

1 **Assessing the economic impacts of future fluvial flooding in six countries**
2 **under climate change and socio-economic development**

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26 **Abstract**

27 Floods are among the most frequent and costliest natural hazards. Fluvial flood losses are expected to
28 increase in the future, driven by population and economic growth in flood-prone areas, and exacerbated in
29 many regions by effects of climate change on the hydrological cycle. Yet, studies assessing direct and
30 indirect economic impacts of fluvial flooding in combination with climate change and socio-economic
31 projections at a country level are rare. This study presents an integrated flood risk analysis framework to
32 calculate total (direct and indirect) economic damages, with and without socio-economic development,
33 under a range of warming levels from 1.5°C to 34 Direct damages are estimated by linking spatially explicit daily flood hazard data from the Catchment-
35 based Macro-scale Floodplain (CaMa-Flood) model with country and sector specific depth-damage
36 functions. These values input into an economic Input-Output model for the estimation of indirect losses.
37 The study highlights that total fluvial flood losses are largest in China and India when expressed in
38 absolute terms. When expressed as a share of national GDP Egypt faces the largest total losses under both
39 the climate change and climate change plus socio-economic development experiments. The magnitude of
40 indirect losses also increased significantly when socio-economic development was modelled. The study
41 highlights the importance of including socio-economic development when estimating direct and indirect
42 flood losses, as well as the role of recovery dynamics, essential to provide a more comprehensive picture
43 of potential losses that will be important for decision makers.

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46 **Keywords**

47 fluvial flooding, economic impacts, climate change, socio-economic development

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56 1. Introduction

57 Floods are among the most frequent and costliest natural hazards. Globally, floods have affected more
58 than 3.8 billion people and caused direct economic damages of ~826 billion US\$ between 1960-2019
59 (EM-DAT 2020). Fluvial flooding accounts for two thirds of these direct economic damages (*ibid.*). The
60 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report that since the mid-20th century socio-
61 economic losses from floods have been increasing, mainly due to greater exposure and vulnerability of
62 affected populations (Jiménez Cisneros et al. 2014). The impacts of fluvial floods are expected to increase
63 in the future, predominantly driven by population and economic growth in flood-prone areas (Jongman et
64 al. 2012; Tanoue et al. 2016). The intensification of the global hydrological cycle due to climate change
65 will further increase future flood risks (Alfieri et al. 2017), exacerbating flood damages and posing a
66 threat to future generations. Therefore, it is imperative to assess fluvial flood risks under scenarios of
67 climate change and socio-economic development, to support decision-making regarding flood risk
68 management and adaptation strategies.

69 Past efforts have largely focused on estimating future populations exposed to fluvial flooding (e.g.
70 Hirabayashi and Kanae 2009; Hirabayashi et al. 2013; Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes 2014) and the estimation
71 of direct damages (usually to urban areas) (e.g. Winsemius et al. 2013, 2016; Ward et al. 2013, 2017;
72 Alfieri et al. 2017), under different scenarios of climate change and/or socio-economic development.
73 Direct flood damages are typically assessed by linking physical properties of the hazard such as flood
74 depth and area; exposure, in terms of the location of assets or land-use type; and vulnerability, derived
75 from depth-damage functions that denote the damage that would occur at a given flood depth for a given
76 asset or land-use type. Floods can also cause indirect damages, including reduced business production of
77 affected economic sectors; the spread of these losses towards other initially non-affected sectors through
78 inter-sectoral linkages; and the costs of recovery processes (Koks and Thissen 2016). Indirect damages
79 may continue to be felt after the flood event has ended, reflecting the full time dimension of the event, as
80 well as negatively and positively affecting regions outside of the original event (Carrera et al. 2015). Due
81 to these factors indirect losses can be high, or even exceed direct damages (Koks et al. 2015). The scale
82 and duration of indirect losses will be dependent on the severity of the event, the pre-existing state of the
83 economy, and the ability of individuals, businesses and markets to adapt and recover. Yet, in terms of
84 flood risks, indirect impacts and their wider macro-economic effects are still poorly understood (Carrera
85 et al. 2015), and detailed estimation of joint direct and indirect flood-induced economic impacts are
86 relatively rare (Sieg et al. 2019).

87 Given the potential scale of indirect losses, it is important to consider them alongside direct damages to
88 provide a more complete picture of the economic consequences of flood events (Koks et al. 2019).
89 However, only a limited number of studies assess the total economic impacts of future fluvial flooding in
90 combination with climate change and socio-economic projections. Dottori et al. (2018) carried out a
91 global fluvial flood risk assessment by estimating human losses, and direct and indirect economic impacts
92 under a range of temperature and socio-economic scenarios. However, they only considered welfare or
93 consumption losses as a proxy of indirect impacts, ignoring changes in sectoral outputs. Willner et al.
94 (2018) assessed the economic losses from climate change-related fluvial floods in the near future (2035),
95 mainly in China, the US, and the European Union, but with fixed socio-economic conditions. Koks et al.
96 (2019) evaluated the total economic consequences of future fluvial flooding at a sub-national scale for

97 Europe, including indirect impacts and regional economic interdependencies for five aggregated sector
98 groups. However, the authors noted the relatively simple approach to estimate the initial reduction in
99 production capacity following a flood, from which indirect damages were calculated. This was based on
100 the value of exposed assets per sector divided by the total asset value for each sector, assuming each
101 sector needed a certain stock of assets to produce outputs. Furthermore, the study excluded damages to
102 residential buildings, which are a significant part of direct flood impacts.

103 In addition, flood risk analysis is usually performed at a global, continental or aggregated multi-country
104 level. Single-country analysis is less common, particularly studies that consider both direct and indirect
105 losses under future scenarios of climate change alongside scenarios of socio-economic development. This
106 is particularly true for developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where rapid growth in
107 population and economic activities is forecast to take place, driving large increases in flood exposure and
108 economic losses (Jongman et al. 2012; Dottori et al. 2018) (see SM1.1 for a review of literature on the six
109 countries covered in this study). Where country level studies do exist they often focus on specific cities or
110 river basins only and are disparate, using different climate models, levels of global warming, economic
111 and population data etc., hindering comparison.

112 Lastly, existing flood risk projections do not always cover the plausible range of global warming,
113 especially higher warming levels such as 3°C or above. Since the global mean temperature increase
114 implied by countries' Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement is
115 estimated to be in the range of 2.7°C to 3.5°C by 2100 (Gütschow et al. 2018), it is important to examine
116 a wide range of climate change impacts on flood risk. Likewise, an accurate understanding of the drivers
117 of future fluvial flood risk is critical to help adopt effective risk reduction measures, but few studies have
118 integrated both climate and socio-economic drivers (Muis et al. 2015; Winsemius et al. 2016). Winsemius
119 et al. (2016) performed the first global fluvial flood risk assessment that separated the effects of climate
120 change and socio-economic growth, but only estimated direct urban damages.

121 This study is novel in that it presents an integrated flood risk analysis focused on direct and indirect
122 economic damages caused by floods, both with and without the inclusion of socio-economic
123 development. A broad range of warming levels from <1.5°C to 4°C are considered. The framework is
124 applied to six developing countries: Brazil, China, India, Egypt, Ethiopia and Ghana. This demonstrates
125 the flexibility of the method to be applied to multiple countries, to facilitate regional comparison, and
126 reflects a range of different climate impacts, geographies and levels of development.

127 **2. Data and methods**

128 **2.1 Climate forcing and flood hazard data**

129 The daily streamflow and flood inundation depth are simulated at 0.25° spatial resolution by using a
130 physical model cascade, the Hydrologiska Byråns Vattenbalansavdelning (HBV) model and Catchment-
131 based Macro-scale Floodplain (CaMa-Flood) model. The WATCH daily bias-adjusted reanalysis dataset
132 (Weedon et al. 2014) for 1961-1990 was used as the climate forcing data for the baseline period (1961-
133 1990). The climate forcing data for the future period (2086-2115) were generated by combining monthly

134 observations, daily reanalysis data, and projected changes in climate from General Circulation Models
135 (GCMs). The projected changes in climate for the specific warming levels considered here are $<1.5^{\circ}\text{C}$,
136 $<2^{\circ}\text{C}$ (which denote aiming to stay below 1.5°C and 2°C in 2100, respectively, with 66% probability),
137 exactly 2.5°C , 3°C , 3.5°C and 4°C relative to pre-industrial levels (see Warren et al. (2020) of this special
138 issue). To sample the uncertainty in regional climate change projections we use patterns of change
139 simulated by five GCMs obtained from the Climate Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5). A
140 river discharge corresponding to a 1 in 100-year flood in the baseline period was selected as the hazard
141 indicator, in line with several previous studies (e.g. Hirabayashi and Kanae 2009; Hirabayashi et al. 2013;
142 Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes 2014; Arnell and Gosling 2016). Whilst adaptation is not modelled, the 1 in
143 100-year event is often used as a hazard indicator given flood protection works are often designed for this
144 return period (with some exceptions e.g. the Netherlands). The time series of the simulated annual
145 maximum daily river discharge in the baseline period for each grid, GCM and scenario were fitted
146 respectively to a Gumbel distribution function using the maximum likelihood method. The magnitude of
147 river discharge having a 100-year return period in the baseline was then calculated. The economic risks
148 associated with the projected changes in flood hazard were calculated in the modelled inundation areas in
149 which annual maximum discharge in the future period exceeds the baseline 1 in 100-year threshold.
150 Details of climate forcing and flood hazard data used in this study are described in He et al. (2020) of this
151 special issue.

152 **2.2 Model experiment design**

153 Projected changes in average annual economic damages for the future period (2086-2115) are compared
154 to the baseline period (1961-1990). Two sets of model experiments are conducted: a “climate change
155 only” experiment (CC), in which socio-economic conditions are kept constant at the baseline level for the
156 six warming scenarios; and a “climate change and socio-economic development” experiment (CC+SE),
157 which considers both climate change and socio-economic growth in parallel. The differences between the
158 estimates can reflect the effect of socio-economic development alone on future flood risks. Here, socio-
159 economic development refers to each country’s population, labour force, gross domestic product (GDP)
160 and capital stock. The socio-economic data used to calculate the direct and indirect losses for both the
161 baseline and future scenarios are described below.

162 **2.3 Direct damages**

163 For each flood event direct damages are calculated for agricultural, residential, commercial and industrial
164 land-use sectors by linking the simulated flood depth and area with country and sector specific depth-
165 damage functions and maximum damage values from Huizinga et al. (2017) and land cover maps from
166 the European Space Agency Climate Change Initiative (ESA CCI) land cover product at 10-arcsec
167 resolution (ESA 2017). The depth-damage functions provide estimates of the fractional damage (damage
168 as a percentage of the associated maximum damage value) for a given flood depth per land-use class.
169 Since it is difficult to establish depth-damage functions for the future, this study uses the same set of
170 functions for both the baseline and future periods as in other studies (e.g. Alfieri et al. 2017; Dottori et al.
171 2018).

172 The land cover map from 1992, the earliest year available in the ESA CCI's product, is used for the
173 baseline period and the map of 2015 for the future period, assuming a constant land cover after 2015.
174 Employing two sets of land cover maps from the same data source means they are produced with the
175 same approach and ensures consistency between estimates. Using different years can also account for the
176 effect of land cover change, especially urban expansion, in the real world. This is beneficial as many
177 studies do not allow for urban expansion (e.g. Rojas et al. 2013; Winsemius et al. 2013, 2016; Ward et al.
178 2017), which will be a key driver of increased future flood risks (Muis et al. 2015).

179 For the agricultural land-use sector, the cropland area is obtained directly from the ESA CCI land cover
180 maps, then aggregated at the resolution of the flood hazard maps (0.25°). However, the global land cover
181 data represents urban land as a single class and does not differentiate between residential, commercial,
182 and industrial sectors. Therefore, the urban land class is disaggregated into these three sub-classes. In
183 terms of the occupation of residential, commercial and industrial urban land-use sectors in cities, several
184 previous studies assume uniform percentages across the globe (e.g. Dottori et al. 2018), ignoring
185 differences between individual countries. Huizinga et al. (2017) suggest that the percentages that
186 commerce and industry contribute to national GDP could be used to downscale the single urban land
187 class. However, the contribution of a sector to national GDP does not necessarily relate to the land surface
188 it occupies. In this case, the population in a sector would be more relevant to the occupied land area.
189 Therefore, in this study the residential population and employment in commercial and industrial sectors
190 are used as proxies to downscale the single urban land class. It is assumed that the percentages of
191 occupation of each sector within cities are equivalent to those of the population in each sector. Population
192 data from the World Bank World Development Indicators are used (World Bank 2019). To be consistent
193 with the land cover maps, population data from 1992 and 2015 per country are used to calculate the
194 country-specific percentages for the baseline and future scenarios respectively. Lastly, the estimated
195 direct economic damages per sector are aggregated at a country level for estimating the indirect losses.
196 All economic damages are expressed in 2010 US\$ values.

197 **2.4 Indirect damages**

198 The method for estimating indirect damage from fluvial floods is based on the existing Flood Footprint
199 model presented in Mendoza-Tinoco et al. (2020). The Flood Footprint model draws on the Adaptive
200 Regional Input-Output (ARIO) model (Hallegatte 2008), a widely used model to calculate indirect
201 economic impacts of disaster events. Other methods, such as Computable General Equilibrium (CGE)
202 models (e.g. Rose and Liao 2005), are also used in this field. While CGE models are good at reflecting
203 the inter-industry links, they require many parameters to be calibrated and tend to be overly optimistic
204 about market flexibility (Carrera et al. 2015; Kajitani and Tatano 2017). In contrast, Input-Output models
205 not only include sectoral interdependence, but also maintain a level of simplicity which makes them
206 popular in indirect economic impact evaluation of disaster events (Okuyama and Santos 2014; Koks et al.
207 2016), and permits easy integration with external models and data (Galbusera and Giannopoulos 2018).
208 For further review of recent modelling approaches focused on the indirect damage from fluvial floods see
209 Mendoza-Tinoco et al. (2020).

210

211 Below we present an overview of the key model components and the modelling process regarding the
 212 CC+SE experiment. For a full description of the model please see SM1.2 and Mendoza-Tinoco et al.
 213 (2020).

214
 215 The Flood Footprint model is run at a monthly time-step. The economy is initially in equilibrium, with
 216 total supply and demand balanced as follows¹:

$$218 \quad x_i^0 + im_i^0 = \sum_{j=1}^n a_{i,j} * x_j^0 + fd_i^0 \quad (1)$$

$$219 \quad fd_i^0 = hc_i^0 + gc_i^0 + inv_i^0 + ex_i^0 \quad (2)$$

220
 221
 222 Where x_i^0 , im_i^0 and fd_i^0 are output, imports and final demand of products in sector i in the pre-flood
 223 equilibrium (month before flooding $t = 0$). $a_{i,j}$ reflects the i th row and j th column element of the input
 224 coefficient matrix derived from the IOTs, reflecting the intermediate demand for product i required to
 225 produce one unit of product j . n represents the number of industrial sectors. Thus, the left-hand side of
 226 equation 1 represents the total supply of product i , while the right-hand side denotes its total demand.

227
 228 Final demand consists of: 1) household consumption (hc_i^0), divided into basic demand (bd_i^0) and other
 229 consumption (ohc_i^0): $hc_i^0 = bd_i^0 + ohc_i^0$; 2) governmental expenditure (gc_i^0); 3) fixed capital formation
 230 or investment (inv_i^0); and 4) exports (ex_i^0).

231
 232 Following a flood event supply and demand become imbalanced and the economy is no longer in
 233 equilibrium. On the supply side, direct flood damage to industrial capital and labour reduce the
 234 production capacity of affected sectors. Equations 3 and 4 show the industrial capital available for
 235 production in each month following flooding.

$$237 \quad \alpha_i^t = \frac{\Delta k_i^t}{k_i^t} \quad (3)$$

$$238 \quad k_i^t = (1 - \alpha_i^t) * (k_i^{t-1} + \sum_j r a_{j,i}^{t-1}) \quad (4)$$

240
 241 Here α_i^t is the proportion of damaged capital in sector i during month t and Δk_i^t is the direct damage to
 242 the capital stock (as estimated in section 2.3). k_i^t is the available capital of sector i at the beginning of
 243 month t . Available capital is defined as the remaining capital following a flood plus any recovered

¹ In this paper, we use bold capital letters to represent matrices (e.g. **I** and **A**), italic bold lowercase letters for vectors (e.g. **x**), and italic lowercase letters for scalars (e.g. n). Vectors are column vectors by default, and the transposition is denoted by an apostrophe (e.g. \mathbf{x}'). The conversion from a vector to a diagonal matrix is expressed as italic bold lowercase letters with a circumflex (e.g. $\hat{\alpha}$).

244 capital during the previous month. ra_{ji}^t is the element of an $n * n$ recovery matrix \mathbf{RA}^t , which denotes
 245 the investment from sector j to restore capital in sector i in month t .

246
 247 Capital production capacity, xk_i^t , is assumed proportional to available capital, k_i^t , in each month, relative
 248 to the pre-flood level:

$$250 \quad xk_i^t = \frac{k_i^t}{k_i^0} * x_i^0 \quad (5)$$

251
 252 Damaged physical capital includes industrial and residential capital. Available residential capital is
 253 calculated in the same manner as industrial capital above, but has no effect on production capacity as it is
 254 not involved in the production process². Similarly, labour availability, l^t , can change in the aftermath of a
 255 flood reflecting casualties and transport disruptions which may delay or impede travel to work. In the
 256 model it is assumed that labour can flow freely across different industrial sectors, so that during each
 257 month the labour production capacity, xl_i^t , in each sector experiences the same percentage change as the
 258 total labour supply (a full description of labour availability and its recovery parameters are provided in the
 259 SM 1.2).

260
 261 The available production capacity of sector i in month t , $xcap_i^t$, is determined by the minimum capacity
 262 of labour and capital in that month, where ‘min’ is the minimum value between xk_i^t and xl_i^t :

$$263 \quad xcap_i^t = \min(xk_i^t, xl_i^t) \quad (6)$$

264
 265 The importing capacity, $imcap_i^t$, is assumed to be constrained by the surviving capacity of the transport
 266 sector, $xcap_{tran}^t$. If the remaining capacity of the transport sector ‘tran’ declines by $x\%$ in month t , then
 267 the imports will contract by the same percent relative to the pre-flood level, im_i^0 .

$$270 \quad imcap_i^t = \frac{xcap_{tran}^t}{x_{tran}^0} * im_i^0 \quad (7)$$

271
 272 Demand fluctuations are also incorporated in the Flood Footprint model. A new type of final demand
 273 arises due to the need for reconstruction and replacement of damaged physical capital, including
 274 industrial and residential capital. For example, $rd_{i,j}^t$ is the element of an $n * n$ reconstruction demand
 275 matrix \mathbf{RD}^t , which denotes the investment that is needed for sector i to support the capital
 276 reconstruction of industrial sector j :

277

² Although damage to residential capital can have indirect effects on the production process as its recovery results in a non-negligible part of the total reconstruction demand, competing with industrial capital for reconstruction resources.

278
$$rd_{i,j}^t = \max \left\{ \left[(1 + r_s) * k_j^{t-1} - k_j^t - \sum_{m=1}^{t-1} rasto_j^m \right] * d_i, 0 \right\} \quad (8)$$

279 Where ‘max’ is the maximum, r_s is the targeted growth rate of capital stock, and $\sum_{m=1}^{t-1} rasto_j^m$ is the
 280 accumulative capital under construction before month t . Capital under construction does not contribute to
 281 a productivity increase until it is fully recovered. Therefore, the demand for capital reconstruction in
 282 sector j reflects the gap between the capital target, $(1 + r_s) * k_j^{t-1}$ and the actual amount of capital minus
 283 the capital already under construction. Such demand is allocated to sector i according to the contribution
 284 of that sector to capital reconstruction, which defines d_i . Reconstruction demand of the residential sector,
 285 $rd_{i,res}^t$, is defined in the same way.

286
 287 Furthermore, strategic adaptive behaviour in the aftermath of floods can also drive people to ensure a
 288 continued consumption of basic commodities, such as food, clothes and medical services (Mendoza-
 289 Tinoco et al., 2017). The coexistence of reconstruction and basic demand delimits the boundary of final
 290 demand in the model (see SM 1.2 for further details).

291
 292 Given disruptions to both the supply and demand sides, industrial sectors choose their optimal production,
 293 $x_i^{t,*}$, and imports, $im_i^{t,*}$, under production, import and consumption constraints, to maximize the total
 294 economic supply each month during the post-flood recovery. This in turn determines the amount of final
 295 demand, $fd_i^{t,*}$, that could be satisfied:

296
 297
$$fd_i^{t,*} = x_i^{t,*} + im_i^{t,*} - \sum_j a_{i,j} * x_i^{t,*} \quad (9)$$

298 The remaining final products, after satisfying the basic demand, are then proportionally allocated to the
 299 reconstruction demand and other categories of final demand. Capital is recovered through reconstruction,
 300 while labour is recovered exogenously (see SM 1.2 for further details). This iterative process continues
 301 until the total supply and demand of the economy are in equilibrium and the economic output recovers to
 302 the targeted growth trajectory.

303 Total indirect economic damage is calculated as the loss of monthly GDP compared to its potential:

304
$$va_i^{t,*} = x_i^{t,*} - \sum_{j=1}^n a_{j,i} * x_i^{t,*} \quad (10)$$

305
 306
$$IndirectDamage = \sum_t \left[(1 + r_g)^t * \sum_{i=1}^n va_i^0 - \sum_{i=1}^n va_i^{t,*} \right] \quad (11)$$

307 Here $va_i^{t,*}$ refers to the value added of sector i in month t , which is the extra value of final products
308 created above intermediate input. Summation of value added in all sectors, $\sum_{i=1}^n va_i^{t,*}$, constitutes the
309 national GDP for month t , where r_g is the targeted growth rate of national GDP. The total indirect
310 damage is the accumulative losses of GDP over all months. This reflects the method for the CC+SE
311 experiment, whereby the economy can recover to a target level above the pre-flood level, based on the
312 exogenous growth trajectory. However, in the CC only experiment economic recovery is constrained to
313 the pre-flood level. Constraints on physical capital, labour, output and imports are set so that they cannot
314 grow larger than the pre-flood level. In this case r_g is set to zero, which indicates no economic growth.

315 Economic data used for the indirect damage estimation includes information on national Input-Output
316 tables (IOTs), GDP, capital stock and labour force (see SM Table S1 for an overview of data used to
317 calculate the flood-induced indirect damages in the baseline and future periods for the CC and CC+SE
318 experiments). For each of the countries IOTs are obtained from their national statistical websites,
319 providing information on intermediate demand, final demand, value-added, output, imports and exports at
320 the country level. For each country, the earliest version IOT available is used to approximate the economy
321 during the baseline period. For the CC experiment, the same IOT is used for both the baseline and future
322 periods. Under the CC+SE experiment the economic structure is assumed to vary in the future. This
323 variance is represented by using the same IOT as used in the CC only experiment in the baseline but the
324 most recent version of the IOT available for each country in the future period (see SM Table S2 for
325 country specific details on the IOTs used). This, to some extent, reflects the structural change from the
326 baseline economy to the future one, given difficulties in projecting IOTs for 2100. The IOTs also provide
327 data on the sectors involved in capital reconstruction from the investment column contained in the final
328 demand block. The share of each sector investing in fixed capital formation indicates its contribution to
329 the reconstruction process, namely the values of d_i . The annual IOT data is lastly divided by twelve to
330 represent a monthly value.

331 Industry data from the IOTs are aggregated to ten sector groups per country: Agriculture (AGR), Mining
332 (MIN), Food Manufacturing (FDM), Other Manufacturing (OTM), Utilities (UTL), Construction (CON),
333 Trade (TRA), Transport (TRA), Public services (PUB) and Other Services (OTS) (see also SM Table S2).
334 Where sectoral-level data is not available, such as for capital stock, it is disaggregated to the ten sector
335 groups based on their proportional contribution to national GDP.

336 In line with the direct damage estimation, data on GDP, population and labour force are derived from the
337 World Bank World Development Indicators (World Bank 2019). Data on capital stock is from the
338 Investment and Capital Stock (ICSD) dataset from the IMF (IMF 2015). Capital stock is divided into
339 industrial and residential capital based on land use from the land cover maps (ESA 2017). Under the CC
340 experiment data on GDP, population, labour force, and capital stock are set as constant to restrict any
341 socio-economic change. In the CC+SE experiment these data are dynamic. For the baseline scenarios this
342 reflects reported trends in data from 1961-1990. For the warming scenarios, trends in data are based on
343 the SSP2 projections whereby social, economic, and technological trends do not shift markedly from
344 historical patterns (Riahi et al. 2017).

345 The shock of the flood event is represented by data on physical damage to capital assets (section 2.3) and
346 labour loss. While the same depth-damage functions are used for the estimation of direct losses for both
347 baseline and future periods, the calculated direct damages are scaled prior to use in the I-O model, based
348 on the baseline and projected GDP per capita, according to the power law functions provided by Huizinga
349 et al. (2017). Exponents in the power law functions are smaller than one, indicating that direct damage is
350 not proportional to GDP per capita and grows slower than GDP per capita. The scaled damage is
351 disaggregated into specific industrial sectors in proportion to their capital stock.

352 Population exposure to fluvial flooding for each country is provided by He et al. (2020) of this special
353 issue. Affected labour is derived by multiplying the exposed population by the labour participation rate,
354 from the World Bank (World Bank, 2019). The number of affected employees during each flood are
355 divided into four categories: the dead, the heavily injured, the slightly injured, and others affected by
356 flood-induced traffic disruptions. The ratios between these categories are determined based on the
357 historical average of recorded floods for each country from the EM-DAT Dataset (EM-DAT 2020). This
358 data feeds into the labour calculations in the I-O model (described in SM 1.2).

359 **3. Results**

360 **3.1 Direct and indirect fluvial flood damages**

361 Figure 1 presents estimates of direct and indirect economic damage for each country and climate scenario,
362 under the CC and CC+SE experiments (results are plotted on the same axis to compare risk, see SM Figs
363 S1 and S2 for results plotted on separate axis per country for more detail). The results reflect the
364 underlying data provided from the flood hazard model, highlighting increasing economic damages, above
365 the baseline, in line with the increasing warming scenarios. For Egypt, the largest increases in average
366 damage occur up to scenario 3: 2.5°C, after which damages continue to increase albeit at a smaller rate.
367 This reflects the findings of He et al (2020), who note that the proportional area of the Nile River Basin
368 that experiences a decrease in the return period of a 1 in 100-year event (increase in flood frequency)
369 changes little from scenario 1: <1.5°C to 6: 4°C.

370 Under the CC experiment, direct damages under scenario 1: <1.5°C are 399 (+95%, relative to baseline,
371 Brazil), 1,713 (+80%, China), 427 (+13,783%, Egypt), 54 (+341%, Ethiopia), 11 (+255%, Ghana) and
372 719 (+435%, India) million US\$ per year. Direct damages increase to 4,267 (+1,979%, relative to
373 baseline, Brazil), 5,759 (+506%, China), 1,495 (+48,508%, Egypt), 147 (+1,108%, Ethiopia), 79
374 (+2,401%, Ghana), and 7,888 (+5,767%, India) million US\$ per year under scenario 6: 4°C. The indirect
375 damages, though much lower than direct damages, display similar trends (Figure 1). The Economic
376 Amplification Ratio (EAR), defined as the ratio of total costs to direct costs (Hallegatte et al. 2007), is
377 relatively constant across the warming scenarios for each country. As an average across the warming
378 scenarios the EAR is 1.23 (Brazil), 1.15 (China), 1.61 (Egypt), 1.36 (Ethiopia), 1.22 (Ghana) and 1.26
379 (India).

380 Under the CC+SE experiment the magnitude of direct damage increases significantly for all countries,
381 reflecting the increasing population and economic assets at risk. Under scenario 1: <1.5°C direct damages

382 range from 0.13 billion US\$ per year (Ghana) to 42 billion US\$ per year (China). Losses increase to 1.12
383 billion US\$ per year (Ghana) and 129 billion US\$ per year (China) under scenario 6: 4°C. The magnitude
384 of indirect damages not only increase but also surpass the direct damages (Figure 1). Indirect losses range
385 from 1.7 billion US\$ per year (Ghana) to 51 billion US\$ per year (China) under scenario 1: <1.5°C,
386 increasing to 12 billion US\$ per year (Ghana) and 256 billion US\$ per year (China) under scenario 6:
387 4°C. As an average across the warming scenarios the EAR increases to 10.97 (Brazil), 2.36 (China),
388 16.21 (Egypt), 12.05 (Ethiopia), 12.94 (Ghana) and 6.62 (India).

389 The increase in direct damage under the CC+SE experiment reflects the steady growth in capital stock,
390 population and GDP under the SSP2 trajectories, resulting in larger flood exposure in the future period
391 compared to the baseline. Indirect losses are significantly larger than direct losses as indirect losses in the
392 CC+SE experiment accumulate over time and reflect the potential for a continuous slowdown in
393 economic growth from the projected growth trajectory if no floods occurred. In other words, the indirect
394 flood damages presented here do not only result in a short-term impact on economic output, but have the
395 potential to restrict longer-term economic growth (discussed further in section 3.4, Figures 4 and 5). Thus,
396 the inclusion of socio-economic development results in large increases in total losses when compared to
397 the equivalent CC experiment run; for example, under scenario 6: 4°C, the total losses will increase by
398 3,613% (Brazil), 5,670% (China), 5,265% (Egypt), 6,095% (Ethiopia), 13,447% (Ghana) and 5,503%
399 (India).

400 Figure 1 also illustrates that there is a large range in uncertainty, shown as the ensemble maximum and
401 minimum values, which also increases under higher warming levels. This reflects the variance seen in the
402 flood model outputs, representing differences in climate change patterns projected by the five GCMs.

403 [Figure 1]

404 **3.2 Percentage change to national GDP**

405 Figure 2 presents the average annual indirect economic damage as a share of national GDP. Under both
406 the CC and CC+SE experiments Egypt suffers the largest reductions to national GDP, reaching 2.3% and
407 3.0% under scenario 6: 4°C, respectively. This highlights the high population density and the fact that
408 most economic activities, including agriculture, take place in the Nile Valley (Aliboni 2012). While flood
409 risk was low in the baseline period in Egypt this increases in the future, driven by increased precipitation
410 upstream in Sudan and Ethiopia which increases river flows and flood risk along the Nile (He et al. 2020).

411 Under the CC experiment, Ethiopia and India face the next largest impacts to GDP, after Egypt, equating
412 to 0.73% and 0.76% of GDP respectively, under scenario 6: 4.0°C. However, for Ethiopia losses decline
413 from the baseline (1.09% of GDP) when socio-economic development is included, ranging from 0.09% to
414 0.28% of GDP under scenarios 1 to 6. This reflects the different baseline and future projections of socio-
415 economic growth in Ethiopia, which makes the country appear more resilient when viewed in relative
416 terms, to the costs of fluvial floods under future projections of climate change (see also SM Fig S3 and
417 S4). A similar trend is seen in China when considering socio-economic development. Winsemius et al.
418 (2016) also highlight how socio-economic change can be a driver for reduced future flood risk, in relative
419 terms, particularly in higher income countries.

420 Brazil faces the lowest indirect damages of all countries as a proportion of GDP under the CC experiment
421 (0.16% under scenario 6: 4°C), but the second largest losses under the CC+SE experiment (1.80% under
422 scenario 6: 4°C). Whilst losses as a proportion of GDP initially decline at lower warming levels, increases
423 are seen from scenario 3: 2.5°C onwards. A similar trend is seen for India and Ghana. For India, indirect
424 losses as a proportion of GDP initially decline from the baseline at lower levels of warming, before
425 increases are seen from scenario 4: 3°C onwards, suggesting a tipping point where increasing flood risk
426 outweighs any relative benefits of socio-economic development. Similar trends in direct flood damage
427 were reported by Dottori et al. (2018) for several regions in the world, with damage as a share of GDP
428 declining with warming, particularly for fast growing economies, although the trend was reversed when
429 damages were reported in absolute terms (as in Figure 1 above). Hence, it is important to consider
430 changing socio-economic characteristics such as population change, land-use change and economic
431 growth trajectories, alongside climate change.

432 [Figure 2]

433 3.3 Sectoral distribution of fluvial flood damages

434 A further benefit of the methodology is that it allows sectoral disaggregation of flood damages. Figure 3
435 shows a subset of the results for the six countries, split by direct and indirect losses (see SM Fig S5 for
436 full results). Direct and indirect losses to sectors increase in line with increasing warming scenarios. As
437 above, they are significantly higher, with a greater share of indirect losses, under the CC+SE experiment.

438 Under the CC experiment the agricultural sector (AGR) faces some of the largest losses in China,
439 Ethiopia, Egypt, Ghana and India, as well as other manufacturing (OTM) and public (PUB) and other
440 services (OTS). This is similar to findings of Dottori et al. (2018) who found pronounced agricultural
441 losses in low-income regions with a higher share of agricultural GDP. In Brazil, the largest impacts are
442 felt by other manufacturing (OTM), public (PUB) and other services (OTS), whilst Ethiopia also sees
443 large losses to its food manufacturing (FDM) sector. Whilst the losses increase from scenario 1: <1.5°C to
444 6: 4°C, the sectoral distribution of losses in each country remains similar. However, under the CC+SE
445 experiment the results also reflect underlying changes in the economic structure of the countries,
446 including the expansion of service sectors of the economy. For example, there are increasing losses to
447 public services (PUB) and other services (OTS) under scenario 6: 4°C for countries such as India and
448 Ghana, who predominantly saw losses to the agricultural sector (AGR) under the CC experiment.

449 [Figure 3]

450 3.4 Recovery Dynamics

451 When calculating indirect damages under the CC experiment it is assumed that the economy recovers to
452 the pre-flood level (section 2.4). Figure 4 illustrates the dynamic percentage change of monthly GDP for
453 each country, under the baseline and six warming scenarios, relative to the pre-flood level. The
454 fluctuations highlight each occurrence of flooding and the post-flood recovery period. Fluvial flood losses
455 to monthly GDP range from up to 2.9% in Ethiopia (Baseline) and up to 15.2% in Egypt (scenario 6:
456 4°C). For all countries, it usually takes several months for GDP to recover to pre-flood levels. The

457 frequency of events, scale of losses, and recovery time increase in severity in line with the increasing
458 warming levels.

459 In terms of flood frequency, it can be seen that during the 30-year baseline, in large countries which have
460 some of the world's largest rivers (e.g. China, Brazil and India), there will be more than 25 years with 1 in
461 100-year floods. Although flood-induced damages are aggregated to the national scale, these floods may
462 occur in different areas of the country, particularly for countries with more than one major river. During
463 the future period, a flood exceeding the baseline 1 in 100-year threshold will no longer be a 1 in 100-year
464 flood, thus extreme flood events from the baseline perspective become more frequent in the future under
465 the warming scenarios.

466 Focusing on the dynamics of individual flood events over time, and their indirect losses, is beneficial as it
467 highlights the different magnitude of impacts between flood events. It also highlights the potential impact,
468 in terms of the magnitude of losses and duration for recovery, of successive flood events that may occur
469 while the country is still in a recovery period, as shown in China and Egypt around month 50.

470 [Figure 4]

471 Under the CC+SE experiment the economy can recover to a level above the pre-flood economy based on
472 the exogenous growth data used within the I-O model (2086-2115 for the climate scenarios, and 1961-
473 1990 for the baseline scenario). In this case, the level of recovery required to re-establish the pre-flood
474 trajectory is larger (Figure 5). Consequently, indirect impacts can continue to accumulate over time as
475 they also account for the overall slowdown in the growth rate of the economy from its potential trajectory,
476 highlighted by the downward sloping trends in Figure 5. Fluvial flood losses to monthly GDP range from
477 up to 1.5% in Egypt for scenario 1: <1.5°C and up to 4.7% in Egypt for scenario 6: 4°C. Indirect damage
478 as a share of monthly GDP is generally lower than under the CC experiment given the future economic
479 growth trajectories (see Fig S3). Yet, although the impact of individual flood events, in terms of the
480 potential loss to monthly GDP, is more severe under the CC experiment, when totalled over time the
481 accumulated impacts are higher under the CC+SE experiment.

482 [Figure 5]

483 Figure 5 also shows how the trajectory of trends under the baseline period (i.e., navy blue lines) differ to
484 those of the climate scenarios, ranging from 0.6% in Egypt up to 4.8% in China. The differences reflect
485 the different frequency and intensity of flood events, with the economy able to recover fully between
486 events in many instances. Typically, when absolute economic growth continues over time full economic
487 recovery is impossible, as the growth continues at a slower rate than under the pre-flood economy. Full
488 recovery usually occurs in periods of economic recessions (Fig. S4) when other constraints (e.g., droughts
489 and famine) become more severe than flood constraints and dominate economic trajectories. These
490 deviations result in spikes, or downward trends, in Figure 5 when displayed as a percentage change in
491 monthly GDP from the pre-flood economy. These periods of economic recession reflect that the baseline
492 is based on historical growth data and these time series do not always follow a smooth trajectory. In
493 contrast, the future scenarios are based on deviations from projected growth data between 2086-2115
494 from the SSP2 scenario. These trajectories do follow a smooth pathway hence another reason for the
495 difference in the baseline trajectories when compared to the climate scenarios in Figure 5. Thirdly, while

496 absolute losses increase under the warming scenarios, in relative terms losses to GDP may appear smaller
497 in the future given the level of projected economic growth, as seen in China when comparing the baseline
498 to future scenarios (Figure 2). This is consistent with the results of Dottori et al. (2018), which implies
499 that some economies grow faster than flood-induced direct damage with warming.

500 **4. Discussion and Conclusions**

501 The above analysis provides an assessment of the direct and indirect economic impacts of fluvial flooding
502 in six countries under future scenarios of climate change and socio-economic development. It covers a
503 range of climate scenarios reflecting ambitious targets as well as higher levels of warming. The study
504 demonstrates the importance of including socio-economic development when projecting direct and
505 indirect flood losses, and the implications of this for damage estimates. Population change, land-use
506 change and economic growth can be just as, or more, important than climate change in terms of
507 understanding the future dynamics of fluvial flood risk (Dottori et al. 2018). The methodology considers
508 direct and indirect economic impacts, providing a more comprehensive assessment of total damages at the
509 national level, while facilitating comparison across countries.

510 Results highlight the potential for large increases in flood related losses under future warming scenarios.
511 Absolute fluvial flood losses are largest in China and India. However, as a share of national GDP Egypt
512 faces the most serious consequences, under both the CC and CC+SE experiments. The magnitude of
513 indirect losses also varies largely when comparing between the CC and CC+SE experiments, becoming
514 particularly severe in Egypt, Ghana and Ethiopia under the CC+SE experiments.

515 The method is also beneficial in that dynamic recovery is considered. This provides valuable insights into
516 the role of recovery dynamics in influencing losses, and paves the way for further research in this area,
517 particularly important given the past knowledge gap in considering such dynamics in I-O models (Meyer
518 et al. 2013). The results highlight the potential lost opportunity costs, in terms of economic development,
519 due to fluvial flooding in the future. The baseline CC+SE results also emphasise the importance of other
520 exogenous constraints (such as droughts and famine) that may be felt in successive years or in
521 combination with flooding constraints, causing different recovery dynamics and loss estimates.

522 In terms of validating results, the lack of empirical data on the dynamics of business recovery (Koks et al.
523 2019), and documented economic data on the indirect costs of flooding makes comparison difficult.
524 Direct damage estimates for the baseline period under the CC+SE experiment can be compared with data
525 from the EM-DAT database (EM-DAT 2020). Total direct damages for the baseline period modelled here
526 are 6,640 (Brazil), 25,123 (China), 87 (Egypt), 215 (Ethiopia), 86 (Ghana), and 4,050 (India) million
527 US\$. Damages reported by EM-DAT during the same period are 4,185 (Brazil), 10,219 (China), 14
528 (Egypt), 0.92 (Ethiopia), 75 (Ghana), and 5,744 (India) million US\$. For Brazil, Ghana and India the
529 estimates are comparable to those reported by EM-DAT (around 15-60% difference). For the other three
530 countries the estimates are much larger than reported data. This likely reflects the underreporting of
531 economic damages in the EM-DAT database, particularly for developing countries in past decades
532 (Kundzewicz et al. 2014).

533 Regarding the percentage change in direct damages relative to the baseline, results can be compared with
534 Alfieri et al. (2017). Their estimates were made under three warming scenarios (1.5°C, 2°C, and 4°C),
535 assuming constant socio-economic conditions and using the same set of depth-damage functions as this
536 study (Huizinga et al. 2017). Estimates presented here under the CC experiment for Brazil, China and
537 India are in good agreement with those reported by Alfieri et al. (2017). However, the estimates for the
538 three African countries in this study are much larger. This discrepancy is also noted by He et al. (2020)
539 when comparing population exposure to flooding with that of Alfieri et al. (2017). Consequently, the
540 higher estimates for the three African countries in this study likely reflect higher increasing flood
541 occurrences projected by the flood hazard model.

542 However, as with any economic impact study of climate change it is extremely challenging to capture all
543 aspects of the subject within a single framework. Several studies highlight that flood risk assessments are
544 sensitive to the choice of GCMs or climate driving datasets (Sperna Weiland et al. 2012; Ward et al.
545 2013; Alfieri et al. 2015). However, in this study, the overall patterns seen with increasing warming levels
546 are consistent among the five GCMs, which sample a reasonable proportion of the overall uncertainty in
547 modelled precipitation in the wider CMIP5 (He et al. 2020).

548 The study also focuses on economic losses relating to floods whose magnitude exceeds a baseline 1 in
549 100-year return period. Smaller events, which may still have an economic effect, are not considered,
550 leading to a potential underestimation of losses. Conversely, as the flood data from CaMa-Flood does not
551 consider flood protection (He et al. 2020), focusing on a 1 in 100-year flood event can reduce the
552 potential of overestimating risks given many flood protection defences are designed at protection levels
553 lower than the 100-year return period. While beyond the scope of this study, more recently available
554 global flood defence data could be used to investigate the role of adaptation further in the future
555 (Scussolini et al. 2016). Winsemius et al. (2016) found that including improvement in flood protection
556 levels over time would significantly reduce economic damages, although this extension to the modelling
557 has its own limitations in terms of the availability and accuracy of data for this parameter (Tanoue et al.
558 2016).

559 There is also uncertainty associated with the depth-damage functions used. Dottori et al. (2018) employed
560 the same set of functions in their study and claimed that the associated uncertainty would exceed $\pm 50\%$,
561 as also noted by Huizinga et al. (2017). Given there are no alternative, globally consistent databases
562 available, it is not feasible to assess the effect of the depth-damage functions used in this study.
563 Nevertheless, the database of depth-damage curves used in this study is beneficial as it accounts for
564 heterogeneity across the six countries as well as facilitating a country comparison.

565 This study also assumes a constant land cover after 2015 in the CC+SE experiment. When socio-
566 economic growth is modelled with constant land cover the exposure value per unit area increases more in
567 the model than in reality where the area constructed on will grow. Though predicted future land cover
568 maps exist (e.g. van Vuuren et al. 2017), they are often at a coarser resolution and subject to several
569 assumptions (*ibid*) which can introduce further uncertainty into the economic calculations.

570 Lastly, there are uncertainties arising from the underlying data, parameterisation of the I-O model and
571 assumptions on recovery dynamics used for the estimation of indirect losses, which would benefit from
572 future research. For example, the IOTs used for the baseline and future analysis were dependent on the

573 latest years of data available for each country, which differed, with the classification of certain sectors
574 varying for some countries (SM Table S2). However, modelling the future structure of an economy,
575 particularly when applied to multiple countries, is always difficult (Koks et al. 2019).

576 Nonetheless, the analysis presented here is beneficial in many aspects as discussed at the start of this
577 section. Going forwards, the provision of more comprehensive estimates of fluvial flood risk, that account
578 for both the effects of climate change and uncertainty under a range of warming scenarios, and the role of
579 socio-economic development, will provide important insights to support decision-making regarding flood
580 risk management, and in terms of investment needs for adaptation (Mokrech et al. 2015). Being able to
581 apply the analysis at a country level is important for future research as economic losses will be related to
582 the level of development of the specific society, and could capture any flood prevention measures in place
583 which can differ regionally and overtime as income levels rise (Jongman et al. 2015). And, as noted by
584 other authors (e.g. Koks et al., 2019), the study also contributes to the objectives of the Sendai
585 Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction to better understand disaster risk (UNDRR, 2015), essential to
586 help inform and support the development of post-disaster recovery and adaptation strategies.

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727 **Figure Captions**

728 **Fig. 1** Average annual direct and indirect fluvial flood damages calculated across the 30-year time period
729 for the baseline and six warming scenarios in each country. Damages in panel A are expressed in million
730 US\$/yr for the CC experiment and in panel B in billion US\$/yr for the CC+SE experiment. Bars represent
731 the five model ensemble average, with whiskers indicating the ensemble maximum and minimum.

732 **Fig. 2** The average annual indirect economic damage as a share of national GDP (%) (model ensemble
733 average) caused by fluvial flooding for the baseline and future scenarios in the six countries.

734 **Fig. 3** Loss in million US\$/yr, under the 1.5°C and 4°C climate scenarios with (CC+SE) and without
735 (CC) socio-economic change for the six countries. The bars represent total losses, with the share of direct
736 and indirect losses indicated by the shading. Results are presented for ten sectors: Agriculture (AGR);
737 Mining (MIN); Food Manufacturing (FDM); Other Manufacturing (OTM); Utilities (UTL); Construction
738 (CON); Trade (TRD); Transport (TRA); Public Services (PUB); Other Services (OTS).

739 **Fig. 4** Percentage change in monthly GDP (%) due to fluvial flooding for the baseline and climate
740 scenarios under the CC experiment. Lines represent the five model ensemble average.

741 **Fig. 5** Percentage change in monthly GDP (%) due to fluvial flooding from the pre-flood economy for the
742 baseline (based on actual exogenous growth data between 1960-1993) and climate scenarios (based on
743 projected exogenous growth data between 2085-2118).

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759

760 **Conflicts of interest/Competing interests**

761 The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

762

763 **Availability of data and materials**

764 Data and models used are outlined in the text and listed in full in the references.

765

766 **Code availability**

767 Not applicable

768

769 **Authors' contributions**

770 Zhiqiang Yin and Dabo Guan designed the study. Zhiqiang Yin and Yixin Hu performed the analysis.

771 Zhiqiang Yin carried out the direct damage modelling and Yixin Hu carried out the indirect damage

772 modelling. Zhiqiang Yin, Yixin Hu and Katie Jenkins interpreted the results, and prepared the manuscript.

773 Katie Jenkins prepared the figures and Supplementary Material. Yi He provided the flood hazard data.

774 Nicole Forstehäusler prepared the land cover data. Lili Yang contributed to the input-output modelling.

775 Rhosanna Jenkins contributed to the literature review in Supplementary Material. Rachel Warren and

776 Dabo Guan coordinated and supervised the project, and reviewed the manuscript.