466 0.727 North Carolina 2 0.1203 11.3595*** 3.255 5.596 3 0.2917 0.490 0.735 North Dakota 1 0.0716 35.317*** 3.544 6.265 1 0.2128** 0.659 Ohio 2 0.0502 9.7562*** 3.210 5.383 1 0.0427 0.171 0.260 Pennsylvania 1 <td>Missouri</td> <td>1</td> <td>0.0325</td> <td>54.337***</td> <td>3.164</td> <td>4.855</td> <td>1</td> <td>0.0196</td> <td>0.183</td> <td>0.270</td>	Missouri	1	0.0325	54.337***	3.164	4.855	1	0.0196	0.183	0.270
Nevada 1 0.934 23.2356*** 3.309 5.589 1 0.1486 0.175 0.297 New 1 0.1288 14.8744*** 3.582 5.355 2 0.0984 0.434 0.623 New Jersey 1 0.0436 41.1981*** 3.622 5.648 1 0.2028** 0.175 0.246 New Mexico 1 0.1045 23.61*** 3.628 6.037 1 0.2267** 0.184 0.268 New York 1 0.2925 12.0951*** 3.265 5.576 3 0.2917 0.490 0.735 North Carolina 2 0.1203 11.3595*** 3.545 6.265 1 0.2128** 0.454 0.655 Ohio 1 0.0716 35.317*** 3.544 6.265 1 0.2128** 0.169 0.289 Oklahoma 2 0.0502 9.7562*** 3.210 5.383 1 0.0427 0.171 0.260 Pennsylvania<	Montana	1	0.354	12.4944***	3.283	6.402	1	0.056	0.170	0.307
New Hampshire 1 0.1288 14.8744*** 3.582 5.355 2 0.0984 0.434 0.623 New Jersey 1 0.0436 41.1981*** 3.622 5.648 1 0.2028** 0.175 0.246 New Mexico 1 0.1045 23.61*** 3.622 5.648 1 0.2028** 0.175 0.246 New York 1 0.2925 12.0951*** 3.626 5.077 3 0.2835 0.466 0.727 North Carolina 2 0.1031 11.3595*** 3.255 5.596 3 0.2917 0.490 0.735 North Dakota 1 0.1716 35.317*** 3.544 6.265 1 0.2128** 0.454 0.659 Ohio 1 0.0716 35.317*** 3.244 6.265 1 0.1614 0.174 0.248 Oregon 2 0.0502 9.7562*** 3.210 5.383 1 0.0427 0.171 0.260 P	Nebraska	1	0.1246	20.7568***	3.289	5.083	1	0.0529	0.184	0.273
Hampshire10.128814.8744***3.5825.35520.09840.4340.623New Jersey10.043641.1981***3.6225.64810.2028**0.1750.246New Mexico10.104523.61***3.6286.03710.2267**0.1840.268New York10.292512.0951***3.2665.07730.28350.4660.727North Carolina20.120311.3595***3.2555.59630.29170.4900.735North Dakota11.136714.6192***3.4375.79531.2936***0.4540.655Ohio10.071635.317***3.5446.26510.2128**0.1690.289Oklahoma20.06390.51463.3085.51210.16140.1740.248Oregon20.05029.7562***3.2105.38310.04270.1710.260Pennsylvania10.094921.4255***3.4995.09110.16820.1220.302South Carolina10.021642.3941***3.2124.98010.16070.1840.266South Carolina10.023317.9654***3.2125.96610.04710.1910.275Tennessee10.12926.3823***3.4235.10110.14890.1770.249Vermont20.1437		1	0.934	23.2356***	3.309	5.589	1	0.1486	0.175	0.297
New Jersey10.043641.1981***3.6225.64810.2028**0.1750.246New Mexico10.104523.61***3.6286.03710.2267**0.1840.268New York10.292512.0951***3.2665.07730.28350.4660.727North Carolina20.120311.3595***3.2555.59630.29170.4900.735North Dakota11.136714.6192***3.4375.79531.2936***0.4540.655Ohio10.071635.317***3.5446.26510.2128**0.1690.289Oklahoma20.06390.51463.3085.51210.16140.1740.248Oregon20.05029.7562***3.2105.38310.04270.1710.260Pennsylvania10.094921.4255***3.4995.09110.16820.1720.280Rhode Island10.30466.722***3.4195.94610.06370.1820.302South Carolina10.021642.3941***3.2124.98010.16070.1840.266South Carolina10.12926.3823***3.2124.98010.16070.1840.266South Carolina10.020317.9654***3.3195.10830.3930.4800.756Utah0.12926.3823**										
New Mexico 1 0.1045 23.61*** 3.628 6.037 1 0.2267** 0.184 0.268 New York 1 0.2925 12.0951*** 3.266 5.077 3 0.2835 0.466 0.727 North Carolina 2 0.1203 11.3595*** 3.255 5.596 3 0.2917 0.490 0.735 North Dakota 1 1.1367 14.6192*** 3.437 5.795 3 1.2936*** 0.454 0.655 Ohio 1 0.0716 35.317*** 3.544 6.265 1 0.2128** 0.169 0.289 Oklahoma 2 0.0639 0.5146 3.308 5.512 1 0.1614 0.174 0.248 Oregon 2 0.0502 9.7562*** 3.419 5.916 1 0.0637 0.182 0.302 Rhode Island 1 0.3046 6.722*** 3.419 5.946 1 0.0637 0.182 0.302 South Ca	*	1								
New York10.292512.0951***3.2665.07730.28350.4660.727North Carolina20.120311.3595***3.2555.59630.29170.4900.735North Dakota11.136714.6192***3.4375.79531.2936***0.4540.655Ohio10.071635.317***3.5446.26510.2128**0.1690.289Oklahoma20.06390.51463.3085.51210.16140.1740.248Oregon20.05029.7562***3.2105.38310.04270.1710.260Pennsylvania10.094921.4255***3.4995.09110.16820.1720.280Rhode Island10.30466.722***3.4195.94610.06370.1820.302South Carolina10.021642.3941***3.2124.98010.16070.1840.266South Dakota10.09349.7278***3.2255.26610.04710.1910.275Tennessee10.12926.3823***3.3195.10830.3930.4800.756Utah10.06252.70483.4245.01430.3740.4360.721Vermont20.14372.69293.4645.01430.3740.4360.721Virginia10.16252.70483.429 <td></td> <td>1</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>		1								
North Carolina20.120311.3595***3.2555.59630.29170.4900.735North Dakota11.136714.6192***3.4375.79531.2936***0.4540.655Ohio10.071635.317***3.5446.26510.2128**0.1690.289Oklahoma20.06390.51463.3085.51210.16140.1740.248Oregon20.05029.7562***3.2105.38310.04270.1710.260Pennsylvania10.094921.4255***3.4995.09110.16820.1720.280Rhode Island10.30466.722***3.4195.94610.06370.1820.302South Carolina10.021642.3941***3.2124.98010.16070.1840.266South Dakota10.09349.7278***3.2255.26610.04710.1910.275Tennesee10.12926.3823***3.4235.10110.14890.1770.249Texas10.205317.9654***3.3195.10830.3930.4800.756Utah10.089917.0162***3.2204.81910.01840.1820.270Vermont20.14372.69293.4645.01430.3740.4360.721Virginia10.06252.70483.429 </td <td></td> <td>1</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>		1								
North Dakota11.136714.6192***3.4375.79531.2936***0.4540.655Ohio10.071635.317***3.5446.26510.2128**0.1690.289Oklahoma20.06390.51463.3085.51210.16140.1740.248Oregon20.05029.7562***3.2105.38310.04270.1710.260Pennsylvania10.094921.4255***3.4995.09110.16820.1720.280Rhode Island10.30466.722***3.4195.94610.06370.1820.302South Carolina10.021642.3941***3.2124.98010.16070.1840.266South Dakota10.09349.7278***3.2255.26610.04710.1910.275Tennessee10.12926.3823***3.3195.10830.3930.4800.756Utah10.089917.0162***3.2004.81910.01840.1820.270Vermont20.14372.69293.4645.01430.3740.4360.721Virginia10.136120.7089***3.4295.71710.1650.1950.300West Virginia20.05137.0059***3.5626.26610.4194***0.1820.256Wisconsin10.02319.0016*** <td< td=""><td></td><td>1</td><td></td><td></td><td>3.266</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></td<>		1			3.266					
Ohio10.071635.317***3.5446.26510.2128**0.1690.289Oklahoma20.06390.51463.3085.51210.16140.1740.248Oregon20.05029.7562***3.2105.38310.04270.1710.260Pennsylvania10.094921.4255***3.4995.09110.16820.1720.280Rhode Island10.30466.722***3.4195.94610.06370.1820.302South Carolina10.021642.3941***3.2124.98010.16070.1840.266South Dakota10.09349.7278***3.2255.26610.04710.1910.275Tennessee10.12926.3823***3.4235.10110.14890.1770.249Texas10.205317.9654***3.3195.10830.3930.4800.756Utah10.089917.0162***3.2204.81910.01840.1820.270Vermont20.14372.69293.4645.01430.3740.4360.721Virginia10.06252.70483.4295.71710.1650.1950.300West Virginia20.05137.0059***3.5626.26610.4194***0.1820.256Wisconsin10.02319.0016***3.428 <td< td=""><td>North Carolina</td><td>2</td><td></td><td></td><td>3.255</td><td>5.596</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.490</td><td></td></td<>	North Carolina	2			3.255	5.596			0.490	
Oklahoma20.06390.51463.3085.51210.16140.1740.248Oregon20.05029.7562***3.2105.38310.04270.1710.260Pennsylvania10.094921.4255***3.4995.09110.16820.1720.280Rhode Island10.30466.722***3.4195.94610.06370.1820.302South Carolina10.021642.3941***3.2124.98010.16070.1840.266South Dakota10.09349.7278***3.2255.26610.04710.1910.275Tennessee10.12926.3823***3.4235.10110.14890.1770.249Texas10.205317.9654***3.3195.10830.3930.4800.756Utah10.089917.0162***3.2204.81910.01840.1820.270Vermont20.14372.69293.4645.01430.3740.4360.721Virginia10.06252.70483.4245.04610.14690.1820.283Washington10.136120.7089***3.4295.71710.1650.1950.300West Virginia20.05137.0059**3.5626.26610.4194***0.1820.256Wisconsin10.02319.0016***3.428 <td>North Dakota</td> <td>1</td> <td>1.1367</td> <td>14.6192***</td> <td>3.437</td> <td>5.795</td> <td>3</td> <td>1.2936***</td> <td>0.454</td> <td>0.655</td>	North Dakota	1	1.1367	14.6192***	3.437	5.795	3	1.2936***	0.454	0.655
Oregon20.05029.7562***3.2105.38310.04270.1710.260Pennsylvania10.094921.4255***3.4995.09110.16820.1720.280Rhode Island10.30466.722***3.4195.94610.06370.1820.302South Carolina10.021642.3941***3.2124.98010.16070.1840.266South Dakota10.09349.7278***3.2255.26610.04710.1910.275Tennessee10.12926.3823***3.4235.10110.14890.1770.249Texas10.205317.9654***3.3195.10830.3930.4800.756Utah10.089917.0162***3.2204.81910.01840.1820.270Vermont20.14372.69293.4645.01430.3740.4360.721Virginia10.06252.70483.4295.71710.1650.1950.300West Virginia20.05137.0059***3.5626.26610.4194***0.1820.256Wisconsin10.02319.0016***3.4284.87310.13490.1620.321	Ohio	1	0.0716	35.317***	3.544	6.265	1	0.2128**	0.169	0.289
Pennsylvania10.094921.4255***3.4995.09110.16820.1720.280Rhode Island10.30466.722***3.4195.94610.06370.1820.302South Carolina10.021642.3941***3.2124.98010.16070.1840.266South Dakota10.09349.7278***3.2255.26610.04710.1910.275Tennessee10.12926.3823***3.4235.10110.14890.1770.249Texas10.205317.9654***3.3195.10830.3930.4800.756Utah10.089917.0162***3.2204.81910.01840.1820.270Vermont20.14372.69293.4645.01430.3740.4360.721Virginia10.136120.7089***3.4295.71710.1650.1950.300West Virginia20.05137.0059***3.5626.26610.4194***0.1820.256Wisconsin10.02319.0016***3.4284.87310.13490.1620.321	Oklahoma	2	0.0639	0.5146	3.308	5.512	1	0.1614	0.174	0.248
Rhode Island10.30466.722***3.4195.94610.06370.1820.302South Carolina10.021642.3941***3.2124.98010.16070.1840.266South Dakota10.09349.7278***3.2255.26610.04710.1910.275Tennessee10.12926.3823***3.4235.10110.14890.1770.249Texas10.205317.9654***3.3195.10830.3930.4800.756Utah10.089917.0162***3.2204.81910.01840.1820.270Vermont20.14372.69293.4645.01430.3740.4360.721Virginia10.06252.70483.4235.10710.1650.1950.300West Virginia20.05137.0059***3.5626.26610.4194**0.1820.256Wisconsin10.02319.0016***3.4284.87310.13490.1620.321	Oregon	2	0.0502	9.7562***	3.210	5.383	1	0.0427	0.171	0.260
South Carolina10.021642.3941***3.2124.98010.16070.1840.266South Dakota10.09349.7278***3.2255.26610.04710.1910.275Tennessee10.12926.3823***3.4235.10110.14890.1770.249Texas10.205317.9654***3.3195.10830.3930.4800.756Utah10.089917.0162***3.2204.81910.01840.1820.270Vermont20.14372.69293.4645.01430.3740.4360.721Virginia10.06252.70483.4245.04610.14690.1820.283Washington10.136120.7089***3.4295.71710.1650.1950.300West Virginia20.05137.0059***3.5626.26610.4194***0.1820.256Wisconsin10.02319.0016***3.4284.87310.13490.1620.321	Pennsylvania	1	0.0949	21.4255***	3.499	5.091	1	0.1682	0.172	0.280
South Dakota10.09349.7278***3.2255.26610.04710.1910.275Tennessee10.12926.3823***3.4235.10110.14890.1770.249Texas10.205317.9654***3.3195.10830.3930.4800.756Utah10.089917.0162***3.2204.81910.01840.1820.270Vermont20.14372.69293.4645.01430.3740.4360.721Virginia10.06252.70483.4245.04610.14690.1820.283Washington10.136120.7089***3.4295.71710.1650.1950.300West Virginia20.05137.0059***3.5626.26610.4194***0.1820.256Wisconsin10.02319.0016***3.4284.87310.13490.1620.321	Rhode Island	1	0.3046	6.722***	3.419	5.946	1	0.0637	0.182	0.302
Tennessee10.12926.3823***3.4235.10110.14890.1770.249Texas10.205317.9654***3.3195.10830.3930.4800.756Utah10.089917.0162***3.2204.81910.01840.1820.270Vermont20.14372.69293.4645.01430.3740.4360.721Virginia10.06252.70483.4245.04610.14690.1820.283Washington10.136120.7089***3.4295.71710.1650.1950.300West Virginia20.05137.0059***3.5626.26610.4194***0.1820.256Wisconsin10.02319.0016***3.4284.87310.13490.1620.321	South Carolina	1	0.0216	42.3941***	3.212	4.980	1	0.1607	0.184	0.266
Texas10.205317.9654***3.3195.10830.3930.4800.756Utah10.089917.0162***3.2204.81910.01840.1820.270Vermont20.14372.69293.4645.01430.3740.4360.721Virginia10.06252.70483.4245.04610.14690.1820.283Washington10.136120.7089***3.4295.71710.1650.1950.300West Virginia20.05137.0059***3.5626.26610.4194***0.1820.256Wisconsin10.02319.0016***3.4284.87310.13490.1620.321	South Dakota	1	0.0934	9.7278***	3.225	5.266	1	0.0471	0.191	0.275
Utah10.089917.0162***3.2204.81910.01840.1820.270Vermont20.14372.69293.4645.01430.3740.4360.721Virginia10.06252.70483.4245.04610.14690.1820.283Washington10.136120.7089***3.4295.71710.1650.1950.300West Virginia20.05137.0059***3.5626.26610.4194***0.1820.256Wisconsin10.02319.0016***3.4284.87310.13490.1620.321	Tennessee	1	0.1292	6.3823***	3.423	5.101	1	0.1489	0.177	0.249
Vermont20.14372.69293.4645.01430.3740.4360.721Virginia10.06252.70483.4245.04610.14690.1820.283Washington10.136120.7089***3.4295.71710.1650.1950.300West Virginia20.05137.0059***3.5626.26610.4194***0.1820.256Wisconsin10.02319.0016***3.4284.87310.13490.1620.321	Texas	1	0.2053	17.9654***	3.319	5.108	3	0.393	0.480	0.756
Virginia10.06252.70483.4245.04610.14690.1820.283Washington10.136120.7089***3.4295.71710.1650.1950.300West Virginia20.05137.0059***3.5626.26610.4194***0.1820.256Wisconsin10.02319.0016***3.4284.87310.13490.1620.321	Utah	1	0.0899	17.0162***	3.220	4.819	1	0.0184	0.182	0.270
Washington10.136120.7089***3.4295.71710.1650.1950.300West Virginia20.05137.0059***3.5626.26610.4194***0.1820.256Wisconsin10.02319.0016***3.4284.87310.13490.1620.321	Vermont	2	0.1437	2.6929	3.464	5.014	3	0.374	0.436	0.721
West Virginia 2 0.0513 7.0059*** 3.562 6.266 1 0.4194*** 0.182 0.256 Wisconsin 1 0.0231 9.0016*** 3.428 4.873 1 0.1349 0.162 0.321	Virginia	1	0.0625	2.7048	3.424	5.046	1	0.1469	0.182	0.283
Wisconsin 1 0.0231 9.0016*** 3.428 4.873 1 0.1349 0.162 0.321	Washington	1	0.1361	20.7089***	3.429	5.717	1	0.165	0.195	0.300
	West Virginia	2	0.0513	7.0059***	3.562	6.266	1	0.4194***	0.182	0.256
Wyoming 1 0.2189 21.5697*** 3.373 5.094 2 0.1451 0.4138 0.603	Wisconsin	1	0.0231	9.0016***	3.428	4.873	1	0.1349	0.162	0.321
	Wyoming	1	0.2189	21.5697***	3.373	5.094	2	0.1451	0.4138	0.603

	Panel 1	B: The resu	lts for Constan	t and trend with Fo	ourier tr	end station	arity		
	Optimum	Optimum	Optimum F-			Optimum	Fourier		
	frequency	ssr.	stat.	95%	99%	band	stat.	95%	99%
Alabama	1	0.0348	19.0763***	3.641	6.123	1	0.040	0.053	0.065
Alaska	1	0.1674	18.8384***	3.593	5.698	1	0.040	0.053	0.067
Arizona	1	0.0702	35.8999***	3.098	5.108	1	0.046	0.056	0.069
Arkansas	1	0.0809	5.5074***	3.513	5.472	1	0.028	0.056	0.070
California	1	0.0205	97.1551***	3.340	5.397	1	0.038	0.056	0.071
Colorado	1	0.012	66.3057***	3.189	4.822	1	0.026	0.054	0.068
Connecticut	1	0.0528	9.2118***	3.187	5.848	1	0.030	0.054	0.068
Delaware	1	0.1365	12.5628***	3.667	5.671	1	0.025	0.057	0.073
Florida	1	0.0353	11.9829***	3.763	5.614	4	0.331***	0.154	0.223
Georgia	1	0.0607	12.704***	3.317	5.068	1	0.025	0.056	0.068
Hawaii	2	0.0996	8.5757***	3.612	5.237	1	0.0362	0.057	0.068
Idaho	1	0.0958	24.6821***	3.382	5.420	1	0.027	0.055	0.070
Illinois	1	0.0244	138.5393***	3.166	5.400	1	0.0422	0.056	0.071
Indiana	2	0.0108	3.0653	3.736	5.439	2	0.0786	0.133	0.194
Iowa	2	0.0321	6.4459***	3.556	5.460	4	0.1024	0.155	0.209
Kansas	1	0.0382	13.8201***	3.362	5.906	2	0.091	0.137	0.199
Kentucky	1	0.0114	5.5247***	3.428	5.324	1	0.0463	0.053	0.068
Louisiana	2	0.0546	12.3429***	3.466	6.072	3	0.133	0.158	0.234
Maine	1	0.1754	4.8093**	3.604	6.343	1	0.0465	0.056	0.070
Maryland	1	0.037	12.19***	3.132	5.016	2	0.0403	0.030	0.184
Massachusetts	2	0.0608	4.2231**	3.319	4.977	4	0.2152***	0.150	0.104
Michigan	1	0.0008	4.8213**	3.333	6.590	2	0.2132	0.132	0.207
Minnesota	1	0.0142	28.5844***	3.338	5.381	1	0.0298	0.057	0.190
	1	0.0293	32.4346***	3.682	5.738	1	0.0298	0.057	0.073
Mississippi Missouri		0.0338	50.5816***	3.462	5.289	1	0.0333	0.055	0.074
	1		10.043***				0.0921***		
Montana	2	0.1511		3.302	5.249	1		0.054	0.070
Nebraska	1	0.0479	5.1458**	3.412	5.617	1	0.0335		
Nevada New	2	0.0699	3.4032**	3.401	5.239	3	0.2377***	0.153	0.213
Hampshire	1	0.1176	16.4198***	3.354	5.905	2	0.0505	0.139	0.202
New Jersey	1	0.0324	9.8355***	3.671	6.226	4	0.1512	0.155	0.218
New Mexico	1	0.0638	2.8883	3.370	5.084	4	0.2139***	0.145	0.202
New York	1	0.0373	40.0432***	3.350	4.774	1	0.0247	0.055	0.069
North	1	0.0373	10.0132	5.550	1., , 1	1	0.0217	0.055	0.007
Carolina	2	0.0331	13.884***	3.550	5.521	3	0.0733	0.152	0.211
North Dakota	1	0.0576	105.6152***	3.594	5.193	1	0.0283	0.055	0.070
Ohio	1	0.0092	122.8591***	3.131	5.921	1	0.0485	0.054	0.068
Oklahoma	1	0.0357	5.9526***	3.405	5.821	1	0.0228	0.056	0.068
Oregon	2	0.0502	8.4455***	3.427	5.052	1	0.0427	0.054	0.070
Pennsylvania	1	0.0181	38.4488***	3.096	5.613	2	0.0687	0.134	0.207
Rhode Island	2	0.2399	10.8406***	3.290	5.156	1	0.0618***	0.055	0.066
South									
Carolina	1	0.0178	32.7744***	3.279	5.006	1	0.0373	0.054	0.069
South Dakota	1	0.0924	9.7127***	3.066	5.187	1	0.0383	0.054	0.067
Tennessee	1	0.0426	3.097	3.422	5.300	1	0.0391	0.055	0.067
Texas	2	0.0226	15.9083***	3.398	5.295	1	0.1151***	0.055	0.070
Utah	1	0.0899	15.7802***	3.629	5.403	1	0.0184	0.055	0.072
Vermont	1	0.1147	6.8699***	3.305	5.647	1	0.0294	0.054	0.069
Virginia	1	0.0251	15.8909***	3.388	5.536	1	0.0376	0.056	0.074

Washington	1	0.0585	7.7225***	3.399	5.404	1	0.036	0.056	0.071
West Virginia	2	0.0423	6.7081***	3.363	4.778	2	0.1254	0.136	0.207
Wisconsin	1	0.0166	18.2175***	3.198	5.114	1	0.037	0.053	0.069
Wyoming	1	0.052	43.2759***	3.513	5.428	1	0.0514	0.056	0.075

Note: ** denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% level of acceptance. *** denotes rejection of the null
 hypothesis at 1% level of acceptance.

Source: Authors' computation. Note: the reason for omitting entries in SBC criteria and KPSS test is that Pesaran's test does not report them in their computation

5

6 These results presented by employing the KPSS stationary test compliment the earlier results on the 7 stationarity using Pesaran (2007) pair-wise approach. There was a clear indication that the null was 8 rejected for about 70% to 80% times. Further, results based on full sample data (i.e., without club 9 formations) with constant Fourier stationarity test provide evidence that the null hypothesis of 10 stationarity was not rejected for states such as but not limited to Georgia, Hawaii, Montana, Nebraska, 11 Oregon South Dakota and Utah. However, with constant and trend Fourier stationarity test it showed 12 that for Indiana, New Mexico, Tennessee the Fourier based model is an appropriate choice, and the null 13 hypothesis of stationarity is rejected only for Florida, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, 14 Rhode Island, Texas indicating that only these states are not convergent. These findings implied that 15 there are state-level heterogeneities for which it would be appropriate to consider the aspect of club convergence. Due to the fact that we have established the existences of two groups, as a result of 16 17 heterogeneity among the states.

18

20

Table 4: Results Based on Club Convergence

19 Panel A1: Club Convergence Test

27 Beta Coefficient: -0.8208

28 t-statistics: -18.6026

- 29
- 30 1st club: North Dakota and Wyoming
- **Beta Coefficient=** 0.192
- **32 t-statistics:** 3.2
- 33

<sup>Full Sample: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming</sup>

2nd Club: Alsaka, Iowa, West Virginia 1 **Beta Coefficient** = 0.012 2 3 t-statistics: 0.133 4 Divergent: Iowa 5 3rd Club: 6 Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Montana and Nebraska 7 **Beta Coefficient** = 0.1458 t-statistics: 1.275 9 Divergent: Kentucky and Montana 10 4th Club: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, 11 12 Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, 13 Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin. 14 **Beta Coefficient =** -2.006 15 t-statistics: -5.640 Divergent: South Dakota and New Mexico 16 17 5th Club: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, 18 19 Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, 20 Virginia and Washington. **Beta Coefficient:** = 0.143 21 t-statistics: 1.341 22 23 Panel A2: Summary of Club Convergence Test 24 Club3 log(t) Club1 Club2 Club4 Club5 Coeff 0.192 0.012 0.145 -0.19 0.143 1.275 T-stat 3.2 0.133 -1.563 1.341 25 26 27 **Panel B: Clubs Merging Analysis** New Club 1 28 (Club 1 + other convergent clubs) 29 Club merging statistics -0.81430 (-19.498)New Club II 31 (Club 2 + other convergent clubs) 32 -0.795 Club merging statistics 33 (-11.754)34 **New Club III** (Club 3 + other convergent clubs) 35 Club merging statistics -0.698 36 (-11.178)37 New Club IV (Club 4 + other convergent clubs) 38 Club merging statistics -0.190 39 (-1.563)40 New Club V (Club 5 + other convergent clubs) 41 Club merging statistics -0.14342 (1.341)43 44 Panel C: Clubs Merging Analysis based on Schnurbus et al. (2016) Club1+2 Club2+3 Club3+4 Club4+5 log(t)

Coeff	-0.273	-0.08	-0.462	-0.698
T-stat	-6.509	-0.698	-5.253	-11.178

1

2 Panel D: Final Club Memberships

log(t)	Club1	Club2	Club3	Club4
Coeff	0.192	-0.08	-0.19	0.143
T-stat	3.2	-0.698	-1.563	1.341

3

4 Panel D2: Final Club classifications

- 5 Club 1: North Dakota Wyoming
- 6 <u>Club 2:</u> Alaska | Indiana | Iowa | Kentucky | Louisiana | Montana | Nebraska | West Virginia |
- 7 <u>Club 3:</u> Alabama | Arkansas | Colorado | Georgia | Illinois | Kansas | Maine | Michigan | Minnesota |

8 <u>Mississippi | Missouri | New Hampshire | New Mexico | Ohio | Oklahoma | Pennsylvania | South Carolina</u>

9 South Dakota | Tennessee | Texas | Utah | Wisconsin |

10 Club 4: | Arizona | California | Connecticut | Delaware | Florida | Hawaii | Idaho | Maryland |

<u>Massachusetts | Nevada | New Jersey | New York | North Carolina | Oregon | Rhode Island | Vermont |</u>
 Virginia | Washington |

13 Source: Authors' Computations

Notes: Testing for the one-sided null hypothesis b ≥ 0 against b<0, the analysis makes use the critical value t_{0.05: rT-2-1=228} =
 - 1.65156 across all cases. Statistical significance at the 5% level is denoted by 'a', rejecting the null hypothesis of convergence.
 The figures in parenthesis denote t-statistics.

18 Results of the club-convergence are presented in Table 4. Essentially, we examined five different 19 clubs/subgroups, which consist of 2, 3, 5, 22 and 18 countries, respectively. A formal test of convergence 20 would give answers to inquires whether we can merge clubs to form a larger convergence, on the one 21 hand, and also give general information on each club. It is presented in Table 4 that there is convergence in club one member states (North Dakota and Wyoming). These states are similar in terms of socio and 22 23 economic fundamentals such as GDP per capita, population density, and geographical locations. Thus, 24 it could be argued that the PCEs are high and not be too different from each other. This is due to the fact 25 that North Dakota is an oil-producing state, while Wyoming fracking is celebrated for its large oil and 26 mining sites. Hence, both states would converge towards steady states in the long run. The speed of 27 convergence is estimated to be one-fifth of the average of the full sample's speed. We proceed to inquire 28 if the rest group forms the other convergent club. The significance of the t- statistics shows that we can 29 repeat the clustering procedures. This procedure would continue until the t-statistics for the repeated 30 clustering is no longer significant. The second club convergence has three member countries (Alaska, 31 Iowa and West Virginia). These states economic activities revolves around agriculture. Iowa could be 32 regarded to have diverging tendencies due to their higher in population density, income (GDP per 33 capita). Alaska and West Virginia are among the lowest GDP level and GDP growth. The speed of convergence of this club is somehow low. This might be attributed to the fact that the club has
 representatives of both convergence and divergence tendencies.

3 The third club membership includes Kentucky, Indiana, Louisiana, Montana and Nebraska. These states 4 economic activities is a mix of both agricultural, manufacturing and industrial. It could be argued that 5 these countries are related in terms of median income level (GDP per capita), and housing units. 6 However, it could be deduced that Montana and Kentucky are divergent from this club. This could be 7 due to the fact that the level of industrialization is relatively low (for instance, Kentucky is famous for 8 its distillery industry, while Montana is widely known as cattle ranching). Thus, these diverging states 9 could be due to low carbon emissions. Another plausible reason for this could be related to higher 10 population in Kentucky, which is estimated to be about four folds of Montana's. Also, the population 11 growth rate in the former is twice that of the latter (United States Census Bureau). It is worthy to note 12 that the GDP of Kentucky is almost 5 times that of Montana's. The fourth club majorly consists of states 13 with relatively high income, high population and population density. The economic activities of these states are majorly manufacturing and services (retail) with less emphasis on agriculture. The 14 15 manufacturing activities include automobile, shipping docks, aeroplanes, fabrics, rug and carpet mills, 16 pharmacy, to mention a few. Also, this group has several iconic companies that are listed in the Fortune 17 1000 companies. However, of this group, it was discovered that South Dakota and New Mexico have 18 diverging tendencies, a situation attributable to their means of economic activities (agriculture). Hence, 19 their level of emission is considered to be low. Further scrutiny into these states shows that (i) they have 20 relatively low income and GDP per capita; (ii) lower population and population density, and (iii) lower 21 housing units. The rest of the states belongs to the fifth club. These states economic activities are hugely 22 centred on services, which covers financial, fashion, sport, sport, hospitality, civil service and tourism. 23 Also, states house the manufacturing of computers and other ICT gadgets. Of this lot, it was found that 24 Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon and Rhode Island behave in a different manner. This might be due to 25 their different level of economic activities. For instance, Rhode Island derives her income from Marinas and ship-building. Also, prior to the millennium, Oregon is a natural resource centred state (fishing, 26 27 timber and agriculture). Perhaps, there is a renewed attempt to shift the economy to the high tech sector,

which started receiving attention in the early 2000s. For instance, to know whether we can merge club
which any other clubs, we can use the log t-test with a panel that contains information of all member
clubs. If it was found that the estimated convergence parameter (beta) is significant, which indicates
convergence, we can conclude that the clubs can be merged. This iteration continues until the points
where the convergence parameter is no longer statistically significant. The results presented in Table 4
prima facie evidence of the rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence. This leads us to conclude.

7 **5.** Conclusion

This paper examines the convergence hypothesis for 50 states in the United States of America for the period 1976-2014. In essence, we seek to examine whether per capita carbon emission across the states moves in the same direction and converge over time or there are tendencies towards divergence. The two techniques used to test out hypothesis are Pesaran (2007) panel unit root test and Phillips and Sul's (2007) tests. The advantages of these two approaches are that they can capture the effect and/or significance of the heterogeneity that might be inherent in the dataset. Furthermore, these tests have been identified to be very flexible to cover a range of transition periods.

15 Our results support the existence of divergence at the state level of carbon emission in the USA. Using 16 the half-life convergence method, we were able to report a point estimate of the unbiased half-life of 17 convergence. Although, we found that there were significant differences among states on the time it takes to converge, however, the average among the states was 5.7 years with a 95% confidence interval 18 of 5.4 - 5.9 years. The results of stationarity using the KPSS stationary test complimented and hence 19 20 provided robustness to our estimates by suggesting that the null of a unit root was rejected most of the 21 time. The notion of the club convergence which was also a significant contribution of this study was 22 also tested. The results showed that there were four identifiable clubs. The rest of the states are put 23 together into another single club, making a total of five clubs. The estimates and classifications of the 24 club convergence and corresponding clubs are particularly important in terms of harmonisation and 25 formulations of climate policies at state and federal levels.

1 The half-life estimates are also important in terms of policy formulation on CO₂ emissions and 2 coordinated actions by the states to influence the convergence and homogeneity of policy in the Post-3 convergence epoch. Evidence of divergence from the USA would make it difficult for other developed 4 or developing countries to agree to emissions reduction obligations. These diverging tendencies require 5 special consideration from policymakers. There is a need for policymakers in the US to be aggressive 6 in terms of setting policies that would seek to achieve convergence, while simultaneously reducing PCE. 7 If this can be achieved, other developed countries will follow suit and encourage developing countries 8 to also reduce their emission level. Also, the attainment of convergence will enhance the accuracy of 9 future projection of the emission rate.

10 The results of the club-convergence test have demonstrated the importance of streamlining emission 11 abatement policies to emission convergence paths that is unique to the clusters of states. Hence, the 12 state-specific structure must be considered when designing and implementing policies that seek to 13 mitigate emissions, so that some states would not be adversely affected due to the influence and actions of other states. Concomitantly, a common federal level policy for all the states under investigation may 14 15 not be very efficient due to the heterogeneity among them. Undauntedly, there is a need to cut down on 16 unsustainable energy use and carbon emissions at a global level which also requires technology transfer 17 and domestic innovations. In this regards, the actions and policies at the national or federal levels require 18 to be matched with states and international levels. On the states levels, the aspect of convergence and 19 club convergence covered in this treatise has profound implications which can be a good guide to 20 navigate the federal policy and match it with global efforts to tackle the environmental challenges.

The transparency and quality of direct GHG emissions have not been significantly improved over time and it had been acknowledged in forums that energy-intensive organisations in the USA decreased the transparency, it is proposed the future research shall incept this aspect.

24

- 25
- 26

1 References

2 Aldy, J.E., 2006. Per capita carbon dioxide emissions: convergence or divergence? Environ. Resour. Econ.
33, 533–55.

4 Andreoni V, Galmarini S., 2012. European CO₂ emission trends: a decomposition analysis for water and
aviation transport sectors, Energy. 45, 595–602.

6 Apergis N, Payne J.E. 2017. Per capita carbon dioxide emissions across US states by sector and fossil fuel
7 source: Evidence from club convergence tests, Energy Econ.63, 365–72.

8 Auffhammer, M, Steinhauser R. 2007, The future trajectory of us co2 emission, The role of state vs.
9 aggregate information, Journal of Regional Sciences. 47, 47–61.

10 Barassi, M.R., Cole, M.A., Elliott RJR 2008. Stochastic divergence or convergence of per capita carbon
 11 dioxide emissions: re-examining the evidence, Environ. Resour. Econ, 40:121–37.

Barassi, M.R., Cole, M.A., Elliott, R.J.R. 2011. The stochastic convergence of CO 2 emissions: a long
memory approach. Environ. Resour. Econ, 49:367–85.

14 Barro, R.J., Sala-i-Martin, X. 1990. Economic growth and convergence across the United States, National
Bureau of Economic Research.

16 Baumol, W.J. 1986. Productivity growth, convergence, and welfare: what the long-run data show, Am17 Econ. Rev. 1072–85.

18 Becker, R. Enders, W. Lee, J. 2006. A Stationarity Test in the Presence of An Unknown Number of Smooth
Breaks, J. Time Ser. Anal, 27: 381-409.

20 Bulte, E, List, J.A. Strazicich, M.C. 2007. Regulatory federalism and the distribution of air pollutant
emissions, J. Reg. Scien. 47:155–78.

Burnett, J.W. (2016) "Club convergence and clustering of U.S. energy-related CO2emission" Resource and
 Energy Economics 46, 62–84

24 Burnett, J.W. 2016. Club convergence and clustering of US energy-related CO₂ emissions, Resource and
 25 Energy Economics; 46: 62–84.

26 Camarero, M., Castillo-Gimenez, J., Picazo-Tadeo, A., and Tamarit, C., (2014) "Is eco-efficiency in
greenhouse gas emissions converging among European Union countries?" Empirical Economics, 47,
143–168

29 Carlino, G. A. Mills, L.O. 1996. Testing Neoclassical convergence in regional incomes and earnings, Reg.
30 Sci. Urban Econ; 26:565–90.

31 Carlino, G.A. Mills, L.O. 1993. Are US regional incomes converging?: A time series analysis, J. Monet.
32 Econ., 32: 335–46.

33 Chang, C-P, Lee, C-C.2008. Are per capita carbon dioxide emissions converging among industrialized
34 countries? New time series evidence with structural breaks, Environmental and Development
35 Economics, 13:497–515.

- 1 Chiu, Y-B. 2017. Carbon dioxide, income and energy: Evidence from a non-linear model. Energy2 Econ;61:279–88.
- 3 Choi, C-Y, Mark, N., Sul, D. 2004, Unbiased estimation of the half-life to PPP convergence in panel data.
 J. Money Credit Bank., 38 : 921 938.
- 5 Christidou, M, Panagiotidis T, Sharma A.2013. On the stationarity of per capita carbon dioxide emissions
 6 over a century, Econ. Model 33, 918–25.
- 7 Clemencon, R. (2016) The Two Sides of the Paris Climate Agreement: Dismal Failure or Historic
 8 Breakthrough? Journal of Environment & Development 25(1), 3-24
- 9 Criado, C.O., Grether, J-M. 2011. Convergence in per capita CO 2 emissions: a robust distributional
 approach. Resour. Energy Econ; 33:637–65.
- 11 EPA (2018), Overview of Greenhouse Gases, available at https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases.
- 13 EPA(2020).SourcesofGreenhouseGasEmissions.Availableat14https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions
- 15 Ezcurra, R.2007b. Is there cross-country convergence in carbon dioxide emissions? Energy16 Policy;35:1363–72.
- 17 Ezcurra,, R. 2007a. The world distribution of carbon dioxide emissions, Appl. Econ. Lett., 14:349-52.
- 18 Herrerias, M. J. 2012. CO₂ weighted convergence across the EU-25 countries (1920–2007), Appl. Energy,
 92, 9–16.
- 20 Herrerias, M.J. 2013. The environmental convergence hypothesis: Carbon dioxide emissions according to
 21 the source of energy, Energy Policy, 61, 1140-1150
- 22 IEA. 2017. Energy-related carbon dioxide emissions worldwide from 1975 to 2016 (in gigatonnes). Statista.
- Accessed 9 August, 2017. Available from https://www.statista.com/statistics/526002/energy-related carbon-dioxide-emissions-worldwide/.
- 25 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014–Impacts, Adaptation and26 Vulnerability: Regional Aspects. Cambridge University Press.
- 27 Lee, C-C, Chang, C-P. 2008. New evidence on the convergence of per capita carbon dioxide emissions
 28 from panel seemingly unrelated regressions augmented Dickey–Fuller tests, Energy; 33:1468–75.
- 29 Li, X-L, Tang, DP, Chang, T. 2014, CO₂ emissions converge in the 50 US states—Sequential panel
 30 selection method, Econ Model, 40:320–33.
- 31 List, J. A. 1999. Have air pollutant emissions converged among US regions? Evidence from unit root tests,
 32 South Econ J: 66, 144–55.
- 33 Lluís, Carrion-i-Silvestre J, Barrio-Castro D, López-Bazo E. 2005. Breaking the panels: an application to
 34 the GDP per capita, Econom. J.; 8:159–75.

1 Morales-Lage, R., Bengochea-Morancho, A., Camarero, M. and Martínez-Zarzoso, I. (2019) "Club

- 2 convergence of sectoral CO2 emissions in the European Union", Energy Policy, 135
- 3 <u>https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111019</u>.
- 4 Nguyen, Van P.2005. Distribution dynamics of CO 2 emissions, Environ. Resour. Econ. ;32:495–508.
- 5 Panopoulou, E., Pantelidis, T. 2009. Club convergence in carbon dioxide emissions, Environ. Resour. Econ,
 6 44, 47–70.
- 7 Payne, J. E, Miller, S, Lee, J., Cho, M.H, .2014. Convergence of per capita sulphur dioxide emissions across
 8 US states, Appl. Econ., 46:1202–11.
- 9 Pesaran, M.H. 2007, A simple panel unit root test in the presence of cross-section dependence, J. Appl.
 10 Econom., 22, 265–312.
- 11 Phillips, P.C.B., Sul, D. 2007. Transition modeling and econometric convergence tests, Econometrica;
 75,1771–855.
- 13 Quah, D. T.1990. International Patterns of Growth: Persistence in Cross-county Disposities.
- 14 Rios, V. and Gianmoena, L. (2018) "Convergence in CO2emissions: A spatial economic analysis with
 cross-country interaction" Energy Economics, 75, 222-238
- 16 Romero-Ávila, D. 2008, Convergence in carbon dioxide emissions among industrialised countries revisited,
 17 Energy Econ. 30, 2265–82.
- 18 Sala-i-Martin, X.X. 1996. Regional cohesion: evidence and theories of regional growth and convergence,
 European Economic Review: 40,1325–52.
- 20 Schnurbus, J., Haupt, H., Meier, V. 2017 Economic Transition and Growth: A Replication. J. Appl. Econ.,
 32, 1039–1042.
- 22 Stegman, A., McKibbin, W. J. 2005. Convergence and per capita carbon emission. Brookings Discussion23 Papers in International Economics No. 167.
- 24 Strazicich, M., List, J.A., 2003. Are CO₂ emission levels converging among industrial countries? Environ.
 25 Resour. Econ 24, 263–71.
- 26 Westerlund, J, Basher, S.A.,2008. Testing for convergence in carbon dioxide emissions using a century of
 panel data, Environ. Resour. Econ; 40,109–20.
- 28 Whitehouse.2015., Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in
- the Federal Government and Across the Supply Chain, The White House, March 19, 2015, accessed
 June 17, 2017 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/19/fact-sheet-reducing-
- June 17, 2017 https://obainawintenouse.areinves.gov/une-press-office/2015/05/15/fact-sheet-reducin
- 31 greenhouse-gas-emissions-federal-government-and-acro
- 32 Yavuz, N.C., Yilanci, V. 2013. Convergence in per capita carbon dioxide emissions among G7 countries:
 a TAR panel unit root approach, Environ. Resour. Econ, 54, 283–291.