The Unconscious War: Literature, Psychoanalysis, and Citizenship, 1939-45

by

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Abstract

The Unconscious War examines the role of psychoanalysis in the cultural and literary history of the Second World War. This thesis suggests that psychoanalysis stretched its disciplinary boundaries in wartime, when analysts began to examine the psychology of the social-democratic citizen, the origins of morality, co-operation and empathy, and (conversely) aggression, delinquency, and disobedience. War also saw the increasing institutionalisation of psychoanalysis, with analysts offering childcare advice on the BBC, opening nurseries, and addressing specific problems posed by the tumultuous war environment. As the practice became more and more involved in social and political life, literary discussions about war-citizenry and social responsibility also began to adopt psychoanalytic language and tropes. Just as analysts examined the theoretical distinction between the 'private' and 'public' self, writers explored war citizenry through the language of the unconscious—of desire, emotion, and fantasy. Drawing from a range of writers and intellectuals, including Melanie Klein, Elizabeth Bowen, Donald W. Winnicott, Naomi Mitchison, and the organisers of Mass-Observation, I suggest that psychoanalysis became useful for exploring, celebrating, and interrogating contemporary notions of statehood and national identity. For instance, Bowen explores the uncanny and discomforting nature of social-democratic citizenship, the Mass-Observation organisers attempt to find evidence of a unifying social unconscious, Winnicott casts complex psychoanalytic knowledge in an everyday sound on the BBC, and Klein's phantasy-oriented theories collapse the distinction between 'self' and 'society' altogether. This thesis thus works to deepen our understanding of the social history of psychoanalysis and its influence on works of late modernist literature.

Table of Contents

List of Illustrations

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INTRODUCTION

During the Second World War, writers in British culture increasingly turned to psychoanalysis, not because it promised to deliver eternal truths about the human mind, but rather as a means of interrogating new forms of citizenship elaborated by the wartime state. This study examines the relationship between psychoanalysis and literature at this moment, when a language of mind and consciousness became intertwined with discussions of statehood and national identity. Drawing from a range of writers and intellectuals, including Melanie Klein, Elizabeth Bowen, Donald W. Winnicott, and Naomi Mitchison, I argue that we can find psychoanalysis in contemporaneous discussions (fictional and non-fictional) about the individual and their relation to society, about the distinction between the private and public self. In *Civilisation and Its Discontents* (1929), Freud writes that 'it seems certain that we do not feel comfortable in our present-day civilization'; in social life, he argues, the individual remains always in a state of disquiet—citizenship is a fraying rope we tie between ourselves and others that is always on the verge of snapping.[1] But Freud's rather cynical understanding of the ever-precarious social relationship does not represent the full story of psychoanalysis and its dealings with civilisation.[2] This thesis proposes that the Second World War initiated a newly 'social' psychoanalysis, where the interpersonal relationship was seen not only as a space of aggression and conflict, but as the origin of citizenly cooperation, morality, love, and compassion. This was also a moment when the literary representation of psychoanalysis shifted; for the writers I look at in this thesis, the value of psychoanalysis lies in its ability to speak to the capability (or incapability) of the self to act as a 'good' or productive citizen, to be a functioning member of a society at war.

At the centre of this study is the figure of the 'war-citizen'—hardy and responsible, resilient and self-sacrificing. The Second World War was a collective political experience, one that relied on far-reaching, national significations. Throughout the war, domestic propaganda worked to unite the population under a singular national identity and, as a result, to increase civilian dedication to the war effort. As Sonya O. Rose argues, the 'idea that the British were one people fighting a people's war dominated popular culture' during wartime, when

[1] Sigmund Freud, *Civilisation and Its Discontents* (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1961), p. 41.
[2] In this thesis I treat 'citizenship' as a cultural and ideological category, which, I suggest, finds expression in legal and political systems. As well as describing the legal membership of the individual to their national identity, 'citizenship' more generally describes the relationship between self and society (or, in Freud's terms, 'civilisation').

citizenship came to mean the 'voluntary fulfilment of obligations', as well as a 'willingness to contribute to the welfare of the community'.[3] As such, propaganda posters called for citizens to take an active role in the war machine. Posters called for women to 'come into the factories' or 'keep the farms going', others campaigned for national service by appealing to citizenly qualities of conscientiousness and reliability: 'Air raid warden wanted', a poster held in the Imperial War Museum declares, 'a responsible job for responsible men'.[4] This thesis addresses how the ideal characteristics of the 'war-citizen'—responsibility, reliability, hardiness—are explored in psychoanalytic and literary writing during the Second World War.

However, as I explore in this introduction, the concept of 'war-citizenship' held its own ambiguities and contradictions. The war-citizen is responsible yet dependent, family-oriented yet socially-conscious, self-sacrificing yet autonomous. They operate as part of a 'collective', and yet they must be self-sustaining individuals, dedicated to personal as much as social progression. The 'war-citizen', then, speaks to a complex historical relationship between the self and society, when the wartime state seemed to be dedicated to both the collective and the individual. This figure was, in many ways, a precursor to the citizen of post-war welfare-era Britain, who had access to public services 'from cradle to the grave' but, nevertheless, was responsible for the wellbeing and maintenance of their own family unit.[5] Psychoanalytic and literary explorations of this relationship between self and society seem to orbit around the figure of the 'war-citizen', who sits somewhere between individuality and collectivity. Essentially, these explorations focus on how the individual develops a 'national identity' and whether feelings of social connectedness are organic to the human condition. It is to this question, in particular, that psychoanalysis can speak.

Psychoanalysis has long provided literary critics with a framework for understanding the affects and effects of trauma, the horrors of the abject, the presence of the surreal or the uncanny, and the hidden forces operating underneath writing itself. But this thesis does not advocate for the revival of Freudian readings of literature, nor does it undergo a strictly psychoanalytic methodology. Rather, I am interested in positioning authors, intellectuals, texts

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[3] Sonya O. Rose, *Which People's War?: National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 20-21.

[4] 'Women of Britain – Come into the Factories', Poster, The Imperial War Museum, Art.IWM PST 3645. Accessed online at < https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/11141> [accessed 9th July 2021]; 'Join the Women's Land Army', Poster, The Imperial War Museum, Art.IWM PST 16608. Accessed online at < https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/33506> [Accessed 9th July 2021]; 'Air Raid Wardens Wanted – ARP', The Imperial War Museum, Art.IWM PST 13880. Accessed online at < https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/11141> [Accessed 9th July 2021].

[5] I will go on to discuss this more fully in chapter one, where narratives of social reconstruction after the war often required the (re)instatement of 'good' family living.

and projects in a social and intellectual history. In my readings of novels, broadcasts, diaries, pamphlets and essays, I look to contextualise contemporary discussions of inner life within a wider history of psychoanalysis and its applications. The writers and intellectuals I examine all have one thing in common: they grapple with psychoanalysis and its potential purposes, and most especially with the question of how theories about phantasy and inner life might speak to sociality and culture. I am not only concerned with those who embrace this newly social form of psychoanalysis. This thesis also explores reactions of discomfort, hesitation, or resistance. For some, the very idea that theories about the mysterious unconscious should be employed for social purposes is difficult to swallow. I am interested in these ambivalent reactions, where the straightforward application of psychoanalysis to the social realm is troubled or problematised. This thesis does not endeavour to provide a comprehensive history of British psychoanalysis or its effect on wartime culture. Rather, it collects responses to a changing configuration between individuals and the cultures that they live in, and is particularly interested in the appearance of psychoanalysis (and its more colloquial manifestations) in these responses.

What follows is necessarily selective: I examine just a handful of texts written during the Second World War, and I do not address all literary experimentations with psychoanalysis and its social forms in this period. I am particularly interested in writing that is already 'social' through its proximity to public and political institutions and organisations. For instance, I examine broadcasts produced by writers on the wartime BBC, as well as responses to the social organisation Mass-Observation, which had links to the wartime state. The authors and texts I look at do not only respond to the conditions of war, then, but also to the changing values of the institutions they are written and performed under. As such, they explore what kind of literary (and psychoanalytic) expression such institutions allow. Additionally, while I discuss writers in Britain, it is important to note that not all of them are British—Melanie Klein was Austrian, Anna Freud arrived in Britain just as war was beginning, and Naomi Mitchison is much more interested in 'Scottishness' than she is 'Britishness'. Nevertheless, all of the writers in this thesis use psychoanalysis to think about national identity and statehood, and do so in the context of changing social energies in wartime and postwar Britain.

The Unconscious War works at the intersection of modernist studies, psychoanalytic theory, and social history in order to propose a new way of reading the literatures and writings of the Second World War. This thesis notes how the preoccupations of literary authors and communities intersected with those of psychoanalysts, and examines how theories of mind and consciousness filtered to the public and literary imagination. It expands our understanding of

Second World War society and culture, and contemplates how contemporary questions of statehood and national identity united writers, intellectuals, scientists, and psychoanalysts.

This introduction will proceed in four parts. The first part will examine the character and the qualities of the 'war-citizen' in contemporary discourse, and will also note its emergence from pre-war liberal thought. The second part will look at psychoanalytic narratives and debates about citizenship, national identity and statehood, and will suggest that there was a concerted move amongst analysts in the 1930s and 40s towards examining psychological investments in society, or with the concept of the citizen. The third part suggests that we can read this same preoccupation with citizenship in late modernist literatures, where literary experimentation was bound up with examining the relationship between personal and social consciousness. In the fourth, I map the structure of the thesis and explain the preoccupations of each chapter.

0.1 The Invention of the Social Citizen

This thesis approaches the category of the 'citizen' by examining how the term appeared in social and cultural discourse in Britain throughout the late 1930s and 1940s. I do not fix the term 'citizen' with a singular definition, but rather see it as an elastic notion, capable of shifting in meaning depending on its historical contexts and uses. I track how citizenship is explored in literature, on the radio, in social policy, and in contemporary psychoanalytic theory. Throughout my readings of this material, I argue that the figure of the citizen is important to colloquial figurations of the self at the mid-century.

To understand the role of the 'citizen' in this period, we should first consider the changing relationship between the individual and the state in early twentieth-century Britain. The creation of the Welfare State in the immediate post-war years provided British people with expansive 'social rights', where the state now played active role in the social fulfilment of its citizens. But Labour's 1948 welfare policies were not unprecedented. Rather, ideas about the need for widespread social welfare can be traced back to Liberal political thought at the turn of the century. Historians have worked to situate the policies of 1948 in a wider political history. Mary Evans and David Morgan, for instance, argue that the social policies implemented by early twentieth-century Liberal governments laid the groundwork for the founding of the Welfare State. They note that the 'principal architects' of postwar society 'were not radical

socialists but – in the case of Beveridge and Keynes – Liberals by party affiliation and belief'.[6] Though not as expansive as those put forward in the 1940s, pre-war Liberal governments implemented new, interventionist policies that allowed the state to intervene in the lives of citizens in newfound ways in education, health, and work-life. Perhaps the most notable of these policies was David Lloyd George's 1911 'National Insurance Act', which provided working people across Britain with health insurance relating to sickness and unemployment.[7] The Act signalled a turn away from Victorian-era *laissez-faire* social economics, from the figuration of the individual as completely separate from the society that they live in. This strain of Liberal thought, which favoured state intervention in the lives of citizens, is often called 'New Liberalism', a term adopted by economists like L. T. Hobhouse and J. A. Hobson to argue for a new reciprocity between the state and its citizens.[8] Derek Heater notes that the 'New Liberals' pictured 'a mutual relationship of citizenly and state responsibilities' where 'the citizen has the duty, and should accept the duty, of contributing to the smooth and just operation of society' and 'the state has the duty of providing the minimal conditions for individuals to exercise their civic functions'.[9] In this formulation, the state and the citizen must both be *active* agents, with a shared aim to create a productive, successful society. The National Insurance Act laid out these expectations explicitly: employees, as well as employers and the state, were mandated to make contributions to their health insurance. As such, New Liberalism relied on personal, as well as state, responsibility.

Tracing New Liberal thought back the work of the Idealist philosophers of the mid-nineteenth century, Heater argues that liberal notions of citizenship were preoccupied with 'the individual's character', a character who assumed 'the moral qualities of self-reliance and responsibility grounded in the rational and intellectual capacities'.[10] Pre-war New Liberal policies, then, were predicated on the image of the functional citizen, on the personal qualities of reliability and rationality. While New Liberals celebrated a newly-reciprocal relationship between the state and its citizens, this model of active, practical citizenship also garnered *self-*

[6] Mary Evans and David Morgan, *The Battle for Britain: Citizenship and Ideology in the Second World War* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 7.
[7] For a fuller discussion about Liberal governments and their influence on post-war welfare policies, including an overview of the 1911 National Insurance Act, see: George R. Boyer, *The Winding Road to the Welfare State* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2019).
[8] The need to improve living and working conditions perhaps arose from what Andrew Vincent calls an 'economic crisis at the close of the nineteenth century', where wage stagnation, over-production and worsening working conditions resulted in 'trade depressions'. See: Andrew Vincent, 'The New Liberalism in Britain 1880-1914', *American Journal of Politics and History,* 36 (1990), 388-405 (393-93).
[9] Derek Heater, *Citizenship in Britain: A History* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), p. 166.
[10] Heater, p. 166.

responsibility—citizens were responsible for governing themselves, for making 'good' ethical decisions, and for acting lawfully. Hobhouse, for example, argued that each individual must keep in mind a 'common good', that which is 'effectively shared by all members of the society to which we attribute it, as something entering into and enriching their personal lives'.[11] For Hobhouse, the 'common good' refers to society as a space where individuals can mutually develop into moral individuals, but, essentially, it is up to the *individual* to ensure this 'self-realisation'.[12] For Hobhouse, society is a productive space for individuals to undergo self-progression, and citizenship denotes the membership that makes such progression possible. Heater argues that the New Liberal concept of the 'citizen' influenced the making of the Welfare State in the 1940s (many of the New Liberal thinkers, he notes, later became architects of British social democracy). For Heater, the policies of 1948 saw the New Liberal model of the active citizen meet its 'conclusion'.[13] But Heater also contends that the fulfilment of 'social citizenship' was tied to the experience of war; social citizenry, he writes, 'emerged out of the expectations aroused by the Second World War and the planning engaged in during its course'.[14] Though we can root the origins of Welfare-era citizenship in New Liberal thought at the turn of the century, it was war that motivated the implementation of widespread social security.

0.2 The War Citizen

If the meaning of the 'citizen' was shifting in the early decades of the twentieth century, the Second World War accelerated this transformation. In war, social citizenship became a necessity of national survival. War relies on nationhood as a marker of identity—the state is dependent on (and works to foster) personal investments in national identity for the willing participation and support of its citizens. As such, wartime state propaganda hoped to inspire collective action and to unify the British populace in a shared struggle against Axis powers in Europe. In wartime social and political discourse, the figure of the 'citizen' became associated with the social rights and responsibilities of individuals in Britain. As Sonya O. Rose notes, the term 'citizen' featured in a variety of wartime discussions and debates (she lists, for example,

[11] L. T. Hobhouse, 'Industry and State', in *Sociology and Philosophy,* ed. by Morris Ginsberg (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 209-16 (p. 213).
[12] L. T. Hobhouse, *Rational Good* (London: Routledge, 2020), p. 96.
[13] Derek Heater, *Citizenship in Britain: A History* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), p. 176.
[14] Heater, p. 176.

discussions about 'the nature of wartime service and issues of equity', 'arguments about the need for youth groups, debates about reconstruction' and even 'admonitions about sexual propriety').[15] Rose argues that in wartime, citizenship gained a new patriotic significance, where it could be used effectively in aid of morale-boosting and encouraging participation in the war effort. 'Citizenship during this period', she argues, 'was predominantly understood to be a moral or ethical practice that was deemed crucial for national survival', where 'membership in the British nation during wartime […] meant the transformation of private individuals into public, civic participants'.[16] Indeed, the experience of war on the home front blurred the boundary between 'domestic' and 'public' living: as Nazi bombers flew over British towns and cities, houses and gardens suddenly became battle-sites.[17] Even when sitting at home, civilians assumed the role of the 'war-citizen'; they were urged to black out their windows, ration their bathwater, or take shelter on the sudden blaring of an air-raid siren.[18] They were encouraged to bring the war into the home, to tune their wireless to the weekly war news, and sometimes to provide shelter to the evacuated children of bombed cities. Additionally, the presence of the wireless in the home and the city-wide blaring of air-raid sirens provided individuals with an immediate sonic connection to their fellow citizens; the aural environment of war inscribed citizens into a national community, where the public was united behind a great national purpose.

According to government officials, war conditions justified state involvement in the private lives of individuals: war was a state of emergency, a time for widespread personal sacrifice. A 1941 Ministry of Information pamphlet proclaimed that, in the face of war, the people of Britain have 'thrown aside [their] privileges', that the 'British working men and women have willingly surrendered cherished rights' in aid of the war effort.[19] This language of self-sacrifice permeated wartime discourse; duties and obligations to the community were deemed more important than individual, private affairs. Social and cultural institutions, too, played an important role in the propagandistic encouragement of 'good' citizenry, with Clement Attlee encouraging the public to support the government's newfound control on a BBC radio broadcast in 1940: 'There is no distinction between rich and poor, between worker

[15] Sonya O. Rose, *Which People's War?: National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 14.
[16] Sonya O. Rose, *Which People's War?,* p. 20.
[17] Lindsey German and John Rees, *A People's History of London* (London: Verso, 2012), p. 213.
[18] See: Mike Brown and Carol Harris, *The Wartime House: Home Life in Wartime Britain 1939-1945* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2001).
[19] *Factories of Freedom* (Ministry of Information, 1942), pp. 7;11. LBY K. 8212, The Imperial War Museum Archive, London, United Kingdom.

and employer; between man and woman; the services and property of all must be at the disposal of the Government for the common task.'[20] In a 1942 memorandum, Ernest Bevin, the wartime Minister for Labour, argued that war-citizenry often meant accepting a 'personal responsibility for achieving victory'. This meant willingly abandoning 'personal interests' and adopting a 'fiery enthusiasm' and 'sense of urgency'. The public, he argued, must accept this 'necessary part of the war effort'.[21] War-citizenship set out the individual's responsibilities towards the welfare of the entire community, but it also presupposed a voluntary fulfilment of these responsibilities, where all members take an active and participatory role towards the protection and betterment of society.

This thesis is preoccupied with the character of the 'good' war-citizen, the individual who takes their social responsibility seriously, and who fulfils the personal and ethical obligations set out by the wartime government. In a 1942 article called 'A Study of War Attitudes', published in *The British Journal of Medical Psychology,* the psychologist P. E. Vernon argued that 'it is justifiable […] to speak of a *good citizenship* type, which tends to do voluntary war work, to save, to carry gas-masks, and make air-raid and first-aid preparations […] Good citizens not only do more but also know more about the war, and they listen to and retain their interest in the wireless more than average'.[22] It is clear that Vernon's characterisation of the 'good' citizen is based on their willingness to contribute to the war effort without complaint or hesitation. Further on in the article, he explains that the 'good' citizen would never fail to send in a ration book application and would maintain a 'cheerful and wishful' attitude and an optimism about the success of the British military effort and postwar reconstruction.[23] Harold L. Smith argues that wartime discourse can be characterised by the promotion of 'social solidarity' and 'social idealism'; the idea, first of all, that citizens are part of a new collective and, secondly, that in engaging in the war effort they are working in defence of democracy, or of the successful future of Britain and Britishness.[24] Sonya O. Rose, too, argues that the term 'good citizenship' was used to denote the 'voluntary fulfilment of obligations and willingness to contribute to the welfare of the community'. Rose notes that in

[20] Clement Attlee, "Each Must Make His Contribution," BBC Home Service, 22 May 1940. quoted in Janice Ho, *Nation And Citizenship In The Twentieth-Century British Novel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 86.
[21] Ernest Bevin, 'Industrial morale' (memorandum), quoted in Harold L. Smith, *Britain in the Second World War: A Social History* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 46.
[22] P. E. Vernon, 'A Study of War Attitudes', *The British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 14 (1942), 271-291 (284).
[23] Vernon, p. 290.
[24] Harold L. Smith, *Britain in the Second World War: A Social History* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 10; p. 46.

public discourse, the 'good' citizen was often juxtaposed to the 'bad citizen', the citizen who was apathetic or resistant to the war-effort, the delinquent, or even the careless talker.[25] Citizenship at this moment relied on moral judgments where the feelings, desires, emotions, and actions of individuals determined their value to the wider community. This thesis examines explorations of 'good' citizenship in literary and psychoanalytic texts, but it also looks at how writers and analysts explore misbehaviour and resistance—the failure to fulfil citizenly obligations.

This figure of the 'good' war-citizen was also key to the development of the social democratic state in the years after the war had ended. Postwar legislation maintained the importance of self-responsibility, and the Welfare State codified state involvement in the personal lives of citizens. According to Janice Ho, this reciprocal state-citizen relationship was central to Britain's postwar reconstruction; she writes that 'the expansion of wartime state powers facilitated the postwar social state by strengthening the institutional apparatuses for intervening into citizens' lives and routinizing such interventions'.[26] Indeed, much of the legislation that would characterize the postwar welfare state was drawn up during the war. William Beveridge's *Social Insurance and Allied Services* (otherwise known as the 'Beveridge Report') was published in November 1942 and the ensuing 'White Paper', which detailed plans for a National Health Service, was published in 1944 by the wartime coalition government. As well as this, The Education Act of 1944 set out postwar policies for compulsory secondary-level education. In the first pages of the act, we can see an assumption that there would be continuity between 'wartime' and 'postwar' citizenship; it states that purpose of education in postwar Britain would be to 'contribute towards the spiritual, moral, mental, and physical development of the community'. Each school, it continued, would enable '[young people] to develop their various aptitudes and capacities and will prepare them for the responsibilities of citizenship.[27] Wartime had inscribed a language of personal responsibility and self-sacrifice, a language that would linger in postwar legislation.

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[25] Rose, *Which People's War?,* p. 20. Also see: Sonya O. Rose, 'Cultural analysis and moral discourses: episodes, continuities and transformations', in *Beyond the cultural turn,* ed. by Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (Berkeley, CA, 1999), pp. 217–39. Jo Fox also discusses the figure of the 'careless talker' in the propaganda of the Second World War, who embodies the government's anxieties about bad citizenry and misbehaviour. See: Jo Fox, 'Careless Talk: Tensions within British Domestic Propaganda during the Second World War', *Journal of British Studies,* 51 (2012), 936-966.

[26] Janice Ho, *Nation and Citizenship in the Twentieth-Century British Novel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 86.

[27] Education Act 1944 (British Government, 1944). Accessed online at <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1944/31/pdfs/ukpga_19440031_en.pdf> [Accessed 9th July 2021], pp. 30-31.

In a 1949 paper called 'Citizenship and Social Class', one of the most influential contemporary thinkers on citizenship, T. H. Marshall, compared contemporary citizenship in the era of the Welfare State to that under nineteenth century industrial capitalism. At the beginning of the industrial revolution, Marshall argues, citizenship was determined on the economic status of the individual—citizens were free 'to earn, to save, to buy property or to rent a house, and to enjoy whatever political rights were attached to these economic achievements'.[28] To be a citizen only meant participating in a capitalist wage-labour system. But, he argues, the rights associated with citizenship transformed drastically as a result of the significant social upheaval during the Second World War. The implementation of welfare policies led to a newly expansive formulation of citizenship and now included the right of any civilian to participate in the country's social and cultural heritage; citizenship now invoked social, as well as economic and political, rights. But Marshall also recognised that the relationship between the state and the citizen was not one-sided, and argued that welfare-era Britain looked to ensure the 'progressive fulfilment of its own ideas' in promoting the idea of an individual's 'duty' toward their nation to be responsible, participate, and adopt socially acceptable morals and values:

> The duty to improve and civilise oneself is therefore a social duty, and not merely a personal one, because the social health of a society depends upon the civilisation of its members. And a community that enforces this duty has begun to realise that its culture is an organic unity and its civilisation a national heritage.[29]

Citizenship, in this formation, is 'a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community', a community that operates on an 'image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed'.[30] 'Citizenship

[28] T. H. Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', in *Citizenship and Social Class,* ed. by T. H. Marshall and Tom Bottomore (London: Pluto, 1992) pp. 8-49 (p. 16).
[29] Marshall, p. 16.
[30] Marshall, p. 28. Michael Sullivan notes that Marshall's optimistic conception that the founding of the welfare state constituted the 'final achievement of full citizen rights' that would 'lead to the abolition of poverty' is 'difficult to take', especially in the context of 'the late twentieth century', and after a concerted effort by the Thatcherite government to dismantle state provisions. See: Michael Sullivan, *The Development of the British Welfare State* (London: Prentice Hall, 1996), p. x. While he is right that Marshall's vision was a perhaps too-optimistic conception of a progressive historical trajectory of citizenship, it is important to note that Marshall's study shows a certain self-awareness, an acknowledgment that future governments might regress to less-expansive modes of citizenship. In his essay, Marshall writes that 'this phase [of social democratic citizenship] will not continue indefinitely'. He writes that there might be 'profound and

and Social Class' sets out the idea that statehood is formed of ethical obligations, where individuals have a moral duty to individually uphold the values of the British state, even in the privacy of their own homes. Indeed, Ho notes that what is particularly notable about the essay is Marshall's 'ability to see the social and political spheres as contiguous and not separate domains', an attitude that she roots 'in a postwar historical moment during which governmental management of the social sphere was formally codified, thus providing the infrastructural ground on which Marshall's theories were based'[31]. For Marshall, expansive social rights come with expansive social duties. His essay allows us to see how wartime and post-war modes of citizenship collapsed the distinction between home life and public life—the individual is always a citizen; their every action contributes to (or impedes) the 'social health' of the nation as a whole.

Throughout this thesis, I understand citizenship at the mid-century as formed of contradictions. Though it constituted a new ideology of mutuality and collectivity, the values inscribed in war regurgitated a liberal idea about the importance of individual responsibility, the need to act (morally and ethically) as a 'good' citizen. In chapter one, I discuss how this responsibility manifested in a duty to maintain the family unit—the family came to signify the return of stability in a period of social fracture, and was seen as a space where children could learn how to be independent and self-sustaining. As Gal Gerson notes in an article that explores the link between psychological theory and prevailing notions of citizenship, 'developing perceptions of the mind' in welfare-era Britain took note of 'both the separateness of individuals and of the ways in which they interact and depend on each other'.[32] Gerson notes the importance of the 'family' at this time, and argues that welfare ideology was itself modelled on a familial relationship, with the state acting in a newly maternalistic role towards its citizens, seen in what he calls 'maternal attention' – a duty of care. '[R]ights within the welfare state', Gerson argues, 'acknowledge the individual's interest in company and extend maternal attention into legislation and politics. At the same time, rights function, like maternal attention, as an educative tool given by society in order to mould the individual into autonomy'.[33] According to Gerson, policies of care acted as an essential prerequisite for the development of self-sustaining, responsible individuals, no longer in need of any state support or guidance. The

disturbing effects which would be produced by any hasty attempt to reverse the present and recent trends.' Marshall, p. 49.

[31] Ho, p. 61.

[32] Gal Gerson, 'Liberalism, Sociability, and Object Relations Theory', *The European Legacy,* 10 (2005), 423.

[33] Gerson, 'Liberalism', p. 427.

goal of social democracy is to foster the individual's capability for independence, all the while binding citizens to a 'community' towards which they feel responsible. Gerson tracks 'liberalist social democracy', the driving force behind wartime and welfare state legislation, back to the 'advanced liberalism' of the early twentieth-century.[34] Social democracy must be understood as an offshoot of liberalism, he argues, as both social forms are 'organized around the vision of the healthy, self-confident individual who is interested in the presence and good of others', a personality that is 'a product of the social environment, particularly the close family'.[35] Citizenship in mid-century Britain thus relied on the symbiosis of seemingly opposed qualities; citizens needed to be independent and dependent, individualistic and social.[36] The success of society seemed to rely on the character of the 'good citizen', who is preoccupied with their self-progression.

Governmental institutions consequently looked for new connections between desire, emotion and national belonging; after all, the success of the 'active' citizen relied on their psychological wellbeing, their ability to act in a rational and functional way. As Nikolas Rose notes, the shift in the British state towards 'social democracy' allowed 'experts' to interact in new 'social assemblages', where they could 'elaborate new bodies of mundane, practical social knowledge of the habits, conducts, capacities, dreams and desires of citizens, and of their errors, deviations, inconstancies and pathologies'.[37] Rose also notes that this institutional dialogue also occurred 'with individuals themselves', where the same 'experts' could address the citizen's 'daily worries and decisions over investment, child rearing, factory organization or diet', and offer 'to teach them the techniques by which they might manage better, earn more, bring up healthier or happier children and much more besides'.[38] For instance, Eva Hubback's *The Population of Britain* (1947), argued that the figure of the citizen should feature in every educative setting, that 'hygiene, family relationships, child management and the domestic crafts' should be taught according to a set of 'good', productive qualities and morals.[39] The expansive interventionist policies of the wartime government always had this model citizen as

[34] Gerson, 'Liberalism', p. 423.
[35] Gerson, 'Liberalism', p. 425.
[36] For a longer overview of the changing role of the citizen in wartime, see Derek Heater, *Citizenship in Britain: A History* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006) and David Morgan and Mary Evans, *The Battle for Britain: Citizenship and Ideology in the Second World War* (London: Routledge, 1993).
[37] Nikolas Rose, *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 132.
[38] Nikolas Rose, p. 132.
[39] Eva Hubback, *The Population of Britain* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1947), p. 186.

its goal: the citizen who took care of their health, worked diligently towards the 'war effort', and, perhaps most importantly, inspired the same values in their families and peers.

The changes in citizenship in wartime and postwar Britain, then, can be best examined by paying attention to a newly tenuous distinction between private and public life. Though maintaining this distinction was still important, in this period the 'citizen' was active in *both* private and public realms. Indeed, their actions in private and domestic spaces seemed to determine whether or not they fit into the model of the 'good' citizen. Good citizenry was defined in terms of personal traits and characteristics—on the beneficial effects of rationality, optimism, hardiness and, above all, a deep sense of morality. As Janice Ho puts it, this 'ideal of character expands the scope of citizenship from the world of public action into the space of personal behavior and internal life'.[40] This thesis thinks about how these changes in citizenship coincided with a shift in psychoanalytic theory. In the late 1930s and 1940s, psychoanalysts turned their attention towards examining morality and ethics, towards thinking about the real-world implications of violent desires, and the importance of love, reparation and kindness. I read these theories as part of the cultural discourse surrounding the figure of the 'citizen', and examine how psychoanalysis at this time was also preoccupied with the importance of self-responsibility and rationality.

0.3 Psychoanalysis and the Citizen

Why might psychoanalysis be an important tool for examining the 'citizen'? What might it say about how individuals relate to their friends, peers, colleagues and communities? How can narratives about the mind and its development speak to how and why we reach towards a feeling of 'national belonging'? As Stephen Frosh points out, 'to be a citizen, one not only has to formally belong somewhere; one has also to feel that this belonging is real'.[41] Frosh argues that a dialogue about citizenship must not just 'describe abstract patterns of rights and responsibilities'. To do so, he writes, would be 'falling into the destructive trap of imposing a virtual world onto real human subjects'. It must, rather, 'engage with the specificity of the relationships between subjects and their communities, with all the wilful, unexpected, irrational and sometimes even uncanny phenomena so produced'. Frosh recognises that such an examination must recognise the 'existence of a sphere of emotional activity connected to, but

[40] Ho, p. 95.
[41] Stephen Frosh, 'Psychoanalysis, Identity and Citizenship', in *Culture and Citizenship,* ed. by Nick Stevenson (London: SAGE, 2001), pp. 62-73 (p. 62).

always out of step with, external events'—that is, 'the actual world of real human subjects'.[42] For Frosh, psychoanalysis is a perfect tool for examining the individual's real investments in society, it can help us to understand why the term 'citizenship' is and has been so important, or it can offer an explanation for the need to emotionally 'invest' in the world around us. Crucially, Frosh argues that psychoanalysis provides something important to social analysis. He calls this the 'excess', the factor that the individual's 'fears and desires' play in social life.[43] Frosh writes that 'social explanations fail to give an account of what drives people on, when no objective, rational interests are perceivable'. Psychoanalysis, however, might help us understand 'the desperate and rigid self-defining of whole communities in terms of "nationality"' and the 'clinging onto some notion of identity bearing small relation to any real attribute of the individual or group'.[44] These phenomena (which we might call the work of the unconscious) are an important aspect of 'citizenship' and its emotional and affective resonances.

For many analysts, theoretical questions about the relationship between the 'self' and 'society' addressed how individual desires are contained by the social world. In *Civilisation and its Discontents*, for example, Sigmund Freud argues that civilisation emerged as a systemic way to control individual desires and passions. Freud argues that the individual is always in an antagonistic relationship with the social world. The very presence of human desire and instinct (the instincts for sex, aggression, death) mean that 'civilized society is perpetually threatened with disintegration', as these 'instinctual passions are stronger than reasonable interests'. Civilisation, Freud argues, 'has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's aggressive instincts'. [45] This can be seen in the setting of rules and laws, or in efforts to unite individuals through methods of identification (appeals, perhaps, to a shared national identity). Civilisation, then, requires an essential compromise between the individual's desires and what is socially acceptable or beneficial. Freud writes that we must understand civilisation as being formed 'for protection and out of fear'—civilisation, he writes, serves 'the rule of the reality principle as it works to curb unconscious impulses'.[46] Civilisation is an essential 'regressive agency'; though, as a structure, it protects the individual from their own and others' destructive and primitive impulses, its rules and regulations limit and repress the ego so that 'social happiness' is never truly possible.

[42] Frosh, p. 62.
[43] Frosh, pp. 63-64.
[44] Frosh, p. 63.
[45] Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents,* pp. 58-9.
[46] Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents,* p. 52.

According to Freud there are aspects of the self that are resistant to civilisation—society is an alienating and oppressive structure, it threatens to contain the uncontainable. If we take Freud's view, the term 'citizenship' expresses a relationship that is always precarious and on the brink of collapse. As long as the individual remains in the social group they are in a state of discomfort. Freud roots this discomfort in knowledge about the impossibility of satisfaction under strict social regulations. This is a result of the fact that the Freudian ego always sees the 'outside', objective world as an object of its desire. In moving past primary narcissism, the ego has the unsettling realisation that any satisfaction of desire must always come from the outside world and the objects in it, an 'other' that the ego cannot control. Freud understands any social and political conflict (or 'discontent') as a natural consequence of this discomfort, the chafing that occurs when the outside world restricts the realisation of the individual's deepest desires.

Freud's understanding of citizenship is profoundly pessimistic. For Freud, humans are by nature individualistic—communities and societies are merely groupings of atomistic individuals who are, ultimately, only interested in the fulfilment of their own desires. But not all psychoanalysts at the mid-century saw the individual as intrinsically opposed to society. This thesis is concerned with analysts from the object-relations tradition, who argued that ego-development can only occur as a consequence of interpersonal relationships. For analysts like Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott and Joan Riviere, the first interaction between the mother and the child determines the individual's later social relationships, their actions and feelings towards their wider communities. Zaretsky describes the 'shift' in the history of psychoanalysis towards 'object-relations' as evidence that a new emphasis was being placed on examining 'concrete obligations to others.' Object relations, he argues, formed a new, 'ethically responsible' and relational ego, whose 'main terrain […] was the terrain of personal life, a terrain of friends colleagues and relations, not the narrowly conceived family anymore'.[47] Stephen Frosh, too, argues that for object-relations psychoanalysts there is a 'social contract' that 'arises out of the interpersonal encounter between self and other' and 'which under suitable conditions allows the subject to feel confident about the ongoing support and predictability to be found in the world'.[48] The object-relational model of the social relationship suggests that there is a way to engage in society that fosters individual satisfaction, personal actualisation, or the development of a strong moral compass. For many object relations psychoanalysts, it is the relationship between the 'self' and the 'other' that initiates the capability for empathy and

[47] Eli Zaretsky, 'Melanie Klein and the Emergence of Modern Personal Life', in *Reading Melanie Klein,* ed. by John Phillips and Lyndsey Stonebridge (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 32-50 (p. 34).
[48] Frosh, p. 65.

compassion. Society is a space where we understand and work through our destructive desires and impulses. For these analysts, morality is a consequence of the acknowledgment that there is a 'social' world.

Object-relational psychoanalysis stresses the importance of community. As I will argue in chapter one, it makes possible the notion that the individual is able to learn and care about the needs and desires of others. In the object-relational model, then, the process of becoming a 'citizen' is worthwhile, even valuable. The recognition that there is a social world causes the individual to transfer an innate capability for compassion and love to actual objects—to their family, first, but then to their friends, fellow citizens, and wider communities. Frosh argues that these theories suggest that the 'opposition between individual and society no longer looks unavoidable; rather, its existence is a sign of the failure to provide a suitable foundation for a positive social identity'.[49] If Freud argues that the individual's desire, directed outwards, threatens to destroy the social world and the people in it, object-relations psychoanalysts (while sometimes acknowledging the individual's potential for this destruction) argue there is a way to engage with civilisation that is healthy and productive. In this thesis, I examine how this story about the shift in psychoanalysis towards a new, interpersonal school of thought is also a story about the shift in its application and uses—its integration into social analysis.

At this point, I would like to turn back to Nikolas Rose's argument that social democracy allowed 'experts' to interact in new 'social assemblages'. The first purpose of this thesis is to examine how psychoanalysis became associated with this kind of social expertise. To what extent, I ask, did psychoanalysis become entwined with a specific historical effort to understand and uphold a particular image of the participatory, responsible citizen? As Rose notes, experts would 'ally themselves with political authorities, focusing upon their problems and problematizing new issues, translating political concerns about economic productivity, innovation, industrial unrest, social stability, law and order, normality and pathology and so forth into the vocabulary of management, accounting, medicine, social science and psychology'.[50] In the first chapter, I consider what Rose calls the 'double alliance' between the institution of psychoanalysis and the British state. [51] I argue that British psychoanalysts at the mid-century turned their attention to examining (and sometimes interrogating) this figure of the 'citizen'. In this formation, psychoanalysis could speak to the origins of unwanted social behaviour, the importance of cohesion and security, and even to the psychological aftereffects

[49] Frosh, pp. 65-66.
[50] Nikolas Rose, p. 132.
[51] Nikolas Rose, p. 132.

of mass bombing and child evacuation. We might refer to this as the political instrumentalisation of psychoanalysis, as its own imperatives gradually aligned to the imperatives of governmental and state institutions.

In *The War Inside* (2013), Michal Shapira notes that in wartime, psychoanalysis had 'very real implications for public debate and social policy'. Shapira argues that British psychoanalysis was 'bound to the rationale of a specific understanding of social democracy in a period of war and peace'.[52] The newfound focus on concrete familial relationships meant that psychoanalysis could now offer 'influential answers to questions regarding the possibility of harmonious and cooperative human relations in the twentieth century'. For Shapira, psychoanalysis thus 'helped make the modern democratic self in Britain'—its role was to understand (and at times to promote) the democratic capabilities of the 'self'.[53] In the first chapter, I examine how the 'value' of psychoanalysis during the Second World War was its ability to speak to the idea that the individual is (or should be) on a productive and upward path towards social and self-betterment. In particular, I look at how child analysts were thinking about the development of morality and empathy. Throughout, I argue that narratives about the mind and its ethical development were implicitly engaging with the figure of the social democratic citizen.

It is helpful, here, to draw a distinction between politicisation and political instrumentalisation. The instrumentalisation of psychoanalysis does not mean it was newly 'political', only that psychoanalysis seemed to move away from an idea of the 'self' as being atomistic and innately separated from the society that it exists in. The desire that psychoanalysis be 'apolitical' or 'transhistorical' must also been seen as a 'political position', in that it seemed to demonstrate an anxiety that personal life be kept separate from political life. In particular, Freudian psychoanalysis replicates the liberal idea that there is an important separation between private and public spaces, between the 'self' and the 'citizen'. I suggest that psychoanalytic thought in the late 1930s and '40s reimagined the inside/outside dichotomy, rethinking the individual's relationship to other people. This changed the politics of psychoanalysis; it shifted the emphasis, positioning social problems and questions more firmly in the psychoanalytic remit. This shift coincided with the move towards social democracy in Britain that came to a head during the Second World War, which in turn perpetuated the idea that there is a singular, shared national heritage that binds individuals together as citizens. It is important, then, to

[52] Michal Shapira, *The War Inside* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 5.
[53] Shapira, pp. 5-6.

examine how ideas of statehood and national identity emerge in contemporary psychoanalytic writings.

This thesis looks at the various ways analysts, writers and intellectuals came to relate and associate psychoanalytic ideas and methods with the 'social', where it was useful for examining the distinction between the 'private' and 'public' self. In particular, I examine how psychoanalysis became a socially-oriented endeavour, a 'science' that might say something useful about the future of the British citizen. Throughout this thesis, I pay attention to a range of responses to the new role of psychoanalysis, both within the psychoanalytic institution and outside of it. While I begin this discussion with an analysis of psychoanalytic texts, I also examine contemporary radio programmes, literature, and material produced by the sociological organisation Mass-Observation. The various experimentations with psychoanalysis that we can see in these texts demonstrate how writers and intellectuals at the mid-century apprehended the possibility of politicising psychoanalysis, of using it to diagnose or treat social, as well as personal, problems. Beyond that, they also tell us something pertinent about colloquial understandings of the 'self' and interiority at the mid-century.

0.4 Modernism, Psychoanalysis, and Public Life

In her diary entries of December 1939, Virginia Woolf turned to psychoanalysis in hope that it might help her to understand what happens in the 'outside' world, to look for signs of a relationship between the 'self' and wider civilisation. She writes: 'Began reading Freud last night; to enlarge the circumference. to give my brain a wider scope: to make it objective; to get outside. Thus defeat the shrinkage of age. Always take on new things. Break the rhythm &c'. But this, she finds, is a difficult and disappointing endeavour; in a following diary entry she writes:

> Freud is upsetting: reducing one to whirlpool; & I daresay truly. If we're all instinct, the unconscious, what's all this about civilisation, the whole man, freedom, &c? His savagery against God good. The falseness of loving one's neighbours. The conscience as a censor. Hate … but I'm too mixed.[54]

[54] Virginia Woolf, *The Diary of Virginia Woolf*, ed. by Anne Olivier Bell and Andrew McNeillie, 5 vols (London: Hogarth Press, 1989), V, p. 248.

Woolf looks to Freud to avoid the 'shrinkage of age' (perhaps, here, referring to her feelings of isolation in the later years of her life). Woolf's hope is that psychoanalysis might provide some kind of social rather than personal knowledge; it might speak beyond the self and its vicissitudes. For Woolf, Freud's writings seem to only offer a tale about the innateness of human aggression and the inevitability of its expression in social conflict. Disheartened, Woolf wonders if this is all that psychoanalysis can say about 'civilisation', 'loving one's neighbours' and the 'conscience'. Paolo Bugliani argues that Freud acts, for Woolf, as a kind of 'wartime tutelary deity, summoned by an increasingly anxious and eventually utterly desperate Woolf in order to help sort out the chaos into which the war was beginning to plunge western civilisation and human consciousnesses'.[55] Woolf's diary entry provides a small insight into the part that psychoanalysis played for authors in the late modernist period and in the context of widespread social unrest in the late 1930s and 40s. As I explore, the announcement of war (for the second time in less than thirty years spurred a desire to look for psychoanalytic narratives that spoke about the interconnectedness of man, and that perhaps offered some explanation for the recurrence of violence or even some hope for future social reconciliation.

The early twentieth century saw the broadening of psychoanalysis' public. Shortly after the First World War, psychoanalysis was reaching beyond scientific and medical communities and expanding its sphere of influence to writers, artists and intellectuals. In literary communities, psychoanalysis provided a language of instinct, sexual desire and unconscious thought that was both appealing and fascinating, with many modernist writers incorporating theories about the unconscious in their narrative forms and strategies. Some years after writing her novel *To the Lighthouse* (1927), for example, Virginia Woolf explained: 'I did for myself what psycho-analysts do for their patients. I expressed some very long felt and deeply felt emotion. And in expressing it I explained it and then laid it to rest'.[56] In particular, psychoanalysis became extremely popular within the Bloomsbury group of writers and was incorporated into its credo for experimentation. Lyndsey Stonebridge has described the affinities between the analyst and the modernist author as a 'joint venture in forging a new language for the unconscious'; both the modernist author and the psychoanalyst draw to attention the ways that writing exorcises something of the 'self', something previously hidden

[55] Paolo Bugliani, '"Reduced to a Whirlpool": War, Sigmund Freud and Virginia Woolf's (Late) Non-fiction' *E-rea*, 17 (2020), < https://doi.org/10.4000/erea.9654> [accessed 9th July 2021], (para. 19 of 32).
[56] Virginia Woolf, *The Diary of Virginia Woolf*, ed. by Anne Olivier Bell and Andrew McNeillie, 5 vols (London: Hogarth Press, 1989), III, p. 208.

or obscured.[57] Stonebridge also argues that this affinity can also be understood in political terms—psychoanalysis was particularly important or useful to the modernists because it offered a conception of the individual as at war with civilisation and its identifications: 'Bloomsbury not only popularized psychoanalysis for the British intelligentsia, but also domesticated it by incorporating psychoanalysis within its over-arching liberal ethos of the "free and civilized individual"'.[58] This point is also supported by Eli Zaretsky, who notes that modernist literature connected psychoanalytic theories about sexuality 'with new ideas concerning the priority of personal life, the belief that life could be lived as something separate and individual, without a connection in depth to society'.[59] For both Stonebridge and Zaretsky, modernism and psychoanalysis share a certain liberal approach to the 'self' at the beginning of the twentieth century.

However, Woolf's diary suggests that the relationship between the modernist and the psychoanalyst shifted on the outbreak of war. Here, we see a modernist interest in psychoanalytic narratives that involve the individual in social networks, that do not read the self as insular but connected to the world around them. I situate the literatures in this thesis within a larger, historical relationship between literature and psychoanalysis, a relationship that began with the dual venture to locate and express unconscious thoughts and forces in the early modernist period. I understand a continuing literary preoccupation with psychoanalytic thought as a sign of modernism's lingering presence in the literatures of the Second World War. Thus, it is necessary to track the simultaneous development of psychoanalysis and modernism—by doing so, we might get an impression of their interconnectedness, or find within them a similar story about the need to adapt an existing ethos of the insular and individualistic 'self'.

The question about whether we can use the term 'modernism' to describe the literatures of the Second World War has received much critical attention. For some critics, modernism is specifically linked to the 1910s, '20s and '30s, with the onset of global war indicating its demise.[60] For Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, for example, 'somewhere around the end of the 1930s, Modernism, like much else of the world it was born in, came to a kind of

[57] Lyndsey Stonebridge, 'Psychoanalysis and Literature', in *The Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century English Literature,* ed. by Laura Marcus and Peter Nicholls (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 269-285 (p. 269).
[58] Lyndsey Stonebridge, *The Destructive Element: British Psychoanalysis and Modernism* (London: Macmillan, 1998), p. 10.
[59] Eli Zaretsky, 'Psychoanalysis and Postmodernism', *American Literary History,* 8 (1996), 154-169 (156).
[60] Tyrus Miller, for example, situates 'late' modernism in the 1920s and 1930s. See: Tyrus Miller, *Late Modernism: Politics, Fiction, and the Arts between the World Wars* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

end'.[61] As Thomas S. Davis notes 'critical interest often drifts towards [modernism's] origins or its dazzling high points in the teens and twenties'.[62] Wartime scholars have subsequently attempted to understand whether literatures produced in the period 1939-45 can feasibly be called modernist. Why do war literatures suggest the end of modernism, and what, exactly, is the difference between these texts and earlier modernist literatures? Over the last twenty years, the very category of 'modernism' and what it includes/excludes has come under increasing critical scrutiny.[63] In the following paragraphs I examine just a few of these critical interventions in the context of Second World War literary studies.

Gill Plain argues that attempting to understand the literatures of the Second World War as 'modernist' is a distracting and perhaps even damaging endeavour. For Plain, 'a significant reason for the disappearance of these years' in the modernist canon 'is the long-ingrained practice of reading the twentieth-century through the formal trajectory of modernism'.[64] If we read these literatures as 'modernist', we risk 'obliterating the very diverse voices and literary developments of the period'.[65] But perhaps it is still important to consider the term 'modernism' *because* of this diversity. If we consider the literatures of the Second World War as 'modernist', they might speak to the evolution of modernism; how it shifted, adapted, changed in response to historical conditions at the mid-century. This might also challenge our held assumptions about modernism and its philosophies. Marina MacKay argues that 'too often modernism has been seen as an alienated, alienating form of creative production'—critics must account for public and political modernisms, modernisms that engage with the idea that we are ultimately connected to the societies we live in.[66]

Though I do not make any bold claims about the beginning and ending of the modernist period, this thesis proposes that war coincided with an important shift in modernism's historical

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[61] Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, *Modernism: A Guide to European Literature 1890-1930*, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 12.
[62] Thomas S. Davis, 'Late Modernism: British Literature at Midcentury', *Literature Compass*, 9 (2012), 326–337 (326).
[63] For a comprehensive overview of these debates, see Douglas Mao and Rebecca L. Walkowitz. 'The New Modernist Studies', *PMLA*, 123 (2008), 737–748. In particular, Mao and Walkowitz argue that modernist studies has expanded its critical have included 'recent considerations of modernism in relation to mass-media' (746). See, also: Rachel Potter, *Modernist Literature* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012). Marjorie Perloff, too, argues that modernist aesthetics have lingered, in some form, in the literature of the late twentieth century and twenty-first century. Perloff argues contemporary literature remains in modernism's afterlife. See: Marjorie Perloff, *21st-Century Modernism: The "New" Poetics* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002).
[64] Gill Plain, *Literature of the 1940s: War, Postwar, Peace* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press), p. 5.
[65] Plain, p. 5.
[66] Marina MacKay, *Modernism and World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 20-21.

trajectory. The term 'late modernism' (used by a variety of critics including Tyrus Miller, Leo Mellor, Jed Esty, Thomas S. Davis and, most recently, Lauren Addington), is useful in this sense, as it suggests the presence of a transition or transformation in the history of modernism—when the 'early' became the 'late'. Davis argues that the term 'late modernism' allows us to 'retell with greater precision the story of modernism's rise, mutation, and dogged persistence over the course of the long 20th century'.[67] MacKay, too, notes that this label of 'lateness' enables readings of 'modernism through its longer outcomes rather than its notional origins'.[68] MacKay in particular stresses the importance of understanding the work of British 'late' modernists in the context of the Second World War. In doing so, 'late modernism gives the critical and affective content to the story of England's cultural remaking'.[69] Though she notes that idea that war 'revolutionised British society' is simplistic, as it does not quite capture the long evolution and complexity of social democratic thought, MacKay argues that 'war was experienced in nothing short of revolutionary terms'. This discourse, in turn, 'forced modernist writers belatedly to scrutinise their own social and political investments'.[70] MacKay argues that we must understand the literatures of 1939-45 as produced in the context of widespread social fracture and an ensuing national discourse about British endurance and regeneration. She explores how literature in this period became consequently preoccupied with the concept of national identity. For 'metropolitan modernists', she notes, nationalism became 'the most pressing issue of all'.[71] MacKay argues that as Britain became increasingly isolated from the rest of Europe, and as the threat of Nazi invasion lingered on its shores, writers confronted or examined 'the political and moral claims of insular nationality'.[72] Her book explores varied literary responses to a rapidly changing relationship between the modernist writer and the state in this 'late modernist' period.

I do not hope to understand the impact the war had on the entirety of the modernist movement. In fact, the writers in this thesis do not, at first glance, consistently abide by a strict 'modernist' style (chapter two looks at Naomi Mitchison, who spent the war writing a realist novel about the aftermath of the 1745 Jacobite rebellion). However, this does not mean that modernism is absent from these texts. Throughout this thesis, I am concerned with the ways that discussions of 'national identity' and British citizenship in these literatures were mediated

[67] Davis, 'Late Modernism: British Literature at Midcentury', pp. 326-27.
[68] MacKay, *Modernism and World War II,* p. 15.
[69] MacKay, *Modernism and World War II,* pp. 4-5.
[70] MacKay, *Modernism and World War II,* p. 4.
[71] MacKay, *Modernism and World War II,* p. 2.
[72] MacKay, *Modernism and World War II,* p. 2.

through psychoanalysis. I propose that this interest in psychoanalysis is an essential link to modernism. This continuing literary interest in narratives about interior life, about the capabilities and ambivalences of the 'self', root the texts in this thesis to a wider modernist history. I propose that a conversation about psychoanalysis easily leads to one about modernism because of these interconnected concerns. Indeed, even if a text is in some ways 'realist', the presence of psychoanalysis points to underlying modernist preoccupations and energies.

In the field of Second World War literary studies, this relationship between 'late' modernism and psychoanalysis has taken many different forms. Gill Plain, for example, argues that wartime writers engaged with psychoanalytic concepts of desire and sexuality as part of an effort to break down the 'social and cultural constraints that delimit the possibilities of [desire's] expression'. Plain notes that war changed the way psychoanalysis was used and explored in literature: '[Psychoanalysis's] […] language of psychosexual development was […] supplemented by another entirely understandable psychological motivation for the lifting of inhibitions'.[73] She argues that 'with death a likely outcome for servicemen and city-dwellers alike', writers explored the liberating feeling of expressing their deepest desires, sometimes in a 'damning indictment of the prescriptive forces of psychoanalysis' (more precisely, Freud's theories of sexuality).[74] While Plain's analysis of the relationship between the literatures of the Second World War and psychoanalysis is not extensive, her analysis can help us to understand how a psychological language of desire, want, and social restriction remained in the wartime imaginary. Adam Piette's *Imagination at War* (1995) also argues that the Blitz is explored through a language of desire and drive. Piette argues that poets such as David Gascoyne imagined that the burning landscape of London might release 'surreal destructive fantasies from the obscurity of our deeper desires'. For authors like Gascoyne, 'the London brain metaphor was too facile, too tempting, too deliciously violent to be resisted […] London was burning, and they rushed into print to show how much their sexual *néant* was burning them too'.[75] Piette and Plain argue that war provided a landscape onto which writers could map their deepest, personal desires and wants.

While Plain and Piette argue that wartime writers turned to Freudian theories of desire and sexuality in their depictions of bombed landscapes, Lyndsey Stonebridge examines how

[73] Plain, p. 76.
[74] Plain, p. 106.
[75] Adam Piette, *Imagination at War: British Fiction and Poetry 1939-1945* (London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 46.

late modernist writing engaged with a new generation of psychoanalytic thought. In *The Destructive Element* (1998), Stonebridge explores how we might find various elements of Kleinian thought and theory in works of modernism at the mid-century—mourning, anxiety, aggression and reparation can be traced, in one form or another, in the writing of Virginia Woolf, Adrian Stokes, Marion Milner and Stevie Smith. Stonebridge helps us to understand how the writers of late modernism engaged with psychoanalysis's own evolving history. For these writers, Kleinian psychoanalysis offers an 'energizing rhetorical and theoretical force' and seems to contribute to a 'growing knowledge of the intractable complicity between the destructive element within and cultural and social violence without'.[76] As she writes in her introduction: 'At a time when the European theatricals of psychic cruelty which so perturbed both psychoanalysts and writers are once more being played out, and at a moment in contemporary British culture when a politics of reparation (preserving the "good") seems to have acquired a curious new legitimacy', writers and analysts of the early part of the century fail to 'extricate themselves from their own cultural "Kismet"'.[77] The 'destructive element', the theory of emotional aggression and unconscious violence, is important to our understanding of late modernist literature and culture.[78]

Stonebridge's work is important to this thesis; first, she argues that there were important intersections between the British object-relations tradition and literary wartime tradition. Second, she explores how narratives about social anxiety during wartime are, by nature, related to psychoanalysis and its history. This thesis builds on this work by suggesting that this connection is also seen in coinciding literary and psychoanalytic preoccupations with the concept of citizenship during the Second World War—both authors and analysts attempt to understand the tricky and sometimes ambivalent relationship between the individual and their social world. What compromises or sacrifices, if any, does this relationship entail? Is the individual capable of empathy (in Woolf's words, 'loving one's neighbours')? Is there some inner, psychological force that forges social connections from the earliest moments of life, or are humans, as Freud thought, always at war with the idea of the 'other'? These were especially pertinent questions in the context of a rapidly changing state-citizen relationship.

[76] Stonebridge, *The Destructive Element,* p. 16.
[77] Stonebridge, *The Destructive Element,* p. 21.
[78] In her recent article 'Vaccies Go Home!', Maud Ellmann also connects Kleinian psychoanalytic theory to the literature of the Second World War. She examines the impact of the evacuation crisis on Klein's narratives of childhood delinquency and compares Klein's psychoanalysis to literary explorations of the child from the same period. See: Maud Ellmann, 'Vaccies Go Home!: Evacuation, Psychoanalysis and Fiction in World War II Britain', *Oxford Literary Review,* 38 (2016), 240-261.

There is no simple, unified response to these questions. Throughout this thesis, I show that encounters with the 'citizen' were diverse and sometimes contradictory in nature. For some, like Mitchison, the environment of war held a certain promise for social regeneration. For others, like Bowen, the new model of social citizenship and collapsing distinction between 'private' and 'public' life threatened the self's essential individuality. Even within the institution of psychoanalysis, analysts disagreed on exactly how the 'social' bond is formed in the early years of life—Melanie Klein's idea that humans have an innate capability for both empathy *and* sadism was at the centre of intense debate. We can also see more subtle responses to these questions in a willingness to engage with governmental or political institutions, where the writers and analysts in this thesis, to varying degrees, explore new social forms and medias.

The literatures in this thesis are often written under the influence of public and social institutions or organisations. They are social by their proximity to these institutions—they do not simply write about war, but negotiate the political imperatives of their own spaces of production. For example, chapter two examines the modernist broadcasts of Elizabeth Bowen, aired on the BBC Home Service in the early years of war. Chapter three explores the production of Naomi Mitchison's novel *The Bull Calves* (1947), which, I argue, emerged from her role as a panellist for the sociological organisation Mass-Observation (which also became affiliated with the state on the outbreak of war). The literatures studied in this thesis are not fully subordinate to the institutions that they are produced under. Rather, they have the capacity to bring institutional values into question and confront their political, and often propagandistic, imperatives. In her recent book *British Literature and Culture in Second World Wartime* (2020), Beryl Pong argues that, in a time inundated with propagandistic discourse, when 'the state discouraged non-fiction from articulating […] negative sentiments' about the experience of war (which, she notes, could be disorienting, traumatic, and often terrifying), 'the creative licences of fiction enabled the expression of a wider range of emotions and psychological states, including fear and dread, as well as suspicion and scepticism about the People's War'.[79] Building on this, I am interested in the ways that modernist texts pushed the boundary between 'fiction' and 'non-fiction' in order to tie their work to the context of wartime. For Bowen and Mitchison especially, the line between 'fiction' and 'non-fiction' becomes murky and complicated—both authors claim to be recreating history in their work, but these histories are interspersed with the supernatural, surreal, and strange. I suggest that both authors work in a

[79] Beryl Pong, *British Literature and Culture in Second World Wartime: For the Duration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 56.

liminal space between 'fiction' and 'non-fiction', between the 'literary' and the 'historical' text (for Bowen, this is the guise of the radio documentary, for Mitchison the family biography). This hybrid form allows each writer an immediate confrontation with the world outside, with forms of social living in wartime Britain.

My methodology works with a broad definition of the modernist text. In focusing on the dissemination of psychological ideas into popular culture, this thesis shifts emphasis away from examining classically 'literary' texts and, instead, enters into a dialogue with other art forms and non-literary discourses. I examine war diaries, essays in magazines, transcripts of radio broadcasts, and unpublished notes currently held in archives. With this multimedia approach I hope to capture the wide dissemination of psychoanalytic ideas in popular culture and discourse. This also might allow us to see the ways that psychoanalysis and modernism expanded past its private iterations, becoming newly public.

0.5 Chapter Structure

In the chapters that follow I trace the dissemination of psychoanalysis in popular and literary culture in the period 1939-45, paying attention to a variety of its theoretical and aesthetic manifestations. My central claim is that psychoanalysis and modernism, at this historical moment, are both in dialogue with a prevailing national discourse about social citizenship. This also meant that both practices assumed new, public forms. Subsequently, I argue that psychoanalysis becomes a means through which writers like Bowen and Mitchison negotiate their own relationship to a new kind of citizenry or selfhood proposed by the welfare state.

This thesis begins in the psychoanalytic clinic. The first chapter examines psychoanalytic theory and writing during the Second World War, which both *influenced* and *was influenced by* the development of social-democratic statehood. The story about psychoanalysis' social instrumentalisation starts many years before the war. I root the 'social' turn in psychoanalysis in its shift towards 'child analysis' during the early twentieth century. Graham Richards argues that the 1930s was filled with British psychoanalysts 'responding to political developments', and notes that attempts to popularise psychoanalysis 'were often aimed specifically at the child-rearing, child-guidance, market'.[80] Building on his idea, as well as those put forward by Eli Zaretsky, Michal Shapira, and Lyndsey Stonebridge, this chapter

[80] Graham Richards, 'Britain on the Couch: The Popularization of Psychoanalysis in Britain 1918 -1940', *Science in Context*, 13 (2000), 183–230 (205).

suggests that child analysis constituted a mode for thinking about the democratic subject, about the origins and development of collectivity, cooperation, morality and empathy. By examining how these qualities develop in childhood, analysts could think through the relationship between the self and wider society. On the outbreak of war, psychoanalysis' new social role became more explicit. The objects of psychoanalytic study were now the evacuee, the juvenile delinquent, and the unruly 'war-child'—all symbols of the success or failure of British morale and morality in a time of national crisis. In particular, I pay attention to the theoretical writings of Melanie Klein and Anna Freud, who both made crucial connections between the intimate life of the self, the private realm of the family, and the public life of the citizen.

But the integration of psychoanalysis into 'social' life was not smooth—rather, it was ridden with conflict and disagreement as psychoanalysts battled a war of their very own within the confines of the British Psychoanalytical Society. This chapter unravels the differences in Anna Freud and Melanie Klein's understanding of moral development in childhood (which was very much at the centre of such debates). In Anna Freud's conception the child harbours only a partly-developed superego and so must rely on authorities in the outside world to distinguish 'right' from 'wrong'. Here, the analyst becomes an authority figure, a representation of prevailing 'social' rules and norms. However, for Klein, the child is caught in perpetual moral ambivalence. From birth, she argues, the individual treads a fine line between love and hate, empathy and destruction. Her theory about the dual capability for love and hate undermines the democratic ego at the same time as it appears to shore it up; every 'moral' act is in constant danger of being disfigured by an urge to destroy. In this figuration, the analyst helps to reveal destructive tendencies in the hope that, by doing so, they will eventually diminish. As I will go on to explore, reading Klein and Freud can tell us about the alternative ways that analysts approached the problem of citizenship. I will examine how we might find the figure of the war-citizen in their writings, the individual who is empathetic, rational, and who takes responsibility for their own social betterment.

The second chapter moves to examining the diffusion of psychoanalytic ideas in the public sphere. To do so, I examine BBC radio programming and broadcasting during the war. As I propose at the beginning of this chapter, the BBC radio looked to create the impression of a shared and unified British identity at this historical moment—war saw the disbandment of regional broadcasting and, in its place, the instatement of a nationwide 'BBC Home Service'. As such, writers and intellectuals took to the BBC to discuss questions of nationhood and social identity, to celebrate, propagate, and even to bring into question the figure of the 'good' war-citizen. I map how personalities on the BBC gradually incorporated psychoanalytic ideas into

their broadcasts, and, in doing so, attempted to understand the psychological making of citizenry. This chapter is split into three sections, each corresponding to a different voice or personality. I begin with J. B. Priestley, host of the popular 'Postscripts' broadcasts. Priestley's broadcasts often celebrated an image of the hardy war-citizen, who willingly contributes to the war effort. At times, Priestley's broadcasts adopt what I call a 'vernacular psychology'; he uses a kind of pseudo-psychological language (speaking, for example, about 'deep hidden conflicts' or 'wishful thinking') in his promotions of the war-citizen. Though Priestley's broadcasts cannot tell us very much about psychoanalysis' presence on the radio per se, his broadcasts represent an attempt to find connections between private, psychological experience and public life. My discussion of Priestley sets the scene for the remainder of the chapter—here, we can see evidence of an existing conversation, an on-air dialogue, about the psychological capabilities of the 'citizen' in war.

In the second section, I examine how this existing conversation is tied explicitly to psychoanalytic theory in broadcasts by the analyst Donald W. Winnicott. In his broadcasts, Winnicott took on the role of an 'anonymous paediatrician' who offered advice to new mothers on subjects as wide as breastfeeding, maternal guilt, discipline, and even the baby's 'innate morality'. This section examines how Winnicott casts complex psychoanalytic ideas in an ordinary, colloquial register. I argue that Winnicott's 'everyday' sound demonstrates a contemporary, historical need for psychoanalysis to be demotic and familiar, to be socially relevant for teachers, nurses, child carers, and working mothers. I also discuss how Winnicott's popularising discourse connected psychoanalysis with the preservation of the 'social health' of the nation and its citizens; on his radio broadcasts, psychoanalysis operates socially. For Winnicott, the radio itself is a kind of 'transitional' device, a conduit between the self-sustaining and responsible individual and their wider community.

But this chapter also addresses alternate manifestations of psychoanalysis on the BBC: this time, psychoanalysis appears as something *un*familiar and abstract, and cannot be understood or conveyed with rational discourse, or appeals to the 'everyday'-ness of psychoanalytic knowledge. In the third section, I look at Elizabeth Bowen's BBC broadcasts, which are filled with the uncanny, with ghosts and strange apparitions. In these broadcasts, the presence of psychoanalysis troubles and subverts the BBC as a propagator of a new, democratic national identity. Using Freud's 'The Uncanny' (1919), I show that Bowen produces disconcerting confrontations between 'past' and 'present' British lives on-air. Her broadcasts become modernist encounters with the institution itself, and the imperatives towards which it turned on the outbreak of war. By ending with Bowen, we can see that psychoanalysis is not

only a tool for the promotion of social democracy, but also helps broadcasters to turn a critical eye inwards, to trouble and confront contemporaneous notions of citizenship.

In the third chapter I examine how the role of the citizen is explored in 'Mass-Observation'—a sociological, surrealist, and unmistakably psychoanalytic project which encouraged people across Britain to keep day and dream diaries, to record the minutiae of everyday life. By doing so, the organisers hoped to inspire self- and social-consciousness in their panellists. This chapter explores how Mass-Observation attempted to bring Freudian therapy into the social realm, so that 'writing-the-self' also meant 'writing-the-citizen'. For the organisers, the potential of psychoanalysis is its unique ability to reveal the underlying causes and effects of social relationships, as well as its therapeutic capability of improving these relations. This chapter begins by mapping the ways that Mass-Observation was socially instrumentalised; in wartime, I note, the organisation was commissioned to assess morale, or to find evidence of civilian anxiety. I assess how the organisation's hope to collect social information is mirrored in the material itself, with an eye on a collection of dreams. The dream archive is often a space where panellists confront the idea that the dream has a new, social role—that their personal, emotional lives must be understood in terms of the wider preoccupations of their communities. Through close readings of dreams held in the Mass-Observation archive, I suggest that the dream archive proffers a paradox, whereby the panellist's recognition that dreams are meant to serve an instrumental purpose actually prompts the self-reflexivity that Mass-Observation hoped to inspire. The dream archive shows evidence of critical thinking *about* citizenship, where panellists address, confront, or even challenge the idea that their dreams might say something pertinent about the typical experience of the British war-citizen. Mass-Observation's archives, then, provide examples of colloquial figurations of the self in war.

One such dream diarist was the writer Naomi Mitchison. Mitchison's dream diaries are, too, a space where she confronts the distinction between self and citizen. But Mitchison's response to Mass-Observation expands beyond the project itself. In the second half of this chapter, I propose that Mitchison's novel *The Bull Calves* (1947) is connected to her status as a Mass-Observation participant, and that we can see in it the desire to 'write-the-self' (and, by doing so, 'write-the-citizen'). In *The Bull Calves,* Mitchison narrates her family history (where most of the characters are her own ancestors) to examine wider questions about Scottish national identity. In many ways, the novel functions as a call to action: it implores Scottish people to find what binds them together and to unite in their efforts for a better future. But, notably, Mitchison's interest in psychoanalysis differs from Mass-Observation's; it is Jung, not

Freud, who can help her locate a shared cultural consciousness. Mitchison's attempts to find the 'social' in psychoanalysis results in her turning away from the Freudian tradition altogether. But Jungian psychoanalysis does not have all the answers; Mitchison's novel also stresses the dangers of erasing individuality and subjectivity, where female subjectivity sometimes resists assimilation into the 'whole'.

The thesis delineates a shift in the way psychoanalysis is explored and written about in Second World War Britain. For the writers I discuss here, psychoanalysis becomes useful for addressing social life, the nebulous boundary between the private self and the public citizen. For some, psychoanalysis reveals the tensions and problems in categories of national identity. For others it is a tool for inspiring commonality and solidarity, for finding what binds citizens together. In many ways, this is a thesis about the crisis of individuality in late modernism, when even psychoanalysis (which had once provided modernists with a way of writing about the mysteries of the autonomous 'self') must say something pertinent about society and common experience. In her diary, Virginia Woolf dwells in the difficulties of reading Freud at this historic moment. She looks for collectivity in a theory that seems to resist it. This thesis suggests that Woolf's diary entry is one part of a changing relationship between psychoanalysis and its 'outside' world, where theories of the mind became associated with the citizen—with empathy, personal responsibility, and the democratic self.

CHAPTER ONE

WARTIME PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE CHILD AS CITIZEN-IN-TRAINING

1.1 Introduction

In June 1940, as the threat of German invasion hung over Britain, the psychoanalyst Joan Riviere wrote a letter to her colleague Melanie Klein. In the letter, Riviere asks Klein whether psychoanalysis can help to explain the conflict sweeping across Europe. She encourages Klein to share her ideas on how this might be done:

> When the first official mention of invasion began, the possibility of our work all coming to an end seemed so near. I felt we should all have to keep it in our hearts, perhaps, as the only way to save it for the future. Also of course I was constantly thinking of the psychological causes of such terrible loss and destruction as may happen to mankind. So I had the idea of your telling me (and then a group of us) everything you think about these causes, so that all of us who can understand these things at all should share and know as much as possible, to help to preserve it.[1]

Riviere's letter is ridden with an anxiety that war might be the end of psychoanalysis. Under the threat of Nazi invasion, she writes, analysts should be thinking about the practice's potential legacy, and how to effectively 'save it for the future'. As such, Riviere imagines how psychoanalysis might be useful in a time of war—can it exceed its remit, move past the traditional private clinic and, instead, engage in wider social and political movements? Riviere's question, which proposes that psychoanalysis might have something interesting to say about war, brings forward the core question of this chapter: as war swept across Europe, did psychoanalysis gather a new social purpose?[2] To answer this, I examine how analysts

[1] Joan Riviere, 'Letter to Melanie Klein', in Melanie Klein Archives, Contemporary Medical Archives Centre at the Wellcome Institute of the History of Medicine, London, PP/KLE/C.95, p. 1.

[2] It is important to note, here, that Freud's responses to the First World War might be read as a precursor to the 'social turn' in psychoanalysis that I locate in the Second World War. As I mentioned in the thesis introduction, Freud's 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' addressed the problem posed by traumatised soldiers returning from the trenches. A decade later, in *Civilisation and its Discontents,* Freud examined the philosophical relationship between the individual and their social world.

engaged with wartime policies and intervened in conversations about the capabilities and responsibilities of the British citizen. I argue that war was a moment when psychoanalysis underwent a social turn—it could say useful and poignant things about the psychology of war citizens, the origins of delinquency and social unruliness, and, conversely, the human capability for compassion and empathy.

In war, many British psychoanalysts were preoccupied with examining childhood and family life—this, in turn, allowed the practice to become easily associated with the democratic aims of the British State. At the start of this chapter, I examine how the structure of the family was central to the formation of a new type of citizenship in wartime and postwar Britain. The family became a symbol for stability; a sign of the successful recovery of British society after the war. It also became an important site for the development of the healthy personality traits of the British citizen. A healthy and stable family would, in turn, produce healthy and stable children—children ready to assume their duties as conscientious, participatory members of society. But just as the well-behaved child became a symbol for the democratic capability of a new generation of citizens, figures like the unruly evacuee, the juvenile delinquent, and the traumatised war-child signified anxieties that war might cause irreversible damage to the populace of Britain; the trauma of war experience resulting, instead, in a generation of unruly, misbehaving public.

This chapter examines how psychoanalysts, too, contributed to a national dialogue about the capabilities of the citizen. For Eli Zaretsky, the shift of psychoanalytic attention towards real, concrete relationships emphasised the role of sociality for successful ego development. Psychoanalysts could now speak about a 'transfamilial sociality', where the dynamics of family life directly inform later social interactions. Indeed, for Zaretsky the integration of psychoanalysis into the welfare state (which 'began in England during the 1930s, and culminated during World War II') is rooted in a view of the ego as 'ethically responsible', 'not reflecting upon universal considerations, but rather involved in concrete obligations to others'.[3] Building on Zaretsky, this chapter suggests that child analysis was the perfect mode for thinking about the democratic subject at this historical moment: in the context of national turmoil, analysts turned to understanding the origins of co-operation, empathy and social feeling. Many psychoanalysts considered the role the practice might play in the war effort: it could, perhaps, support precarious families under the duress of war conditions, or even relieve

[3] Eli Zaretsky, 'Melanie Klein and the Emergence of Modern Personal Life', in *Reading Melanie Klein,* ed. by John Phillips and Lyndsey Stonebridge (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 32-50 (p. 36).

neurotic children of trauma and so allow for the healthy development of a new cohort of citizens.

But this history of the social turn in psychoanalysis is ridden with conflict. In wartime, the British Psychoanalytical Society was marked with professional disputes between the child analysts Melanie Klein and Anna Freud (and their followers). These disagreements centred on the ethics of child analysis, on the role the analyst plays in the clinic, and on their very different conceptions of the origin of morality in early life. Anna Freud stressed the importance of authorities in the child's social environment, who help the child to develop a moral compass and distinguish 'right' from 'wrong' (these authorities being parents, teachers, and sometimes even analysts themselves). Though Klein, too, was interested in the origin of morality, she theorised that from birth children have a rich and complex phantasy life. In her view, children naturally and independently develop a 'moral' sense. But Klein's 'morality' is precarious; it can, at any moment, be corrupted by the child's simultaneous desire for hate and destruction. In the second section of this chapter, I examine these conflicting ideas about ethical development in childhood, and suggest that they reveal Freud and Klein's respective relationships to a new, socially-oriented psychoanalysis. While Freud's theory of authority lends itself to institutional use, Klein's morally ambivalent child suggests a more complex relationship to the integration of psychoanalysis into the social world. Subsequently, I examine how Klein and Freud engaged with institutionalised forms of psychoanalysis in wartime Britain; while Freud attempted to make psychoanalysis useful to the war-effort and offered practical advice for Welfare-era social policies, Klein insisted on the historically unspecific nature of the child's internal conflicts.

The final section of this chapter examines Klein's writings about the Second World War: her reflections on the causes of conflict, on child evacuation, and on the imaginings of a war-obsessed child patient. Klein's wartime essays and case notes reveal her engagement with wider social and political problems and questions. In them, we find that Klein is not interested in the singularity of the current historical moment—no matter what rages on outside, the individual is always fighting a perpetual 'inside war' between the love and hate drives. All social action and behaviour has its root in this phantasised war—in fact, the war 'outside' is often a symbolic double for her patients' own psychological turmoil. So, on the surface, we might say that Klein avoids engaging with the 'social' world. However, and as I suggest in this final section, her phantasy-focussed psychoanalysis erases the boundary between 'personal' and 'political', 'individual' and 'social'. Her psychoanalysis, I suggest, is social by default. In focusing on how her patients extend their interior reality to the outside world, Klein's clinic

acts a prototype for all social and political relations. Through readings of her wartime case notes, we can see that the success of Kleinian therapy depends on the child being able to finally empathise with others and form meaningful personal connections. Though Klein does not consider the effect of concrete historical events, her psychoanalysis still has an important social dimension.

This chapter proposes that, despite their differences, Freud and Klein show us how psychoanalysts were orienting their theory towards social analysis, to understanding the relationship between the individual and their social world. In their attention to the importance of morality and sociality, Freud and Klein demonstrate a key moment in the history of British psychoanalysis at the mid-century—a distinct move towards examining a new ethos of collectivity and finding the origins of the democratic self.

1.2 The Family at War

In wartime Britain, the family unit took on a new political dimension. Representations of the perfect and supportive nuclear family, the loving mother, the providing father, and the well-behaved children, often represented a successful healing or restoration of Britain after the devastation of war. This was pervasive in the government's plans for the rebuilding of Britain's cities to include wide-ranging domestic suburbs, in the investment in institutionalised child welfare, and in new formations of British citizenship, which placed the 'good family' at its centre. Wartime and postwar discourses paired the family unit with the preservation of proper or good moral and social behaviour. This section sets up the role of the family in contemporary conceptions of citizenship. I examine the cultural expectation that institutions and families would work, synchronously, to maintain the democratic structures of postwar Britain. At this precise historical moment, the family and the state became closely intertwined, the state bolstering and enriching the family structure and vice versa. The first section of this chapter sets up a history of sociocultural discourse about the family-oriented citizen which, I later argue, psychoanalysis also became involved in.

Cultural rhetoric in the period emphasised the importance of the stable and cohesive family unit after a period of warfare and uncertainty. As David Kynaston argues, during wartime 'normative assumptions identifying the moral and social health of the nation with the moral and social health of the family were close to the heart of the era's official and semi-official discourse'. This discourse was predicated on the perception that the 'great disruption of the war and immediate postwar years had been hugely damaging to the cohesiveness of

family life'.[4] 'The family' became an important figuration of safety and stability at the end of the war, an appealing concept after six years of familial separation and social upheaval. The postwar moment was driven by a desire for immediate social healing and reconstruction—as Andrew Sinclair puts it in his study of everyday life in the 1940s, 'the reaction from the war began in the first weeks of the peace, a wish for oblivion, a denial of the past as soon as possible, a search for whatever pleasure and laughter could still be found'.[5] Sinclair describes a huge cultural desire to repress and forget the disturbing past, and instead build a new, stable social order in peace-time. After six years of devastation, many politicians looked to cement some semblance of permanence and normalcy.

But this desire for a new stability was often expressed as a wish to return to pre-war ways of living, where political discourse and policy-making turned to conservative conceptions of family life and gender roles. Matt Houlbrook notes that the pre-war, heteronormative family unit was impacted in wartime by 'women's growing independence' and a large number of "war babies" born out of wedlock.[6] As a result, there was a significant move to put the family at the centre of plans for national recovery. Houlbrook argues that postwar policies emphasised 'the importance of re-establishing gender roles in the domestic sphere and consolidating fragmented and broken apart family units'.[7] This was 'exemplified by new housing provision and the promotion of companionate marriage', as well as the founding of The National Marriage Guidance Council (1948) and the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce (1951), which were 'symptomatic responses to this crisis'.[8] However, it soon became clear that wartime had changed women's roles monumentally, and such a return to family life might not be achievable. A 1949 report by the Royal Commission, recognising this, stated:

> It is clear that women today are not prepared to accept, as most women in Victorian times accepted, a married life of continuous preoccupation with housework and care of children and that the more independent status and wider interests of women today, which are part of the ideals of the community as a whole, are not compatible with repeated and excessive childbearing.[9]

[4] David Kynaston, *Family Britain: 1951-57* (London: Bloomsbury, 2009), p. 561.
[5] Andrew Sinclair, *War Like a Wasp* (London: Faber and Faber 1989), p. 191.
[6] Matt Houlbrook, *Queer London* (London: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 236.
[7] Houlbrook, pp. 130-31.
[8] Houlbrook, p. 236.
[9] Report of the Royal Commission on Population, CMND 7695 (London: HMSO, 1949), p. 148.

The report recommended that the government provide families with allowances, as well as access to improved social services, so as to allow women to bring up their children without sacrificing their financial and personal independence. The report noted that 'the modern woman is not only more conscious of the need for outside interests but has more freedom to engage them; and it would be harmful all round, to the woman, the family and the community to attempt any restriction of the contribution woman can make to the cultural and economic life of the nation'.[10] In postwar Britain women were, more explicitly, figured as active economic providers in the family unit. The report came four years after the first 'family allowances' were mandated under the postwar welfare state: in 1945 the Labour government introduced the allowances in the Beveridge Report, which provided the family with 5 shillings (or 25 pence) per week for every second and subsequent child.[11] These attempts to financially sustain the family unit (despite its changing nature) show that in postwar life the family was still culturally and economically important to the British state—family allowances allowed the family to be economically viable at a moment when more women entered the workforce.[12]

These celebrations of the family as necessary to social progression also represented an anxiety that postwar society might see its collapse. In 1950, Michael Young, from the Labour Party's research department, presented a paper to the Fabian Society entitled 'The British Socialist Way of Life'. In the paper, he criticised William Beveridge's vision that the 'ideal for society was based on the model of the good family, in which the governing principle was that needs should be met by holding all resources available for use where they were needed most'.[13] Instead, Young argued, the family needed 'a good deal of outside support if it were not to be in danger of disruption under the impact of modern forces'. Concerned about communist sympathies on the political left and the collapse of religious beliefs, Young argued for a 'more satisfactory emotional life' under a democratic socialist government that would be 'based on the mutual love of parents and children'.[14] Young was right to be concerned; the war had put considerable strain on the stability of the family unit. For some wives and husbands, separation

[10] Report of the Royal Commission on Population, p. 160.
[11] Kynaston, *Family Britain*, p. 597.
[12] Pat Thane notes that not all women were treated equally in regards to their assumed postwar roles in society. She writes that 'young women were encouraged to stay at home, to boost the birthrate and nurture the new generation, while older women, whose children were grown, were urged to take paid work'. There were also significant class differences, as 'working-class women had always taken paid work when their families needed it'—the change was more discernible in middle-class families: though, in the 1940s, it was usual for women to give up paid work after marriage, by the late 1950s 'most working- and middle-class women stayed in the labor market until their first pregnancy'. Pat Thane, *Life after Death: Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe During the 1940s and 1950s*, p. 209.
[13] Michael Young, quoted in Kynaston, *Family Britain* (2007), p. 539.
[14] Young, quoted in David Kynaston, *Austerity Britain* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), pp. 539-540.

had lasted for several years, and reconciliation, too, presented problems. Kynaston argues that marital strain at the time was also due to women becoming 'more independent' as a result of entering the workforce, while their husbands hoped to return 'to [their] familiar position as the undisputed head' of the family. In England and Wales, the number of divorces rose sharply from 12,314 in 1944 (which itself was double the 1939 figure) to 60,190 by 1947.[15] Young's anxieties about the integrity of the family unit, it seems, could only be remedied by a renewed political focus on the benefits of good family living.

We can also see the promotion of 'good' family living in the plans for the reconstruction of Britain's Blitzed towns and cities. The family became a linchpin of these plans; the location and layout of housing and community centres worked to promote the family-minded citizen. In his study of postwar London, Richard Hornsey points out that new housing 'was constructed as a sanctified space of order and security, insulated from the disruptions of modern life'.[16] After the Second World War, he elaborates, the reconstruction of towns and cities thus focused on a 'new mode of liberal urban governance' which would reform cities into 'vibrant' hubs of social equality and provide a 'spatial and temporal' order through which peace and civic harmony could be experienced.[17] In his paper, Marshall addresses the hopes for social readjustment that underpinned town and city planning and rebuilding in welfare state Britain:

> Town-planning is total planning in this sense. Not only does it treat the community as a whole, but it affects and must take account of all social activities, customs and interests. It aims at creating new physical environments which will actively foster the growth of new human societies. It must decide what these societies are to be like, and try to provide for all the major diversities which they ought to contain.[18]

In 1943, Patrick Abercrombie, Professor of Town Planning at University College London, and the architect J. H. Forshaw were commissioned by London County Council to create a comprehensive plan for the rebuilding of London. Abercrombie went on to write a supplement to this called *The Greater London Plan* in the following year, which extended his vision to the outer suburbs of the city. The plan involved moving over a million people living in overcrowded urban slums into wide-reaching, semi-rural 'new towns' to the south and east of

[15] Kynaston, *Austerity Britain*, p. 97.
[16] Richard Hornsey, *The Spiv and the Architect: Unruly Life in Post-war London* (Minneapolis: Minneapolis University Press, 2010), p. 200.
[17] Hornsey, *The Spiv and the Architect*, p. 11.
[18] Marshall, p. 13.

the city. Abercrombie did not mean to simply restore London to its state before the war, but to completely transform what he saw as a segregated and deteriorating city, which, as Hornsey notes, had been 'teetering on the brink of crisis even before the bombs had begun to fall'.[19] Abercrombie argued that dispersing urban Londoners into a network of smaller, decentralised districts (which he romantically referred to as London's foundation of 'ancient villages') would reinforce 'the identity of the existing communities' and create a 'strong local loyalty' for the working classes.[20]

As Hornsey argues, these re-orderings of domestic and social space 'firmly focused on the needs of the nuclear family and those future citizens—still in their infancy—who would grow up to perpetuate its stable social order'.[21] Abercrombie's ambition was to create small local civic centres, around which the lives of Londoners would gravitate. The local primary school was the symbolic 'nucleus' at the centre of the new towns—playing, as Abercrombie states, 'a far more important role in the life of the community than it does to-day'.[22] Modern new schools with large playing fields would, in turn, ensure the future welfare of children away from the dangers of the urban centres and parks. The spatial structures created by Abercrombie reflect his self-stated desire to 'produce such conditions as shall induce the young married people to remain and bring up families in what should be attractive urban surroundings'.[23]

In a recent study on council housing, John Boughton argues that these plans did not only encourage good family living but rather promoted the idea of a self-sustaining, safe neighbourhood. This included 'new schools, churches, pubs […] community buildings'. Eventually, 'the catchment area of the local elementary school was to define the shape and population—envisaged as between 6,000 and 8,000—of each neighbourhood'.[24] In a speech to the House of Commons in 1949, Aneurin Bevan, too, claimed that the Housing Act of postwar Britain promoted a completely unsegregated community, drawn from all walks of life. But his vision of reconstructed towns also recalled a traditional image of pre-war, pastoral Britain: 'lovely […] English and Welsh villages, where the doctor, the grocer, the butcher, and the farm labourer all lived on the same street'.[25] Indeed, postwar plans for the reconstruction of British towns and cities drew heavily on idyllic, pastoral images of British family life. Bevan's bucolic

[19] Hornsey, p. 40.
[20] Patrick Abercrombie and J. H. Forshaw, *The County of London Plan* (London, Macmillan, 1943), p. 28.
[21] Hornsey, p. 77.
[22] Abercrombie and Forshaw, p. 22.
[23] Abercrombie and Forshaw, p. 78.
[24] John Boughton, *Municipal Dreams: The Rise and Fall of Council Housing* (London: Verso, 2018), p. 99.
[25] Bevan, quoted in Boughton, p. 96.

imaginings exposed the incongruous ideologies at the heart of the reconstruction project, where the progressive promises of a new, fair welfare society (Attlee's 'New Jerusalem') sat side-by-side with a desire to return to a safe, bygone way of life. Political imaginings of postwar Britain, then, relied on familial national rhetoric which stressed the importance of rehabilitating the nuclear family.

1.2.1 The Child at War

While the family signified postwar social stability, the child also became a symbol for a future community of British citizens. The child seemed to encompass both a national hope for a thriving democratic future and an anxiety that the disruptive conditions of wartime might eventually produce damaged, aggressive, and unruly citizens. Cultural and psychoanalytic narratives of childhood, at this historical moment, were preoccupied with how the emotional and psychological health of the child might be impacted by national crisis. In psychoanalysis, analysts examined the child's psychological state in order to understand the development of sociality and morality. As such, and as I will go on to explore, the language and practice of psychology and psychoanalysis became associated with the familialism of wartime and postwar Britain, with the idea the child was a prototype of the future democratic citizen.

At the same time as the family emerged as central to the national ideology in wartime, it came under acute and novel threats under war conditions. In particular, the war created a dangerous landscape for children. Children across Britain had suffered from the traumas of aerial bombing, loss of their homes, separation from their families during evacuation and even, in the case of refugee children arriving on the *Kindertransport*, permanent displacement. For many, the social recovery of these war-children required a reintegration, where possible, into life in the family home (where they might find safety and secure emotional attachments). As Mathew Thomson argues, in postwar Britain there was 'a heightened idealization of home as a landscape for child development and the extension of this ideal across society'.[26] As the war drew to a close, the state became invested in the child as a future citizen; political and social policies looked, accordingly, at how to prevent disorder and delinquency in later life, and so attention shifted to understanding the psychological state of the child and their all-important relationship to their domestic and social environment. As Thomson writes:

[26] Mathew Thomson, *Lost Freedom: The Landscape of the Child and the British Post-War Settlement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 48.

> [T]he war brought to the fore a dilemma over the relationship of the child to a landscape beyond the protection of the home: on the one hand, in highlighting the psychological need for attachment and the importance of an imaginative landscape, it encouraged the idea that home could provide all that the child needed and directed concern towards the need to protect children from outside dangers that threatened such security; on the other, it exposed the energies of children, their attraction towards and ability to cope with the dangers of war, and the need to provide access to a broader landscape or to design special spaces to satisfy these drives.[27]

Kynaston also argues that in the late 1940s and early 1950s 'to an unprecedented, almost cultish extent, children were seen as the future, and it was to them, more than any other section of society, that the new welfare state was devoted'.[28] Though the new postwar welfare state provided free healthcare and schooling for children, Kynaston argues that 'almost all [welfare state] activators were agreed that it was the family that provided the indispensable framework for a child's development'.[29] The pressure on parents to be responsible, and 'do something for the kiddies' (a feat which usually meant 'long hours of overtime') was often complemented on the mother's side 'by a gnawing anxiety about the best way to bring up the children, an anxiety probably exacerbated rather than relieved by the burgeoning advice' that was being provided by the government.[30] The upbringing of the child was, in effect, figured as the upbringing of the citizen. As such, maintaining the family unit would not only ensure a secure upbringing, but would safeguard the values at the heart of the social-democratic state.

Consequently, government institutions looked to support the family in a moment when it seemed to be at risk of splintering. The government founded thousands of war nurseries, which provided crucial care for children whose mothers underwent temporary work in the factories or were unable to care for them, and whose fathers were perhaps away at war. In her essay 'War in the Nursery' (1979), Denise Riley examines the increase in institutional childcare in wartime—she notes that, at this time, there was a huge and concerted effort to bring more children into the nursery: where in 1938 there were 104 day nurseries and 118 nursery schools, by 1944 this number had risen to 1450 fulltime nurseries, 109 part-time nurseries and 784 nursery classes in existing schools.[31] In the early stages of the war and as more and more

[27] Thomson, p. 48.
[28] Kynaston, *Family Britain*, p. 560.
[29] Kynaston, *Family Britain*, p. 558.
[30] Kynaston, *Family Britain*, p. 558.
[31] Denise Riley, 'War in the Nursery', *Feminist Review*, 2 (1979), 82-108 (83).

women entered the workforce, the government came under pressure from trade unions and lobbying groups – if women were to contribute to the war effort, they would need the government to make a provision for state-funded childcare. Early in the war, Riley argues, nurseries were 'to be treated as products of urgency, emergency; their "justification" was as "part of wartime production rather than a general social service"'.[32] An internal memo in the Ministry of Health, for example, stated that 'a line of nurseries is very like a line of spitfires in production'.[33] In the early stages of war, nursery care was seen as another type of 'war work', where those who could not go into the factory could enlist as the carers of the children of those who could.

Though the war nurseries were initiated to free female labour in a time of crisis, they soon gathered a profusion of national support. The government received subsequent demands for more permanent childcare institutions; following this, Riley describes a large wave of support from both the Labour and Conservative parties for nurseries to continue into peace-time, in one form or another.[34] In postwar cities, nurseries were seen as a safety net that would relieve the stress of overcrowding and familial collapse: one minister said that 'Emergency in housing is an emergency in family life, and nurseries could do invaluable help in relieving the overpressed mother'.[35] The nursery, in this way, would support families in a time of social and personal transition, and would help to facilitate their quick return to being healthy, happy, and, perhaps most importantly, self-sustaining. Riley argues that 'pro-nursery sentiment in general was quite congruent with the familialism of the time' as 'nurseries could educate mothers through instruction and influence' and even 'teach parentcraft to adolescents'.[36] She understands wartime and postwar nurseries as an attempt to 'open up the family' to 'a benevolently conceived set of state interventions in the traditionally private spheres'. The family was not seen as an 'autonomous ideological unit', but rather was 'a contributory organism to the politic of the state, the nation, and as such in need of "communal" encouragement'.[37] The nursery stood in a mediatory space between the family and the state, where state investment in institutional childcare indicated an ideological desire to strengthen familial structures in postwar society. Here, we see the crucial figuration of the private and

[32] Riley, p. 87.
[33] Ministry of Health memo, quoted in Riley, p. 83.
[34] Riley, p. 101.
[35] Unnamed minister, quoted in Riley, p. 90.
[36] Riley, pp. 99-100.
[37] Riley, p. 100.

public realms in postwar Britain, where the reconstruction of the family and the reconstruction of a successful postwar society are bound together.

1.2.2 Psychology, Psychoanalysis, and the Dangers of Wartime

The war saw mounting concerns, in particular, about the impact of war on the psychological heath of children, where early disturbances in a child's life might hamper their ability to grow into well-behaved and orderly citizens. In an attempt to combat what they saw as a potential for widespread juvenile delinquency, the British government began to collaborate with psychological institutions like the ISTD (the Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency), which conducted psychoanalytic research into the origins of antisocial behaviour in children. In governmental and psychoanalytic institutions alike we can see this idea that psychological disturbances in early life can hamper the child's ability to grow into a self-sufficient and well-adjusted citizen.

These anxieties about juvenile delinquency in children were exacerbated by the evacuation crisis, by what undesirable aftereffects the trauma of separation might cause. Cases of juvenile delinquency notably increased during the evacuation crisis—official records show that they rose sharply between 1939 and 1940. In 1941, cases of delinquency amongst children reached their peak (though Shapira notes that this may not indicate a rise in criminal behaviour, but perhaps 'more zealous enforcement' towards evacuees, who were already thought to be unruly and destructive).[38] As Shapira notes in her study on war and psychoanalysis, the figure of the evacuee and the juvenile delinquent 'were often linked in public debates, as it was commonly asserted that evacuated schoolchildren were largely responsible for the rise in juvenile crime'.[39] In 1942, the penal reformer Margery Fry, who had also served as the chair of a London court that dealt specifically with juvenile delinquency, argued that the increase in cases was due to 'evacuations, absence of parents in war work, the upset of domestic life by "shelter nights", and, perhaps most of all, the general overexcitement, anxiety, and destructiveness of war mentality'.[40] We can see the same fear underpinning all of this social discourse: the fear of the child's innate penchant for violence and aggression, and that some destructive instinct might be exacerbated by the disorienting environment of war. Psychologists

[38] Shapira, p. 166.
[39] Shapira, p. 166.
[40] Margery Fry, 'Wartime Juvenile Delinquency in England and Some Notes on English Juvenile Courts', *Journal of Educational Sociology,* 16 (1942), 82.

and psychoanalysts, too, turned their attention to how maternal deprivation and separation might cause irrevocable damage in young children, damage that could perhaps lead to criminality later in life. In a January 1944 article in the British Medical Journal, psychologists argued that 'destructive impulses let loose in war may serve to fan the flame of aggression natural to the nursery age' […] 'the Age of Resistance may thus be prolonged to adolescence or adult life in the form of bitterness, irresponsibility or delinquency'.[41] The aggressive and unruly child became the 'bogeyman' of wartime Britain, where hopes for a stable and peaceful democratic future hinged on their recovery and rehabilitation.

As a result of the evacuation crisis, the figure of the delinquent war-child became central to public and governmental plans for social welfare and policies on criminality. Questions about postwar reconstruction now centred on this contentious figure: could the state help children recover from the ills of war and reverse what Margery Fry deemed the 'war mentality'? And would such rehabilitation allow them to develop, successfully, into the well-behaving democratic citizen? By the end of the 1940s, discussions about juvenile delinquency and youth justice became heavily inflected by psychological and psychoanalytic theories; Shapira notes that 'for at least a decade, psychoanalytic principles were at the heart of the training of social workers and probation officers'.[42] As war drew to a close (and as I have noted), the postwar British government began to work with the ISTD, an organisation that Edward Glover deemed 'medico-psychological' in its use of psychoanalytic theory to treat the social problems of delinquency and criminality.[43] Shapira argues that the ISTD signalled the integration of psychological ideas into 'welfare ideology', and so acted as 'a hub for a comprehensive system of child welfare that would embrace the nursery, the home, the school, the playground, and the courts'.[44] For the ISTD, she elaborates, 'childhood, the family, psychological expertise, the prevention of asocial behaviour, and the promotion of good democratic citizenship were woven together'.[45] Criminality and juvenile delinquency became closely linked to psychological and familial conflicts, to the child's home, environment, and their feelings about their own safety.

In 1948, the Ministry of Health attempted to bring the ISTD under the jurisdiction of the National Health Service. Though this received pushback from some ITSD members who worried about the loss of the centre's own identity, its centre for the treatment of delinquency

[41] Unsigned editorial, 'War in the Nursery', *The British Medical Journal* (1944), p. 50.
[42] Shapira, p. 172.
[43] Edward Glover, quoted in Shapira, p. 187.
[44] Shapira, p. 149.
[45] Shapira, p. 153.

was eventually nationalised—a move that signals government investment in a psychological understanding and treatment of criminal activity.[46] The Institute advocated for a 'humane' treatment of criminals; a procedure for delinquents that would not focus on punishment, but would, instead, attempt to reform or readjust behaviour. Shapira notes that the involvement of the state in the workings of the ISTD shows that there was a significant 'interwar transformation of punishment into "welfare discipline", a process in which the intention was to treat or readjust offenders rather than merely punish them'. As Shapira notes, the ISTD played an 'essential part in this interwar transformation of punishment into a 'welfare discipline' that focused on 'teaching citizens self-discipline and communal responsibility in pursuit of democracy'.[58] According to the ISTD, misbehaviour and unruliness emerged from disturbances in the 'inner world' of the child, which, in turn, was caused by some inadequacy in their home environment. Edward Glover, a psychoanalyst who was also one of the Institute's founders, stated that if Britons wished to reduce the increasing number of unstable and unhappy personalities or the rising toll of juvenile delinquency, they must see to it that 'the security of family life of any [citizen] is raised to a decent level, mental as well as material'.[47] The ISTD understood that the psychological wellbeing of the child was absolutely affected by their home environment—as Shapira notes, this led to 'the new reimagination of parenthood not only as a natural capacity but also as a social responsibility'.[48]

The increasing influence of the ISTD in the postwar years, then, allows us to see how the concept of the 'good family' was central to plans for successful reconstruction, where parents became responsible for the capacity of their children to contribute successfully to democratic society. As such, the state reserved the right to intervene in family life, and even, in some cases, to remove the child from dysfunctional and unproductive home environments.[49] The work at the ISTD reveals how psychoanalysis became gradually intertwined with larger political questions about the connection between the family home, criminality, and the democratic self in mid-century Britain, and also shows how readily the government were willing to accept and adopt these ideas towards the purpose of fostering an ideal democratic public. The reformation of the family, then, came hand-in-hand with the reinstatement of

[46] Shapira, p. 172.
[47] Glover, quoted in Shapira, p. 165.
[48] Shapira, p. 174.
[49] The Children Act of 1948 stated that it was the responsibility of local authorities to protect and reclaim any child who could not, for whatever reason, be adequately cared for by their family. Such acts placed paramount importance on the 'welfare of the child' – an issue that was a public as well as a private matter. See: The Children Act of 1948 (Education in England), < http://www.educationengland.org.uk/documents/acts/1948-children-act.html> [accessed 9th July 2021].

'good' moral values in postwar British society. War solidified the connections between the healthy family-oriented citizen and the responsible democratic subject, and, in doing so, it also placed a new importance on the connection between the private and the public lives of the citizen. These conversations about citizenry also had a distinctive psychological tilt: the success of postwar Britain depended on the emotional wellbeing of war-children. According to Shapira, the ITSD 'challenges the view that psychoanalysis was an exclusive science whose work was limited to private clinical practice'.[50] Here, we can begin to see the interaction between psychoanalysis and politics, where the practice became a useful institutional tool for understanding the psychology of citizens and the impact of national trauma.

1.3 Psychoanalysis and the Ethics of Childhood

At the same moment that the family emerged as central to the national ideology in wartime, psychoanalysts turned their attention to tracking the origins of social behaviour in the family unit. In this section, I discuss the politics of the psychoanalytic clinic at this historical moment, where examining the emotional state of the child was often connected to this same goal of fostering the democratic citizen. As Shapira argues, British psychoanalysis at this moment was governed by 'a certain set of ideas that tied together mental health, balanced selfhood, and the preservation of democracy'.[51] Analysts offered a view of the child as an emotional being who acts out social relations psychologically, and thus is deeply affected by the outside world and the people in it. This was a markedly social move in psychoanalysis, a shift in the practice towards the influence of interpersonal relationships on the mind and its development. Wartime also saw the increasing institutionalisation of psychoanalysis: as Shapira notes, the British Psychoanalytical Society 'became important for much public and welfare-state thinking'. She argues that, at this historical moment, 'analysts became involved in the war effort and in the postwar development of the welfare state, influencing social policy, law, popular culture, and public opinion'. This section examines how analysts engaged with the child in order to think about the social application of the practice.

By the 1940s the figure of the child had been dominant in British psychoanalytic circles for almost two decades. In 1925, Sigmund Freud wrote that 'of all the fields in which psychoanalysis has been applied none has aroused so much interest, inspired so much hope,

[50] Shapira, p. 168.
[51] Shapira, p. 237.

and accordingly attracted so many capable workers as the theory and practice of child training […] the child has become the main object of psychoanalysis research'—indeed, analysts like Melanie Klein, Anna Freud, Susan Isaacs, Donald Winnicott and Wilfred Bion all focused on the 'child' in their theoretical and clinical work.[52] I will now turn to the figure of the child in the workings of Melanie Klein and Anna Freud, and examine how their analyses of the development of emotion, morality, and empathy in early life coincided with a wider social effort to foster a democratic sensibility within a new generation of British citizens. The integration of the child into the psychoanalytic clinic changed the social role of the practice as it allowed Klein and Anna Freud to address the social effects of evacuation, displacement, and family breakdown. In a period rife with discourse about the importance of social responsibility, analysts like Klein and Anna Freud were thinking about the intersections between the private and public lives of citizens.

Psychoanalysis's 'social turn' began twenty years before the outbreak of the Second World War, in the aftermath of another global conflict. Adam Phillips argues that, after the First World War, psychoanalytic narratives focused on how the practice might have an 'obvious use' in understanding and treating the traumas of war and social conflict. According to Phillips, the publication of Freud's 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' (1920), which put forward his theory of the death instinct, led to a 'kind of psychic essentialism'—suddenly, developmental narratives of the mind held an 'immense explanatory force'.[53] All human experience, pleasure as well as trauma, could now be explained by the dual existence of and the conflict between the life and death drives, between Eros and Thanatos. According to Phillips, Freud's 'death principle' brought the practice of psychoanalysis sharply into the political sphere. In 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', Freud used his theory of unconscious desire to understand the phenomenon of shell-shock and trauma. Psychoanalysis, no longer consigned to the private clinic, was now being employed for the diagnosis of widespread social problems. Paul Homans, too, argues that the inter-war period indicated a turning point for British psychoanalysis. After the First World War, Homans writes, metapsychology (the study of Freud's fundamental psychoanalytical structures) 'virtually withered away, to be replaced by clinical and theoretical concerns with attachment, loss and the social world of patients, many of whom were soldiers and children'.[54] During this time, psychoanalytic practitioners became

[52] Sigmund Freud, 'Foreword', in August Aichorn, *Wayward Youth* (New York: Penguin, 1965), p. v.
[53] Adam Phillips, *Promises, Promises* (London: Faber & Faber, 2000), p. 42.
[54] Paul Homans, *The Ability to Mourn: Disillusionment and the Social Origins of Psychoanalysis* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989), p. 114.

preoccupied finding a social use for psychoanalytic theory, and founded institutions like the Tavistock Centre which attempted to bridge the gap between the private world of the clinic and the public sphere. Zaretsky argues that the Tavistock Centre was 'a mixture of Freud, psychotherapy, eclectic meliorism, managerial innovation and sociology', with its credo 'no doctrine, only aims'.[55] This form of psychoanalysis—called the 'new psychology'—initiated a new, institutional role for the practice, when clinicians would make a concerted effort to examine the individual's relationship with their immediate environment and the objects in it.

For some analysts, Phillips argues, discussions about the teleology of child development replaced those about the surreal and abstract workings of the unconscious or of dream work. These analysts sought tangible and coherent understandings of unconscious life in their narratives of child development. Phillips argues that for many analysts in the interwar period, 'describing the child was to describe the unconscious' because 'the child was as it were the unconscious *live*: you could see it in action'.[56] For Phillips, this refocus marks a crucial shift in psychoanalysis; he describes the sudden prevalence of the child in psychoanalytic narratives as an 'usurpation'.[57] Child analysis, he argues, signalled a move away from abstract and speculative theories of the mind, and towards more concrete and clinical work. For many post-Freudian analysts, the child's mind was a 'source of coherent narratives' for unconscious life, so that paying attention to the intricacies of the early development of the psyche might help to demystify the unconscious, to rid it of its mysteries and abstractions.

Though psychoanalysts were already thinking about the interactions between the private inner conscious and the wider social conscious (Freud, notably, writes about the individual's confrontation with expectations of society in *Civilisation and its Discontents*), the calamities of the Second World War mobilised analysis for the specific purpose of reconstructing a healthy society. In this context, the interwar desire to identify the essential needs of the child gained new political weight. In the environment of war and reconstruction, analysts became preoccupied by the role of the state in ensuring the fulfilment of the child's needs. As well as the care of children, many analysts also turned their attention to the origins of delinquency and aggression, and to understanding the psychological dynamics of collectives and groups. The role of the psychoanalyst, it seemed, now included the safeguarding of democratic sensibilities and societies in an age of fascism and totalitarianism. As we shall see

[55] Eli Zaretsky, 'Melanie Klein and the Emergence of Modern Personal Life', p. 36; HV Dicks, *50 Years of the Tavistock Clinic* (London: Routledge, 1970), p. 2.
[56] Phillips, *Promises, Promises*, p. 42.
[57] Phillips, *Promises, Promises*, p. 42.

throughout this chapter, psychoanalysis became 'effective' in wartime and postwar Britain, where it found a new use within social democratic institutions.

Though Phillips's description of the changes in psychoanalysis in the interwar period is extremely useful, I would like to suggest that the incorporation of the child into the clinic did not signal such a straightforward turn away from the unconscious or its 'usurpation' in psychoanalytic practice and theory. Rather, as we will go on to see, the period saw a series of competing and divergent narratives about what exactly the child's mind looked like. While some analysts believed that the child was psychically undeveloped and reliant on their environment and the authorities in it, others thought that the mind of the child was rich and complex, a turbulent site of perverse aggression and punishing guilt. Additionally, analysts disagreed on what the role of psychoanalysis in society should be; whether child analysis should be integrated into social institutions or kept within the traditional private realm of the clinic. The shift from the abstract to the concrete, then, was not as clear-cut as Phillips's account might lead us to believe. In order to pay attention to the varied (and even discordant) narratives of the child in this period, I will examine the psychoanalytic writings of Melanie Klein and Anna Freud, two analysts who waged a war of their very own within the British Psychoanalytical Society.

Phillips argues that child analysis was a perfect avenue for understanding acts of war as it often sought to examine the origins of aggression and destructive behaviour. But perhaps child analysis also provided a mode for thinking about the democratic subject, about the origins of collectivity, cooperation, morality and empathy. Narratives of child development allowed analysts to think through the relationship between the self and wider societal structures, and even to theorise about the democratic capabilities of the ego. For analysts like Melanie Klein and Anna Freud, the child provided an avenue for staging and forming theories about the relationship of the individual to their social environments. It is to this that I now turn.

1.3.1 Melanie Klein and the Ambivalent Family Relation

Throughout the 1920s and '30s, Melanie Klein positioned the family as a vital site for psychoanalytic inquiry. She proposed that symbolic and unconscious relations to the family determine the early development of the child's psyche—examining these early relationships, she argued, offered an insight into future social behaviour. Klein's school of psychoanalysis (often referred to as 'Object Relations') saw the 'family' as a prototype for all future interpersonal relations. Klein suggested that the child's empathetic capacity to 'do good' in

society emerges directly from the family unit, and, in particular, from the contentious and ever-changing relationship of the child to the mother-object. But she also saw the family as the origin of the child's darker, more selfish phantasies and their tendencies towards aggression and destruction. Family relationships also allow the individual to work through their most despicable feelings towards others; here, the child commits murder and cannibalism, subjecting the mother to its most sadistic whims. The family is an ambivalent unit in Klein's writings, and the child is caught in a constant battle between their instincts for 'love' and 'hate', a battle that is fought throughout their entire life. Thus, Klein's child analysis has a particular social dimension—what interests her is the development of empathy, morality, and social connectedness. Klein's theories about the moral capabilities of the child allow us to see how child analysis, in particular, became tied to cultural analysis. For Klein, the child mind is just as complex as the adult mind, filled not only with desire and want, but also guilt, regret, and shame—it is the root of all action and behaviour in the social world.

In the decades building up to the Second World War, Klein's understanding of the ego differed from the Freudian model in that she prioritised examining infantile tendencies for aggression and violence in the child—specifically the inherent and dual desires to both love and hate, or to preserve and destroy, the mother. One of the most controversial departures from Freud was Klein's contention the death and life instincts are present in the earliest months of an infant's life, and simply continue (in a state of constant fluctuation) into childhood and adulthood. From its birth, the child is at the behest of powerful and conflicting instincts, the 'love' instinct (a manifestation of the life drive) and the 'hate' instinct (the instinct for destructiveness, envy, death, aggression—what Freud understood as the 'death drive').[58] These two instincts, which are from the beginning fundamental to how the ego relates to the outside world, are locked in perpetual conflict. In the early stages of development, the child attempts to quell this conflict by modifying the death-drive and suppressing destructive impulses or by expelling the death-drive, and the aggression that comes with it, to the outside world (Klein calls this the 'paranoid-schizoid position'). In order to do this, the child must negotiate with their love and hate drives through their relations with objects in their environment, the first of

[58] Klein's theory of 'love' and 'hate' is explained in her essay 'Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms' (1946), where she writes ''object-relations exist from the beginning of life, the first object being the mother's breast which to the child becomes split into a good (gratifying) and bad (frustrating) breast'. The child also splits the 'destructive and hated part of the self' from the good, loving part of the self. See: Melanie Klein, 'Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms', in *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963* (London: Vintage, 1997), pp. 1-24 (p. 5).

which is the mother's breast—the first contact the child has with the 'outside' world.[59] This is the most important and formative object relationship for the infant; Kleinian psychoanalysis thus stipulates that the baby's primitive phantasies and desires can only be confronted and adapted through an emotional and personal connection to the mother. She writes:

> My hypothesis is that the infant has an innate unconscious awareness of the existence of the mother. We know that young animals at once turn to the mother and find their food from her. The human animal is not different in this respect, and this instinctual knowledge is the basis for the infant's primal relation with the mother.[60]

For Klein, the mother-object is always a construction from within, or an 'internal object' (an object that has been taken inside the self and integrated symbolically into the ego). In order to cope with its contradictory feelings and impulses towards the breast-object, its desire to both consume and preserve it, the infant separates the 'good' breast—the giving, feeding breast—from the 'bad' breast—the withdrawing, depriving breast. This is the act of 'splitting', which the child must do in order to suppress and avoid the 'bad' and anxiety-inducing parts of any object, and is a 'dispersal of the destructive instinct which is felt as the source of danger'.[61]

In Klein's matricentric paradigm, the ego never loses the all-important maternal connection; their relationship with the split-apart mother-object determines all future social relationships. As the child encounters more objects in their environment these, too, are subject to this 'splitting' mechanism, so that all the feelings ascribed to the 'bad' breast (the child's desire to destroy) are projected onto any objects in the outside world that are thought to be hostile or persecutory, while the care and the love for the 'good' breast becomes associated with any object that is seen to be caring, kind, and giving. In these early stages of development, the ego sorts objects into 'good' and 'bad' in the unconscious inner world—at first, the ego believes the world outside can split apart, and understood, through what Mary Jacobus calls the 'moralized binarism' of the Kleinian psychoanalytic model.[62] According to Klein, the early life of the child is filled with moral judgments and categorisations; early symbol formations

[59] Klein also explains this process in 'Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms', where she describes the process of 'projection', which 'originates from the deflection of the death instinct outwards and in my view it helps the ego to overcome anxiety by ridding it of danger and badness'. Melanie Klein, 'Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms', p. 6.
[60] Melanie Klein, 'Our Adult World and its Roots in Infancy', in *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963* (London: Vintage, 1997), pp. 247-263 (p. 248).
[61] Melanie Klein, 'Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms', p. 5.
[62] Mary Jacobus, *The Poetics of Psychoanalysis: In the Wake of Klein* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 72.

come about as a result of binarised decisions about the moral value of objects in the outside world.

With the notion of 'splitting', Klein forms a narrative about the moral capacity of the child in early life. Splitting is a coping mechanism for the infant, a way to sort through its conflicting feelings and impulses. Though this is an easy way for the infant to overcome a crisis of ambivalent feelings, Klein stipulates that the child must overcome their desire to 'split' loved-objects in order develop the capacity for empathy. Klein emphasises the importance of coming to terms with what she calls the 'ambivalent' state of the ego, with the simultaneous desire to nurture and to destroy the loved-object.[63] The term 'ambivalence' first appears in Klein's 1935 essay 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States', but is comprehensively explored in 'Mourning and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States', written in 1940.[64] Using the notion of 'ambivalence', Klein describes the ego's recognition and understanding of their conflicting desires for the destruction and preservation of the mother-object—the dual desire to care for and devour the most-loved other. This recognition results in the ego's need to continually attack itself (specifically the bad side of the ego, carefully split from the good, moral, loving self) in a form of masochistic self-sacrifice—a sacrifice that is necessary for the infant's moral and ethical development. She writes:

> Ambivalence, carried out in a splitting of the imagos, enables the small child to gain more trust and belief in its real objects and thus in its internalised ones – to love them more and to carry out in an increasing degree its phantasies of restoration.[65]

But this splitting can only occur when the child has reached the 'depressive position', which is when the child recognises that the breast-object is part of the mother-object and is struck with guilt over its aggressive desires. So the child tries to make 'reparation'—attempts to right their wrong, to re-build the mother as a whole and perfect object.[66] The depressive position marks a crucial step in ethical development—the child must learn to mitigate its destructive instincts,

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[63] Klein, 'The Theory of Anxiety and Guilt', in *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963* (London: Vintage, 1997), pp. 25-42 (p. 26).

[64] Though Klein uses 'ambivalence' analogously to Freud, she expands the term so it is an integral part of the early relation of the ego to the mother-figure. Freud understands 'ambivalence' as the existence of two opposing impulses that are equal in strength and are usually directed towards an object. Freud first uses the term 'ambivalence' to describe the presence of these two impulses in *Totem and Taboo.* See: Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo* (London: Routledge, 2018), p. 77.

[65] Klein, 'Mourning and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States', in *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945* (London: Vintage, 1998), pp. 344-369 (p. 350).

[66] Klein, 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States', in *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945* (London: Vintage, 1998), pp. 262-289 (p. 265).

to dispel or decrease its desires to consume 'the inside of [the mother's body]', its wish to 'scoop […] it out', 'devouring the contents and destroying it by every means which sadism can suggest'.[67] This is the child's first realisation that the outside world is affected totally by the violent actions of the ego. In her essay 'Love, Guilt, and Reparation' (1937), Klein locates the beginnings of 'morality' in the reparative instinct, noting that the depressive position reveals that the infant has a capacity for understanding others, a 'genuine sympathy for other people' that allows a possibility for love: 'We can only put the other person's interests and emotions first, if we have the capacity to identify ourselves with the loved person'.[68] The infant's empathy, and its desire to repair the world outside, is acted on through the belief that it has an omnipotent ability to change the destroyed through goodness, love and affection. The reparative impulse, which is enabled by this belief in omnipotence, provides agency to the Kleinian subject—the infant might not be able to undo their destruction of the mother, but it can put the mother back together again, piece together the fragments until she is 'whole'. But, crucially, in order to put the pieces back together, the child must acknowledge their destructive actions and work to make better or undo the violence they have afflicted. Alongside the destructiveness of the infant 'there exists a profound urge to make sacrifices, in order to help and put right loved people who in phantasy have been harmed or destroyed'.[69]

For Klein, the infant's capacity for empathy and compassion coincides with learning how to cope with the ambivalence of feeling. This is a crucial step towards achieving what Klein calls the 'well-integrated personality', which is the normative and healthy state of the ego (and so is, Klein states in 'Envy and Gratitude' (1957), the 'ultimate aim of psychoanalysis').[70] Klein understands that a form of equilibrium can take place when the subject learns to balance their impulses healthily, which occurs when the infant gains 'self-protection' and so can learn to cope with the discordance of their feelings. Klein argues that the death drive encompasses all aggressive or hateful thought and action, action which she believes the infant can make up for through displays of love and compassion. If the super-ego is split totally from the death drive, then the child can achieve what Klein calls 'integration'. 'Integration' signals the crucial development of coherence and maturity in the ego; ego defences become less intense and the impulse for excessive aggression and violence dissipates.

[67] Klein, 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States', p. 262.
[68] Klein, 'Love, Guilt and Reparation', in *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945* (London: Vintage, 1998), pp. 306-343 (p. 311).
[69] Klein, 'Love, Guilt and Reparation', p. 311.
[70] Melanie Klein, 'Envy and Gratitude', in *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963* (London: Vintage, 1997), pp. 176-235 (p. 231).

Once the ego is well-integrated, the individual has an 'insight into the variety of our contradictory impulses and feelings and the capacity to come to terms with these inner conflicts'.[71] So, the reparative instinct, the desire for care and love, can enliven some future possibility for the ego. If the first reparation is successful and the child experiences 'inner peace' as a result of their first relation with the mother, then they can finally build healthy familial and social relations: 'The success of this first relation extends to relations with other members of the family, first of all to the father, and is reflected in adult attitudes, both in the family circle and towards people in general'.[72] The compassionate, empathetic adult is capable of replicating the successfully-integrated first object-relation in all further social conduct. According to Klein, then, the family is an important site for testing and developing social relations, and is the basis for empathetic feeling.

But, significantly, Klein's idea of morality is complicated by the presence of the destructive instinct. She argues that the love instinct can, at any moment, be marred by the child's desire to enact destruction, or be undermined by the child's subsequent fear that they might be persecuted for such desires. Klein writes that it would be an error to imply that the reparative act only mends, makes better, and heals the actions of the destructive ego. This is because the manic experience of the paranoid-schizoid position (its aggression against the part of the self it deems to be 'bad' or 'evil') cannot be so easily overcome. The 'superego' (the agent of the reparative act, which is the beginning of conscience and morality) may at any moment relapse, and become, once again, 'something which bites, devours, and cuts'.[73] As early as 1933, Klein argued that the 'early super-ego was immeasurably harsher and more cruel than that of the older child or adult, and that it literally crushed down the feeble ego of the small child'.[74] In the hunt for absolute peace and love, reparation can enact the same primal sadism as we can see in the paranoid-schizoid position, where the superego takes on an intensely moral and exacting role, to the extent of being abusive and destructive. As careful as the ego is, it cannot stop destructive instincts from disfiguring the good self: 'Some of the cruelty of the bad objects and of the id becomes attached to the good objects and this then increases the severity of their demands'.[75] These strict demands, Klein writes, 'serve the purpose of supporting the

[71] Klein, 'On Mental Health', in *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963*, pp. 268-274 (p. 269).
[72] Klein, 'On Mental Health', p. 268.
[73] Klein, 'Early Stages of the Oedipus Complex', in *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945* (London: Vintage, 1998), pp. 186-198 (p. 187).
[74] Melanie Klein, 'The Early Development of Conscience in the Child', in *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945* (London: Vintage, 1998), pp. 248-257 (p. 248).
[75] Klein, 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States', p. 268.

ego in its fight against its uncontrollable hatred and its bad attacking objects, with whom the ego is partially identified'.[76] This is the 'vicious circle' of reparation, or what Judith Butler calls the 'perilous self-sacrifice' of the Kleinian ego: the 'good' and 'bad' in the external world are doubles of the 'good' and 'bad' self, so that any desire to mend badness in the outside world is ultimately masochistic.[77] For Klein, morality comes at a perilous price.

Klein's superego is not always benevolent. It does not emerge as a result of the moral demands made by the society in which an individual lives, but is rather the agent of devastating violence against the objects in the outside world. The superego is so dangerous because it coincides with a primitive belief in absolute 'omnipotence'. This notion of omnipotence stretches the life and death drives to their highest potentiality—to an absolute and 'almost despotic' control of the psyche over what it perceives as the 'outside world'. According to Klein, 'omnipotence [...] is so closely bound up in the unconscious with the sadistic impulses with which it was first associated that the child feels again and again that his attempts at reparation have not succeeded, or will not succeed. His sadistic impulses, he feels, may easily get the better of him'.[78] Klein writes that the child then turns to 'manic omnipotence'—'the ego is driven alternately or simultaneously, to combat the fears of deterioration and disintegration by attempted reparations carried out in obsessional ways'.[79] The 'desire to control the object', as well as 'the sadistic gratification of overcoming it and humiliating it, of getting the better of it, the triumph over it, may enter so strongly into the act of reparation [...] that the benign circle started by this act becomes broken'.[80] Klein's ego is continually trapped in a state of ambivalence—good and bad get easily confused so that, in their love for the object, the infant sometimes inflicts more violence and destruction. In its efforts to 'repair' the mother, to create an image of a new mother who is perfect and whole, the child enacts further destruction on the mother as she already exists.

The super-ego, then, can be vicious in its attempts to rectify the violence it thinks it has caused. In *The Destructive Element* (1998), Stonebridge argues that the superego 'does not simply repress murderous desires but draws from them and repeats their ferocity with all the violence that it at the same time prohibits'.[81] Stonebridge argues that the Kleinian ego exists as

[76] Klein, 'A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States', p. 268-269.
[77] Judith Butler, 'Moral Sadism and Doubting One's Own Love: Kleinian Reflections on Melancholia', in *Reading Melanie Klein,* ed. by John Phillips and Lyndsey Stonebridge (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 179-189 (p. 182).
[78] Klein, 'Mourning and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States', p. 350.
[79] Klein, 'Mourning and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States', p. 350.
[80] Klein, 'Mourning and its Relation to Manic-Depressive States', p. 351.
[81] Stonebridge, *The Destructive Element,* p. 7

'both a culturally valued reparation of phantasised destruction and the precipitate of an inclination to violence and aggressively'.[82] The actions of the 'loving' side of the ego, which provide the infant with a 'transgressive pleasure' in the absolution of all violence, can only be enacted *with* violence.[83] This is the tension at the centre of Klein's work—the morality of the ego, its wish to do 'good', is precarious, and is often the site of the most abject violence. As much as Klein upholds or attempts to preserve the family unit in the therapeutic situation, she is always battling the sadistic ego, whose instincts and inclinations for aggression and destruction mean that the family remains, always, in dire peril.[84]

Klein's narrative of child development is not a simple story that begins with a child filled with unchecked desires and ends with a moral individual, capable of coping with these desires. Because of this, her theories were contentious and confusing for many analysts. Edward Glover, one of Klein's critics, claimed that she could not 'tell a story straight', and that the always-fluctuating state of her ego undermined 'the biological progression of an instinct-series', subverting 'all our concepts of progressive mental development'.[85] Glover's gripe with Klein was that she deviated from the orderly sequence of libidinal development that Freud proposed, and suggested, instead, that the child moves haphazardly in and out of 'positions' throughout their life. By abandoning the Freudian model of 'stages', Klein disrupted the narrative of psychological progress, so that the crisis of the paranoid-schizoid position could upset and regress the ego at any point in life. This is sometimes called the 'negativity' of Kleinian psychoanalysis and reveals the ambiguity of her 'moral act'—even adult desires for empathy and kindness can be marred by earlier destructive instincts. At the same moment that the family became ideologically important to the wartime and postwar state, Klein saw it as essential for testing out negative and destructive emotions.

[82] Stonebridge, *The Destructive Element,* p. 38.
[83] Stonebridge, *The Destructive Element,* p. 44.
[84] Klein's concept of reparation has inspired academic work on 'reparative reading', which has been the subject of lively debate in the last couple of decades. Most notably, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick uses Klein's terms 'paranoid' and 'reparative' to describe critical approaches to literature. She argues that 'paranoid' reading consists of a 'hermeneutics of suspicion', an interpretive method which presupposes problems in the text. But 'reparative reading', like Klein's reparative instinct, is driven by a desire for love and pleasure. It is a generous, curious mode of reading: 'to a reparatively positioned reader it can seem realistic and necessary to experience surprise.' Sedgwick argues that literary critics should abandon the paranoid position for a 'reparative' approach. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Touching Feeling* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 146.
[85] Edward Glover, 'Examination of the Klein System of Child Psychology', *Psycho-Analytic Study of the Child,* 1 (1945), 75-118 (112).

1.3.2 Children in the Clinic

So far, I have discussed Klein's narrative of childhood psychological development, where the child's sense of morality emerges from the recognition of their own destructive instinct. But where does this place psychoanalytic therapy? How did Klein integrate the warring child into her clinic, and did she deviate from other analysts who were also thinking about the role psychoanalysis could play in the care of children? In the lead up to the Second World War, the study and analysis of infants and young children posed a possibility for analysts to extend Freud's psychoanalytic ideas and methods (which had been based on adult therapies) so that they could be applied in a situation 'in which the patient may have no access to language or may not be able to use the normal structures of language'.[86] In Britain, the Tavistock Clinic received Rockefeller grants aimed at the development of child psychoanalysis, while psychoanalysts like Melanie Klein and Susan Isaacs 'distinguished themselves from Sigmund Freud by their practical experience with children as mothers, teachers and clinicians'.[87] Isaacs had previously run a nursery school, while Klein, reflecting on her lack of medical training, claimed her own experience as a mother meant that she was adequately qualified to write about infantile psychic development.[88] In her clinic, Klein saw an importance in conversing directly and honestly with the children she analysed. It was not enough for Klein to simply observe the language of children, rather she would interact with them, watch them play, and pay close attention to the way they mediated the analytic environment.

Klein's approach to child analysis stirred up controversy and debate within the British Psychoanalytical Society. To understand exactly why her 'play-technique' was so controversial, I want to draw some comparisons with her contemporary and biggest critic, Anna Freud (who had also become a distinguished child analyst by the 1930s). Even before her arrival in England, Kleinian theory had become extremely controversial in Vienna due to her understanding that the infant holds perverse desires for hate and destruction. Along with disapproving of Klein's negative view of the early morality of the child, many analysts in Vienna and across the Continent also believed her methods to be unorthodox, and even suggested that her practice of speaking to children directly might be detrimental to healthy psychological development. These concerns over Klein's conduct in the clinic were rife

[86] Juliet Mitchell, 'Introduction to Melanie Klein', in *Reading Melanie Klein,* ed. by John Phillips and Lyndsey Stonebridge (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 11-31 (p. 19).
[87] Eli Zaretsky, 'Melanie Klein and the Emergence of Modern Personal Life', p. 36.
[88] Janet Sayers, 'Melanie Klein, Psychoanalysis, and Feminism', *Feminist Review,* 25 (1987), 23-37 (24).

throughout the interwar period, with analysts like Edward Glover, Kate Friedlander, and even Klein's own daughter Melitta Schmideberg frequently speaking against what they called the new 'Kleinian' school of psychoanalysis.[89]

Though there was significant tension between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein throughout the late 1920s and 1930s, it was on Freud's arrival in London during the Second World War that this conflict finally came to a head. These tensions culminated with the 'Controversial Discussions'—a series of meetings during which the followers of the Freudian school attempted to discredit Kleinian psychoanalysis and its dominance in Britain. One of the most contentious questions posed during this time regarded the value that psychoanalysis placed on education, on the clinic's role in society. Should it should be a space in which to school the child's behaviours and psychic processes, or instead a space of observation and expression? Should it be a place for teaching, or rather for encouraging the child to express themselves through traditional methods like free association? Klein believed that children as young as two years old could be, and should be, analysed in the clinic as though they were adults. Anna Freud, however, argued that children at a very young age could not be coherent or detailed about their feelings and desires. Many children, she noted, lacked the knowledge and the vocabulary to express their thoughts in language. But Klein had discovered a solution for this problem. She contested that children could be analysed through an adapted form of free association, one that focused not on language but on movement. Klein devised a 'play technique'—she would watch children interact with toys that she had brought along to the clinic. For Klein, play was a substitute for free association: the latent content of unconscious phantasies could now be accessed through action rather than language.

In Klein's conception, the clinic was not a space of 'education'—that is to say, the analyst should not teach the child to behave correctly. Rather, the analyst's job is only to reveal the historical root of anxieties and desires. Deborah P. Britzman argues that Klein felt that the feeling of not-knowing, what Sigmund Freud called *Hilflosigkeit*, frustrated the infant 'to such an extent that anxiety and aggression marked every moment of normal development'.[90] Klein's task as the analyst, then, was to identify the driving forces behind neurotic or pathological

[89] For more information on the controversies of the 1930s and 1940s, see: Paul Roazen, *Oedipus in Britain* (London, Other Press, 2000), Julia Kristeva, *Melanie Klein* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). For detailed transcripts and notes of the 'Controversial Discussions' see: *The Freud-Klein Controversies 1941-45*, ed. by Pearl King and Richard Steiner (London: Taylor & Francis, 2015).
[90] Deborah P. Britzman, *After-Education: Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, and Psychoanalytic Histories of Learning* (New York: SUNY Press, 2012), , p. 41.

behaviours so that the individual, no matter their age, could progress past them. In *The Psychoanalysis of Children* (1932), Klein writes that:

> Analysis can do for children, whether normal or neurotic, all that it can do for adults and much more. It can spare the child the many miseries and painful experiences which the adult goes through before he comes to be analysed; and its therapeutic prospects are much brighter.[91]

Klein wrote that, when analysing a child, the analyst should not hold back from sharing their interpretations, even if these interpretations are distressing:

> Analysis is not in itself a gentle method: it cannot spare the patient any suffering, and this applies equally to children. In fact, it must force the suffering into consciousness and bring about abreaction if the patients are to be spared permanent and more fatal suffering later.[92]

Subjecting the child to suffering in the analytic situation, she claimed, would alleviate more detrimental suffering in later life. Like the adult patient, the child patient would benefit from understanding, even at an early age, the dynamics of their own dually cruel and loving ego.

This was not an opinion shared by the Viennese psychoanalysts. For example, in contrast to Klein, Anna Freud believed that child analysis should be kept distinct from adult analysis. In her lectures, she argued that the young child cannot undergo true 'analysis' due to the 'immaturity of his ego, the dependency of his superego, and by his resultant incapacity to deal unaided with pressures from the id'.[93] Child analysis, Freud contended, is only appropriate in the instance of 'genuine infantile neurosis'—'analysis, where children are concerned', she continued, 'requires certain modifications and adjustments, or indeed can be undertaken only subject to specific precautions'.[94] It was Klein's attitude that psychoanalysis might be helpful as a means of diminishing psychical difficulties in all children, and not just neurotic children, that differed so far from Freud's own view.

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[91] Klein, *The Psychoanalysis of Children*, trans. by Alix Strachey (London: Vintage, 1997), p. 282.
[92] Klein, 'Symposium on Child-analysis', in *Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945* (London: Vintage, 1998), pp. 139-169 (p. 144).
[93] Anna Freud, 'A Short History of Child Analysis', *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, 21 (1966), 7-14 (9).
[94] Anna Freud, 'Four Lectures on Child Analysis', *The Writings of Anna Freud*, vol 1 (New York: International Universities Press, 1974), pp. 3-72 (p. 3).

For Anna Freud, the psychoanalytic clinic was an educative setting, a place where the child would learn how to express themselves in a healthy way. Freud believed that in childhood the super-ego was only partially developed, and that it was up to the parents, caregivers or other authority figures to help it mature fully, to impart boundaries of what was morally right and wrong. She claimed that the analyst, too, was responsible for this healthy development—it was not enough to observe a child without attempting to correct and rework aggressive or undesirable tendencies. In Freud's clinic, the analyst took on a dual role; they needed 'to analyse *and* to educate, that is to say, in the same breath he must allow and forbid, loosen and bind again' [my emphasis].[95] Here, the child, with the aid of the analyst and the love from actual parents, could learn how to be 'good'; how to adopt a healthy expression of inner desires, and, in turn, more acceptable social behaviour. Where Klein brings repressed desires and instincts to the fore, Anna Freud works to inspire productive and acceptable expressions of those desires, without revealing them explicitly to the child.

The key difference, then, between Klein and Anna Freud is in their respective ideas about the nature of the superego. Though in both cases the superego is the agent of morality, for Klein it is capable of violence and destruction in its perpetual quest to right the wrongs the ego has committed. For Freud, however, the superego is a benevolent and productive force that arises from the influence of outside authorities. As Britzman argues, Freud believed that the superego develops 'not from archaic phantasies of terror and persecution, as Klein claimed it represented, but from the singular combination of love and authority that actual parents or caregivers bestow upon the baby'.[96] For Freud, the superego was a benevolent force, a direct product of the giving and loving objects in the child's environment; the 'uses and tolerances of knowledge are measures of ego development, made from environmental support and the ego's growing capacity to distinguish between real angst and internal conflict, and between projection and reality testing'.[97] Where Klein's superego fluctuates and is morally inconstant, causing the child to succumb to their instinctual aggressive and controlling desires, Freud understood the super-ego as the agent behind the child's successful integration into society.

Anna Freud emphasised the impact outside authorities have on the development of the child's moral compass. According to Freud, at birth the child is narcissistic or 'auto-erotic',

[95] Anna Freud, 'Four Lectures', p. 65.
[96] Deborah P. Britzman, *After-Education: Anna Freud, Melanie Klein, and Psychoanalytic Histories of Learning* (New York: SUNY Press, 2012), p. 43.
[97] Britzman, p. 44.

with little interest in the specific objects in their outside world.[98] In the early stages of life, the infant is concerned only with its 'well-being' and satisfying its own instincts. As the child develops into an adult, they engage with objects in the outside world through the process of identification. Through these identifications, the child adapts to the moral demands of exterior authorities and its superego finally becomes 'whole'. In her 1926 lectures on child analysis, Freud writes about the importance of the first parental relationships, without which the superego would forever be stunted:

> [T]he superego of an adult individual has become the representative of the moral demands made by the society in which he lives… what was originally a personal obligation felt toward the parents becomes, in the course of development, an ego ideal that is independent of its prototypes in the external world. In the case of a child, however, there is as yet no such independence. Detachment from the first love objects still lies in the future, and identification with them is accomplished only gradually and piecemeal. Even though the superego already exists and interacts with the ego at this early period much as it does in later times, its dependence on the objects to which it owes its existence must not be overlooked… [99]

Here, Freud emphasises the paramount importance of exterior reality for the child—authorities in the outside world influence psychic development, they can impart moral knowledge and steer the child in a healthy direction. Just as institutions like the ITSD looked for the origin of juvenile delinquency in the family unit, Freud stressed the importance of parental guidance to the healthy development of the ego.

In doing so, Freud shifted emphasis away from examining repressed drives and desires in the unconscious (which her father had been primarily concerned with) and towards what has often been deemed 'ego psychology' (the examination of conscious life, on behaviour that is immediately observable to the analyst). Suzanne Stewart-Steinberg describes this shift, which is mainly outlined in Freud's most famous work *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense* (1936), as 'a theoretical uprooting […] signalled by a transference from the analysis of

[98] For Anna Freud's views on auto-eroticism, which she contrasts to Klein's understanding of the child's relationship to 'objects' from birth, see *The Freud-Klein Controversies 1941-45*, ed. by Pearl King and Richard Steiner (London: Taylor & Francis, 2015). In her summary of the discussion of April 7th, l943, Anna Freud writes: 'For Mrs. Klein object relationships begin with, or soon after, birth, whereas I consider that there is a narcissistic and auto-erotic phase of several months' duration, which precedes what we call object relationships in its proper sense, even though the beginning of object relation are slowly built up during this initial stage' (p. 418).

[99] Anna Freud, 'Four Lectures', pp. 54-55.

repression to the analysis of defences'.[100] Ego psychology was a discernible move away from attempting to understand the unconscious phantasy lives of patients, which Melanie Klein focused on in her therapies. Anna Freud's 'ego psychology' also demonstrates a wider 'social turn' in psychoanalysis. In the introduction to this thesis, I argue that Sigmund Freud's *Civilisation and Its Discontents* presents an idea of an atomistic individual who is, by nature, uncomfortable in civilisation because social norms force the repression of human desire. But Anna Freud presents a different relationship between the individual and their community: the human being, she suggests, is dependent on outside authorities for successful, healthy psychological development. Here, society holds the humanistic potential to prevent destructive and aggressive behaviours.

This focus on conscious, rather than unconscious, life also shifted the analyst's therapeutic role. In Freud's clinic, Britzman notes, the analyst needed to 'win over the child and be prepared to open some possibilities through confidence building, while foreclosing others by rational persuasion and assuming the position of authority'. For Freud, the infant's development is gradual—through reality-testing, the ego learns to negotiate between its expectations and the reality it is presented with. Eventually, the infant develops the capacity to distinguish between interior and exterior life, between phantasy and reality. As Britzman puts it, 'awareness of outside authority comes before and constitutes knowledge of internal authority'.[101] In her authoritative role, Freud encouraged the child to make what she called a 'positive transference'; she wrote that she 'take[s] great pains to establish in the child a strong attachment to [her]self, and to bring him into a relationship of dependence on [her] […] This affectionate attachment, i.e., the positive transference to the analyst, becomes the prerequisite for all later analytic work'.[102] Negative transference, where the analyst becomes the child's negative ego-ideal (who would incite feelings of aggression and violence) was discouraged:

> We know that with an adult we can work for prolonged periods of time with a negative transference, which we turn to account through consistent interpretation and reference to its origins. But with a child negative impulses towards the analyst - however revealing they may be in many respects - are essentially disturbing and should be dealt with analytically as soon as possible.[103]

[100] Suzanne Stewart-Steinberg, *Impious Fidelity* (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 146.
[101] Britzman, p. 52.
[102] Anna Freud, 'Four Lectures', p. 40.
[103] Anna Freud, 'Introduction to the Technique of Child Analysis', p. 41.

Freud's focus on positive rather than negative transference in the analytic setting shows us that this was a place of schooling, of not only interpretation but pedagogy: negative or antisocial associations were to be discouraged, affection and kindness nurtured. Though Klein also saw the importance of a positive transference in the clinic for the success of therapy, she also acknowledged that negative transference towards the analyst must, at once, be subject to an interpretation. In *The Psychoanalysis of Children* (1932), Klein writes that 'should the child show shyness, anxiety or even only lack of trust, such behaviour is to be taken as a sign of a negative transference, and this makes it still more imperative that interpretation should begin as soon as possible'.[104] Klein argues that by offering the child an analysis of their negative transference, the analyst 'reduces the patient's negative transference by tracing the negative affects involved back to their original objects and situations'.[105] Unlike Freud, Klein does not work to discourage or divert negative behaviour, but instead emphasises a 'need for a combination of eagerness and patience'; the analyst must allow for moments of disruption and resistance, which provide crucial pathways to understanding unconscious life. Where Freud looks to modify disruptive behaviour in the clinic, Klein provides a space for its elucidation.

In Anna Freud's clinic, however, it was the responsibility of the analyst to modify their patient's moral and social behaviour, so that the child grew up capable of 'enjoyment and of accomplishing his life-work'. If the analyst decided 'not to aid such an education', the child's sense of right and wrong remains undeveloped. This leaves the child to act, carelessly, on their baser desires.[106] Freud focused on helping the child through the process of 'reality testing', guiding the ego to manage and even transform its expectations and its anticipations of the outside world. Freud and Klein offer different ideas about the psychological development of the 'moral' impulse—for Klein, the individual's sense of ethical conduct emerges from the primordial conflict between the 'love' and 'hate' drives, for Freud the outside world and the people in it bestow an important ethical influence on the underdeveloped ego. When the child enters the analytic setting, the analyst becomes an important authority in that child's life, capable of changing the course of the patient's real, lived experience in society.

As Anna Freud believed that the baby's exterior environment was a key factor in their development, she also saw an importance in integrating psychoanalytic knowledge into educative settings. Freud argued that education 'could offer the child's help, encourage the

[104] Klein, *The Psychoanalysis of Children,* p. 60.
[105] Klein, *The Psychoanalysis of Children,* p. 21.
[106] Anna Freud, 'The Relation Between Psychoanalysis and Pedagogy', in *Psychoanalysis for Teachers and Parents,* trans. by Barbara Low (Boston: Emerson, 1935), pp. 92-114 (p. 104).

child to develop an interest in being needed, helping others, and sublimating aggression'.[107] In 1935, Freud gave several lectures to teachers and parents in Vienna, encouraging them to incorporate psychoanalysis in their care and discipline of children. Doing so, she stated, would mean that 'the teacher's knowledge of human beings is extended, and his understanding of the complicated relations between the child and the educator is sharpened by psychoanalysis, which gives us a scientific theory of the instincts, of the unconscious and of the libido'.[108] Freud's focus on education also allowed for a seamless application of psychoanalysis to political and social causes. In particular, Freud was interested in social reform; Nick Midgley argues that in the early stages of her career Freud was constantly looking for new ways to bring together her interests in psychoanalysis and child welfare policy. In 1925, she set up a group with well-known Austrian social reformers to discuss the potential connections between educational policy and psychoanalysis. Midgley writes that, at this time, Freud was contributing to a wider conversation about the links between psychoanalysis and pedagogy:

> The radical reforms of education – understood as one aspect of a wider child welfare program – meant that many of the most idealistic and enthusiastic young people in Vienna chose to train as teachers. A significant proportion of these same young idealists were naturally attracted to psychoanalysis and wished to bring together their interest in educational reform with their enthusiasm for this new 'science of the mind,' which promised to revolutionize the way people thought about the psychology of the child.[109]

This interest in educational and social reform carried through to the late 1930s and 1940s, where, on arriving in England, Freud's speciality in child psychology allowed her to contribute to the British war effort. During the Second World War, Anna Freud was actively involved in wartime childcare institutions—in 1940, with fellow psychoanalyst Dorothy Burlingham, she founded the Hampstead War Nursery, a foster care home for bombed-out children in London. Over the course of the war, the nursery sheltered eighty displaced children at a time. As well as housing children, the clinic also had specific psychoanalytic aims; when describing the purpose of the nursery, Freud and Burlingham wrote that they wished to 'do research on the essential psychological needs of children; to study their reactions to bombing, destruction, and early separation from their families; to collect facts about the harmful consequences whenever their essential needs remain unsatisfied; to observe the general influence of community life at

[107] Anna Freud, 'Psychoanalysis and Pedagogy', p. 106.
[108] Anna Freud, 'Psychoanalysis and Pedagogy', p. 106.
[109] Nick Midgley, *Reading Anna Freud* (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 35.

an early age on their development'.[110] The war nurseries became a space for observational psychological research, and Freud would ask her staff to make notes on small index cards about the children's emotional states and behaviour.[111] As well as attempting to discover the psychological impact that familial fracture had on children, Freud also wanted to find out the effects of social upheaval on early life. She examined how children felt in regards to the destruction of their communities—their towns, streets, and social centres. In the Hampstead War Nursery, Freud could connect her knowledge of psychoanalysis explicitly to the social sphere: though she was not doing analysis, the clinic provided her the perfect opportunity for discovering how children were psychologically connected to their environment and to the people in it. In the records of the clinic, we can see that staff were asked, in particular, to notice 'reactions to the disruption of family life', 'responses to substitute mothering', and the 'effects of group living'.[112] Anna Freud's version of psychoanalysis could bridge the gap between the private clinic and the social world. It proposed that child psychology was valuable precisely because of its relevance to social analysis.

Anna Freud's active participation in social causes and the attention she placed on education suggests, more broadly, her commitment to employing psychoanalysis in aid of and in defence of democratic institutions and projects during the Second World War. Stewart-Steinberg notes that Freud's psychoanalysis was informed by a long-standing commitment to social reformist movements in Austria, as well as her own experience of persecution under the fascist Nazi regime. She argues that Freud's 'life project' was to 'defend and protect the ego, especially the egos of children and of those who had been torn apart by the results of fascist and Nazi dictatorships'.[113] She understands that Freud's focus on the social applications of psychoanalysis was indicative of a desire to protect and uphold both her father's legacy and the democratic subject:

> What she sought were adequate defences for the ego in order to create stable democratic institutions. Hers were certainly survival tactics, first and foremost for the movement she had inherited from her father and one that in 1939, when she became its new leader, was most certainly not guaranteed to live. [She was interested in] [h]ow to protect her father's most fundamental discovery—the laws of the unconscious—against

[110] Dorothy Burlingham and Anna Freud, *Annual Report of a Residential War Nursery* (London: 1942), p. 3.
[111] Midgley, p. 71.
[112] Anna Freud, quoted in Midgley, p. 72.
[113] Stewart-Steinberg, p. 5.

> totalitarianism, [and] provide for its continued existence by linking it to the democratic project […] [114]

But Stewart-Steinberg argues that this was a difficult task as it exposed a 'fundamental contradiction: the problem that rational, consenting, and choosing subjects cannot be ruled by the unconscious'. She notes that in order to function a democracy relies on responsible members, who are 'capable of making decisions and choices that address the interests of both the self and of the community'. [115] Indeed, theories of the irrational, unknowable unconscious undermine an idea of the rational democratic citizen who 'participates in stable institutional structures'.[116] As I explored in the introduction to this thesis, the participatory and socially-conscious individual appears in contemporary notions of social democratic citizenship: T. H. Marshall, for example, imagined the postwar citizen as a 'civilized being' who 'live[s] the life of a good citizen, giving such service as one can to promote the welfare of the community'.[117] As such, and in transforming psychoanalysis so it applies to democracy, Freud shifted emphasis away from the unconscious and towards conscious action and behaviour. In Stewart-Steinberg's words, for Anna Freud 'democracy requires—in order for it to function, be ethical and credible—that it gets its unconscious under some form of control. The looming threat, otherwise, is a return to totalitarian logic'.[118] Ego psychology, then, was a concerted effort to continue the legacy of psychoanalysis, to make it relevant to a postwar, democratic order. According to Anna Freud, then, a traumatised, unruly or irrational unconscious undermines the path to democracy.

Child analysis, then, is the first step to fostering the rational and responsible democratic citizen. For Freud, Stewart-Steinberg writes, the nursery 'was never the site of play and irresponsibility, but more vitally the space from within which social, democratic participation came into being'.[119] In the nursery, the child would learn how to function in society; the room of the clinic was 'the model of all sociopolitical relations; far more dramatically, it functioned for her as the fantasy space of an idealized, because just and democratic, order, of indeed an imaginary sociality'.[120] Here, Anna Freud represents a form of psychoanalysis that can easily integrate into democratic institutions. Freud's analysis places an emphasis on the importance

[114] Stewart-Steinberg, p. 5.
[115] Stewart-Steinberg, p. 5.
[116] Stewart-Steinberg, p. 9.
[117] Marshall, p. 78.
[118] Stewart-Steinberg, p. 5.
[119] Stewart-Steinberg, p. 48.
[120] Stewart-Steinberg, p. 42.

of collective identity and group psychology, on understanding and respecting authority, and it gives a new significance to social institutions like schools, nurseries, and psychological centres. For Freud, personal and social stability are the end-goal of psychoanalytic therapy—when they leave her clinic, her patients have become well-adjusted, rational democratic citizens.

Throughout this section, I have drawn some comparisons between Melanie Klein's phantasy-oriented psychoanalysis (her allegiance to the 'unconscious') and Anna Freud's 'ego-psychology' (the analysis of the outward and observable facets of psychological life). These differences, I argue, are especially notable when we look at Klein and Freud's divergent ideas on the formation of morality in the early life of the individual—where Klein believed in the absolute autonomy of the ego, Freud argued that the child needs the help of outside 'authorities' for healthy psychological development. But, regardless of their differences, Freud and Klein both participated in a broader national conversation about the capability of the democratic citizen, the role of the authority in early life, and the relationship between the individual and their social environment.

In the next section of this chapter I note that while Freud was willing to engage with social democratic institutions and find a social use for the psychoanalytic clinic, Klein continued to practice in the private sphere throughout the war, even leaving London for the solace of the Scottish Highlands. If we read Anna Freud's efforts to connect psychoanalysis to the public sphere as evidence of her willing involvement in social democratic institutions, then can Klein's commitment to the private clinic tell us about her own understanding about the social role of the practice? I will look at moments when Klein engages explicitly with the events of the Second World War and the workings of the wartime British state. By examining these writings, which were kept to the private clinic or circulated within her small group of followers, we can understand to what extent Klein also figures psychoanalysis as a psychosocial practice, where patterns of aggressivity and violence in unconscious life reveal something pertinent about concrete historical events. I will question whether we can read a social democratic urge in Klein's wartime writings, or whether the ambiguity of her 'moral' act, where the ego slips between benevolence and destruction, complicates and prohibits such a straightforward application of psychoanalysis to the social world.

1.4 Klein's War Writings

1.4.1 Klein and the Problem of the Second World War

So let's return, again, to the letter that Joan Riviere sent to Klein in June 1940 and that I detailed at the start of this chapter. As we have already seen, Riviere's letter encourages Klein to provide an opinion on the psychological causes of warfare. Specifically, Riviere wants to know how psychoanalysis can explain political inaction and apathy, and what Klein might add to contemporary discussions about the importance of maintaining morale. She writes:

> My idea is that you should tell us first what you believe to be the causes 1) of the German psychological situation, and 2) Secondly of that of the rest of Europe and mainly the Allies, since the last war. To me the apathy and denial of danger in the Allies especially England is not clear (I never shared it). 3) How is it connected with what I call the 'Munich' complex – the son's incapacity to fight for mother and country, and his homosexual leanings.[121]

What can psychoanalysis, she asks, tell us about civilian participation—can it explain the denial of danger, the hesitation to engage in the war effort, or conversely, the all-encompassing desire to see the Nazis defeated? These questions all link back to psychoanalysis's changing role in wartime, to the idea that analysts should turn their attention towards addressing social life (or the 'conscious' experience of the citizen). Riviere is markedly anxious about the legacy of psychoanalysis (earlier in the letter she writes that the German invasion could signal 'the end' of the practice), but these questions put forward her hope that psychoanalysis might yet have a future, where it becomes actively involved in the war effort and the struggle against fascism. Riviere suggests that psychoanalysis provides a helpful lens for understanding and processing the complex psychological effects of living in wartime: indeed, signing off her letter, she writes 'psa [psychoanalysis] is a great anodyne in all this anxiety!'[122] To what extent, then, was Klein willing to engage with these questions? Did she also see potential in a socially-oriented psychoanalysis, newly useful to political ends?

Klein's response came in the form of an essay, which she titled 'What Does Death Represent for the Individual?' (1940). In it, she writes that the individual's desire to engage in social and political violence results from early anxiety and guilt. The fear that arises from warfare or attack, Klein argues, comes from the ego's desire for the 'survival of goodness in

[121] Joan Riviere, Letter to Melanie Klein, in Melanie Klein Archives, Contemporary Medical Archives Centre at the Wellcome Institute of the History of Medicine, London, PP/KLE/C.95, p. 1.
[122] Riviere, p. 2.

spite of all dangers to values'.[123] In war, the individual sees their homeland (which becomes an introjected symbol of the 'perfect mother') in danger from the evil enemy (a symbol of the ego's badness or hateful impulses). In the essay, Klein understands that the 'hating' and 'loving' sides of the ego always have an outward political or social expression, and thus are able to shape the way war appears to us and how we react to it. 'The present situation', she writes, 'proves a very strong stimulus to revive the guilt and fears connected to [...] phantasies'.[124] Written immediately following the Nazi occupation of France and amongst widespread social anxiety that there would soon be a similar invasion on British soil, Klein connects the fear of war in Europe to the individual's early anxiety situation—the original conflict between the life and death drives, between the desire for aggression and the impulse for reparation.

Klein writes that the real terror of war emerges not from the concrete experience of constant bombing or from the fear of Nazi invasion, but from the conflicts and calamities of unconscious life. As Stonebridge puts it, 'it is precisely the way that war confirms the "truth" of our fantasies […] that makes war so pernicious psychically and morally'.[125] The dangers of war become even more destructive and life threatening when the war outside is incorporated into the raging war inside. Klein writes that, in this case: '[T]he individual becomes paralysed, which may amount to suicidal incapacity to deal with external dangers'.[126] As Klein understands it, the experience of war in the 'real' world legitimises the terrors of the psychological war between 'good' and 'bad', or the 'life' and 'death' drives deep in the ego. The ability to cope with the chaotic environment of war depends on the pervasiveness of this internal conflict. An individual's reaction to a real-world crisis is determined by whether or not their death and life drives are still caught in a tumultuous battle for dominance. Once the individual has successfully split apart their life and death drives, carefully separating their loving instincts from their instinct for destruction, they can face the 'outside war' in a healthy way. 'Only thus,' Klein writes, 'is it possible to hate with full strength what is felt to be evil in the external world—to attack and destroy at the same time protecting oneself with one's good internal object as well as external loved object, country, etc., against the bad things'.[127] If the

[123] Melanie Klein, 'What Does Death Represent to the Individual?' Unpubl. ms. Melanie Klein Archives, Contemporary Medical Archives Centre at the Wellcome Institute of the History of Medicine, London. (PP/KLE/C.96), pp. 1-9 (p. 5).
[124] Klein, 'What Does Death Represent to the Individual?', p. 5.
[125] Lyndsey Stonebridge, '"What does death represent to the individual?": Psychoanalysis in Wartime', *differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies*, 20 (2009), 102-116.
[126] Klein, 'What Does Death Represent?', p. 3.
[127] Klein, 'What Does Death Represent?', p. 2.

war 'inside' looms larger than the outside war, then the individual's attempts to attack what it perceives as 'bad' are misdirected towards the 'self'—any attempt to participate in war becomes an act of abject masochism.

Throughout the essay, Klein describes phantasy as an extremely powerful force, which determines and conditions every social relation, every political act, and can even explain the individual's complicity in violent acts of war. If the phantasy-war dominates, engaging in real-world conflict means imperilling the self, as the intense force of the ego's murderousness is directed inwards instead of outwards. Nevertheless, there is a healthy way to engage in war and conflict. Here, Klein emphasises the importance of 'balance' between the unconscious war and the outside war: 'The question of balance so often stressed appears as the ultimate decisive factor. Optimum between external and internal, love and hate, and the methods used against anxiety.'[128] Here, Klein links the optimum psychological state of the war-citizen to the early situation of the child. The relationship between the war-citizen and their country replicates the early child-parent relationship. Protecting the country from bad and evil, she writes, recalls the desire to protect and love the mother in early life. Once the balance between 'love and hatred' is restored, 'parents become in retrospect much more trustworthy, worthwhile preserving, and accordingly also present relatives'.[129] As we have seen, in a war situation the 'balance' might be tipped by excessive and misdirected violence, by the need to invade, kill, commit atrocities towards an 'enemy' which is a double of all the enemies within the ego. However, Klein argues that the inverse is just as damaging—the balance can also be tipped by the absolute denial of the dangers of the outside war. Denying and avoiding the 'outside war', Klein writes, suggests that the individual is once again primarily embroiled in their unconscious war—it suggests a retreat to the 'good inner objects', and means that the individual has *too much* faith that goodness will be protected:

> Certain amount of temporary denial obviously unavoidable and necessary. We look at nature, we read a book, we play with a child, we enjoy food, etc, and we have to remind ourselves that our life and country is at stake. In between the good experience has helped us to deny the danger. If the denial predominates in the attitude it may lead to complacency, flight to the good inner objects, etc. If the help provided by the fact that such good things we just enjoy exist, the belief in the good object and in goodness

[128] Klein, 'What Does Death Represent?', p. 5.
[129] Klein, 'What Does Death Represent?', p. 3.

> ultimately, is not too much denial of the bad things, it may help us to take steps to preserve goodness externally, and may internally help us to remain calm in the face of danger.[130]

For Klein, both political inaction and excessive aggression in a time of war have deep roots to the psychological conflicts of childhood.

Here, we can note, again, the difference between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein's understanding of the wartime role of psychoanalysis. If we look at Freud's war nursery report, we can see that she was invested in the concrete, observable effects of war on the lives of her patients. She thinks about the ways that psychoanalysis can incorporate 'childcare' and safeguard children against any adverse psychological consequences of war conditions:

> War conditions, through the inevitable breaking-up of family life, deprive children of the natural background for their emotional and mental development. The present generation of children has, therefore, little chance to build up its future psychological health and normality which will be needed for the reconstruction of the world after the war. To counteract these deficiencies, war-time care of children has to be more elaborate and more carefully thought out than in ordinary times of peace.[131]

Anna Freud claims that psychoanalysis had a specific political role in the wartime environment, and wrote that all attention should now be moved to the 'essential elements' of childcare: 'the need for personal attachment, for emotional stability, and for permanency of educational influence'.[132] For Klein, however, the calamitous experience of war should not change the practice of psychoanalysis or shift its focus. The environment of war simply provides the already-warring mind with an outlet, a public mode for the expression of deep internal conflicts. For Klein, the mind is not corrupted by the war and its traumas and disruptions. Rather it is the other way around—for the citizen, war is unbearable and traumatic only if the war inside remains unbearable and traumatic. Thus, for Klein it becomes more important than ever to keep analysis in its current state, to focus on observing the complex phantasy lives of patients, and encouraging them to make discoveries about the workings of their own unconscious.

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[130] Klein, 'What Does Death Represent?', p. 3.
[131] Burlingham and Freud, *Annual Report of a Residential War Nursery*, p. 3.
[132] Burlingham and Freud, *Annual Report of a Residential War Nursery*, p. 3.

In her essay, Klein claims that no real progress can be made in war analysis without remaining aware of the 'constant interplay, present and external situation, with the internal and with the past, as well as past experiences'.[133] To back up this point, she uses the following example from her war clinic:

> Striking how the analysis of these secret plotting sadistic phantasies improved internal relationships and relieved anxiety of danger of present situation. In one instance, much former material became so much clearer and illuminating that peace of mind steadily increased, in spite of the worsening of the external situation.[134]

This is the key point of Kleinian analysis: a concerted examination of the 'external situation' is futile because the individual will always attempt to find symbolic expressions in the outside world to represent what is happening in the unconscious. As C. Fred Alford puts it: '[for Klein] there is never a moment when we are not unconsciously phantasising, never a moment in which this phantasising is not influencing our perception of reality'.[135] But the primacy of phantasy life in Kleinian analysis poses a question about how we can possibly relate to the outside world in any meaningful way. If all our social actions are expressions of an unconscious war, does this mean we have no political agency, that every decision we make has, in fact, been already determined by the state of our love and death drives? For Stonebridge, Klein's essay emphasises the 'political powerlessness' of the ego, 'a powerlessness rendered all the more historically poignant in Klein's writing because of the way it implicates a destructive and self-defeating sense of guilt'.[136] Indeed, Klein makes a connection between political action and the early anxiety situation in a way that transforms every political act, removing it from its material contexts and implicating it, instead, into the ever-raging early anxiety situation. The task of the analyst is to reveal these connections between phantasy and reality so that the individual feels able to make meaningful and productive decisions in the social world.

In her response to Riviere's letter, Klein carefully avoids an analysis of concrete historical events. The question is not 'What does the war in Europe represent to the individual?'; she does not attempt to make any precise claims about Nazism, about the persecution of Jewish people, or about the fears that Britain would soon be under the threat of

[133] Klein, 'What Does Death Represent?', p. 3.
[134] Klein, 'What Does Death Represent?', p. 6.
[135] C. Fred Alford, *Klein and Critical Social Theory* (London: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 45.
[136] Stonebridge, '"What does death represent to the individual?"', p. 111.

mass bombing. Instead, she links the experience of 'war' to what she sees as the most fundamental conflict of human experience—that which takes place in the recesses of our unconscious-world, the constant battle against the 'death' instinct, which causes all pain and destruction. Stonebridge suggests that 'the imperative in the wartime essay […] is to find a way of moving through, as it were, our own murderousness, toward not only a different relation to death and loss but also toward having an affectively meaningful relation to the world.'[137] Riviere's questions about citizen morale and participation provide Klein with the opportunity to resume a universal discussion about the psychological roots of human destruction, to return to an analysis of the timeless battle between love and hate.

However, despite Klein's desire to address the universal and ahistorical conflicts of the ego, her theory is bound to the contemporaneous symbols of war. Much of the language Klein used to understand the child's mind was closely associated with the social and political discourse surrounding the two World Wars in the early twentieth century. Michal Shapira notes that Klein looked to war only to look away from it, using symbols and the language of physical war to attempt to understand inner conflict. Though 'it was the war inside that was of interest to her', Klein 'indirectly connected the personal aggression of the family drama to the wider political and social questions of the time related to war and peace'.[138] Perhaps it is no coincidence that Klein's theory of the ego's 'reparation' recalled the 'reparations' enacted by the Treaty of Versailles, which ordered Germany to 'make amends' after the First World War.[139] Shapira argues that while Klein 'did not write on war directly', her writings show the 'ways in which her poetics of violence are symptomatic of the questions at the height of human destruction'.[140] Though phantasy-life was all-important to Klein, we can see issues associated with the sociohistorical context of 1930s and 1940s Britain threading throughout her theory and therapies. Her language of the 'war inside', of the cyclical nature of destruction and reparation, might call to the fore contemporary debates about how the experience of war affects the minds of children. In the first half of the twentieth century, when Europe seemed to oscillate constantly between war and peace-time, Klein used the language of conflict to understand the

[137] Stonebridge, *The Destructive Element,* p. 15.
[138] Shapira, p. 111.
[139] For more detail on how we might read Klein's theories with the Treaty of Versailles in mind, see Karl Figlio, *Remembering as Reparation* (London: Palgrave, 2017). Figlio discusses how 'reparation' entered into social discourse in the early twentieth-century, writing: 'Moreover, the secular concept of reparation entered psychoanalytic and social vocabularies around the same time: mainly through Klein in psychoanalysis and the Treaty of Versailles in social discourse.' (p. 186).
[140] Shapira, p. 111.

movements of the unconscious, which constantly moves between its own acts of warmongering and peace-making.

Throughout 'What does Death Represent to the Individual', Klein puts forward her idea that the subject's perceived danger of world events, of war, holocaust and invasion, do not occur because of any new or unknown threat. Rather, she argues, these fears occur because events can cause an unconscious slippage to another war—the war that arises from the early anxiety situation. She suggests that the real danger always remains *inside* the individual. If the war inside looms large it threatens to pervade all social experience—the individual cannot cope with the problem of bombing, of familial separation and physical evacuation, and is paralysed by the fear of invasion—the fear that they, in their own 'internal hell', have arranged for Hitler to invade the world.[141] The problems children faced in the war (evacuation, familial fracture, the trauma of constant bombing) were not traumatic on their own, but were disruptive because they confirmed the child's worst fears about their own destructiveness.

In an unpublished paper in the Melanie Klein archive at the Wellcome Library called 'Notes on the Problem of Evacuation' (undated), Klein addresses the 'problem' posed by thousands of child refugees who had been displaced from their families and moved across the country. She writes: 'There are many questions connected with the child's own home life, as well as with the new surroundings, in which the child is put, which need to be considered if one wants to discuss the evacuation problem'.[142] For Klein, evacuation causes distress because it threatens to make conscious the child's desires to see their family split apart. Evacuation validates the child's worst fears: that their destructive impulses are very real, and they must now be sent away because they pose a lethal danger to their family:

> It is clear that if a child's fear of being expelled from home because he is so bad and dangerous is very strong, the necessity for him to leave home under evacuation conditions must necessarily confirm his worst fears. He would then feel that not only is he losing his home and all that it means, but also that he has actually endangered his parents - a fear which will he fostered by the actual present fact that he leaves his parents in a more dangerous place than where he himself is going.[143]

[141] Klein, 'What Does Death Represent to the Individual?', p. 8.
[142] Melanie Klein, 'Notes on the Problem of Child Evacuation', Unpubl. Ms, Melanie Klein Archives, Contemporary Medical Archives Centre at the Wellcome Institute of the History of Medicine, London. (PP/KLE/C.94), pp. 1-8 (p. 1).
[143] Klein, 'Child Evacuation', p. 4.

As a defence mechanism, the evacuated child attempts to find 'a new home' and 'better parents' in their new surroundings. 'In the unconscious mind of the child', Klein writes, 'this means to find parents who will not call out one's hatred, who will not retaliate for hatred called against them, and who are not injured by aggressive impulses'.[144] Effectively, the displaced child looks to absolve their destructive tendencies by showering their affection on new parental figures. However, Klein claims that this need to assimilate into a different family is dangerous, as it only serves to 'rouse the anxiety of leaving the parents, and all it implies'.[145] So evacuation is not troublesome on its own; rather the conditions of child evacuation exacerbate the precarious state of the ego. She writes:

> How far is the new situation likely to dispel such fears, and lessen his guilt, and to allow him to adapt himself to the new environment? We can see that this depends, roughly speaking, on two factors: first on what the new environment is actually like; and secondly, on the strength of his own fears. As in every other situation, the two factors, the external & the internal, will interact.[146]

This essay works to trouble contemporary narratives that placed the child as a potential victim of the calamities of the war-environment. Instead, the war environment reveals something pertinent about the child's inner life. It uncovers the ambivalence of their morality, and the disconcerting notion that they are innately capable of destructive behaviour. In her final sentence, Klein suggests that her readers should look beyond the calamities of the war-environment, and into the child's mind, to understand fully the problems that evacuation might cause. She argues that '[t]he consideration of evacuation questions' is useful for the psychoanalyst only insofar as we understand that, for the evacuated child, 'difficulties come out more into the open, problems which appear to some extent in every child development'.[147] The evacuation essay reveals Klein's phantasy-oriented theory of war, where the psychological danger of conflict can only emerge from the complex inner life of the citizen.

In the following section of this chapter, I look closely at a case study of one of Klein's child patients during the war. I examine how Klein approaches a child who has become obsessed and seemingly traumatised by the war-situation. In the clinic, I argue, Klein is fixated on the internal war. The resolution of this war, and of the therapy in general, comes only when

[144] Klein, 'Child Evacuation', p. 6.
[145] Klein, 'Child Evacuation', p. 6.
[146] Klein, 'Child Evacuation', p. 6.
[147] Klein, 'Child Evacuation', p. 8.

the child learns and cares about the needs of others—when they become a capable and empathetic social being.

1.4.2 The Richard Case

Perhaps the most notable of Klein's wartime patients was ten-year-old 'Richard', who saw Klein for six sessions a week between April and August 1941 in the small Scottish town of Pitlochry. Throughout his treatment, Klein kept copious notes on the sessions, which she later wrote up in *Narrative of a Child Analysis* (1961). Published sixteen years after the war ended, this text records 93 sessions, and includes descriptions of Richard's play and the 74 drawings he had composed during his therapy. In her introduction to *Narrative of a Child Analysis*, Klein explains the reasons for Richard's therapy—his parents were worried by his antisocial behaviour and what they saw as an unhealthy dependence on his mother: 'though Richard was devoted to [his mother], he was an extremely difficult child to live with'.[148] Refusing to socialise with other children, 'he had no hobbies to occupy him, was overanxious and over-affectionate towards his mother and, since he could not bear to be away from her, clung to her in a persistent and exhausting way'.[149]

> Much care was lavished on him by his mother and in some ways she pampered him, but she did not seem to realize his great inherent capacity for love and kindness and had little confidence in his future development. At the same time she was very patient; for instance, she did not attempt to press the company of other children on him or to force him to attend school.[150]

Klein writes that the outbreak of war had increased these difficulties, as 'the war stirred up all his anxieties and he was particularly frightened of air-raids and bombs'.[151] Even at the beginning of his analysis, it is clear that Richard is both fascinated with and terrified by the war; he 'followed the news closely and took a great interest in the changes in the war situation, and this preoccupation came up again and again during the course of his analysis'.[152] Often expressing a fear of being attacked or bombed, he charted Hitler's movements on a map that

[148] Melanie Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis* (London: The Hogarth Press, 1975), p. 16.
[149] Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis*, p. 16.
[150] Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis*, p. 16.
[151] Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis*, p. 16.
[152] Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis*, p. 13.

covered one wall of the clinic. He brought a toy fleet to the sessions, replicating manoeuvres he had heard or read about on the floor of the clinic.[153] He spent many of the sessions drawing images of Nazi ships, planes, soldiers, and submarines, indicated by small swastikas or names of well-known war vessels. Richard was clearly concerned with the unfolding political situation in Europe—he often expressed worries about the invasions of Greece, France, and Portugal, and worried that Nazi submarines might be lying in wait in the Mediterranean, ready to attack unknowing Allied ships. Many of his drawings depicted exactly that: boats lying at the bottom of the sea, planes falling from the sky, and the scribbled chaos of explosions (Fig. 1).

Figure 1 - Drawing of an Allied ship and Nazi submarine by "Richard", spring/summer 1941. (Source: Wellcome Trust, London, Melanie Klein Papers, file PP/KLE/B.47)

Klein saw Richard's fear of Nazi invasion as a direct pathway to his early anxiety situation. She interpreted that Richard's fear of enemies stemmed from his attachment to his mother and his desire to possess her completely. During Richard's therapy, Klein posed the idea that the mother's body became a battlefield in Richard's mind, a desired territory to war over. In her writings on the session, she contends that Richard's anxiety is the result of his splitting of the ego into 'good' and 'bad'—Richard is caught between the destructive impulse

[153] Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis,* p. 109.

to attack his mother, to see bombs tear her apart (to, symbolically, consume her), and the competing desire to cherish and protect her. Klein makes the case that Richard is re-enacting and re-creating the external war within him, and is only terrified by Nazi bombs because they represent and unleash his own aggressive and destructive feelings.[154] Klein's therapies of Richard thus involve identifying expressions of his 'loving' and 'hating' impulses. She finds that Richard mediates 'good' and 'evil' feelings through the images of war—the Swastika and the Union Jack, usually sketched on battleships, bombs and airplanes, are straightforward symbols of the 'hate' and 'love' drives. Richard's 'good' object is the homeland, the 'good mother', which must be protected at all costs. The 'bad' object, or his destructive self, is indicated by Nazi symbols—it appears as German planes flying overhead, the U-Boat dropping bombs on Allied submarines, or in the image of a Swastika, drawn again and again on scraps of paper. In a session dated 06/08/1941, Klein's archival notes reveal Richard's preoccupation with the symbols and actions of war and the integration of these into his interior conflict:

> K int. That the bombing German is R killing K, changing himself into the loving R, who writes friendly letters to K - Swastika into Union Jack. K also refers to yesterday's, when R's destroyer genit. was German.
>
> (While R was scribbling No. IV he was singing loudly and angrily.)
>
> (K, int. This as bombing with sounds - refers to anal noises and faeces. Also shows him that in No. IV, among the numbers, marked now A and B by K, is an indistinct 23 - might be a 23 - wh. Is the day of K's intended departure).[155]

Klein goes on to establish a link between Richard's fantasies of throwing faeces with the act of bombing—his 'unconscious desires to attack [his family] with urine and faeces, to devour and kill them'. In these scenarios, Richard figures himself as the Nazi bomber—the bad, evil force that desires destruction above all else. In her notes on a session dated 26/06/41, Klein makes a similar link when she notices that Richard is scribbling on paper as he speaks to her about his mother and father. He takes the pencil and stabs the paper repeatedly, leaving large holes in the drawing. She interprets that this action is suggestive of the destructive force of the bomb, which ruins and defaces everything it comes into contact with: 'K. int. That

[154] Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis*, p. 61.
[155] Melanie Klein, 'Richard', Unpubl. Ms., Melanie Klein Archives, Contemporary Medical Archives Centre at the Wellcome Institute of the History of Medicine, London. (PP/KLE/B.46), p. 459.

scribbling here might stand for injuring, bombing defecation—the violent dots on paper'.[156] Richard is replicating the violence of the Blitz in these motions—the poking of holes in a piece of paper is a visceral replication of the imagined bombing of the mother by his destructive or bad self. As Maud Ellmann notes, Richard sees his inner world as the true war-zone, while the outside world is 'peopled by the introjected doubles of his family circle: mother, father, brother, dog, grandmother and other cameo performers'.[157] The integration of the family into the 'psychodrama' at the heart of the ego takes over the entirety of the analytic situation, with the playroom even representing 'the inside of the mother's body and its population' that must, at all costs, be protected from invasion.[158]

War provides Richard with the means to express his interior conflict; his desire to destroy and devour the mother, and the ensuing need to harm himself and prevent his own murderousness. In Richard's imaginings, Klein argues, war itself becomes a symbol for the death instinct and any reminders of war (the newspapers that litter the clinic, the map on the wall, and even the notion that 'Mrs. K.' might have to, one day, return to the bombed city) return Richard to his unconscious conflict. As such, Klein notes that moments of peace and solace arise in the clinic when Richard forgets, even for a moment, the raging war in Europe. In the sixteenth session of Richard's analysis, Klein notices that looking at the countryside has a calming effect when Richard is especially agitated:

> Suddenly Richard bit the tower of a house (which he called a 'church'). Then the dog bit somebody and disaster followed. Everything collapsed and the dog was the only survivor. Richard again put the toys aside, as he had done after the previous disasters, and said that he was 'tired' of them. He looked worried when he said so. He got up, looked round the room and went out of the door; he cheered up as he gazed (with genuine admiration) at the countryside, remarking on its beauty.[159]

During this session, Klein writes that she 'interpreted that the lovely countryside was a proof that there was a beautiful, good, external world'—a world that gives Richard hope 'that the internal world, particularly his mother's, was good too'.[160] If the playroom, with all its reminders of war, stands for Richard's violent actions against the mother, then the country

[156] Klein, 'Richard', p. 207.
[157] Ellmann, 'Vaccies Go Home!', p. 247.
[158] Ellmann, 'Vaccies Go Home!', p. 247.
[159] Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis*, p. 71.
[160] Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis*, p. 54.

outside is the restoration of the ideal mother, unharmed by Richard and his destruction—the green pastures of Britain are symbolic of the 'beautiful, good, external world', the loving mother, and the end of all familial conflict. This further reinforces Klein's idea that the war has become bound to Richard's internal conflict, and her hope that in quelling Richard's fears about his own destructiveness, she will also help to diminish his fearful relationship to war itself. Klein hopes that analysis will help him realise that the outside war is only terrifying because its symbols and images have been internalised.

If Richard's psychological problems emerge from an inability to distinguish between psychological war and real-life war, then his recovery begins when he realises their separation. Klein writes that when this happens, Richard can understand that his loving impulses might, in fact, help diminish the effects of his destructive instinct—that he has the capability to heal and repair the mother. This, in turn, leads to a form of moral reconstruction, where Richard suddenly has the capability to emphasise even with his professed 'enemies'. As the therapy progresses, Klein notes that Richard was able to 'face and integrate' his dual destructive and reparative instincts toward the mother. As a result, 'a greater tolerance towards other people as well as towards his own shortcomings developed'—'he no longer felt compelled to turn away from destroyed objects but could experience compassion for them'.[161]

In Richard's phantasy formation, the vicious and destructive internal object world presents the family (represented as his 'motherland') as an increasingly fragile unit, which is under the constant threat of destruction by bombs, faeces, and other figurations of the hateful ego. Klein argues that in order to quell these tendencies, Richard must stop acting on his destructive instinct through symbols of war. Instead, Klein encourages Richard to recognise the destructive influence of his death instinct. To do this, Klein gradually reveals the detail of Richard's early oedipal situation to him in the hope that it will lead to his psychological progression through the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions.

Here, we can see how Klein understands the relationship between Richard and the environment of the Second World War, where war presents a set of symbols and images which he uses to 'act out' the unconscious conflict between 'good' and 'bad'. Kleinian analysis looks to find the synthesis between the inner and outer world, it is preoccupied with how the desires of the ego extend to other people, places and things. For Klein, outside conflict fosters and recalls the psychological fighting of the good and bad self (or the life and death drives) for dominance. If her patients are anxious about the war, then this anxiety results from the

[161] Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis,* pp. 465-6.

internalisation of the images and metaphors the war produces into the original ego-conflict. Unlike Anna Freud, who addressed specific problems of the Second World War, Klein does not see an importance in understanding the conditions and traumas of individual historical events. Rather, psychoanalysis' power is its ability to rationalise all social experience within the eternal phantasy-war of the ego.

1.4.3 Creativity and Resistance in Klein's Clinic

So far, we have seen that Klein works to change the narrative that the child is under a new threat in wartime—the 'dangers' of war, she argues, are rooted in unconscious conflict. But she is nevertheless preoccupied with the character of the citizen, the individual who, through psychoanalysis, becomes able to empathise with others in their community. As I argue above, Anna Freud imagined that the war clinic would prevent children from being psychologically and irrevocably damaged by the environment of war. In Freud's therapy, the psychoanalyst also acts as a moral arbiter, who directs the child's judgement of 'right' and 'wrong'. Klein's clinic, too, is a space of moral reconstruction, where the process of psychoanalysis improves the child's relationship to other citizens. What makes Kleinian psychoanalysis unique, however, is her contention that the child must first express and move through their destructive instinct; they must misbehave in order to develop the capacity to be 'good'. In particular, Richard's drawings are a space for the safe expression of aggression and violence, where he can eventually build up the ability to act in a moral, productive, and empathetic way towards the objects in their environment. Here, I draw out the connections that Klein makes between resistance and the destructive instinct, and creativity and the moral instinct. I argue that Richard's creativity, which is also his desire to participate and be active in the therapeutic space, is necessary for his ethical development. The final section of this chapter argues that Klein's clinic thus acts as a microcosm of democratic society, where Richard is able to act out (and correct) social behaviours safely.

As we have seen, Klein prioritised the expression and interpretation of unconscious material, where the child could undergo the process of 'free association' through drawing and movement rather than language. Barbara Wittmann has argued that, in linking psychological expression to the act of drawing, 'the analyst can only interpret the material that the child delivers; the motifs of the children's drawings are, in contrast to wooden toys, not predetermined or limited'.[162] By providing the child with the opportunity to draw, Wittmann

[162] Barbara Wittmann, 'Drawing Cure: Children's Drawings as a Psychoanalytic Instrument', *Configurations*, 18 (2010), pp. 251–272 (p. 264).

argues, Kleinian psychoanalysis allows for the 'opening of the analytic process', where patients themselves have control over the mechanisms of meaning-production in the therapeutic situation.[163] When the child discovers that their desires can be artfully represented in their drawings, Wittmann notes, they have also learned 'the technique of constituting meaning'. This means that they can begin to 'set[s] the world in motion [and] begin[s] to structure the imaginary and symbolic'.[164] It is a striking moment for Richard, for example, when he learns that his drawings point toward some unconscious content; Klein writes that, from this point on, Richard began to be 'extremely interested to find that drawing could be a means of expressing unconscious thoughts'.[165] For Wittmann, the act of drawing provides the child with some notion of agency in the clinic; 'drawing also gives the child a brief opportunity to break the analyst's interpretive sovereignty, since every new drawing catches her unprepared'.[166] Drawing, then, provides for the opportunity for a moment of resistance. According to Wittmann, this is also a 'moment of disempowerment, of surprise, and of interrupted interpretative terrorism that, of course, is well calculated but nevertheless uncontrollable'.[167] Thus the creative act allows the child to exceed the possibilities of the analysis, where drawings may trouble or disrupt the boundaries of psychoanalytic interpretation.

But we can also consider the limits of Wittmann's argument when we note that Klein orients Richard's creative moments of 'disempowerment' and 'surprise' in the narrative of his psychological progression. In particular, Richard's drawings provide a crucial insight into how far the therapy is working. If we return once again to the session dated the 26th June 1941, where Klein suggests that Richard acts out a destructive desire through the act of punching holes through paper, we can see how his resistance to create a drawing is used as evidence for the dominance of his destructive instinct. Klein is interested in these moments of misdemeanour, as they suggest the extent to which Richard has been able to process the ambivalence of his desires. As Wittmann notes, 'Klein's attention is on how the urge to draw imposes itself on or is refused by the patient, with refusal manifesting itself in destructive actions toward the drawing, such as crossing it out or riddling it with holes'.[168] Wittmann thus calls the drawing a 'spatialised Magic Slate'—an ever-changing residue of the analysis in

[163] Wittmann, p. 257.
[164] Wittmann, p. 263.
[165] Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis,* pp. 56-57.
[166] Wittmann, p. 264.
[167] Wittmann, p. 264.
[168] Wittmann, p. 256.

which the child's private iconography unfolds.[169] Though Klein's clinic allows for moments of disruption and destruction, for the contained expression of the violences of the ego, these refusals are always understood as a sign that he still harbours the unchecked desire to destroy the mother. These resistances, shown in the sometimes-violent refusal to participate in drawing and play, are an important part of the Kleinian analytic process. In her notes to the twenty-seventh session of Richard's analysis, Klein states that it is a 'characteristic feature of child analysis that the various activities of the child allow the analyst to see how resistance interacts with growing insight and the great need of the unconscious to express itself'.[170] Resistance suggests that an uncomfortable phantasy is close to consciousness; the child's vehement refusal is the final effort for defence. Though the child is free to express their aggressive instincts, Klein embeds these moments into a narrative about the workings of their unconscious life, where the expression of the destructive instinct is a crucial step towards the success of treatment.

Figure 2 – 'Drawing of a figure by "Richard" (spring/summer 1941)'.
(Wellcome Trust, file PP/KLE/B.47)

In Richard's analysis, resistance is an important aspect of the therapeutic process because it offers an insight into how the patient is responding to psychoanalytic interpretations. When Klein resumes the analysis after a short trip to London, she writes that Richard was steadily

[169] Wittmann, p. 258.
[170] Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis,* p. 129.

beginning to overcome his resistances and beginning to realise the symbolic nature of play. In her notes to the session, she writes that Richard was consciously using his toys to suggest some unsaid feeling or emotion:

> While Richard at times wished to leave the room when anxiety welled up more fully and resistance reached a climax, he never actually left early […] What he did on a number of occasions was not to bring his fleet, which usually expressed his feeling that he had left a good part of his self and of his objects at home. The analysis of this splitting often had the effect that he brought the fleet again in the next session, and that he was able to make another step towards integration.[171]

Here, Richard makes a crucial step towards understanding that his movements and actions have a significant relationship to his desires and instincts. Instead of refusing and leaving the room, Richard is finally able to understand that toys can be used to express his desires in a productive way. Klein argues that this is the point where Richard seems to note some disjuncture between the inside and outside world—slowly his resistances and refusals lessen, and he can move towards the crucial step of 'integration'. So Klein suggests that resistance in the clinic, seen here in the violent poking of holes in a piece of paper, is an important step towards recovery. As analysis goes on, the analyst must observe and interpret the violent behaviour and the resistances of the patient, as resistance suggests that the patient finds certain interpretations troubling and uncomfortable and therefore has recognised the relevance of them to their deep psychological desires.

If refusal to engage with the creative tools in the clinic indicates that the patient is yet to come to terms with ambivalence, then their compliance indicates the opposite. A willingness to be 'creative' in the clinic suggests the promise of recovery; the desire to draw and play implies the presence of the desire to 'make good' (to create and rebuild), rather than the desire to destroy and tear apart. The therapeutic situation allows the child to make this crucial transition from resistance to production. But it is important that Klein allows Richard to express (and thus transgress) negative emotion. If Richard attended Anna Freud's clinic, this destructive behaviour might be discouraged—the analyst, standing in as an authority-figure, might here put forward that refusal is, in fact, the wrong thing to do. Though Klein, too, aims for moments of quiet creativity in the clinic (playing with toys, or drawing a picture without resistance), the clinic is a space where the child works through the complexity and the

[171] Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis,* p. 192.

ambivalences of their inner emotional lives—they must feel able to act on their immoral, base desires. Where, for Freud, the authority figure imparts a basic understanding of 'right' and 'wrong', Klein suggests that the therapeutic space allows the child to develop the 'ability to represent its unconscious in a direct way' so that, with interpretation, 'its fixations can to a considerable extent be resolved'.[172] Klein thus creates a crucial link between the development of morality and the creative urge.



Fig. 3 - Drawing 69, printed in Melanie Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis* (London: Hogarth Press, 1975).

In another of Richard's drawings, he again creates an image of Klein. This time he does not destroy the drawing, but labels it 'sweet Mrs Klein' and writes 'Lovely Eyes' across the forehead (fig. 3). This might be Richard's effort to repair or recreate the mother-figure after destroying her. However, on close scrutiny, Klein suggests that the drawing still holds a hint of the destructive instinct. Klein notices that Richard has drawn a penis on Mrs. Klein, suggesting the presence of the 'bad father'. In her notes, she writes that she 'interpreted that [the drawing of Klein's] tummy was also a face—actually Hitler's—inside her, and that the penis he had added seemed to be Hitler's'.[173] Richard is surprised by Klein's interpretations—he had labelled the drawing 'sweet Mrs. Klein', after all. But the presence of the penis and the eye-like breasts suggests that he has not yet reached the stage of reparative creativity. Indeed,

[172] Melanie Klein, *The Psychoanalysis of Children* (London: Vintage, 1997), p. 9.
[173] Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis*, p. 425

as he produces more drawings (this time rabid scribbles), the aggressiveness becomes more obvious: 'His rage was increasing, his face was red and his eyes flashing; from time to time he ground his teeth and bit the pencil hard, particularly when talking about breasts or drawing circles representing them.'[174] Though Richard's drawing of 'sweet Mrs. Klein' suggests the presence of the loving instinct, Richard has not yet reached the paranoid-schizoid position—his moral instinct is still marred by hate. Klein sees this attempt at reparation as a signal that Richard still requires further sessions, that the clinic has not yet allowed for the successful development of his moral compass.

As we have seen, throughout Klein's analysis of Richard, images of battleships and bombs, submarines and swastikas, must always be taken out of context and interpreted in terms of the early anxiety situation. There is a tension, here, between Klein's universal claims about the nature of the human psyche, the eternal struggle between love and hate, and her use of the concrete 'language of war' to describe this struggle. Throughout his therapy, Klein understands Richard as engaging in a kind of double-talk, where he communicates his unconscious war using symbols and images that he has come across in newspapers. Likewise, in describing the conflicts deep in the ego, Klein adopts this same 'double-talk', so that the images of contemporary conflict stand in for a discussion about the conflicts deep in the human ego. For both Klein and Richard, the language of war actually represents some universal and transhistorical struggle of the human condition.

The hybridity of Klein's psychoanalysis, which merges the universal with the particular, blurs the distinction between social and personal life in her work. Klein does not feel the need to separate a discussion about the concrete experience of social life in the mid-century from an abstract discussion about universal human nature. Rather, she discusses the personal and the political in the same breath. In his essay on Klein and socialism, Michael Rustin argues that this lack of distinction means that Kleinian psychoanalysis has political potential, in that it proposes a relational way of understanding the individual's connection to their environment. As Rustin notes, psychoanalysis's 'concentration on the personal at the expense of the political', as well as its 'privatization of experience and reluctance to seek connections between personal and wider social issues' are 'major reasons for the distance and latent hostility between the psychoanalytical and socialist modes of thought'.[175] However, for Rustin, object relational psychoanalysis troubles the liberal separation between private and

[174] Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis,* p. 425.
[175] Michael Rustin, 'A Socialist Consideration of Kleinian Psychoanalysis', *New Left Review,* 131 (1982), 71-96 (72).

public life; in understanding the relation between an individual and 'objects' in the social world as the most important part of psychological life, Object Relations allows psychoanalysis's expansion into politics and sociology. Analysts can, Rustin argues, make interesting points about social responsibility and the importance of community and solidarity.

Although Klein prioritises the examination of phantasy life over the concrete conditions of her patients, her idea that personal history influences all future relations in society puts forward the idea that the individual has some moral responsibility to the world outside. Klein understands morality as an innate and integral part of human nature—it is not, as Anna Freud states, a result of authoritative influence or force, but develops as a natural and organic response to the confrontation between the 'self' and the 'other'. Though every child is capable of destruction, they are equally capable of intense guilt and compassion. In fact, destruction is always a precursor to empathy. Rustin argues that though Klein's subject is individualistic in nature (in that their personal desires define every social relation), this does not mean that she understands humans as innately self-serving. Instead, he argues that narcissism is an essential step towards developing a democratic capacity for empathetic social relationships. In particular, Rustin suggests that Klein's theory of the depressive position (the moment when the subject first understands the 'self' and 'other' are separate) lends itself to political readings:

> Innate concern for the well-being of the other, at a very deep level, appears to arise in this conception from the earliest lack of differentiation between self and other, and from the process whereby this differentiation comes about. Pleasure and pain are only slowly located in space and time, and in relation to whole persons. This intense experience of pain, as given and received, and this deep involvement with the caring person as the perceived source of all well- and ill-being, gives rise to the capacity to experience the pains and pleasures of the other with an intensity comparable to the pains and pleasures of the self.[176]

For Rustin, Klein's theory of human destructiveness as the 'continuing and unavoidable problem in human lives' does not mean that her psychoanalysis is negative or pessimistic.[177] Instead, he finds some optimism in Klein's work, in the 'greater stress on the possibilities and normality of what we might call powerful "positive" emotions, especially in the concept of

[176] Rustin, p. 81.
[177] Rustin, p. 81.

reparation'.[178] This, he argues, is especially evident in Klein's understanding of art and creativity, which gains a new moral purpose in the context of reparation: art, he argues, is not 'merely an act of symbolic wish-fulfilment arising from hedonistic appetites, but an activity symbolically commemorating and preserving the relation to a loved other'.[179] What is important to Rustin is not the presence of innate destructiveness and aggression in the Kleinian ego, but the individual's ability to contain and displace this negative emotion. The ability to make reparations, he argues, revives the relationship between an individual and their social community as it suggests that the individual has become aware of, and cares for, the needs and demands of the group. Rustin thus links Kleinian thought at the mid-century to 'socialist thinking in Britain, or what can broadly be described as the tradition of British social democracy' which has given a 'central positive weight to the development of the family', 'both as the hoped-for source of richer lives and as the best preventive against moral disorder'.[180] In collapsing the distinction between social and familial relationships, Klein creates a new socially-oriented individual and places an importance on forming healthy, ethically-informed social relationships. For Rustin, Klein's clinic, where she encourages the gradual development of the reparative instinct, becomes a training-ground for the moral individual.

If Klein's clinic is a prototype for all social action, then Richard's therapy can only progress when he begins to take responsibility for his own recovery. Klein suggests that morality, which arises from the reparative situation, is expressed by the impulse to create and participate. The success of the child's psychological progression also means that they finally experience guilt for the more discomforting aspects of their unconscious life, and that they do not turn to extreme aggression or violence when confronted with discomforting interpretations. In her writings on Richard's drawings, we can see that reparative feeling, the beginning of morality, arises when the child ceases their resistances and begins to create meaningful, 'whole' images of the mother-figure. If we see Richard's therapy as a prototype for all social relationships, then we can see that Klein values moments of compliance and creativity, which provide the child with a solution for their misbehaviour and destructiveness.[181] Klein's clinic fosters creativity as a socially beneficial act, allowing the child to develop into a well-adjusted,

[178] Rustin, p. 82.
[179] Rustin, p. 83.
[180] Rustin, p. 84.
[181] In *The Culture of Redemption,* Leo Bersani argues that Klein's theory of reparation provides the creative act with a new political weight, and links the aesthetic of reparation to the belief that literature can redeem historical dealings of sexuality. Leo Bersani, *The Culture of Redemption* (Harvard, MT: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 2.

participatory citizen, whose reparative tendencies outweigh their destructive instincts. Klein's clinic, then, has a certain democratic urge: it allows the individual to develop empathetic feeling towards their fellow citizens. It instils a sense of responsibility to act in a productive, benevolent manner.

However, when we think about Klein's therapy as a democratic space, we must consider the discordance between her theory and practice. Though Klein does collapse the distinction between the social and the personal in her theoretical writings, she kept to private practice during the war and, unlike Anna Freud, did not participate in the expansion of psychoanalysis into the school, the nursery, or the community centre. When we compare her movements during the war to Freud, for example, we might say that while analysts were blurring the boundaries between the 'social' and 'personal' realms in new and interesting ways, Klein was much more interested in maintaining the standards of traditional clinical practice. Though there is something democratic in the content of Kleinian psychoanalysis, her lack of engagement in democratic institutions suggests that, conversely, she was reserved about the utilisation of psychoanalysis towards political and institutional imperatives. Though Klein's figures the psychoanalytic clinic as the starting point for 'good' social behaviour, she distanced herself from the institutionalisation of the British Psychoanalytical Society during the war, and emphasised the importance of the clinical process, headed by the trained specialist.

In the final section of this chapter, I have examined how Klein responds to the problem of war, and particularly to the contentious figure of the war-child, within her theoretical and clinical writings. Though phantasy-life was all-important to Klein, we can see issues associated with the sociohistorical context of 1940s Britain threading throughout these writings. In the early half of the twentieth century, when Europe seemed to constantly oscillate between war and peacetime, Klein used a language of conflict to understand the movements of the child's unconscious, which constantly moves between its own acts of warmongering and peace-making. As we have seen, Klein repositions social debates about the impact of war so that 'dangers' actually come from *inside* the child: inner life is more damaging than any real-world event. The juvenile delinquent, then, is not a child who has been subject to the disruptions of war, but instead has a precarious and undeveloped psychological life, and has not yet reached the essential stage of 'integration'.

In merging the personal and political, Klein argues that any social act can be understood through the psychological balance between love and hate. Klein's theories thus stretch the notion of psychoanalytic subjecthood so that it also involves statehood: no longer preoccupied with the object and its independent existence, she focuses on how we extend our reality to the

outside world. But, at the same time, she also emphasises the power of interiority and phantasy, where we are able to create, destroy, and rebuild the world according to our own whims. This absolute, narcissistic power, however, means that the individual must become a self-regulatory and responsible force—to be 'good' means practicing empathy and productively participating in communities.

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter observes a 'social turn' in British psychoanalysis during the Second World War. In wartime, psychoanalysts like Melanie Klein and Anna Freud examined how (and whether) the individual can successfully integrate into the social world, how they might become loving, caring and cooperative members of a community. Both Klein and Freud considered the possibility that psychoanalysis might be useful to politics, and specifically to the democratic aims of wartime and postwar Britain. Freud welcomed this shift in psychoanalysis with open arms: by forming institutions like the Hampstead War Nursery, she worked to make psychoanalysis directly applicable to the war effort. However, Klein's relationship to a new, socially oriented psychanalysis was more complex. While she, too, suggested that the responsibility of the analyst is to encourage empathy and love, Klein's idea that morality itself can be destructive (her 'negativity') complicates such a straightforward application of psychoanalysis towards social aims. Though there are clear contrasts between the British Psychoanalytical Society and other wartime institutions, such as the BBC and the Ministry of Information (which appear in my subsequent chapters), I suggest that, in war, Klein and Freud use narratives of child development to respond to a newly institutional form of psychoanalysis, which is aligned to the state and its imperatives.

Klein's belief in the primacy of the death drive, in the destructive tendencies at the heart of the ego, provides an explanation for the societal presence of misbehaving children and juvenile delinquency, the unruly, the resistant, and the violent. At first glance, the redemptive arc of the ego—its need to make good, to amend for what it has done—presents a solution to these social problems. But there is a certain friction in Klein's work, a friction that exists in her understanding that even moral acts can be destructive. In the context of wartime Britain, when there seemed to be a division of children into 'good' and 'bad' (the delinquent 'war-child' and the well-behaved child, who was also a prototype for the 'good' citizen), Klein worked to undo a straightforward understanding of moral development—from birth, she argued, the child was caught in a deeply complex, ambivalent emotional state.

So Freud and Klein present two different ways that psychoanalysis became involved in social analysis. While Freud shifted her attention to examining conscious life (the effect of real, concrete events on young children in the war-city), Klein kept an unwavering focus on the unconscious, on the phantasised origins of social experience. Though both Klein and Freud believe the practice has something important to say about society, Klein's 'social' psychoanalysis resists the notion of historical specificity. In some ways, Klein complicates the narrative that psychoanalysis became institutionalised on the outbreak of war: though she draws an important connection between the individual and their civilisation, she does not use psychoanalysis to engage with or combat specific social problems (as, we have seen, Freud does in her war nurseries). But despite these differences, both analysts used psychoanalysis to speak to the capability (or incapability) of the individual to develop into a 'good' citizen, to become responsible, empathetic and self-sufficient.

CHAPTER TWO
PSYCHOANALYSIS ON AIR: THE BBC AND THE UNCONSCIOUS LIVES OF CITIZENS

2.1 Introduction

With the outbreak of war in 1939, the BBC underwent a transformation. As the threat of mass bombing loomed over British towns and cities, public broadcasting was now an indispensable resource for propaganda and mass communication: a perfect mode for the instantaneous transmission of information to citizens at home and abroad. While the BBC of the 1930s often portrayed itself as an independent and objective institution, as a reliable and authoritative voice of the cultured and educated, the demands of war led to immense changes in its tone and appearance. Throughout this chapter, I argue that in war the BBC looked to foster a new aesthetics of familiarity on the airwaves, where the voices it broadcast represented ordinary British citizens. The radio provided distant listeners with the sounds of 'Britishness' so that tuning in to the BBC meant bridging the crucial gap between the 'self' and the 'citizen'. This chapter is preoccupied with the radio as having a kind of aural 'homeliness', where it provided listeners with a feeling of national belonging. But this was also a time when speakers on the BBC increasingly turned to psychoanalysis, to discussions about the unconscious lives of British citizens and the psychological origins of desire, emotion, and social behaviour. In this chapter, I examine how psychoanalysis entered into this intimate relationship between the individual and the voice of the wireless broadcaster, who provided citizens with a concrete link to the social world. On the BBC, psychoanalysis becomes a useful tool for thinking about the making of the 'good' citizen, the specific qualities that allow an individual to be an active, productive member of a society.

During the Second World War, one of the most palpable changes to the BBC was the disbandment of regional broadcasting in favour of the 'BBC Home Service'—a new national service that brought all listeners in Britain under a single programming schedule. In hopes to increase morale and civilian participation, the 'BBC Home Service' worked to create an impression of a united and cooperative British populace. As such, broadcasters often addressed the character of the war-citizen—the conscientious individual who feels a sense of social responsibility towards their nation and its future. In *Writing the Radio War* (2018), Ian Whittington argues that listening to the radio was itself a mode of participation: it offered

British people a feeling of 'simultaneous collective participation in the processes of upheaval and renewal tendered by the war'.[1] For Whittington, the 'intimate acoustics of radio', which brought conversations about nationhood and citizenship into 'the domestic realm', determined the 'limits of acceptable "Britishness" on the airwaves and beyond'.[2] The BBC thus became a 'pre-eminent site for the public discussion of British cultural and political identity', a tool for both reflecting and creating a coherent image of the national populace. A couple of decades later, Elizabeth Bowen reflected on the propagandistic function of the BBC; in creating an idea of a united public, she wrote, 'the voice proved mightier than the pen'. Bowen notes that, for the BBC, 'the desideratum was not to *address* the masses but speak as one of them'. Broadcasters like J. B. Priestley, she wrote, sought to keep 'the people's collective image constantly in front of the people's eyes, and did well in doing so'.[3]

In this chapter I examine how writers and intellectuals took to the BBC to address the politics of contemporary citizenship. I look at three broadcasters (J. B. Priestley, D. W. Winnicott and Elizabeth Bowen) who all used psychological or psychoanalytical tropes to speak about the figure of the 'war-citizen'. This is perhaps not surprising at a moment when, as Shapira explains, 'psychoanalytic terminology became commonplace', and when psychoanalysis itself was 'widely discussed among the general educated public'.[4] All three broadcasters examine the relationship between the 'self' and the outside world on-air; they address what it means to be a 'citizen' and what sacrifices such a label necessitates. As the radio transmits information about the social world to the 'individual', the broadcast becomes an apt space for addressing the boundary between the 'private' and 'public' self. I examine how (and whether) Priestley, Winnicott and Bowen adapt to the propagandistic function of the BBC in these conversations. Did they speak about psychological ideas in the context of the BBC's own hope to garner a British community on-air, or did they deviate from or resist the straightforward application of these ideas toward an institutional goal?

This chapter is thus concerned with the relationship between the institution of the BBC and its autonomous broadcasters. In *Modernist Informatics* (2016), James Purdon argues that by the late 1930s, writers began to respond to the 'political regulation of information systems and the use of information systems as instruments of political authority'.[5] As Purdon notes, by

[1] Ian Whittington, *Writing the Radio War* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), p. 4.
[2] Whittington, p. 4.
[3] Elizabeth Bowen, *The Mulberry Tree: Writings of Elizabeth Bowen*, ed. by Hermione Lee (New York: Harcourt, 1986), p. 184.
[4] Shapira, pp. 9-10.
[5] James Purdon, *Modernist Informatics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 16.

the end of the Second World War a 'new regime of information' was largely in place, 'redefining the relationship between citizen and state according to the new priorities of superpower politics'.[6] Writers like Graham Greene and Ford Madox Ford explored what he calls an 'information aesthetic', where they 'reflect upon and make visible the informatic structures governing their own work'.[7] This 'information aesthetic' might also be useful in examining how Winnicott, Priestley and Bowen approached the radio broadcast as an institutional, propagandistic tool.

For Priestley and Winnicott, psychoanalysis became bound up with a new kind of information-work on the BBC. Conversations about national belonging and British subjectivity were often tinged by ideas about the unconscious, about the correct way to bring up a child and the origins of 'good' social behaviour. In the first two sections of this chapter, I argue that for both Winnicott and Priestley psychology operated socially as a mode of citizens gaining 'self-knowledge' as participatory and productive war-citizens. But in order for psychology to be used as such, it needed to take on a familiar, demotic tone. In the first section of this chapter, I suggest that Priestley uses what I call a 'vernacular psychology' in his role as a demotic representative of 'the people': he discusses the mind of the citizen in an everyday, common-sense language, where psychologically healthy citizens exhibit a desire to contribute to the war effort. In his own broadcasts, Winnicott inflects this conversation about psychology and national duty more explicitly with psychoanalysis. In doing so, Winnicott acts as a mediating conduit between the abstract theoretical psychoanalytic world and the everyday lives of citizens. For Winnicott, psychoanalytic ideas are socially benevolent; they are crucial, even, for the development of a new generation of democratically minded individuals, who must maintain the distinction between self and society in order to healthily invest in their outer community. By casting psychoanalytic knowledge in an everyday sound, Winnicott attempted to make the practice 'homely', relevant to the ordinary lives of British citizens.

Finally, I argue that there is room for a form of psychoanalysis on the BBC that resists its use for the promotion of democratic citizenship. Here, I look at Elizabeth Bowen's radio plays, which were broadcast on the BBC Third Programme throughout the war. Though Bowen's radio plays address national heritage and belonging, they are also filled with the surreal and the incomprehensible: with ghosts, phantoms, and strange voices. In her BBC broadcasts, Bowen experiments with the disconcerting experience of listening to disembodied

[6] Purdon, p. 22.
[7] Purdon, p. 16.

voices on the wireless—an experience that perhaps can be best explained using the Freudian notion of the 'uncanny'. Bowen explores what happens when we put the unconscious (and its mysteries) to play on the radio. But Bowen's uncanny broadcasts also have a distinct social function: in the strange meeting of past and present British lives, the familiar and the unknown, she stresses the dangers of erasing historical forms of citizenship and, with it, individuality itself. It is through a writerly, modernist experimentation with psychoanalysis that Bowen stages these conservative criticisms of citizenship on the BBC.

Throughout this chapter, I suggest that the story about psychoanalysis and the wartime BBC can be told through examining the broadcasts of these three figures, who all discuss the psychology of the British citizen on-air. But Bowen, Priestley and Winnicott all have different aesthetic, as well as political, motivations: while Priestley and Winnicott attend to the discursive nature of psychological knowledge, Bowen's uncanny broadcasts disrupt the easy communication of unconscious life.

2.2 J. B. Priestley as Voice of the People

On the 14th of July 1940, the novelist and playwright J. B. Priestley held a radio broadcast on the BBC Home Service. In the broadcast, he spoke about the transformative effect the war might have on the British people:

> The war, because it demands a huge collective effort, is compelling us to change not only our ordinary, social and economic habits, but also our habits of thought. We're actually changing over from the property view to the sense of community, which simply means that we realise we are all in the same boat.[8]

For Priestley, war has collapsed the distinction between 'private' and 'public' living; it allows the citizen to turn away from individualistic ways of thinking and towards a new, expansive relationship with their nation and the people in it. 'There is a stirring in us now', says Priestley, 'a desire which could soon became a controlled but passionate determination to remodel and recreate this life of ours, to make it the glorious beginning of a new world order'.[9] Priestley's call to the British people is clearly influenced by psychological language; a new, democratic world order requires a crucial shift in how citizens think, what they desire, and how they

[8] J. B. Priestley, *Postscripts* (London: William Heinemann, 1940), p. 38.
[9] Priestley, p. 38.

channel their emotions into action. Priestley's broadcasts engage in a 'vernacular psychology' (a colloquial discourse about mind, desire, and wish) to encourage listeners to be invested in the war effort. He initiated a popular idiom for discussing psychology on-air; his discussions about how the psychological lives of individuals influence their actions as citizens is grounded in a language of 'common-sense'.

Beginning with the Dunkirk evacuation and over the course of intense aerial bombardment in Britain, J. B. Priestley voiced a series of twenty-eight broadcasts called the 'Postscripts' on the BBC Home Service. The broadcasts, which aired directly after the BBC news programme on Sundays at 9 o'clock, primarily served as a means of increasing morale after the sometimes distressing war reports. The 'Postscripts' were short broadcasts (usually no longer than ten minutes) where Priestley shared his reflections on the news that week, or anecdotes about his own experiences in London, under threat of aerial attack. These broadcasts were hugely popular: between June 1940 and March 1941, a third of the adult listening public were listening in to the 'Postscripts'.[10] In the spring of 1941, listenership peaked at 40.4%. Priestley's popularity lay in his ability to relate his thoughtful reflections on war events to the experiences of average British citizen and his optimistic celebrations of the endurance and resilience of the British public.[11] His broadcasts reveal the BBC's concerted effort to appear as a democratic and representative institution, an organisation *for* the public and *by* the public.

The BBC's employment of J. B. Priestley demonstrated an institutional turning-point. In the 1930s, the BBC presented itself as the communicator of important cultural and political voices; as Whittington notes, its 'distilled manifestation was the Oxford accent'.[12] According to unofficial BBC policy, regional dialects and accents were deemed 'unclear'– as, interestingly, were the 'more extreme forms of upper-class drawl'.[13] By ensuring that the voices they broadcast were, as they claimed, removed from regional or local markers, the BBC attempted to portray itself as an objective, educational institution. In his role as the first Director-General of the BBC, John Reith famously claimed that the primary principles of the BBC were to 'inform, educate, and entertain'.[14] These three principles cemented the BBC's role as a venue of both enjoyment and learning: it supposed that the broadcaster had a specific

[10] John Baxendale, *Priestley's England: J. B. Priestley and English Culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), p. 14.
[11] Baxendale, p. 14.
[12] Whittington, p. 41.
[13] Keith Williams, *British Writers and the Media 1930-45* (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1996), pp. 30-31.
[14] Simon J. Potter, *Broadcasting Empire: The BBC and the British World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 5.

pedagogical function—to inform, rather than mirror or represent, the people of Britain. Emily Bloom argues that though the BBC's first wartime broadcasts consisted of 'announcements and talks by government ministers' (in a way that replicated this previous aim to appear authoritative and reliable), it soon needed to reinvent itself in light of the government's 'culture and wartime strategies'.[15] The inclusion of Priestley's voice, for instance, with his marked Yorkshire accent and colloquial, approachable style, marked the BBC's decisive move towards on-air personalities that were representative of the 'every-man', or the wider listening body.

This seemed a necessary step: the BBC of the early war struggled to gain the trust and support of British citizens. The BBC's need to rebrand itself was exacerbated by the sudden popularity of William Joyce, or 'Lord Haw-Haw', a British-born Nazi propagandist who would broadcast to Britain from Radio Hamburg. Lord Haw-Haw's broadcasts were witty and supercilious in tone, and were often seen as an exciting alternative to the rather dry BBC news reports. By January 1940, it was estimated that a third of British people tuned into these broadcasts directly after the BBC news.[16] Mass-Observation found that Lord Haw-Haw was fulfilling a public need for an informal and non-establishment voice. In their report on the popularity of Lord Haw-Haw, Mass-Observation quotes one participant as saying 'we nearly always turn him on at 9.15 to try and glean some news that the Ministry of Information withholds from us'.[17] The success of Lord Haw-Haw was his ability to address the public not as a removed authority, but as an involved and familiar fellow citizen. In order to 'actively attract new audiences', and lessen the popularity of Radio Hamburg, the BBC looked to find an alternative voice, a voice from inside the institution that also spoke in this demotic and idiomatic manner.[18] Whilst the BBC continued with its 'objective'-seeming news reports, it invested heavily in radio personalities, in content that promised to communicate the voices of the people and not the elite, removed voices of the institution. As Sian Nicholas notes, 'while its impersonality gave it the essential aura of authority', the BBC soon realised that 'personalities able to articulate the hopes and aspirations of a people at war might be the strongest of morale-boosters'.[19] The hiring of J. B. Priestley was a concerted attempt to move

[15] Emily Bloom, *The Wireless Past: Anglo-Irish Writers and the BBC, 1931-1968* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 78.
[16] Martin Doherty, *Nazi Wireless Propaganda: Lord Haw-Haw and British Public Opinion in the Second World War* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), p. 93.
[17] 'Public and Private Opinion of Lord Haw-Haw', March 1940, Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex, 65.4.
[18] Doherty, p. 65.
[19] Sian Nicholas, '"Sly Demagogues" and Wartime Radio: J. B. Priestley and the BBC', *Twentieth Century British History*, 6 (1995), 247-266 (255)

away from an aesthetics of authority. Over the war years, Priestley became the 'first non-politician to whom listeners regularly tuned to hear his personal political and philosophical views'.[20] With Priestley, the BBC took a chance on the cult of personality that had made Lord Haw-Haw so popular.

Priestley's broadcasts operated as an integral part of the BBC's project to appear as a democratic, listening body, and distance itself from its earlier status as the microphone of the metropolitan elite, concerned with respectability above all else. Instead, the Postscripts broadcasts fostered an on-air 'ethics of familiarity'.[21] As Whittington notes, Priestley's 'demotic' Yorkshire voice provided 'emotional sincerity alien to most wartime propaganda', and thus furthered the BBC's aim to generate widespread support for the People's War.[22] A BBC Listener Research Report found that, for many listeners, there was 'homeliness of [Priestley's] voice', a 'quiet confidence of his manner', and a 'virile commonsense of his matter'.[23] For many, the appeal of Priestley was his ability to represent himself as a regular citizen, a patriot on the fringes of the institution. Whittington argues that 'Priestley excelled, in large part, because his winking at authority was still thoroughly patriotic. He could fill the gaps between stodgy government pronouncements and public opinion with wry optimism rather than defeatism or rancour'.[24] Priestley often positioned himself as a voice of the public rather than of the institution, and would indeed speak candidly and reflexively about the BBC and its practices. Where in the 1930s BBC broadcasters presented themselves as objective 'statesman', Priestley was suspicious of authority and officialdom: 'It isn't woolly pussy-footed officialdom that will win this war' he said in his broadcast on 30th June 1940, 'but the courage, endurance and rising spirits of the British people'.[25] Speaking directly after the news program, Priestley would reflect on the weekly news, and offer anecdotal tales about the hardiness of the British public in a time of crisis. In doing so, Priestley endeavoured to distinguish himself from the war reporters at the BBC, who worked to maintain an air of neutrality throughout the conflict.[26]

In doing so, Priestley positioned himself, carefully, alongside 'the people'. In one of his earliest broadcasts, he refers to himself as a member of a 'community', all happily

[20] Nicholas, p. 248.
[21] Whittington, p. 37.
[22] Whittington, p. 51.
[23] 'Listeners' Comments on Mr. Duff Cooper, Mr. J. B. Priestley, and Sir Hugh Elles', quoted in Whittington, p. 47.
[24] Whittington, p. 30.
[25] J. B. Priestley, *Postscripts,* p. 19.
[26] He was the opposite to the authoritative BBC correspondents like Denis Johnston, a war reporter attempted to maintain an air of neutrality and objectivity, and who sought to covey 'the Truth' and nothing else. For an in-depth discussion on Johnston and the BBC's desire to be objective see Whittington, pp. 117-152.

contributing to the war effort: 'there we were, ploughman and parson, shepherd and clerk, turning out at night, as our forefathers had often done before us, to keep watch and ward over the sleeping English hills and fields and homesteads'.[27] In the BBC's overseas journal, *London Calling,* a listener called Priestley 'a representative Englishman'.[28] This was also true by Priestley's own admission. In the preface to his published broadcasts in 1940, he wrote about the majority of people who 'may be almost inarticulate in themselves and yet recognise in an instant when something that is at least trying to be real and true is being said to them'.[29] Priestley's task at the BBC was to speak to the people as though standing among them.

In this role, Priestley often used the broadcast to celebrate a new, democratic state-citizen relationship. Many of the broadcasts were founded on the image of the British Isles emerging anew, healed from a troubled past of division and fracture. He celebrated an image of a new Britain, one that is filled with citizens participating in social and public institutions. In this imagined Britain the private individual all but disappears in lieu of a new active citizen. In his 'Postscripts' broadcast on the 8th September 1940, Priestley makes a distinction between his experiences of the two World Wars. The First World War, he argues, solidified the divide between civilians 'who developed some most unpleasant characteristics' and 'lived in security', and soldiers who were 'mown down by the million' on foreign fields.[30] Being a civilian during the last war, Priestley continues, must have been an 'unendurable' feat—those safe at home were naturally disengaged from the conflict occurring miles away. But, Priestley argued, the Second World War saw the blurring of the boundary between the soldier and the civilian: 'at least we are sharing such danger as there is, and are not leaning back watching all our young men wither away'.[31] While twenty years before civilians were 'a helpless passive lot', a 'weight of tax-paying stuff to be huddled out of harm's way', during the Blitz citizens encountered the 'smoke and fury of the battlefield'. They, too, became soldiers, and Priestley praises the 'milkmen and postmen soldiers, house-wife and mother soldiers [...] and even broadcasting soldiers'.[32] This widening of the definition of war experience, where the domestic citizen toils and suffers alongside soldiers abroad, not only serves the imperatives of 'People's War' propaganda but also inscribes the conditions for a new model of active citizenship.

[27] Priestley, *Postscripts,* p. 12.
[28] 'The Men who Speak for Britain: 1. J. B. Priestley' (1940), quoted in Whittington, p. 47.
[29] Priestley, *Postscripts,* vii.
[30] Priestley, *Postscripts,* p. 67.
[31] Priestley, *Postscripts,* p. 68.
[32] Priestley, *Postscripts,* pp. 67-68.

In his exploration of the figure of the 'citizen', Priestley also forged connections between psychology and social behaviour. In his broadcasts, he explored how the citizen might be able to better themselves, be more productive and responsible, and more invested in the wellbeing of the nation. While Priestley never alluded to specific psychological theories, he used popular cultural adaptations of psychological discourse, speaking loosely and vaguely about the hidden facets of an individual's emotional life. Priestley's forays into psychology allowed him to speak about and understand the impact of war on citizens, to explore what it means to harbour individual feelings and desires while also working as part of a whole. This simplified psychological vernacular was always used in aid of propagandistic government imperatives; if the citizen understood the workings of the psyche, he claimed, this would go hand in hand with increased morale, a better way of coping with the war, and a moral obligation to help one's neighbour. On Priestley's broadcasts, psychological knowledge allows the public to become better war-citizens.

On the 25th of June 1942, Priestley dedicated a broadcast on the BBC North American Service to his ideas about what he called 'wishful thinking'. In the broadcast, Priestley speaks about two different kinds of 'wishful thinking' that he has observed among friends and citizens; one that aids the Allied war effort, and one that inadvertently allows the Germans the upper hand. This former kind of 'wishful thinking', Priestley goes on, 'is simply a process of dodging the unpleasant facts, and so refusing to face the consequences'.[33] These wishful thinkers, he argues, often resort to bouts of rage or anger, as they are 'trying desperately hard to deceive themselves, and instead of helping them to deceive themselves, by stressing the unpleasant facts and the possible consequences, you are making the deep hidden conflict still worse. The result is a sudden anger that can only express itself in abuse'. Priestley, here, brings philosophies of the mind sharply into a discussion about the conduct of the war-citizen. In discussing an individual's 'deep hidden conflict', he also makes assumptions about their innate sense of morality. On this broadcast, Priestley remodels psychological ideas to fit the prevailing propagandistic project of the BBC. His exploration of 'wishful thinking' on the North American Service, a program used by the BBC Radio to incite support for Britain in the United States, exhibits his hope that a psychological vernacular can be usefully employed to aid the war effort. In speaking in a colloquial idiom about a 'deep hidden conflict' in all of us, Priestley

[33] J. B. Priestley, 'Wishful Thinking', BBC North American Service, BBC Sound and Moving Image Archive, T10082W C3.

hopes to awaken a political obligation in American citizens to support suffering British and Allied troops and civilians across the Atlantic.

Later in the broadcast, Priestley describes the wish as 'a powerful and deep-seated desire, which is itself the spring and fountain of strong emotion'. He explains that we can, and must, understand war as a psychic phenomenon:

> A war is primarily action, and the source of action is not thought, but emotion. It's strong feeling that compels us to act, and when we face unpleasant facts we need this strong feeling to sustain us. Now the unwishful thinker, who has a clear head but not necessarily a stout heart, may be able to see what these facts are and take a realistic view of the situation […] but it doesn't follow that he may be able to do anything about it. He may find his will paralysed, just because it is not being nourished by that spring and fountain of strong emotion, which in turn comes from a deep-seated and powerful desire.[34]

Priestley's understanding is that to engage in 'action', to help towards the common Allied goal of stopping Nazi Germany, is to be in tune with the 'spring and fountain of strong emotion'—those who do not act, who are 'paralysed', are not engaging with their innermost or unconscious desires, and so lack motivation to help others as needed. It is the hidden will of the individual, their 'stout heart' and not their sense of rationality, that provides adversity in the face of hardship. Priestley's form of psychology places a heavy weight on morality, on citizenship, and on social responsibility. Priestley's 'healthy' citizen is aware of their place in society, of the obligations ascribed by their nationhood, and of their moral duty to act on a will to help others. Though we cannot link these ideas simply to psychoanalytic thought (rather, they seem to adopt a popularised psychological language about the hidden workings of the mind that is free from technical or scientific jargon), it is important to note that Priestley harboured a long-standing interest in Jungian psychoanalysis, which, as Baxendale argues, 'converged with his social and political critique of the modern world'.[35] Priestley's appreciation of Jung led him to speak about psychoanalysis on-air in 1946. The Radio Times billing states: 'J. B. Priestley, who for many years has been intensely interested in reviews of the famous psychologist, Carl Gustave Jung, has just been to Switzerland to see him. Tonight he describes the impression Jung made upon him'.[36] Though the audio recording of the programme does not exist, Jung

[34] J. B. Priestley, 'Wishful Thinking'.
[35] John Baxendale, 'Priestley's England : J. B. Priestley and English Culture', p. 4
[36] 'J. B. PRIESTLEY', BBC Home Service Basic, *The Radio Times,* 91 (18 June 1946), p. 10.

later wrote to Priestley on reading the transcript, and said that 'he had never seen a better summary of his main ideas in such a concise form'.[37] So we can make the assumption that Priestley's understandings of psychology, while not explicitly psychoanalytic in language, were in some ways influenced by psychoanalytic thought.[38] His broadcasts press together his interest in psychology with a discussion about the interactions between the inner and outer worlds of the war-citizen, and about the origins of good social behaviour.

On the BBC, Priestley used psychology to discuss the basic moral and ethical values of the citizen. He often used evocative, often poetic terms in his psychological discussions, such as 'spring and fountain of strong emotion' and the 'deep-seated and powerful desire'. This might speak of the diffusion of Freudian and Jungian ideas into popular culture, so that psychoanalytic models of the psyche become entangled with an idea of 'common sense'. But it also allows us to see how discussions about the 'psychology of the citizen' on-air had a distinct propagandistic function. Priestley's exploration of the psychic lives of good citizens, spoken through this popularised psychological vernacular, poses questions about how far the BBC were willing to use psychological ideas for a political cause. In speaking about the links between inner desire and national belonging, Priestley hopes to inspire the citizen to become involved in the betterment of their nation and the people in it.

Priestley's discussions about the inner lives of citizens were always in pursuit of his (and, indeed, the BBC's) hopes for a participatory and socially responsible British public. As such, and as Nicholas notes, Priestley's broadcasts are preoccupied with both 'war aims' *and* 'peace aims'.[39] Radio is a means for encouraging the public to participate in a new, democratic society, even after war. Priestley's broadcasts also speak to the integration of psychology into popular thought, where the character of the 'citizen' was discussed in the language of the mind. In this way, the broadcasts reveal how the capability of the democratic citizen was discussed under the cover of psychological health. In the next section, I examine how this psychological conversation about citizenship, nationhood and social responsibility was inflected more explicitly with psychoanalytic ideas and theories when the BBC extended the arm of invitation to the analyst Donald W. Winnicott.

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[37] Carl Jung, *Letters of C. G. Jung: Volume I, 1906-1950*, ed. by Gerhard Adler, 2 vols., I (London: Routledge, 1973), p. 440.
[38] Schoenl argues that Jung's friendship with Priestley 'led to greater awareness of Jung's psychology in America and Britain'. See: William J. Schoenl, *C. G. Jung: His Friendships with Mary Mellon and J. B. Priestley* (Asheville, NC: Chiron, 2018), xi.
[39] Nicholas, p. 265.

2.3 Making Psychoanalysis Homely: Winnicott and the BBC

In 1943, the BBC invited the psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott to host a radio show on the psychology of young children. While Freud had voiced a short broadcast five years earlier on the origins of psychoanalysis, Winnicott's invitation was a particularly significant moment for the public reception of psychoanalysis in mid-century Britain; it signalled an increasing institutional and cultural interest in the practice, especially in a moment of war and crisis. Winnicott's broadcasts brought psychoanalysis firmly into a public conversation about the everyday effects of conflict on the lives of citizens. Throughout the war, he discussed the psychical effects of child evacuation, blackouts, and discussed how mothers might cope with childcare in a time of social upheaval. Overall, Winnicott broadcast nearly 60 talks from 1943 to 1962—first on the BBC Home Service and the Light Programme, and then on Women's Hour. His broadcasts primarily addressed parents and teachers, providing advice on how to protect their children during national conflict, how to deal with difficulty or misbehaviour, and how to provide a good, supportive home to a new baby. Focusing on 'The Ordinary Devoted Mother and Her Baby', a series of nine talks that were broadcast in the years after the war, I suggest that Winnicott is preoccupied with the character of the social democratic citizen: the responsible figure who works to better themselves and their family for the good of wider society. In relating psychological theory to the everyday experience of British citizens, Winnicott worked to make psychoanalysis 'homely'—to cast it with a new ordinariness, so that it might speak to the concrete experiences of mothers and children, sitting by the wireless at home.

As I have argued above, Priestley's broadcasts represented an institutional attempt to explore the interconnections between mental and social life. Inviting Winnicott onto the radio indicated that the BBC was willing to tie an existing conversation about the psychology of the citizen explicitly to psychoanalytic theories. Throughout his broadcasts, Winnicott uses psychoanalysis to discuss the everyday health and welfare of British citizens. In this section, I examine how Winnicott translated psychoanalysis from the private clinic to the medium of the radio. To do so, he attempted to express complicated psychic processes in an ordinary, simple language. As well as this, I suggest that his theoretical style lent itself, naturally, to the medium of the radio, where his appeals to the 'everyday'-ness of the practice played into the BBC's own political imperatives to democratise psychological knowledge, and to make citizens personally (and psychologically) responsible for their participation in social causes.

Winnicott worked to create a conversational relationship between himself and his audience members, where his listeners could take an active and participatory role in the broadcasts themselves. In his first broadcast in his 'The Ordinary Devoted Mother and Her Baby' series, Winnicott set up this reciprocal relationship: 'for nine weeks at this time on Wednesdays you and I can meet, if we can together find we are sufficiently interested in each other'.[40] Like Priestley, Winnicott places himself alongside the 'people'—he is not the authoritative voice of the institution but rather a friend and fellow citizen. 'You will be relieved to know I'm not going to be telling you what to do', he tells his listeners, 'I'm a man, and I have never been a mother, and so I can never really know what it is like to see wrapped up over there in the cot a bit of my own self'.[41] Aware of his limitations as an authoritative voice on motherhood, he invited his listeners to write in: 'for another thing, you can write; you can actually let me know, if you like, at what age your baby or babies seemed to notice you as a person'.[42] Winnicott was hesitant to take the role as an authoritative voice on the care of children. Rather, he referred to mothers as 'the real experts', assuring them that 'no-one who comes along to give you advice will ever know this as well as you know it yourself'.[43] As such, he assured mothers to listen to their own natural instincts above the advice of medical professionals. Winnicott was anxious that his radio show would not 'undermin[e] the self-confidence of the listener', and wanted to communicate that the real 'specialist' knowledge on childhood is contained in the small, everyday interactions between the mother and child.[44] As Adam Phillips argues, Winnicott held an 'almost religious commitment' to an idea that mothers hold a 'simple and personal truth'—an almost instinctual knowledge about how to properly care for children.[45] In one broadcast, he tells mothers to trust themselves to make decisions on bringing up their babies:

> Even in the womb, your baby is a human being unlike any other human being. By the time he is born he will have had quite a lot of experience, unpleasant as well as pleasant. It is, of course, easy to read into the face of newborn babies things that are not there, though to be sure a baby may look very wise at times, even philosophical. But if I were

[40] Donald W. Winnicott, *The Ordinary Devoted Mother and her Baby: Nine Broadcast Talks,* Wellcome Collection, Wellcome Library, London, PP/ADD/K/3/13, p. 3.
[41] Winnicott, *Ordinary Devoted Mother,* p. 3.
[42] Winnicott, *Ordinary Devoted Mother,* p. 6.
[43] Donald W. Winnicott, 'Getting to Know Your Baby', in *The Collected Works of D. W. Winnicott*, ed. by Lesley Caldwell and Helen Taylor Robinson, 12 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), II, p. 213.
[44] Donald W. Winnicott, *Talking to Parents* (Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 1993), p. 4.
[45] Adam Phillips, *Winnicott* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 25.

> you, I wouldn't wait until the psychologists have decided how human a baby is at birth. I should just go right ahead and get to know the little boy or girl, and let him get to know you'.[46]

There are parallels between Priestley and Winnicott: both appeal to the public as compatriots, both cast psychological ideas in an everyday idiom, and both explore questions about the role of citizens in the future of society—whether this be their actions towards the national war effort, or in the space of the home. In both cases, Priestley and Winnicott's success on the airwaves reveal the BBC's commitment to amicable, friendly personalities, removed, as they were, from the distant and objective institution. Indeed, Eli Zaretsky calls Winnicott 'the first English analytic media celebrity'—the popular voice of psychoanalysis.[47]

But this desire to appear as a voice of the fellow citizen did not always fit to the BBC's institutional imperatives—we can see this in the correspondence between Winnicott and his producers, Janet Quigley and (after the war) Isa Benzie. Though he was given relatively free rein over his programmes, Quigley often prompted Winnicott to use more concrete and specific instructions to new mothers; in a letter dated the 1st November 1943 she wrote that the initial draft of his talks was 'not factual enough', and that he should provide 'some actual examples of how a mother gets to know her baby'.[48] Quigley was anxious that Winnicott would discourage mothers or make them feel guilty and demoralised, and instead advised that he should maintain an optimistic tone for the sake of morale. When he showed her the script of his fourth talk, for example, which addressed the importance of the father-figure, she wondered whether Winnicott could employ 'a more positive, encouraging tilt' so as to make sure that the programme was not 'depressing' to mothers whose husbands were away at war. 'Most men', she continued, 'are frightened of small babies […] Many women […] get the children off to bed before the father returns'.[49] The way to do this, she thought, was to offer mothers concrete and immediate modes of improving the care of their children. Though it often meant changing his talks considerably, Winnicott often took Quigley's advice on board, even quoting her feedback verbatim on-air in one instance as advice given by a 'friend'.[50] By looking at this

[46] Donald Winnicott, 'Getting to Know Your Baby', p. 222.
[47] Eli Zaretsky, '"One Large Secure, Solid Background": Melanie Klein and the Origins of the British Welfare State, *Psychoanalysis and History*, 1 (1999), 136-154 (p. 150)
[48] Janet Quigley, quoted in Anne Karpf, 'Constructing and Addressing the "Ordinary Devoted Mother"', *History Workshop Journal*, 78 (2014), 82-106 (85).
[49] Quigley, quoted in Anne Karpf, p. 87.
[50] Karpf, p. 87.

correspondence, we can see how Winnicott treaded a careful line between the 'expert' and the 'fellow citizen' on air. Though he kept a conversational tone, his status as the 'anonymous psychologist', or the 'doctor caring for children' gave his broadcasts some authority. As Anne Karpf puts it, this 'camouflage of medicine and psychology' prevented 'listeners from being scared of what he had to say' as it emphasised his 'medical expertise and his focus on normality'.[51] This balance of a conversational and authoritative tone perhaps speaks to the BBC's own desire to be both a voice for the people and the propagandistic voice of the state. It is also indicative of the conflicting need to both democratise knowledge about psychoanalytic processes while also protecting the sanctity of the family unit in Britain. Winnicott's broadcasts point to the complicated, democratic facilitation of psychoanalytic theory on the airwaves—though he appeared demotic and familiar, he had an important role in the BBC's aim to promote civic responsibility in a time of crisis.

2.3.1 Winnicott and Ordinary Language

In his role as the BBC's 'anonymous psychologist', Winnicott attempted to communicate complex psychoanalytical concepts in an accessible, colloquial register. But he often found it difficult to address psychoanalytic theories (even without mentioning them explicitly) and, at the same time, maintain the optimistic tone that producers required. A 1944 broadcast called 'Why does your baby cry' was particularly unpopular among the audience. In it, Winnicott suggested that there was perhaps nothing that can be done about a child that is crying.[52] After the broadcast Winnicott received a flurry of critical letters and wrote to Quigley for some advice; 'one can't be sure if one does harm or good' he wrote, concerned that he was causing rather than relieving anxiety. Quigley reminded him of the need to maintain the persona of the constructive paediatrician as 'one has to be very careful in talks of this kind not to alarm people unduly'.[53] Winnicott addressed these feelings of guilt on air:

> Talking as observer and psychologist […] to mothers and fathers, about their children, I find that however careful one is, one tends to make them feel guilty. I've taken a lot of trouble to try and put things in such a way that it's not critical and that it's trying to explain

[51] Karpf, p. 97.
[52] Donald W. Winnicott, 'Why Does Your Baby Cry?', in *The Collected Works of D. W. Winnicott*, ed. by Lesley Caldwell and Helen Taylor Robinson, 12 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), II, pp. 237-246.
[53] Quigley, quoted in Karpf, p. 92.

> things rather than to say that this is wrong […] And yet people constantly come to me and say, every time you talk, or every time I read something you write, I feel so wicked.[54]

Jan Abram argues that Winnicott deconstructed the technical and clinical language of psychoanalysis in order 'to keep his thinking alive'.[55] Abram writes that Winnicott's psychoanalytic style was to be as honest and sincere as possible: he was constantly aware of the need to appeal to his audience, to make himself into a benevolent and trustworthy character. To do that, Abram argues, Winnicott needed to speak candidly and positively, and rid his broadcasts of alienating scientific language.

Winnicott's commitment to a simple psychoanalytic language is also evident in his writings from this period. Thomas Ogden notes the particularly colloquial nature of Winnicott's theoretical work and argues that the 'distinctive signature' of Winnicott's writing is 'the voice': 'It is casual and conversational, yet always profoundly respectful of both the reader and the subject matter under discussion. The speaking voice gives itself permission to wander, and yet has the compactness of poetry'.[56] Ogden writes that Winnicott's writing imitates the spoken voice; though it is spare and straightforward, he argues, this simplicity also holds a certain poetic register. At the beginning of his career, Winnicott himself described his psychoanalytic style as deliberately simple—in a 1919 letter to his sister Violet he wrote 'if there is anything which is not completely simple for anyone to understand I want you to tell me because I am now practising so that one day I will be able to introduce the subject [psychoanalysis] to English people so that who runs may read'.[57] For Winnicott, a clarity of expression was key in making technical (and often complicated) psychoanalytic theories accessible to a wider audience.

For Winnicott, transmitting psychoanalysis to the public means changing its language and register. But by casting psychoanalysis in an 'everyday' vernacular (and abandoning technical and specialised language), was he diminishing or diluting it in any way? Here, we might turn to Raymond Williams's understanding of the term 'jargon' as referring to language that is 'specialized, unfamiliar, belonging to a hostile position, and unintelligible chatter'.[58]

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[54] Donald W. Winnicott, 'Feeling Guilty', in *Talking to Parents*, ed. by Clare Winnicott, Christopher Bollas, et. al. (Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 1993), pp. 95-104 (p. 96).
[55] Jan Abram, *The Language of Winnicott: a Dictionary of Winnicott's Use of Words* (London: Karnac, 1996), p. 263.
[56] Thomas Ogden, 'Reading Winnicott', *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, 70 (2001), 299-333 (300).
[57] Donald W. Winnicott, 'Letter to Violet Winnicott', in *The Spontaneous Gesture. Selected letters of D. W. Winnicott* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 1-4.
[58] Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 175-176.

Williams notes that the term 'jargon' is used in a dismissive way 'mainly in relation to psychology and sociology'. But specialised language only turns into 'jargon' when it is removed from its reified, professionalised spaces:

> The specialized vocabularies of various sciences and branches of knowledge do not ordinarily attract description as jargon if they remain sufficiently specialized. The problem is usually the entry of such terms into more general talk and writing.[59]

It is the confrontation between specialist terminology and the popular oralities and idioms of everyday life, then, which threatens a smooth cultural communication of psychoanalysis. According to Williams's understanding of 'jargon', psychoanalytic language, so often consigned to research, education or clinical practice, would change on its entry into the public sphere, and be seen as unfamiliar, obscure or even hostile. Though Williams's concern is that an aversion to 'jargon' is also an aversion to ideas that 'challenge other ways of thinking', Winnicott attempts to explain new and often complicated concepts in an everyday, popular idiom.[60] Winnicott's psychoanalytic vernacular involves a use of ordinary over specialised language, where he attempts to convey complicated psychoanalytic ideas in clear and colloquial speech. In his hopes to popularise psychoanalysis, he attempts to strip his language of 'jargon' or specialist technical terms, while still preserving the complexity of the underlying ideas.

Winnicott never mentions the term 'psychoanalysis' on air, nor 'ego', 'superego' or 'id'. Rather, he carefully presents himself as an anonymous 'doctor caring for children': an expert not in psychoanalysis or psychology, but specifically in the care of children.[61] He attempted to speak about complicated and theoretical psychoanalytic processes—the first relationship with the mother-object, the movement of the child through feelings of guilt and aggression—with an everyday, colloquial sound. See, for example, his 1947 broadcast on the importance of the mother-child relationship in determining the dynamics of later social relations:

> The baby cannot exist alone, but is essentially part of a relationship—the only true basis of a child to father and mother, to other, and eventually to society is the first successful relationship between the mother and baby, between two people, with not even a regular

[59] Williams, pp. 175-176.
[60] Williams, pp. 175-176.
[61] Winnicott, quoted in Karpf, p. 97.

> feeding rule coming between them, nor even a rule that baby must be breastfed. In human affairs, the more complex can only develop out of the more simple.[62]

This is the psychoanalytic conception of the primacy of the first interaction—and the resulting Oedipal complex—that particularly dominated British object relational psychoanalysis throughout the 1930s. But Winnicott does not call the mother the 'object' and does not make reference to a psychoanalytic history of thinking through this first interaction. Rather, he casts psychoanalysis in a popular idiom—attempting to make it 'more simple'. The task is only to make mothers more 'confident' and self-assured in following their 'natural instincts', and to realise that 'their job is an important one'.

Winnicott's hesitance to use specialised or technical terms in his role as the anonymous psychologist on the BBC might speak of the diffusion of Freudian ideas into popular culture, so that psychoanalytic models of the psyche become entangled with an idea of 'common sense'. In this way, Winnicott attempted to emphasise the ordinariness of psychoanalytic processes for the average listener—hearing it in everyday language might allow them to make a connection between their own experience and the scientific, specialised processes of psychoanalysis. But the use of colloquialisms also indicates how psychoanalysis was being employed for a specific political and social purpose on the radio, becoming a propagandistic tool for the preservation of morale in wartime. Though Winnicott wished to democratise psychoanalysis, he also needed to negotiate the social and political imperatives of the institution that provided him such a popular platform. While Winnicott did not fully represent political motivations of the BBC, we can see how a governmental need to popularise psychology in the interest of morale, patriotism, and social cohesion allowed a new kind of 'everyday' psychoanalytic vernacular to come to the fore.

Lisa Farley argues that Winnicott played an important 'part of a cultural turn within psychoanalysis that sought to extend the discourse of psychoanalysis to "everyday" worlds peopled by social workers, teachers, medical professionals, and parents'.[63] Winnicott's analytic setting, for example, was modelled after the 'ordinary tasks of parents, especially that of the

[62] Donald W. Winnicott, 'Further Thoughts on Babies as Persons', in *The Collected Works of D. W. Winnicott*, ed. by Lesley Caldwell and Helen Taylor Robinson, 12 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), III, pp. 95-100 (p. 98).
[63] Lisa Farley, 'Analysis on the Air: A Sound History of Winnicott in Wartime', *American Imago*, 69 (2012), 449-471 (458).

mother with her infant or with the father playing a mother role'.[64] This analytic setting required a physical environment that is safe and comforting: Winnicott wrote that it should be 'comfortably warm', 'lit properly', not 'dead quiet', and, perhaps most importantly, should contain an analyst who is 'alive' and 'breathing'.[65] We might say that the radio imitates the psychoanalytic setting—it is a medium based on *voice*, on communication. Though it is one-sided, it relies on a presupposed intimacy between the broadcaster and the listener. Winnicott's frequent appeals to his listener as 'you' and his claims about the mother's expertise (in one broadcast, he claims that the mother is 'clever like the philosophers') creates the impression that the work of psychoanalysis can be easily transferred to the home.[66] Winnicott celebrates the 'ordinary' home as the perfect space for bringing up a well-adjusted baby (in another broadcast, he tells his listeners that all they need to do, to ensure a successful upbringing, is create a 'reliable environment' where they attend to 'bodily care' and show 'active adaptation to the baby's needs').[67] Winnicott encourages mothers to use psychoanalytic knowledge in non-traditional and non-clinical spaces. In this way (and in Farley's words), the broadcasts are an 'uncanny echo of the therapeutic practice of psychoanalysis itself'.[68] In this sense, the broadcast itself becomes a 'reliable environment in a period of social breakdown'—Farley argues that it became, for Winnicott, the best chance of 'staying in touch with listeners' and providing a 'situation for thought'.[69] Winnicott's use of 'ordinary' language, then, is a necessary element of the 'ordinary' broadcast, which transmits important psychoanalytic knowledge to everyday spaces.

We might contrast Winnicott's 'ordinary' or colloquial language with other forms of psychoanalytic communication during the wartime and postwar period, and in particular James Strachey's motivations in translating Freud's works for *The Standard Edition* (published between 1953 and 1974). Strachey's translations of Freud were hugely popular and influential: *The Standard Edition* had a large impact on the reception of Freud's theory in the mid-twentieth century. In contrast to Winnicott's colloquial language, Strachey believed his translation must capture the particularity and complexity of psychoanalytic theory. In his preface to the first

[64] Donald W. Winnicott, 'Metapsychological and Clinical Aspects of Eegression within the Psycho-analytical Set-up', in *Collected Papers: Through Paediatrics to Psycho-analysis* (London: Tavistock, 1992), pp. 278–294 (pp. 286).
[65] Winnicott, 'Metapsychological and Clinical', pp. 285-6.
[66] Donald W. Winnicott, 'The World in Small Doses', in *The Ordinary Devoted Mother and her Baby: Nine Broadcast Talks,* Wellcome Collection, Wellcome Library, London, PP/ADD/K/3/13, pp. 32-37 (p. 37).
[67] Winnicott, 'The Innate Morality of the Baby', in *The Ordinary Devoted Mother and her Baby: Nine Broadcast Talks,* Wellcome Collection, London, PP/ADD/K/3/13, pp. 38-42 (p. 39).
[68] Farley, p. 466.
[69] Farley, p. 465.

volume of *The Standard Edition,* Strachey writes about the importance of maintaining an air of technical expertise in the English version of Freud's works:

> For wherever Freud becomes difficult or obscure it is necessary to move closer to a literal translation at the cost of any stylistic elegance. For the same reason, too, it is necessary to swallow whole into the translation quite a number of technical terms, stereotyped phrases and neologisms which cannot with the best will in the world be regarded as "English"[70]

Linstrum argues that Strachey's anxiety to portray psychoanalysis as a scientific endeavour encompassed a desire to transform the practice into a 'vehicle for political and social criticism'.[71] In a lecture given in London in the early 1930s, Strachey spoke about psychoanalysis as a 'new technical device' with potential applications in 'the family', 'the school', 'the factory', 'the nation', and 'the world'.[72] In creating a specialised jargon for psychoanalysis (coining terms like 'cathexis' for Freud's *Besetzung,* for example), Strachey was attempting to legitimise psychoanalysis as a science, ready to be employed for social and political use. We might say that Winnicott and Strachey shared the same desire to broaden psychoanalysis's public. Indeed, Winnicott was also interested in the real-world application of psychoanalysis, where it could be used to address or improve the everyday lives of citizens—in his broadcast titled 'The Innate Morality of the Baby', Winnicott claims that he will address the 'business of how to get your baby to become nice and clean and good and obedient, sociable, moral and everything'.[73] For both Strachey and Winnicott, the value of psychoanalysis is its pertinence to social life. However, where Winnicott attempted to give psychoanalysis a more demotic and idiomatic connotation, Strachey hoped to present it as a respected science and so constructed 'a stable conceptual vocabulary from Freud's writing'. Winnicott and Strachey were, of course, pitching to different audiences—Winnicott was concerned with the accessibility of psychoanalytic ideas to all British people, Strachey wished to preserve the complexity of Freud's theories so as to celebrate their intellectual innovation.

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[70] James Strachey, 'General Preface', in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud,* trans. by James Strachey, 24 vols (London: The Hogarth Press, 1953-74), I (1953), xviii–xix (xix).
[71] Erik Linstrum, 'The Making of a Translator: James Strachey and the Origins of British Psychoanalysis', *Journal of British Studies,* 53 (2014), 685-704 (688).
[72] James Strachey, 'Lecture I: Changing People's Minds', *Bulletin of the International Psychoanalytic Association* 14 (1933), 294.
[73] Winnicott, 'Innate Morality', p. 38.

As such, they diverged in their beliefs about how psychoanalytic knowledge should be relayed to a mass audience: should it be spoken from the mouth of the authoritative expert or, rather, the friendly fellow citizen?

Linstrum argues that Strachey understood psychoanalysis to be an 'authoritative form of technical expertise rather than a vague source of artistic inspiration'.[74] He roots Strachey's linguistic choices in his overall desire 'to place psychoanalysis on a firmer scientific footing'.[75] Using neologisms like the term *cathexis*, Strachey argued, might induce readers to invest in learning about psychoanalysis more concretely. For Linstrum, Strachey's point 'was not that readers should discover their *own* meaning but that they should discover Freud's'.[76] Winnicott's opinion was entirely different: for him, psychoanalysis was not a technical and empirical guide to unconscious life, but rather was easily translatable to the everyday world of the British citizen. The listener did not have to learn the precise meaning of *cathexis* to garner knowledge about their own or their child's psychic life—rather, this knowledge was instinctual and ingrained, and perhaps removing technical jargon would allow individuals to access it more easily. For both Winnicott and Strachey, the question for the cultural diffusion of psychoanalysis concerned language above all. However, while Winnicott saw the importance of the exoteric, Strachey favoured the esoteric. If Winnicott hoped to provide psychoanalysis with the register of the 'everyday', Strachey celebrated the particular and complex nature of Freud's ideas, casting it to the realm of the expert, the scientist, and the academic.

So Winnicott prioritised a psychoanalysis that was adaptable to demotic forms of public communication, distancing himself from more technical Freudian language. It is difficult to know exactly how much Freud Winnicott read in the original language, but according to his biographer Brett Kahr, he 'probably never studied Freud in German—at least not in any depth'.[77] In a letter to one of his correspondents in 1964, he wrote that 'I read German very slowly and I am not able to get the full volume of something in German without a good deal of work'.[78] When he began studying psychoanalysis many of Freud's texts had not yet appeared in translation, a factor that perhaps influenced Winnicott to produce his own psychoanalytic style. Scarfone argues that Winnicott's style of language was dissimilar from Strachey's translations of Freud—instead, she contends, Winnicott's 'respect and faithfulness to his own

[74] Linstrum, p. 686.
[75] Linstrum, p. 700.
[76] Linstrum, p. 699.
[77] Brett Kahr, *D.W. Winnicott: A Biographical Portrait* (London: Routledge, 2018), p. 50
[78] Winnicott, quoted in Kahr, p. 50.

experience and to his own self […] not only 'allows but requires a personal language'.[79] Scarfone goes on to suggest that Winnicott's language, while perhaps not faithful to the scientific standardised language of Strachey's translations or even to Freud's own German terminology, is, in consequence, more faithful to a kind of 'Freudian' psychoanalytic register that relies on individual choices:

> The idea is the same in Freud as in Winnicott: it is not a matter of clinging to a standard vocabulary, but of saying precisely what one means to say, of staying true to one's thought without compromise, and of using the words that are felt most appropriate to the matter at hand.[80]

Winnicott is interested in turning psychoanalysis into a kind of 'people's science': though he wished to preserve its status as a technical, objective, and rational practice, there was a coinciding desire to ensure that this science was adaptable for public transmission, that it was accessible to the entire population.

2.3.2 Winnicott's Model of Relational Psychoanalysis

What was it about Winnicottian psychoanalysis that was particularly appealing to the wartime BBC? We can answer this by looking at the greater emphasis that Winnicott placed on the productive ways an individual might engage with the outside world, with their society and communities. Shapira argues that Winnicott's broadcasts were 'conducted in a period in which the BBC dedicated more attention to children and women as listeners and as important participants in democracy'. Winnicott's psychoanalysis, too, stresses the importance of home life as the origin of democratic feeling; the relationship between the mother and child is, he thought, the starting-point for social connection and participation. This perhaps meant that Winnicott's psychoanalysis was adaptable to the BBC's aims to create an impression of a cohesive, collaborative society.

Winnicott's psychoanalysis outlines a need to observe the baby relationally and socially—he places a primacy on examining the interplay between the individual and their environment. For Winnicott, the relationship between the baby and the objects in their

[79] Dominique Scarfone, 'Reading Winnicott Slowly…', *British Journal of Psychotherapy*, 32 (2016), 240-346 (343).
[80] Scarfone, p. 343.

environment—first the mother, and then, as they grow older, friends and peers in the wider social sphere—are absolutely tied to the development of an identity and personality. According to Winnicott, there is no way you can observe the processes of the first stages of life without first observing the baby's environment, and specifically their relationship to the mother-object. In his 1964 book *The Child and the Outside World,* where he published his BBC broadcasts in written form, Winnicott recalls a remark that he had once made: 'there is no such thing as a baby [...] if you set out to describe a baby, you will find you are describing a baby and someone. A baby cannot exist alone but is essentially part of a relationship'.[81] Winnicott argues that the baby needs the mother 'to be continuously there as a whole person', to act as a secure anchor during the crucial stages of early development. Here, the mother is kind of mirror against whom the child tests out its own existence—as Winnicott puts it, this interaction helps the baby to feel 'real'.[82] A successful early relationship contributes to a more secure and adjusted sense of self. In Winnicott's formulation, 'the baby is an aggregate of sensations and body parts', which 'require an external presence if they are to integrate'.[83] As the first external presence, the mother's 'consistent attention' allows for (in Gerson's words), the 'various inputs that go into the making of individuality – fantasy and somatic stimuli, past, present and future – to crystallise into a tolerably cohesive whole'.[84] The psychological development of the individual cannot be explained without understanding the community that they inhabit. Winnicott argues that 'a description of the emotional development of the individual cannot be made entirely in terms of the individual', rather it must take into account environment, community, and society.[85]

Adam Phillips notes that the key differences between Freud and Winnicott's psychoanalysis lie in the way that they understand the development of a 'sense of self'. He notes that, for Freud, 'the individual constructed an always precarious sexual identity, whereas for Winnicott, out of an always paradoxical involvement with others, the individual gathers the sense of self he was born with as a potential'.[86] Phillips goes on to make a distinction between Freud and Winnicott's conception of the relationship between the individual and their outside world. For Freud, he argues, 'culture' acts 'like the father' in that it prohibits and frustrates the

[81] D. W. Winnicott, *The Child, the Family and the Outside World* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1947), p. 354.
[82] Winnicott, 'Further Thoughts', p. 98.
[83] Winnicott, 'Further Thoughts', p. 101.
[84] Gal Gerson, *Individuality and Ideology in British Object Relations Theory* (London: Routledge, 2021), p. 88.
[85] Winnicott, *Playing and Reality*, p. 53.
[86] Adam Phillips, *Winnicott* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 7.

individual, who is 'divided and driven by the contradictions [of their desires], into frustrating involvement with others'.[87] For Winnicott, however, culture is 'like the mother'—it can 'facilitate growth' and provide the individual with a secure and stable identity.[88] In fact, the relationship with the mother is the first step towards a productive connection between the individual and any exterior objects. Throughout its early development, the baby shifts from an absolute dependence on and a perceived omnipotence over the mother-object (or the breast-object), which appears like 'magic' when needed, to the recognition that the mother-object is in fact separate from the self and so is not subject to the baby's whims and desires. This is the move from absolute subjectivity (the idea that the mother-object is an extension of 'I') to an understanding of objectivity (the idea that there are external objects separate to the self).

One of the innovations of Winnicott's psychoanalysis is a renewed focus on this period of transition. In order to explain how the baby moves from a belief of absolute omnipotence to understanding that there are exterior objects that do not fall under one's own control, Winnicott developed the concept of 'transitional phenomena'. The 'transitional phenomena' can include actions and objects that act as a bridge between the inner and outer worlds, and make possible this essential development away from absolute subjectivity. An example of 'transitional phenomena' might be 'objects that are not part of the infant's body yet are not fully recognised as belonging to external reality'—a blanket, a teddy bear, a toy.[89] Here, Winnicott expands on Freud's idea of 'reality-testing'. He argues that there is a need to understand the 'intermediate state between a baby's inability and his growing ability to recognise and accept reality'.[90] The 'first possession', the transitional object, is the baby's first stake in this journey. It is not mutually exclusive to the inner or outer world, but instead it belongs to both—it is at once 'Me' and 'Not-Me'.

However, Winnicott does not confine transitional phenomena to the early stages of development. Rather:

> This intermediate area of experience, unchallenged in respect of its belonging to inner or external (shared) reality, constitutes the greater part of the infant's experience, and throughout life is retained in the intense experiencing that belongs to the arts and to religion and to imaginative living, and to creative scientific work.[91]

[87] Phillips, *Winnicott*, p. 7.
[88] Phillips, *Winnicott*, p. 7.
[89] Winnicott, *Playing and Reality* (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 8.
[90] Winnicott, *Playing and Reality*, p. 14.
[91] Winnicott, *Playing and Reality*, p. 14.

Thus, the first possession is only the beginning of the individual's experience with transitional phenomena. Eventually, the infant decathects psychic energy from this initial object, 'so that in the course of years it becomes not so much forgotten as relegated to limbo'.[92] But the first object only loses its meaning because 'the transitional phenomena have become diffused, have become spread out over the whole intermediate territory between "inner psychic reality" and "the external world as perceived by two persons in common", that is to say, over the whole cultural field'.[93] All social and cultural experience, then, must be understood in terms of the initial investment in the first transitional object. Winnicott's theory unravels the dichotomy of the 'other' and the 'self', so cultural objects and interests become 'transitional objects'. While these never hold the same personal significance of the 'first possession', these later phenomena still allow for a meeting of 'inner' and 'outer' psychic life, so that the individual can invest their own identity, their personal desires and wishes, in people, places, and things. By expanding the 'intermediate' stage of the Freudian reality principle, Winnicott emphasises the influence that social and political relationships have on an individual's identity and independence. As Phillips puts it, 'man can only find himself in relation with others and in the independence gained through acknowledgment of dependence'.[94] Freud saw a confrontation with the 'outside world' as a moment of conflict and challenge, but Winnicott finds a beneficial value in this first interaction with the 'other'—the self, he argues, never fully removes itself from this intermediate stage.

Winnicott's psychoanalysis draws newfound attention to the intermediate space between inner psychic life and the outside world. By giving this 'transitional' space new developmental significance, Winnicott attempts to deconstruct an inside/outside dichotomy, so that the *process* of investment in social and cultural objects and relationships itself—the cathexis—becomes an important (and ongoing) factor in the formation of the ego-identity. On his BBC broadcasts, Winnicott explores this transitional period with his listeners—the 'tricky moment' when the baby is slowly learning the difference between the self and other. In his talks, he speaks about the need for 'patience and tolerance and [the mother's] understanding of what is happening' so that the child can move, organically, through this imperative transitional period, and learn to relate to and empathise with others:

[92] Winnicott, *Playing and Reality,* p, 14.
[93] Winnicott, *Playing and Reality,* p. 16.
[94] Phillips, *Winnicott,* p. 7.

> Gradually your infant will become interested in your point of view too, but the foundation for this is your getting to know him, and so being able to wait for what is so much more valuable than goodness and compliance, the baby's own gradually developing sense of minding what results from his actions and thoughts[95]

This might explain why Winnicott's psychoanalysis was so attractive to the BBC, especially in its responsibilities as a source of propaganda; the broadcasts encourage mothers to think about the development of their infant into the community-minded individual, who thinks carefully about their relationship to the world around them. In another talk, Winnicott speaks about the early mother-child relationship as being the 'very beginning of co-operation and social sense'—it is 'worth all the trouble it involves!' he remarks.[96] As well as setting out the need for the collaborative and considerate individual, Winnicott's broadcasts also abide by the BBC's aim to keep messaging positive and optimistic in their effort to maintain morale. It was perhaps easy to give Winnicott's version of psychoanalysis this optimistic spin, as he often suggests that the relationship between the individual and their society can be a positive and beneficial one. In his analysis, the acknowledgment of a world outside the self does not present a crisis to the individual—it provides them with an opportunity to expand an idea of 'selfhood' so that they may go on to be responsible and kind in their communities. In his 1957 essay 'Mother's Contribution to Society', Winnicott wrote that 'every man or woman who is sane, every man or woman who has the feeling of being a person in the world, and for whom the world means something, every happy person, is in infinite debt to a woman'.[97] The initial relationship between the child and their mother was the defining relationship for later success and happiness in society.

2.3.3 Winnicott and the Question of the Citizen

Many of Winnicott's writings during and after the Second World War centred on the very question of the 'good' citizen—the character of upstanding morals, who acts for the good of the whole community. As we have seen, Winnicott believed that morality originated in the

[95] Donald W. Winnicott, 'The New Baby: Getting to Know Your Baby', in *The Collected Works of D. W. Winnicott,* ed. by Robert Adès, 12 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), XXII, pp. 245-249 (p. 248).
[96] Donald W. Winnicott, 'Problems of Management: Training Babies', in *The Collected Works of D. W. Winnicott,* ed. by Robert Adès, 12 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), XXII, pp. 241-253 (p. 241).
[97] Donald W. Winnicott, 'Mother's Contribution to Society', *The Collected Works of D. W. Winnicott,* ed. by Lesley Caldwell and Helen Taylor Robinson, 12 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), V, pp. 239-296 p. 294.

family unit; it is the 'warmth of the personal relationship', he says in one of his broadcasts, that allows the child to test out their desires, to develop into a well-adjusted individual. In a letter published in the *British Medical Journal* in 1946, Winnicott makes explicit connections between the initial mother-child relationship and the success or failure of the citizen. In a response to a previous letter written by 'Dr Stungo', Winnicott writes that the 'real source of good citizenship' is the 'life of the child in his home, including the first relationship, that between the infant and mother'. He goes on to argue that an individual's actions in the wider world can only be examined in terms of this primary relationship. The good citizen, he argues, is one whose allegiance to their society and community comes naturally:

> On the basis of a good first relationship, more complex relationships can be developed gradually at home, and if all goes well the wider world is approached through the family's external relationships. If these things fail, citizenship (or something similar) has to be taught, and a job it is.[98]

If their interest is to create the good citizen, he argues, doctors should not interfere in the mother-child relationship 'except in the case of dire necessity'. The most important factor in ensuring that children become invested in their enacting social good, Winnicott argues, is to allow parents and teachers (who often act as extensions of the parent) to 'carry on intuitively and without being able to account for all that they do'.[99] He criticises Dr. Stungo's opinion that '"children learn something of love, charity, sacrifice, humility, modesty, good and evil from religious instruction"' and that they should be '"taught to appreciate the nature of hate, envy, greed, spite, guilt, and temper"'. In Winnicott's opinion, we do not need to use doctrine or religion to teach children who 'know more about all these things than we do'.[100] Winnicott had faith in a natural and innate mothering inclination, and in the idea that this inclination produces already-formed 'good' citizens.

We can certainly position Winnicott's ideas within a wider shift in the history of citizenship. As Zaretsky argues, after the Second World War 'modern citizenship rested on immediate, particularistic, and family-centred loyalties, not on dreams of universal brotherhood'.[101] For Winnicott, democracy has its origins in the private, family home. Much

[98] Donald W. Winnicott, 'Psychology in the Child's Education', *British Medical Journal*, 1 (1946), 998.
[99] Winnicott, 'Psychology in the Child's Education', p. 998.
[100] Winnicott, 'Psychology in the Child's Education', p. 999.
[101] Eli Zaretsky, *Political Freud: A History* (New York: Colombia University Press, 2015), p. 132.

of his writings on society thus stress the importance of maintaining a self-governing private sphere, where natural mother-child interactions ensure the development of healthy citizens. In the introduction to this thesis, I note that citizenship at the mid-century was formed of contradictions: though the Welfare State meant a widespread expansion of social rights, the citizen was expected to be responsible and self-reliant. In the sociologist T. H. Marshall's words, citizenship at the mid-century meant the 'loyalty of *free men* endowed with rights and protected by a common law' [my emphasis].[102] The 'active' citizen of Welfare-era Britain must inhabit both the private and public sphere. Though citizens participate in (and receive protections from) society, they still need to maintain an essential individuality. For Winnicott, the state works to enable and maintain this individuality. Society must ensure the protection of the private family, which, for Winnicott, has real social value: it is the origin of socially good, moral behaviour. Indeed, Gerson argues that Winnicott understands democracy as 'based on unimpeded nuclear families' so that the main task of the state should be to 'safeguard the home's viability by putting resources at its disposal'.[103] Gerson argues that Winnicottian psychoanalysis demonstrates the 'tendency of liberalism to progressively concern itself with the relationship between individual development, on the one hand, and the objective grid within which individuality moves, on the other hand'.[104] Winnicott's broadcasts, which address the dynamics of the family home, are always in the service of maintaining this functioning private sphere. By speaking on the BBC, he becomes part of a historical governmental effort to sustain private family living; he works to sustain individuality for the good of the community as a whole.

However, Winnicott's dedication to the family as the origin of democratic feeling meant that he was often critical of what he saw as the too-interventionist policies of the post-war social democratic state. Winnicott expressed his concerns about a National Health Service, which, he argued, would transform doctors, psychiatrists, and paediatricians into political agents and civil servants. In a particularly scathing letter to William Beveridge in 1946, Winnicott writes that it was Beveridge's 'true ignorance' that allowed him to 'make medical practice subservient to politics instead of to science'. Winnicott speaks of his ensuing 'hatred' of Beveridge, a hatred that stems from what he sees as the making of 'irresponsible suggestions

[102] Marshall, p. 41.
[103] Gal Gerson, 'Individuality, deliberation and welfare in Donald Winnicott', *History of the Human Sciences*, 18 (2005), 107-126 (122).
[104] Gerson, 'Individuality', p. 123.

in respect of doctors'.[105] Less than a month later, on the 6th November 1946, Winnicott sent a letter to *The Times.* The letter contained a similarly worded worry that 'medical practice is now to be subservient not to science but to politics'.[106] In both of these cases, we can note that Winnicott holds a liberal understanding of the 'political' sphere, where 'politics' does not suffuse all aspects of the social world, but operates as an insulated part of society. Winnicott's regard of psychology as an objective, insular practice perhaps demonstrates his own anxiety that psychoanalysis, too, might lose its 'scientific' authority if incorporated into political institutions. After all, in a letter to the analyst Ella Sharpe only a week later, he insists that psychoanalysis belongs in a greater capacity to the sciences rather than the arts: 'I am not certain I agree with you about psychoanalysis as an art […] in psychoanalysis the art is less and the technique based on scientific considerations more'.[107] Though Winnicott's broadcasts make psychoanalysis accessible, his aversion to the merging of politics and psychology suggests his dedication to an idea of the autonomous 'self', who is essentially separate from wider social structures.

Sally Alexander argues that despite Winnicott's reservations about social democracy, he should still be seen as 'the psychoanalyst for the welfare state' due to his arguments for 'public provision and good enough environments' consistently in 'talks, bestselling books, medical journals and BBC broadcasts'.[108] Indeed, Winnicott's reservations about Beveridge's National Health Service stemmed from his thought that 'ordinary homes and families, good enough mothers, sometimes fail'. Social institutions might damage the fluctuating (sometimes failing and even destructive) dynamic between the mother and the child. He thus saw some social-democratic provisions, in Alexander's words, as 'a rigid grid of thought and clinical practice' that ultimately demonstrated 'the subsoil of totalitarian thinking'.[109] If the state ignored the crucial dynamic of the mother and the child, and did not make provisions to extend this dynamic to societal communities and institutions, then the work that they did for their citizens was 'arbitrarily cruel' and emotionally depriving.[110]

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[105] D. W. Winnicott, 'Letter to Lord Beveridge', in *The Collected Works of D. W. Winnicott*, ed. by Lesley Caldwell and Helen Taylor Robinson, 12 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), III, pp. 37-38 (p. 37).
[106] D. W. Winnicott, 'Letter to *The Times'* in *The Collected Works of D. W. Winnicott*, ed. by Lesley Caldwell and Helen Taylor Robinson, 12 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), III, pp. 39-40 (p. 39).
[107] D. W. Winnicott, 'Letter to Ella Sharpe', in *The Collected Works of D. W. Winnicott*, ed. by Lesley Caldwell and Helen Taylor Robinson, 12 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 41-42 (p. 41).
[108] Sally Alexander, 'D. W. Winnicott and the Social Democratic Vision', in *Psychoanalysis in the Age of Totalitarianism,* ed. By Matt Ffytche and Daniel Pick (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 78-95 (p. 87).
[109] Alexander, p. 88.
[110] Alexander, p. 88.

Winnicott was concerned that psychoanalysis—not as art or as philosophy, but as objective science—might be ignored in an institutional understanding of what makes a 'good citizen'. Alexander imagines that Winnicott's watchword might have been '"Listen to the unconscious, not the planners"'.[111] Winnicott's hatred for Beveridge and his anger at the National Health Service, all stemmed from his despair that an 'ordinary mother' may no longer be trusted, and that a child might be deprived of a crucial developmental environment as a result. Denise Riley characterises the increase in institutional childcare after the Second World War as part of a 'general move to open up the family—not only to corrective inspection, as in the case of 'problem families', but also to a benevolently conceived set of state interventions in the traditionally private spheres'.[112] But Winnicott was sceptical that opening up the family in this way would make vast improvements to society. Though he was not wholly opposed to state intervention (he made the case that this was particularly important with problematic or so-called 'anti-social' parents), he was concerned that 'benevolent' state interventions might actually be damaging to the individual.

Perhaps the most striking example of Winnicott's ideas about democracy is his article 'Thoughts on the Meaning of the Word Democracy' (1949). Here, Winnicott attempts to understand the mechanisms of a society in terms of the psychological and emotional development of the individuals that inhabit it; in short, he contends that a democracy, where 'healthy' and 'well-adjusted' individuals happily participate in society, can only occur when those individuals reach a required level of 'maturity'.[113] This level of 'maturity', which indicates the individual's democratic capability, originates in the 'ordinary, commonplace home'.[114] As we have seen, the ordinary home is a 'reliable' environment where the individual tests out an initial relationship between the self and the outside world. This environment allows the healthy citizen to develop a secure 'sense of self', which they view as separate from the society they live in. For Winnicott, 'well-grounded personal development' is a necessary step for gaining a healthy 'social sense'.[115] Winnicott's conception of a true democracy is a society that can strike a clear balance between the private and public lives of individuals—the individual, he argues, should not over-identify with a national identity. Winnicott argues that

[111] Alexander, p. 95.
[112] Riley, p. 100.
[113] D. W. Winnicott, 'Some Thoughts on the Meaning of the Word Democracy' in *The Collected Works of D. W. Winnicott*, ed. by Lesley Caldwell and Helen Taylor Robinson, 12 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), III, pp. 407-422 (p. 407).
[114] Winnicott, 'Some Thoughts', p. 408.
[115] Winnicott, 'Some Thoughts', p. 409.

this is a 'pro-society tendency that is anti-individual' and calls those who identify in this way 'hidden anti-socials', as opposed to 'healthy' and 'whole' persons who are 'able to find the whole conflict within the self as well as being able to see the whole conflict outside the self, in external (shared) reality'. When 'healthy' individuals come together, he finishes, 'they each contribute a whole world, because each brings a whole person'.[116] Winnicott here emphasises the importance of maintaining a private world while also participating in a public one. In a true democracy, the family unit (where the individual becomes 'whole') is indispensable.

In *The War Inside,* Shapira examines the ways that analysts on the radio circulated a postwar ideal of a functional, nuclear family unit. Shapira notices that psychoanalytic broadcasts on the BBC in the late 1940s and early '50s demonstrated the 'shift from a collective wartime citizenship toward a postwar domestic citizenship and to a focus on conservative family relationships in general and the mother–child bond in particular as important to the functioning of a democratic regime'.[117] Winnicott's radio talks certainly support Shapira's argument: his childcare advice often stressed the importance of a functional and self-sustaining family unit, where the mother holds an innate, irrefutable skill for childrearing, and where 'no book's rules can take the place of this feeling a mother has for her infant's needs, which enables her to make at times an almost exact adaptation to those needs'.[118]

Winnicott did not only hope to democratise psychoanalysis, he also hoped that psychoanalysis might play a part in democratic procedures themselves. In the latter half of the 1940s, when Britain saw a wave of welfare policies, Winnicott's broadcasts worked to preserve what he saw as the most important element of a successful society: the initial relationship between a mother and her child. In the same year that he wrote the essay on democracy, Winnicott voiced 'The Ordinary Devoted Mother and Her Baby' series. In one of his last talks in the series, Winnicott suggested that his broadcasts had an overall social purpose—they did not only involve assuring new mothers on their innate capabilities as caregivers, but tied these capabilities more explicitly to a political project:

> The ordinary thing would be to say that this talk is about "training." The word "training" certainly brings to your mind the sort of thing that I want to go into today, which is the business of how to get your baby to become nice and clean and good and obedient,

[116] Winnicott, 'Some Thoughts', p. 413.
[117] Shapira, p. 135.
[118] Winnicott, 'Close-up of Mother Feeding Baby', in *The Collected Works of D. W. Winnicott*, ed. by Lesley Caldwell and Helen Taylor Robinson, 12 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), III, pp. 289-292 (p. 289).

> sociable, moral and everything. I was going to say happy, too, but you can't teach a child to be happy.[119]

The lesson of this talk is that a mother's love is important above all for the baby to develop into a cooperative social being. The mother, he writes, should not 'feel [the] aim is to implant goodness and a sense of right or wrong', because, by doing so, 'the baby is left without firm roots to the good behaviour'.[120] He describes that imparting a too-strong moral compass on a baby is like 'inviting the baby to split into two halves'—the first half being the baby's 'spontaneity and capacity to make a contribution to society' and the second 'quite separately, are the world's demands'.[121] Instead, he advises, the mother should allow for the baby's 'innate tendencies towards morality' to come to the fore. To do so, he writes, the mother should simply love the baby: 'because of the mother's sensitive ways, which belong to the fact of her love, the roots of the infant's personal moral sense are preserved'.[122] Over time, the mother 'becomes gradually released from the need to be so terribly sensitive'—eventually, she will lose her role as the 'good mother', the baby will develop an active imagination and will act out an internal moral conflict creatively with objects in the outside world.[123] The first mother-child interaction is, Winnicott contends, crucial preparation for later social interactions. He finishes the talk by explaining the significance of a psychological and cultural focus on the mother and the child:

> So, civilisation has started again inside a new human being. In practice, you will be neither training nor neglecting your infant. You will be providing a reliable setting in which the infant can sooner or later discover an interest in co-operating with you, an interest in seeing your point of view, liking to do what you like, and being pleased to adopt your ideas of right and wrong. Little children are fiercely moral. It's for you to catch on to their primitive morality and to tone it down gradually to the humanity that comes from mature understanding.[124]

Here, Winnicott celebrates the family-oriented British citizen, who is responsible for bringing up a new generation of democratically-minded individuals. But perhaps the most crucial

[119] Donald Winnicott, 'Innate Morality', p. 38.
[120] Winnicott, 'Innate Morality', p. 41.
[121] Winnicott, 'Innate Morality', p. 41.
[122] Winnicott, 'Innate Morality', p. 41.
[123] Winnicott, 'Innate Morality', p. 41.
[124] Winnicott, 'Innate Morality', p. 42.

element of the democratic British citizen is the need to negotiate between the self as a private individual and also as a part of public and national institutions. Winnicott's radio broadcasts—which relay advice (sanctioned by the government) to domestic spaces, provide this crucial link between the individual, their family, and the outside world. For Winnicott, the radio thus operates as a kind of 'transitional object'. Access to the radio waves through the domestic device of the radio captures the essential dialectic of the social democratic citizen who occupies both a 'public' life (in engaging with cultural institutions like the BBC), but who also maintains a separate private life with their family. This duality of existence was extremely important to Winnicott, who advocated for safe and secure environments both in domestic and public life. The material object of the radio usually occupied domestic or private spaces: during the war, it usually sat in living rooms and kitchens, and families gathered around together to hear the war news. While the poorest families did not own a wireless in their home, they could access radio programming at pubs, cafes, and workplaces. Though the radio usually occupied the space of the home, it provided a transitional gateway to the public realm—and to the collectivised modes of citizenship that this realm entailed, so that, as Whittington notes, 'nation' and 'audience' became 'nearly coterminous'.[125]

We might use Winnicott's idea of the transitional phenomena to understand the cultural effect of the radio in mid-century Britain. Bainbridge and Yates have made connections between the spatial nature of the radio broadcast and Winnicott's 'transitional object'—they notice that the radio 'provide[s] for experience that unites the inner and outer worlds, allowing us to live out a profound sense of enrichment that is uniquely personal and unable to be challenged by others'.[126] For Bainbridge and Yates, the radio is a transitional object because it acts as a transmitter of a wider social and cultural world: it is the individual's access point to the wider groups and networks that they feel invested in. Virginia Woolf also explored the notion of the radio as a point of negotiation between the individual and the social. She describes the wireless as the defining technology of her time, which, she writes, brings the horrors of war into the domestic space instantaneously. From her rural Sussex cottage, Woolf describes the experience of turning on the wireless in the middle of the war and hearing 'an airman telling us how this very afternoon he shot down a raider; his machine caught fire; he plunged into the sea; the light turned green and then black; he rose to the top and was rescued by a trawler'.[127]

[125] Whittington, p. 13.
[126] Caroline Bainbridge and Candida Yates, *Media and the Inner World* (London: Macmillan, 2014), p. 45.
[127] Virginia Woolf, 'The Leaning Tower', in *The Moment and Other Essays* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1948), pp. 128-154 (pp. 130-31).

The wireless blurs the boundary between individual and social experience—a concept that Woolf finds frightening. She writes that never before have citizens been confronted with the disembodied voices of war: 'Scott never saw the sailors drowning at Trafalgar; Jane Austen never heard the cannon roar at Waterloo. Neither of them heard Napoleon's voice as we hear Hitler's voice as we sit at home of an evening'.[128] The modern writer, she argues, is tasked with holding the entirety of the social world in their mind.

For Winnicott, the radio has a more benevolent task: it is the link between the private family world and the public life of the citizen. The radio is the essential tool of Winnicott's ideal democratic citizen who, on listening to a public medium, participates in a national community and, on turning the radio off, retreats to their own private life. The radio broadcast as a kind of transitional object is perhaps the perfect analogy for Winnicott's conception of the ideal democratic society. In this society there are two worlds, the inside world (the private) and the outside world (the social). The radio, in bringing these two worlds together without belonging exclusively to one or the other, allows for a safe form of cathexis, where the individual can participate in society without losing their essential individuality.

In this section, I have examined Winnicott's compliance and resistance to the BBC's political imperatives. Winnicott's moments of resistance to the BBC (and, indeed, to social democratic institutions as a whole) seem to hinge on his reluctance to assume an authoritative role. For Winnicott, the well-adjusted individual emerges naturally from the family unit (which should remain, safely, in the private sphere)—'if mothers are told what to do', he wrote later, 'they soon get in a muddle, and (what is most important of all) they lose their own ability to act without knowing exactly what is right and what is wrong'.[129] Instead, Winnicott attempts to form a bridge between the clinical world of psychoanalysis and the everyday lives of citizens. With his broadcasts, Winnicott integrated psychoanalytic thought into popular discourse, making connections between psychological health and the figure of the well-adjusted citizen. By listening in, Winnicott not only hopes that his audience will become socially responsible and participatory citizens, but that they will also trust in their instinctual skills as mothers and child carers. In order to reach such an audience, psychoanalysis must take on an aesthetics of familiarity. Winnicott continues a discursive conversation initiated by Priestley about the link between 'good citizenship' and psychological health, but he inflects it (more explicitly) with psychoanalysis. In the next section, I explore an alternate manifestation of psychoanalysis on

[128] Woolf, 'The Leaning Tower', p. 131.
[129] D. W. Winnicott, *Talking to Parents*, ed. by Clare Winnicott, Christopher Bollas et. al. (Cambridge, MA: Perseus, 1993), p. 5.

the wartime BBC: this time, psychoanalysis appears as something *un*familiar and abstract, and cannot be understood or conveyed with a colloquial and rational discourse. Here, I turn to Elizabeth Bowen's strange and ghostly BBC broadcasts which, in exploring the uncanniness of radio technologies themselves, stage a modernist encounter with the BBC and its social and political imperatives in wartime Britain.

2.4 Elizabeth Bowen and the Uncanny Broadcast

So far, we have seen how psychoanalysis took on an aesthetic of familiarity and homeliness on the airwaves, where Priestley and Winnicott speak about the mind of the citizen in an everyday sound. In this way, psychological knowledge is presented as akin to 'common sense', it is made ordinary. But Bowen stages a different kind of encounter with psychoanalysis on the airwaves: she pays attention to the incomprehensible aspects of psychological life, the mysteries of the unconscious. In these broadcasts, Bowen experiments with the radio form, with the peculiar and disconcerting experience of listening to disembodied, distant voices in the comfort of the home. I argue that we can read these experiments through the lens of the Freudian 'uncanny' (the discomforting feeling that arises on the meeting of the familiar and the unfamiliar). Unlike Priestley and Winnicott, who both use psychology to promote a new form of active citizenship, Bowen's explorations of the unconscious on the airwaves confuse and (at times) resist the BBC's propagandistic function. Though Bowen, too, is interested in the idea of a shared, national heritage, her broadcasts are filled with the surreal and the incomprehensible: with ghostly voices and apparitions. On her radio plays, ghostly figures haunt wartime London to remind citizens of a past they should not forget: an older, more traditional way of living. Bowen uses these ghosts to explore the dangers of social change. I suggest that these broadcasts, then, are an aesthetic means of resisting the BBC's propagandistic imperatives, and allow Bowen to make conservative critiques of a new, more expansive mode of citizenship.

Between the years 1941 and 1973, Bowen became a regular broadcaster on the BBC. As well as hosting her own broadcasts, she was often invited as a guest contributor for on-air discussions on literary or political topics, or to read her fiction on-air. Even before she appeared on the BBC, Bowen was somewhat familiar with the technology of the radio—her husband was hired as the Secretary to the Central Council of School Broadcasting at the BBC from 1935 to 1945, and had later advised the Electric and Musical Industries on gramophone recordings. But despite her husband's involvement in the BBC and his own technical knowledge of the wireless, she did not engage in broadcasting until she was invited to take part in a discussion

entitled 'Strength of Mind: Do Women Think Like Men?' in 1941.[130] Her familiarity with the radio form perhaps meant that she was more sympathetic with the broadcast as a new mode of communication than modernist writers like Virginia Woolf, who described the wireless as an inescapable source of dread that filled all homes with a monologic 'spate of words'.[131] For Bowen the radio form presented new aesthetic possibilities. She wrote that 'writing for the air frenzies me; it is such a new and different technique—all the same, its problems are fascinating'.[132] Bowen was fascinated by the radio form, of its problems and its prospects for writerly experimentation.

In her wartime radio career, Bowen dramatised the life and fiction of three historical authors—Anthony Trollope, Jane Austen and Frances Burney. During these broadcasts, Bowen imagined what it might be like if those authors could reappear in the present-day moment as ghostly figures, as phantoms, or as strange disembodied voices. Fanny Burney explores the alien scenes of wartime London, a ghostly Anthony Trollope has a conversation with a young soldier taking a train to the front line, and Jane Austen (or at least her disembodied voice), constantly interrupts her own biographical broadcast. Though these broadcasts were presented as straightforward documentaries or biographies of historical authors, Bowen always kept one eye fixed on the present. In the plays, she resurrects historical figures so that they can live in, speak in and observe wartime London. As a result, Bowen's radio is a ghostly and strange space—a space which brings authors back from a dead, a space of confrontation between past and present British lives. Emily Bloom describes Bowen's radio as 'spectral'—by this, she means that Bowen was interested in the occult properties of the radio form which 'offered an irresistible opportunity to resurrect authorial spirits'.[133] In Bowen's broadcasts 'writers return to earth as ghostly visitors who chastise, correct, or disrupt the expectations of their living readers'.[134] In staging ghostly visitations from the past, Bowen attempts to reposition these authors and their texts in the 'now', so that encounters with figures from Britain's literary history act as a mode of engaging with the present-day, with wartime society.

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[130] Though Bowen's radio career is rather extensive, it has received little scholarly attention. Allan Hepburn's recent edited collection of her broadcasts and radio plays has sought to inspire further critical inquiry. When we examine Bowen's oeuvre of literary works, he argues, we would be remiss to leave out her broadcasts, where she thinks about the sensation and the feeling of language and sound. See: Allan Hepburn, 'Introduction', in *Listening in: Broadcasts, Speeches, and Interviews by Elizabeth Bowen,* ed. by Allan Hepburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 1-24 (p. 10).

[131] Virginia Woolf, 'Thoughts on Peace in an Air Raid', in *Selected Essays,* ed. by David Bradshaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 216-220 (p. 217).

[132] Bowen, quoted in Hepburn, 'Introduction', p. 10.

[133] Emily Bloom, *The Wireless Past: Anglo-Irish Writers and the BBC, 1931-1968* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 96.

[134] Bloom, p. 96.

By exploring the strange and otherworldly elements of the wireless, Bowen's radio broadcasts become, in the Freudian sense, uncanny. Emily Bloom argues that Bowen's broadcasts are concerned with the 'uncanny presence of media technologies as a tool for combating nostalgic approaches to literature'.[135] Following Bloom's psychoanalytic examination of Bowen's broadcasts, this chapter conducts a fuller exploration of the relationship between these on-air experiments and Freud's concept of the *unheimlich*. I suggest that Bowen's broadcasts, whether consciously or unconsciously, employ psychoanalysis in a way that challenges its manifestation as a demotic science, or its implementation for a political purpose. Where Winnicott and Priestley attempt to make psychology accessible, Bowen explores how psychoanalysis might trouble or unsettle the broadcast's social role, its ability to communicate effectively with a national audience. Bowen is interested in the excesses of the radio form; on the broadcasts, she finds another role for the unconscious altogether, where the workings of the mind cannot be understood or communicated through a rational or colloquial discourse. Instead, Bowen's broadcasts are filled with ghostly interference. Here, Bowen presents another role for psychoanalysis on the BBC: she thinks about the uncanny effects of listening to the radio, the ways in which the technology itself can force a confrontation between past and present.

In his essay 'The Uncanny' (1919), Freud endeavours to understand the curious feeling of unease, and sometimes of terror and revulsion, when we are faced with that which is at once familiar and unfamiliar. Freud takes his cue from Ernst Jentsch's essay 'On the Psychology of the Uncanny' (1906) ('*Zur Psychologie des Unheimlichen*'), which employs the German terms '*heimlich'* and '*unheimlich'* in order to attempt to understand the 'special core of feeling' that arises when faced with the unknown or the undesirable; these words denote a feeling (or a lack of feeling) of homeliness, of comfort, safety, and familiarity.[136] In 'The Uncanny', Freud begins with a comprehensive examination of *heimlich* and *unheimlich*. He argues that there is a curious correlation between the two terms: 'What interests us most […] is to find that among its different shades of meaning the word "*heimlich"* exhibits one which is identical to its opposite *"unheimlich"*. What is *"heimlich"* thus comes to be "*unheimlich"*. Freud notes that *heimlich* is 'a word the meaning of which develops in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally coincides with its opposite, *unheimlich*'.[137] The uncanny, then, 'is in reality nothing new

[135] Bloom, p. 104.
[136] Sigmund Freud, 'The Uncanny', in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. by James Strachey, 24 vols (London: The Hogarth Press, 1953-74), XVII (1955), pp. 217-256 (p. 218)
[137] Freud, 'The Uncanny', p. 223-5.

or alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from it only through the process of repression'; it is an encounter with 'that class of the frightening that goes back to what was once well known and had long been familiar' but has since been suppressed.[138] One of Freud's examples of an uncanny object or thing is 'the *doppelgänger'*, or the 'double', which is disconcerting because it is 'sprung from the soil of unbounded self-love, from the primary narcissism which dominates the mind of the child and of primitive man'.[139] When the double is encountered later in life, Freud writes that it threatens a return to this infantile, primitive state. Or it might even signify the work of the 'super-ego', which projects undesirable feelings onto its 'double' in order to repress it. The appearance of multiple selves would, in this case, expose the splitting of the ego in early life, and thus the presence of the 'conscience' or super-ego. The feeling of uncanniness arises from a confrontation with a previous and primitive state or belief—something that once was familiar, but has since become tinged with the foreign and the strange, or simply something confined to the past that has suddenly reared its head in the present.

The radio produces the feeling of the uncanny by virtue of its occupation in 'homely' space. By the end of the 1930s, the radio became directly entangled with, and even defined by, the space of the home. Ian Whittington describes the wartime radio as producing 'intimate acoustics'; in bringing 'conversations into the domestic realm', he argues, the BBC 'offered writers access to an unprecedented public sphere'.[140] The sounds of the wireless invade the familiarity of the home, bringing forth voices of strangers into a space of safety and comfort. When these voices are ghostly voices, the voices of the dead, the alien and strange quality of the wireless is amplified. Though it is a home-object, its technological mechanisms are unknown, even supernatural. Edward D. Miller argues that 'twentieth century technologies of the home have served, not to eliminate the return of surmounted primitive beliefs, but rather to extend such beliefs into burgeoning regions, enabling new manifestations and inviting a frenzy of diagnoses and pathologizing'.[141] The uncanniness of the wireless arises from its ability to speak a disembodied human voice—though an inanimate object, it transmits a living (and, indeed, sometimes dead) human voice. Miller contemplates the various ways that the radio broadcasts can recall repressed primitive beliefs:

[138] Freud, 'The Uncanny', p. 240; p. 219.
[139] Freud, 'The Uncanny', p. 234.
[140] Whittington, p. 6.
[141] Edward D. Miller, *Emergency Broadcasting and 1930s American Radio* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003), p. 24.

> For the listener who believes he hears a dead relative on the air, this is only uncanny if he also believes (as an adult who has consciously rid himself of primitive fear) that it is not possible for the dead to speak via an electric medium. It is uncanny if this occurrence reminds him of a fantasy of a voice that he once experienced as pleasurable. Indeed, it is uncanny if it reminds him of the sound of his own voice severed from his own body.[142]

The radio provides us with another uncanny phenomenon: though it is tied to the domestic life, to the safe and familiar, it can bring forth the unbidden and the frightening. It can turn homes into haunted houses.

When we consider the uncanniness of the radio form, we should also note its early associations with the mystical and the supernatural. In the early days of its invention, listening to voices on the radio was seen as akin to a séance, the practice of recalling the dead from beyond the grave. Carole Morales argues that Marconi and Tesla 'realised the possibility of using the radio as a wireless telephone for the dead'—the mechanical marvel of the wireless, its ability to transmit voices as if from the ether, cast it with the supernatural.[143] Likewise, Edison's phonograph became known as a 'spirit phone' after he announced in *Scientific American* magazine that his new 'apparatus' was built to see whether it was 'possible for personalities which have left this earth to communicate with us'.[144] Jeffrey Sconce emphasises the importance of the occult to early cultural reactions towards the wireless. He explains that 'as wireless itself moved from nautical technology to amateur novelty to the institution of the broadcast radio, numerous scientists, philosophers, and psychologists explored the still ambiguous boundary between psychic phenomena and a unified theory of electricity, magnetism, waves, fields, ether, and consciousness'.[145] Sconce argues that the radio form 'presented a new and often disturbing model of consciousness and communication, one that replaced the fascination for telegraphy's now mundane "lightning lines" with the more abstract wonder of electronic communication through the open air'.[146] Bowen's experimentation with the ghostliness of the radio broadcast, then, was rooted in a cultural history of the wireless that intertwined its electrical function with the mystery of the occult.

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[142] Edward D. Miller, p. 23.
[143] Carole Morales, 'Radio from Beyond the Grave', *Semiotext(e),* 16 (1993), 330-34 (331).
[144] Thomas Edison, qtd. in Austin C. Lescarboura, "Edison's Views on Life and Death", *Scientific American,* CXXIII/18 (30 October 1920), p. 446.
[145] Jeffrey Sconce, 'The Wireless Ego', in *Broadcasting Modernism*, ed. by Debra Rae Cohen, Michael Coyle and Jane Lewty (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2009), p. 31-50 (p. 32).
[146] Jeffrey Sconce, *Haunted Media: Electronic Presence from Telegraphy to Television* (2006), p. 62.

Following this, I will consider Bowen's radio plays in the 'New Judgement' series as experiments with the uncanny. During these broadcasts, Bowen would stage the ghostly appearances of famous (and long-dead) British novelists in the present moment. The 'New Judgement' series was developed by Stephen Potter, the Literary Editor of the BBC's Features Department, and was described as a gathering of 'eminent contemporaries' who would speak 'on their classical prototypes'. [147] For the first of Bowen's 'New Judgement' contributions, Potter invited her to speak on Jane Austen in a broadcast that aired on 8th March 1942 on the *BBC Third Programme.* But what first seems like a straightforward biographical broadcast soon unravels into a fantastical ghost story, as the voices of Austen's sister and niece appear as if called to the present by the very mention of their names.

As the narrator moves through a biography of Jane Austen's life, they are continually interrupted by these ghostly figures and voices. On mentioning Austen's sister Cassandra, the narrator is shocked to learn of the presence of a second voice:

> NARRATOR: Jane Austen was born at Steventon rectory – twelve miles from Basingstoke, in the pleasant county of Hampshire – on the 16th of December, 1775 […] Jane herself was to live here till she was twenty-six. She had, apart from her six brothers, one sister – Cassandra –
> CASSANDRA: *(In eager affirmation)* – Yes –
> NARRATOR: *(Startled)* Miss Cassandra? – I did not know you were here!
> CASSANDRA: She would desire me to be present.
> NARRATOR: *(A little rattled)* Of course – naturally – I do see – yes. *(Picking up again on more even tone)*[148]

The narrator's surprise at this sudden disruption of the broadcast prompts the simultaneous surprise of the listener—though neither can see Cassandra, it is clear that her voice has been resurrected over the radio waves. What's more, when the narrator mentions Jane's beloved niece Fanny, the broadcast is interrupted again—this time, Fanny's voice appears from the ether. When Jane's voice finally makes an appearance, however, it is not Jane herself that has

[147] Stephen Potter, qtd. in Julian Potter, *Stephen Potter at the BBC* (Suffolk: Orford Books, 2004), p. 122.
[148] Elizabeth Bowen, 'New Judgement: Elizabeth Bowen on Jane Austen', in *Listening in: Broadcasts, Speeches, and Interviews by Elizabeth Bowen,* ed. by Allan Hepburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 39-55 (p. 39). Please note that Hepburn collected the original transcriptions of Bowen's broadcasts: the diacritical marks and bracketed comments are present on the transcripts themselves, and so we can suppose they were made by Bowen's own hand.

joined the broadcast, but rather disembodied aural vestiges of Cassandra and Fanny's own memories (in the script, Jane's lines are labelled 'Jane's Voice', where Cassandra and Fanny are written in as characters in their own right). Throughout the broadcast, Jane never occupies the 'present' to join the narrator. Her voice is only rekindled by the memories of Cassandra and Fanny, who speak about her as though she is long dead and gone:

> CASSANDRA: *(Almost violently – disturbed)* – Jane – disinclination! But you were the soul of cheerfulness!
> NARRATOR: Just now – I think – Miss Cassandra, she was not speaking to you.
> CASSANDRA: To whom, then? Who else was there? I knew her whole heart!
> FANNY: *(Softly)* I wonder – did you?
> CASSANDRA: *(Extreme agitation)* Jane, Jane – they are trying to come between us. Strangers, strangers – who tell me they are The World. Even Fanny – They pretend you gave me the lie. Speak to me, speak to them – tell them – (voice rising) – Where are you – Jane?
> JANE'S VOICE: *(By contrast to Cassandra's, sounding extremely human, youthful, normal, matter-of-fact)* Here I am, Cassandra – in Bath, still at Bath.[149]

Cassandra and Fanny's voices linger for the remainder of the broadcast, continually interrupting the narrator with their memories of Austen's life. Here, Bowen explores the technological mysteries of the radio form, where the wireless harnesses a supernatural power, where it can, seemingly on its own, raise voices from the dead. Previous scholarship has discussed how Bowen's literatures are filled with objects that seem to take on a life of their own; Ellmann argues that for Bowen 'the object is too "over-charged" to be transcended; it hovers on the threshold of hallucination, "frighteningly bright," confounding reality with fantasy'.[150] Inglesby, too, notes the 'literary animism' of Bowen's fictions, where objects themselves take on 'integrity' and are suddenly 'independent' agents.[151] In Bowen's broadcasts it is the wireless that is 'over-charged' and that becomes the animate agent: the radio-as-object seems to overpower the logic of the broadcast itself. The intrusion of Cassandra's voice transforms the function of the radio play from a straightforward biography, a narrator telling

[149] Bowen, 'New Judgement: Elizabeth Bowen on Jane Austen', p. 47.
[150] Ellmann, 'Shadowing Elizabeth Bowen', *New England Review*, 24 (2003), 144-169 (148).
[151] E. C. Inglesby, '"Expressive Objects": Elizabeth Bowen's Narrative Materializes.' *Modern Fiction Studies*, 53 (2007), 306-333 (326).

us about Austen's life, to a ghost story, where the listener is suddenly confronted with the phantom voices of the dead. Bloom, too, argues that 'the immediacy of the broadcast, as well as its ability to carry the human voice beyond its embodied frame, allows for an occult mode of communication that is, at the same time, familiar and domestic'. The appearance of the dead, Bloom explains, 'created a sense of eerie temporal simultaneity not unlike that of a séance in which the communicant is both present and absent at once'.[152] For Bowen, recording a broadcast is an opportunity to play with the disorienting effects of the wireless. Where for Priestley and Winnicott radio is a familiarising object, a way to communicate clearly with a wide body of citizens, Bowen subverts her audience's expectations in an effort to explore the strangeness of radio communication.

To understand Bowen's relationship to the BBC and its wartime aims, we first have to consider her representation of figures plucked from what she sees as a shared British past. The uncanniness of the broadcast is also a way for Bowen to explore the concept of national heritage, where she questions whether old ways of living are ever, really, confined to the past. Cassandra and Fanny's intrusion marks the broadcast with conflict: the narrator, angered at the little information they have on Austen's life, confronts Cassandra for burning Austen's letters and hiding crucial details about the author's romances, hopes, and desires from public view. It becomes clear that Austen cannot occupy the 'present' in a ghostly form, as her niece and sister can, because of this sabotage:

> NARRATOR: […] Interrupted by her illness, the last of her novels, Sanditon, was to remain unfinished –
>
> CASSANDRA: – *I* know how it was to end –
>
> NARRATOR*: (Rounding on Cassandra)* Miss Cassandra, we think you know more than that! – Those destroyed letters – you know, we hold you accountable! Your sister Jane is known to have written you, day by day, the hopes and the fears involved in her one crucial love-affair. She did love, but remained unmarried – that is all we have left. That story – the clue to her life, the key to her art – has been lost to us, through your act. You elected to burn those letters. You took too much upon you. Your sister was more than your sister: she belongs to the world.[153]

[152] Bloom, p. 104.
[153] Bowen, 'New Judgement: Elizabeth Bowen on Jane Austen', pp. 40-41.

The narrator chastises Cassandra's selfish act, which also removes important facets of Austen's life from present-day knowledge. The narrator argues that Austen's life does not belong solely to the past, to her family and contemporaries. Rather, Austen's life and work exists in and is pertinent to both the past and the present.

Bowen's resurrection of Austen on the radio does not serve a nostalgic desire to learn more about Georgian England; it reinvents Austen for a strange, new, wartime environment, where the medium of the radio brings forth surreal modes of engaging with the author and her literature. In 1948, Bowen wrote an essay called 'What Jane Austen Means to Me', where she criticises the way that Austen is remembered in twentieth-century Britain. She admonishes those who love Austen for the 'delicious, dainty, miniature little world' she provides, the 'escape from the violences of today'. Bowen writes that the love that many people hold for Austen emerges from the idea that she is 'soothingly remote from our harsh realities'. [154] But, she contends, people that love Austen for reasons of escapism fail to see the timeless significance of her work. In the essay, Bowen recalls the first time that she read Austen in her early twenties. She initially resisted reading Austen, thinking that that her novels would be full of frivolity and triviality (she had believed the 'propaganda' that Austen was only 'an ideal writer for teenage girls').[155] Bowen writes that a 'degree of maturity' is required 'to grasp the problems [Austen] really poses, to feel the exciting rightness of her evaluations, to measure the emotions she keeps in play, or to suspect the depths under her bright surface'. For Bowen, Austen's astute understanding of the complexity of social life means that her works are 'impossible to outgrow; at any age, she seems to be one's contemporary – not merely keeping pace with one's own experience but casting light ever ahead of it'. [156] Austen finds significance in the ways her characters confront the minutiae of life, the everyday 'conflict[s] between reason and emotion – or, to put it more simply, thought and feeling' that are always 'conscious within ourselves'.[157] Turning to Austen to escape the dangers of everyday life, then, is futile: Austen 'was aware of violence, be sure', Bowen finishes.[158] The 'New Judgement' broadcast takes the confinement of Austen to the past as its main conflict. Austen's appearance as merely a disembodied voice, as well the narrator's chastisement of Cassandra and anger that 'the clue to her life, the key to her art' was needlessly lost, signals an attempt to recapture Austen for the

[154] Bowen, 'What Jane Austen Means to Me', in *People, Places, Things,* ed. by Allan Hepburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), pp. 230-235 (230).
[155] Bowen, 'What Jane Austen Means to Me', p. 230.
[156] Bowen, 'What Jane Austen Means to Me', p. 226.
[157] Bowen, 'What Jane Austen Means to Me', p. 229.
[158] Bowen, 'What Jane Austen Means to Me', p. 230.

present. For Bowen, Austen's literature does not belong to any one place, person, or time; rather, as the narrator tells us, '[s]he is here. The present always occupied her, to the exclusion of any other scene. The *Now* was always her moment. She is here, where she always dwelt, in the *Now*.'[159] In a time of great social change, when figures like Priestley were using the radio to promote Britain's promising future, Bowen stresses the lingering importance of the past and its traditions.

In her postwar broadcast 'The Cult of Nostalgia' (1951), Bowen criticises the desire for a more idyllic, or simpler, past—the past itself, she argues, is built out of 'zest, out of a sometimes blind vitality, out of barbarian energy'; 'there it stands, there it lies, mounting, extending, never complete, in all the nobility of its imperfection'.[160] What of the present, she asks, which is 'disconcerting, so fleeting, so fascinating in its quivering inability to be pinned down'? Great art, she argues, has only sought to 'enclose that eternal "now"'. [161] Bowen's 'new judgement' is to reclaim the present-ness of great works of literature—a task that is perfectly suited to the medium of radio. As Bloom notes, 'broadcasts in this period were rarely recorded, and those that were recorded were not frequently re-broadcast'.[162] The uniqueness of the radio broadcast as an aesthetic form, then, was that the types of communication it produced were always temporary and fleeting; here one moment and gone the next. The broadcast shifts the focus of the listener to the present moment—it grounds them in the 'eternal now'. For Bowen, the past as an idyll is always incomplete, but is nevertheless a permanent fixture in the present lives of citizens, a spectre to which the present in unceasingly compared. As the job of the radio broadcast is to turn the listener's gaze to the present, it is the perfect medium for disrupting a conception of the 'past' as a static and unmoving thing.

Throughout 'The Cult of Nostalgia', Bowen is interested in the ways that people seek symbols of the past for some kind of consolation or assurance. Indulging in 'pastness', she argues, is comforting because it gives us a sense of security, of safety—assigning an importance to monuments of the past protects us from the shock of the unfamiliar and the alien: 'How can we not seek, in some form, an abiding city? We continue to cry out for the well-known, the comfortable, the dear, for protecting walls round the soul.'[163] Turning back to the past, she argues, is a solution when faced with the estrangement of the present. The past, then,

[159] Bowen, 'New Judgement: Elizabeth Bowen on Jane Austen', p. 55.
[160] Bowen, 'The Cult of Nostalgia', in *Listening in: Broadcasts, Speeches, and Interviews by Elizabeth Bowen,* ed. by Allan Hepburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 97-102 (p. 101).
[161] Bowen, 'The Cult of Nostalgia', p. 102.
[162] Bloom, p. 99.
[163] Bowen, 'The Cult of Nostalgia', p. 98.

is a 'repository of all treasures' for the individual.[164] These treasures, however, can be accessed by embracing the novelty of the radio form and its uncanny affects. Bringing back dead voices on the radio forces a direct confrontation with the past *within* the present. In her broadcasts, Bowen effectively 'doubles' the past and the present; Jane's voice (which repeats words she uttered in Georgian ballrooms and personal conversations with her niece and her sister) occupies both the past and the present at once. In Bowen's broadcasts, the past is 'uncanny' because it transcends its pastness—historical personalities are no longer confined to history, to the monument, the statue, or even the biography. The occult qualities of the radio therefore harbour a potential to disrupt and upset the linear categories of 'past' and 'present', 'dead' and 'alive'.

Though her radio broadcasts are unique in their ability to resurrect the dead in an instant, scholars have also attended to the strange temporalities of her fiction, where we can also see Bowen's desire to upset the stable categories of 'past' and 'present'. Doryjane A. Birrer argues that Bowen often emphasises the importance of a 'transtemporal subjectivity' in her fiction, the idea of a 'destabilized "I" as existing in a fluid realm comprised simultaneously of past (memory), present (experience), and future (expectation), accessed both consciously and unconsciously, predictably and unpredictably by each individual'.[165] Birrer suggests that Bowen's characters are often haunted by ghostly reminders of the past, which she relates specifically to Freud's psychoanalytic theory of *nachträglichkeit*, which means a 'belatedness' or a 'deferred action'—the retroactive inscription of a past event with a traumatic memory or feeling. For Birrer, Bowen emphasises the need to consider the past and the present simultaneously—by doing this, Birrer argues, Bowen's characters can access a 'transtemporal subjectivity', an understanding of the connectedness of their past lives, their memories and traumas, and their present experiences. For Birrer, Bowen's stories are often a cautionary tale, a warning against the individual's attempts to 'try in any way to ignore, escape, or cling to past, present, or future at the expense of a more productive and fluid transtemporal subjectivity'. She goes on to explain that, for Bowen, the 'transtemporal subjectivity' is a 'significant aspect of potential human agency' and involves the reciprocal interplay of past, present, and future experiences'.[166] When writing about her wartime short story collection, *The Demon Lover*

[164] Bowen, 'The Cult of Nostalgia', p. 98.
[165] Doryjane A. Birrer, 'Time, Memory, and the "Uncertain I": Transtemporal Subjectivity in Elizabeth Bowen's Short Fiction', *PsyART A Hyperlink Journal for the Psychological Study of the Arts* (2008), <http://psyartjournal.com/article/show/a_birrer-time_memory_and_the_uncertain_i_transtem> [Accessed 9th July 2021], para. 15 of 37.
[166] Birrer, para. 1 of 37.

(1945), Bowen discusses how her fiction is concerned with the inseparability of the past and the present, and the impossibility of knowing one without the other: 'the past', she writes, 'in all these cases, discharges its load of feeling into the anaesthetized and bewildered present'. In her radio broadcasts, 'transtemporal' subjectivity becomes a tangible possibility: as the listener is hyperaware that the broadcast occupies present-time, the past automatically is bound in 'present-ness'—past and present time can be experienced almost simultaneously. In Bowen's BBC broadcasts, she hopes to destabilise the citizen's relationship to the figures of their national past, encouraging her listeners to form new transtemporal subjectivities in order to confront the past within the present. These ghostly experiments, then, complicate the very notion of 'national heritage', the revered symbols of a shared past.

Bowen's second broadcast in her 'New Judgement' series took as its subject Anthony Trollope, a Victorian author who had experienced a resurgence of popularity during wartime. The broadcast was aired on the BBC on 4th May 1945, but was so popular that it was published in paperback form by Oxford University Press a year later. In the broadcast a young soldier, William, bids goodbye to his Uncle Jasper, and leaves for war on a steam train. But before he leaves, he asks to borrow a novel of Anthony Trollope's for the journey, a notion that Jasper finds bewildering. Jasper describes the novels, which often portrayed quiet pastoral life in Victorian villages, as 'plum duff, sheer plum duff!'. He laughs at the notion that William might charge onto the battle lines having read Trollope, and not 'Hardy, Meredith, [and] James' who 'wrote for adult minds; or, at least, for minds that wanted to be adult'.[167] Despite this, William boards the train with a Trollope novel in his hands, and watches the countryside stream past the window as he makes his journey. Disconcertingly, he soon comes into view of the fictional town of Barchester—one of Trollope's own creations—and then, with a shock, notices that the ghostly figure of Trollope himself is seated opposite in the train carriage. In the rest of the broadcast, Trollope and William have a conversation about the lasting impression the former's novels have made on a new generation and why it is that William treasures his books so.

Like Austen's voice, the appearance of Trollope's ghostly figure suggests that he exists, in one form or another, in the present-day. Even Trollope is hesitant to talk about something as permanent as death, pausing every time it is brought up in conversation. When William speaks about the modern radio, he responds 'I had—er… left England… before any of *that* came in', and when the posthumous publication of his biography is brought up later in the broadcast,

[167] Elizabeth Bowen, *Anthony Trollope: A New Judgement* (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 12.

Trollope wavers once again: '[it was] brought out after I'd—left the scene'.[168] Trollope's trepidation at speaking about 'death' again signals Bowen's hope that we can recuperate the authors of the past in the contemporary context of wartime Britain. This hope is made clear, again, at the end of the broadcast. After Trollope's figure has disappeared from the train carriage, William dozes in his seat and Trollope's autobiography slips from his fingers, landing wide open on the floor. The pages 'blow over rapidly, in a draught' so that 'the last paragraph is exposed for a moment—it is too dark to read it'. Then we hear Trollope's voice one final time, reading out loud the last words of his biography:

> TROLLOPE'S VOICE: [*from the distance and with a solemn impersonality*]: 'Now I stretch out my hand and from the further shore I bid adieu to all who have cared to read the many words I have written.'… Now I stretch out my hand…[169]

In these final moments, and as Trollope reaches his hand towards the present-day radio audience, Bowen also invites the listener to reach back to Trollope, to bring his novels into dialogue with a new wartime context. The broadcast suggests that such a dialogue is essential to a productive modern relationship with a writer like Trollope, who, as Uncle Jasper argues in the first part of the programme, some may turn to for some much-needed escapism, to rid oneself of the troubling context of life in war.

This broadcast was perhaps a response to the growing popularity of Victorian classic literature during the Second World War. Despite rationing publisher's consumption of paper (in 1941 paper distribution had reduced to 37.5% of what it was prior to the war), the Ministry of War saw an importance in providing the public with access to certain types of literature.[170] In her study of British publishing in wartime, Valerie Holman notes that the Ministry of Information prioritised the publication of literature that they deemed important to the preservation of public morale. Though there was a limited supply of print materials, their distribution was determined on whether publishers furthered the government's social and political imperatives:

[168] Bowen, *Anthony Trollope,* p. 17.
[169] Bowen, *Anthony Trollope,* p. 21.
[170] Valerie Holman, 'The Ministry of Information and British Publishing, 1939-1946', *Book History,* 8 (2005), 197-226 (208).

> While publishers could only benefit from a larger supply of paper, it came at a price: apart from what was published out of the normal quota, books of propaganda value would always be selected for purchase, or supported by an extra ration, at the expense of publications less obviously directed to the war effort, or, in later years, to the image of Britain as a democratic leader in peacetime.[171]

The distribution of paper and print material in this way privileged presses that were willing to publish approved literary works—Bloom notes that this often included 'nineteenth-century classic novels such as the works of Trollope, Henry James, and Leo Tolstoy'.[172] Trollope's popularity in particular grew immensely during the war years—perhaps due to the settings of his novels, the assumption that he portrayed the idyll of English country life. Marina MacKay also notes that 'Trollope made a wartime comeback, presumably because his serial representations of English country living represented a community that looked, albeit from a distance, enviably secure'.[173] Here, Bowen intervenes in a conversation about the social utility of Trollope's literatures—she argues that it is not the 'enviably secure' setting that makes his works so pertinent in wartime, rather it is the uncanny parallels that can be drawn between these two separate time periods. Trollope's literature is useful only on the collapse of the stable categories of past and present English life.

Bowen's 'New Judgement' of Anthony Trollope attempts to reveal the deeper reasons for the sudden cultural resurgence of a writer like Trollope, who might, she suggests, tell us something about the lives and the desires of a new British generation: 'Trollope holds up a mirror in which English faces, seasons and scenes remain. It is a mirror, not distorting, not flattering; with only one magic quality: retention'.[174] Bowen, here, offers a rebuttal to Uncle Jasper's idea that the young only like Trollope because he offers 'something [they] would have liked', the 'Plumstead Episcopi roaring fires… the rooks in the elms, the port on the table…'.[175] But for Bowen (and for William), Trollope's novels do not offer an escape into a pleasant past, but instead constitute a way of confronting the present. Trollope's 'faithful talent' is his ability to reflect the timeless and 'plain light of nature', which is able to exceed the context of Victorian England, and which can apply even to a wartime setting. 'Can one wonder', asks the narrator, 'it should reassure William to look across the years, and find, in the Trollope mirror,

[171] Holman, p. 209.
[172] Bloom, p. 103.
[173] MacKay, *Modernism and World War II,* p. 25.
[174] Bowen, *Anthony Trollope,* pp. 19-20.
[175] Bowen, *Anthony Trollope,* p. 4.

faces so like his own?'[176] In the broadcast, Trollope notices that William's fascination with his novels stems from a sense of 'isolation'—an isolation that, he argues, comes from William's inability to access his 'proper inheritance as a young Englishman'. Trollope goes on to explain that in his own youth he felt the same isolation, despite the reasons for such a feeling being so different: 'I was a gentleman's son who was, apparently, never to be a gentleman, and who knew no way to be anything else'.[177] William is so attracted to Trollope's works because he sees his own desires and anxieties reflected back at him in the Victorian novels.

As such, Trollope's ghostly visitation provides William clarity to his own situation, his own feelings, and helps him to understand the plight of his generation. In this way, we can apply Bowen's 'transtemporal subjectivity', as Birrer understands it, to her exploration of William's, and the listener's, relation to their national heritage. The younger generation's fascination with the lives and works of past generations, Bowen suggests, expresses their hidden anxieties and desires. If the Austen broadcast is uncanny because it disrupts the categories of 'past' and 'present', then the Trollope broadcast's uncanniness arises from these moments of social doubling. Here, Bowen explores the 'uncanny' on a social level, where historical moments repeat themselves; the present seems to be a mirror-image, a doppelgänger, of the past. As the doppelgänger seems to exist in two places at once, Bowen's broadcast takes place in doubled-time, where William confronts the newfound similarities between himself and Trollope, with the disillusioned youth of his generation with Trollope's own experience as an outsider. Bowen uses the uncanny to point out the 'sameness' of two different time periods: Victorian-era and wartime Britain. Here, Bowen places modern notions of citizenship within a longer, historical context—the past, she suggests, is important and useful to present-day understandings of Britishness. As such, she challenges the idea that war necessitates a new social order (a 'New Jerusalem'): for Bowen, the past holds important values that need preserving.

2.4.1 Bowen and the Politics of the BBC

Initially, we might argue that the 'New Judgement' broadcasts fit to the aims of the wartime BBC. Indeed, Bowen advocates for citizens to form new relationships with figures plucked from a shared British history. For Bowen, radio is a useful tool for communicating with a wide, national community about the importance of heritage. We might compare her preoccupation

[176] Bowen, *Anthony Trollope,* p. 20.
[177] Bowen, *Anthony Trollope,* p. 16-17.

with pastness to Priestley's *Postscripts*. Priestley's broadcasts were embroiled in the promotion of a new life after the war, of the exciting promise of a burgeoning social-democratic community. But, in doing so, he often appealed to idyllic, pastoral images of pre-war Britain—'sleeping English hills and fields and homesteads'. In Whittington's terms, Priestley worked to 'cast the present in terms of proleptic nostalgia instantaneously'. Though Bowen is critical of this romantic view of the past, she uses her broadcasts to imagine how the past is significant to present-day British life: she provides her listeners with an opportunity to engage more productively with the past within the present, to access a new (in Birrer's words) 'transtemporal' subjectivity. In these ways, and like Priestley and Winnicott, Bowen sees the broadcast as a useful tool for addressing social life, or the connection between the individual and their national heritage.

But we should also consider the ways in which Bowen disobeys, subverts, or feels uncomfortable with the BBC's prevailing imperatives as a governmental institution. Though her broadcasts do attempt to engage listeners with their national past, in her other radio appearances Bowen was adamant that it was not the writer's role to have political conversations on the radio. The writer-broadcaster, she thought, should be clearly separate from the war correspondent, the news anchor, or the government representative. In an exchange of letters with Graham Greene in 1948, Bowen argued that writers should keep away from political discourse: 'writers should keep out of pulpits and off platforms, and just write […] They should not for a moment consider putting their names to petitions or letters to newspapers on matters that they do not know much about and have no reason to know anything about'.[178] In a 1969 review of Agnus Calder's *The People's War* (1969), Bowen stressed the distance between herself, a writer who sometimes featured on the radio, and what she calls 'star personalities', figures like J. B. Priestley whose political project was to keep 'people's collective image constantly in front of the people's eyes' (a task, she said, that he was more proficient at than even Churchill).[179]

Bowen's desire to separate herself from the institution is even more evident when we consider that, throughout the postwar period, she was critical of new social democratic policies. Bowen articulates her criticisms of the welfare state in an article called 'A Way of Life', published in 1947 in *Vogue*. In it, Bowen is concerned about the normalisation of state involvement in the everyday lives of citizens – she sees social democratic policies as a

[178] Elizabeth Bowen, 'Why Do I Write?' in *The Mulberry Tree: Writings by Elizabeth Bowen*, ed. by Hermione Lee (New York: Harcourt, 1986), pp. 221–229 (225).
[179] Bowen, *The Mulberry Tree*, p. 184.

dangerous continuation of the exceptional moves made by the wartime state at a moment when total intervention was necessary. Indeed, as Ho notes, the 'expansion of wartime state powers facilitated the postwar social state by strengthening the institutional apparatuses for intervening into citizens' lives and routinizing such interventions'.[180] As I noted in the introduction to this thesis, welfare systems did exist before the 1940s, but the 'postwar moment' was unique in that it reframed the relationship between the state and the individual. As Ho explains, the 'centralized bureaucracy organizing welfare services after 1945 was nonetheless unprecedented, given the haphazard nature of social provision in the pre-war era, cobbled together from diverse sectors of voluntary and civil associations, religious organizations, and state functionaries'.[181] Indeed, we have seen that postwar British society solidified the idea of the 'citizen'—an essential term for understanding how the individual and the state exist in an involved and collaborative relationship.

But, for Bowen, this relationship between the citizen and the state is problematic—there is, she argues, a real danger in creating a new social order for postwar Britain. In the *Vogue* article, Bowen writes about the dangers of imposing an unrecognisable 'way of life' on British citizens, who are most familiar with the traditions and the customs of pre-war society. In postwar life, she argues, British people were faced with the dangerous opportunity to wipe out all that is familiar, to create a new and unrecognisable societal structure. For Bowen, the introduction of women into the workforce, as well as numerous social welfare provisions, may result in the permanent upending of a 'home routine which women will almost kill themselves (and the war years have almost killed them) to maintain'.[182] In the article, Bowen describes her feeling of unease at the very notion that the state will continue to interfere in the lives of private citizens once wartime is over. She decries the younger generation, coming home from war, with a 'goodbye-to-all-that attitude'—beneath their cries for change, she argues, the young also want what is comfortable and familiar: 'they are half revolutionaries, half nostalgics'.[183] Bowen's *Vogue* article provides another interpretation of the uncanniness of her radio broadcasts, of her exploration of the disconcerting meeting of the familiar and unknown. In many ways, her broadcasts stress the dangers of forgetting the past; Austen cannot speak to the audience as her sister and niece can because parts of her life have been hidden and obscured; William's confrontation with Trollope's ghostly figure brings a new light to his own

[180] Ho, p. 86.
[181] Ho, p. 86.
[182] Elizabeth Bowen, 'A Way of Life', in in *People, Places, Things,* ed. by Allan Hepburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), pp. 386-391 (p. 389).
[183] Bowen, 'A Way of Life', p. 390.

generational plight, which had previously been a mystery to him. Bowen's radio ghosts signify the dangers of forgetting the past in a present that is, in many ways, new and bewildering. Her wireless experiments are thus a mode for staging a much-needed confrontation between past and present British lives, where the past is an important and useful 'repository of treasures'.

Another of Bowen's anxieties is that belonging to a collective social existence might rid citizens of their crucial individuality, or diminish their personal (and unconscious) desires. In her *Vogue* article, Bowen writes about the impossibility of truly knowing the self: 'You can live for years without forming more than a fragmentary concept of the person one is', she writes.[184] For Bowen, postwar welfare systems, in automatically assuming the needs of individuals, hinder the indeterminable and nebulous 'self':

> It seems symbolic that in our houses, even, we are hampered, and being drained of our needed energies, by an outmoded plan: the average middle and upper-class British home was built for, and remains the expression of, an order, a material way of living, now gone for good.[185]

The social democratic state, then, poses a threat to the individual: Bowen's fear is that an 'outmoded plan' will force a new way of living on a national populace that is not ready for it. Though Bowen is critical of a type of nostalgia that looks to the past for comfort or distraction, other forms of nostalgia are beneficial and valuable. In particular, Bowen celebrates a kind of nostalgia that seeks to preserve tradition, or, in this particular case, maintains the order of the family-oriented and self-sufficient home. Ho describes Bowen's specific form of nostalgia as 'nostalgia for the minimalist state of classical liberalism'—Bowen's hope, she argues, is that postwar life might recall a pre-war social order, for there to be minimal institutional intervention in the lives of citizens.[186] Bowen's relationship with nostalgia, then, is double-edged: though she is critical of a certain form of nostalgia, in her article for *Vogue*, Bowen yearns for the structure of liberal pre-war society, and emphasises the importance of maintaining the traditions and freedoms that are under threat of eradication by the burgeoning threat of the welfare state. Indeed, Hermione Lee and Heather Bryant Jordan have positioned Bowen as a Burkean conservative, committed to the ideal of a 'powerful and renovated

[184] Bowen, 'A Way of Life', p. 386.
[185] Bowen, 'A Way of Life', p. 390.
[186] Ho, p. 87.

traditionalism'.[187] This certainly explains Bowen's interest in the past and its lingering significance; tradition, she believes, has an important part to play in modern-day society.

Bowen's nostalgia for classical liberalism is also nostalgia for a previous form of the British citizen. Unlike the postwar citizen, who is expected to participate as part of a collective for the good of society, the pre-war citizen operates primarily on their own imperatives and desires; as Ho explains, the liberal citizen was often seen as 'an unconstrained individual in pursuit of his or her own private ends'.[188] For Ho, Bowen resists a consolidated and coherent idea of the 'good' citizen, whose qualities and character mean that they can easily contribute to the well-being of society. In the wartime novel *The Heat of the Day* (1948), Ho argues, Bowen 'responds to a wartime discourse of good citizenship that curtailed private freedom in the name of collective security and that aimed to regulate the political and sexual virtues of citizens through an all-encompassing language of national character'.[189] In many ways, Bowen's broadcasts intervene in a cultural discourse about the very notion of 'national character' (that the BBC had very much been at the helm of). The ghosts are manifestations of a forgotten past that has once again resurfaced, and that can reveal new things about society and the people living in it—returning to the past, to past ways of living, is a beneficial act, which can help us to understand the frustrations, anxieties, and, in William's case, even the social isolation of the present.

Bowen's 'New Judgements' broadcasts place an emphasis on maintaining the separation between the private and the personal sphere in an era of increasing state intervention. She makes a careful distinction between the experiences of private and public life and emphasises the impossibility of collapsing the former into the latter. In her Anthony Trollope broadcast, for example, Trollope speaks about how writing novels and creating characters became a mode for getting to know himself, of understanding his hidden desires, anxieties, and ambitions. William is eager to connect this process to the medium of the radio, to see the novel as another mode of cultural transmission, where, he says, 'a novelist is a sort of medium. Sits down, takes up his pen, goes into a sort of trance'.[190] When William suggests that the author is a receiving station that picks up and transmits 'all sorts of things that are in the air', Trollope initially agrees, but goes on to wonder whether it might even be the other way around—

[187] Heather Bryant Jordan, *How will the Heart Endure?: Elizabeth Bowen and the Language of War* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1992), p. 204; Hermione Lee, *Elizabeth Bowen: An Estimation* (London: Vision Press, 1981), p. 26.
[188] Ho, p. 89.
[189] Ho, p. 87.
[190] Bowen, *Anthony Trollope,* p. 12

characters and stories pick up unknown and undiscovered aspects of the author themselves. Trollope pushes back against William's idea that the author expresses the anxieties and desires of a wider community. Instead, he argues that writing is a process that delves deep into the psyche of the author, drawing forth, sometimes unintentionally, emotions and wishes hidden deep within the individual. Bowen suggests that Trollope's novels do not only tell the reader about the intricacies of the Victorian social scene, but reveal the mysterious workings of the individual unconscious. Trollope says that the characters 'commandeered me—my pen, my reasoning powers. And, more than that, they drew on a lot in me—desires, scruples, aspirations and daydreams—of whose existence *I* had not been aware'.[191] Some characters, he goes on, operate as forms of wish fulfilment: 'the best of them were what, without knowing, I should have liked to be. The worst of them—in the moral sense, that's to say—were, what, without knowing, I'd somehow avoided being.' When William asks him what the Archdeacon Grantley represented (from Trollope's novel *Barchester Towers* (1857)), Trollope describes him as 'the product of my moral consciousness. He raised, for me, questions I haven't answered yet'.[192] Trollope's novels have a psychoanalytic function: they speak his innermost secrets, his wants and desires. Though they reflect Victorian society, they also reveal something timeless about the unconscious of the individual.[193]

As we have seen, Bowen's ghostly radio broadcasts advocate for a way to read historical literature that keeps sight of the present social world. But, crucially, Bowen also stresses that literary expression can represent the idiosyncratic, private lives of individuals, where writing parses the hidden workings of unconscious life. The ephemeral radio broadcast, which presses together the past and the present, is also the perfect mode for discussing the way that literature brings forth the repressions of the unconscious, and the strange feeling that results from 'something which ought to have been kept concealed but which has nevertheless come to light'.[194] Using the medium of the radio, Bowen addresses the importance of understanding the past workings of the unconscious on the thoughts and behaviours of present life. Trollope's literature, she argues, contain the mysterious and unknown workings of his unconscious (which, for Trollope, are only revealed when expressed in writing). Austen's literatures, too,

[191] Elizabeth Bowen, *Anthony Trollope,* p. 14.
[192] Elizabeth Bowen, *Anthony Trollop,* p. 15.
[193] Freud discusses the timelessness of the unconscious is in his essay 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' (1920); the processes of the unconscious, he argues, cannot be 'ordered temporally' because 'time does not change them in any way'. For Freud, the idea of linear time cannot be applied to the workings of the unconscious, which, in the process of 'repetition compulsion', exists in constant state of repeating the past within the present. See: Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (London: Penguin, 2006), p. 60.
[194] Freud, 'The Uncanny', p. 220.

are seen as products of her lived experiences (so much so that the narrator is frustrated that parts of Austen's love-life are forever lost). The literatures of Austen and Trollope are filled with the spontaneous and fragmented expressions of repressed feeling, anxieties, and desires. Here, Bowen suggests that literary works are filled with the enigmas of the unconscious. The presence of these intensely private and personal expressions of mental life complicates William's interpretation that the text is simply a manifestation of social and cultural forces—that writing 'plucks from the air'. If the wireless, as Virginia Woolf thought, blurs the boundary between individual and social experience, then Bowen fights to once again sharpen it, to reinforce the distinction between the public and the private. While Bowen's broadcasts address the wartime construction of British national identity and character, she also takes care to note that there are facets of individual life that exist outside of a social identity: the individual is not solely a citizen.

2.4.2 Stammering, Stuttering, and the Difficulties of Occupying the Wartime Radio Personality

Bowen's broadcasts draw attention to the form of spoken language—to its failures and inconsistencies. In essence, the radio broadcast becomes a way of mediating the possibility of successful cultural communication. As in the psychoanalytic situation, in which the analyst traces the slippages and the inconsistencies of language (which signify a slippage to the unconscious), the radio broadcast draws attention to the imminent utterance of speech and to the details of its enunciation. For Bowen, the aural nature of the broadcast required her to confront her own difficulties with speech. She was perceptive of her limitations as a radio broadcaster, having suffered from a stutter since she was a child, which she describes in her memoir as a psychosomatic symptom that had emerged from the traumas of coping with the 'tensions and mystery' of her father's illness. According to Bowen, the 'apprehensive silences' and 'chaotic shoutings' of her childhood caused 'nothing more disastrous than a stammer'. [195] This, in turn, posed challenges when she appeared on-air. In an internal memo dated the 9th of August 1956, the BBC producer B. C. Horton wrote that Bowen's stutter caused problems for editors of her programmes, who resorted to meticulously trimming the tapes of her talks to rid them of any awkward breaks and hesitations: 'Elizabeth Bowen, however, is a stammerer – that is why we have never used her on such a big undertaking before we had tape'.[196] Hepburn

[195] Elizabeth Bowen, *Pictures and Conversations* (New York: Knopf, 1975), p. 12.
[196] B. C. Horton, quoted in Bloom, p. 95.

notices that, in an effort to overcome her speaking difficulties, Bowen consistently improvised on the radio, transforming 'words and whole phrases' that 'presented potential snares for the habitual stammerer'. In the broadcast 'Books that Grow up with One' (1949), for instance, Bowen substitutes 'remembrance' for 'memory', 'glancing' for 'looking, and 'mark' for 'touchstone'. Hepburn argues that 'Bowen's persistence in speaking in public as a lecturer and over the radio was, given the severity of her stutter, a defiant gesture'.[197] But Bowen's stutter is also a defining feature of her explorations with the radio form. Unlike proficient orators like Priestley, who inflected an idiomatic and conversational vernacular, Bowen's broadcasts explore the difficulties of using the radio for smooth cultural communication.

Ellmann argues that Bowen's difficulties in speaking influenced her unique prose style—she argues that the stutter is reflected in Bowen's tendency to obfuscate, to tie characters' dialogue in knots. Here, Bowen's writing is 'often a mode of overcoming the failures of regular communication', where the jars, hesitations, stops and starts of conversation are tamed in prose. For Ellmann, Bowen's experience of verbal difficulties made her aware of the artifice of written dialogue, which obscures spoken mishaps and smooths the communications of everyday life: 'to express nothing is to coerce it into language, and Bowen's twisted sentences (like the stammer she developed in reaction to her father's breakdown) suggest a sense of guilt about the act of writing as a violation of the inarticulate'.[198] Allan Hepburn notes, too, that for Bowen 'writing is a form of escape from a stammer. Whereas a stammer might indicate an interdiction against speaking – what is difficult to say, what cannot be verbalised because of social conventions – written language, no matter how inverted, is always fluent on the page'.[199] Scholars like Anna Teekell and Susan Osborn have argued that Bowen's use of convoluted phrasing and language is deliberate. Osborn argues that Bowen's complex syntax and 'notoriously strange prose style' produces in every sentence 'some disorientation of sense, some unexpected deviation from standard meaning'.[200] *The Heat of the Day*, for example, drew criticism from editors at Jonathan Cape for its difficult syntax, who claimed that it created 'discomfort' for the reader. In her reply, Bowen said that this discomfort was worth preserving: 'I'd rather keep the jars, "jingles" and awkwardnesses […] They do to

[197] Hepburn, 'Introduction', p. 6.
[198] Maud Ellmann, *Elizabeth Bowen: The Shadow Across the Page* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), p. 12.
[199] Hepburn, 'Introduction', p. 9.
[200] Susan Osborn, 'Reconsidering Elizabeth Bowen', *Modern Fiction Studies*, 52 (2006), 187-197 (192); Anna Teekell, 'Elizabeth Bowen and Language at War', *New Hibernia Review / Iris Éireannach Nua*, 15 (2011), 61-79.

my mind express something. In some cases I want the rhythm to jerk and jar—to an extent, even, which may displease the reader'.[201] Bowen saw an importance in preserving the inconsistencies and the failures of everyday communication in her prose writing. Crucially, this can also inform the way we read and listen to her broadcasts and radio plays.

The radio broadcast emphasises the hesitations and the flounders of everyday speech; in a radio performance, the speaker must be conscious of moments of awkward phrasing or vocal disturbances, they are suddenly confronted with the immediate and physical difficulties of communicating with the tongue, the mouth, and the teeth. Bowen was not interested in hiding these difficulties; rather, she endeavoured to preserve any errors and mistakes. When her talks on 'Truth and Fiction' were published in essay form, Bowen added a headnote that explained that 'the talks were recorded as they were spoken; and in that form they are given here. Repetitions, overemphasis, incoherences, etc., must be allowed for'.[202] Here, her on-air stuttering and stammering represent the limits of the radio form, its communicative failures.

Bowen was fascinated with the formal aspects of the radio broadcast and with the unique sensations that listening to the wireless produced for the listener. On the launch of the *Third Programme* in 1947, Bowen writes about how radio can allow for a new kind of aesthetic consumption. It can focus the individual's attention on the experience of listening, on the dynamics and the rhythms of language—when we listen to a broadcast, she argues, the listener's attention should be drawn to its 'sheer sound':

> Language can put out a majesty in its sheer sound, even apart from sense: in poetry and, at its greatest, prose, this becomes apparent. My own feeling is that in listening to spoken (or broadcast) speech, we have listened for sense too much and for sound too little.[203]

For Bowen, the radio allows for new modes of literary experimentation, where the snags of everyday communication can finally be exposed. Hepburn argues that, for Bowen, the radio 'creates a style of immediacy'. It is an aural space where 'mishearing and misdirection have their part'.[204] The interference of Bowen's stutter, her repetitions and hesitations, signal the intrusion of her traumatic past on her present speech—like Trollope's novels, which reveal the intricate psychic life of the author, the radio form brings forth the complex workings of

[201] Elizabeth Bowen, letter to Jonathan Cape (1948), quoted in Maud Ellmann, *Elizabeth Bowen*, p. 166.
[202] Elizabeth Bowen, *Afterthought: Pieces about Writing* (London: Longmans, 1962), p. 114.
[203] Elizabeth Bowen, 'Third Programme', *Vogue* (April 1947), p. 102.
[204] Allan Hepburn, 'Acoustic Modernism: BBC Radio and *The Little Girls*', *Textual Practice,* 27 (2013), 143-162 (144).

Bowen's unconscious. These elements of Bowen's broadcasts also keep her at a careful distance from the 'star personalities' of Priestley and (to some extent) Winnicott, who both endeavour to speak as clearly as possible. As such, Bowen's attention to the sound of the broadcast (and its disruptions and interferences) allows her to explore the difficulties of mass cultural communication, of using an aural device to address and relate to a unified national community.

2.4.3 Bowen's Broadcasts as Modernist Estrangement

So far, we have seen that Bowen's exploration with the 'uncanniness' of the radio broadcast allows her to experiment with the novelty and the strangeness of a new technology. The immediacy of the broadcast allows for a stark confrontation between the dead and the alive, the past and the present, and it also has the power to bring forth the mysterious workings of the unconscious. In the final section of this chapter, I claim that we can see the modernist strains of Bowen's broadcasts in their mingling of reality, of daily life in the war-city, with fantasy and hallucination. For Bowen, the broadcast often becomes a mode of estrangement, where she playfully disorients the expectations of the listeners by transforming the familiar modern world into a strange and alien space.

To do this, I will be looking at Bowen's 1942 radio play 'London Revisited'. Though it was not commissioned under the 'New Judgement' series, the broadcast contains many of the themes we have seen in the previous two plays: it contains a ghostly visit to modern-day London by the Georgian author Fanny Burney, who must confront the differences between life in her own time period and the modern world. While only the beginning section of this script survives, the broadcast (or, what remains of it) is still a valuable object of study—it exhibits, perhaps more than the previous plays, Bowen's fascination with the ephemeral radio form. In the play, Burney visits the strange environment of wartime London. During the broadcast, Bowen seeks to defamiliarise the present and showcase the alienating aspects of modern life. She endeavours, I argue, to transform all of London into an uncanny space. Unlike the Trollope and the Austen broadcast, the Burney broadcast does not seem to be concerned with fostering new and productive relationships with writers of the past (though it should be noted that the end of the broadcast is missing, so this interpretation can only be made when looking at the initial pages). My contention is that we can see the modernist strains of Bowen's radio experimentations most starkly in the Burney broadcast, as it is concerned, above all, with the fragmentation and alienation of the modern world.

At the beginning of the broadcast, Burney's contemporaries and friends watch from the heavens as Fanny travels an 'earth at war', anxious for her to return. Fanny does finally return, 'breathless and unsteady', to tell strange tales of a land that is unfamiliar to all of them.[205] She describes wartime London as a strange and unnatural world—a world that is suddenly plunged in darkness as the result of nightly blackouts, a world that is 'extinguished and blotted out'. Fanny is confused and frightened at the 'Stygian black of London', with 'not a chink of candlelight' to light the streets.[206] Here, London's eeriness stems from utter and total darkness under the blackout. In the early years of the war, city life changed monumentally: fears of nightly air bombing attacks meant that blackout regulations were enforced even before war was officially announced. These regulations required all windows, whether domestic or commercial, to be covered with heavy curtains, cardboard, or even black paint. Even the home was no longer a safe place—Kristine A. Miller notes that, during the Second World War, 'traditional notions of the home's seclusion and security crumbled with the walls of townhouses, flats, private homes, and air-raid shelters'.[207] Fanny's wonder and fear at blacked-out London only serves to make the war environment seem eerie to radio listeners. During the broadcast, Bowen attempts to express the peculiarity, the otherworldliness of wartime, where the city no longer radiates the comforting familiarity of 'home'. In the war-city, homes sit constantly under the threat of their own destruction. Fanny's horror signals the distance between the pre-war London, filled with seemingly permanent buildings and monuments, and wartime London, where these buildings, and the history that they represent, can disappear overnight and turn, suddenly, into a pile of dust and rubble.

But London is not only terrifying because of its wartime environment, where nightly darkness seems to swallow the city whole. Rather, as the broadcasts go on, we come to realise that, for Fanny, the entire modern world is strange, down to the blinking of traffic lights:

> Ruby, topaz and emerald, propped or suspended by some agency, supersede one another, and, in their blinking, artfully rival the one before. I could see that, at each appearance of

[205] Elizabeth Bowen, 'London Revisited: As Seen by Fanny Burney', in *Listening in: Broadcasts, Speeches, and Interviews by Elizabeth Bowen,* ed. by Allan Hepburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 56-62 (p. 60).
[206] Bowen, 'London Revisited', p. 60.
[207] Kristine A. Miller, '"Even a Shelter's Not Safe": The Blitz on Homes in Elizabeth Bowen's Wartime Writing' *Twentieth Century Literature,* 45 (1999), 138-158 (140).

> emerald, the carriages leaped on, in a greedy rush. Topaz, by shining briefly, appeared to assert a warning; each ruby brought about an affrighted stop.[208]

Fanny attempts to rationalise the mechanical colours of traffic lights using her knowledge of the natural world—the red of a ruby, the amber of topaz, and the green of an emerald. Similarly, the A.R.P. warden, holding a torch before him, becomes insect-like; a 'glow-worm', with 'his beam preced[ing] him'. These equivalences only widen the gap between modern life and the natural world, where wartime London is unnatural in its man-made artifice. Even cars, or 'carriages' as Fanny understands them, are described as bizarre and grotesque insects; their form is like that 'of some kind of larva or grub', with a structure that 'slinks on […] bloated wheels' and is 'propelled forward by some infernal interior force'.[209] Fanny's horror at the buses, the streets, and even the people, arises from the stark divorce between her own world and the alien technologies of London, between the familiar and unfamiliar. The transcript breaks off shortly after, but in these initial pages we can see that the framing of the broadcast stages a visceral encounter with the uncanny. Throughout what remains of the Burney broadcast, Bowen attempts to portray the wartime city as incredibly daunting and unfamiliar—war alienates Fanny from the city, turns the place she once knew and loved into something terrifying, even grotesque.

In the 'London Revisited' broadcast, Bowen experiments with the feeling of the uncanny in order to address the estranging nature of the wartime city. In the introduction to *The Demon Lover*, Bowen wrote that the Blitz instantly transformed the way citizens engaged with London, and even with each other: 'The violent destruction of solid things, the explosion of the illusion that prestige, power, and permanence attach to bulk and weight, left all of us, equally, heady and disembodied. Walls went down; and we felt, if not knew, each other'.[210] The destruction of the city-space is also the destruction of history itself—citizens, no longer bound together by the physical markers of their past identities, must forge new relationships with one another that do not rely on the notion of a shared history. The war-city is filled with the ghostly reminders of this history, which is on the precipice of disappearing. Here, Bowen

[208] Bowen, 'London Revisited', p. 61.
[209] Bowen, 'London Revisited', p. 62.
[210] Bowen, 'The Demon Lover', in *Collected Impressions* (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1950) pp. 47-52 (p. 48).

employs the uncanny to represent living in the estranging war-city, where the ghosts of the past constantly remind citizens of a bygone way of living.[211]

Thus, we can see how Bowen uses the figure of the ghost to trouble new modes of citizenship in wartime, where their presence reveals an unresolved, overlooked past. Laura Murphy also discusses how the ghosts in Bowen's wartime fictions are often manifestations of the existential anxiety caused by 'the threat to individuality, rights and legal status created by the expansion of the state'.[212] What is at stake in these stories, she argues, is always the notion of 'individual liberty'. As such, Bowen's fiction explores the intrusion of the state on the nebulous and contradictory unconscious lives of citizens. For Murphy, the ghosts signal the 'inflictions and injustices by the operation of the nation state'—she discusses the often terrifying encounters with ghosts in Bowen's stories, which she reads as symbolic of a 'fear of annihilation'.[213] But Bowen's ghost stories do not always endeavour to affect a feeling of horror. In the broadcasts, experimenting with the 'uncanny' is often a mode for encouraging citizens to engage more constructively with their past. Bowen stresses the danger of looking into the past without simultaneously relating it to the present (as we can see in her discussions of the 'cult' of nostalgia, her disavowal of looking to the past as a mode of escapism). But, in the Burney broadcast, she also emphasises the danger of becoming too engaged with the present and forgetting the markers of a shared history and heritage—the war-city is so terrifying to Fanny because it lacks any sign of familiarity, there is no sign of her own history in its buildings and streets. Bowen's ghost stories are directly entangled with an interrogation of what it means to form a new state, and a new way of living, where a lingering presence of ghosts and historical figures suggest the danger of forgetting an important cultural past.

On the BBC, Bowen blends the estranging ghost story with the political and social role of the radio broadcast. Unlike in her wartime fiction, in which ghosts represent a 'threat of non-existence' in the context of absolute state expansion, on the broadcast the ghost story becomes, instead, instilled with the promotion of a different kind of national identity. In his discussion of ghosts in modernist literature, Luke Thurston argues that the ghost story 'offers modernist

[211] This chapter looks at Bowen's broadcasts in some ways as an extension of her wartime short fiction: the ephemerality of the broadcast, like the short story, allows Bowen to explore the strange impermanence of the war climate. Her broadcasts are, like her stories, filled with ghosts and phantoms and supernatural events, and can be read in context with Bowen's 'war gothic', a term used by Thomas S. Davis to describe her literatures that are filled with 'disorderly temporalities, alternating narratives, ghostly returns'. See: Thomas S. Davis, 'Elizabeth Bowen's War Gothic', *Textual Practice*, 27 (2013), 29–47 (29).

[212] Laura Murphy, 'The State of Exception and Exceptional States in Elizabeth Bowen's Wartime Ghost Stories', *Open Library of Humanities,* 5 (2019), 1-26 (5).

[213] Murphy, p. 20.

writers a mystical imaginary alternative to the alienated discursive matrix of modern identity'.[214] The ghostly broadcast represents Bowen's confrontation with the BBC and its promotion of the newly responsible and participatory citizen. The presence of ghosts on Bowen's radio, and the constant repetition of the past within the present, often undermine the propagandistic imperatives of the BBC, and even allow her to promote a different relationship between the citizen and the state. During these broadcasts, Bowen emphasises the importance of the citizen's essential individuality in the face of a new and more expansive mode of citizenship, and she recalls (and even celebrates) an earlier, *laissez-faire* state-citizen relationship.

Bowen expresses the difficulties associated with the instrumentalisation of the broadcast for the BBC's political purpose—even *when* the radio is used for such matters, the ephemeral nature of the medium itself cannot be avoided. By paying attention to the occult properties of the radio, Bowen explores its formal potential to go beyond, or overcome, its social use. Throughout the 'New Judgement' broadcasts, ghostliness is the unassailable attribute of this strange technology. In these spectral experiments on the BBC *Third Programme*, Bowen confronts a strict idea of the role of the BBC wartime broadcaster; the friendly and demotic representative of people whose speech is easy to understand, and who, underneath their amiable persona, manages to foster a productive relationship between the individual and state institutions. In Bowen's plays, the qualities of the wartime BBC personality become complicated by the very presence of the radio as a technology. Here, using the radio form for mass communication is always precarious—at any moment, it seems, the listener may be faced with spectral images of the past; with ghosts, phantoms, or the uncanny voices of the dead. In exploring the uncanniness that arises from listening to the wireless, Bowen supplies another role for psychoanalysis on the BBC. Far from Winnicott's hope that psychoanalysis can be transformed into a useful science, an easily employable tool for the maintenance of a successful social democracy, Bowen explores how using the radio leaves some residue of the unconscious left over: the unassailable and complex desires, fears, and feelings that might arise when faced with something like the 'uncanny'.

2.5 Conclusion

[214] Luke Thurston, *Literary Ghost from the Victorians to Modernism: The Haunting Interval* (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 168.

Priestley, Winnicott and Bowen all demonstrate the various ways that psychoanalysis became involved in an institutional conversation about the war-citizen and national identity on the radio. In the first two sections of this chapter, I argued that the BBC promoted a popularised version of psychoanalysis in order to strengthen a case for the active psychic participation of citizens in the war effort. Both Priestley and Winnicott, to varying degrees, attempted to bring psychology into a national conversation about what it means to be a British citizen at the mid-century, under the new formation of the wartime and postwar state. Priestley's discursive, demotic broadcasts used psychology to address the character of the healthy, socially-conscious British citizen. For Winnicott, the radio is almost a free psychological clinic for all citizens, an accessible route to the specialised knowledge of psychoanalysis. However, while Priestley and Winnicott contribute to a popular social discourse about the connection between desire, emotion and national belonging, Bowen's broadcasts complicate, and sometimes even disrupt, this dialogue. In her attention to the abstract elements of psychic life, to the mysterious workings of the unconscious and to the strange effects of the 'uncanny', Bowen reveals the ways that psychoanalysis undermines its social application. In doing so, she also plays with the language of the radio broadcast. While Priestley and Winnicott use colloquial, everyday speech to create an intimate on-air environment (and to cast complicated psychological ideas in an accessible register), Bowen challenges the idea that radio, as a medium, should produce feelings of familiarity, or make complicated notions simple. Instead, her uncanny broadcasts turn wartime London into an alien space and stage disconcerting confrontations between past and present British lives.

Throughout, we have seen how Bowen uses the 'uncanny' to resist modern forms of citizenship. For Bowen, the mental lives of individuals are idiosyncratic and personal, and should exist apart from their lives in the social sphere, as citizens of the state. In many ways, we can see similarities between Winnicott and Bowen in their discomfort about the expansion of the state into the private homes of families and individuals. But where Winnicott struggles with interventionist government policies that are not informed by psychoanalysis, Bowen is concerned that the expansion of the state might cancel out the very notion of individuality. In her broadcasts, Bowen carves out a new space for the unconscious on the radio waves: her experiments with the uncanny experience of listening to the wireless suggest that there was room on the BBC radio for abstract and modernist experimentations with psychoanalysis and its tropes. It is through this writerly and aesthetic psychoanalysis that Bowen's conservatism disrupts its application towards the BBC's institutional goals. Bowen's broadcasts show that the BBC did not only circulate a form of psychoanalysis that was useful for a social democratic

purpose: in some instances, we can see, broadcasters addressed the untenable and the discomforting aspects of unconscious life; the difficulties in easily assuming the role of the citizen.

CHAPTER THREE

WRITING-THE-CITIZEN IN MASS-OBSERVATION AND NAOMI MITCHISON'S *THE BULL CALVES*

3.1 Introduction

In 1936 the surrealist poet Charles Madge, the documentarian and filmmaker Humphrey Jennings, and the social anthropologist Tom Harrisson founded the project 'Mass-Observation' (M-O). Over the next decade, M-O would collect thousands of day diaries, questionnaires, dream journals, and interviews from all over Britain. The organisers gathered and edited these materials and, in the period 1937-1950, published twenty-four books on their findings. M-O was not solely a sociological study, but had multiple (often contradictory) aims. Samuel Hynes writes that the project's goals mirrored a politically disordered generation: 'It was at once literary and scientific, realist and surrealist, political and psychological, Marxist and Freudian, objective and salvationist. In its confusions of methods and goals it is a complex example of the confusions of young intellectuals at the time.'[1] But despite these contradictions, the M-O organisers were all united in one goal: to capture an idea of 'national character', to find evidence of common experience amongst all British citizens at the mid-century. This chapter proposes that M-O's sociology was bound up with psychoanalysis; in fragments of daily experience, they looked for a social unconscious shared by all British citizens.

As Jenny Shaw notes, M-O was unique in that 'imagination was allowed to play a central role in the process of sociological research'.[2] The project endeavoured to understand the effect of emotion, desire, and fantasy on the experience of everyday life—it regarded the 'unconscious' as a social phenomenon, where it suggested the complex forces that lie hidden underneath all social action. Hynes notes that the project is demonstrative of the 'confusions' of young intellectuals in the 1930s, but it is also useful to understand how psychoanalysis, too, was becoming 'confused' in its appropriations and uses. For the organisers, psychoanalysis had scientific and anthropological possibilities—it could help to capture something essential about the mind of the British citizen. The organisers saw M-O as the repository of the cultural

[1] Samuel Hynes, *The Auden Generation: Literature and Politics in England in the 1930s* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 278.
[2] Jenny Shaw, 'Surrealism, Mass-Observation and Researching Imagination', in *Methodological Imaginations*, ed. by E. Stina Lyon and Joan Busfield (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 1-16 (p. 1).

unconscious. As well as this, M-O had a distinct therapeutic function: it did not only seek to locate the 'collective unconscious' but to give it space for expression, to air it out. This chapter explores how M-O attempted to bring Freudian therapy into the social realm, so that 'writing-the-self' also meant 'writing-the-citizen'. In M-O, psychoanalysis' function became both personal and political—self-improvement resulted in social improvement. Writing for M-O would rid the citizen of political and social apathy, and encourage them to become actively involved in social life.

During wartime, the political function of psychoanalysis became more explicit. As M-O began to conduct work on behalf of the Ministry of Information, tapping into psychoanalytic theories helped the organisers determine levels of citizen morale and examine the psychological effects of mass-bombing. The institutionalisation of M-O, I suggest, reveals how readily the wartime state incorporated psychoanalytic methods towards their own directives. As such, the (now government-funded) M-O began to preoccupy itself with the figure of the socially-responsible 'war-citizen'. To examine this citizen, the organisers collected the dreams of their panellists in order to find evidence of collective war experience, of mass desires or anxieties in a time of crisis. But the dream-archive opens a space for the panellists' own reactions to the project—in the unpublished mass of dream material, panellists grapple with the notion that their unconscious life must be social, it must speak to the typical experience of the British war-citizen. The dream-archive is a reflexive space where panellists confront the institutionalised form of M-O and the political imperatives toward which it turned in wartime.

In the second part of this chapter, I examine how one panellist, the writer Naomi Mitchison, responded to M-O's aim to connect the personal and the social unconscious. I argue that Mitchison's novel *The Bull Calves* (1947), which she wrote during her time as a panellist, is influenced by M-O and its social imperatives. In the novel, Mitchison writes her own family history in order to explore, more broadly, Scottish national identity. In doing so, she connects 'public' and 'private' life; her family's (and her own) experiences of grief and despair come to represent the historical plight of the Scottish people. Like the M-O organisers, Mitchison encourages her fellow citizens to be active in society—she stresses the importance of community, of binding together and working as a collective. But Mitchison's hope to present these citizens with a full image of Scottish national character in her novel (which I read alongside Lukácsian theories of realism) requires a different approach in representing the 'social unconscious'. In order to represent a social totality, Mitchison turns to psychoanalytic models that prioritise mass cultural analysis. It is Jung, not Freud, that allows her to discuss the 'social unconscious' as a singular, unified concept. But Mitchison's novel does not fit

seamlessly to a Jungian model. Finally, I note that her novel is filled with the supernatural, with mysterious appearances that seem to appear from thin air. These moments of strangeness complicate the function of her novel as national allegory and leave room for the unexplained idiosyncrasies of individual subjectivity.

Despite their methodological and theoretical differences, then, Madge, Harrisson, Jennings, and Mitchison all see psychoanalysis' potential in its unique ability to reveal the underlying causes and effects of social relationships, as well as its therapeutic capability of improving these relations. This chapter proposes that in the literatures of the late modernist period, psychoanalysis became a useful tool for working out the connection between the self and society. In M-O and *The Bull Calves*, psychoanalysis's strength is its pertinence to sociological aims, its ability to reveal both the personal and the social unconscious.

3.2 Locating National Character

From its inception, M-O sought to connect the personal, idiosyncratic expressions of panellists to a wider understanding of the British citizen at the mid-century. Writing for a M-O directive was seen as a process of interrogating the self (Humphrey Jennings writes that this is how we 'show off ourselves to ourselves'), but the observers also suggested that their responses to M-O directives might reveal the shared experiences of all British citizens.[3] These writings were, at once, subjective and objective, suggestive of individual *and* social experience. Laura Marcus argues that there was a tension in the project between its seemingly disparate methods, where it was both 'a reflexive concept of studying ourselves and our own society, and a model of anthropological distance'.[4] The first two sections of this chapter examines each of these aims. Despite its methodological confusions, the M-O organisers were always preoccupied with establishing a coherent image of the British citizen. In this first section, I argue that the empirical function of M-O (which Marcus calls its method of 'documentary realism') was to collect the objective experience of the citizen at the mid-century.

The M-O organisers proposed a new form of social 'mapping'—in prompting their panellists to record their everyday lives in excessive detail, the observers suggested that they could find evidence of shared feeling. This idea of M-O was empiricist and scientific in nature, the emphasis on collecting a mass of experience and 'facts' that would represent, in their

[3] Humphrey Jennings, 'The Poet and the Public', in *The Humphrey Jennings Film Reader*, ed. by Kevin Jackson (London: Carcanet, 1993), pp. 255-82 (p. 260).
[4] Laura Marcus, 'Introduction: The Project of Mass-Observation', *New Formations*, 44 (2001), 5-20 (9).

entirety, contemporary public opinion, belief, feeling, and even superstition. The organisers hoped to find, in the sum of day diaries, photographs, bus tickets, and dream reports, some indication of a mass, cultural consciousness. In *Britain by Mass-Observation* (1939), Harrisson and Madge stress the urgent need for 'facts' about everyday life. To understand 'what millions are feeling and doing', they argue, 'we must first have facts'. To get these facts 'a new kind of organisation is needed'—a new science that takes into account the intricacies of social life, a 'Science of Ourselves'.[5] This was a stance of objective observation, and was distinctly aligned with one of the project's founders—Tom Harrisson.

Harrisson was an anthropologist, and in the years before joining M-O had ventured to the island of Malekula in the South Pacific. This was initially a trip to study the behaviours of Malekulan birds, but Harrisson instead became fascinated by the natives.[6] This was the beginning of the approach he would later take forward to M-O. The role of the anthropologist, Harrisson argued, was to assimilate themselves as much as possible to the new, alien culture: 'Most of the time I wrote down nothing, being too busy eating, sleeping, drinking *kava*, living hard and good until I became almost part of the landscape.'[7] When he returned to Britain, Harrisson exhibited a similar ethnographic desire to capture the 'real' or 'authentic' life of the citizen by, effectively, becoming part of their landscape. In his study of Bolton (his observation of so-called 'Worktown' which he had begun even before founding M-O) he focused his attention on the movements of people on the street: their behaviours, habits, work lives, the way that they dressed, what they bought, their daily routines. He endeavoured to become part of Bolton's landscape, working intermittently as a labourer, shop worker, local journalist, cotton mill worker, ice cream vendor, and truck driver, to observe working-class culture from the inside.[8]

James Hinton describes Harrisson's approach in Bolton as similar to his practices of ornithology: for Harrisson, he writes, 'the key to objective reporting was watching and listening, observing the masses as if they were birds'.[9] Where direct interviewing might solicit responses that were inclined toward what the respondent thinks the interviewer wants to know and hear, this distant observation (watching and listening without intervening) would, Harrisson argued, make it 'possible to be objective about things that were close to some of the

[5] Tom Harrisson and Charles Madge, *Britain by Mass Observation* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1939), p. 9.
[6] James Hinton, *The Mass Observers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 11.
[7] Tom Harrisson quoted in Judith Heimann, *The Most Offending Soul Alive* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), p. 84.
[8] Hinton, p. 18.
[9] Hinton, p. 33.

observers'.[10] Harrisson soon came to see Bolton as the quintessential British industrial town, calling it 'representative of the industrial life-pattern which prevails for the majority of people in Britain'.[11] Harrisson's technique for observing was sporadic and seemingly unsystematic: 'We could not ignore who did and did not drop their tram tickets into the litter bins', he wrote in an initial draft for the M-O publication *First Year's Work* (1938), 'for the first two months we wrote down everything we could observe or find. It was important to avoid falling into the old accepted categories'.[12] Madge wrote that in collecting the minutiae of everyday life, the organisers could cast 'some sort of net […] to catch that fleeting, glinting apparition, the essence of time'.[13] Indeed, in their first pamphlet, *Mass-Observation* (1937), Harrisson and Madge state that the observer's function is only to 'describe fully, clearly, and in simple language all that he sees and hears in connection with the specific problem he is asked to work on'.[14] A year later, they wrote that the observers should replicate the technologies of direct observation: 'The Observers are the cameras with which we are trying to photograph contemporary life. The trained Observer is ideally a camera with no distortion'.[15] The hope to record everyday life in such detail displays an anxiety to capture a complete, organic image of the citizen—to leave out nothing, even the most mundane or fleeting occurrences in everyday life, and to minimise any subjective influence. In other words, the observers were to blend seamlessly into the background: their function, like the scientific instrument, was to collect the raw, unmediated data of everyday life.

According to this first aim (its 'documentary realism'), M-O looked to compile responses, to organise them into a coherent narrative. In the organisers' reports and books, we can see an anxiety to find common themes and symbols, to understand the diverse range of responses through moments of typicality or interrelation. Collecting responses in this way might, the organisers hoped, 'make the invisible forces [of] custom and agreement [...] visible'.[16] The mass of material produced by panellists would constitute an archive of individual expression, but would also allow the observers to notice patterns and routines, or typical responses to shared historical experiences. In the early days of the project, then, the organisers put forward the idea that capturing the 'random particularities of cultural

[10] Tom Harrisson, draft for *First Year's Work,* quoted in Hinton, p. 34.
[11] Tom Harrisson, 'M-O in Bolton: A Social Experiment', W I/C, Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, p. 2.
[12] Tom Harrisson, quoted in Hinton, p. 31.
[13] Charles Madge, *Britain Revisited* (London: Gollancz,1961), p. 280.
[14] Tom Harrisson and Charles Madge, *Mass-Observation* (London: Frederick Muller, 1937), p. 31.
[15] Tom Harrisson and Charles Madge, *First Year's Work* (London: Lindsay Drummond, 1938), p. 66.
[16] Harrisson and Madge, *Britain by Mass-Observation,* p. 8.

phenomena' would eventually lead to a representation of the totality of the social world, where participants act as 'meteorological stations from whose reports a weather map of popular feeling can be compiled'.[17] Madge and Harrisson argued that M-O would 'put to the test the "readability" of material produced by amateur writers'[18]. The organisers were interested in how they could convert material gathered in day-diaries to objective, social fact—to make it 'readable', ready for scientific analysis. This was the sociology of M-O, its desire to locate a real, clear picture of the social world in 1930s Britain. To examine the collective consciousness, they collected shared anxieties, desires, and fears: the 'dominant tendencies' of the British citizen.

3.3 Writing-the-Self as Social Therapy

The desire to capture a clear picture of national character was, in some ways, contradicted by another of M-O's aims: to provide ordinary people across Britain with the opportunity for organic self-expression. The project's early publications suggested that participating in the project allowed the individual to adopt a new voice, stripped of clichés or cultural tropes. Writing for M-O would liberate panellists by providing them with the ability to write and think critically about their social position. The desire is often linked to the poet Charles Madge, another of M-O's founders, whose vision for the project was tightly bound to his Marxism. Madge's hope was that encouraging the panellists to write masses of detail about their lives, feelings and movements would allow for the unveiling of an underlying or subliminal 'social consciousness'. In an essay written in 1937, 'Press, Radio, and Social Consciousness', Madge writes about 'the homogeneity of modern society', which he sees as 'a function of the Press and the radio': 'these modern mechanisms ensure that everyone should read, and everyone should hear, a statement about the world which is valid for a day, and only for a day'.[19] Madge is interested in the sudden 'mass-literacy' that followed the Industrial Revolution. This 'new and vast […] phenomenon', he argues, has resulted in the populace being 'unceasingly bombarded with words'.[20] But these words are spouted from a hegemonic capitalist social order: they come 'principally from two central sources'—newspapers (dominated by 'big business') and the BBC. In the context of this homogenisation, 'instruction, entertainment,

[17] Harrisson and Madge, *Britain by Mass-Observation,* p. 30.
[18] Harrisson and Madge, *Mass-Observation,* p. 41.
[19] Charles Madge, 'Press, Radio, and Social Consciousness' in *The Mind in Chains,* ed. By Cecil D. Lewis (London: Frederick Muller, 1937), pp. 147-163 (p. 148).
[20] Madge, 'Press, Radio, and Social Consciousness', p. 147.

propaganda, advertisement' are blended in 'mixtures of varying proportions and efficacy, in such a way that it is impossible to disentangle the twisted skein'.[21] The solution, for Madge, lies in establishing a new language (or poetry) by and for the everyman. If the 'literate mass' is given a space to write, Madge concludes, they might also finally feel 'free to express [their] wishes' and gain agency over their own language. M-O, then, was not just a mode of observing and understanding the populace, but rather saw itself as a vehicle for a kind of social therapy.

M-O's solution to the homogenisation of language is also repeated in the third founder, Humphrey Jennings's essay 'The Poet and the Public' (1938). Jennings repeats Madge's concerns on the monopolisation of public rhetoric, and again offers a solution—a writing about *ourselves:*

> We've seen the way in which newspapers and short stories help us to deal with the *outside* world, but what about our lives by *ourselves?* You see newspapers don't give us news about ourselves. Who is going to help us to show off ourselves to ourselves—because that is what we need.[22]

In contrast to Harrisson's hope to create an objective ethnography of working-class culture, we can understand Madge and Jennings's aim as similar to Walter Benjamin's wish to collapse the distinction between the 'author' and the 'audience' in his essay 'The Author as Producer' (1936).[23] Benjamin argues that in modernity the masses are no longer passive readers who can only access 'literature' through the expertise of the 'author-figure'. He writes that the newspaper muddies the 'distinction between author and public'—readers do not see authors as separate, alienated, but rather as 'co-workers', or even as 'producers' who simply express the interests of their mass readership in writing. [24] Benjamin argues that, as a result of the breaking down of hierarchies, the author must see themselves 'on the side of the proletariat'.[25] There is

[21] Madge, 'Press, Radio, and Social Consciousness' p. 149.
[22] Jennings, 'The Poet and the Public', p. 260.
[23] Ben Jones and Rebecca Searle also relate Humphrey Jennings's film aesthetics to Walter Benjamin. They note that in films such as *Pandemonium,* Jennings's attempts to 'represent the experiences of ordinary, everyday individuals is combined with the attempt to represent those experiences collectively and open them up to understanding and critique' (207). They connect this effort (explored in the filmic montage) to Walter Benjamin's *Arcades Project:* both Jennings and Benjamin see the 'potential of montage as a form through which to articulate the everyday experience of modern life' (194). Ben Jones and Rebecca Searle, 'Humphrey Jennings, the Left and the Experience of Modernity in mid twentieth-century Britain', *History Workshop Journal*, 75 (2013), 190–212.
[24] Walter Benjamin, 'The Author as Producer' in *Understanding Brecht,* trans. by Anna Bostock (London: Verso, 1998), pp. 85-103 (p. 90).
[25] Benjamin, p. 85.

a new, revolutionary possibility when the author is on the side of the worker, not the bourgeoisie. M-O, too, looked to break the distinction between 'author' and 'reader'; to open up the act of authorship to 'ordinary people'. If you give any Briton the opportunity to write, they argued, then they would organically begin to contribute to a new form of poetry—a 'people's poetry'. The solution to the homogenisation of culture (as Madge saw it) was to start a new form of 'popular poetry', one that would connect 'the real world with this world of poetry fantasy'.[26]

The opening of M-O's first book publication *May the Twelfth* in 1937, for instance, argued that observing the 1936 abdication crisis was especially important to the project because it 'at last […] created a situation to which there was no stock response'.[27] The hope was that the panellist, finally liberated from their 'prejudices and preconceptions', would be able to react in a free and unmediated way and, in doing so, would somehow gain access to the 'social consciousness'.[28] Through their continual transgressions from learned stock responses, the subject would achieve a new form of self-knowledge, would realise their social position, and perhaps even begin to resist it. In the pamphlet *Britain by Mass-Observation*, the organisers wrote about an immediate and urgent importance of recording lives in this way:

> Fact is urgent—we are cogs in a vast and complicated machine which may turn out to be an infernal machine that is going to blow us all to smithereens. In any case, life is short, and if we are at all interested in this world (instead of, or as well as, the next world) we had better hurry up and learn where we stand.'[29]

For the organisers, the very act of putting a pen to paper had a radical potential; it might help the individual to realise something important about their complex social position—to learn where they stand. Writing for the project, then, would 'effectively contribute to an increase in the general social consciousness', and would 'counteract the tendency so universal in modern life to perform all our actions through sheer habit, with as little consciousness of our

[26] Madge, 'Press, Radio, and Social Consciousness', p. 163.
[27] Humphrey Jennings and Charles Madge with T.O. Beachcroft et al., *May the Twelfth: Mass Observation Day Surveys* (London: Faber & Faber, 1937), p. 9.
[28] Harrisson and Madge, *Britain by Mass-Observation*, p. 9.
[29] Harrisson and Madge, *Britain by Mass-Observation*, p. 8.

surroundings as though we were walking in our sleep'.[30] By contributing to the project, the panellists were undergoing a form of social therapy.

In order to encourage the organic expression of the 'social consciousness', the project turned to psychoanalysis. In a 1937 letter to the *New Statesman*, for example, Madge writes that 'fieldwork, i.e., the collection of evidence of mass wish-situations' allows the organisers 'to deal with elements so repressed that only what is admitted to be a first-class upheaval brings them to the surface'. Madge argued that the task of M-O was to look for the 'phenomenon of coincidence'—common images which hint at shared desires or anxieties. But in order to retrieve such images from the depths of the 'unconscious', the project needed to undergo the work of psychoanalysis. Madge writes:

> In fact it is probable that in the ultra-repressed condition of our society they can only materialise in this form, so mysterious in appearance. But the 'mystery' is part of the mechanism of repression. It can be reduced scientifically into the constituent terms of the hidden wish, and referred back to the accepted principles of anthropology. These principles and those of psycho-analysis, and the sciences dealing with the behaviour of man, have been applied by the group to the Crystal Palace-Abdication symbolic situation.[31]

In their introductory remarks for their collection of *May the Twelfth* recordings, Madge, Harrisson and Jennings reinforce the idea that their collection of day diaries helps to reveal unconscious national feeling:

> The Observers are trying to act as recording systems, and we can use them as recorders among other things of certain fantastic aspects of the day. At a time of dramatic national consciousness people's propensities for fantasy are strongly stimulated and also get caught up in connection with the central symbolism. There is evidently some relation between the fantasy of these dreams and the fantastic incidents in real life on this day.[32]

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[30] Charles Madge, Humphrey Jennings and Tom Harrisson, *Mass-Observation* (London: Fredrick Muller, 1937),

[31] Charles Madge, 'Anthropology at Home', *The New Statesman and Nation* (2 January 1937), quoted in *The Everyday Life Reader,* ed. by Ben Highmore (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 146.

[32] Jennings and Madge, *May the Twelfth,* p. 337.

Here, the organisers express their hope that the project would allow for the articulation of latent thoughts. These personal and individual desires and anxieties, they assumed, were all related to another consciousness—the mass, national consciousness, where social and cultural symbols continually enter into the psyche of all citizens.

In order to examine the phenomena of everyday life (and link these phenomena to underlying 'unconscious' thought), the project turned to the aesthetics of Surrealism. In their first pamphlet, the organisation presented a list of 'topics' it would be observing, a list that, as Highmore notes, is reminiscent of a Surrealist montage:

> Behaviours at war memorials.
> Shouts and gestures of motorists.
> The aspidistra cult.
> Anthropology of football pools.
> Bathroom behaviour.
> Beards, armpits, eyebrows.
> Anti-semitism […][33]

Though the project was clearly influenced by the aesthetics of Surrealism, in the years before founding M-O Madge was critical of what he saw as the Surrealist preoccupation with the private, individual mind and its mysteries. He argued that Surrealism (as practice) required shifting in order to be used instead for a social and political project. As such, Madge warns against a definition of Surrealism that contains it solely to the literary sphere: 'surrealism is not a literary school […] it is a laboratory of studies, of experimentations, which rejects any form of individualism'. Madge likens Surrealism to a kind of science, a science that 'in human hands, remains fallible – it has its own margin of error, and its own type of superstition'.[34] In this way, Surrealism's activities are 'universal, and would continue even if its organized and self-avowed theoreticians were to relapse into silence'.[35] In its expansion of Surrealist practices to social analysis, James Clifford argues that M-O followed the logic of what he calls 'ethnographic surrealism'—a kind of ethnography that makes use of collage-like aesthetics in order to dispel the idea that cultures can be contained in one, unified narrative. Clifford's identification of the

[33] Tom Harrisson, Humphrey Jennings and Charles Madge, 'Anthropology at Home', *The New Statesman and Nation* (30 January 1937), quoted in Highmore, *The Everyday Life Reader*, p. 147.
[34] Charles Madge, 'Surrealism for the English', *New Verse*, 6 (1933), p. 14.
[35] Madge, p. 14.

M-O project as ethnographic surrealism comes in what he sees as its resistance to the central authority or voice of the ethnographer, and instead an attention to multiple, sometimes contradictory, voices. This, we can follow from Clifford's argument, allows the M-O to capture the contested and diverse nature of 'everyday life'.[36] For Clifford, M-O is an example of ethnographic surrealism because it refuses to contain the writings of panellists within the ethnographer's tendentious interpretations. But this is complicated when we consider that M-O's preoccupation with collecting evidence of national character—moments of contestation or disagreement might undermine the hope to find what is 'dominant' in society. Highmore also notes that the Surrealist strains of the project were always joined with this desire to cultivate a unified image of the British citizen. He argues that if M-O's 'Surrealism included a vague adherence to the work of psychoanalysis joined with an aesthetic practice based on the principle of montage, and an anthropological approach (ethnography) focuses on the macro-analysis of the meanings and experience of culture, then their combination could be characterised as a practice of understanding society as a totality of fragments'.[37] So Madge turned to Surrealism so he could make the odd and the peculiar legible. Here, the individual, enigmatic fantasy, superstition or belief must connect to a wider social consciousness.

Interestingly, M-O's methodology for collecting evidence of 'social consciousness' mirrored the psychoanalytic therapeutic situation. As Ben Highmore notes, the first questionnaire, released to their panellists during the first *May the Twelfth* project, replicated the logic of Freudian free association. Free association works by intuitive leaps between topics and questions, a strategy that might render unexpected or uncensored insights into the unconscious. One directive for the *May the Twelfth* project gave instructions obviously inspired by free association, which usually takes place in the Freudian therapeutic situation: 'Answers should be obtained from the person questioned at a speed which will prevent him from taking refuge in a merely conventional and socially correct response'.[38] As such, the provided questionnaire jumped from questions about the abdication of Edward VIII to those about the individual's childhood:

9. Do you or did you want to get away from home, and if so, why?
10. Do you want to have a son, or a daughter, or both?

[36] James Clifford, 'On Ethnographic Surrealism', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 23 (1981), pp. 539-564 (p. 563).
[37] Ben Highmore, *Everyday Life and Cultural Theory* (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 81-82.
[38] M-O Directive, quoted in Highmore, *Everyday Life and Cultural Theory*, p. 90.

11. Do you hate your boss; do you hate your job?

12. What is your greatest ambition?

13. Did you want the King to marry Mrs. Simpson, and if so, why?

14. Were you glad or sorry when the Crystal Palace was burnt down and if so, why?

15. Do you approve of the institution of marriage as it exists in this country at present? If not, how would you wish it changed?

[…]' [39]

Ben Highmore argues that, in using this method, the observers were 'making connections between the personal and the social which suggests that material in the everyday public world can be invested with unconscious meanings'.[40] Like Freudian free association, airing out this 'everyday material' is intended to be therapeutic; through directives like these, panellists can access new forms of self-knowledge. In *First Year's Work*, for example, Harrisson and Madge write that asking people about their smoking habits revealed how cigarettes have a distinct 'social function'. For the panellists, learning about this social function was a direct consequence of their involvement in M-O; Harrisson and Madge write that the 'social factors become "invisible," until investigation brings them out'.[41] The organisers do not only want to access the social unconscious, but employ it for the clear means of self and social improvement.

As such, the early strains of the project encouraged modes of individual expression insofar that self-awareness would, eventually, lead to social awareness. The individual unconscious is an untapped resource of social matter, and it is up to the panellist themselves to plumb these depths. Hinton notes that the organisers were 'exemplifying a modernity which linked reflexive self-exploration to participation in public affairs and, for many of them, an engagement with high culture'.[42] But I am also interested in how this focus on 'self-reflexivity' can help us to understand how M-O approached the phenomenon of 'national character' or, indeed, of citizenship. Does this progressive model of 'writing-the-self' reveal M-O's fidelity to contemporaneous notions of citizenship, to the idea that the individual holds a moral responsibility towards society and the people in it? In this writing for oneself, and *about* oneself, the project encourages the citizen to be *active*, to take the improvement of their lives in their own hands—to be committed self-analysts. Writing, in this way, reveals a mutual

[39] Highmore, *Everyday Life and Cultural Theory*, pp. 90-91.
[40] Highmore, *Everyday Life and Cultural Theory*, p. 91.
[41] Harrisson and Madge, *First Years Work*, p. 25.
[42] Hinton, pp. 235-236.

responsibility amongst citizens to address societal or structural inequalities. Though framed as a revolutionary strategy, M-O's dual preoccupation with national character and self-improvement points to the underlying assumptions the organisers were making about the ordinary citizen and their capabilities: in writing and examining the self, panellists were taking on the role of the observer *and* the panellist, the analyst and the analysand. By moving psychoanalysis to the social realm, the responsibility for both the expression and interpretation of social desires and anxieties seemed to lie solely with the citizen themselves.

On the outbreak of war, M-O's preoccupation with the figure of the 'citizen' became even more explicit. In war, M-O became directly involved with governmental initiatives, with surveying morale and civil participation for the Ministry of Information ('MOI'). In July 1940, Harrisson argued that the role of M-O was now to 'analyse morale into its constituent parts, to foresee the tension points and suggest solutions'. M-O's function was now to survey war feeling; to figure out how (and whether) the ordinary person in Britain had assumed the new responsibilities of war-citizenry.

3.4 Mass-Observation and the War-Citizen

The collaboration between M-O and the MOI began in September 1939, when it became clear that M-O had lost all financial support from its clients. Harrisson wrote to his colleagues telling them that the organization was 'now completely out of resources'—many of its observers, still stationed across Britain, were left unpaid and extremely frustrated.[43] Harrisson looked to the Ministry of Information for help. In a letter to Richard Crossman, a producer of British propaganda films, he wrote: 'I do think that during a war M-O could make observations of value [...] I think that properly co-ordinated study linked to propaganda, information and ARP [Air Raid Precautions] would materially increase the social and psychological happiness of the civilian population'. If M-O is 'accepted by the Ministry of Information', Harrisson writes, it will create a 'full and objective record of what war means in terms of individual and mass behaviour'—a record that might prove important 'for history and for re-planning after the war'.[44] Harrisson and the MOI struck a deal in August 1940 and the Ministry started to commission M-O's wartime directives. Groth and Lusty point out that 'Mass-Observation increasingly became a survey-oriented organisation' in war, a project now 'concerned to gauge

[43] Tom Harrisson, qtd. in Hinton, p. 128.
[44] Tom Harrisson, Letter to Richard Crossman, 28 August 1939, TC 43/2/B, Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex, United Kingdom.

the mood and morale of the general populace in the emergency circumstances of wartime Britain'.[45] But this move also suggested the organization's shift away from an earlier commitment to the radical, emancipatory potential of writing (grounded, as it was, in Charles Madge's Marxism). Boris Jardine notes that because of these institutional affiliations, M-O 'transformed from an organisation that experimented with different kinds of anonymity, editorial practice and archival labour' to one in which 'a single model dominated'.[46] James Purdon goes further and argues that the transformation of M-O 'into a semi-official government body reporting to Whitehall ministries […] closed off the possibility of M-O developing into a genuine alternative to the aesthetic of bourgeois modernism on the one hand and proletarian socialist realism on the other'.[47] Indeed, disturbed by what he saw as its move towards 'home front espionage', Madge cited the collaboration between M-O and the state as a reason for his resigning from the project in the early war years.[48] If the early years of M-O were defined by experimental methodologies, by Madge and Jennings' preoccupation with socialism and surrealism, wartime M-O seemed to be a complete reversal, where the willing involvement of the project in the state apparatus wiped it of its revolutionary potential.

In M-O's first publication during the Second World War, *War Begins at Home* (1940), Harrisson is frank about the usefulness of this work to wartime imperatives: 'Government should be fully aware of all the trends in civilian morale. They need an accurate machine for measuring such trends; a war barometer'.[49] War necessitated the production of useable, concrete information about the experience of citizens, and so the organisers adapted the aims of the project. In March 1941, for instance, M-O published a report on 'morale' in Glasgow. But such a report required the observers to classify what it meant to be a 'war-citizen', to exhibit signs of 'morale'. In the report, the observers state that by morale they do not only mean the 'determination to carry on', but also 'determination to carry on with the utmost energy, a determination based on a realisation of the facts and with a readiness for many minor and some major sacrifice including life itself'.[50] The report goes on to venture a definition of 'good' morale: 'Good morale means hard and persistent work, means optimism, maximum unity,

[45] Helen Groth and Natalya Lusty, *Dreams and Modernity: A Cultural History* (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 166.
[46] Boris Jardine, 'Mass-Observation, surrealist sociology, and the bathos of paperwork', *History of the Human Sciences* 31 (2019), 52-79 (74).
[47] Purdon, p. 91.
[48] Charles Madge, quoted in Groth and Lusty, *Dreams and Modernity,* p. 166.
[49] Tom Harrisson and Charles Madge, *War Begins at Home* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1940), p. v.
[50] 'Morale in Glasgow', File Report 600, Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, p. 2.

reasonable awareness of the true situation and absence of complacency and confidences which are not based on fact and which are therefore likely to be terribly let down as time passes'.[51] M-O's definition of 'good' morale seems to also indicate an understanding of the 'good' war-citizen, who acts selflessly, who makes personal sacrifices, and who is aware that they are operating as part of a unified whole.

In war, the desire to locate a 'mass consciousness' in the miscellanea of collected material became explicitly associated with the figure of the 'citizen'. For the observers themselves, the usefulness of M-O to the wartime state was its ability to speak to how citizens *really* feel, to plumb the recesses of the 'national consciousness' and understand public reactions to the environment of war. One of the hired observers, J. B. Ferraby (who, as Hinton notes, became influential to M-O's operation after the departure of Madge and Jennings), wrote an article called 'The Problem of Propaganda' (1944).[52] In the article, Ferraby introduces M-O as a study of people's reactions to propagandistic material in wartime. First of all, Ferraby argues for the existence of a 'mass consciousness' amongst the people of Britain, which is the evidence of what he calls the underlying, ever-present 'national character'. Ferraby writes that 'if it is admitted that there is some common element in the character of a nation, this presupposes a common element in the desires of the individuals from whom the nation is formed. And there is no reason to suppose that the common desires are solely conscious ones'. He argues that the work of propaganda is to speak to the 'common desires' which reside in this 'national unconscious'.[53] Though he notes that this is a difficult task, Ferraby argues that M-O is unique in that it uses methods which 'involve the analysis of the verbatim comments of a large number of people on a large variety of subjects'.[54] It is only on casting the net wide that the 'mass unconscious' can hope to be represented. This is important to a study of propaganda, because 'Public reactions to specific propaganda campaigns are to a large extent governed by the relation the campaign holds to the mass-unconscious'.[55]

Summarising the findings of M-O directives, Ferraby makes a distinction between 'dishonest' and 'honest' propaganda using the language of the unconscious. Dishonest propaganda 'acts chiefly by creating false associations between elements in the mass-unconscious and the views propagated', while 'honest propaganda may have a positive social

[51] 'Morale in Glasgow', p. 2.
[52] Hinton, p. 288.
[53] J. B. Ferraby, 'The Problem of Propaganda', File Report 2150, Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, p. 102.
[54] Ferraby, p. 103.
[55] Ferraby, p. 103.

value […] in so far as it enables mass efforts to be simulated to ends that are agreed by all to be desirable'.[56] The honest propagandist does not only appeal to these socially-valuable unconscious wishes, but also inspires citizens to take on their own propagandistic work: '[Honest propaganda] allows groups agreed by all to be in possession of special information to apply their wisdom to persuading others to take a course of action the special information suggests is desirable'.[57] Again, we catch a glimpse of the notion of the war-citizen who is motivated and productive, and who also takes on the responsibility to inspire this productiveness in their compatriots. Ferraby's article also neatly summarises the usefulness of psychoanalysis to the observers in war: psychoanalysis is no longer a science of the individual, but a science of the collective. In its attention to the hidden wishes and desires of citizens, it can speak to the nature of a 'national character' and even to the effectiveness of propagandistic material. Throughout the 1940s, the relationship between M-O and psychoanalysis revolved around the character of the citizen, where the project surveyed the psychological and sociological effects of war.

In the introduction to this thesis, I note that psychoanalysis worked in 'social assemblages' in wartime, a term that Nikolas Rose uses to describe how 'experts' in fields such as psychology, sociology, medicine and anthropology became newly preoccupied with the everyday practices of the British citizen. It seems that wartime M-O took on the role of the 'expert' (as outlined by Rose)—the professional who says useful things about the mental and emotional state of the British citizen, can explain the reasons behind such behaviour, and perhaps even offer solutions.[58] M-O's processes of self-recording and diary writing played nicely into this 'expert'-role—as we have seen, by responding to M-O's directives, individuals learned 'techniques' for a better, socially-aware form of living. Rodney Harrison argues that by using 'collective self-monitoring [...] to record the quotidian, interior lives of the individual liberal subject', and then relating the 'new collective forms of self-knowing and self-regulating that it produced [...] to the population more generally', M-O was 'implicated in the development of new conceptions of population and "culture" as "surfaces of government"'.[59] M-O's work with the MOI, in particular, produced 'relations of governance' between the state

[56] Ferraby, p. 107.
[57] Ferraby, p. 107.
[58] Nikolas Rose, *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 132.
[59] Rodney Harrison, 'Observing, Collecting and Governing "Ourselves" and "Others": Mass-Observation's Fieldwork Agencements', *History and Anthropology*, 25, (2014), 227-245 (228-229).

and the citizen that were now "transactional" in nature.[60] Harrison's argument is that M-O was instrumental in the formation of a reciprocal state-citizen relationship (in which the M-O participant was 'self-fashioning'—becoming responsible for their own moral and social progression). Here, the habits, thoughts, and even dreams of ordinary people are subsumed into a kaleidoscopic image of the war citizen—who acts, as Harrison puts it, as a 'surface of government'. Purdon, too, notes that in war M-O became incorporated in 'an official regime of surveillance which served to reinforce the optical and social power of the state'. Purdon argues that there are important continuities between pre-war and wartime M-O, that 'the initial phase of the Mass-Observation project was compromised not because of its own internal contradictions but rather because of its willingness to work with central government toward the consolidation of a unified "national point of view"'.[61] Indeed, this chapter also finds an important continuity between pre-war and wartime M-O, a continuity that I root in the project's representation of citizenship.

The contradictions in wartime M-O mirror the same contradictions in contemporaneous conceptions of wartime citizenship that I outlined in the introduction; as the war-citizen was a hybrid of the liberal 'self-fashioning' British subject and the new, dependent social citizen, the M-O panellist was both able to assume *individuality* (in finding their unique poetic voice) and *typicality* (in being representative of the population as a whole). But this synthesis of the individual and the typical brought its own tensions. What happened when the material itself refused such organization, when it is *too* idiosyncratic, peculiar or irrational?

3.5 The Dream Archive

In the early days of the Second World War, a 49-year-old woman from Hampshire writes to M-O and describes her efforts to record her dreams for the project. But this proves unexpectedly difficult. She writes:

> Ever since I had your letter I have faithfully put pen and paper beside my bed so as to catch the flying dream, but no real dream has come. An odd jumble of girl-hood memories and day to day duties that are so vague and passing that I cannot set them

[60] Harrison, p. 229.
[61] Purdon, p. 93.

> down. The first week of the war I dreamt I had actually been killed while watching an air battle over Portsmouth, but since then I have not dreamt of the war once.[62]

She feels she has let the organisers down and, trying to produce material that is some way meaningful, rushes 'round [her] friends trying to rake up some nice dreams or nightmares' for them. But the answer is the same: no. Since the war began, dreams 'have lost form and shape'. The panellist finds this disheartening. She believes that the war-dream is useful to the organisers; it might say something pertinent about the mind of the citizen at a monumental historical moment. If only she could write that elusive 'real' dream! But it flies away, refusing to be caught.

This dream narrative, like many others in the M-O archive, exhibits a form of self-consciousness. In particular, the diarist is aware how her dream might (or might not) contribute to M-O's aims. She believes that dreaming about the quotidian is useless to the project, and that her inability to conjure up a 'war-dream' means that she has, ultimately, failed. The next section of this chapter is about such feelings of failure in the dream archive—the frustrations and challenges of using something as personal and enigmatic as the dream-image as evidence of the experience of the British citizen, suddenly at war. I argue that, in these moments of difficulty, the dream-archive stages a confrontation between the diarists and the observers, where the observers' hope that dreams might offer an insight to a shared psychological experience hangs, spectre-like, over the narratives themselves. M-O's initiatives on dreams and dreaming opened up a space where participants could interrogate the project and its contradictions. Though some panellists were eager to conduct self-analysis in their dream reports, and pointed out common symbols and their meanings, others expressed annoyance at the futility of the task. In addressing the problems of this kind of dream recording, the panellists also confronted the notion that M-O's interpretations of their dream-life might become entwined with wider sociological aims—the idea that their dreams might lose their 'true' significance and, instead, be subordinated to new social and political ends. I explore how panellists use their dream diaries to explore their newfound role as the 'war-citizen'.

So far, we have seen that M-O collected the intimate personal lives of its panellists as a way to discover a totality of social experience. The dream reports are perhaps most

[62] Typescript of Dream, 'DREAMS 1937-48', Topic Collection 28, Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex. Available through: Adam Matthew, Marlborough, Mass Observation Online, http://www.massobservation.amdigital.co.uk/Documents/Details/TopicCollection-28 [Accessed 9th July 2021].

demonstrative of this simultaneous hope to capture peculiarity and commonality—here, we see M-O use individual phantasy as an expression of social existence. But the dream material also presented glaring methodological and epistemological problems: What, exactly, is a dream 'evidence' of? How can we draw significance from the messy and sometimes obscure dream-images that panellists sent in? What's more, is it even possible to get to the meaning of the dream (sprung from the mysterious depths of unconscious life) outside of the psychoanalytic clinic, or without the help of personal context? In the following section, we see that M-O's attempts to enforce a system on the unsystematic, to find clear signs in the enigmatic, figural, and sometimes strange nature of the dream narratives undermines its simultaneous hope that dreams might reveal the anxieties of the war-citizen. This does not, however, mean that the dream material is not useful to us, that it does not contain important historical material. Daniel Pick and Lyndal Roper argue that the M-O dream archive 'may well have other uses for historians: for instance, enabling one to explore shifting popular attitudes to the role of dreams, and disclosing a striking persistence of belief that dreams are indeed prophetic'.[63] Indeed, the dream archive is often a space where panellists confront the idea that the dream has a new, social role—that their personal, emotional lives must be understood in terms of the wider preoccupations of their communities. It is important, then, to pay attention to the *way* the participants wrote about their phantasy lives, how they attempted to make their dream-images useful to the project, and, ultimately, why some of them felt this was a fruitless task.

From its earliest days, the organisers considered the dream an important component of 'everyday experience'—in *May the Twelfth*, the dreams of panellists offered an insight into how the impending Coronation seeped into their phantasy lives in obscure ways.[64] The attention to dreams continued throughout the war, when panellists were sent directives like the one below:

> 3. *(a)* Describe in as much detail as possible the *next* dream that you have after receiving this directive.
> *(b)* Describe, again in as much detail as possible, the most vivid dream that you can ever remember having.

[63] Daniel Pick and Lyndal Roper, 'Introduction', in *Dreams and History: The Interpretation of Dreams from Ancient Greece to Modern Psychoanalysis*, ed. Daniel Pick and Lyndal Roper (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 1-22 (p. 11).
[64] Jennings and Madge, *May the Twelfth*, pp. 324-344.

(Dream questions have been asked by Mass-Observation both before and during the war).[65]

In response to these questions, hundreds of dream diaries were sent to M-O. Like the day diaries, the dream diaries varied in their length and scope—some were extremely detailed, others laconic. Some of the dreams included long contextual remarks, or even the panellists' own interpretations, while others were presented without comment. A 1949 report, attempting to identify common themes, topics, and preoccupations, collected and examined these war dreams. The author of the report is likely to be Tom Harrisson, who had requested all dream material to be forwarded directly to him in 1939.[66] Though the report does find some commonalities in the dreams—it identified categories like the 'technicolour' dream and the 'nightmare'—the dream narratives clearly resisted analysis of wider social anxieties and fantasies.

From the beginning, the report is aware of its constraints: it begins by stating that M-O is 'restricted' by its status as a 'sociological organisation'—it is limited 'to discovering and describing the range and frequency of types of dreams and dream symbols; it remains for the psychiatrist to give these symbols life and colour, to say, if he can, what fears and ways they symbolise'.[67] The report describes the sociologist (or the M-O observer) as 'ill-equipped' for such interpretation as they operate on a 'superficial level'—'his interest is not so much in individuals and depth, as in masses and extent'.[68] The report consequently focuses on providing a few general categories for war dreams without a unifying or analytical focus. Reluctant to make any interpretive claims himself, Tom Harrisson recruited the psychoanalyst R. A. Macdonald to analyse the anxiety dreams of panellists. But Macdonald's handwritten report, 'Series of Anxiety Dreams from MO' (1939), also draws attention to the limitations of the project. In the report, Macdonald writes that he can examine only how individual dream narratives might relate 'to the conduct of the country during wartime'—he explains that reading the dream reports outside of an analytic situation is inimical to psychoanalytic exegesis. 'It is

[65] Mass Observation Directive Questionnaire, January 1949, Mass Observation Archive, University of Sussex, United Kingdom.
[66] In a letter dated 21 September 1939 to the Mass-Observers, Harrisson wrote 'for this dream material, though not for anything else, please send in to me personally at the above W.II address'. M-O Directive Replies 1939 (microfilm), Dreams, Roll 8, Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex, United Kingdom.
[67] 'A Report on Dreams', File Report 3096, March 1949, Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex, p. 1.
[68] 'A Report on Dreams', p. 1.

impossible to give any detailed interpretations of the dreams', writes Macdonald, 'as the personal associations of the dreamers are essential to this'.[69] In light of these difficulties, Macdonald suggest that the M-O organisers pay attention to the 'social' images in dreams. He prompts the observers to, in the future, think about questions like 'what are the effects of increased darkness?' (a reference to frequent blackouts during air raids) and '[d]o any people wake up with anxiety not associated with a dream, but rather about war, air raids, etc.?' [70] M-O's attempts to linger somewhere between sociology and psychoanalysis leads to these moments of difficulty, where the material itself seems to resist interpretation.

Much of the scholarship on M-O focuses on these contradictions, on the ways the project was limited in what it could achieve as either a sociological or an experimental, surrealist study. M-O's dream archive, Groth and Lusty write, is marked by 'an anxiety of failure'—by the pressure to create a full picture, to be in some way meaningful or socially and historically relevant.[71] In his article on M-O's use of dream reports, Tyrus Miller has also examined how the directors' 'genuine hope of using [the dreams] as sociological data, for the diagnosis and solution of social problems' often conflicted with 'the weaknesses of their methods'.[72] The eventual report on 'war dreams', he notes, only included a small number of their candidates (on his rough estimate the dreams of 'about 20 women and 20 men'). This was an incredibly small sample for a report that wished to disclose common anxieties, thoughts and desires. As Miller argues,

> [t]he partialness of the sample, the unsystematic nature of the collection effort, the absence (in most cases) of the dreamer's associations with the dream images, the possible influence of the survey itself on what was dreamed or recorded, and the 'irrational' figural form of the dreams themselves would together appear to render them intractable to the historian's methods.[73]

Having questioned the sociological validity of the dream report, Miller argues that it is also futile to look for a more experimental methodology in M-O's dream initiatives, to find, in its

[69] R. A. Macdonald, 'Series of Anxiety-Dreams from MO', TC 28/1/D, Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, p. 9.
[70] Macdonald, p. 9.
[71] Groth and Lusty, p. 173.
[72] Tyrus Miller, 'In the Blitz of Dreams: Mass Observation and the Historical Uses of Dream Reports', *New Formations*, 44 (2001), 34-57 (37).
[73] Miller, 'Blitz of Dreams', p. 37.

depths, the project's hope to capture the peculiarities or surrealities of everyday life: 'Beyond reconfirming loose ties with the aesthetic and psychological interests of the founding directors [...] the dream project does not really confirm a subterranean surrealism in M-O'.[74] Miller thus moves his attention away from finding evidence of surrealism and towards the dreams themselves, to 'the unexpected ways in which the dream reporters fulfilled or failed to fulfil their assignments'.[75] Groth and Lusty, too, argue that the M-O dream archive is trapped in 'implacable obscurity', which, by nature of its hoard of data and subjective material, 'refuses any unifying interpretive coherence'.[76] For Groth and Lusty the dream archive cannot be adequately contained by the scope of the project, but instead provides a 'way in' to the 'emotional and intimate dimensions of everyday life'.[77] Though the M-O organizers' efforts to contain the dream material ultimately foundered, the dream narratives themselves are perhaps most interesting to the historian—here, I argue, we can find the panellists' reactions to the project itself, to the idea that 'everyday life', no matter how personal, ordinary, or incomprehensible, must take on a new political dimension under M-O's watchful eye.

3.5.1 The Censoring-Self

To what extent, then, can we read M-O's dream-archive as a space of negotiation, where panellists grapple with the contradictions of the project, the idea that dreams must be, at once, personal and typical? In this section, I move beyond the 1949 report and examine the unpublished dreams held in the Mass Observation Archive, held at the University of Sussex. In particular, I am interested in moments when the panellists show an awareness (and sometimes an anxiety) that their dreams must be significant to the project—that, even in moments of peculiarity, they should indicate some common emotion or feeling. This section examines these moments when panellists believe they are self-censoring rather than self-observing, or when they express a concern that the project itself immobilizes some organic or authentic mode of psychological expression.

Some participants' dream narratives resist the project itself and move against the idea that their dreams should fit into an already-formed narrative about the connections between nationhood and psychological life. One panellist decided to stop sending in her dream

[74] Miller, 'Blitz of Dreams', p. 39.
[75] Miller, 'Blitz of Dreams', p. 39.
[76] Groth and Lusty, p. 148.
[77] Groth and Lusty, p. 148.

narratives with the thought that she might be seen as 'abnormal as some of Freud's patients'. She writes that her dreams would not be helpful to the project or viable to the specific wartime context: 'my dreams were not really typical of the times'. A further panellist is irritated that the enquiring observers are affecting what she dreams about: 'I think it's pretty hopeless collecting. Just what do you expect? On receiving your letter, I promptly dreamed you a war dream the next night. + look at it. Hopeless cooked. I bet I never dreamed that. Censor sitting waiting and all gone literary long before it got to me'.[78] This participant assumes that the process of recording has distorted her dreams ('cooked' probably refers to the act of doctoring information in order to mislead or deceive, as in the colloquial phrase 'to cook the books'). This deception is 'hopeless'—though self-censoring is consciously enacted, it is not willingly done. Her conscious mind acts as a kind of 'censor', waiting to organise and filter the images that she dreams up, leaving only those that might contribute to M-O's directives. She then describes her inability at getting to the 'true' dream, the dream that is raw and uncensored. She recognises that a part of her mind is acting as an extension of M-O and, consequently, as an agent of a new kind of wartime social surveillance.

Here, the participant writes about the absolute failure of representing the dream in writing. For her, even the act of remembering, of processing, imposes a narrative form onto the dream-image, which distorts and reworks it, such that the prospect of the raw dream (as the unprocessed psychic image or trace) is lost. For this panellist, M-O's hope that there would be some observable relationship between psychic life and war experience obscures the raw dream-images. This is not solely the fault of the participant's own psychological mechanisms of repression; she implies that M-O, too, is playing a role in the restriction of dream material. Dream-images pass not only through one stage of mediation (the retelling of the dream so that it is 'literary' and has a narrative), but also a second (the need for the teller to organize the dream so that it is relevant to M-O's directives). It is especially notable that the participant describes the dream as though it arrives at her psyche from some outside place ('long before it got to me'). She is convinced that external forces have produced the dream—that the dream is a consequence of wartime conditions and anxieties and so arrives at the psyche from a shared external reality. But, she suggests, the project fails to capture these anxieties as long as it relies on their manifestation in dream narratives.

[78] Typescript of dream, 'War Dreams 1940', TC 28/1/I1, Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex, United Kingdom.

Regardless, the panellist goes on to detail her war dream. The dream, as she remembers it, consists of only one scene, which she describes as 'practically static'. The dream is 'taken from actual work conditions'—she stands in a laboratory, on a 'higher level', watching people on the lower floors. An alarm has sounded, and she watches from this 'commanding position' as the people move to the shelter at the far side of this laboratory: 'I am at the top of the stairs, feeling that the organisation is admirable, life serious + earnest, everyone moving with precision + dignity, in real danger nobly faced.' She watches as the laboratory is invaded by 'a giggling theatre queue of little typists + lads, pushing + squeezing each other + joking along to the shelter—a couple of hundred of them'. As the dream goes on, the scene seems to transform into a kind of theatre, with a 'uniformed usherette' punching tickets for entrance into the shelter. Here, the dreamer positions herself as a spectator, standing on the platform like an audience member watching a play. Her gaze mirrors those of the observers, and she remarks about the effectiveness of the 'institution'; she discerns whether people are calm, loud, panicked, or relaxed as they move towards the shelter. Much like the wartime observers, she takes it upon herself to judge the morale of the citizens below. In her retelling, the participant positions her own eye as proxy for the eye of the M-O organiser: she inhabits a 'static' position above the crowd. The dream-self seems to take on the 'commanding position' of the M-O observer: the silent ethnographer who, though detached from the action, still must create a narrative about it.

As she finishes the dream report, the participant reiterates the fictional nature of this re-telling: 'That is fictionalised in writing. The dream was the almost simultaneous taking in of the whole lab scene, + the swift flick over of emotion [...] I felt indignant at the over-crowding of the shelter, + was just beginning to be indignant at the pay-girl with the tickets—but these were waking additions.' Here, the panellist recognizes that even the feelings that she prescribes to dream-self are constructed by the conscious mind on waking—they are fictional. As this example helps to demonstrate, the dream archive exposes the diarists' understanding of how the conscious mind polices and modifies their innermost desires and drives—a narrative is forced on the dream at the very moment of 'waking'. This is not the only recognition of the ego-as-censor in the dream archive: another panellist writes of 'More bad dreams during [...] infrequent sleeps - mostly so lousy that they're being censored even in sleep'.[79] In such examples, the 'censor' is always located internally—the participants are writing about a process

[79] Typescript of dream, 'War Dreams 1940', TC 28/1/I1, Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex, United Kingdom.

in which they pre-emptively edit and select unconscious images for the benefit of their conscious hopes and objectives.

Many of the participants also expressed an anxiety that they might be failing the project in some way—that their dreams were not coherent or detailed, or simply that they could not remember what they dreamt about at all. One female participant, for example, wrote: 'I'm sorry I can't help you much with dreams because I dream very rarely anyway, and nowadays I feel too tired to dream at all'. For another, the story is much the same: 'I have thought of the dream diary you mention, but have spent many dreamless nights recently'.[80] In another diary, M-O lingers ominously over the dream itself; the panellist writes about a 'chaotic dream in which the National Registration form and a MASS OBSERVATION MSS. were involved. I had apparently given too much or too little information in one or both, anyhow trouble was brewing for me with "the authorities"'.[81] The status of M-O as a mode of governmental surveillance (especially in this phantasy about the organization acting as an 'authority') influences the contents of the dreams it produces; phantasies are short-circuited by an underlying need to comply with, or be useful for, a sociological project.

So, the figure of the 'censor' is a common theme in the reports: it takes the form of M-O directives that appear unbidden in dreams, but it also materialises in panellists who are aware of their own psychological self-regulation, in the policing that occurs within the ego. The censoring of the self, in this way, might be read as the panellists' compliance with the aims of the project: the participants interpret their dreams as products of the social; they understand the interconnectedness of private and public life. However, the internal censor also suggests a resistance to the very possibility that dream-life can be used for any form of social or political instrumentalisation. For many participants, the censor filters out the incoherent and forces psychological images into a coherent narrative; it suppresses and obscures the raw dream material so that any form of self-reflexivity is futile. For these panellists, the process of self-authorship already impedes the aims of the project.

For Freud, the 'censor' is an important figure—he theorises that parts of the dream are naturally suppressed on waking by the conscious mind. There are striking similarities between Freud's model of self-censorship and notion of the irretrievable or missing dream in the M-O dream archive. In his essay 'On Dreams' (1911), Freud argues that there are two 'thought-

[80] Typescript of dream, 'War Dreams 1940', TC 28/1/I1, Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex, United Kingdom.
[81] Typescript of dream, 'War Dreams 1940', TC 28/1/I1, Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex, United Kingdom.

constructing agencies' in the mental apparatus. The first of these is the 'unconscious', the repository of all human desires and wishes. Though the second agent, too, has access to unconscious thought, it also 'enjoys the privilege of having free access to consciousness for its products'.[82] Freud theorises that unconscious thought can only reach consciousness by way of this second agent. In order to understand how information from the unconscious is filtered into the conscious mind, Freud uses the image of a 'censor', who sits 'on the frontier between the two agencies, where the first passes over to the second' and 'only allows what is agreeable to it to pass through and holds back everything else'.[83] Anything that the censor does not permit into conscious thought (it may believe, for example, that the thought is too offensive or damaging), is repressed back into the unconscious. But when we dream, Freud argues, our internal prohibitions relax and this 'censor' becomes weak, so that it is 'possible for what has hitherto been repressed to make a path for itself to consciousness'.[84] The internal censor, however, has been reduced but not eradicated, and so unconscious material must be altered in some way as it enters the dream in a way that 'mitigate[s] its offensive features. Freud argues, then, that dreams must contain symbols and images that are not representative of raw unconscious content but are a pathway to understanding our deep desires and wishes. The dream is a 'compromise' between the censor, suddenly in a weakened state, and repressed material that is on the brink of surfacing. Freud's 'censor', which he also calls the 'conscience', can also determine how the individual remembers dreams—dreams that are too suggestive of unconscious wishes are more likely to be forgotten and further repressed by the censoring conscience.[85]

The idea of the incomplete, fraudulent or 'hopeless cooked' dream in M-O's archive certainly mirrors Freud's theory of dream censorship. This is not to say that the panellists are all reading and responding to Freud in their dream diaries, but rather that the narratives display a colloquial awareness of the self-policing ego. For these panellists, the role of the internal censor is to obscure the true meaning of the dream. The presence of the 'censor' in dream narratives also shows how the panellists were using their diaries for self-analysis—by reflecting on the dynamics of psychological life, they realise that M-O's directive cannot easily be fulfilled and the mind will always complicate or muddle the results. Incidentally, dream

[82] Sigmund Freud, 'On Dreams', in *The Freud Reader,* ed. by Peter Gay (London: Vintage, 1995), pp. 142-172 (pp. 165).
[83] Freud, 'On Dreams', p. 166.
[84] Freud, 'On Dreams', p. 166.
[85] Freud, 'On Dreams', p. 166.

reports which recognise these complications are still, I suggest, important to understanding the forms of self-analysis the project generated.

Tyrus Miller argues that, for many panellists, responding to M-O directives 'became the vehicle for communicating a wide range of attitudes, emotions, and personal information'.[86] For Miller, it is 'precisely in not properly fulfilling the task of supplying reliable information into the hidden realms of their psychic life for the social-psychological analysis' that the dreams 'become historically valuable'. Miller argues that the 'aberrant' and resistant responses actually leave a 'trace' of historical information. This is a trace of the 'on-going negotiation between individuals and government institutions, in which psychic, epistemic, and political spaces are being interlaced in new configurations'.[87] But, more precisely, the excess of dream material opens up an opportunity to observe how panellists negotiate new forms of wartime citizenship that placed a political significance on personal, domestic life. Looking at the unpublished material in particular allows us to see the ways that panellists were engaging with the presence of M-O as a state-affiliated organisation, a representative of a newly-interventionist wartime government. In these unedited reports, the creative freedoms of dream-writing allow for moments that disempower or overcome the organisers' interpretations and conclusions. What the dream reports contain is in fact the panellists' narratives of their own psychological lives. The reports show how they are receptive and resistant to contemporaneous notions of self-regulation and surveillance.

The dream archive thus proffers a paradox, whereby the panellist's recognition that dreams are meant to serve an instrumental purpose actually prompts the self-reflexivity that M-O hoped to inspire. The dream archive shows evidence of critical thinking, where panellists address, confront, or even challenge the idea that their dreams might say something pertinent about the typical experience of the British citizen during wartime. In this archive, the panellists' demarcation of the 'raw' and 'produced' dream (or the 'raw' and 'cooked' dream) becomes a way of addressing the difficulties in transforming the nebulous and excessive 'self' into an image of the war-citizen, whose psychological activity is a straightforward product of their environmental conditions, and whose duty to sustain morale pervades the very depths of unconscious life. Amongst a prevailing discourse of 'self-sacrifice' and responsibility, when even the curiosities of dream-life become sources of sociological study, the dream archive is an important historical resource. Here, we can find an assortment of mediations on a new mode

[86] Miller, 'Blitz of Dreams', p. 40.
[87] Miller, 'Blitz of Dreams', p. 41.

of citizenship, characterized by coinciding commitments to the self-directed individual and the interdependent citizen.

3.5.2 Naomi Mitchison's dreams

One of M-O's dream recorders was the writer Naomi Mitchison, who also approaches the dream diary as a space for self-analysis. In her reports, Mitchison often attempts to find recurrences in her dream-images, or to make quasi-psychoanalytic interpretations. However, her dream reports are also a space for expressing her reservations about the project—she often articulates her scepticism that recording dream-life might be useful for wider social analysis. Unlike her day diaries, which she published independently in the 1980s, and which she filled with opinions on society and politics, Mitchison finds that dreams are often difficult to interpret—they are too obscure and lost easily on waking. Though she does attempt to understand her dreams as examples of her social anxieties and political opinions, these interpretations are hesitant and underwritten with feelings of failure. For Mitchison, moving dreams from the sleeping mind to the waking mind acts as an obfuscation or concealment. Anxieties buried deep in her psyche can never be authentically captured or realised by writing a dream narrative.

As with many of the other panellists, the act of scribing for M-O creeps into and interrupts Mitchison's dream narratives. On one night in 1941, she writes that she had a 'restless night'—'Dreamt I wrote down my first dream at great length: noticed I left my torch burning and wondered it hadn't burnt out'.[88] The need to create dream narratives for M-O often appears as a kind of spectre in Mitchison's psychic recordings, and she often writes about the pressure to remember something meaningful about her dreams. On the night of February 27th 1941, she writes that she is 'finding it hard to remember dreams—have tried to now for several nights without success'. She is 'over-tired and sleeping very deeply, in too deep a layer to remember'. In another dream report, she writes that she has dreamt 'a number of small dreams which appeared to be connected, but the connections were so irrational (by waking standards) that [she] cannot now recall them'.[89] Mitchison goes on to write about the difference between the sleeping mind and the waking mind:

[88] 'Naomi Mitchison's Dreams, 1939-42', Mass-Observation Archive, University of Sussex, TC 28/1/H.
[89] 'Naomi Mitchison's Dreams, 1939-42'.

> I am, however, fairly clear of something which I have long suspected: that one normally dreams several dreams at a time. In waking life this is so more or less, but one is usually only aware of one layer of conscious thinking; however the other is certainly going on, as one becomes aware of its end-results. In dreams there is not one rational and surface movie going on, but several.[90]

Mitchison's failure to portray her psychic life accurately on paper is beyond her control. Writing the dreams down chronologically in waking life seems to let something of the multi-layered dream experience escape. A couple of days later, Mitchison writes: 'I have a feeling that I don't remember dreams unless they are at least slightly rational'. Mitchison is aware of the mediating force of the conscious mind, which must confine dream-images in a coherent narrative form. In an accompanying note to Tom Harrisson, she writes of her belief that she can record only the 'coherent bits of a night full of incoherency'. She goes on: 'I am not sleeping deep enough to get far down kind of dreams just now, owing to pregnancy. I always have fine nightmares in the fortnight after childbirth, and shall try and net some for you.' Mitchison is readily aware of the 'conscious mind' as mediator of the unconscious. She uses the image of netting a dream (like a wild animal or fish from the ocean). In retelling the dream, it seems that the conscious mind tames it. It takes it out of context (from the wild) and turns it into something else. In one entry, she writes that she had a 'deep sleep, dreams largely forgotten; am suspicious of those I remember, which were obviously tests […] in [the remembered] dreams I behaved with great calm, actual and mental. What did I do in the forgotten dreams?' Mitchison suggests that her conscious mind is acting as the censor—the censor that hides unwanted thought and behaviour, that selects, deletes and cuts as necessary. She is suspicious of her remembered dreams, the rational and coherent pictures that her conscious mind presents, as these seem to conceal the raw, irrational, and incoherent.

Despite her scepticism about the success of consciously narrating dream-life, Mitchison still attempts to use her dream reports as a space of self-analysis. She often presents her own interpretations alongside her dreams, and points out recurring images that she believes relate to her unconscious desires. She discloses these observations in accompanying notes, pointing out the frequent themes like water, her children, and even feelings of defeat and dread:

[90] 'Naomi Mitchison's Dreams, 1939-42'.

> Note on these dreams The water dream as usual, presumably either socially symbolic or else a "return to the womb", as some schools of thought would say. […] What I have not had this week, though I have it very frequently, is a defeat dream, which takes various forms, but the main thing is the acceptance of defeat. However I am not sure how much this is social (not feeling that victory in present war is likely) or personal (death of child).[91]

In this note, Mitchison seems to be creating a dichotomy between the 'social' dream and the 'personal dream'. It does seem that the dream can be 'socially symbolic', but only insofar as it is detached from personal life. The personal desire to 'return to the womb' (tied to 'schools of thought' about the innermost desires of the individual mind), does not seem to be attached to 'social' problems like 'not feeling that victory in present war is likely', but rather is personal and private. As soon as she starts to interpret the dreams, Mitchison is imposing her own categories on the dream-images—she has a decisive agency over what is social and what is personal. Mitchison's position is at once the panellist *and* the observer, the patient and the analyst. The dream archive opens up a space for this kind of intervention—participants are not just reporters of everyday life but also do essential interpretive work. Though she is hesitant about the effectiveness of writing down dreams, it is clear that by doing so she is able to make new interpretations about the workings of her psyche. Following the logic of self-analysis, Mitchison turns the mirror back on herself, and takes up, solely, the task of interpretation.

In her dream reports we can see that Mitchison struggles with connecting the enigmatic, personal dream to wider social anxieties and experience—dreams have either a personal or social significance, yet cannot be both at once. In the final section of this chapter, I examine Mitchison's novel *The Bull Calves* (1947), written during the years she acted as a M-O participant, to argue that her response to M-O moved past the remit of the project itself. The creative production of the novel is tied to Mitchison's role as a panellist—it is a space for both self- and social-analysis, where what seems, at first, to be a straightforward family biography becomes an exploration of Scotland and Scottish identity.

3.6 Writing-the-Self in Naomi Mitchison's *The Bull Calves*

[91] 'Naomi Mitchison's Dreams, 1939-42'..

The Bull Calves is set in 1747, two years after the failed Jacobite Rebellion of 1745, as the Haldanes, a noble Scottish family, gather at their ancestral home of Gleneagles. Over a summer weekend, the various family members hesitantly share memories of the rebellion, negotiate their political differences, and attempt to discuss their position in a society that now heavily regulates and restricts their actions. Mitchison's heroine is Kirstie Haldane, who is visiting Gleneagles with her second husband, the Highlander William Macintosh. William—often referred to as 'Black William'—is met with distrust amongst Kirstie's lowlander family. It becomes clear that he has a secret and is hiding a dark and shadowy past. Over the course of the novel, Kirstie and William reveal the secrets they have been holding close to their chests; Kirstie's is her involvement with witchcraft and her belief that she caused the death of her first husband with voodoo magic, and William's is his previous marriage to a Native American tribeswoman. Throughout *The Bull Calves,* the characters slowly reconcile their differences, work through the traumas that haunt them, and decide to stop dwelling on past failures and instead look towards their shared future—the Scottish future.

The novel is spatially and temporally compact: it takes place over two days and, though characters relay their memories of the past rebellion in detail, we remain at Gleneagles throughout. Though the novel explores the failures of rebellion, the 1745 conflict is relayed to us solely through second-hand retellings, where the characters think over the traumas of their pasts. Over these two days, the family also discover that one of the younger Haldanes has been harbouring a known Jacobite in the attic. In the aftermath of this discovery, the family assess their loyalties: do they feel obliged to the state, to reporting and handing in the fugitive, or do old ties to the Scottish land mean that they are still sympathetic to revolutionary causes? The conflict—that is also incidentally between Scotland and the British state that rules it—is finally reconciled at the end of the novel. The Lord President of Scotland, the head of the Judiciary, visits the family and decides not to prosecute anyone for harbouring the fugitive. Instead, he encourages the family to work together for the future of Scotland: 'We must act together and build ourselves up slowly and surely', he argues, 'by way of the peaceful arts and trades through commerce and agriculture, until we are well of our wounds'.[92] Throughout this section I argue that *The Bull Calves* has an allegorical function, where the reconciliation of the Haldanes' family life acts as metaphor for Mitchison's hopes for social unity and reconciliation in modern-day Scotland. But the story also has a personal significance to Mitchison herself. *The Bull Calves* doubles as a family biography: the Haldanes are her own relatives, Gleneagles is

[92] Naomi Mitchison, *The Bull Calves* (London: Virago Press, 1997), p. 389.

her ancestral home, and the names of her characters are taken directly from her family tree. It is, in many ways, an attempt to write (or re-write) her own family history.

We might, then, read the novel as an extension of Mitchison's writings for M-O—we could see it as a project of self-knowledge, where Mitchison writes the story of Kirstie and William in order to examine her own identity as a Haldane. Indeed, Mitchison prints her family tree at the start of the novel (including her own name at the bottom). While clarifying the relationships between her characters, the tree also indicates the stake Mitchison has in telling the story, a story that is both written *by her* and *about her*. Thus, Douglas Gifford argues that *The Bull Calves* is Mitchison's 'deepest exploration of her own roots. Ideological as well as genealogical. It is her own favourite novel, and holds the key to her entire development as novelist and person'.[93] For Gifford, the novel encapsulates Mitchison's desire to understand her place in the world and in her family. Gifford proposes that we can certainly draw connections between Mitchison and the central protagonist Kirstie Haldane, who is the same age as Mitchison and who too has recently lost a child. As I will go on to explore, the novel often bridges the gap between present-day and past Scotland, where historical events parallel present-day social problems, but it also draws a connection between the past- and present-Haldanes, where Kirstie often stands for Mitchison's own desires and hopes in composing the novel.

If the novel is a mode for writing-the-self, it also allows Mitchison to resolve her own forgotten or unfinished stories. In her notes on chapter one, she writes that 'Kirstie and Black William, my hero and heroine, are only names in two family trees. They died young. I have given them the lives they might have had, the child they might have had'.[94] Mitchison's family history is also a retrieval of what is lost, a mode for re-imagining a tragic and unfulfilling past. This re-imagined Haldane family (made whole again by Mitchison) are, as Gifford argues, 'capable of real altruism and total involvement for and in Scotland'.[95] Their settling of differences (and the differences of a fractured Scottish society) is largely due to the mediatory presence of Kirstie Haldane. Gifford suggests that Kirstie's 'unifying consciousness' stands for 'something essential in the Scottish psyche' that 'cuts across political and traditional hates'.[96] Mitchison's history operates on a utopian impulse, where her own family works diligently toward improving Scottish society. In this way, we might read the novel in relation to M-O's

[93] Douglas Gifford, 'Forgiving the Past: Naomi Mitchison's *The Bull Calves*', *Scottish Studies,* 10 (1990), 219-241 (240).
[94] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves,* p. 407
[95] Douglas Gifford, 'Modern Scottish Fiction', *Studies in Scottish Literature,* 13 (1978), 250-273 (255)
[96] Gifford, 'Modern Scottish Fiction', p. 255.

promotion of self-improvement, where Mitchison imagines her own family as valuable social and political actors. This history not only allows her to make sense of the conflict that she is witnessing in 1940s Scotland and beyond, but also provides a form of reconciliation and closure: it looks to the past in an attempt to find a solution for the future. If Kirstie is indeed Mitchison's mirror, as Gifford proposes, then we can suggest that her mediatory function in the novel parallels Mitchison's own desire to unify the Scottish people, to reconcile present differences and find evidence of a shared national identity. It is Mitchison's effort to take an active role, as her ancestors do, in the betterment of Scottish social life. Mitchison's novel, then, allows her to make connections between the private, personal world and the social world, where her family history operates as a kind of national allegory—a parallel to the modern-day people of Scotland as they emerge from the chaos of global war.

As such, Mitchison's endeavour to know the self is tied to her hopes for the emancipation and celebration of her community. In her M-O diary, which she later published in a book called *Among You Taking Notes…* (1986), Mitchison describes a conversation with an Edinburgh librarian during her research for *The Bull Calves.* Mitchison notes that it became clear that the librarian saw her 'as part of Scottish history, descendant and representative of the Haldanes and indeed of all the great families whose blood is mixed in mine - for indeed there is scarcely one of them that isn't represented, Highland and Lowland'. In turn, Mitchison writes that she felt 'pride and responsibility, immediately, that I had to write the hell of a good book, that I had to explain something very important, that it was laid on me'.[97] *The Bull Calves* is a story about Mitchison finding her own Scottish heritage. The novel acts as a kind of origin story for contemporary Scottish nationhood, but it is also Mitchison's own quest for national belonging. In the dream archive, writing about personal desires and phantasies is not always political—dreams are either examples of personal desires *or* social desires. But the novel is where Mitchison connects her personal life with her social life, where writing about her own Scottish identity turns into writing about her community, and about the strife of the Scottish people as a whole.

3.6.1 A Novel for Scotland

There are significant parallels between Mitchison's novel and the early, radical strains of M-O. In particular, we can compare her aims to those of Charles Madge, who saw a revolutionary

[97] Naomi Mitchison, *Among You Taking Notes…* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 169-70.

potential in ordinary people participating in the project and learning 'where [they] stand'. Mitchison hopes that her book will provide local people with crucial knowledge about their history and land—motivations that parallel M-O's own aim to liberate British people with new forms of personal and social knowledge. In a 1948 article about the book, Mitchison writes that making her story intelligible to the people of Carradale (the Scottish fishing village she lived in during the war) was essential:

> During the writing of my last book I spent some time in reading parts of it aloud to people who had not more than an elementary education, and whose work had been of such an arduous manual kind as to leave them with little time for aesthetic appreciation. I tried my book out on them to see if it was intelligible, *and whether it interpreted for them the thoughts that they could not speak, and whether it helped to dispel certain kinds of social lies from their minds.'*[98] [own emphasis]

The Bull Calves is dedicated to Carradale: Mitchison sees the novel as having a distinct pedagogical function, it is a way for her community to learn about themselves. For Madge, the masses acquire this knowledge by participating in a 'people's poetry'—day and dream diaries provide individuals with the tools they need for careful social and self-analysis. Though Mitchison is the one who is writing, she sees an emancipatory potential in sharing the revolutionary history of the people of Scotland: these are the words that ordinary people cannot 'speak'. By relaying the history of Scotland to ordinary people, she argues, they might find the agency to sort through their 'minds' and find any 'lies' they have been told about the society they live in. This is extremely similar to Madge's own hope that ordinary people writing for M-O would be able to untangle what he called the 'twisted skein' of misinformation that comes from modern mechanisms like the press and the radio.[99] In *The Bull Calves*, Mitchison is acting as both the M-O participant and observer: she extends her mode of writing-as-self-analysis to her novel, but her novel is also doing the work of the observers, who encourage ordinary people to think critically about their social position. Assuming this hybrid role, *The Bull Calves* is both a work of self-analysis (of the kind that M-O wanted to inspire) and an attempt at ethnography, where detail about Scottish culture and community (seen in her extensive historical endnotes) is shared with a radical promise.

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[98] Naomi Mitchison, 'Writers in the Soviet - and in Britain', *Forward*, 42 (1948), 2.
[99] Charles Madge, 'Press, Radio, and Social Consciousness' in *The Mind in Chains*, ed. by Cecil D. Lewis (London: Frederick Muller, 1937), pp. 147-163 (p. 149).

In her 1938 work *The Moral Basis of Politics*, Mitchison emphasises the importance of finding 'binding factors' for the progression of a fair and equal society—ideas or concerns that unite groups of people and give a sense of societal connectedness.[100] The book narrates Mitchison's realisation about the connection between private and political life: 'I began to realise that politics was not a special kind of game for skilled players', she writes, 'but rather a whole-aspect of life'.[101] Mitchison argues that there is an essential ethical problem in contemporary politics and economics—in order for citizens to achieve the 'right relationships', she writes, they must first experience 'economic equality'.[102] The everyday, material reality of citizens is tied to their ability to participate productively in society. *The Moral Basis of Politics* allows us to see how Mitchison understood politics as bound to the experience of everyday life—as Jenni Calder argues, her writing is always preoccupied with 'closely meshed' personal and social commitments.[103] As we shall see, in *The Bull Calves* Mitchison connects public and private experience—close, family dynamics of the Haldane family are frequently related to larger, political events. Just as Madge and Harrisson attempted to find the link between the 'everyday' experience and contemporary politics (or the private and social unconscious), Mitchison looks for the 'binding factors' that can inspire in Scottish people a feeling of shared nationhood with their fellow citizens.

In her authorial notes, Mitchison describes her hopes for a 'new Scotland'—she sees revolutionary potential in re-writing and re-imagining mythologies, stories, tales that bind people together in a community. There is an importance in maintaining what she calls the 'soul' of Scotland, which has the potential to be harnessed for political good:

> The new Scotland will be away different from the old Scotland, at least in looks. It may drop everything, the language, the music, the dances, the kilt and the plaid, the memories and stories, the remaining crafts of the countryside, aye and the kirk sessions in with the rest. Yet the soul does not die and it returns in its right shape. It will be well to keep certain traditions of thinking and doing alive, here and there, so that if they are what the soul needs with which the clothe itself newly, they can be brought and burnished again.[104]

[100] Naomi Mitchison, *The Moral Basis of Politics* (London: Constable, 1938), p. 72.
[101] Mitchison, *Moral Basis*, p. 84.
[102] Mitchison, *Moral Basis*, p. 84.
[103] Jenni Calder, 'More Than Merely Ourselves: Naomi Mitchison', in *A History of Scottish Women's Writing*, ed. Douglas Gifford and Dorothy McMillan (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), pp. 444-55 (p. 454).
[104] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 486.

Mitchison's novel works to bridge the gap between 1747 and 1947, drawing connections between the aftermath of conflicts two hundred years apart: 'the smooth mid-century'.[105] As such, Mitchison's historical project is rooted indelibly in the present-day. Previous scholarship has explored the presentism of the novel. Gifford argues that 'the nineteen-forties are a backcloth for the novel which must be constantly kept in sight', while Moira Burgess describes the novel as 'bravely affirmative of the process of recovery' after a conflict has taken place—an optimistic narrative of post-conflict regeneration, written as Europe was emerging from the devastation of the Second World War.[106]

The voice of the 'present-day' appears in Mitchison's copious authorial notes, where she shares stories about Carradale and elaborates on the novel's themes. The notes include details of eighteenth-century dances and hunting practices, histories of land enclosure, and even Mitchison's opinions about superstition, witchcraft, and psychoanalysis. In these notes, Mitchison provides her own ethnography of Scotland: 'In a book which has the social and political implications that this book obviously has', she writes, 'one's motives are not always artistic'.[107] She continues: 'if this book is taken as seriously by school and University teachers as some of my other historical novels have been (and I believe this one is away better as history!) it may encourage them […] to allow the children under their charge in Scotland to express themselves in spoken and written Scots of their own district'.[108] Mitchison's novel is thus an attempt to find the 'soul' of Scotland, the traditions and cultural practices that should not be cast to a 'shadowy and mocking past', but can, instead, be 'newly written and newly sung', re-shaped in 'new, strange forms' to suit the modern age. Mitchison argues that revisiting the 'soul' of the country in these new ways would be 'good for Scotland'. Instead of 'clinging blindly to old things', Mitchison wants to reclaim the 'old' and turn it into the 'new'.[109] She warns against a kind of blind nostalgia, a celebration the past that does not also attempt to engage with the present. She asks, 'what at all is the point of people learning the Gaelic songs and singing them at Mods with the correct pronunciation but not really knowing what they mean?' It is a pity, she goes on, 'to divert people's energies at such a critical moment as this, and some of those who occupy themselves with the Celtic past might better consider

[105] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves,* p. 19.
[106] Douglas Gifford, 'Forgiving the Past: Naomi Mitchison's *The Bull Calves*', p. 222; Moira Burgess, *Mitchison's Ghosts* (Glasgow: Humming Earth, 2008), p. 76.
[107] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves,* p. 407
[108] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves,* p. 411.
[109] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves,* p. 487.

and act for the future'.[110] In Mitchison's conception of societal progression, the celebration of localised communities is a crucial step towards wider political advancement. She sees a hope in the formation of a cultural heritage which every citizen feels automatically involved in.[111]

So there are clear parallels between Mitchison's novel and M-O—namely, the desire to find evidence of a shared national identity (the 'soul' of a country), as well as the idea that addressing this identity might lead to citizens taking an active role towards the improvement of society. But there are also crucial differences: in her discussion of nation and citizenry, Mitchison is concerned with Scottishness—her citizen belongs not to Britain but to Scotland. Though M-O claimed to represent all British people, their own view of 'Britishness' was notably Anglocentric. A majority of M-O's fieldwork took place in England—its study of quintessential working-class British life ('Worktown') focused only on the town of Bolton. For Jed Esty, M-O demonstrated a distinct 'anthropological/Anglo-centric turn' in the late thirties; the project 'increasingly made the nation into an object of documentary observation, a knowable unit of cultural and social relations rather than a fractured metropole'.[112] Esty argues that the desire to capture 'Englishness' was ingrained both in the project's experimental and institutional iterations: 'the centralizing effect of Mass-Observation, particularly with the onset of World War II, took the litany of shared Englishness on a short trip from radical intentions to conservative organicism'.[113] So Mitchison's more peripheral focus on Scotland and Scottishness was a marked move away from the M-O and its 'English' emphasis.

While Mitchison remained a member of the Labour Party throughout the war years, she became a staunch proponent for Scottish devolution on moving to Carradale in wartime. John A. Burnett argues that the war saw a revival of Scottish nationalism, as it acted as a 'catalyst for a new, more forceful attitude within Scottish political circles'.[114] Burnett argues that Mitchison, in particular, was an enthusiastic voice of this movement and often promoted Scottish self-governance throughout the war. Even in her M-O diaries, Mitchison describes her fealty to Scotland and its people: 'In the afternoon talked about nationalism and about the kind of books I want to write, about the language I want to use for them, about the tradition of writing, and so on. I feel nervous about it; there is something deep down, I feel defensive and

[110] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves,* p. 486.
[111] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves,* p. 486.
[112] Jed Esty, *A Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 45; p. 17.
[113] Esty, p. 45.
[114] John A. Burnett, *The Making of the Modern Scottish Highlands, 1939–1965* (Dublin: Four Courts, 2010), p. 195.

passionate, as I do about being a woman. Not quite reasonable. I feel I don't care about being in the same tradition as Shakespeare and Beethoven if only I can do something for my own people in Scotland.'[115] Mitchison's writing inside and outside of the project complicates the notion of coherent British citizenship that the organisers hoped to capture. Although Mitchison seems to adopt M-O's model of writing-the-self, she also works against the project's assumptions of British national identity.

Another difference hinges on how Mitchison and the M-O organisers approach the concept of 'realism', on how they understand the accurate representation of 'national character'. As we have seen, Charles Madge believed panellists might access revolutionary thought (and break with 'stock responses') by growing accustomed to new forms of self-expression. The project turned to surrealist and Freudian methodologies in order to collect these moments of individual expression as evidence of wider social feeling. By contrast, Mitchison attempts to use a singular text to accurately represent historical ways of thinking. Indeed, in her authorial notes, she writes that her novel was an attempt to 'try and get as near as might be to ancient ways of thought', to reveal fully the experience of living under the structures of eighteenth-century Scotland.[116] Here, we might say that Mitchison's text follows the logic of a Lukácsian historical novel. In *The Historical Novel* (1937), Georg Lukács argues that the greatness of the 'classical historical novel' lies in the 'capacity to give living human embodiment to historical-social types'.[117] For Lukács, authors like Walter Scott treat the past as the 'prehistory of the present', where the 'historical, social, and human forces' that have formed the present-day are exposed to view. Lukács' argument is that the task of 'realism' is to maintain the essential dialectic between social and individual experience in order to create a 'unity of the particular and the universal'.[118] As such, a realist novel must follow characters that take on what he calls a 'typicality'—though characters possess individual traits, they stand for larger social and political identities that exceed their own idiosyncrasies. In other words, characters (and their trajectories) are instruments for the examination and analysis of material reality, of social order and fundamental political forces. We can understand Black William, for example, as a stand-in for a certain social type: a Highlander of post-1745 Scotland, who still had ties to the Jacobite cause and thus signifies lingering revolutionary sympathies. The

[115] Mitchison, *Among You Taking Notes…*, p. 159.
[116] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves,* p. 408.
[117] Georg Lukács, *The Historical Novel,* trans. by Hannah and Stanley Mitchell (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981, p. 36.
[118] Lukács, 'Art and Objective Truth' in *Writer and Critic and Other Essays,* trans. by Arthur Kahn (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2005), pp. 26-60 (p. 46).

Lowlanders represent a different 'social type' altogether—the emerging Scottish bourgeoisie, who, leaving the pagan beliefs of Scotland behind, gradually became assimilated to the wider capitalist order. The presence of the 'typical' is necessary in achieving Lukács' 'social totality'—the work should exist as a 'self-contained whole' where the 'concreteness of objective reality must be reconstituted in perceptual immediacy', and where 'any extract, any event, any individual or any aspect of the individual's life must represent such a context in its concreteness, thus in the unity of all its important determinants'.[119] While Lukács celebrated the realist form, he was sceptical of the literary schools of aestheticism and modernism, because of their 'glorification of the "sovereignty" of the creative individual', which in turn 'evolves into a theory of a contemptuous, parasitic divorce of art from life, into a denial of any objectivity in art'.[120]

In her M-O diary, Mitchison is also cautious of literature that is insular and obscure—she sees these traits as a refusal to engage with wider political causes. On reading Kathleen Raine's poems (who was also involved with M-O in its early days), Mitchison's first impression is that 'they seemed hopelessly difficult and obscure, so putting off'.[121] Though Mitchison finds the poems 'lovely', she worries about the abstract nature of Raine's language: 'It means you aren't writing except for a limited audience, those who will try again'.[122] Mitchison's reservations about Raine's surrealist poetry stems from its commitment to fragmentation. Where Raine records the miscellanea of everyday life in an attempt to find 'traces of the beautiful, degraded, dishonoured, suffering, but still the *deus absconditus*', Mitchison's literary task is cohesion and reconciliation, where a shared national language and story binds together a community.[123] Mitchison writes that she 'does not get all of them [Raine's poems] and doubt[s] if it is worth making the tremendous effort which might be necessary to do so; one should perhaps put that effort into research and political work…'[124] These criticisms of Raine clarify Mitchison's complicated relationship with M-O's political project: Mitchison, like Lukács, values the historical realist form for its ability to represent a 'social totality'. Though Mitchison and Madge share a humanist desire to represent totality, we might say that they disagree on how this can be accomplished; can totality be represented by

[119] Lukács, 'Art and Objective Truth', p. 47.
[120] Lukács, 'Art and Objective Truth', p. 42.
[121] Mitchison, *Among You Taking Notes…*, p. 262.
[122] Mitchison, *Among You Taking Notes…*, p. 262.
[123] Kathleen Raine, quoted in Kevin Robins and Frank Webster, *Times of the Technoculture* (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 24.
[124] Mitchison, *Among You Taking Notes…*, p. 262.

amassing fragmentary or divergent voices, or, rather, can the individual represent totality through a coherent and unified narrative?

To understand the distinction between Mitchison's and M-O's political projects we can turn to Lukács' conception of 'extensive' and 'intensive' totalities. The 'extensive' totality denotes a full, objective representation of social reality. But, Lukács suggests, the ability to depict the extensive totality 'is beyond the possible scope of any artistic creation; the totality of reality can only be reproduced intellectually in ever-increasing approximation through the infinite process of science'.[125] For Lukács, the scientific method (unlike the artistic method) can accurately record material social forces. (By 'science' Lukács refers to theoretical or conceptual modes of analysis—in particular, he suggests historical materialism abides by a scientific, objective method).[126] Notably, the organisers of M-O positioned their project as science; they claimed it could capture 'social relations' in 'the every-day lives and feelings of ordinary people'.[127] As such, we might say that the project's effort to create a new (and social) scientific method was also an attempt to represent the 'extensive totality' of life. Indeed, in *Britain by Mass-Observation,* the M-O organisers profess that their project will 'give both voice and ear to what the millions [of Britons] are feeling and doing under the shadow of […] terrific events'.[128] But M-O's claim to be simultaneously science *and* poetry complicates such a straightforward understanding of the project's 'extensive totality'. The collected materials did not only represent objective historical fact but also had an artistic purpose; together, day and dream diaries formed a 'people's poetry'. But Lukács claims that the 'totality of the work of art', in contrast to science, is 'rather intensive' because of its 'self-contained' or closed quality.[129] By nature, a work of art is limited in representing totality, as it must abide by strict formal rules. If it wishes to depict 'totality', art must abide by 'the circumscribed and self-contained ordering of those factors which objectively are of decisive significance for the portion of life depicted, which determine its existence'.[130] But, in its mixture of science and poetry, M-O explores the possibility of representing the 'extensive totality' in the artwork.

[125] Lukács, 'Art and Objective Truth', p. 38.
[126] For Lukács, Marxism yields a useful methodical, scientific approach to understanding history. In *History and Class Consciousness,* he writes that '[p]roletarian science is revolutionary not just by virtue of its revolutionary ideas which is opposes to bourgeois society, but above all because of its method. *The primacy of the category of the totality is the bearer of the principle of revolution in science.*' Lukács, *History of Class Consciousness,* trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1972), p. 27.
[127] Harrisson and Madge, *Britain by Mass-Observation,* p. 9.
[128] Harrisson and Madge, *Britain by Mass-Observation,* p. 9.
[129] Lukács, 'Art and Objective Truth', p. 38.
[130] Lukács, 'Art and Objective Truth', p. 38.

Here, moments of individual expression (no matter how surreal, strange, or subjectivised) can capture a rich and complete picture of social life.

So the fundamental difference between Lukácsian historical realism (of the kind we see in Mitchison's novel) and M-O's 'documentary realism' centres on the revolutionary process of writing, a difference that is not only concerned with the capabilities of a modernist methodology, but, crucially, the capability of the individual and their aesthetic expression. According to Madge and Harrisson, a surrealist methodology, in capturing the 'random particularities of cultural phenomena', is able to represent the totality of the social world—participants act as 'meteorological stations from whose reports a weather map of popular feeling can be compiled'.[131] At the centre of this surrealist methodology is the individual, whose new ability for social analysis allows them to contribute to a 'people's poetry'. But Lukács argued that access to a revolutionary self-consciousness only occurs once the individual understands their own experience as part of a social totality. By doing so, the individual is able to confront their position in the complex and alienating capitalist order. Madge and Harrisson see the totality as the sum of various particularities, whereas Lukács sees it as the dialectical interrelation between the universal and the particular. For Lukács, totality is not the 'mechanical aggregate of individual historical events'—in such a collection direct experience becomes 'strongly subjectivised, more firmly conceived as an independent and autonomous function of the individual (as impression, emotional response, etc., abstractly divorced from the objective reality which generates it)'.[132] For M-O, individual expression poses a radical possibility because it allows the individual to transcend an accepted cultural narrative (or 'stock response'), whereas for Lukács radical literary expression is only possible through a direct confrontation with and a deeper exploration of cultural narratives.

In paying attention to moments of individual expression, M-O's 'totality' can involve the strange, odd, and peculiar. In other words, it leaves space for the expression of the personal unconscious, of the individual's desires, anxieties and phantasies. By contrast, Mitchison looks to relate isolated events in Scotland's past to the social reality of the present-day, and thus situate the individual and particular in a wider socio-historical context. But applying Lukács' theory so straightforwardly to *The Bull Calves* also misses the distinctly personal function of the novel. For Mitchison, the novel operates as a means of gaining self, as well as social, knowledge. Mitchison is not only preoccupied with unveiling social forces, but also uses the

[131] Harrisson and Madge, *Britain by Mass-Observation*, p. 30.
[132] Lukács, 'Art and Objective Truth', p. 32.

novel to air her own personal grief, anxieties and emotions. Mitchison's fidelity to M-O's model of writing-the-self complicates this interpretation of Mitchison's novel as a work of Lukácsian historical realism.

To reveal this dual function of *The Bull Calves*, Mitchison prefaces her novel with a poem called 'Clemency Ealasaid', which is dated June 1940. The poem begins with Mitchison's grief over the death of her unborn child, Clemency, and moves to express simultaneous feelings of anxiety and fear over the devastation in Europe. The poem moves seamlessly between these two subjects, so that Mitchison's private, familial grief merges with widespread wartime devastation: 'Now I am trying to bargain, to say take her death, my grief, / But save me the others, from bombs, shells, from pandemic/ Disease, save me children and husband, save Ruth, Dick/ Taggy, and all of them'.[133] In her M-O diary, Mitchison writes that *The Bull Calves* was, at first, an attempt at catharsis, an expression of her grief over a lost child:

> Dr. Cameron says I should start writing a book. As though one could turn on the tap. But I think I must consider it, even if nothing comes of it. I might write a history of Kintyre: that is a very small-scale history, but with implications taking in outside political and economic movements […] If only I had my baby I wouldn't need to write a book that probably nobody wants to read.[134]

It becomes obvious for Mitchison that writing a story inspired by her own mourning materialises as an exploration of how these feelings are replicated in her wider community. She is not mourning for just her child, but rather for the entirety of Europe, for all those lost children that she now feels connected to. Mourning the inevitable '[h]arvest of dead babies, disease, hatred' that war will bring, Mitchison writes 'my breasts tingle and stab with milk that no one wants'.[135] Mitchison suggests that there is the potential for recovery or solace in this sharing her grief with her community. But this is not an easy feat, and ultimately results in more heartbreak, as she begins to take on the grief of the town of Carradale, also trapped in the claws of global conflict. In a section of 'Clemency Ealasaid' titled *'Carradale'* Mitchison begins: 'This was to have been a binding between me and Carradale. / Weeper of Carradale Glen, fairy hare, cleft rock, did none of/ you speak?'[136] Mitchison attempts to find solace in Carradale, in

[133] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 8.
[134] Mitchison, *Among You Taking Notes…*, p. 45.
[135] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 9.
[136] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 9.

Scottish land and culture, and in the mythologies of the place she considers home. But Carradale, too, is suspended in grief and fear, unable to provide this solace while its own past is shrouded in the 'blackness' of a 'still curtain':

> The roughest day is not yet. This was a rough day
> For me and perhaps for Carradale. But the roughest day,
> The day lived through by Macbeth who had been king,
> Some say a good king, and by Fruach, my ancestors,
> Hangs now in the future, the unturned page, the history book
> So far unwritten, and we, single-sighted,
> Not having seen the ghost funeral nor identified the bearers,
> Imagine it next week or next month, Ragnarok, the doomday.
> Who knows what each shall lose? Who knows the issue?
> Will there be another birth, a fair one, or is West Europe
> Too old, too old for that, as I shall be too old
> For another bearing[137]

The poem operates on parallels between Mitchison's personal life and the wider social stage. Mitchison relates her inability to have another child (she is 'too old/For another bearing') with Europe, now old, unable to regenerate and see another 'birth'. The poem explores how she cannot articulate this 'rough day', the loss of her child, as a singular or individual experience. Rather, Mitchison sees a danger in this kind of individualism, in confining grief, sadness and fear to personal experience: 'Thinking of these things wrongly, archaically, personally,/ I must retract'.[138] Janet Montefiore notes that the poem is a 'successful interweaving of personal and public life', where 'Mitchison writes, very consciously, both as a woman and a citizen': this dual subjectivity means that even bodily feelings of emptiness and grief, the milk that stabs at her breasts, are experienced as social phenomena.[139] War brings Mitchison's ties to the 'social' world—Carradale, Scotland, and even Europe—sharply into focus. In the poem, Mitchison expresses her disappointment that Carradale could not offer her solace in grief; she describes the silence of her town and community as a 'flowery betrayal'. If the poem expresses her

[137] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 9.
[138] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 7.
[139] Janet Montefiore, *Men and Women Writers of the 1930s: The Dangerous Flood of History* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1996), p. 127.

frustration at the lack of a 'binding' between her and Carradale, then the ensuing novel attempts to find and solidify this social connection.

So Mitchison is preoccupied with the figure of the citizen, with understanding the nature of the relationship between the individual and wider society. Earlier in this chapter, I discussed how in war M-O became preoccupied with surveying the 'war-citizen', the individual who is self-reliant and yet takes on a social responsibility toward their community. Mitchison's 'Clemency Ealasaid' also seems to promote this figuration of citizenship, where the individual is actively involved in their cultural heritage. Nattie Golubov argues that Mitchison was part of a group of writers during the 1940s who were thinking and writing about active citizenry. Golubov writes that Mitchison, along with authors like Rebecca West, Winifred Holtby, and Storm Jameson, developed an interest in a kind of politics and literature that rejected fragmentation and individualism. Golubov argues that, instead, these writers encouraged 'individuals to become engaged in shared and collectivised systems', because they believed that 'politics and morals could not be compartmentalised into different spheres of individual and collective life'.[140] In their promotion of collectivisation, these writers attempted to 'revitalise the public sphere as a strategy of resistance to authority by encouraging their readers to become active citizens and contribute to the creation of a more democratic, socialised capitalism'.[141] Golubov argues that, for these writers, individuals became 'self-governing agents aware of their political power' and thus were able to use their 'freedom' in a socially productive manner.[142] The 'spirit of cooperation', Golubov argues, 'could be achieved when members of a community felt compelled to participate directly in the public life of their local community out of a sense of belonging'.[143] Indeed, Mitchison celebrates the idiosyncrasies and traditions of localised communities, and sees an importance in recognising and subscribing to specific geographic identities—in particular, she describes her writing as always dedicated to Scottish people: 'whether I called my book-people Greeks or Scythians, bond or free, I was writing about and for Scots. I was always trying "to write for my own race," as Yeats did. A heart-breaking business, as he also found.'[144] Mitchison is preoccupied with her own status as

[140] Nattie Golubov, 'English Ethical Socialism: Women Writers, Political Ideas and the Public Sphere Between the Wars', *Women's History Review*, 14 (2005), 33-59 (38).
[141] Golubov, p. 34.
[142] Golubov, p. 47.
[143] Golubov, p. 42.
[144] Mitchison, quoted in Helen Lloyd, 'Witness to a Century: the Autobiographical Writings of Naomi Mitchison' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Glasgow, 2005), p. 146. In *The Moral Basis of Politics,* Mitchison emphasises the importance of a 'common body of social ethics' that such a shared identity engenders. See: Mitchison, *Moral Basis,* p. 72.

part of this community (which she often talks about in terms of her biological or ancestral lineage, her 'race'), but she is also anxious to be a voice *for* the people—a Scot allowing other Scots to speak. Her attempts to forge a connection between herself and the local community is a call for others to do the same.

Golubov, too, stresses the importance of the 'local' for this group of writers. She situates these writers within the tradition of 'ethical socialism', a brand of British socialism associated with thinkers like R. H. Tawney that 'takes into account the specificity of national cultures in shaping politics and society'.[145] Indeed, Mitchison's 'socialism' stresses the importance of celebrating local culture. In her essay 'A Socialist Plan for Scotland' (1932), Mitchison writes that a future Scottish state might be 'based not on the town but on the country, on a basis not of individual ownership, but of a co-operative group which would in practice work out as some-thing like the Scandinavian or early Scottish steading'. In this future, the working people of Scotland would live not in sprawling cities, but in small countryside communities so that they 'never lose touch with the soil, the seasons, nor with the sense of being part of an intense culture, a small nationality'.[146] Mitchison's vision of socialist Scotland relies on a small, specific definition of national character. Perhaps this is indicative of Mitchison's own desire to use her novel to prove her Scottishness; to fit into her own community, she finds clear ancestral ties.

Mitchison begins the novel by emphasising the importance of maintaining familial and ancestral ties. We begin with a conversation between Kirstie Haldane, returning once more to her family home, and her niece Catherine. As the gathering commences, Catherine grumbles about the conversations she would have to entertain from her 'older' family members. She complains that 'Aunt Kirstie would begin to talk, to ramble and remember, and all the older ones would join in and there they would be blethering away about what had nothing at all to do with nowadays of the things the young ones were after'.[147] Catherine, used to a metropolitan life travelling between Edinburgh, London and Paris, is sceptical about the beliefs of her older relatives, who speak of faeries and witches and lament about rebellions that she cannot remember. But, as she talks with her aunt, Catherine becomes more and more convinced about Kirstie's own involvement with witchcraft, and attempts to stymie the unsavoury rumours that spread over Gleneagles. The relationship between Catherine and Kirstie mirrors the relationship between Mitchison and the people of Carradale, her envisioned readers. As the

[145] Golubov, p. 38.
[146] Mitchison, 'A Socialist Plan for Scotland', *The Modern Scot,* 1 (1932), 25-30 (27).
[147] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves,* p. 24.

novel draws to a close, Catherine enters into an engagement to her cousin John Haldane. In this moment, she notices Kirstie's embroidery lying abandoned, picks it up, and continues to stitch. We see the embroidery again, once more, from Kirstie's perspective, as she 'stood for a moment by the chest where Catherine had left her embroidery with one more wee leaf finished upon it'.[148] The symbolic suggestion here is clear: Catherine, continuing Kirstie's embroidery, is also accepting her inherited role in her family and community. Though she hopes for travel and adventure, her engagement solidifies her place in the family tree and at Gleneagles.

3.6.2 Mitchison, Psychoanalysis, and the Social Unconscious

Mitchison is also interested in using psychoanalytic theory to understand the relationship between an individual and their society. But her approach differs significantly from M-O's—as we will see in this section, she turns to Jung, not to Freud, to map a 'social unconscious'. So far, I've argued that both the M-O organisers and Mitchison share a desire to represent a social totality in writing but diverge on how this can be done. Following this, I suggest that Mitchison's attention to literary realist forms, where she hopes to capture Scottish identity fully within a single text, explains her fascination with Jungian psychoanalysis, with finding the symbols, images, and archetypes common to every citizen's unconscious.

For both Mitchison and the M-O organisers, psychoanalysis has a distinct social use—it can help reveal and decipher shared anxieties and desires and find what binds citizens together. Madge, Harrisson and Jennings paid attention to spontaneous expressions of the unconscious, where moments of individual expression might point to the presence of a social unconscious. But Mitchison turns away from this Freudian method and instead pays attention to Jungian ideas about the 'cultural unconscious'. In Mitchison's notes to the novel, she explains that Jung's theory of the cultural unconscious influenced her depiction of the Haldanes, of their superstitions, their beliefs, and their values. Mitchison writes about her sustained interest in Jung's *The Integration of the Personality* (1939), where he describes how the individual forms a personality in the early years of their life. Jung writes that archetypal figures like 'The Wise Old Man' or 'The Great Mother' are integrated into the self from a collective cultural unconscious (these archetypes, Jung argues, are common to all human civilisation across the world, past and present, the same figures appearing over and over again

[148] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 384.

across all mythological and religious iconography).[149] Individuals grow their own consciousness, Jung argues, 'out of an unconscious psyche which is older than it, and which goes on functioning together with it or even in spite of it'.[150] The individual, from birth, is connected to all other human experience, to the shared memories and beliefs stored in the unconscious. This all-encompassing unconscious 'moulds the human species and is just as much a part of it as the human body, which, though ephemeral in the individual, is collectively of immense age'.[151]

Though Mitchison did not read Jung's work until she had most of her novel planned out, she uses her notes to explain how much of her characterisation and plot mirrors Jung's theories about the integration of these cultural 'personalities'. Mitchison writes that she finds Jung's psychoanalytic theory particularly convincing when she looks to her own psychic life: 'I will not now go into the context of my dreams', she states, 'which, by 1943, encouraged me to suppose Jung has the right fish by the tail'.[152] This is Mitchison's only mention of her M-O dream diary in her authorial notes, in a section where she attempts to write about her psychological 'intentions' in writing the novel. Her dreams, then, or at least her awareness of the importance of noticing and analysing dream-life, lead her to this fascination with Carl Jung, with attempting to link her psyche to a larger, social psyche.

Mitchison's interest in Jung is grounded in her desire to discover the importance of societal communality and co-operation. It is Jung, not Freud, that allows Mitchison to find a connection between the personal and social unconscious. In *The Moral Basis of Politics*, Mitchison explains her difficulties in bringing psychoanalysis and politics together. She criticises the idea (that she identifies with 'some psychologists') that 'all this fuss about politics is just due to an inharmonious sex life or something of the kind' or, rather, 'the workings of one's unconscious and repressed feelings about one's parents'. Her answer to this is that psychoanalysts are (mostly) ignorant of the 'profounder dissatisfactions than those produced by the sexual emotions' because 'the only people who can afford to visit analysts or psychiatrists are those with enough to eat, warm clothes, shelter, an education and a reasonable amount of economic security'. Mitchison concludes that psychology has 'even more than the

[149] Carl Jung, *The Integration of the Personality*, trans. by Stanley Dell (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1940), p. 95; 113.
[150] Carl Jung, 'Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation', in *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, trans. by R. F. C. Hull (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 284.
[151] Jung, 'Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation', p. 287.
[152] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 512.

other sciences, been coloured by the capitalist system within which it has worked'.[153] From these observations, we can see how Mitchison associates psychoanalysis with a kind of systemic individualism, where psychoanalysis is incompatible with true social analysis—it is too preoccupied with private and personal life.

We can also see this frustration Mitchison's dream diaries, where she writes about the idea that 'social' dreams are, in the Freudian model, never *really* about social life:

> Note I discussed this dream business with a Freudian psychologist at Oxford; she said she thought one only dreamt one's usual personal dreams with a war dress (and that it was no good doing them for a week at a time, they must be worked out for months: I said this would be intolerably tiring). I doubt this, think that one's feeling about the war makes the dreams, and that the different atmosphere of this dream is a victory atmosphere instead of the guilt atmosphere of the "pre-second-front" year'.[154]

Here, Mitchison resists the assumption that her 'social' dreams are actually not social at all. In her M-O dream diary, Mitchison is wary of the psychoanalytic process that finds symbols of personal desire in social phantasies. Her understanding that the 'social' and 'personal' dream must be separate (as seen earlier in the chapter) underlines her effort to find evidence that the unconscious also engages with community and society, that it does not only hold the deep, hidden desires of the individual. In her authorial notes to *The Bull Calves,* Mitchison suggests that the personal unconscious is filled with symbols from the social world. To explain this, she uses the figure of the child who imagines that they have seen monsters, witches, or 'wicked shadows' in the night. On one level of consciousness, she writes, which is 'the daytime consciousness of twentieth-century urban civilisation', the child's imaginings are explained as 'dreams and nonsense'. But, she continues, 'when the level drops, the thing again becomes real somewhere in the psyche' and will be forever real to the individual 'unless subjected to some psychic process which will annul or explain it'.[155] For Mitchison, the nightly terror is evidence of some pre-scientific, irrational knowledge that all human beings share. The dream, then, might actually provide the individual with access to symbols and archetypes from a shared social unconscious—though the significance of the figures of the witch or the dark shadow has changed over the last two hundred years, for Mitchison the very presence of the 'nightly terror'

[153] Mitchison, *Moral Basis,* pp. 22-23.
[154] Mass-Observation Archive, 'Dreams 1939-1945', p. 539.
[155] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves,* p. 501.

suggests that the individual, from childhood, incorporates the beliefs and the anxieties of their society into their own psyche.

So Jung allows Mitchison to think about and write a national mythology. We might say that her approach to psychoanalysis mirrors her approach to 'realism': just as she attempts to represent the social totality in the novel-form, she looks to psychoanalysis for evidence that the individual is intrinsically tied to the social world. As Lukács criticises modernist representations of the autonomous individual, we might say that Jung offers an alternative teleology to psychological development. In his figuration, the individual's desires and anxieties, their very personality, connects to wider civilisation. In the introduction to this thesis, I discussed how Freud's *Civilisation and its Discontents* suggests that the individual is in perpetual conflict with their social world; their desires must be sacrificed or suppressed on entry into civilisation. Mitchison's turn to Jung is perhaps an effort to find a model of psychoanalysis that sees society as a necessary condition for individual development.

Jung understands the ego as part of a shared project of societal progress and advancement. Though the individual develops their own personal unconscious, Jung's psychoanalysis differs from Freudian conceptions of the psyche in that he believes that the individual, in being part of a cultural unconscious, 'continually repeats the stage of development last reached by the species'.[156] The collective unconscious, as a reservoir of shared cultural and historical experience, is the root of a feeling of connectedness to fellow members of a society. Just as Jung prioritises the imagos of the collective over the individual psyche, *The Bull Calves* is an attempt to find shared Scottish cultural symbols. In her authorial notes, Mitchison argues that 'we have to have mythologies which will be potent and protecting for our own era […] I have thought about symbols, not merely as protection for the individual, but also as social glue, doubtless another aspect of the same thing'.[157] As such, Mitchison's novel explores witches and fairies—figures plucked from Scottish mythology. In her authorial notes, Mitchison argues that these symbols or 'archetypes' of eighteenth-century Scotland might still be relevant to the present day. Even though William and Kirstie could never understand their problems 'in terms of analytical psychology', Mitchison argues that 'the archetypes of the unconscious are no less of the eighteenth century than of the twentieth – or any other fully human century – so some of the images will be the same'.[158] Jung allows

[156] Jung, 'Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation', p. 279.
[157] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves,* p. 516.
[158] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves,* p. 514.

Mitchison, then, to find a connection between past and present psychological lives, where the consciousness of historical characters have an important relevance to present-day Scotland.

The 'Jungian plot' of the novel is evident in the reconciliation of William and Kirstie at the end of the novel, when Kirstie finally confesses her fascination with witchcraft. William encourages Kirstie to believe, as he does, that witchcraft comes from a deep part of the self that is susceptible to evil and sin. This part of the self is a vestige of man's original sin, that William believes the individual must face and dispel before God can save them: 'There is a deep part of ourselves that we canna rightly know and that might be in some way the natural man and woman before the Fall and also before Redemption'.[159] This dark and deep part of the self, he argues, cannot be ignored, but rather confronted and understood: 'what I am saying', he tells Kirstie, 'is that maybe we have all of us to face what comes from the inner part before we can be our right selves and stand before God'.[160] William's hope—that Kirstie needs to realise the deepest parts of her 'soul', to 'look far down into the depths', in order to believe that she is no longer a witch, follows the logic of psychoanalytic therapy.[161] William is here speaking about the therapeutic nature of accessing primal and repressed knowledge—knowledge that, he argues, is inherent in all human beings. Kirstie, too, mirrors a kind of patient-figure; she points out that 'it isna common to have the thing pointed out so plain as it was to me, when the bottom of my sin and misery in the moment of my accepting it and drowning, turned to the very fullness of my joy'.[162] Here, William seems to be the analyst to Kirstie's analysand—it is Kirstie's ignorance of a dark or hidden part of herself that causes a kind of 'neurosis' and a belief in witchcraft, and it is William who finally allows her the release of realising the full extent of her psyche.

In her authorial notes on this section, Mitchison turns again to Jungian psychoanalysis, to the idea that this hidden side of the self is actually another archetype: the 'shadow self' (which, Jung writes, is 'an embodiment of 'everything that the subject refuses to acknowledge about himself').[163] In her authorial notes, Mitchison argues that Jung can help us to understand Kirstie's 'witch episode'. During this 'psychosis induced by great personal unhappiness [… Kirstie] had almost drowned in the dark waters of her unconscious and was about to submit to her animus conceived of as the Devil in his many shapes […]. But at the moment of her crisis, the animus was projected on to a real person, William, who thus became her soul, her breath,

[159] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 327.
[160] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 329.
[161] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 329.
[162] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 329.
[163] Jung, 'Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation', p. 284.

and in whom she was bound to have the utmost faith since he represented something stronger than her conscious self'.[164] In this moment, Kirstie projects all that she is hesitant to admit about herself onto William, and so he becomes a symbol of the part of herself that she feels is evil and belongs to the devil. In order to recover from this moment of 'great personal unhappiness', Kirstie needs to reach toward her relationship with William (her animus, a projection of her soul). It is her relationship with William that allows her to recover from her anxiety that she has killed her previous husband. It is important that Kirstie's reconciliation of her own past trauma coincides with the reconciliation of her family. Gill Plain argues that, here, Mitchison's emphasis is on the potential of 'self-knowledge', where Kirstie's own healing and recognition mirrors the larger, social reconciliation of her family.[165] Indeed, Kirstie's history of witchcraft frequently threatens to tarnish her family's reputation. When the Lord President arrives at Gleneagles, he describes Scottish people as a 'community of Christians', a comment that leads Captain John, Kirstie's nephew, to wonder whether the allegations of witchcraft against Kirstie mean that she can no longer be part of that community. But Kirstie's recognition that witchcraft is psychological in nature allows her back into this community, and firmly back into her place at Gleneagles. Kirstie's 'healing' is, at once, social and personal—she is like the imagined M-O participant in that learning about the 'self' leads to becoming active, again, in her community.

3.6.3 The Supernatural and Subjectivity

So far, Mitchison seems to provide the strange and surreal with a new rationality; Kirstie's turn to witchcraft can be explained straightforwardly as a purely psychological phenomenon. For Mitchison, psychoanalysis helps to resolve the social and familial tensions of the text. The novel's 'reconciliation' arrives in Kirstie's recognition that her fascination with the 'devil' is merely psychological, a realisation that allows her to finally leave her traumatic past behind and look towards the future. In the previous section, we can see that Mitchison's preoccupation is with the therapeutic function of psychoanalysis; its use for social, as well as personal, betterment. But there are also moments when Kirstie's experience with the supernatural surpasses the explanations of psychoanalysis. The realisation that William is her 'animus' and that 'witchcraft' merely stands for a 'dark part' of her soul does not put an end to her

[164] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 513.
[165] Plain, p. 212.

experiences with strange apparitions. In fact, the novel ends with another mysterious encounter, when a ghost-like figure approaches Kirstie in the middle of the night.

Lying awake in the dark, Kirstie muses about the 'appearances' that often plague her at night, which she describes as the 'images of corruption'. 'Maybe they were in everyone', Kirstie thinks, 'the creatures of dark sea in which folks must swim or drown until they can find their own opposite'—she rationalises that this must be 'the same for everyone but not all allow themselves to perceive them'.[166] This is the Jungian explanation—the assimilation of a cultural symbol or 'archetype' into the personal unconscious. Yet, even as Kirstie thinks of her 'witchcraft' as a kind of phenomenon of the mind, she is confronted by an 'appearance' which 'came floating out of the corner of her sight'.[167] Kirstie, holding her breath as the 'thing' floats away, decides that the appearance is 'neither of Good nor yet of Evil, but like the fairy host, on neither side in the battle'. She sees the 'thing', which has a 'nasty wee face and a kind of bashed and sicklike body', as a 'poor wee bit thing' that deserves to be pitied and not feared.[168] This odd confrontation with the supernatural, still unexplained at the end of the text, offers a final moment of resistance to scientific or psychological explanations of the phenomena Kirstie experiences. The 'thing' is neither 'good' nor 'bad', but shrouded in ambiguity.

Douglas Gifford argues that the supernatural elements of the text represent 'the inability of the rational and practical mind to claim complete knowledge of the world'. This, Gifford goes on,

> can be read throughout the novel as a statement allowing the possibility of the supernatural, with its most disturbing moments occurring when Kirstie sees things that she (and Mitchison) allow to have independent life – that is, they are not simply psychological manifestations within Kirstie projected by her onto the external world, but Evil in objectively real action.[169]

Gifford writes about a kind of doubling in Mitchison's authorial notes on the text: 'the reader […] is left feeling that there are two Mitchisons; one intensely organised and practical about the way forward for Scotland, and another lingering fascinated over the survival of actual Evil and the supernatural'.[170] But this isn't a doubling per se, but rather the refusal of binary

[166] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 404.
[167] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 404.
[168] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 404.
[169] Gifford, 'Forgiving the Past: Naomi Mitchison's *The Bull Calves*', p. 236.
[170] Gifford, 'Forgiving the Past', p. 236.

thinking; her notes often advocate inhabiting an in-between place, to not committing fully to either scientific or superstitious belief. Mitchison writes that 'an attitude of scepticism before all phenomena is probably desirable', but 'what gets [her] down is when people believe any kind of nonsense they see in print so long as it is labelled marvels of modern science'.[171] She laments those who half-believe in 'all sorts of unofficial charms and luck tokens, not to speak of gremlins', and yet 'won't so much as see a genuine fairy walking within a yard of them!' Mitchison claims that she inhabits the same position of 'suspended judgement' as she believes her characters to be in, standing 'halfway between the two attitudes' (belief in the supernatural and in 'modern science').[172] The novel, too, stands at this half-way point: it is never clear whether the powers of the witches exist only in Kirstie's imagination, or whether they are 'real' and have had some role to play in the death of her husband. These moments of witchcraft, of unexplained appearances that float to Kirstie in bed, problematise the scientific and psychological explanations for the superstitious beliefs of her characters. Mitchison's 'appearances' disrupt the logic of a psychoanalytical explanation for the existence of witchcraft, and root it, instead, in the unexplained excesses of individual subjectivity.

Kirstie's experiences with witches and witchcraft leave behind an 'excess', a mystery that cannot be explained. The rational, explanatory power of psychoanalysis, here, seems to have limits. In her authorial notes, Mitchison also discusses the limits of psychoanalytic representation. In particular, she argues that psychoanalytic narratives have not yet addressed female subjectivity. The problem with the Jungian psychoanalytic model in particular, she writes, is the refusal to acknowledge a woman's perspective. 'The whole thing is (perhaps inevitably) written so much from the male point of view', Mitchison explains, 'that it is sometimes quite disconcertingly difficult for a woman to follow it sympathetically'. Mitchison notes that women are not 'individuals' in Jung's work, but instead they are just 'part of a lump'. She remarks that it is 'deplorable' that 'no woman of genius has written on the psychology of the unconscious from the female point of view'.[173] In her recent study of Jung's work, Susan Rowland finds that women only appear in Jungian psychoanalysis in abstract terms (usually as the concept of 'the anima'). For Rowland, Jung 'tends to detach "feminine nature" from biological women'—a contention that Mitchison, in her notes, also seems to share.[174] Though Mitchison finds value in thinking about mass consciousness, and so employing psychoanalysis

[171] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 498.
[172] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 498.
[173] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves*, p. 512.
[174] Susan Rowland, *Jung: A Feminist Revision* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), p. 43.

in a socialist project, she sees a danger in the erasure of female subjectivity, in psychic models that prioritise a 'masculine' mind.

Mitchison's exploration of witchcraft, then, suggests the problem that femininity poses to psychological narratives—for Kirstie, witchcraft is always associated with women and feminine power. Her encounter with witchcraft coincides with the abuse she suffers at the hands of her first husband, and as she attempts to find a way out of the patriarchal order that imprisons her. Kirstie, oppressed and disillusioned, can only find solace in the powers of the supernatural, and in the community of women who show her how to use them. Moira Burgess argues that witchcraft in the novel is a symbol of 'Kirstie's very strength — her sexual power, crushed and distorted in her first marriage — which has (or could have) given her, potentially, powers beyond the normal'.[175] Witchcraft symbolises what is left out of contemporary psychoanalytic discourses: it is a rejection of women as 'lump', of models that strip them of subjectivity. Gill Plain argues that Mitchison 'considers the definitions of 'civilised' behaviour and depicts the dangerous but powerful allure of something beyond the rigid codes of the patriarchal symbolic – a power that is outside the boundaries of the rational, and yet is capable of destabilising and disrupting that order'.[176] For Kirstie, witchcraft not only introduces her to female-led communities, but also paves the way toward an ulterior knowledge, allowing her to see things that are 'unseen', that lie on the edge of reality. Witchcraft not only reinstates the possibility for a female subjectivity in psychoanalysis, but also suggests the presence of a knowledge that cannot be reached using already established male-centred narratives of the mind. This 'in-between' space between superstition and science problematises a Jungian reading of the novel.

Kirstie's experimentation with witchcraft—recalled once again at the end of the novel as she confronts the 'appearance'—also complicates the reconciliatory function of the text. Even as the political differences of the family have been put to rest, and as the characters decide to stop arguing about the past rebellion and instead focus on their clan's future, the 'appearance' brings a moment of Kirstie's unresolved past back into the present. The 'appearance', in conjuring a past trauma, ultimately undermines the hopeful and forward-looking ambitions of the novel. Mitchison's ending has two contradictory functions: first it reinstates the 'order of things' in reconciling political differences in the Haldane family, and second it signals the lingering traumas of the past, which seem, at any moment, ready to rupture this reconciliation.

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[175] Moira Burgess, 'Naomi Mitchison and the Supernatural', *The Bottle Imp,* 19 (2015), < https://www.thebottleimp.org.uk/2016/06/naomi-mitchison-and-the-supernatural/> [accessed 9th July 2021].
[176] Plain, p. 142.

This tension of the unresolved past is only reinforced in the final moment between Kirstie and William. As they settle in bed, William resolves not to tell his wife of his previous marriage to a Native American woman. Kirstie, knowing that he is keeping something from her, accepts that there will always be secrets between them, and that sharing these secrets might only 'hurt the both of [them]' more.[177] Though the case of the Jacobite fugitive has been resolved, Kirstie and William's pasts still hang threateningly over the newly reconciled Haldane family.

It is important to note that *The Bull Calves* does not always exhibit a hopeful desire for regeneration and reconciliation—Mitchison also explores feelings of failure and disappointment in the novel, which are often the result of failed social change. The novel does not only provide a space for a kind of utopian fantasy for the reconciliation of society—it also ventilates feelings of desolation, grief and disappointment, all of which arise when hopes for social and political change have stalled. The rebellion is remembered with great solemnity, with characters previously involved in revolutionary causes now resigned to family and home life. Kirstie tells her niece about the devastation after the Jacobite rebellion, when 'the beasts had been killed, the meal eaten or squandered, and the houses and byres burnt, aye and the hearts broken'.[178] In exploring moments of failure, the novel also anticipates future social traumas—of times where social harmony seems untenable, even when it seems a consensus has been reached. Though the novel does end with a reconciliation, we are still confronted with these feelings of uncertainty and disappointment, in Mitchison's awareness that the country is in, historically and presently, 'a pretty bad mess'.[179] These moments call to mind Claire Langhamer's argument that M-O allows us to see the 'messy and complex ways in which individuals understood the status and role of emotion within a rapidly changing world and constructed themselves as emotional citizens', where 'feeling was increasingly seen as a legitimate basis upon which to assert knowledge claims about the world and carve out a place within civil society'.[180] In these moments of resignation, Mitchison fuses the Lukácsian aims of her novel with her role as a M-O panellist: her feelings of despair or hopelessness are extrapolated outwards, so that her role as the 'emotional citizen' is tied to an exploration of wider social traumas. In these moments, we can see Mitchison's attempts to use the novel for *both* social and personal analysis, to be both the observer and the observed. But this, inevitably, results in complication and tension—though she hopes that her novel will unite the Scottish

[177] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves,* p. 406.
[178] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves,* p. 69.
[179] Mitchison, *The Bull Calves,* p. 436.
[180] Claire Langhamer, 'An Archive of Feeling? Mass Observation and the Mid-century Moment', *Insights,* 9 (2016), 2-7 (7).

populace, its simultaneous function as a cathartic mode of expressing grief (at both the personal and social level) muddles such a straightforward reading of the text.

3.7 Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, I have argued that M-O saw a new, social potential in psychoanalysis and its methodologies. Psychoanalysis enabled the organisers to understand and examine societal relations, to find evidence of national character and, in war, to survey citizen morale and compliance. Under the project, Freudian methodologies of free association gained a new social impetus. Though this assumption often inhibited the social instrumentalisation of the project (gathered material could not be easily compiled and used to identify contemporary issues), it provided a space for spontaneous individual expression. Here, the psychoanalytic method allows for moments of spontaneous resistance, where panellists' psychic lives disrupt or exceed the social aims of the project. In particular, the dream archive is a space for the expression of the personal unconscious; panellists like Naomi Mitchison use M-O for self-analysis, for the exploration of their own desires and anxieties. In the dream material, we can also see how the panellists confront the project itself; they write about the difficulty of bringing together the personal and social unconscious, of finding signs of typicality in the obscurity of phantasy life. They imagine that a 'censor' is sitting in wait, ready to turn their unconscious thoughts into legible, useful social material. During this transformation, they argue that the dream is distorted, that some psychological truth has been lost. In these narratives, the hidden excesses of the 'self' (or the unconscious) resist social categorisation.

This chapter pays close attention to one panellist in particular: the writer Naomi Mitchison. I argue that the creative production of *The Bull Calves* is connected to Mitchison's status as a M-O participant. Though Mitchison struggles to bridge the gap between personal and social life in her dream diary, she is able to articulate their relation in her novel. She examines how private psychic lives are connected to a wider social consciousness, she attempts to understand how war is experienced as a social phenomenon, and she negotiates the idea that writing (and encouraging others to write) might lead to the creation of a better and fairer society. Mitchison's novel is also a project of 'writing-the-self'. As much as it is an exploration of Scotland as nation, the novel is also Mitchison's assertion of her own identity as a Haldane. In her family biography, she connects her own despair and grief to the social grief of Europe, while her own family and its divisions become symbolic of wider divisions in modern-day Scotland. Mitchison presents Scottish society as a symbiotic space, where the distinctions

between ‘individual’, ‘family’ and ‘society’ collapse. As such, she uses psychoanalysis to write about the psychological interconnectedness of all Scottish citizens—like the M-O organisers, psychoanalysis allows Mitchison to explore collective experience.

In both M-O and *The Bull Calves,* psychoanalysis’ value is its ability to oscillate between the close examination of intra-psychic lives and wider cultural analysis. But psychoanalysis does not only reveal rational social facts. In both projects, it is not merely an objective ‘science’ but leaves space for the nebulous and mysterious expressions of the private unconscious. The dream material produced by M-O troubles its desire to find the typical experience of the war-citizen. In *The Bull Calves,* Mitchison’s supernatural apparitions suggest the presence of something unexplainable—the excesses of individual subjectivity that resist social rationalisation. In M-O and *The Bull Calves,* the unconscious is both rational and irrational, objective and subjective, social and personal.

CONCLUSION: PSYCHOANALYSIS, PHANTASY, POLITICS

In *States of Fantasy* (1996), Jacqueline Rose contends that psychoanalytic notions of 'fantasy' can help decipher 'the real world of the unconscious dreams of nations'.[1] Rose argues that the cultural examination of nationhood and national feeling must take into account the role of fantasy: 'there is no way of understanding political identities and destinies without letting fantasy into the frame'.[2] For Rose, fantasy, 'far from being the antagonist of public, social, being—plays a central constitutive role in the modern world of states and nations'. Indeed, Rose suggests, the state relies on the individual's affective investments in a notion of 'national identity'. Fantasy has its own 'psychic reality'; it is grounded in a material desire, tied (however loosely) to the 'real' world and the objects in it. [3] For Freud, fantasy refers to an imagined world that sits close to and alongside reality; it is a world (in Rose's words) 'no less important—indeed no less real—than the world we live and move in; but distinguished from that world by the fertility, the potentially endless transformative capacities of the mind'.[4] In this fantasy-world, there is no gap between the desire and reality—the function of fantasy (or its unconscious form 'phantasy') is to contain what is unattainable in life, the unreachable excess of human desire. As such, fantasy seems to be the meeting point, the mediating space, between the individual and their civilisation.

The writers and intellectuals in this thesis are all preoccupied with the fantasy of a 'national community': the phenomenon of shared heritage and identity, the desire that the individual should belong to a wider, social community. For some, 'fantasy' becomes a useful object of study for examining unexpressed social desires. For Charles Madge and Tom Harrisson, for example, delving into the depths of dream life might unearth the 'social consciousness' of their panellists, or might help us to understand what links together British citizens at a particular historical moment. For others, 'fantasy' undoes or troubles the idea of national belonging: Bowen uses the radio broadcast to suggest that there remains an unconscious part of the 'self' that does not fit to the category of 'citizen'. Acknowledging the psychological element of national identity allows many of the writers and intellectuals in this thesis to think critically about the concept of citizenship. What, they ask, does it mean to

[1] Jacqueline Rose, *States of Fantasy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 3
[2] Jacqueline Rose, *States of Fantasy,* p. 4.
[3] Jacqueline Rose, *States of Fantasy,* p. 4.
[4] Jacqueline Rose, *On Not Being Able to Sleep: Psychoanalysis and the Modern World* (London: Vintage, 2010), p. 55.

identify with a state, to see yourself as part of a larger social body? What does this do to the individual and their desires, their fantasies? In Rose's words, using the term 'fantasy' allows us to understand the psychological 'hold' the state has over its subjects:

> Fantasy has been where statehood takes hold of and binds its subjects and then, unequal to its own injunctions, lets slip just a little. We cannot bypass modern statehood; we are still living in its world. Fantasy allows us first to acknowledge that as a more than external matter. But we should not forget, either, that fantasy's supreme characteristic is that of running ahead of itself. There is something coerced and coercive, but also wild and unpredictable, about it. If fantasy can give us the inner measure of statehood, it might also help to prise open the space in the mind where the worst of modern statehood loses its conviction, falters, and starts to let go.[5]

For Rose, paying attention to 'fantasy' reveals moments of discordance between the individual and their assumed national identity. Fantasy might unveil the anomalies and inconsistencies inherent in states and their proposed identities, the moments when the desires of the state and the citizen do not completely match up. In each chapter of this thesis, I reveal how various intellectuals (inside the psychoanalytic institution and outside of it) find connections between the concept of 'nationhood' and the phantasy-world of the unconscious. The language of psychoanalysis (of dream, superego and fantasy) is useful, for them, to describe, understand, and sometimes even resist modern notions of citizenship and nationhood.

Throughout this thesis, I have shown that citizenship was frequently understood, during and after the Second World War, as a psychological phenomenon. The British war-citizen was not only socially responsible, but also psychologically and emotionally stable (and so capable of their duties towards their nation). In the introduction, I suggested that wartime social discourse presented an image of the 'good' citizen—the subject who was in control of their desires, had morale, and was emotionally (and actively) invested in the war effort. Contemporary understandings of the 'citizen', then, took into account the personal desires of the individual, and how these desires might ideally match up to those of the state. Here, we can turn to Stephen Frosh's argument that citizenship has an important psychological element:

[5] Jacqueline Rose, *States of Fantasy,* p. 5.

> 'Citizenship' […] is not just a matter of taking up one's allotted place, although it does require that set of regulated behaviours. It is also a matter of investing oneself in the emotional complex of the social order and its institutions, enjoying its successes, imagining its future progress, projecting away its anxieties, closing down the alternatives.[6]

What Naomi Mitchison's *The Bull Calves,* Elizabeth Bowen's 'Anthony Trollope' broadcast, Tom Harrisson's dream report and Melanie Klein's 'Richard case' have in common, I suggest, is a conception that these emotional investments in society can be understood psychologically. On their view, psychoanalysis is useful for deciphering the relationship between the subject and wider civilisation. It can explain the impulse to go to war, the desire to defeat the enemy, and the warm feeling of belonging in a like-minded community. Conversely, it can explain social alienation and withdrawal, delinquency, and even political resistance.

This thesis is thus preoccupied with the philosophical interrelation between individual and society. In the introduction, I note that this division was important to wartime and postwar modes of citizenship—welfare-era citizenship had a distinct 'New Liberal' edge, where the individual had a responsibility to prosper in the private sphere in order to do public good. Though war produced a new, expansive mode of citizenship (the citizen was now more fully involved in what T. H. Marshall called Britain's 'national heritage'), the self/citizen boundary was, nevertheless, important to welfare-era ideology. The individual had a duty to maintain their own and their family's wellbeing, to act according to 'good' moral values, and be productive and stable, both at home and in the public sphere. As such, I examine how writers, psychoanalysts, and intellectuals attempted to negotiate this component of welfare-state citizenship, its prevalence in both the private and public world.

These examinations of citizenship often interrogate the concept of a shared 'national heritage' or history; Elizabeth Bowen and Naomi Mitchison, for example, make connections between past and present British lives. In their writerly responses to the BBC and M-O, Mitchison and Bowen revisit past national conflicts, or consider again figures from a British cultural past. Naomi Mitchison's *The Bull Calves* revisits the Jacobite rebellion of 1745, while Elizabeth Bowen stages disconcerting on-air confrontations with historical authors, who all emerge, ghost-like, in the present-day. In *Modernism, War, and Violence* (2017), Marina MacKay examines the 'pastness' of Second World War literature. In particular, she suggests

[6] Frosh, p. 73.

that the unfinished problem of the First World War lies, spectre-like, in the literatures of the Second—there is a 'sharply recursive and revisionist dimension' to some 'late modernist works', a return to a path already trodden.[7] MacKay argues that we can find patterns of repeated violence in the works of authors such as Henry Green, Virginia Woolf, Ezra Pound and Storm Jameson—traces of a past war, a wound still open and seeping. In many ways, she argues, the literatures of the Second World War exist in the trauma-ridden aftermath of the First. I am interested in what MacKay calls the 'secondness' of the Second World War, in tracing its relationship to histories of national conflict that came before it.[8] For Mitchison and Bowen, the 'past' is an important and useful category. Returning to Britain's past reveals the tensions and problems of the present, but it can also be a useful tool for inspiring commonality and solidarity. This preoccupation with the national past is also evident elsewhere in this thesis: 'Mass-Observation' attested to be history-making in creating an archive of ordinary people's emotions and desires (they called this 'the people's poetry'). Additionally, on his 'Postscripts' broadcasts, J. B. Priestley appealed to figures of Britain's past (Shakespeare, Hardy, Dickens) in his propagandistic attempt to increase support for the war effort. For many of the writers in this thesis, the past is an important resource for understanding modern-day statehood.

These re-imaginings of the past emerge from a commitment to psychoanalysis and its methods. Indeed, as John Farrell notes, the 'primary message' of psychoanalysis 'was that we never leave the past behind; both in personal and in historical terms, we are haunted by it'.[9] But what is interesting about the texts I look at is that the explored 'past' is always a cultural past, a shared past or national history. In chapter three, for instance, I argue that Mitchison attempts to draw a parallel between eighteenth-century Scottish society, in the aftermath of the 1745 Jacobite rebellion, and her own wartime Scottish community in Carradale. By making visible this connection, Mitchison positions present-day social problems in a longer national history: a history of conflict, devastation, then peace and resolution. In chapter two, I suggest that Elizabeth Bowen experiments with the 'uncanny' on air to suggest that modern life is *too* alien—that postwar social changes constitute a dangerous deviation from a celebrated 'British' identity. Bowen and Mitchison are in some ways the antithesis of one another: Bowen's criticism of social democratic citizenship is a sharp contrast to Mitchison's hope that collectivity might go even further, that war might bring with it the emancipation of the Scottish

[7] Marina MacKay, *Modernism, War, and Violence* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), p. 112.
[8] MacKay, *Modernism, War, and Violence*, p. 113.
[9] John Farrell, 'Psychoanalysis and Modernism', in *British Literature in Transition, 1920-1940*, ed. by Charles Ferrall, Dougal McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 125-142 (p. 125).

people and the formation of a new, collective identity. Nevertheless, we can find moments of concordance in their writings; for both Bowen and Mitchison, visiting the past is, implicitly, a means of addressing the present. It is a way to negotiate (and sometimes challenge) prevailing categories of national identity.

Notably, I have found three women in this thesis—Klein, Bowen and Mitchison—to occupy a reflexive position, where all three deviate from or pull into question the assumptions made by the institutions they are writing under. Klein's psychoanalysis came under intense scrutiny in the British Psychoanalytical Society; Mitchison turns to the novel, not to her Mass-Observation diary, to find evidence of the 'social unconscious'; and Bowen is resistant to the BBC's promotion of Welfare-era citizenship. This thesis opens further questions about the role gender plays in the interplay between these writers and their cultural or professional institutions. In *States of Fantasy,* Rose discusses Virginia Woolf's claim, from *Three Guineas* (1938), that women are fortunate to be denied 'the stigma of nationhood', that they can, in effect, access a sort of 'feminized migrancy'.[10] This is a tempting 'solution to the political ills of the contemporary world'. But, Rose argues, women also need to reckon with the boundaries set by the nation-state: 'You can't, even as a woman, just float off.'[11] The women in this thesis are aware of the importance of 'national identity' to the individual's subjecthood. Though they know they cannot 'float off', is it possible to posit a relationship between their gender and their contentious, contemplative stance on citizenship and national identity? If we were to pursue this, however, we would also need to consider the relatively privileged status of these three women, who are all white and middle-class.

Finally, this thesis suggests that psychoanalysis gained a distinct sociological purpose during the Second World War. As I note throughout, the wartime institutionalisation of psychoanalysis had a transformative effect on the practice: shifting psychoanalysis to sociological and political spheres also meant changing its language and register. Psychoanalysts like Winnicott and Anna Freud attempted to make psychoanalysis palatable to the general public: to modify more abstract psychoanalytic theories so that they might say something concrete, useful, or positive about real social problems. In these public forms, psychoanalysis moved away from larger philosophical questions about human civilisation, desire, and instinct, and towards identifying specific social needs. But did this theoretical shift set a precedent for the practice after the war? Did psychoanalysis play a crucial role in the

[10] Virginia Woolf, *Three Guineas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 273; 313.
[11] Rose, *States of Fantasy,* p. 13.

social transformations of postwar Britain? Was it useful for preserving the wellbeing of citizens, preventing crime, and maintaining a peaceful, democratic society? To offer a speculative answer to these questions, we might look to the popularity of Winnicott, who remained on the BBC throughout the 1950s and '60s. Indeed, Shapira notes that the postwar period saw the continuing institutionalisation of psychoanalysis: by intervening in Winnicottian debates about child rearing and criminal justice, she suggests, analysts at the British Psychoanalytical Society were carving out a 'social place' for psychoanalytic expertise in welfare-state Britain. Here, the practice had an important role in the 'remaking of democracy and modern society'.[12] But this prompts the question: what particular image of the 'self' emerges from the politicised and institutionalised form of psychoanalysis?

The Unconscious War contemplates the place of psychoanalysis in the study of society and culture. Indeed, one of the central debates during the British Psychoanalytical Society's 'Controversial Discussions' concerned psychoanalysis' professional status. Where, exactly, does psychoanalysis sit in modern society? Is it a science with concrete, real-world applicability? Does it belong to the arts, to philosophers, academics, or practitioners? Sigmund Freud was infamously concerned with psychoanalysis' social value and reputation—at the end of his life, he claimed that psychoanalysis, like 'psychology, too, is a natural science'.[13] But he also noted that there are problems in examining psychoanalysis with a view to scientific objectivity: 'We have often heard it maintained that sciences should be built up on clear and sharply defined basic concepts. In actual fact no science, not even the most exact, begins with such definitions'.[14] For Freud, psychoanalysis defies science's attention to empirical data and knowledge. After all, the unconscious is, in large part, unobservable and unknowable and, as such, resists the rationalising power of the scientific method. This thesis examines what happens when psychoanalysis is brought face-to-face with cultural analysis, when it becomes useful to the work of sociology, politics, and medicine. In war, I suggest, the unconscious extended its reach: questions about citizenship and social behaviour were bound up with a language of desire, emotion and fantasy. I suggest that it is the unscientific quality of psychoanalysis—its ability to exceed rational, objective explanation—that the writers and

[12] Shapira, p. 238.
[13] Sigmund Freud, 'Some Elementary Lessons in Psycho-analysis', in *The Standard Edition of The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. by James Strachey, 24 vols (London: The Hogarth Press, 1953-74), XXIII (1964), pp. 279-286 (p. 282).
[14] Sigmund Freud, 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes', in *The Standard Edition of The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. by James Strachey, 24 vols (London: The Hogarth Press, 1953-74), XIV (1957), pp. 109-140 (p. 117).

intellectuals in this thesis find so useful. Here, psychoanalysis might help unveil or explain the emotional investments of the citizen, the nebulous feeling of belonging in a national community.

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