

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Danish nearshore wind energy policy: Exploring actors, ideas, discursive processes and institutions via discursive institutionalism

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Abstract

This article explores Danish renewable energy policy and policymaking, focusing on the development of nearshore wind energy and the role played by various actors, their competing ideas, the discursive processes in which they participate, and the institutional settings where exchanges occur. The research employs a case study design, concentrating on the *Vesterhav Syd* nearshore windfarm project. Drawing on semi-structured interviews, the paper exploits Discursive Institutionalism and one of its recent refinements, labelled *Ideational Power* that highlights power *over*, *through* and *in* ideas. The data gathered provides compelling evidence of the ways in which actors struggle for dominance, each seeking to persuade others of their preferred policy problem definition and solutions: a process that oscillates between highly technical coordinative discourses among government agencies and business organisations and more politicised communicative discourses among a wider set of actors that includes community groups. Significantly, this case reveals the power of various policy stakeholders in Danish energy policy, suggesting that once decisions are taken at the national level of governance to construct a windfarm, only limited influence can be exerted by local groups on the outcomes. Our findings raise wider questions about such processes beyond the Danish case.

KEYWORDS

Denmark, discursive institutionalism, ideational power, nearshore windfarm, renewable energy

1 | INTRODUCTION

Renewable energy is increasingly considered to be essential in seeking to achieve a low-carbon (or zero-carbon) economy, an objective driven by national and international climate and energy targets (Dupont & Oberthür, 2015; Solorio & Bocquillon, 2017). Arguably, achieving such climate goals requires investment, particularly in renewable energy infrastructure (e.g., in constructing large-scale

windfarms). Whilst there may be broad public support for such an energy transition, the development of large-scale renewable energy projects near to private dwellings may fail to secure local community approval. Indeed, local residents may be apprehensive about the potentially adverse effects of such schemes, especially as they may espouse different perspectives about their local neighbourhood (Creamer et al., 2019; Juerges et al., 2018). Crucially, local residents may challenge formal policy planning decisions even though those

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same private individuals and community groups may subscribe to wider environmental and energy policy objectives (Johansen, 2019; Upham & Johansen, 2020) with the result that local community groups and 'ordinary people' become entangled in the policy process alongside elite decision-makers.

This article demonstrates that divergent ideas about energy, climate change and cognate topics such as nature conservation may co-exist, even in an environmental 'pioneer' country such as Denmark (Johansen, 2019). Critically, while an extensive literature chronicles Denmark's long-standing political commitment to renewable energies (Andersen, 1997; Andersen & Nielsen, 2016; Börzel, 2002; Dyrhaug, 2017, 2021), and particularly wind power (Eikeland & Inderberg, 2016), there is a paucity of scholarship concerning large-scale renewable energy infrastructure projects and their acceptance (or not) among local community groups and residents (but see Burningham et al., 2015; Haggett, 2011; Szarka, 2004). Prompted by this research gap, this article analyses the policy processes surrounding the development of one particular Danish nearshore windfarm: *Vesterhav Syd*. Our study scrutinises the role and impact of the policy actors who participate in the policymaking. What is immediately evident is that the various actors subscribe to diverse ideas about the issue with the result that they compete to shape the policymaking, aiming to control the policy outcomes, but with varying degrees of success.

More specifically, in this article we conduct a fine-grained analysis of the policymaking surrounding the *Vesterhav Syd* nearshore windfarm project and its tendering process. This is an important case because the project was (and continues to be) steered politically by the Danish government and political parties via a 2011 Danish multi-annual energy agreement (Dyrhaug, 2022). Ordinarily, the implementation of such a project would be a technical stage in the coordinative policy process, but in this case, it became politicised owing to a protest campaign conducted by an active group of second homeowners. The protest group drew on notions of 'nature' and 'aesthetics' to challenge the planning decisions, resulting in communicative discussions that overlapped with the coordinative policy process. Critically, this case is striking because the decision-making and accompanying discourses were simultaneously both 'political' and 'technical' involving formal policymakers, elite professionals and others such as grassroots protest groups.

The analysis in this article is framed by Discursive Institutionalism (DI) (Schmidt, 2002, 2008, 2010, 2014, 2017; Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004), which invites an examination of the *roles of actors*, the *set(s) of ideas* they espouse, the *interactive discursive processes* in which the actors participate, and the *institutional settings* that emerge. Building on that literature, we combine it with a more recently developed elaboration of that scholarship, proffered by Carstensen and Schmidt (2016), labelled *ideational power* or the *power of ideas*. Amalgamating them, we dissect the *Vesterhav Syd* nearshore windfarm case, examining which actors participate in the policymaking, the ideas they champion, the types of ideas they support (whether *cognitive* and/or *normative*), the types of discourse that occurs (whether *coordinative* and/or *communicative*) and which actors have *power over*, *power through* and *power in* ideas. We address two core research questions: What ideational power do

different actors employ to influence near-shore windfarm decision-making? Furthermore, how do these forms of ideational power influence decision-making?

Having introduced this article, we now outline the structure of the article. The next section charts the development of Danish renewable energy policy. Then, the subsequent section explores the conceptual frameworks adopted (i.e., DI and the *power of ideas*) and summarises our research methods. Next, we provide detailed empirical evidence from the case study, organised in terms of the concepts drawn from DI and ideational power. The penultimate section of the article discusses the theoretical implications and empirical aspects of our research bringing in findings from other studies and places the case in a broader context. We close the article by offering key conclusions about what our research reveals and the possible lessons that can be drawn from the case.

2 | BACKGROUND: DANISH RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY AND OFFSHORE WIND

Owing to its long-standing record of developing renewable energy, Denmark is considered to be an environmental front-runner (Andersen, 1997; Dyrhaug, 2022). Successive Danish governments have used this leading position to push for more ambitious EU climate and energy targets (Dyrhaug, 2017). Crucially, in Denmark, there is a long history of exploiting wind energy (Andersen & Nielsen, 2016; Dyrhaug, 2017, 2022; Hvelplund, 2005): the first Danish onshore windfarms were built in the 1970s and the first offshore windfarm in 1991. Whilst there has been broad Danish public support for renewable energy, residents and communities living in close proximity to planned and newly constructed windfarms have lodged objections. Those who have been prominently active in opposing such developments are those with holiday homes: they have chosen to buy property in a particular area because of its natural beauty and wildlife (Johansen, 2019). Critically, these divergent and clashing perspectives create significant tensions surrounding the hegemonic ideational beliefs about how to address climate change challenges.

At this juncture, it is worth underscoring the point that technological innovation has facilitated the construction of large offshore windfarms off the coast of Denmark. Such developments typically offer a larger capacity than onshore windfarms. They are more distant from local communities. Consequently, they may provoke less hostility from local communities and homeowners. Accordingly, offshore windfarms may be considered to be an 'ideal solution' in facilitating an energy transition. Nevertheless, some nearshore windfarms¹ are still close enough to the coastline to be visible to local residents and may adversely affect the aesthetics of the landscape, prompting some coastal homeowners to organise themselves into protest groups who challenge the infrastructure projects (Burningham et al., 2015; Johansen, 2019; Upham & Johansen, 2020). Similar to the situation surrounding onshore windfarm developments, such protest groups tend to engage in the policy process by lobbying politicians, participating in public hearings and confronting the professional elites' technical dialogues (concerning market conditions and environmental impact

assessments), as was the case with the *Vesterhav Syd* nearshore wind-farm, our case study.

Significantly, Danish energy transition began as a bottom-up process led by entrepreneurs. Subsequently, local communities organised as cooperatives, also set up windfarms. Afterwards, this initially small-scale energy production became more politicalised as windfarms increased in size and the issue of climate change gained greater political salience. From the late 1980s onwards, Danish energy transition shifted towards a top-down process (Szarka, 2004) as the sector became more industrialised (Læssøe, 2007) and energy companies oversaw the building of windfarms. Critically, since 2003, Danish offshore wind projects have been subject to public tendering (Fitch-Roy, 2016: 593; Meyer, 2007). Consequently, Danish energy policy and policy implementation is now mainly a top-down policy mechanism directed by two key bodies: the *Ministry of Climate, Energy and Utilities*, which is responsible for the political process; and the *Energy Agency* which implements political decisions, manages the technical process, and engages in market dialogues with energy companies who potentially may want to bid for the public tender (Dyrhaug, 2022). The policy processes surrounding these infrastructure projects typically include public hearings and meetings with local communities, who are invited to respond to the environmental impact assessment (EIA). Such forums offer a legitimate route for local communities to voice their concerns. These patterns of interaction occur in our chosen case: they emerge as crystallised institutional arrangements born out of the rule-setting and associated norms surrounding the process.

Significantly, whilst nearshore and offshore windfarms projects are managed through top-down national political agreements, onshore windfarms remain bottom-up projects initiated by local companies and communities. The onshore windfarms policy process is usually managed by local municipalities. However, all renewable energy projects are required to contribute towards Danish national political climate and energy goals, which until recently, were embodied in the multiannual energy agreements reached between the government of the day and other political parties in parliament. These agreements² determine the long-term climate and energy targets in addition to supporting investment in renewable energy infrastructure (such as the construction of offshore windfarms). Such agreements help to frame climate change political discourse in Denmark with the result that the opposition political parties that are not part of the multi-annual energy agreement often exploit the agreements in their communicative discourses to criticise the incumbent government (Dyrhaug, 2021). The opposition parties, who are signatories to the political agreements, are committed to the agreement beyond the next election: they cannot change the agreement even if they were to gain power after an election.

Strikingly, climate change and energy transition issues have been important nodal points in Danish communicative discourses over recent years, in which parliamentary parties, the business sector, think-tanks and other stakeholders have tried to control the pace and direction of the energy transition. This was evident in the 2019 Danish general election, which was labelled the 'climate election' because climate change had become the central policy issue during the

election campaign (Møller Hansen & Stubager, 2021). Even populist right-wing parties that did not previously have a position on the topic were propelled into developing a clearer climate profile. Following the 2019 general election, the newly elected Social Democratic minority government reached a political agreement with all the political parties in the parliament to adopt a new climate law³ that would prevent future governments from backsliding on previous climate commitments.

Significantly, the energy agreements and the climate law both require Denmark to accelerate its energy transition, with wind power being an essential element. These priorities are observable not only in the policy and actions of Danish public bodies but also in those of Danish wind power sector entrepreneurs. Whilst, as mentioned above, local industrialists were the first-movers in building windfarms in Denmark, as the transition towards adopting low carbon energy technologies became a higher political priority, windfarms have been built on a larger-scale and become a more important component of a wider national Danish energy policy, to be delivered via the multiannual energy agreements mentioned above. Crucially, the infrastructure projects identified in the multiannual energy agreements are awarded via public tendering (Dyrhaug, 2021). Such is the significance of wind energy and the financial incentives available that some businesses have even gone to the lengths of creating industrial clusters in response (Eikeland & Inderberg, 2016).

Overall, the growing significance of renewable and wind energy in Denmark is evidenced by the powerful political commitments made by Danish politicians and governments with respect to climate change and energy transition priorities (Energy Agency, 2021: 2–4). This is exemplified by a recently reached political agreement (in 2020) between the Social Democratic minority government and most of the political parties in the Danish parliament, in which they pledged to build an 'energy island' with 3-gigawatt capacity in the North Sea. The energy island is expected to be operational by 2030, connected to different windfarms in the North Sea, and able to distribute electricity to several European countries (Danish Government, 2020). Such developments are a forceful marker of Danish allegiance to wind energy.

3 | CORE CONCEPTS, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS

We now turn our attention to concepts and scholarship that underpin our work, linking those to our research questions and qualitative methods. Our research is fundamentally concerned with *actors*, *ideas* and the *power of ideas*, *discourse* and the *institutional arrangements* that emerge from the interplay of these elements. We draw on previous work that has similar foci (for examples of previous pivotal texts see: Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Beland & Cox, 2016; Blyth, 1997). As has been widely observed (see e.g., Beland, 2019; Swinkels, 2020), such elements have invariably been central to the work of scholars in our chosen field and used widely across disciplines and sub-disciplines such as public policy analysis, political economy, international relations and comparative politics.

Locating our work in the context of this scholarship, we choose to draw on a number of concepts. First, like Beland, we treat *ideas* as “...the historically constructed beliefs and perceptions of both individual and collective actors” (Beland, 2019, 4). Similar to Beland (2019, 5), we connect ideas and actors and view their interaction through a study of institutions, perceiving ideas expressed by actors as being vital to the creation of institutions: in other words, both formal and informal institutions manifest themselves as the codification of ideas. Furthermore, ideas and institutions interact and impact on each other during these processes, moulding one another. Together these key components (i.e., actors, ideas, institutions and the struggle for power) provide the foundations of our research. Building on those concepts, we chose to rely on the work of Vivian Schmidt as a solo author (e.g., Schmidt, 2002, 2008, 2010, 2014, 2017) and in combination with others (e.g., Radaelli and Schmidt, 2014) and her *Discursive Institutional* approach. Additionally, we exploit a subsequent refinement of the DI literature, labelled the *power of ideas* or *Ideational power* (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016). It is to that literature that we now turn in more detail.

3.1 | Discursive institutionalism

Since DI first emerged in the early 2000s, it has been refined through the work of Schmidt and others (Schmidt, 2002, 2008, 2010, 2014; Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004). Drawing on those foundations, the approach has been exploited by a growing number of researchers who have used it to investigate a range of public policy areas (e.g., den Besten et al., 2014; Buijs et al., 2014; Crespy & Schmidt, 2014; Fairbrass, 2011; Fitch-Roy et al., 2020; Lorenzoni & Benson, 2014; Schmidt, 2014).

DI's chief appeal lies in the way in which it advances ‘new institutionalism’ by treating policy as a dynamic phenomenon, providing insights into the mechanisms for change in contrast to the older forms of ‘new institutionalisms’ such as historical institutionalism (HI), rational choice institutionalism (RI) and sociological institutionalism (SI) which are thought to be more limited in their explanatory capacity, focusing to a greater extent on policy stability and continuity (Schmidt, 2008, 2010, 2017).

The principal contribution of DI scholarship (Schmidt, 2002, 2008, 2010, 2014, 2017; Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004) is that it highlights and demands an analysis of *the substantive content of agents' ideas* and the *Interactive processes of discourse*. From Schmidt's standpoint (Schmidt, 2017, 249), by employing DI in public policy analysis, prior neo-institutionalist frameworks (such as HI, RI and SI) can be enhanced by capturing the processes of change. Furthermore, Schmidt argues that we should explore the *sources of ideas* (such as slogans, narratives, stories and frames) and the *dynamics of the discursive processes* (2017, 250). She contends that agents deliberately manipulate ideas in policy coordination and political communication. Here, Schmidt draws on earlier work by Beland and Cox (2016), Blyth (1997), Baumgartner and Jones (1993).

Another prominent feature of DI (Schmidt, 2017, 251) is that it categorises discursive interaction as one of two types: either *coordinative* or *communicative* policymaking. The former tends to occur ‘behind closed

doors’, where the deliberation, contestation and legitimisation that occurs is restricted to policy elites such as public authorities, experts, business actors and others (Schmidt, 2002, 2008). By contrast, the latter takes the form of interaction whereby political actors translate ideas (developed during coordinative discourse) into accessible language for the general public (Schmidt, 2017, 251): in other words, action designed to shape public opinion. The actors involved in communicative discourse may include the media, interest groups, public intellectuals, opinion formers, social movements and ordinary people. Critically, such all discourse may be either top-down, bottom-up or both (Schmidt, 2002, 2014).

3.2 | Ideational power

Turning now to Carstensen and Schmidt's (2016) notion of *ideational power*⁴, they define it as the capacity of actors (whether individual or collective) to influence other actors' *normative* and *cognitive* beliefs via the use of *ideational elements* (2016 p. 318) such as discourse, practices, norms and identities (2016, p. 322). Carstensen and Schmidt (2016) then proceed to identify three types of ideational power: *power through*, *power over* and *power in* ideas. *Power through* ideas is said to be the ability to *persuade* other actors to accept ideas. *Power over* ideas is thought of as the *imposition* of ideas and the *capacity to resist* the inclusion of alternative ideas. *Power in* ideas manifests as the establishment of *hegemony* or *institutions that can impose constraints* on those ideas that are recognised in the policymaking process.

To elaborate further, in outlining *power through ideas*, Carstensen and Schmidt suggest that persuasion relies on the cognitive and normative ideas that can be marshalled (2016, p. 324) and contend that persuasion can include both coordinative and communicative discourse (2016, p. 325). When it comes to *power over ideas*, Carstensen and Schmidt argue that this implies control over the production of meaning and the diffusion of information via channels such as the mass media. Therefore, those actors who can control the levers of power can promote their own ideas to the exclusion of others' ideas. Significantly, ideational power may operate in both a top-down and bottom-up direction (2016, p. 322). Accordingly, Carstensen and Schmidt suggest that so-called ‘powerless’ actors can ‘shame’ more powerful actors and raise consciousness about particular ideas (2016, p. 326). Concerning *power in ideas*, Carstensen and Schmidt argue that this revolves around deep-level ideational and institutional structures where actors may act to depoliticise certain ideas so that those ideas recede into the background, becoming taken-for-granted or uncontentious. Nevertheless, such ideas may function as a constraint on alternative views. Where there is *power in ideas*, the ideas can be used to justify and validate certain notions. Arguably, even such deep-seated ideas can develop or be changed, evolving over time incrementally (2016, p. 329) and may prove to be more powerful than coercive or structural power. The most valuable aspect of this refinement to DI is the greater emphasis on actors' agency and the attention paid to the interaction between elites and less powerful groups of actors (2016, p. 320), issues that are central to our investigation.

3.3 | Research questions

Exploiting the above literature, we scrutinise the relationship between more powerful and less powerful actors in Danish nearshore wind energy policymaking arena, examining the ideas, beliefs, objectives, behaviour, interaction and power of the actors involved. Specifically, we address the following questions in relation to the *Vesterhav Syd* nearshore windfarm case: what ideational power do the different actors use to influence near-shore *Vesterhav Syd* windfarm decision-making? Furthermore, how do these forms of ideational power influence decision-making?

4 | METHODS

The research conducted for this article employs a qualitative research design centred around an in-depth explorative case study of the *Vesterhav Syd* nearshore windfarm project that combines documentary analysis with semi-structured interviewing, enabling a fine-grained analysis of the policy process. The documents scrutinised include official documents from the Energy Agency, public hearings documents (including written comments by local protest groups), documents published by the local protest groups, and newspaper reporting. Not all documents are cited and thus are not mentioned in the reference list, but they helped to inform the research and this article. Crucially, the documentary analysis conducted reveals how actors and their ideas coalesced into institutions and shaped the policy process and policy outcomes.

In total, nine semi-structured interviews were held in autumn 2019 with civil servants from both the Energy Agency and the Ministry, energy interest organisations, energy producers and local protest groups. The respondents were selected because they were central to the policy process, possessed knowledge about Danish wind energy policy and/or had been vocal activists protesting against the project. Additionally, one of the authors observed the Energy Agency's online public hearing, held in May 2020, where the protest groups also participated. The interviews and observations furnish rich data about actors' perceptions of the policy processes and their ability to advance their ideas.

Using these methods, we trace the policy process, gaining insights into the decision-making associated with our case study. Overall, these data enable triangulation, offering profound insights into the interactive processes at the various stages of the policy process and how the actors' ideas interrelate and influence policymaking.

4.1 | Case study: Ideational contestation and a protracted policy process

4.1.1 | Multiannual agreements and the tendering process

Most Danish offshore windfarms are seen as 'grand political infrastructure projects' that form part of the multiannual energy

agreements between the government of the day and the political parties in the parliament. The energy agreements determine how many offshore windfarms are to be built and their capacity. Such projects are linked to Danish national climate and energy policy objectives. There is, therefore, a clear connection between individual offshore windfarms and wider, long-term national (and EU) political climate goals (Dyrhaug, 2017).

Charting recent history, in 2012, a Danish energy agreement gave planning permission for the construction of four nearshore windfarms instead of more distant offshore windfarms, the former being typically less expensive to build than the latter. Crucially, once the Danish government and political parties earmark funds for such windfarms, the Energy Agency then becomes responsible for implementing the agreement and initiating a public tendering process: a highly technical mechanism involving an EIA of the marine area and developing a public tender inviting private companies to bid and then construct the windfarm. Dialogues between the Energy Agency and the potential bidders are usually conducted to discuss the market implications. These are typically coordinative discourses, conducted 'behind closed doors', where only invited elite public and private actors participate. In parallel, public hearings are held, involving the local communities affected by the project: these are examples of communicative discourse. Such institutional structures and processes shape the ability of the competing actors (and their ideas) to influence the policy outcomes. Exclusion from the coordinative discourse limits the impact of the wider public, local community groups, and homeowners, privileging the ability of the elite participants to hold sway over the decision-making processes and decisions reached.

4.1.2 | Case study: *Vesterhav Syd* nearshore windfarm project

The policy process associated with our chosen case study began in 2015, when the Energy Agency conducted an EIA for the multi-site *Vesterhav Syd*. This entailed public hearings involving national agencies, local municipalities and residents but, as suggested above, offered the latter relatively limited influence over decisions. The preliminary EIA report was published later in 2015 and the public tender took place in 2016. The Energy Agency awarded the tender to Vattenfall in December 2016, when it also published the EIA report based on Vattenfall's project plan.

However, opposition groups, especially the 'Stop *Vesterhav Syd*' group, challenged the EIA, arguing that it did not provide an accurate picture of the visual effects of the construction of the windfarm. Subsequently, in December 2019, the Energy Complaint Tribunal⁵ ruled that the Energy Agency should withdraw the original EIA and perform another assessment. In January 2020, Vattenfall published a more precise plan of the location of the wind turbines, which the Energy Agency used as the basis for a new EIA and public hearing. In the first half of 2020, the Energy Agency held further public hearings for the new draft EIA. Later that same year, in December 2020, the Energy Agency adopted the EIA and Vattenfall was given permission to begin

the construction of the windfarm after a three-year delay: this underlines the stronger influence exerted by the elite decision-makers. At this point, *Stop Vesterhav Syd* encouraged its members to send objections to the Energy Agency, thereby attempting to further stall the process.

Further procedural complications arose in June 2021, when the Environment and Food Complaint Tribunal found that the Environmental Agency had not followed the correct procedures when conducting the EIA: this concerned the onshore connection point to the main grid. It was determined that the Environmental Agency had not complied with the EU's *Habitat Directive* and *Natura 2000* legal requirements (Environment and Food Complaint Tribunal, 2021). Consequently, the Environmental Agency was obliged to undertake yet another EIA, thereby further delaying the development. In sum, both the Energy Agency and the Environmental Agency had committed procedural errors, further postponing the construction of the windfarm and grid connection. Consequently, actual construction only started in January 2023 (DR, 2023).

4.1.3 | Public tender market conditions: Coordinative discourses

Crucially, the informal dialogue with the potential developers associated with the *Vesterhav Syd* case took place following the problematic 2008 public tender for the Anholt offshore windfarm. This is important because in the Anholt case, the Energy Agency had developed a public tender without dialogue with the potential bidders, which resulted in the bid being too expensive for developers and meant that Ørsted was the sole bidder. With no rivals, Ørsted won the bid (interviews 1, 5 and 6, 2019). Reflecting on these earlier experiences, an informal dialogue phase was introduced into the planning process to try and ensure that the market conditions for the tender would be competitive. This is reflected in the comments of one of the interviewees from the Energy Agency who noted that:

Potential bidders actively lobby in connection with the negotiations for the energy agreement to shape the tender. These are big companies with big power, so they have been active early before the negotiations and throughout the whole process. We have a continuous dialogue with potential bidders all the way through the process, as part of our tender model. Overall, our external contact is directed at the industry instead of the local community (interview 1, 2019).

Several stakeholder interviewees corroborated these observations and assessment of the coordinative discourses (interviewees 2, 4, 6 and 7, 2019). Indeed, this type of informal dialogue between the central public administration and stakeholders is typical of the Danish corporatist political system (Binderkrantz & Christiansen, 2015).

Respondents interviewed reported an 'institutionalisation' of the informal market dialogues, a codification of ideas into institutions in effect, commenting that it is an element of the tendering process for

offshore windfarms that they believed benefitted all concerned. Significantly in the nearshore *Vesterhav Syd* wind project, both the external stakeholders and the Energy Agency shared the normative value that wind power is 'good'. Accordingly, none of the actors challenged the underlining normative ideas behind the project. Instead, they supported the government's long-term climate objectives and values.

4.1.4 | The environmental impact assessment: Communicative discourses

In addition to the market discussions with potential developers, the Energy Agency is also responsible for conducting an EIA both for the site area for the proposed windfarm and for the connection point on land. These technical environmental impact assessments are usually conducted before the project permission is granted (i.e., ordinarily the EIA takes place prior to the public tender). Crucially, the EIA is regulated by the EU's EIA directive (Directive 2014/52), which defines the assessment criteria.

Normally, the draft EIA is published and aired at a public hearing: an example of coordinative discourse feeding into the communicative processes. Other government agencies (e.g., the Environmental Agency), the Coastal Authority (a division of the Environmental Agency), the impacted municipality, and local residents are invited to participate in the public hearing. Additionally, the municipality may invite local businesses to contribute to these public meetings. Both the informal market dialogue and the public hearings represent important feedback loops for the Energy Agency, informing the decision-making, with the public hearings representing a formal route and the lobbying of selected politicians and ministers and/or the media being informal methods. The EIA and public hearings are open to the wider public, who can comment on the discussions and the publicly available documents, such as the EIA. Accordingly, the EIA public hearings can connect with the broader political sphere through communicative discourses.

In the *Vesterhav Syd* case, the proposed site is situated in a tourist area. Many visitors, especially German holidaymakers and second homeowners, come to Ringkøbing-Skjern for the summer to enjoy the beach and 'unspoilt nature' with the result that the planned nearshore wind project would be sited close to holiday-homes and/or second homes. Whilst local residents and businesses tended to support the nearshore windfarm, many second homeowners and some tourist organisations opposed the project because they believed that the windfarm would adversely affect 'nature' and the aesthetics of the local area, impairing the views from the shore (Johansen, 2019; interview 9, 2019). Indeed, some second homeowners were so incensed by the plans that they mobilised as part of the '*Stop Vesterhav Syd* group',⁶ formally known as the '*Foreningen Stop Vesterhav Syd*'. In effect, these second homeowners played a significant (but, perhaps unanticipated) role in opposing the planned near shore developments (but see a parallel situation of 'incomers' in rural Scotland as documented by Creamer et al., 2019). That said, ultimately, these project opponents were only able to exert limited influence over the decision-making.

It is worth noting that the *Foreningen Stop Vesterhav Syd* group's origins lie with the Association of the Second Homeowners' Associations in the *Holmlands Klit* area, the latter being a coastal region overlooking the windfarm project. The Association agreed and adopted its fundamental common policy position at a general meeting. In contrast to the solidarity of *Foreningen Stop Vesterhav Syd* group, other parts of the local community were divided. Some businesses saw potential for employment opportunities, whilst other firms (in the tourist sector) were concerned about the potentially damaging effect of the windfarm on tourism (interview 8, 2019). Crucially, some research (see e.g., Johansen, 2019: 700) shows that permanent residents often have a more sympathetic or favourable view of near shore windfarms. This was the case with the permanent residents living in the vicinity of *Vesterhav Syd* nearshore windfarm. The former proved to be much less vocal compared to the opposition from the second homeowners (i.e., the 'incomers') living in the area. Indeed, much of the active hostility⁷ towards the windfarm came from *Foreningen Stop Vesterhav Syd*.

The opposition groups in our case study drew on three discursive arguments to oppose the windfarm: visual impairment; socio-economic assessment and the policy process itself. Their first argument emphasised the harm of views towards the sea from the seashore, noise pollution and the potential threat to health (interview 9, 2019). Their argument draws on the idea of 'clean nature', an aesthetic perspective about nature (Johansen, 2019) and nature conservation. Indeed, 'place attachment' is important for the potential effects on the local area (Haggett, 2011, pp. 505–6). The idea of unspoilt nature was seen by the opposition groups as being more important than the need for an energy transition, although some members of the opposition group might, in general, support the latter. This creates a disjuncture between the local sentiment and the wider perspective (Haggett, 2011, p. 506) as the protesters 'want to save the environment' and the pro-wind advocates 'want to save the planet' (Szarka, 2004: 326).

Indeed, most national politicians support (and supported) the idea of energy transition as part of a wider discourse on climate change. One leading politician, Ida Auken, stated in a television programme that the visual landscape changes (i.e., impairment) are necessary for the 'common good' and the achievement of climate goals. Similarly, a local business manager stated that:

I believe that we should be able to look at the things we have created. We should be able to look at polluting energy like coal and nuclear power stations. There are people who do not buy that argument (interview 8, 2019).

Crucially, the 'aesthetic argument' flows into the second argument about the socio-economic consequences of change, as reflected in the comments of a second homeowner who summarised the situation as:

It is socio-economically wrong to build nearshore windmills, they affect the coast, visual and aesthetics, noise pollution. It can lead to illness. It is also socio-economic wrong to give state aid [to build windfarms] (interview 9, 2019).

It is also important to underscore the point that the *Stop VHS* group criticised the EIA for not including a proper socio-economic assessment, including, contrarily, for failing to provide a socio-economic assessment of *not* building the windfarm (Foreningen Stop VHS, 2021). However, the Danish government and political parties had legally committed themselves to the project in the 2012 Energy Agreement and the project could only be halted by the political parties who had originally signed the agreement. Accordingly, the Energy Agency was not permitted to conduct a socio-economic assessment of *not* building the windfarm without a new political agreement and instruction from the minister.

Interestingly, the issue of public financial support for offshore windfarms was alluded to by several stakeholders interviewed (interviewee 4, 6 and 7, 2019), who said that technological developments had reduced the cost of building bigger offshore windfarms making them more economically feasible. Several interviewees compared the Danish and other European finance models as regards the construction of windfarms, with some mentioning instances where no public financing is available (interviewee 1, 4 and 6, 2019). Here, they agreed that the market conditions set out in the public tender were vital to the private companies and operators of the windfarms.

The third discursive argument deployed focused on the EIA policy process itself, in terms of the mechanisms associated with the public hearings and the visualisation of the wind turbines from the coast in the EIA report. The municipality of Ringkøbing-Skjern held public meetings for its local residents about the project in 2014, at the same time as the Energy Agency initiated the EIA process and held public meetings (see Table 1). However, second homeowners were not directly consulted as the local authorities had focused on the local businesses and permanent residents. Consequently, the second homeowners felt excluded from the policy process (interviews 8 and 9, 2019; Kirk, 2017). Interestingly, one stakeholder interviewee (interviewee 6, 2019) commenting on the EIA for *Vesterhav Syd*, remarked that he:

.... felt the Energy Agency showed big willingness to make sure the framework [for the public tenders] were as optimal as possible. Which is why I do not believe that the Energy Agency wanted to make mistakes in their Environmental Impact Assessment, but it was influenced by the legal advice they received. ... it is in the Energy Agency's own interest to make sure there is a little risk as possible for the bidders, so that the Energy Agency, the Danish state, and the electricity-consumer get the best price. Thus, I believe there is a willingness to listen and formally there is a set up for an open process.

Decisively, the second homeowners' normative values differed from those of the other actors. As mentioned above, the former group is primarily concerned with 'nature' and the 'aesthetics of nature' (Johansen, 2019; interview 9, 2019): their discourse highlights the preservation of nature. By contrast, the established and more powerful actors' guiding normative ideas (i.e., those of businesses and the public bodies) stem from notions of 'green growth' and 'energy transition' (interviews 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7, 2019). In parallel, at the outset of the construction process, Vattenfall announces that it will create

**TABLE 1** Policy process and timeline for *Vesterhav Syd*.

Year	Month	Formal activity	Activity category	Discourse type
2012	March	Political energy policy agreement 2012–2020	Political	Communicative
	October	Offshore windfarms committee report identifies locations for near-shore windfarms	Technical	Coordinative
2013	January	Energinet conduct EIA for land connection	Technical	Coordinative
2014	January	Energy Agency starts EIA process	Public meeting with public authorities and local community	Communicative, followed by coordinative
	December	Second homeowners association meets with Parliamentary committee	Public meeting	Communicative
2015	April–June	Publication of draft EIA	Publication, public hearing, & local citizen participation	Communicative
	November	Final EIA adopted	Publication	
2016	Throughout		Informal markets dialogue led by the Energy Agency	Coordinative
	-	The Energy Agency publish the public tender	Technical, bureaucratic	From coordinative to communicative
	November	The energy agency award the public tender to Vattenfall	Bureaucratic decision	Coordinative
2017	January	Second homeowners groups submit complaints to Energiklagenævnet		Coordinative
	February	Vattenfall and Energinet hosts a public meeting about the project and compensation for loss of value on property	Citizen participation	Communicative
2018	December	Energiklagenævnet's decision (Energy complaint's tribunal)	Bureaucratic	Coordinative
2019	March	Vattenfall postpone project with 3 years	Corporate	Coordinative
		New EIA investigation	Technical	Coordinative
2020	May–June	Energy Agency: Public hearing for new draft EIA		From coordinative to communicative
	December	Energiklagenævnet's decision (Energy complaint's tribunal)	Bureaucratic	Coordinative
2021	May	Miljø- og Fødevareklagenævnet decision (The Environment and Food Complaint's tribunal)	Bureaucratic	Coordinative
2023	January	Construction of windfarm starts	Corporate	

Source: Authors.

50 new jobs directly linked to the project. In response, a local baker in Hvide Sande says that he hopes to get a 'slice of the cake' (TV Midtvest, 2023). Consequently, the various communicative discourses surrounding *Vesterhav Syd* are difficult to reconcile because they represent conflicting values. In effect, it seems that the political commitment to energy transition and climate change took priority over concerns about landscape aesthetics. Ultimately, the hegemony of climate change discourse was never really challenged. Rather, it was the policy process itself that was disputed.

A further significant element of the *Stop Vesterhav Syd* group's criticism of the EIA policy process connects to the first argument

about the landscape aesthetics. Here, the protest group criticised the EIA report's visualisation of the wind turbines, which they argued did not provide an accurate depiction. The *Stop Vesterhav Syd* group paid for their own visualisation, which, in contrast to the EIA report, showed the windfarm as being much more visible and distinct when viewed from the shore. The opposition groups argued that the EIA report's visualisation did not precisely represent the final placement of the wind turbines (as decided by Vattenfall). The Complaint Tribunal upheld this argument, stating that the EIA report had not shown the actual construction of the windfarm sufficiently accurately. Consequently, the *Stop Vesterhav Syd* group was able to successfully

challenge the EIA report, with the result that the Energy Agency had to conduct another assessment, particularly with respect to the visualisation of the exact location of the wind turbines. Indeed, most of the private responses to the second public hearing from 2020 focused on the location of the windfarm and the aesthetic changes to the landscape (Energy Agency, 2020).

Whilst several private actors commented on the visualisation of the windfarm and questioned its accuracy as shown in the public hearing document, the Energy Agency defended this, stating that the images showing the wind turbines were all computer generated (i.e., were merely 'illustrative') and that they are not a legal requirement in the EIA (Energy Agency, 2020: 20). Importantly, after the publication of the second EIA report in December 2020, the *Stop Vesterhav Syd* group challenged the revised EIA by sending a complaint to the Energy Complaint Tribunal, attempting to halt the project completely (Foreningen Stop VHS, 2021). Again, the complaint procedure was used to impede the construction of the windfarms, with the intention that the project would be shelved completely.

The discursive strategy used by the opposition groups, especially the second homeowners' group, involved lobbying both local and national politicians, including the then minister for Energy, Climate and Utilities, Lars Christian Lilleholt (2015–2019), who was attentive to their complaints (interview 3, 2019). This lobbying behaviour politicised what would normally be a technical tendering policy procedure. Moreover, as one stakeholder (interview 4, 2019) bemoaned, national parliamentarians were not accustomed to receiving so many complaints about wind-turbines, primarily because usually local municipalities are responsible for onshore windfarms and that is where opposition often surfaces. Recently, some local politicians have voiced concerns about the strong opposition to onshore wind-turbines and the negative impact the opposition potentially could have on achieving the 2030 climate goals (Danish Radio, 2021). Crucially, however, the different governments and the national politicians would not revoke the 2012 energy agreement. As indicated earlier in this article, both the general public and political parties showed their commitment to mitigating climate change in the 2019 general election, popularly known as the 'climate election' (Møller Hansen & Stubager, 2021). Overall, the goals of nature conservation and advancing an energy transition are likely to continue to come into conflict as more renewable energy projects are proposed.

In short, our evidence reveals decision-making that oscillates between 'technical' and 'political' ideas, a process played out via both coordinative and communicative discourses (as shown in Table 1), with institutional structures emerging and being codified during the policy-making that in turn shape the ability of competing actors and ideas to influence policy (and vice versa).

5 | DISCUSSION

In this article, we present empirical evidence relating to Danish renewable energy policy and policymaking (specifically wind energy), examined via the *Vesterhav Syd* nearshore windfarm project and the associated tendering mechanism. Our analysis is underpinned by

concepts drawn from DI literature and one of its refinements (i.e., ideational power). Now, we scrutinise that data in relation to the three types of ideational powers identified by Carstensen and Schmidt (2016) and locate these findings in the context of other empirical studies concerning renewable energy projects and broader discourses about (low/zero carbon) energy transition.

Using concepts arising from DI (Schmidt, 2002, 2008, 2010, 2014, 2017; Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004) concerning the *set(s) of ideas* in play, the *interactive discursive processes*, and the types of discourse (*coordinative* and/or *communicative*), our evidence suggests that major infrastructure projects such as the construction of nearshore windfarms (such as the *Vesterhav Syd* nearshore windfarm), often reflect 'grand political ideas' that draw on both political and technical discourses, oscillating between the two types as in this case. The technical discourses (conducted among government agencies and businesses involved in the public tendering procedures for the project) take the form of *coordinative discourses* (Schmidt, 2008) tend to be confined to the political elites (Fitch-Roy, 2016). By contrast, public discourses extend to a wider group of actors, including local groups (businesses, residents and municipalities) who participate in public hearings. These forums are often more 'political' and equate to a type of *communicative discourse* (Schmidt, 2008). With respect to the *Vesterhav Syd* nearshore windfarm we observe these patterns of interaction played out: we see both coordinative and communicative discourses deployed with varying degrees of impact and success.

When we focus more closely on the ideas that were promoted and by whom, we find that several actors, specifically politicians, public authorities and business organisations supported the construction of the *Vesterhav Syd* nearshore windfarm. However, these actors appear to have differing (if overlapping) motivations. In our case study, both the external stakeholders and the Energy Agency shared the normative idea that wind power is 'good' and energy transition is an important political target. Clearly, Danish public bodies support the building of nearshore windfarms such as *Vesterhav Syd* because they see them as playing an essential role in meeting the country's broader energy and climate policy objectives. By contrast, wind energy businesses such as Vattenfall and Ørsted appear to be more incentivised by the financial rewards that may accrue from the construction of a windfarm. Overall, Danish business associations and energy companies espouse the normative idea of 'green transition' and renewable energies, especially as 'green energy technology' is an important export for these companies (Dyrhaug, 2021).

By contrast, local communities and a range of homeowners oppose the development of windfarms, wanting to prevent construction, emphasising the importance of nature conservation, and citing the potential threat to wildlife and damage to the aesthetics of the locality. Such groups and individuals not only dispute some of the ideas advanced by public bodies and business but also take issue with the policy process itself. But, as demonstrated by the *Vesterhav Syd* case, ultimately, opposition groups such as '*Stop Vesterhav Syd*' may only have a limited impact. In this case they succeeded in stalling the development of the windfarm at great financial cost to Vattenfall. However, ultimately, they were not able to prevent its construction:



their ideas failed to win the ‘battle of ideas’ played out during the policymaking process. In summary, as the competing actors and their rival ideas vied for dominance, their interactions crystallised into institutional arrangements that favoured the elites (i.e., government and large businesses) to the disadvantage of the less powerful local opposition groups.

Evidently, protest against local renewable energy infrastructure projects is not uncommon and described elsewhere in academic literature. Similar or parallel findings to our own have been published: see for example, Jürges et al. (Jürges et al., 2018, 386–7) whose research examines a case study of windfarm projects (in forests) in the USA and Germany, revealing how local groups protest against such windfarm projects, arguing for the need to achieve environmental benefits and reduce environmental harm. By contrast, Bidwell (2023) shows how non-residents’ values and acceptance of a nearshore windfarm in the United States (Block Island, New York) changed over time as construction progressed, and support became stronger. Strikingly, Bidwell (2023) contends that nearshore windfarms can become tourist destinations in their own right, changing the ways in which a locality can attract visitors. This evidence indicates that ideas and beliefs are not static: they can change over time as dominating ideas take hold in a local community, reflecting the *power in ideas*.

Returning to our specific research questions (derived from Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016), the following patterns can be discerned in our case study data. As regards, *power through ideas*, the ideas advanced by ‘Stop Vesterhav Syd’ as part of their campaign against the windfarm failed to convince other actors. The protesters’ efforts to advance the normative idea of ‘unspoiled nature’ were overridden by those of the more powerful actors such as the government, civil servants, and energy sector during the technocratic stage of the decision-making. The latter’s normative and cognitive beliefs that the energy transition (with its sought-after phasing-out of fossil fuel) necessitates investment in renewable energy (for achieving national and EU climate objectives) prevailed. Given the top-down decision to construct the nearshore windfarm and the overwhelming support for climate change in the general population (Møller Hansen & Stubager, 2021), it is not surprising that the opposition groups were unable to successfully challenge or change the policy decision. The opposition group’s success was limited to stalling the planning process and delaying construction.

As regards *power over ideas* and the use of the policy-making processes to impose ideas, those of the public bodies and private actors triumphed over those of some of the local community and homeowner groups. Clearly, the ability of protesters to influence planned renewable energy infrastructure projects varies: some are able to stop a project whilst others, such as the second homeowners in this case, can merely postpone the construction phase by contesting the administrative procedure. Indeed, as Szarka’s (2004) comparative study of windfarms in Denmark, the United Kingdom and France shows,

“...the anti-wind movement no longer dismissed climate change discourse. Campaigners tacitly acknowledge its hegemony but redirect it in a way that allows them to

accuse government of policy errors and wasting public funds” (Szarka, 2004; 326).

The protest groups associated with the *Vesterhav Syd* windfarm case were only able to exert *power over ideas* by pointing towards bureaucratic errors in the administrative procedures conducted by the public authorities.

As far as *power in ideas* is concerned, the hegemonic ideas of energy transition and climate change prevailed. In other words, the hegemony of the existing ‘decarbonisation’ and ‘climate change’ ideas were not successfully challenged nor swept aside by alternative ideas such as ‘nature conservation’ and the ‘protection of wildlife’. Our data suggests that the ability of local groups, who protest against local renewable energy projects (as in the *Vesterhav Syd* case), to exercise *power in ideas* and challenge the hegemonic communicative discourse concerning energy transition is becoming increasingly difficult owing to the mounting strength of discourses about the need to reduce fossil fuel dependency. Crucially, such discourses have become more potent since the start of global energy crises in 2021. Energy supply emergencies and rapidly rising prices (especially in the EU), for example as caused by the impact of the war in Ukraine, have created opportunities for the EU to press ahead with the implementation of the European Green Deal (Fairbrass & Vasilakos, 2019). For example, the *REpowerEU* proposal to reduce reliance on imported fossil fuels and diversify energy supply (von Homeyer et al., 2022) has found greater traction.

In sum, the gap between local and global communicative discourses is reduced as *power in ideas*, here represented by the notion of ‘energy transition’, increasingly gains more hegemony not only in Denmark but throughout the EU as national governments respond to the energy crises. Indeed, the Danish government’s response to the recent energy crisis has been to increase investments in renewable energies (e.g., windfarms and energy islands), thereby accelerating moves towards meeting the 2030 energy and climate objectives (Danish government, 2022). This begs the question of how local communities will respond now (and in the future) to new renewable energy infrastructure projects and whether the energy crises, especially the associated high energy prices, will change local residents’ responses.

Overall, our case has demonstrated that it is difficult for local protest groups to exert much ideational power once more powerful actors such as the Danish government and political parties in parliament have decided to initiate a new infrastructure project. This illustrates the ways in which ideas can become codified. The emerging institutional configurations fashion the ability of rival ideas to affect policy (and vice versa). In short, the ideas advocated by the protest groups are unable to displace established discourses (or institutions): instead, they are confined to using the institutional arrangements to merely stall the process with limited effect on the overall dominant discourse.

Returning to the ideational beliefs concerning climate change, almost all actors in our case, regardless of their opinions about the specific project, agree that climate change is ‘real’ and that it is important

to ‘do something’, but as the case also shows they fundamentally differ on what should be done thereby creating a tension between energy transition, nature aesthetics and nature conservation (Johansen, 2019). In short, climate change and energy transition have different meanings for different actors and provoke different responses.

6 | CONCLUSIONS

Some caution is needed in drawing conclusions. Our case study, the *Vesterhav Syd* windfarm, is not characteristic of offshore wind projects in Denmark. Rather, it is more akin to onshore windfarm projects, where local residents will protest against wind turbines (and similarly, solar panels). However, preliminary research concerning parallel developments in the UK (but not reported in this article) reveal similar patterns: an analogous set of actors employing similar ideas and using similar types of discourse and methods have emerged in response to offshore windfarm developments around the UK with comparable outcomes.

Recall that in Denmark, onshore windfarms tend not to be politically determined by the Danish national government. Instead, typically they are bottom-up projects often initiated by local entrepreneurs, making it easier for local groups to protest and stop the development of renewable energy projects. However, the 2020 Danish climate law now demands political action to achieve a zero-carbon economy by 2050. This, in turn, appears to have made a top-down process more likely (and impactful) as it necessitates greater investment in renewable energies such as windfarms and solar panels by public and private actors. Such developments plainly do affect the aesthetics of the local landscapes and, therefore, are more likely to face local resistance but it is opposition that will probably be relatively impotent in the face of more powerful (elite) actors.

This article makes an important contribution to our knowledge about and understanding of the relationships between the professional-technical experts (i.e., the civil servants and businesses) and the political actors involved (i.e., Ministers, lower ranked politicians and local protest groups) who seek to influence Danish nearshore wind energy policy. Using the *Vesterhav Syd* nearshore windfarm case, we reveal that Danish wind energy policymaking involves a wide range of actors who compete for dominance over the policy agenda, and who seek to determine the content and direction of the policy. Our findings show that as these actors interact with one another, they view to secure support for their ideas, simultaneously attempting to eliminate or undermine rival ideas. In other words, ideas and discourse (discursive processes) combine to create (new and changing) institutions: ideas become codified in the form of institutions as they interact with one another, influencing and moulding each other. Crucially, we find that grassroots activism (protests) can play a role in shaping both local and national public renewable energy policy, but that this power tends to have a limited impact in determining policy ideas, being restricted to stalling the policy process. Accordingly, one of the chief lessons arising from our research is that as the climate change agenda becomes ever more weighty, policymakers will have to find (more) effective ways to

engage with all stakeholders, including local protest groups, in order to avoid delays in meeting climate objectives.

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST STATEMENT

The authors report there are no competing interests to declare.

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ Nearshore windfarms tend to be located between 4 and 10 km from the coast and are visible from land, whereas offshore windfarms are typically further out in the sea and are not always observable from the shore. Like onshore windfarms, local people living close to nearshore windfarms may well oppose the development, adopting a ‘not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) response.
- ² Danish governments are either minority governments with support from some political parties or coalition governments. Most big political agreements are made with the opposition, this binds these parties to the agreement beyond the next election, thereby enabling long term political stability in a parliamentary system with many political parties.
- ³ The law established a target of 70% emission reduction (based on 1990) by 2030 and a carbon-neutral society by 2050 (both targets aligned to EU policy objectives).
- ⁴ Crucially, Carstensen and Schmidt (2016) distinguish ideational power from other types of power such as ‘compulsory’, ‘structural’ and ‘institutional’ power.
- ⁵ The energy complaint tribunal is the highest authority for complaint concerning decisions made by other public authorities like the Energy Agency, the Danish utility regulator, Energinet (the energy infrastructure provider), and municipalities.
- ⁶ *Stop Vesterhav Syd* was formed by Nørre Lyngvig Camping, Michael K. Andersen-Stormodden—owner of the area for the southern cable connection, the second homeowners at Holmslands klit association, Lars Schwartz—owner of the area for the northern cable connection, Søndervig residence association and Søndervig Centerforening.
- ⁷ Strikingly, it was the group’s chairperson, a retired national politician Jens Kirk, who was very vocal in the local media.

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APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interview 1: The Danish Energy Agency, October 2019.

Interview 2: The Danish Ministry for Climate, Energy and Utilities, September 2019.

Interview 3: The Danish Ministry for Climate, Energy and Utilities, September 2019.

Interview 4: Trade Association A, September 2019.

Interview 5: Trade Association B, August 2019.

Interview 6: Energy Company A, September 2019.

Interview 7: Energy Company B, October 2019.

Interview 8: Local Business, September 2019.

Interview 9: Second Home-owner Association, August 2019.