Exploring the relationship between international Twitter campaigns and domestic women's rights

Reilly Anne Dempsey Willis, JD MPH

PhD

University of East Anglia

School of Law

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Abstract

This thesis sets out to empirically examine the relationship between international campaigns which originate in and continue to be driven by Twitter and domestic women's rights. The study looks at eight campaigns targeting seven countries, with over 1 million Tweets and 1500 pieces of legal evidence. The study looks at four aspects of legal change: legislation, institutionalisation, law enforcement, and dialogue with international human rights bodies. The campaigns are explored in four areas as well, looking at persistence, users, engagement, and Tweet content.

The study sets out to provide evidence for whether hashtag campaigns can contribute to domestic legal change, and, if so, if certain campaign behaviours are more associated with change and in what way. Overall, this study has found that hashtag campaigns can contribute towards domestic legal change, both positively and negatively. Two campaigns resulted in backsliding, three had no impact, two led to tactical concessions, and one campaign showed some elements of tentative success. Campaigns which are domestically driven, with a high level of foreign-attention, showing persistence, engagement, and consistency are more likely to see to positive legal outcomes. Conversely, campaigns which lack in domestic drive, can be seen as 'foreign meddling', and fail to achieve persistence, engagement, or consistency are more likely to see to negative outcomes.

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#Introduction

Hashtag campaigns have become part of everyday life, with people even using the word 'hashtag' in general conversations (as in 'how are you today?' 'hashtag feeling tired.'[1]). News outlets use Tweets from both the general public and from well-known figures to report on top stories. That which trends on Twitter becomes a headline. Official political announcements which used to be exclusive to broadsheets are made on Twitter first.[2] Twitter is certainly not the only social media platform that has made its way into the mainstream provision of news and information, but the ease of using hashtags for organising, sharing, and discussing topics is unique to Twitter. Hashtags have also found their way onto other platforms; as they originated on Twitter, their present day ubiquity underscores the power of Tweets.[3]

This power has been harnessed by many, including non-governmental organisations ('NGOs').[4] When working as a human rights advocate, campaigning for policy changes to improve the lives of women and girls, I noted a distinct and extremely rapid transition in the NGO world to social media. Every campaign suddenly 'had' to have a social media drive. Rather than asking our organisation's members to go out and volunteer locally (as we had done in the past) we were now asking them to send a Tweet, like a Facebook post, or sign a change.org petition, for most members targeting a foreign country. Participation may have increased, but our understanding of the potential outcomes was not. Monitoring and evaluation rigor were nigh on impossible with these social media campaigns. As a

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[1] At the time of writing, the author can confirm that this is a true statement.

[2] Bart Cammaerts, 'Protest Logics and the Mediation Opportunity Structure' (2012) 27 European Journal of Communication 117.

[3] While hashtags are searchable and appear on other social media platforms, Twitter is the primary space for utilising hashtags.

[4] Sara Vissers and Dietlind Stolle, 'Spill-Over Effects Between Facebook and On/Offline Political Participation? Evidence from a Two-Wave Panel Study' (2014) 11 Journal of Information Technology & Politics 259; C Guo and GD Saxton, 'Tweeting Social Change: How Social Media Are Changing Nonprofit Advocacy' (2013) 43 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 57; Giselle A Auger, 'Fostering Democracy through Social Media: Evaluating Diametrically Opposed Nonprofit Advocacy Organizations' Use of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube' (2013) 39 Public Relations Review 369; Lindley Curtis and others, 'Adoption of Social Media for Public Relations by Nonprofit Organizations' (2010) 36 Public Relations Review 90; Hyunjin Seo, Ji Young Kim and Sung-Un Yang, 'Global Activism and New Media: A Study of Transnational NGOs' Online Public Relations' (2009) 35 Public Relations Review 123.

practitioner, without assessments or even a general idea of what these campaigns were doing, I felt as though our responsibility as advocates for women and girls was at risk. Thus, the idea for this research was born. This thesis therefore sets out to explore the relationship between international, Twitter-driven campaigns and changes to domestic law, looking specifically at women's rights.[5]

There are now over four billion individuals using the internet, representing a 53% global penetration rate, with over three billion of these users active on social media.[6] This is a 13% increase since 2017.[7] Of those using social media, 330 million are on Twitter, placing it seventh of all social media platforms.[8] These numbers, however, mask significant inequalities.[9] The divide in household access to the internet between developed, developing, and least developed countries persists, with household access to the internet in developed countries twice as high as that in developing countries, and five times as high as least developed countries.[10] While 70% of North Americans, 66% of Northern Europeans, and 54% of Western Europeans actively use social media, only 12% of Central Asians, 6% of Middle Africans, and 20% of Southern Asians are social media active.[11] This could lead to problems in transnational advocacy via social media, whereby the majority of users are, statistically, in the Global North, but the campaigns tend to target the Global South. Concerns are imminent about the ability of the domestic voice to play a significant role in the campaign, compounded by the social media functionality which may favour the elite.[12] Equally, statistics show that in every region in the world, men are using the internet more than women. The gender gap is even more pronounced in developing and least developed countries.[13] Even more concerning is that this gender gap is *increasing* in the developing and least developed countries.[14] This added layer of inequality creates another complex concern when using social media for women's rights campaigns in particular.

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[5] 'International' Twitter-driven campaigns are those campaigns which originated in and continued to be driven by Twitter, which have attracted both domestic *and* international attention.
[6] 'Digital in 2018: World's Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion Mark' (*We Are Social UK*, 30 January 2018) <https://wearesocial.com/uk/blog/2018/01/global-digital-report-2018> accessed 4 October 2018.
[7] ibid.
[8] ibid.
[9] International Telecommunication Union, 'Measuring the Information Society Report 2017' (2017) <https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/publications/mis2017.aspx> accessed 4 December 2018.
[10] ibid.
[11] 'Digital in 2018: World's Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion Mark' (n 6).
[12] Kate Ott, 'Social Media and Feminist Values: Aligned or Maligned?' (2018) 39 Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 93.
[13] International Telecommunication Union (n 9).
[14] ibid.

Using theories of legal change and norm institutionalisation to inform methodological choices, this research takes a unique and innovative approach to measuring and modelling the relationships between Twitter driven campaigns and domestic legal change. The research is framed by the spiral model of human rights change, building upon the body of scholarship critiquing the model for its underrepresentation of domestic voice and overly simplistic view of long-term, meaningful legal change. Similarly, there is an emerging body of literature which critiques the use of social media for activism, building upon traditional media effects theories.[15] Using social media as a mode for transnational activism could exacerbate the critiques of the spiral model, given the landscape presented above.[16]

The specific research questions addressed in this thesis are:

1. Can international campaigns originating in and driven by Twitter contribute to domestic legal change in women's rights?
2. If so, which campaign behaviours are associated with change?

This research makes unique contributions to academia in three key areas across law and international relations.

1. **Examining the relationship between international Twitter campaigns on domestic legal change for women**: Significant research is now being done in and on the Twittersphere, however as social media grows and changes, substantial gaps in knowledge still exist.[17] Little is being done to empirically explore the relationship (or

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[15] Malcolm Gladwell, 'Small Change' [2010] *The New Yorker* <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/04/small-change-malcolm-gladwell> accessed 14 March 2016; Malcolm Gladwell and Clay Shirky, 'From Innovation to Revolution: Do Social Media Make Protests Possible?' (2011) 90 *Foreign Affairs* 153; Clay Shirky, *Here Comes Everybody: How Change Happens When People Come Together* (Updated with a new chapter, Penguin Books 2009); Clay Shirky, 'The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change' (2011) 90 *Foreign Affairs* 28.

[16] Reilly Dempsey Willis and Benjamin Mason Meier, 'Framing the Position of Social Media in the Local Institutionalization of International Human Rights Norms' in Thorsten Bonacker, Judith von Heusinger and Kerstin Zimmer (eds), *Localization in Development Aid: How Global Institutions enter Local Lifeworlds* (Routledge 2017).

[17] E Schwarz, '@hannah_arendt: An Arendtian Critique of Online Social Networks' (2014) 43 Millennium - Journal of International Studies 165; Philip Alston, 'Introduction: Third Generation Human Rights Fact-Finding' (2013) 107 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 61; Margaret Satterthwaite, 'Finding, Verifying, and Curating Human Rights Facts' (2013) 107 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 62; Brian Root, 'Statistics and Data in Human Rights Research' (2013) 107 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 65; Steven R Ratner, 'The Political Dimension of International Human Rights Fact-Finding' (2013) 107 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 70; Anita Breuer, Todd Landman and Dorothea Farquhar, 'Social Media and Protest Mobilization: Evidence from the Tunisian Revolution' (2015) 22

lack thereof) between *international* Twitter campaigns on *domestic* law, looking at the utility of Twitter for transnational advocacy (both organic and networked) for improving domestic women's rights.[18] This is an area ripe for empirical exploration.[19]

2. **Taking a comparative approach to measure Twitter campaigns**: Many Twitter studies focus on an in-depth analysis of one particular campaign,[20] or comparing two campaigns in the same country,[21] whereas this research takes a unique methodological step to a multi-country study, looking at the differences and similarities across seven countries representing a wide geo-political spectrum. This will add a new dimension to the academic understanding of Twitter's relationship with legal systems. A comparative approach can uncover important findings that differ from a single country study.

3. **Experimenting with new methodologies in examining norm institutionalisation to bring the 'law' more into focus, specifically in relation to the spiral model**: This research builds upon the innovative approach taken by Meier and Kim in their work on examining norm institutionalisation.[22] Applying a modified version of this normative work specifically to Twitter will make an important contribution to the study of norms. This normative aspect of the research fills noted gaps in the literature on the spiral model, addressing the issue of whether governments 'talk the talk' after

Democratization 764; Julia Elyachar, 'Writing the Revolution: Dilemmas of Ethnographic Writing after the January 25th Revolution in Egypt — Cultural Anthropology' <http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/209-writing-the-revolution> accessed 28 April 2016; Khaled Fahmy, 'The Real Tragedy Behind the Fire of Institut d'Egypte — Cultural Anthropology' (*Cultural Anthropology*) <http://culanth.org/fieldsights/233-the> accessed 28 April 2016; Mahboubeh Abbasgholizadeh, '"To Do Something We Are Unable to Do in Iran": Cyberspace, the Public Sphere, and the Iranian Women's Movement' (2014) 39 Signs 831; Nima Naghibi, 'Diasporic Disclosures: Social Networking, NEDA, and the 2009 Iranian Presidential Elections' (2011) 34 Biography 56.

[18] Amanda Potts and others, 'Exploring "Success" in Digitally Augmented Activism: A Triangulated Approach to Analyzing UK Activist Twitter Use' (2014) 6 Discourse, Context & Media 65; Charli Carpenter and B Jose, 'Transnational Issue Networks in Real and Virtual Space: The Case of Women, Peace and Security' (2012) 12 Global Networks 525; I Chiluwa and P Ifukor, '"War against Our Children": Stance and Evaluation in #BringBackOurGirls Campaign Discourse on Twitter and Facebook' (2015) 26 Discourse & Society 267; Debolina Dutta and Oishik Sircar, 'India's Winter of Discontent: Some Feminist Dilemmas in the Wake of a Rape' (2013) 39 Feminist Studies 293.

[19] Schwarz (n 17).

[20] Divya Titus, 'Social Media as a Gateway for Young Feminists: Lessons from the #IWillGoOut Campaign in India' (2018) 26 Gender & Development 231; Tilly A Gurman, Catherine Nichols and Elyssa S Greenberg, 'Potential for Social Media to Challenge Gender-Based Violence in India: A Quantitative Analysis of Twitter Use' (2018) 26 Gender & Development 325; Rosemary Pennington, 'Making Space in Social Media: #MuslimWomensDay in Twitter' (2018) 42 Journal of Communication Inquiry 199.

[21] Ben O'Loughlin and others, 'Twitter and Global Political Crises: Cycles of Insecurity in #PrayforParis and #PrayforSyria' (2017) 10 Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 175.

[22] Benjamin Mason Meier and Yuna Kim, 'Human Rights Accountability Through Treaty Bodies: Examining Human Rights Treaty Monitoring for Water and Sanitation' (2015) 26 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 139.

they 'walk the walk'.[23] In other words, once a treaty is signed or a law changed
(walking the walk), is long term meaningful change manifested in government
discourse, policies, and approaches (talking the talk)?

The impact of the thesis beyond academia is to provide activists, advocates, practitioners, and
individuals around the world with rigorous, evidence-based knowledge about the long term
effects of hashtag campaigns. The study identifies campaign characteristics which are more
likely to be associated with positive legal outcomes, as well as campaign characteristics and
behaviours which are likely to be associated with no change, or, in some cases, potentially
negative legal changes. While this is one small contribution, perhaps this research can have a
real world, positive impact on women and girls. As Simmons stated, '[w]hen the tweets turn
from dinner preferences to revolutionary politics, that can matter.'[24] But how, why, and
when?[25]

The Spiral Model

In 1998, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink published a ground-breaking book in
transnational advocacy, where they outlined their 'boomerang model'.[26] The model used a
visual metaphor of a boomerang to describe the relationship between domestic civil society
and transnational advocacy networks ('TANs') in advocating for domestic change. The
metaphor envisions domestic groups 'boomeranging' out to transnational networks to exert
foreign pressure on domestic governments. This theory opened significant doors to the work
of TANs and marked a watershed moment in activism research.

Shortly thereafter, the boomerang model formed the baseline for the development of a more
detailed, predictive model. Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink pulled together a series of case studies

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[23] Simmons explicitly calls for this kind of research, stating that further examination of the spiral model that has
not yet been undertaken could include: 'actual textual analysis of a relevant corpus of government statements,
press releases, documents, speeches, and debates that would demonstrate a change in the language governments
use when discussing policies related to rights practice.' Beth A Simmons, 'From Ratification to Compliance:
Quantitative Evidence on the Spiral Model' in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), *The persistent
power of human rights: from commitment to compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013).
[24] Beth A Simmons, 'International Studies in the Global Information Age' (2011) 55 International Studies
Quarterly 589, 590.
[25] Beth A Simmons, 'Preface: International Relationships in the Information Age' (2013) 15 International
Studies Review 1.
[26] Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics* (Cornell University Press 1998).

on human rights change to identify consistent patterns, trends, and outcomes. The result was the spiral model of human rights change.[27] The model, again using a visualisation, resembles a spiral moving across three groups of horizontally aligned actors (domestic state, domestic civil society, and international actors) and through five vertically aligned phases of change. Again, the pivotal element of the model, *necessary* for change, was (and still is) the influence of the international actors. The model was revisited in 2013, and, although some clarifications were suggested, the basic tenets of the model were upheld through additional case studies and scope condition identification.[28] Since its first publication, the spiral model has been tested, interrogated, and both critiqued and lauded as a revolutionary approach to activism.

Having undertaken a survey of the critiques of the spiral model, this thesis posits that they fall into five primary categories:[29]

1. The model under-represents domestic actors, structures, and voices.[30]

2. The modality of the spiral model runs a distinct risk of sparking backlash from the domestic government.[31]

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[27] Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge Univ Press 1999).

[28] Thomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), *The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013).

[29] These are explained in detail in Chapter 2.

[30] Alison Brysk, 'Communicative Action and Human Rights in Colombia: When Words Fail' [2009] Colombia Internacional 36; Anthony Tirado Chase, 'The State and Human Rights: Governance and Sustainable Human Development in Yemen' [2003] International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 213; Isabelle Cheng and Lara Momesso, 'Look, the World Is Watching How We Treat Migrants! The Making of the Anti-Trafficking Legislation during the Ma Administration' (2017) 46 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 61; Umit Cizre, 'The Truth and Fiction About (Turkey's) Human Rights Politics' (2001) 3 Human Rights Review 55; Xinyuan Dai, 'The "Compliance Gap" and the Efficacy of International Human Rights Institutions' in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), *The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013); Man-ho Heo, 'Mongolia's Political Change and Human Rights in Five-Phase Spiral Model: Implications for North Korea: Mongolia's Political Change and HR' (2014) 29 Pacific Focus 413; Andreas Laursen, 'Israel's Supreme Court and International Human Rights Law: The Judgement on "Moderate Physical Pressure"' (2000) 69 Nordic Journal of International Law 413; Alejandro Anaya Muñoz, 'Transnational and Domestic Processes in the Definition of Human Rights Policies in Mexico' (2009) 31 Human Rights Quarterly 35; Rolf Schwarz, 'The Paradox of Sovereignty, Regime Type and Human Rights Compliance' (2004) 8 The International Journal of Human Rights 199; Simmons, 'From Ratification to Compliance: Quantitative Evidence on the Spiral Model' (n 23).

[31] Brysk (n 30); Omar G Encarnación, 'International Influence, Domestic Activism, and Gay Rights in Argentina' (2013) 128 Political Science Quarterly 687; Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, 'How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law' (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 621; Kathryn Sikkink, 'The United States and Torture: Does the Spiral Model Work?' in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), *The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013); Anja Jetschke, 'The Power of Human Rights a Decade after: From Euphoria to Contestation?' in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), *The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013).

3. Some countries get 'stuck' and never progress through to the final phase of the model, thus lacking in long-term, meaningful change to the laws and their implementation.[32]

4. The model presupposes a baseline level of domestic state capacity to instigate and implement change. This is not always true.[33]

5. The model relies heavily on naming and shaming and the advocacy work done by transnational networks, whilst ignoring the role of material incentives often presented by foreign *governments*, not just civil society.[34]

Beyond the overarching non-neutrality of Twitter rooted in its algorithms and filter bubbles,[35] there are five relevant areas of critique of specific to using social media for activism, building upon media effects theories:

1. As evidenced earlier, social media is predominantly a tool of the Global Northern elite, potentially creating homogenisation through functionalities.[36]

2. Social media is organic and thus less 'controllable' than other campaigns.[37]

3. Social media campaigns could potentially lack persistence, coming and going faster than meaningful change demands.[38]

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[32] Raed A Alhargan, 'The Impact of the UN Human Rights System and Human Rights INGOs on the Saudi Government with Special Reference to the Spiral Model' (2012) 16 The International Journal of Human Rights 598; Brysk (n 30); Jetschke (n 31); Eran Shor, 'Conflict, Terrorism, and the Socialization of Human Rights Norms: The Spiral Model Revisited' (2008) 55 Social Problems 117.

[33] Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse, 'Human Rights in Areas of Limited Statehood: The New Agenda' in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), *The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013); Jack Goldsmith and Stephen D Krasner, 'The Limits of Idealism' (2003) 132 Daedalus 47; Shor (n 32).

[34] Goldsmith and Krasner (n 33); Jérôme Y Bachelard, 'The Anglo-Leasing Corruption Scandal in Kenya: The Politics of International and Domestic Pressures and Counter-Pressures' (2010) 37 Review of African Political Economy 187; Ronald R Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 'Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric' (2007) 13 European Journal of International Relations 35; Robyn Linde, 'Statelessness and Roma Communities in the Czech Republic: Competing Theories of State Compliance' (2006) 13 International Journal on Minority & Group Rights 341; Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, 'Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice' (2003) 28 International Security 5.

[35] Andrew Henry Jakubowicz, 'Alt_Right White Lite: Trolling, Hate Speech and Cyber Racism on Social Media' (2017) 9 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 41; Sarah J Jackson and Brooke Foucault Welles, 'Hijacking #myNYPD: Social Media Dissent and Networked Counterpublics: Hijacking #myNYPD' (2015) 65 Journal of Communication 932; Ott (n 12); Rune Karlsen and others, 'Echo Chamber and Trench Warfare Dynamics in Online Debates' (2017) 32 European Journal of Communication 257.

[36] 'Digital in 2018: World's Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion Mark' (n 6); Ott (n 12).

[37] Sarah Joseph, 'Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights' (2012) 35 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 145; Gladwell (n 15); Evgeny Morovoz, 'The Internet' (2010) 179 *Foreign Policy* 40.

[38] Marta Poblet and Jonathan Kolieb, 'Responding to Human Rights Abuses in the Digital Era: New Tools, Old Challenges' (2018) 54 Stanford Journal of International Law 259.

4. Campaigns tend to virally take off without participants having much knowledge of the domestic situation.[39]

5. Social media campaigns do not present many incentives for governments to change as participants do not put themselves at risk or have a stake in outcomes.[40]

These categories form the basis for this study's design, giving credence to the variables which have been selected and explored for their role in forming the relationships between international Twitter campaigns and domestic legal change. The theoretical framework provides the architecture for the methodological design of this study. Critiques of the spiral model enable the research to focus not only on the potential positive outcomes, but also the risks. Adopting a critical approach to the spiral model and the role of transnational advocacy in domestic legal change will open the door to exploring the full breadth of potential outcomes – positive *and* negative.

To answer these questions, this study looks at nearly 1 million Tweets across eight campaigns targeting domestic legal change in seven countries. The campaigns included in this study are:

1. #stopstoning – calling for changes to the law in Iran which sets stoning as a form of the death penalty for women accused (often falsely) of adultery

2. #letwomengotostadium – advocating for the lifting of a ban on women attending men's volleyball matches in Iran, seen as an affront to women's autonomy and equality

3. #farkhunda – the brutal mob murder of a young woman in Afghanistan, in the presence of police, was caught on film and went viral on social media. The resulting hashtag campaign in her name called upon the government to strengthen law enforcement to protect women from violence, particularly in the public sphere.

4. #sendeanlat – rates of femicide in Turkey have been steadily rising for many years. When a young woman was raped and murdered on a bus, her story led to the campaign #sendeanlat, which roughly translates into 'share your story'. The

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[39] Srilatha Batliwala, 'Grassroots Movements as Transnational Actors: Implications for Global Civil Society' (2002) 13 VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary & Nonprofit Organizations 393; Lilie Chouliaraki, 'Post-Humanitarianism Humanitarian Communication beyond a Politics of Pity' (2010) 13 International Journal of Cultural Studies 107; Stuart Garman, 'New Communications Technologies in Emergencies' in Roger MacGinty and Jenny H Peterson (eds), *The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action* (Routledge 2015); K Davis Cross, 'Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later' (2012) 39 Review of International Studies 137.

[40] Gladwell and Shirky (n 15); Gladwell (n 15); Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction* (2nd edn, Blackwell Publishing 2006).

campaign specifically called upon the government to repeal a law which allowed mitigation in many femicide cases based on 'provocation.'

5. #mydressmychoice – a woman in Nairobi was publicly and violently stripped naked because she was wearing a mini-skirt. This incident was also videoed and went viral on social media. The ensuing hashtag campaign advocated for stronger laws to protect women from violence and more action from front line law enforcement.

6. #delhigangrape – When a young woman was brutally gang raped and murdered on a bus in India, her story ignited outcry via social media. The campaign demanded that the government strengthen laws and law enforcement, particularly in the courts, to protect women and girls.

7. #niunamenos – machismo culture in Argentina is often blamed for the high rates of femicide. After a report of a young woman murdered because of her gender, activists turned to social media to catalyse the country. The campaign had very clear demands for changes and improvements to the laws around femicide, including the establishment of a national registry of femicide.

8. #women2drive – for decades, a religious decree banned women from driving in Saudi Arabia. Activists decided to use social media to reinvigorate their campaign, filming themselves driving and posting the videos online. The campaign took off, demanding that the ban be lifted.

It is important to recognise that the attention drawn to issues highlighted in social media campaigns will be necessarily different than the potential effects from traditional media. Social media, organic in nature, allows the framing and attention on an issue to reflect, at least to some extent, society's views more so than traditional (edited and curated) media. This is of course not without drawbacks, which are explored in detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis. All of the campaigns in this study either started with or became popularised via a Tweet and continued to be driven by the use of Twitter. The campaigns were known more by the hashtag than any other descriptor. The campaigns sought to use mass public support and pressure to force governments to act. They all set out to improve the lives of women and girls through domestic legal change. Yet very little is known about the long-term influence on or relationship with law – positive, negative, or neither. This research seeks to understand the full range of potential outcomes through a large scale, comparative study to determine whether campaigns originating in and driven by Twitter are associated with legal change. Ultimately, the thesis seeks to identify a 'package' of campaign characteristics that are most

closely aligned with positive legal change to create an 'ideal' hashtag campaign. Equally important, the study will identify risky Twitter campaign behaviours which are correlated to negative outcomes. To the best of the author's knowledge, this kind of large scale, comparative study specifically looking at the relationship between international campaigns driven by Twitter and domestic women's rights has not yet been done.

To do this, the research explores three sets of variables: context (understanding the baseline domestic political and demographic environment), Twitter campaign characteristics (the independent variables), and legal change (the dependent variables). The context variables look at a variety of domestic aspects, from government type to the presence of women's rights NGOs to internet penetration. Twitter campaigns are examined based on number of Tweets per day, the relationship between retweets, replies, and likes, user profiles, and Tweet content. Legal change is broken down into four categories: legislation, institutionalisation (including soft law, government discourse, budget allocations, etc.), law enforcement (from front line policing through to the highest level of court cases), and examination of the treatment of women's rights norms through state dialogue with UN treaty bodies.

Results

This research has found that campaigns which originate in and continue to be driven by Twitter are associated with a wide range of legal outcomes, from the situation being *worse* after the campaign through to potentially positive changes for women. As introduced above, legal change was measured across four areas: legislative change, evidence of long term institutionalisation of the campaign goals, how the law is implemented and enforced, and how the government approaches the issue in dialogue with relevant UN treaty bodies. A simple rating scale was used to quantify the level of change across each of the four areas, starting from a score of one which represents a situation where the campaign has been associated with negative outcomes, where the legal status of women and girls has changed for the worse. A score of five represents a 'perfect' change where all of the campaign's legal change goals were achieved and implemented and women are actively benefitting from the campaign. A score of three equates to no change. It is worth noting that no campaign was rated as a one, nor was any campaign rated as a five.

Table 1.1: Summary of Results

	#stopstoning	#letwomengotostadium	#farkhunda	#sendeanlat	#mydressmychoice	#delhigangrape	#niunamenos	#women2drive
Overall legal change (average)	**2.00**	**2.50**	**2.63**	**2.75**	**3.00**	**3.13**	**3.63**	**3.88**
Overall campaign score (composite)	**2.12**	**2.15**	**2.60**	**2.78**	**3.53**	**3.92**	**4.01**	**3.91**
Legislation	2.00	3.00	3.50	2.50	3.00	5.00	5.00	5.00
Institutionalisation	3.00	2.00	3.00	2.50	3.50	3.00	3.50	4.00
Law enforcement	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	2.50	2.00	2.00	2.50
UN reporting	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.50	4.00	4.00

The levels of change varied greatly across the legal components, with the most change seen in legislation itself. Some change was seen in institutionalisation, which is broadly defined to include government discourse, soft law and policies, and, where accessible, budget allocations. Law enforcement, which includes the whole scope from front line policing through to the highest level of court cases, showed the most reluctance to change for women, with the least positive outcomes. Evidence of norm institutionalisation through dialogue with UN treaty bodies illustrated a range of outcomes. In short, campaigns which are consistent, persistent, domestically driven but with international attention, and which draw down from international women's rights norms (the components of the composite campaign score in Table 1.1 above) are associated with more positive change (the overall legal change figure in Table 1.1). Campaigns which lack domestic voice and drive, fail to attract a high level of foreign pressure, lack in persistence and consistency, show more volatile and varying messaging, and are less aligned with international women's rights norms, are associated with more negative outcomes.

Structure

Chapter 2 of this thesis sets out the theoretical framework and methodology. The chapter traces a brief history of the development of the spiral model, looking at literature in constructivism, norm evolution, and transnational advocacy networks, leading to an in depth

explanation of the spiral model itself. A significant part of this chapter lays out the primary critiques of the spiral model, mapping and coding a variety of papers and studies to generate overarching categories of assessments of the model's validity. These critiques provide the basic architecture for study design and methodological choices. Literature on the non-neutrality of social media, media effects, and the role of activism through social media are also introduced. The chapter culminates in the presentation of a research map which guides the rest of the thesis. Technical details on the specific methodological choices are included in the appendices.

A key finding of this study, as shown in Table 1.1, was that Twitter campaigns are associated with a variety of legal outcomes. The campaigns can be loosely grouped into four categories of outcomes: negative/regressive, status quo, semi-positive, and positive. Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 present detailed findings and analyses of each of these categories of outcomes. These chapters first present a chronological exploration of legal change, looking at legislation, institutionalisation of legal norms, the role of law enforcement including policing and the judiciary, and normative evaluation of the presence of change in dialogue with relevant UN treaty bodies and Universal Periodic Reviews. These areas are analysed for the time period before the campaign started and after the campaign started to gauge change. This analysis provides critical insight into the overall categorisation of legal outcomes.

These chapters then describe and analyse in detail the Twitter campaigns themselves, exploring how the campaigns behaved and what the key characteristics were. For example, who were the most active participants in the campaigns? Did the campaigns peak and die off or was there consistent activity over time? Were participants retweeting or replying? How were the campaigns normatively framed over time in the content of Tweets? These questions paint a distinct picture for each group of campaigns. These chapters answer research question 1: Can international campaigns originating in and driven by Twitter contribute to domestic legal change in women's rights?

Chapter 7 draws all of the legal and campaign analyses together through statistical testing and modelling. This chapter tests each of the variables to specifically address research question 2: Which campaign behaviours are associated with change? This chapter presents the quantification of the Twitter variables and the legal variables. These quantified variables are then statistically tested to identify significant relationships between campaign behaviours and

characteristics and legal outcomes. This chapter culminates in presenting a simple linear regression to model the relationship between campaigns driven by Twitter and legal change.

Finally, the concluding chapter draws the major findings together, providing an overarching analysis of the relationship between international campaigns originating in and driven by Twitter and legal change in domestic women's rights. This chapter presents what an 'ideal' campaign might look like, providing much needed evidence-based guidance to advocacy networks and activists around the world. The chapter also presents the limitations of the study and identifies key areas for future work.

Chapter 2 Research Framework

Introduction

International relations scholars came together in the 1990s to model the role of transnational advocacy networks in moving governments from a regime of human rights abuses to a regime of legal conformity with human rights norms. It was called the spiral model of human rights change, and it was on evidence from 10 case studies.[1] The model was again revisited in 2013, exploring some of the critiques and pushing the model into new issue and geographic areas. The evaluation reaffirmed its validity in mapping and predicting legal, human rights change. At the time, it was ground-breaking. Not only did the model prove the importance and indeed necessity of transnational actors, but it also showed that there was an identifiable pattern. Human rights change was shown to be systematic, coherent, and consistent, across a spectrum of different countries and cultures. The model has been both lauded and heavily critiqued. It is worth noting at the outset that the original model was developed before social media campaigning became prevalent.

In this research framework chapter, I first explore the development of the model, laying the theoretical groundwork and tracing the model's roots. This leads to describing the spiral model itself, moving into a survey of the main critiques, and coding them into five different areas – lack of progression, domestic backlash, under-emphasis of the role of domestic actors (and conversely overemphasis of the role of transnational actors), overlooking critical capacity issues, and finally ignoring the importance of material incentives. Similarly, academic and scholarly critiques of social media activism, stemming from media effects literature, are then presented. These critique areas are used to develop the research design, informing the variable selection, analysis and understanding, and framing conclusions. Each independent variable of interest is derived from one of the critique areas, ensuring that the research itself is grounded in theory and scholarship, to fully understand the utility of Twitter-driven campaigns in legal change. In essence, the research asks the same questions scholars asked of the spiral model, but in a social media environment. Ample time is then spent presenting the theoretically informed and grounded methodology.

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[1] Kenya, Uganda, South Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, Indonesia, the Philippines, Chile, Guatemala, and Eastern Europe.

Constructivist Roots

A new international relations theory emerged in the 1980s which attempted to bridge gaps between competing theories of realism (states are driven by power and thus in a constant state of aggression) and neoliberal institutionalism (states are not driven by power alone and thus are in a constant state of cooperation).[2] This emerging theory used the concept of 'constructivism' from other fields of research. Applied to the field of IR and legal change, state interests and identities are not set in stone as previous theories held, but rather are mutually constitutive and changeable.[3] It is the state interactions themselves that determine interests and identities. The strand of constructivism taken in this thesis is best summed up by Adler when he states 'the main goal of constructivism is to provide both theoretical and empirical explanations of social institutions and social change with the help of the combined effect of agents and social structures.'[4] This thesis takes this conventional constructivist approach.[5]

Constructivists define power broadly, taking in not just material, economic, military forms, but also power in the form of the ability to define the rules of the game and dictate the norms and institutions that restrict or constrain behaviours and actions. Constructivism, as with previous IR theories, continues to carve out important spaces for language and discourse: 'speech acts...not only describe a reality, they also construct it.'[6] It is through communication (interactions) that the act of mutual constitution (of identities and interests) occurs.[7] The constructivist approach underscores that reality is also constructed through dialogue.[8] Meaning is negotiated, and depends entirely on the interpretations of both the 'sender' and the 'receiver'.[9] Wendt explains this process as 'signalling, interpreting, and responding' and

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[2] Emanuel Adler, 'Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics' (1997) 3 European Journal of Interntional Relations 319.

[3] Thomas Risse, '"Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics' (2000) 54 International Organization 1, 5 discussing the work of Onuf, Kratochwil, and Wendy; John Gerard Ruggie, 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge' (1998) 52 International Organization 855.

[4] Adler (n 2) 325.

[5] As opposed to a critical constructivist approach. See, e.g. Hopf.

[6] Friedrich V Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Reprint, Cambridge Univ Press 1989).

[7] Richard J Evanoff, 'Universalist, Relativist, and Constructivist Approaches to Intercultural Ethics' (2004) 28 International Journal of Intercultural Relations 439; Matthew J Hoffmann, 'Is Constructivist Ethics an Oxymoron?' (2009) 11 International Studies Review 231.

[8] Evanoff (n 7) 449.

[9] ibid 500.

sees it as a social act in and of itself.[10] Risse also delves into the study of the role of language and communication in constructivism, finding that a 'logic of arguing', when certain conditions are present, can be a critical aspect in negotiating collective meaning and shared understandings in international relations.[11] These negotiations have real world impact, shaping and changing how states behave, interact, and relate to each other. This forms the theoretical basis for the spiral model itself.

Notably, many feminists take a radical constructivist approach, whereby gender is socially constructed, but constructed in a male-dominated, hetero-patriarchal normative environment.[12] Understanding this environment and the norms and rules which follow allows feminist researchers to deconstruct gender inequalities and the power relations which continue to favour males over females (in a socially determined way). Most researchers agree that gender is an analytical tool, not a methodology.[13] A constructivist approach brings this lens into focus.[14] As this research will focus on women's rights in various forms, it is important to recognise that a constructivist approach will frame the research so that the gendered nature of the norms and their formation (and change) can be illustrated. As a variable, it is absolutely critical to consider the gendered nature of the power dynamics and hierarchies which pave the way for normative change.

Conventional constructivists 'seek to explain the social construction of reality'.[15] It is this empirical approach that opens doors to understanding how certain rules, norms, and institutions are constructed, the interests and identities which fuelled their formations, the knowledge and discourse which underpin them, and how they operate within a set of given conditions.[16] Social facts necessitate social interpretation and understanding, which make them inherently different from natural facts. Constructivists, through research, strive to attach meaning and understanding to those social facts, to understand the socially determined world in which these facts are created and operationalised. In this way, researchers can

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[10] Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics' (1992) 46 International Organization 391, 405.
[11] Risse (n 3).
[12] Laura Sjoberg and J Ann Tickner, 'Feminist Perspectives on International Relations' in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and BA Simmons (eds), *Handbook of International Relations* (2nd edn, SAGE Publications Ltd 2013).
[13] ibid.
[14] Emanuel Adler, 'Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates' in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and BA Simmons (eds), *Handbook of International Relations* (2nd edn, SAGE Publications Ltd 2013).
[15] Adler (n 2) 328.
[16] Adler (n 2).

employ objectivity to understand subjectivity. This is not to say that constructivism is not rife with internal debate over empirical perspectives, but for the purposes of this research, utilising the tenets of constructivism, employing an empirical, conventional constructivist methodology will underpin the understanding of human rights change.[17]

Norms

Constructivism gives formal rise to the study and appreciation of norms, and in particular human rights norms, within the field of IR.[18] Norms are generally defined as 'standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations'[19] or 'a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.'[20] The constructivist approach is thus needed to understand and explore said identities. The study of norms, at the heart of this research, sits squarely within this conventional constructivist approach.[21] Whilst the concept of 'norms' in international relations and law predates the evolution of constructivist frameworks, using a constructivist approach to the study of norms ties together the understanding of state behaviours (constructivism) with behavioural standards (norms).[22] Using a norms approach also allows for the core IR concepts of self-interest, power, and language to remain a part of

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[17] There are some methodological challenges with this constructivist approach in empirical research. For example, if everything is constructed and nothing is "real" in international relations, then we may feel that we do not have an objective reality against which to measure research findings (Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 'Foregrounding Ontology: Dualism, Monism, and IR Theory' (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 129; Friedrich Kratochwil, 'Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt's "Social Theory of International Politics" and the Constructivist Challenge' (2000) 29 Millennium (03058298) 73.) However, according to Jackson the goal is to produce knowledge – and if the research is systematic, consistent, honest, and rigorous, then knowledge had indeed been produced.

[18] Kathryn Sikkink, 'Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human Rights' (1998) 31 *PS: Political Science and Politics* 517, 517–523; John L Campbell, 'Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy' (2002) 28 Annual Review of Sociology 21; Jeffrey T Checkel, 'Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe' (1999) 43 International Studies Quarterly 83; Martha Finnemore, 'Are Legal Norms Distinctive?' (2000) 32 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 699, 699; Lisa L Martin and Beth A Simmons, 'Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions' (1998) 52 International Organization 729, 738; Jeffrey W Legro, 'Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the "Failure" of Internationalism' (1997) 51 International Organization 31, 31; Elias Steinhilper, 'From "the Rest" to "the West"? Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Western Bias in Norm Diffusion Research' (2015) 17 International Studies Review 536, 537.

[19] Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State' (2009) 40 International Organization 753, 767.

[20] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change' (1998) 52 International Organization 887, 891; See also Peter J Katzenstein, Robert O Keohane and Stephen D Krasner, 'International Organization and the Study of World Politics' (1998) 52 International Organization 645; Finnemore (n 18); Audie Klotz, 'Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa' (1995) 49 International Organization 451.

[21] Sikkink, 'Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human Rights' (n 18) 517–523; Campbell (n 18); Checkel (n 18); Finnemore (n 18) 699; Martin and Simmons (n 18) 738; Legro (n 18) 31; Steinhilper (n 18) 537.

[22] Legro (n 18).

the decision-making process. In fact, Goertz goes so far as to state '[n]orms and their impact on behaviour cannot be studied apart from issues of power and self-interest.'[23]

Norms, when accepted, create obligations.[24] A common definitional thread also seen in the literature on norms is the idea of consequences for non-compliance[25] and the use of sanctions.[26] The literature is in fact teeming with references to the importance of consequences in defining norms, even to the extent of utilising the term 'punishment' for non-conforming behaviour.[27] In the real world, of course, this does not mean that all individuals or states will conform all the time, as each decision is made against a background of all the exogenous factors at play.[28] Once again, the constructivist approach here holds that states interests and identities will both change and be changed by interactions; thus a constructivist understanding of norms presents a very dynamic picture. It is a complex web when looking at the influence of international norms on domestic policies.[29]

The process whereby a norm comes to be is commonly referred to as the 'life cycle' of a norm.[30] In the first stage, called norm emergence, an individual or group of individuals actively work to frame an idea as a norm. These individuals are called 'norm entrepreneurs'.[31] It is important to note that norms do not generally become norms on their own but rather it takes active work to take an idea and construct it so that it becomes a norm.[32] According to Finnemore and Sikkink, at the international level, norm entrepreneurs tend to have an organisational platform, usually the establishment or use of transnational advocacy networks (explored in more detail later in this chapter), non-governmental

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[23] Gary Goertz and Paul F Diehl, 'Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some Conceptual and Measurement Issues' (1992) 36 The Journal of Conflict Resolution 634, 661.

[24] Andrew P Cortell and James W Davis, 'Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda' (2000) 2 International Studies Review 65.

[25] Robert Axelrod, 'An Evolutionary Approach to Norms' (1986) 80 The American Political Science Review 1095.

[26] Goertz and Diehl (n 23).

[27] Stephen D Krasner, 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables' in Stephen D Krasner (ed), *International regimes* (11. print, Cornell Univ Press 2004); Kratochwil (n 6); Sikkink, Katherine, 'The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe' in Judith Goldstein and Robert O Keohane (eds), *Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions, and political change* (Cornell University Press 1993); James G March and Johan P Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders' (1998) 52 International Organization 943; Axelrod (n 25); Goertz and Diehl (n 23).

[28] March and Olsen (n 27); Sonia Cardenas, 'Norm Collision: Explaining the Effects of International Human Rights Pressure on State Behavior' (2004) 6 International Studies Review 213 looking specifically at states' decisions to violate human rights norms.

[29] *See e.g.* Cardenas (n 28); Goertz and Diehl (n 23); Cortell and Davis (n 24).

[30] Finnemore and Sikkink (n 20) 895.

[31] Finnemore and Sikkink (n 20).

[32] ibid 897.

organisations, international bodies such as the UN, and other platforms.[33] Once a norm 'emerges', it must reach a 'tipping point.' After the tipping point is reached, the norm enters a process referred to as 'cascading', where, as the descriptive word suggests, the norm becomes so widely accepted that those not embracing the norm are seen as non-conforming, and are enticed to become norm followers.[34] At this point, there must be some kind of reward for norm compliance (even if it just belonging) and some kind of consequence for norm breaking (even of a social nature, such as reputational damage). The spiral model addresses, generally, human rights norms which have gone through this life cycle and now carry consequences for non-conformity. Some human rights norms are more widely accepted than others; this thesis looks at women's rights and in many campaigns violence against women. These norms are not universal but have generally become internationally accepted. Therefore, there is at least some form of consequence for non-conformity to the norms in this study.

Finally, norms become internalised. At this point, the norm becomes so pervasive that it is part of 'everyday life.'[35] The norm is no longer questioned, and non-conforming behaviour is both rare and carries a significant consequence, sometimes quite 'painful.'[36] In the international setting, internalised norms provide a baseline level of predictability, stability, legitimation, and even trust between nation states, and at best can provide a level of deterrence.[37] With the constructivist perspective, norms help to shape and understand interests and identities, which can then help to predict interactions. Having institutionalised and internalised norms allows states to negotiate and debate, to enter into agreements, and to make commitments to one another bilaterally or multilaterally. Without norms, levels of uncertainty increase which can lead to (arguably) less action and more stagnation. Many factors play a role in the likelihood of a norm reaching this stage of the life cycle, such as legitimation, prominence, and intrinsic characteristics of the norm.[38] For example, concepts which resonate across cultures are more likely to be the basis of norms which are eventually institutionalised.[39] This is not, of course, without controversy, debate, or examples to the

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[33] Finnemore and Sikkink (n 20).
[34] ibid 901.
[35] Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Cornell University Press 1998) 35.
[36] Axelrod (n 25) 1104.
[37] Axelrod (n 25).
[38] Finnemore and Sikkink (n 20) 906–7.
[39] Keck and Sikkink (n 35).

contrary,[40] but the majority of scholars accept that a norm with transnationally agreed roots is more likely to take hold.

Well established norms are often codified in law, where they can 'exert long-term effects on policy making.'[41] Some scholars hold that if a norm is strong enough, it matters not whether it is codified into law or not, as individuals and states will abide.[42] In other words, if norms are influencing action and behaviour, does it matter whether they have been codified into law, and in particular international law, at all?[43] Some, on the other hand, find that the act of moving a norm into a set law changes the stakes and carries more weight than the norm on its own.[44] Conversely, laws based on weak norms are less likely to be successful enforced or abided.[45] In this way social norms and laws 'are often mutually supporting.'[46]

This model of norm institutionalisation is not without critique. Relevant to this research, there is a growing body of scholarship which highlights the 'Western' bias in norm institutionalisation, both in study and in practice.[47] Scholars have pointed out, rightfully so, that the majority of research into norms has focussed on predominantly Western norms.[48] When viewed in light of the life cycle described above, the heavily Western bias of norm entrepreneurs and norm framing becomes evident. This could also be intensified when using a social media platform to engage in normative work. Steinhilper notably titles his article 'From the West to the Rest' to capture the essence of this bias in the study of norms.[49] The ideas of 'norm makers' and 'norm takers' also emerge in this literature, where 'norm makers' are almost exclusively seen as Western or Northern agents, and 'norm takers' are those in the Global South.[50]

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[40] Finnemore and Sikkink (n 20) 908.
[41] Campbell (n 18) 31.
[42] Finnemore (n 18).
[43] ibid 701.
[44] Judith Goldstein and Robert O Keohane, 'Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework' in Judith Goldstein and Robert O Keohane (eds), *Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions, and political change* (Cornell University Press 1993); Martin and Simmons (n 18) 750. Martin and Simmons show that '[s]tates that believed that human-rights accords were nothing but meaningless scraps of paper found themselves surprised by the ability of transnational actors to use these commitments to force governments to change their policies.'
[45] Axelrod (n 25) 1106 specifically addressing Prohibition.
[46] ibid.
[47] Amitav Acharya, 'How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism' (2004) 58 International Organization 239; Steinhilper (n 18).
[48] Steinhilper (n 18).
[49] ibid.
[50] Susanne Zwingel, 'How Do Norms Travel? Theorizing International Women's Rights in Transnational Perspective' (2012) 56 International Studies Quarterly 115; Acharya (n 47); Steinhilper (n 18).

Building on this overly Westernised approach, domestic norms, structures, and policies are often critical but overlooked or under-emphasised variables in predicting outcomes and behaviours.[51] The so-called 'second wave' of research in norms works to prioritise and re(visit) the preeminent role of domestic structures and agents in the institutionalisation of international norms.[52] Much of the current literature finds that domestic variables have a significant effect on the internationalisation of international norms.[53] If a norm does not or cannot fit within the domestic state's interests or preferences then it will not internalise at the domestic level.[54] Cortell and Davis go further to specify domestic factors which explain the likelihood of institutionalisation – the domestic 'salience' of the norm and the domestic 'structural context.'[55] They find that more attention needs to be paid to understanding the process and the mechanisms at the domestic level which lead to the institutionalisation of an international norm. Their approach is to focus not on the norm itself, but rather the domestic factors surrounding the norm.[56] Domestic actors can use an international norms to bolster their work, but this is highly dependent on the interests of state and societal actors, and that domestic structures are a central determinant of the impact of international norms.[57] Acharya adds to this scholarship factors such as 'the authority of key norm-takers, the strength of prior local norms, [and] the credibility and prestige of local agents.'[58] Martin and Simmons in fact find that, under certain conditions, international institutions amplify *domestic* identities and interests. In other words, institutions will move actors already on a certain path further along that path, whilst those who have interests and identities further away from the institution will remain the same, or perhaps regress.[59] While the role of domestic actors and structures do form part of the spiral mode, a primary area of critique draws from this second wave normative work to find that the model under-specifies and under-emphasises the domestic factors while over-emphasising the role of international factors. A key part of this thesis is to

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[51] *See e.g.,* Checkel (n 18); Acharya (n 47); Martin and Simmons (n 18); Cortell and Davis (n 24); Andrew Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics' (1997) 51 International Organization 513; Andrew Moravcsik, 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe' (2000) 54 International Organization 217; Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'A Liberal Theory of International Law' (2000) 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings 240.

[52] Acharya (n 47) 240; Martin and Simmons (n 18) 739; Cortell and Davis (n 24) 66.

[53] Martin and Simmons (n 18) 739 "scholars today are turning once again to models of domestic politics to suggest new questions and approaches to the study of international institutions". Acharya (n 47); Andrew P Cortell and James W Davis, 'How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms' (1996) 40 International Studies Quarterly 451; Cortell and Davis (n 24).

[54] Checkel (n 18); Acharya (n 47); Cortell and Davis (n 53); Cortell and Davis (n 24).

[55] Cortell and Davis (n 53); Cortell and Davis (n 24).

[56] Cortell and Davis (n 24).

[57] Cortell and Davis (n 53).

[58] Acharya (n 47) 247–8.

[59] Martin and Simmons (n 18).

empirically explore the role of domestic voices in Twitter-driven campaigns to move domestic states towards international women's rights norms, resting on these second-wave normative theories and critiques of the spiral model.

Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs)

As noted above, critical players in the life cycle of norms are transnational advocacy networks, defined generally as groups working across state borders on a given issue, from a place of shared values and discourse, made up of non-state actors.[60] TANs are often norm entrepreneurs, framing issues in ways that help move them along the life cycle, with the ultimate goal of institutionalisation and internalisation. The work of TANs is thus inherently linked to norms.[61]

> [Transnational advocacy networks] contribute to changing perceptions that both state and societal actors may have of their identities, interests, and preferences, to transforming their discursive positions, and ultimately to changing procedures, policies, and behaviour.[62]

Constructivism, bringing together state interests, identities, interactions, and information, is the core of the work of TANs, while norm institutionalisation is the desired outcome. These networks allow for the gathering and sharing of information which can be critical to shaping, changing, and driving political agendas.[63] Building on its centrality in constructivism, the role of information is central to the work and effectiveness of TANs.[64] Information is generally contained in facts and testimony, and is used to frame issues in a way that is sympathetic to the cause and ultimately leads to change.[65] In addition to the role of information, TANs also use symbolism, leverage, and accountability (i.e. naming and

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[60] C Kiel, 'How Transnational Advocacy Networks Mobilize: Applying the Literature on Interest Groups to International Action' (2011) 3 Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International Studies 77.

[61] Sanjeev Khagram, James V Riker and Kathryn Sikkink, 'From Santiago to Seattle: Transnational Advocacy Groups Restructing World Politics' in Sanjeev Khagram, James V Riker and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), *Restructuring world politics: transnational social movements, networks, and norms* (University of Minnesota Press 2002).

[62] Keck and Sikkink (n 35) 3.

[63] Emanuel Adler and Peter M Haas, 'Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program' (1992) 46 International Organization 367; K Davis Cross, 'Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later' (2012) 39 Review of International Studies 137; Peter M Haas, 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination' (1992) 46 International Organization 1.

[64] Keck and Sikkink (n 35) 18–22.

[65] ibid 19; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (n 61) 11.

shaming) to achieve their goals.[66] The most successful TANs almost always work in partnership with domestic groups or individuals, reinforcing efforts to overcome domestic barriers.[67] However, some criticise TANs for being predominantly Western, both in location and values, where 'critics claim that this physical location in the most developed countries has led these social change INGOs to reflect primarily the sensibilities of citizens or governments in the developed world.'[68]

Social media has fundamentally changed the ability of networks to share information.[69] Whereas prior to the advent of social media, TANs would have undertaken specific and strategic work, with the organic and participatory nature of social media, it is possible that this has changed.[70] Interestingly, Keck and Sikkink specify that traditional TANs work does not generally involve mass mobilisation, which could be used to challenge the platform of social media in human rights campaigning.[71]

The Spiral Model of Human Rights Change

> In sum, we argue that the diffusion of international norms in the human rights area crucially depends on the establishment and the sustainability of networks among domestic and international actors who manage to link up with international regimes, to alert Western public opinion and Western governments.[72]

Building upon Keck and Sikkink's 'boomerang model' which began to specify the role of TANs in domestic activism,[73] the spiral model frames 'the various processes involved in the movement from norm expectation to real country-level results.'[74] Broadly, the model tracks how states move from human rights repression to denial, to tactical concessions, to

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[66] Keck and Sikkink (n 35) 22–25; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (n 61).

[67] Kiel (n 60); Keck and Sikkink (n 35).

[68] Kathryn Sikkink and Jackie Smith, 'Infrastructures for Change: Transnational Organizations, 1953-93' in Sanjeev Khagram, James V Riker and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), *Restructuring world politics: transnational social movements, networks, and norms* (University of Minnesota Press 2002) 35.

[69] Charli Carpenter and B Jose, 'Transnational Issue Networks in Real and Virtual Space: The Case of Women, Peace and Security' (2012) 12 Global Networks 525.

[70] ibid.

[71] Keck and Sikkink (n 35) 18.

[72] Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge Univ Press 1999) 5.

[73] Keck and Sikkink (n 35).

[74] Thomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), *The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013) 5.

prescriptive status, and finally to rule-consistent behaviour. The initial concept of a boomerang visualised advocacy work as domestic groups 'boomeranging' out to transnational groups and repeating the process to achieve change. This model was further developed and refined into a spiral, moving from domestic actors to transnational actors to target governments, again repeating in a spiralling motion to work through five phases to achieve long-term, meaningful legal change. Transnational actors and foreign pressure are essential to the model when moving from repression to denial, and again from denial to tactical concessions. Since the development of this model, some scholars have also found that the continued presence of transnational advocacy is critical to move from tactical concessions through to norm institutionalisation.[75]

The authors set out to formally research the role of norms and norm institutionalisation in human rights and legal change. Their aim was to link theory to practice, models to impact, particularly in the legal field of human rights.[76] The model is therefore both legal and political. 10 case studies of countries that were known to have moved from a regime which violated human rights norms to a regime which, to some extent at least, respected, protected, and fulfilled human rights norms were selected for in depth study. Across all 10 cases studies, similar patterns were identified. These patterns were analysed and led to the development of a 'model', rooted in constructivism, academic understanding of norm institutionalisation, and previous research into the role of TANs.

The model begins with the combination of a human rights violating state and a 'weak' domestic opposition. Once the international network becomes involved, mobilisation occurs and pressure is exerted. At this stage, the domestic state moves from repression to denial; the government publicly denies that there is any violation of human rights occurring. Sustained pressure from the international network forces the domestic government to, eventually, make some sort of 'tactical concession' to relieve the pressure. This is the critical turning point of the process of legal change. This move opens the door for the domestic opposition to gain strength and for the international network to continue to exert pressure and mobilise against the domestic state. Eventually, states engage in either policy or regime change. The final

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[75] E Neumayer, 'Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?' (2005) 49 Journal of Conflict Resolution 925; Kathryn Sikkink, 'A Typology of Relations Between Social Movements and International Institutions' (The American Society of International Law 2003).
[76] Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (n 72) 2.

phases of the model see the domestic state accept the international norm and, in some cases, institutionalise the norm fully. The visual model, showing the spiral action, is below.

Figure 2.1: The Spiral Model of Human Rights Change

Society	State	International/ Transnational
Weak domestic opposition	1. Repression	Transnational networks • Receive information from domestic opposition • Invoke international human rights norms • Pressurize repressive state • Mobilize international organizations and liberal states
Domestic opposition	2. Denial Repressive state denies validity of human rights norms as subject to international jurisdiction, claims non-intervention norms	Sustained bilateral and multilateral network pressure
Mobilization and strengthening of groups engaging human rights norms • New domestic actors and sustained links to transnational networks • Normative appeals • Information • Expansion in new political space • Human rights assuming centerstage in societal discourse	3. Tactical concessions • Concessions to the human rights network • Reduced margin of manoeuvre re human rights Policy change Regime change	
	4. Prescriptive status State accepts international norm • Ratifies international treaties • Institutionalizes norms domestically • Discursive practices	
	5. Rule-consistent behaviour	Reduced network mobilization

The glue holding the model together is the networking between international groups and domestic groups. The international groups are responsible for exerting the pressure necessary to move the domestic regime through a process of legal change; some pressure from the 'bottom up' is needed from domestic groups, but the lynchpin of the model is the leverage provided by the international network. The model seeks, 'ultimately, to specify the causal mechanisms by which international norms affect domestic structural change.'[77]

Transnational actors are accredited with movement in the key early stages of the model, rooted in international naming and shaming, while also 'empowering and strengthening the initially weak domestic opposition.'[78] It is not until well into the third, sometimes fourth phase, that the role of domestic civil society comes into play. Even then, it is framed as a 'supplemental' pressure to that from the transnational actors.[79] When revisited a decade later, Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink focussed more on examining the spiral model as a theory of legal change, noting that 'international lawyers have become aware of the increasing social science scholarship on human rights, while political scientists started to take the particular characteristics of law seriously.'[80]

The Spiral Model as a Theory of Legal Change

> The most important general legal questions, it seems to me, both in theory and practice, concern, first, the nature of the relationship between a society and the legal rules that operate within it, and, second, the forces that cause law to change.[81]

One of the unique contributions of this research from a theoretical perspective is the work it does to apply international relations theories and methodologies to analyse legal change.[82] Traditional legal research takes a doctrinal approach, using case law, legislation, and academic analysis to explore how the law changes. These approaches tend to use a natural

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[77] ibid 19.
[78] ibid 34.
[79] ibid.
[80] Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink (n 74) 4.
[81] Alan Watson, 'Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture' (1983) 131 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1121, 1121.
[82] Examples of using international relations theories in the study of the law: Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, 'International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda' (1993) 87 The American Journal of International Law 205; Slaughter (n 51); Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'Judicial Globalization' [2000] Virginia Journal of International Law 1103.

law,[83] positivist,[84] or legal realist[85] framework. These frameworks view legal change as an *internal* process. Laws are changed through a social, democratic, institutionalised process.[86] This thesis takes a different approach, focussing on the role of non-state actors and external influences in changing law. Legal change is situated as an external process, capitalising on the interdisciplinarity central to this work. Of note, a sub-study of this thesis (in the process of being published elsewhere) explores whether these external forces fall within a Habermasian 'utopia' which focusses on the voices of the many, or a Sunstein 'echo chamber', where the voices of the many are silenced by the elite few.[87]

Additionally, this research takes a non-linear, non-binary theoretical approach to exploring legal change. Many traditional legal scholars adopt an evolutionary view of legal change, tracing how laws reflect society, and, as societies move through evolutionary processes, so does the law.[88] Law is an expression of 'collective conscience' which, based in an anthropological understanding of humans, changes.[89] These theories, though not without modern critique, echoed a directional legacy throughout theories of legal change. Legal change in this approach is seen as a linear process. The spiral model, though attempting to change two-dimensional thinking to three-dimensional thinking, is still critiqued for its uni-directionality and overly simplistic understanding of legal change.[90] Although the authors recognise that the relationship between norms, identities, and interests are not one-directional, the movement towards legal change specified in the model is. There are a series of binary relationships, such as 'from above' and 'from below' which fail to acknowledge many realities of the processes of legal change.[91] This thesis rejects the linear, binary approach to understanding legal change and explores the critique of the spiral model for its uni-

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[83] John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2011).

[84] Hla Hart, 'The New Challenge to Legal Positivism (1979)' (2016) 36 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 459; HLA Hart, 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals' (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593; Lon L Fuller, 'Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart' (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 630.

[85] Thomas J Miles and Cass R Sunstein, 'The New Legal Realism' (2008) 75 The University of Chicago Law Review; Chicago 831; Neil Duxbury, 'The Reinvention of American Legal Realism' (1992) 12 Legal Studies; Cardiff 137.

[86] Mark Tushnet, 'Against Judicial Review' (Social Science Research Network 2009) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 1368857 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1368857> accessed 17 December 2019.

[87] Willis, Reilly Dempsey, 'Habermasian Utopia or Sunstein's Echo Chamber? The "Dark Side" of Hashtag Hijacking and Women's Rights' [Forthcoming] TBD.

[88] John Sutton, *Law/Society: Origins, Interactions, and Change* (SAGE Publications, Inc 2001), discussing the work of Maine and Durkheim.

[89] ibid 34.

[90] Eran Shor, 'Conflict, Terrorism, and the Socialization of Human Rights Norms: The Spiral Model Revisited' (2008) 55 Social Problems 117.

[91] Mark Goodale and Sally Engle-Merry (eds), *The Practice of Human Rights Edited by Mark Goodale* (2007) 13–17.

directionality, drawing down from international relations theories and sociological approaches. These concepts are explored more fully in Chapter 8 of this thesis.

Finally, legal change is traditionally distilled down to pure legislative or case law analysis. While this is an important aspect of what is deemed 'legal', it is just one small part of the overall landscape of law which affects individuals in their everyday life. 'Law' includes a wider range of indicators, not just hard law written into legislation or treaties. One of the unique contributions of this research is the wide definition and exploration of 'legal change', encompassing not just the law as it is written, but the law as it is institutionalised and implemented. Goodale and Engle-Merry have undertaken extensive research into this area, exploring how, when, where, and why normative legal change occurs.[92] It is not a simple, uni-directional, linear process from advocacy to change, but rather a complex, nuanced, interconnected back and forth. This research therefore applies the spiral model as a theory of legal change, whilst recognising some of its shortcomings through a critical approach. Legal change is analysed based on the work of external forces, as opposed to traditional internal analysis, at the same time rejecting the conventional linear, binary, and uni-directional approaches.

Criticisms of the Spiral Model

Evan Shor provides a blunt but accurate overview of the critiques of the spiral model: it is 'too crude, deterministic, and holds a somewhat naively optimistic view.'[93] An in-depth survey of scholarship testing and critiquing the spiral model resulted in the identification of five primary categories of broadly agreed upon weaknesses: 1) an over-emphasis of international (Western) actors coupled with a lack of recognition of the power of domestic actors, 2) ignoring the risk of government backlash against foreign involvement, particularly of a Western nature, 3) a general problem of progression, where many states do not move through to the final phases of the model (without recognition in the model of this problem), 4) although there are some scope conditions present in the model's description, these conditions do not give adequate treatment to domestic capacity, and, finally 5) the model's reliance on naming and shaming without seriously taking into account the role of other incentives (i.e. material). These critiques, coupled with the critiques of social media, are the

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[92] Goodale and Engle-Merry (n 91).
[93] Shor (n 90) 122.

cornerstones of this thesis, informing the choice of variables used to test the utility of international Twitter-driven campaigns for domestic human rights change. This chapter therefore culminates in the production of a 'research map' which matches the spiral model critiques to the identified risks of campaigning via social media and the media effects literature. This research map is re-visited throughout the thesis to frame, understand, and interpret results.

Domestic actors

Many scholars and studies focus on the spiral model's lack of prioritisation of domestic factors. Munoz's work in Mexico found that the work of transnational groups was equalled by the work of domestic groups, and it was this combination that led to positive change, more so than had the TANs dominated change as specified by the spiral model.[94] Encarnacion applied the spiral model to the gay rights' movement in Argentina, and came to the conclusion that it was the work of the domestic movement that was critical to change.[95] Another interesting perspective was presented in Cheng's work, where she found that human rights change was achieved in Taiwan, but this meant that the Taiwanese people had to adopt Western norms and approaches which were not conducive or reflective of domestic culture or desires.[96] In the Israeli context, despite the theoretical applicability of the model, long term change was not achieved in part because the work was supported by domestic activists, but not by the broader domestic citizenry.[97] Cizre identified similar problems in the Turkish context whereby the intervention of TANs resulted in domestic NGO dependency on foreign funding, which alienated them from the wider society.[98] In her work examining the model in Colombia, Brysk finds that the nature of the violations meant that the government was able to effectively silence the voice of international actors, that the presence of TANs may have increased the violence, and indeed that the human rights norms in question needed to be

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[94] Alejandro Anaya Muñoz, 'Transnational and Domestic Processes in the Definition of Human Rights Policies in Mexico' (2009) 31 Human Rights Quarterly 35.
[95] Omar G Encarnación, 'International Influence, Domestic Activism, and Gay Rights in Argentina' (2013) 128 Political Science Quarterly 687.
[96] Isabelle Cheng and Lara Momesso, 'Look, the World Is Watching How We Treat Migrants! The Making of the Anti-Trafficking Legislation during the Ma Administration' (2017) 46 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 61.
[97] Andreas Laursen, 'Israel's Supreme Court and International Human Rights Law: The Judgement on "Moderate Physical Pressure"' (2000) 69 Nordic Journal of International Law 413.
[98] Umit Cizre, 'The Truth and Fiction About (Turkey's) Human Rights Politics' (2001) 3 Human Rights Review 55.

broadly accepted by domestic society on the whole, not just activist groups.[99] The combination of these elements in the Colombian context meant that human rights change was not possible.

Domestic regime is also potentially underspecified in the spiral model. Both Schwartz and Heo find that domestic regime change was the most critical component in achieving change, not the role of TANs.[100] Schwartz in particular criticises the model for having, essentially, just one independent variable – the involvement of TANs. He finds that, in reality, the process is much more dynamic and domestically driven. Similarly, Chase tested the model's applicability in Yemen, and found that the lack of recognition of the importance and influence of domestic actors, both government, activist, and non-activist, may explain the lack of human rights change.[101] Although she still found that, broadly, the model is largely proven by quantitative studies, Simmons also presents similar critiques in her review.[102]

Although the spiral model carves important space for domestic civil society, the crux of the model is the strong-arm intervention from international actors. As can be seen in the visualisation of the model, almost all of the specified change comes from the actions and influence of international voices. This runs the risk of returning to the now-rejected 'victim saviour' dichotomy, where TANs and other international actors must come 'to the rescue' and use their power and clout to pressure domestic governments to change.[103] While this pressure is necessary, it is *not* both sufficient *and* necessary. Rather, these critiques find that it is the domestic drive and voice which are the cornerstones of change. Although there may be a place for TANs to exert pressure, this pressure must stem from domestic roots and must reflect the voice of the people who will be most affected by any change, or lack thereof.

This thesis focusses heavily on the risks inherent in over-reliance on foreign pressure. One of the main concerns is that change will not occur if domestic actors, structures, and voices are

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[99] Alison Brysk, 'Communicative Action and Human Rights in Colombia: When Words Fail' [2009] Colombia Internacional 36.

[100] Rolf Schwarz, 'The Paradox of Sovereignty, Regime Type and Human Rights Compliance' (2004) 8 The International Journal of Human Rights 199; Man-ho Heo, 'Mongolia's Political Change and Human Rights in Five-Phase Spiral Model: Implications for North Korea: Mongolia's Political Change and HR' (2014) 29 Pacific Focus 413.

[101] Anthony Tirado Chase, 'The State and Human Rights: Governance and Sustainable Human Development in Yemen' [2003] International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 213.

[102] Beth A Simmons, 'From Ratification to Compliance: Quantitative Evidence on the Spiral Model' in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), *The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013).

[103] Makau W Mutua, 'Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights' <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1525547> accessed 21 October 2018.

not central to a campaign. Just as critics find that the spiral model may not 'work' without a stronger focus on domestic factors, hashtag campaigns which are driven by foreign actors and voices may not achieve the desired change. This thesis empirically explores this risk.

Target Government Backlash

Stemming from the potential under-specification of the role of domestic actors, a similar critique finds that the over-reliance on foreign actors runs the very real risk of domestic government backlash. Goodman and Jinks generally find that the model is part of a dynamic process and does indeed lead to predictions about the nature of human rights change, however they also discuss the model's lack of attention to potential backlash.[104] Similarly, Jetschke and Liese also broadly uphold the model, but raise concerns over the model's ability to open the door to government counter-framing of issues.[105] Sikkink applies the spiral model in the US setting in the 2013 revisit, and again although her research applies to more authoritarian governments, she finds that backlash in the US context was damaging to the process.[106] Returning to her study in Colombia, Brysk notes that the involvement of international actors may have fuelled some of the human rights violations carried out by the state, particularly in the government's use of violence against both domestic and foreign actors.[107] Though not directly seen in his work in Argentina, Encarnacion highlighted how many other Latin American countries purposefully rejected gay rights as a Western, American ideal which derailed any domestic movement.[108]

Particularly as Western bias and influence appears to become less and less palatable to non-Western countries, the sustained international involvement specified by the model runs the risk of sparking domestic regressive backlash. Governments have been seen to purposefully and intentionally act out in response to the 'foreign meddling' in domestic affairs. Without due accord to the position and voice of domestic actors, the spiral model not only overlooks

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[104] Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, 'How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law' (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 621.
[105] Anja Jetschke, 'The Power of Human Rights a Decade after: From Euphoria to Contestation?' in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), *The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013).
[106] Kathryn Sikkink, 'The United States and Torture: Does the Spiral Model Work?' in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), *The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013).
[107] Brysk (n 99).
[108] Encarnación (n 95).

but indeed paves the way for this kind of backlash which can have devastating long-term effects.

This risk builds upon the previous section. Not only does the over-emphasis on foreign actors run the risk of lack of change, it can also in effect make things worse than before. Particularly in social media, which tends to be seen as a Western tool (and statistically remains so[109]), the possibility of government backlash is exacerbated. With the organic, user-driven, and at times uncontrollable nature of social media, messaging is harder to temper to reduce the risk of government backlash. If a domestic government perceives a Twitter-driven campaign more as 'meddling' and less as 'advocating' there is a real potential for backlash in many different, and unpredictable, forms. This thesis analyses empirical evidence to investigate how target governments react to international Twitter-driven campaigns advocating for domestic legal change.

Lack of progression

In his study in Saudi Arabia, Alhargan found that the model was an excellent representation of the first three phases, but that it deviated when progressing beyond tactical concessions.[110] Jetscke and Liese in their work also find issues with progression.[111] Again, they find that the first three phases hold true, but phases four and five can be problematic. Brysk in another study on sexual politics found that there was a stalling effect between commitment and compliance.[112] Shor not only found a lack of progression as problematic, but indeed identified countries which in fact *regressed*. He therefore takes issue with the uni-directionality of the model introduced above in addition to the potential for lack of progression.[113]

At many points in the development of the spiral model, the researchers tracked a government through to Phase Four and concluded that, with time, the government would indeed move

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[109] 'Digital in 2018: World's Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion Mark' (*We Are Social UK*, 30 January 2018) <https://wearesocial.com/uk/blog/2018/01/global-digital-report-2018> accessed 4 October 2018.
[110] Raed A Alhargan, 'The Impact of the UN Human Rights System and Human Rights INGOs on the Saudi Government with Special Reference to the Spiral Model' (2012) 16 The International Journal of Human Rights 598.
[111] Anja Jetschke and Andrea Liese, 'The Spiral Model: How Does It Score After Ten Years?', *Workshop: The Power of Human Rights - Ten Years After* (2009).
[112] Alison Brysk, 'Changing Hearts and Minds' in Thomas Risse, Stephen C Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), *The Persistent Power of Human Rights* (Cambridge University Press 2013).
[113] Shor (n 90).

into Phase Five.[114] Additionally, in some cases the establishment of Phase Five has been less than thorough. Governments are considered to have institutionalised said norms if they 'talk the talk' but we do not truly know if they 'walk the walk'.[115] In other words, true institutionalisation needs to be measured and examined much more specifically. Too many times, governments dipped their toes in the metaphorical water of human rights norms but then failed to fully institutionalise the normative change which would positively affect domestic civil society.

If campaigns at times struggle to move governments from prescriptive status through to rule-consistent behaviour, the fickle and capricious nature of social media then becomes an area of significant concern. In the simplest of terms, if a campaign that is strategically and hierarchically managed and operated fails to institutionalise human rights norms, how could a social media campaign, moving quickly and passing in and out of public attention, possibly be successful in instituting long-term meaningful change? Again, this thesis uses empirical evidence from Twitter-driven campaigns to provide some insight into this question.

Domestic Capacity

Domestic capacity has also been examined as a potential weakness in the spiral model. Borzel and Risse explore the applicability and utility of the model in limited statehood contexts. They find that the model is still relevant, but with less impact on a government with limited capacity.[116] Of note, their work points out that the model only really has two options for governments: deliberate non-compliance or compliance. There is no scope in the model for non-compliance *not* due to deliberate state decisions. Goldsmith and Krasner come to a similar conclusion about the model ignoring national capabilities.[117] Shor's exploration is equally fascinating, where he finds that the model does not leave any room for security threats or differentiation of domestic practices. This lack of accommodation for domestic capacity issues, either due to potential conflict or differing practices, renders the model problematic in his view.[118]

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[114] Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (n 72).
[115] Simmons (n 102).
[116] Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse, 'Human Rights in Areas of Limited Statehood: The New Agenda' in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), *The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013).
[117] Jack Goldsmith and Stephen D Krasner, 'The Limits of Idealism' (2003) 132 Daedalus 47.
[118] Shor (n 90).

Although the second incarnation of the model attempted to address some of the capacity criticisms, it still remains a weak point.[119] The model does not appropriately accommodate the practicalities of domestic government capacities. In other words, there are cases where the government, for lack of a better word, *wants* to change but lacks the capacity to do so. Capacity may be infrastructure related or power related, but either way the government is in a position where it cannot progress through the model. The model does not allow for this kind of 'deviation' where domestic capacity becomes a significant variable which impacts on final outcomes.

International Twitter-driven campaigns are even less likely to be able to accommodate for domestic capacity. Governments are targeted by social media users with little to no knowledge of the ability to implement change. The pseudo-mob mentality on social media does not stop to think about whether change is even possible before demanding domestic change. Again, this risk is potentially exacerbated if the campaign is foreign-driven. If domestic capacity does indeed dictate whether a campaign will be successful or not, a Twitter-driven campaign could face even greater challenges.

Incentives

Krebs and Jackson present a strong argument that, when it comes to governments instituting change, persuasion alone usually is not enough.[120] Linde's work applying the model to the Czech Republic found that, while reputational damage did play a critical role given the political environment and timing, in reality economics played more important part than persuasion alone.[121] When looking at corruption in Kenya, Bachelard found that not only did the spiral model not take account of material incentives for *positive* change, but in fact did not take account of the possible role of material incentives for *not changing,* particularly in a context dealing with corruption.[122] Similarly, Goldsmith and Krasner also highlight the potential role of material interests which are not accounted for in the model.[123] Snyder and

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[119] Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink (n 74).
[120] Ronald R Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 'Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric' (2007) 13 European Journal of International Relations 35.
[121] Robyn Linde, 'Statelessness and Roma Communities in the Czech Republic: Competing Theories of State Compliance' (2006) 13 International Journal on Minority & Group Rights 341.
[122] Jérôme Y Bachelard, 'The Anglo-Leasing Corruption Scandal in Kenya: The Politics of International and Domestic Pressures and Counter-Pressures' (2010) 37 Review of African Political Economy 187.
[123] Goldsmith and Krasner (n 117).

Vinjamuri also discuss the need for both carrot and stick in the institutionalisation of change, something which the model does not fully address.[124]

The current model discounts and ignores the very real importance of incentives other than reputational damage. Rather than building the role of incentives into the model, the model chooses to ignore this aspect. For example, some of the case studies did indeed show that incentives, in the end, were part of the movement towards rule consistent behaviour, but the model instead seems to place causality on the sustained pressure from international actors and TANs.[125]

International Twitter-driven campaigns will rely almost exclusively on reputational harm and naming and shaming as incentives for change. This kind of pressure, while certainly useful, may not rise to the level necessary to institute long-term, meaningful domestic change. This thesis will study the level of personal 'risk' in these campaigns as a way to assess how powerful the incentives for governments to change are.

The Role of Social Media

Similar to the critiques of the spiral model, this chapter now turns to a critical approach to understanding the role of social media in activism and campaigning for women's rights. Here, it is useful to draw analogies to the literature on media effects, the 'CNN effect', and the role of the media in agenda setting.[126] These theories (and the debates within) explore the role of the media in influencing public opinion and political agendas. A visual model can be used to situate this thesis within the media effects literature:

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[124] Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, 'Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice' (2003) 28 International Security 5.

[125] Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (n 72).

[126] See, e.g. Maxwell E McCombs, Donald L Shaw and David H Weaver, 'New Directions in Agenda-Setting Theory and Research' (2014) 17 Mass Communication and Society 781; Maxwell Mccombs, 'Civic Osmosis: The Social Impact of Media' (2012) 25 Comunicación y Sociedad 7; Steven Livingston, 'The CNN Effect Reconsidered (Again): Problematizing ICT and Global Governance in the CNN Effect Research Agenda' (2011) 4 Media, War & Conflict 20; Eytan Gilboa, 'The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International Relations' (2005) 22 Political Communication 27; Manuel Castells, 'Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network Society' (2007) 1 International Journal of Communication (19328036) 238; Elizabeth M Perse and Jennifer L Lambe, 'Models of Media Effects', *Media effects and society* (Second edition, Routledge 2017); Maxwell McCombs and Amy Reynolds, 'How the News Shapes Our Civic Agenda' in Jennings Bryant and Mary Beth Oliver (eds), *Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research* (Routledge 2008).

Figure 2.2: Situating within the media effects literature

Each arrow represents an aspect of the media effects literature, indicating influence (the dotted lines are indirect forms of influence). The right-hand side of the figure represents, primarily, the majority of the media effects literature.[127] The left-hand side is an emerging area of research, cutting across many disciplines. This study looks to explore the strength, effectiveness, and, to some extent, the directionality of the arrows primarily on the left-hand side. The focus of this thesis, in this initial research at least, is on the relationships between social media and the government, *via* individual users. Some researchers go so far as to see this as a bypassing effect: 'significant communicative acts with political and social effects *bypass states and traditional media alike*.'[128] Although this is an overly simplistic view which looks at the micro and macro level as distinct, the reality is that these lines are blurred and there are both individual level and societal level effects.[129]

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[127] There is some debate about the directionality of these arrows as well. See, e.g. Piers Robinson, 'The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?' (1999) 25 Review of International Studies 301.

[128] Steven Livingston (n 126) 28. Livingston goes on to specifically identify Iran as an example: 'Examples of scale shifting include the use of Facebook, YouTube and Twitter to bypass Iranian state authorities when transmitting images and accounts of political protests in 2009.'

[129] Elizabeth M Perse and Jennifer L Lambe, 'Introduction: Do Media Have Effects?', *Media effects and society* (Second edition, Routledge 2017).

In essence, the media effects literature shows that the media have an impact on public opinion, and that public opinion does then sway political agenda setting and government actions, as well as potential changes of regimes through elections (with a definite Western focus on liberal democracies). Social media and traditional media have a burgeoning relationship of influence, best conceptualised as cyclical in nature. Traditional media is now influenced by social media as much as the reverse.[130] As described by Livingston:

> Today, digital media are interactive and the distinction between producer and consumer is blurred. As a result, content is often caught up in a recursive process of saliency reinforcement by both new media, such as Twitter and YouTube, and traditional media, such as CNN.[131]

A media effects framework helps to conceptualise some of the macro level questions this thesis seeks to address: what effect does social media have on individuals? Does it influence their decision to participate in the campaign at a population level (in terms of the population of the campaign)? How does the media affect the manner in which they participate (i.e. do they reply, do they retweet, do they write their own original Tweet?) Is there an impact on how often they engage with the campaign? The answers to these questions then have an additional cyclical effect by feeding into the social media campaign and altering the influence at individual level. As social media is user-driven, there is a bi-directionality of influence that continues, changes, and flows over time. This research certainly does not purport to answer all of these questions, but it is firmly situated in the knowledge that the relationships of influence and effect are a complex interwoven web. Castells explains this as a 'multimodal' system, both 'synchronous and asynchronous.'[132] Perloff presents a thoroughly visceral picture of the interactions: 'a complex, labyrinth-like area in which perceptions become reality, reality is enshrouded by perceptions, and perceptions hinge on the very important factor of whether you are considering the media's impact on other people or yourself.'[133] Although outside the scope of this thesis, there is also a vibrant debate about the potential homogenising effect of social media, creating echo chambers of influence.[134]

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[130] McCombs, Shaw and Weaver (n 126).
[131] Steven Livingston (n 126) 29.
[132] Castells, 'Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network Society' (n 126) 246.
[133] Richard M Perloff, 'Mass Media, Social Perception, and the Third-Person Effect' in Jennings Bryant and Mary Beth Oliver (eds), *Media Effects: Advances in Theory and Research* (Routledge 2008) 252.
[134] Willis, Reilly Dempsey (n 87); Perse and Lambe (n 129).

This research explores five specific risk areas identified in social media campaigning: the elite-driven nature of the media, the organic, and potentially chaotic, approach to framing, the proven 'fickleness' of trends and campaigns on social media, the potential for a damaging lack of knowledge and understanding of the domestic situation from foreign online campaigners, and the perception of domestic governments of the lack of risk and investment from (foreign) online campaign participants.[135]

Elite-driven

It is well established that communication has a 'fundamental' relationship with power structures.[136] Social media is driven, shaped, and built by a global elite which tend not to reflect non-Western values.[137] Although there is (and definitely was) some argument that social media is potentially *less* elite-driven than traditional media,[138] current approaches recognise the continued power imbalances even in new digital media. The very code which operationalises the platforms comes from a Western, capitalist, predominantly white male world, laden with unconscious (and perhaps conscious) bias. Using these platforms to address issues affecting non-white women in non-Western countries seems a paradox which is hard to accept. This is compounded by the algorithms and filter bubbles which are meant to personalise or even monetise the user experience, leading to 'echo chambers' which may be closed to non-dominant discourse.[139] This is a huge risk when campaigning online.

Additionally, as evidenced by the statistics presented in Chapter 1 of this thesis, social media still tends to be dominated by users from the Global North.[140] In this study, despite efforts to

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[135] Reilly Dempsey Willis and Benjamin Mason Meier, 'Framing the Position of Social Media in the Local Institutionalization of International Human Rights Norms' in Thorsten Bonacker, Judith von Heusinger and Kerstin Zimmer (eds), *Localization in Development Aid: How Global Institutions enter Local Lifeworlds* (Routledge 2017).

[136] Castells, 'Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network Society' (n 126) 238; See also Manuel Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age* (Second edition, Polity Press 2015).

[137] Chrysi Dagoula, 'Mapping Political Discussions on Twitter: Where the Elites Remain Elites' (2019) 7 Media and Communication 225; Sebastian Stier, Wolf J Schünemann and Stefan Steiger, 'Of Activists and Gatekeepers: Temporal and Structural Properties of Policy Networks on Twitter' (2018) 20 New Media & Society 1910; Kate Ott, 'Social Media and Feminist Values: Aligned or Maligned?' (2018) 39 Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 93; Grant Blank, 'The Digital Divide Among Twitter Users and Its Implications for Social Research' (2017) 35 Social Science Computer Review 679.

[138] For a discussion on the elite-driven nature of traditional media, see, e.g. Piers Robinson (n 127) 303–4; For a discussion on the potential of social media for non-dominant discourse, see, e.g. Castells, 'Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network Society' (n 126).

[139] Willis, Reilly Dempsey (n 87).

[140] 'Digital in 2018: World's Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion Mark' (n 109).

identify and analyse a campaign targeting a domestic law in the Global North, the vast majority of hashtag campaigns target countries in the Global South. Ireland (#repealthe8th) is in the Global North but was excluded from the final study as it was not as driven by Twitter as the other campaigns were. Argentina is arguably a 'Global North'/ Western/ developed country and is the only campaign in this study where the target government is not in the Global South. Therefore, there is indirect evidence suggesting that many international Twitter driven campaigns continue to target countries in the Global South. Viewed in light of the critique of the spiral model that it under-emphasises the role of domestic actors and domestic voices, looking at social media campaigns this is likely to be of even more concern. With social media dominated by users from the Global North, and campaigns targeting countries in the Global South, the likelihood of domestic users and voices being 'drowned out' by foreign influence is high. Equally, the platforms are designed in an elite-driven way which reduces the likelihood of non-Western, non-elite voices gaining visibility.

Social media is organic and chaotic

By definition, social media is 'social' because content is user-driven (though see discussion on the underlying algorithms and filter bubble which act as gatekeepers for some messages to emerge and others to die off – not all users have equal access).[141] 'Messaging is organic, created and promulgated by users', and likely to be a sub-section of elite users at that.[142] According to Castells, 'it is self-generated in content, self-directed in emission, and self-selected in reception by many that communicate with many.'[143] No longer do the knowledge based hierarchies of advocacy networks or the expertise levels of epistemic communities apply; rather an elite-hierarchy which is unmanaged dictates the rules.[144] This does not mean that there is no scope for organisationally driven framing, but there are no guarantees that users will carry the messaging as set out by formal advocacy networks.[145] Therefore there is

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[141] Sarah Joseph, 'Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights' (2012) 35 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 145; Bart Cammaerts, 'Protest Logics and the Mediation Opportunity Structure' (2012) 27 European Journal of Communication 117.

[142] Anjali S Bal and others, 'Do Good, Goes Bad, Gets Ugly: Kony 2012' (2013) 13 Journal of Public Affairs 202.

[143] Castells, 'Communication, Power and Counter-Power in the Network Society' (n 126) 248.

[144] Steven Livingston (n 126); ibid; Malcolm Gladwell, 'Small Change' [2010] *The New Yorker* <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/04/small-change-malcolm-gladwell> accessed 14 March 2016; E Schwarz, '@hannah_arendt: An Arendtian Critique of Online Social Networks' (2014) 43 Millennium - Journal of International Studies 165.

[145] Giselle A Auger, 'Fostering Democracy through Social Media: Evaluating Diametrically Opposed Nonprofit Advocacy Organizations' Use of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube' (2013) 39 Public Relations Review 369.

little control over the messaging which will dominate the campaigns or 'earn' visibility through the platforms themselves.

The 'noisiness' of a multitude of competing frames is also identified as problematic in the media effects literature.[146] There is little control over how messaging evolves, changes, or fluctuates over time. As stated by a feminist writing about the #delhigangrape campaign: '[f]eminist voices have been a part of these projects, but the chorus of slogans made it difficult to decipher who was saying what.'[147] This differs significantly from the more traditional work of transnational advocacy networks where framing and messaging is carefully and strategically constructed and crafted to suit particular purposes. Constructed messaging is, ideally, sensitive to domestic context and reflective of domestic society. Organic and potentially elite-driven social media messaging, which can be retweeted thousands of times, is user-generated and may not reflect those strategic choices or sensitivities. As Joseph writes, 'social media can also spread bad ideas and content just as it can spread good ideas and content.'[148] Another area of concern is the ability of counter-narratives or repressive regimes to co-opt or thwart an advocacy campaign.[149]

'Fickleness' of social media

Social media campaigns could potentially lack persistence, coming and going faster than meaningful change demands. This risk draws down from the 'CNN effect', a theory which holds that the speed of the spread of news with modern technology has a potential 'policy forcing' effect on decision makers.[150] According to Gilboa, this effect can mean that 'media pressure on reluctant governments are most likely to result in minimalist policies aimed at defusing pressure for interventions on the ground.'[151] Governments can no longer make carefully considered decisions, but rather are forced to respond with almost immediate effect, sometimes to reports that are ill-founded or lacking in evidence.[152] The media effects

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[146] McCombs, Shaw and Weaver (n 126); Piers Robinson (n 127).
[147] Debolina Dutta and Oishik Sircar, 'India's Winter of Discontent: Some Feminist Dilemmas in the Wake of a Rape' (2013) 39 Feminist Studies 293, 295.
[148] Joseph (n 141) 173.
[149] Beth A Simmons, 'Preface: International Relationships in the Information Age' (2013) 15 International Studies Review 1; Willis, Reilly Dempsey (n 87); Reilly Dempsey Willis, 'To Tweet or Not to Tweet: How Hashtag Campaigns Open Spaces for Counter-Narratives' (2018).
[150] Gilboa (n 126).
[151] ibid 334.
[152] Gilboa (n 126); Steven Livingston (n 126); Piers Robinson (n 127).

literature identified this as problematic simply when television became more connected via satellite feeds; this effect when mapped onto social media is likely to increase.

Media effects studies also highlight the so-called 'sleeper effect', whereby the influence of the media on individuals may not manifest for quite some time.[153] With the speed at which social media moves, this sleeper effect could problematise the long-term potential of the influence. Hashtags which are trending today may not trend next week or may not even be around next month. Research has shown that the average lifespan of a Tweet, including Retweets, is just 18 minutes.[154] Social media experts recommend that campaigns for business or marketing last between 45 days and nine months.[155] Using these metrics as indicators of users' general social media attention span, this indicates that hashtag campaigns are at risk of being relatively short-lived. If longevity is a concern of advocacy campaigns under the spiral model, then campaigns on social media are even more uncertain to progress through to rule consistent behaviour. In her work on exploring the use of social media in Iran after the 2009 elections, Naghibi found that the Iranian protests dominated North American media – until the death of Michael Jackson.[156] Western attention cared about the Iranian protests, but only until the King of Pop overdosed. Additionally, information spreads quickly, including erroneous or false Tweets.[157] In fact, the pace of social media has even been characterised as 'dangerous' to international law, in direct conflict with the slow and methodical pace of international justice.[158]

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[153] Perse and Lambe (n 129).

[154] 'When Is My Tweet's Prime of Life? (A Brief Statistical Interlude.)' (*Moz*) <https://moz.com/blog/when-is-my-tweets-prime-of-life> accessed 10 December 2018; 'The Life Span of a Tweet: Why Fast Isn't Fast Enough in a Crisis' (*Stanton Communication*, 16 March 2017) <https://stantoncomm.com/life-span-tweet> accessed 10 December 2018.

[155] 'Multi-Channel Marketing: How Long Should Campaigns Last?' (*Technology Therapy™ Group*, 12 January 2015) <https://technologytherapy.com/long-multi-channel-advertising-campaigns-last/> accessed 10 December 2018; 'How Long Does a Typical Social Media Campaign Last?' (*Ignite Social Media - The original social media agency*, 7 February 2008) <https://www.ignitesocialmedia.com/lifestyle/how-long-does-a-typical-social-media-campaign-last/> accessed 10 December 2018.

[156] Nima Naghibi, 'Diasporic Disclosures: Social Networking, NEDA, and the 2009 Iranian Presidential Elections' (2011) 34 Biography 56.

[157] Joseph (n 141); 'Bring Back Our Girls: Boko Haram Should Be Scared of a Hashtag' *The Independent* (13 May 2014) <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-bring-back-our-girls-campaign-is-working-boko-haram-should-be-scared-of-a-hashtag-9360830.html> accessed 11 December 2018.

[158] Marta Poblet and Jonathan Kolieb, 'Responding to Human Rights Abuses in the Digital Era: New Tools, Old Challenges' (2018) 54 Stanford Journal of International Law 259.

Lack of knowledge of the domestic context or voice

Somewhat derivative of the first social media risk outlined in this section, with many hashtag users likely being foreign there is a major concern that individuals are campaigning blindly, without any knowledge of the domestic context, voice, or desires. Research has shown that the vast majority of social media activity is in 'entertainment'; this could blur the lines between serious advocacy campaigns and personal desires for online identity creation.[159] One researcher has even gone so far as to refer to social media activism as a 'narcissistic compulsion to self-disclose.'[160] A powerful quote on this topic comes from a commentary on the #bringbackourgirls campaign:

> The dualistic construction of women as worthy of political recognition due to their relationship to a more privileged agent [comparing the girls to Obama's daughters] works powerfully in the age of hashtag activism through its ability to draw emotional response and impassioned reaction from a non-contiguous and apathetic populous...The enthusiastic Western adoption of #BringBackOurGirls must also be treated skeptically for its failure to consider its own imperial dynamics.[161]

It is highly unlikely that every individual who adds their voice to an international Twitter-driven campaign will have background knowledge or understanding of the issue from the domestic perspective. Scholars have been raising concerns about the role of transnational advocacy networks in domestic human rights issues for many years.[162] Coupled with the statistics presented earlier, there is a significant risk that the majority of those participating in a hashtag campaign will have little knowledge of the domestic situation. This runs several advocacy risks, two of which are of significant relevance to this research. First and foremost, this 'foreign' influence, if not reflective or respective of domestic factors, could lead to government backlash. As this is a critique of the spiral model, again the risk is likely

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[159] Schwarz (n 144).
[160] Naghibi (n 156) 59.
[161] Meredith Loken, '#BringBackOurGirls and the Invisibility of Imperialism' (2014) 14 Feminist Media Studies 1100.
[162] Srilatha Batliwala, 'Grassroots Movements as Transnational Actors: Implications for Global Civil Society' (2002) 13 VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary & Nonprofit Organizations 393; Lilie Chouliaraki, 'Post-Humanitarianism Humanitarian Communication beyond a Politics of Pity' (2010) 13 International Journal of Cultural Studies 107; Stuart Garman, 'New Communications Technologies in Emergencies' in Roger MacGinty and Jenny H Peterson (eds), *The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action* (Routledge 2015); Cross (n 63).

heightened in social media campaigns. Second, there is a risk of off-point messaging which is not what women and girls living in the target country actually *want*. This is why it is a golden rule of advocacy to ensure that those affected by decisions are involved in decisions (the right to participation). Given the removed nature of social media, with the typical user profile, it is likely that hashtag campaign participants simply do not know enough about the domestic situation, context, or voice to accurately and effectively campaign for change. There is a significant risk that messaging, organically emerging from Twitter users, could be off-point or even antithetical to the needs of domestic women and girls. Scholars have critiqued the spiral model for not having enough sensitivities to the domestic context; once again this critique is potentially amplified when looking at social media campaigns.

No 'risk' to campaign participants

One of the main tenets of the slactivist literature is that true activism is rooted in the personal risk that activists take when participating in a campaign – arrest, losing a job, marking their identity, even potential physical harm.[163] Gladwell makes this eminently clear when he writes 'Facebook activism succeeds not by motivating people to make a real sacrifice but by motivating them to do the things people do when they're not motivated enough to make a real sacrifice.'[164] This personal risk or sacrifice, in traditional campaigning, underscores to the governments how important the issue is to voting citizens.[165] From a feminist perspective, there is also something particularly important about using the physical female body in acts of protest.[166] Although there is extensive research exploring how 'collective identity' and community building can be achieved in protest movements on social media and how this may translate into some offline political activity,[167] the efficacy of this new kind of protest is

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[163] Gladwell (n 144); Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction* (2nd edn, Blackwell Publishing 2006).

[164] Gladwell (n 144).

[165] Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics* (Cambridge University Press 1994); Joel Penney, 'Social Media and Symbolic Action: Exploring Participation in the Facebook Red Equal Sign Profile Picture Campaign' (2015) 20 Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 52.

[166] Karina Eileraas, 'Sex(t)Ing Revolution, Femen-Izing the Public Square: Aliaa Magda Elmahdy, Nude Protest, and Transnational Feminist Body Politics' (2014) 40 Signs 40.

[167] Manuel Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope : Social Movements in the Internet Age* (Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA : Polity Press, 2015 2015); Paolo Gerbaudo, *Tweets and the Streets. Social Media and Contemporary Activism* (London : Pluto Press, 2012 2012); Paolo Gerbaudo and Emiliano Treré, 'In Search of the "We" of Social Media Activism: Introduction to the Special Issue on Social Media and Protest Identities' (2015) 18 Information, Communication & Society 865; Stefania Milan, 'From Social Movements to Cloud Protesting: The Evolution of Collective Identity' (2015) 18 Information, Communication & Society 887.

contested.[168] The disruption caused by social media protests are, arguably, less damaging to domestic governments.[169]

Leading scholars have shown that online collective identity is more likely in networks which extend outside of the virtual environment; in other words online networks are more successful if they are an extension of face to face networks.[170] This network potential is likely to be lost in transnational campaigns, given the international nature of the participants' locations. Although for some there is risk even in participating in online campaigning, for many there is no real risk. [171] This lack of risk translates into a lack of incentive for the domestic government to change. The only incentive for governments to change is the naming and shaming pressure, which may extend from social media into traditional media. However, as critics of the spiral model point out, other incentives may be necessary to truly push a domestic government to change. The lack of risk and associated incentives in social media campaigns may simply not rise to the level necessary to see long term, meaningful, institutionalised change. When researching the impact of social media on an early campaign, Save Darfur, the researchers found that:

> Considering the extraordinary size of this movement (1.2 million members), the influence and accessibility of the world's largest social medium (Facebook), and the moral urgency of the social issue at stake (genocide), the amount and quality of activism that resulted from the myriad online interactions among Cause members were extraordinarily modest.[172]

Critique Mapping

The crux of this work is to match these critiques of the spiral model to risks inherent in social media campaigning, thus providing a sound theoretical basis for the empirical work.

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[168] Schwarz (n 144); Maria Bakardjieva, 'Do Clouds Have Politics? Collective Actors in Social Media Land' (2015) 18 Information, Communication & Society 983.
[169] Della Porta and Diani (n 163); Cammaerts (n 141).
[170] Bond and others, 'A 61-Million-Person Experiment in Social Influence and Political Mobilization' (2012) 489 Nature 295; Schwarz (n 144).
[171] Malcolm Gladwell and Clay Shirky, 'From Innovation to Revolution: Do Social Media Make Protests Possible?' (2011) 90 *Foreign Affairs* 153; Gladwell (n 144); Della Porta and Diani (n 163).
[172] Kevin Lewis, Kurt Gray and Jens Meierhenrich, 'The Structure of Online Activism' [2014] Sociological Science 1, 4.

Table 2.1: Linking Spiral Model Critiques to Social Media Risks

Theoretical grounding	Social media risk	Link
Lack of focus on domestic actors/overemphasis on Western approaches	Social media is elite-driven and non-neutral; campaigns may be dominated and/or driven by elite international actors	If there is concern that traditional advocacy campaigns may place too much emphasis on the role of transnational/Western actors, this risk is greater in a social media environment where campaigns are more likely to be dominated and/or driven by foreign/Western elite participants.
Potential government backlash	Social media is organic and chaotic by nature, with little to no control or organisation tempering messages to governments	The lack of ability to manage the messaging means that campaigns may be framed in a way which unintentionally or inadvertently sparks government backlash.
Lack of long-term progression	Social media campaigns seem to or could potentially lack persistence, coming and going faster than meaningful change demands	The short attention span of social media may not give campaigns long enough to properly effect long-term, meaningful, institutionalised change – even more so than traditional campaigns.
Ignores domestic capacity issues	Campaigns tend to virally take off without much knowledge of the domestic situation	Without knowledge of the domestic situation, Twitter campaigns may be asking for changes which the domestic government is not in a position to make. This concern was relevant to traditional campaigns with much more organisation and knowledge; the nature of social media campaign participants raises even more concern about the lack of knowledge of the domestic government's capacity to institute change.
Ignores material or nuanced incentives	Social media campaigns do not present many incentives for governments to change as users do not put themselves at risk or have a stake in outcomes	If there were concerns that pure naming and shaming incentives were not enough to explain domestic government changes as per the spiral model, social media presents even *less* incentive for governments to change.

This map provides an overview of the research framework for this thesis and will be used at several points throughout to ensure clarity and focus. This is the 'golden thread' of the work.

Methodological Framework

Research questions

With this theoretical grounding, this research therefore sets out to answer the following questions:

3. Can international campaigns originating in and driven by Twitter contribute to domestic legal change in women's rights?
4. If so, which campaign behaviours are associated with change?

Overall design

Several different methodological approaches were explored in the early stages of research. The first approach considered was to attempt to find matched case studies, with one being driven by online activities and one driven by traditional offline activities. The campaign outcomes would then be quantified and compared, to identify differences in legal changes. After extensive thought, discussion, and even colloquium presentations, it was decided that, before comparing 'apples' (social media campaigns) to 'oranges' (offline campaigns), it was necessary to develop an in-depth understanding of the 'apples' on their own. This approach, exploring online campaigns *first*, then leaves the door open for future work to move to a comparative approach between online and offline campaigns.

Another approach which in the end was discarded was the inclusion of stakeholder interviews. This would have been much more relevant had the comparative approach described above been adopted. Stakeholder interviews could have helped to clarify campaign goals, challenges, and perhaps outcomes. However, again, it was decided that this first stage research was best focussed on the campaigns themselves and the development of an in-depth baseline understanding of the campaign behaviours, uninfluenced by stakeholder perceptions. Equally, with online campaigns there is a risk in exercising researcher bias in identifying campaign organisers. The campaigns are, by definition, organically driven. Choosing 'organisers' may have provided potentially misleading or biased data. Stakeholder interviews may be appropriate in future research, when moving to a comparative process.

It has also been suggested to undertake a traditional media analysis to explore the relationship between the social media messaging and activities and those of traditional media, again stemming from the media effects theories. This would help to explain just how 'organic' and individual-driven the framing and messaging of the campaigns were, compared to how the campaign was framed on non-social media. Mapping the interaction of non-social media with social media in these campaigns could provide additional useful insight. Again, this was deemed to be something to explore in future iterations of the research, adding too much to this initial study.

Theoretically, the research has also undergone changes in approach which influenced the methodological choices. The initial approach was not critical of the spiral model, but rather relied solely on the risks inherent in using social media and the non-neutrality of the platforms. After significant time spent with current literature on the spiral model, the theoretical approach completely shifted to taking this critical perspective on the spiral model. At first, the critical approach was underscored by Moravcsik's liberal theories.[173] In fact, the first full draft of the thesis included significant work using Moravcsik's theories to critique the spiral model. However, at that stage the thesis presented as confusing, trying to achieve too much and answer too many questions. Again, it was decided to pare back and focus on one stream of research, leaving other pieces for the future. There is every intention to engage in further theoretical work, drawing heavily from Moravcsik, to critique the spiral model.

Campaign selection

With the overarching framework and architecture built, the next and perhaps most crucial step in the research was the selection of hashtag campaigns. A large-scale mapping exercise was undertaken to identify all possible hashtag campaigns for women's rights. 51 campaigns were initially identified. Through an iterative process, a set of distinct selection criteria was then developed:

1. International attention
2. More than 1,000 Tweets
3. Seeking specific domestic legal change (either repealing an existing law, passing a new law, or implementing an existing law) in the area of women's rights

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[173] Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences Seriously' (n 51); Moravcsik, 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes' (n 51).

4. Originating in, and continuing to be driven by, Twitter

As discussed in Chapter 1 and again revisited in Chapter 8, selection criteria four was pivotal to the study. These are all campaigns which 'took off' with a Tweet. Some campaigning may have been ongoing before the original Tweet, but the campaigns did not garner significant attention until the hashtag campaign emerged. Therefore, these campaigns all *originated in* and are *rooted in* Twitter via a hashtag. The campaigns then all had to continue to be *driven* by Twitter. This means that the campaigns centred on social media – they were referred to by the hashtag (i.e. it was not generally known as, say, Ni Una Menos, it was referred to as #niunamenos), activities were organised on social media, activists shared information and knowledge on Twitter, key messages were developed and spread via Twitter (though see discussion on the non-neutrality of Twitter later in this chapter), and this continued drive and focus on social media was clear throughout the entire lifespan of the campaign. This, by no means, is to claim that there were no other campaign activities taking place, but rather that there is something inherently different about campaigns which originate in and continue to be driven by Twitter. They are Twitter-*based* and Twitter-*driven* campaigns, not Twitter-*only* campaigns. The role of social media in mobilising, messaging, and framing is different from campaigns which are not driven by Twitter. It is this difference which necessitates study to help understand the role of social media driven campaigns in legal change.

Of the initially identified 51 campaigns, all fit criteria one. 19 campaigns were excluded on criteria three, as they sought to raise awareness and dialogue, but not to change specific domestic law. Eight campaigns were excluded for targeting legal change, but not in one specific domestic location (one of which also failed on criteria two). Five were excluded for campaigning for general domestic legal change, not specific. Four were excluded for focussing on individual cases and not changes in the law as a whole. Two were excluded for having multiple hashtags. This left a possible list of 13. The target number of campaigns was 10, given data collection and time constraints. Three more were excluded from the final list to ensure a range of geographic targets and issues in focus. The final list of 10 is presented below.

Table 2.2: Overview of Study Campaigns

Campaign	Target location	Topic	Legal change sought
#delhigangrape	India	Violence Against Women and Girls ('VAWG')	Strengthening laws protecting women from sexual violence, including prosecutions
#farkhunda	Afghanistan	VAWG	Strengthening laws prosecuting perpetrators of violence against women and improving frontline policing to protect women and girls in public spaces
#letwomengotostadium	Iran	Discrimination	Call for a change to law which bans women from entering sporting stadiums to watch men's volleyball
#mydressmychoice	Kenya	Bodily integrity	Properly implementing existing laws protecting women from violence, particularly in the public sphere
#niunamenos	Argentina	VAWG, femicide	Strengthening laws protecting women from femicide, including prosecutions
#sendeanlat	Turkey	Rape, VAWG	Strengthening laws protecting women from femicide, including prosecutions
#stopstoning	Iran	VAWG/gender equality	Repealing a law which calls for stoning as a form of capital punishment
#Women2Drive	Saudi Arabia	Equality	Lifting a ban on women driving
#malala	*Pakistan*	*Right to education*	*Strengthening laws around girls' access to education*
#notacriminal	*Ireland*	*Bodily integrity*	*Decriminalisation of abortion*

(Details of the facts of each campaign are presented in the relevant analytical chapters.)

During the process of data collection and initial analysis, two campaigns were excluded, #malala and #notacriminal. #malala, although the largest and arguably most 'famous' campaign in the study, was excluded as the content of the Tweets significantly lost focus on girls' right to education in Pakistan. The hashtag quickly changed and became focussed on Malala herself as a spokesperson, activist, and role model for girls' rights in general. This therefore meant the campaign failed to meet the original selection criteria. Initial analysis of

#notacriminal Tweets showed that this hashtag was subsidiary to another hashtag, #repealthe8th. Tweets for #repealthe8th were then collected. Legal data was collected for this campaign and it became very clear that this campaign was not driven by Twitter, but rather was a 'traditional' advocacy campaign using a multitude of tools and strategies. Twitter was just one. The campaign was therefore, in the late stages of the study, excluded. This left eight campaigns for the final analysis.

The exclusion of #notacriminal is particularly important, as it underscores the careful consideration and attention paid to ensuring that the campaigns in the study were rooted in *and driven by* Twitter. By excluding this campaign well into the study, this shows how the selection criteria were rigorously, consistently, and objectively applied throughout. This also shows that it is possible to clarify the differences between a campaign that is driven by Twitter and a campaign which merely uses Twitter.

Variable selection

Variables were selected from a dual process of identifying metrics to measure the desired characteristics from the research map and assessing available data. An initial list of 25 potential variables were identified based on the research framework only. These were then compared to the data available through a matching process, resulting in a variable map containing 22 variables, five to measure context, 12 independent variables from Twitter data, and five dependent variables to measure legal change.

Context variables were identified to ensure that country characteristics could be examined. Independent variable/Twitter data included the following information: date of the Tweet, content of the Tweet, author of the Tweet, and the number of times it was liked, retweeted, or replied to. From the most 100 prolific users in each campaign, additional information was collected on location, profile, number of campaign Tweets, number of Tweets ever sent, and number of followers. This data generated a total of 513 parameters for study.

Finally, an initial list of five legal categories was set to measure the dependent variable of legal change and outcomes. This list included hard law, soft law, budget allocation, judicial involvement, and UN reporting. As the data was collected and analysed, the list was reduced down to four and amended: legislative change, institutionalisation (including government discourse, soft law, and budgets), law enforcement (to cover both police involvement and the courts), and UN dialogue. These categories adequately covered the data which was available

while providing ample evidence for quantifying legal change. The full list of legal variables, including important information on the process of quantification, is included in Appendix 1. Throughout the process of data collection, cleaning, and analysis, some adjustments and modifications were necessary. The final variable map included eight context variables measured across 14 parameters, seven Twitter variables measured across 513 parameters, and four legal variables measured across 150-200 pieces of evidence per campaign. The full list of parameters and definitions is also included in Appendix 1.

Challenges[174]

This research presented a host of methodological challenges. Each challenge, however, also presented a route for improving and strengthening the research design and providing new levels of insight and analysis. These challenges are briefly outlined below.

Ethical concerns

There are some ethical considerations when using Twitter data. Although users certainly know and understand that their Tweets will remain publicly available, equally they did not explicitly consent to their Tweets being used in academic research. With full cognisance of this conflict, this research has had ethical approval from the University of East Anglia's General Research Ethics Committee. Specific identifiers have been removed from any Tweet content included in the thesis, and only relevant Tweet language has been included (i.e. not the entire Tweet content). While it is theoretically possible to use the information in this thesis to find Tweets and therefore find the profiles of the users, efforts have been made to minimise any risk or any ethical concerns. Additionally, the vast majority of the analysis looks at macro, population-level data which also goes some way to minimising ethical concerns.

Data collection

The process of finding historical Twitter data was extremely complex. At the time of writing the initial research proposal, historical Tweets were freely available via various online tools. However, Twitter changed the terms and conditions for accessing historical Tweets (defined

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[174] For an in-depth discussion of the methodological challenges, see Reilly Dempsey Willis, 'Exploring the Relationship between Global Twitter Campaigns and Domestic Law: Methodological Challenges and Solutions' (2020) Forthcoming Information and Communications Technology Law.

as more than two weeks old) during the initial phases of the research. This therefore meant that the data needed for the study was going to be difficult to obtain.

Quotes were gathered for the monetized services available for purchasing bulk sets of Twitter data. This was deemed to be far outside the research budget and this option was therefore null. Web scraping was explored, however this option clearly violates the Twitter terms and conditions and was rejected on this basis. The final option was to collect the Tweets manually. This entailed using Twitter's advanced search function and copying and pasting Tweets. This is fully in line with Twitter's terms and conditions.[175] Although time and labour intensive, this method of data collection was chosen as the best possible option for collecting the data.

In the end, this became an incredibly important process within the study. Having the opportunity to scroll through all of the Tweets and thus become intimately familiar with each campaign positively influenced the end result analysis. The process of manual collection meant that for each campaign, significant time was spent developing an understanding of campaign drivers, ebbs and flows of Tweets and information, images which appeared perhaps hundreds of times, Tweets which were retweeted regularly, the issues, topics, and even emotions which dominated different epochs, and an overall general impression of what was really *happening* in each campaign. Although outside the scope of this thesis, this manual collection process also brought the counter-narrative phenomena to the fore.[176] Seeing the sometimes overwhelming presence of counter-narratives or campaign co-option was a fascinating and indeed unexpected outcome of this data collection process.

Translation

Significant time, effort, and creativity went into the problem of translation. How could a study that critiques the spiral model for its overemphasis on Western actors and under-emphasis on domestic voices be valid if Tweets in the mother tongue were not analysed? Equally, how could a PhD thesis access the resources necessary to translate several hundred

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[175] Twitter, 'Developer Agreement and Policy' <https://developer.twitter.com/en/developer-terms/agreement-and-policy.html> accessed 15 September 2018; 'Archiving Tweets: Reckoning with Twitter's Policy' (*Insight News Lab*) <http://newslab.insight-centre.org/tweetarchivingchallenges/> accessed 15 September 2018.
[176] Willis, Reilly Dempsey (n 87).

thousand Tweets? This was an extraordinarily difficult barrier to overcome in the research design and much time was spent thinking, testing, and exploring options.

First, it is important to note that translation only affected one area of independent variables (content). Persistence, engagement, and users could be analysed without large scale translation. The exploration of consistent, variable, and international norms, alongside the sentiment analysis, were the areas which necessitated translation. Equally, some of the campaigns targeted English speaking countries; again, translation was not a concern in these campaigns.

The initial, and unsatisfying, decision was that translation was simply too expensive and complicated. Only English Tweets would be included in the content analysis. However, upon further reflection, this just seemed unacceptable given the nature and overall aims of the study. After extensive problem-solving thoughts, a novel approach was devised. As the normative analysis was only looking at sets of most commonly used words or phrases, only these needed to be translated, which could easily be done via Google Translate. In other words, the 100 most commonly used words or phrases could be collected from Tweets in any language, and the short sets of results could then be translated into English. There was no need to translate the entire set of Tweets, just the emerging norms. Equally, the presence of international norms was distilled down into a list of roughly 100 key words and phrases. This list could be translated via Google Translate into any number of languages and searches undertaken accordingly.

The initial study design did not include sentiment analysis. However, once all the Tweets were collected it was decided that adding in the sentiment analysis would be a fairly straightforward endeavour that would not add too much time to the data collection. Once this was in place, it was then discovered that a fairly simple programmatic add-on for sentiment analysis included translation. Therefore, in the end, it was actually possible to translate Tweets.

Correlation

The issue of correlation versus causation is ripe in any study of this nature. Robinson highlights this point when exploring the CNN effect: 'the difficulty [is in] measuring exactly the precise impact which media has on policy…and the significance each attaches to policy

certainty (and uncertainty) in determining media influence.'[177] Similar challenges are discussed across many areas of media effect studies.[178] As with the media effects literature, it is not possible to show direct causation in this kind of research, but it is possible to ensure the study design is rigorous enough to allow for correlations and indirect relationships to be shown.[179] In this case, the correlations are between the campaigns and the legal outcomes. As written in a forthcoming paper,

> Correlation can also be underscored by timelines, quotes, and government activities. For example, in some cases there were spikes in Tweets followed by government action (#delhigangrape). In other cases, the government specifically referred to the hashtag campaign when discussing legislative changes (#stopstoning). Government officials implementing change even referred to the hashtag itself, announcing changes on Twitter (#niunamenos). The campaigners themselves used Twitter as the platform to engage officials in some instances. In #niunamenos, candidates in upcoming elections were asked to sign a pledge to implement the campaign demands and, critically to Tweet this pledge out.[180]

It is this kind of evidence which supports the finding of relationships between the campaigns and the legal outcomes are valid.

The non-neutrality of Twitter

This research is very cognisant of the non-neutrality of social media.[181] Feminists in particular have highlighted with concern the inherent gender biases in the framework on which social media are built.[182] When translated into campaign and activist research, there must be some recognition of the algorithms that allow certain information to flow and other information to fade away and the filter bubbles which create 'personalised' online experiences.[183] The data generated for this study was created within a power-laden hierarchy

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[177] Piers Robinson (n 127) 304.
[178] Perse and Lambe (n 129).
[179] Piers Robinson (n 127) 305.
[180] Willis (n 174).
[181] AH Jakubowicz, 'Alt_Right White Lite: Trolling, Hate Speech and Cyber Racism on Social Media' (2017) 9 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 41; Jackson and Foucault Welles, above n 4.
[182] Ott (n 137).
[183] Ott, above n 14; Karlsen and others, above n 2.

which tends to favour the elite (discussed in detail earlier in this chapter).[184] These structures, algorithms, and filter bubbles may distort the framing, messaging, and content of the Tweets. Equally, these aspects of Twitter which lend themselves to homophily may mean that certain Tweets gain more visibility not because of the Tweet itself, but because of the algorithms working in the background. Certain campaign messages will reach some sub-sections of the participant population but not all. This needs to be understood as a limitation of the study. To that end, the Twitter account which was created to collect data was used solely for this purpose, with very few follows and even fewer followers. Although this does not address the macro level underlying issues and biases, it does at least attempt to minimise bias in the data collection.

Quantification of legal change

Legislation

As a key outcome variable from the spiral model is legislative change, it is crucial to look at this variable as an indicator of 'success' of the campaigns.[185] To this end, relevant laws and legislation were identified and collected from before the campaign and after the campaign started. Change was measured against the stated goals of the campaigns. As a criterion for inclusion in the study was a clear legal goal, each campaign therefore had a stated desired change in some form of legislation. This aspect of the legal analysis was, therefore, fairly straightforward.

Institutionalisation

Beyond simply hard law legal change, advocates are well aware that soft law is needed to move from rhetoric to implementation on the ground. This measure indicates the regime's willingness to institutionalise the norm. To gauge how the domestic government *really* addressed the issues in the question, a wide range of documentation and reporting was collected and analysed from before and after the campaign. This ranged from policies and regulations intended to implement the law (for example, a national strategy on violence against women), budgetary information (for example, how much money does the government spend on programmes to reduce violence against women?), evidence of government

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[184] Dagoula (n 137).
[185] Goodale and Engle-Merry (n 91).

discourse relating to the campaign and the issue (press releases, interviews, media reports), NGO documentation providing domestic insight into the 'on the ground' situation for women and girls, and any other relevant and reliable information discovered through a snowballing technique. When read together, these various pieces created a mosaic picture of how far changes had been institutionalised to benefit women and girls domestically. Change was measured by how much the picture 'aligned' with the goals of the campaign. For example, if the law changed, were there systems, policies, and regulations also put in place to ensure that the law could be implemented and supported properly? Did the government use language that reflected the goals of the campaign? Was there evidence of an increase in budget allocation to programmes designed to address the issue in question? Again, when taken together, this analysis tended to show a clear, measurable outcome for each campaign.

Law enforcement

The involvement of courts has been cited as an important aspect of institutionalising norms and moving from Phase 3 to Phases 4 and 5 of the spiral model.[186] Proper use of law enforcement and litigation can 'make or break' how the norm is activated on the ground. When this research first began, the intention was to focus purely on case law relevant to each campaign. However, when in depth research on the legal change began in earnest, it became very clear that front line policing was equally important to measuring legal change. To that end, and as much as feasible, information was collected on the actions of police and rates of prosecutions, as well as case law and judicial decisions. Again, the campaigns were generally very clear on the changes that were sought in law enforcement and thus there were clear benchmarks for measuring change.

UN Treaty Body Dialogue

The final area of law used to measure legal change was the state dialogue with relevant UN treaty bodies. This stemmed from the innovative methodology developed by Meier and Kim in their work on water and sanitation.[187] This process of coding and using state reports to explore the role of international human rights norms in domestic governance provided another important dimension to the measurement of legal change. Analysing what is and is

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[186] Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (n 72).
[187] Benjamin Mason Meier and Yuna Kim, 'Human Rights Accountability Through Treaty Bodies: Examining Human Rights Treaty Monitoring for Water and Sanitation' (2015) 26 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 139.

not reported by the state opens a fascinating window on how the government approaches the issue in question, particularly in an international context. For example, many governments will use process indicators to show work they have undertaken to implement women's rights – leaflets printed, workshops held, public service announcement produced – but very few include outcome indicators – reductions in incidents of violence against women, increases in prosecutions, improvements in social attitudes, and so on. Reviewing the language used in UN reporting from the government also gave exceptional insight into the institutionalisation of norms, both positive and negative. It was truly amazing to read some of the replies from the governments during face to face dialogue with the committees. Again, change was measured against levels of alignment with the campaign goals.

Taken together, these four distinct areas of legal change provided a holistic and coherent analysis of domestic legal change.

Using Composite Scores

For each variable, a process was also undertaken to distil the rather large number of parameters down to one composite score. For the independent variables, parameters which were ordinal, scaled, and most reflected the research questions were identified. The numerical data was then divided into quintiles for each parameter, and each campaign given a score of 1-5 based on the quintiles. These were reversed for negative parameters. The average of these scaled scores provided the composite score in each independent variable for each campaign. The full list of parameters included in the composite scores in included in Appendix 3.

Creating composite scores can be useful, but brings the risk that nuanced information will be lost. For this reason, while the composite scores were analysed in detail, this was not at the expense of the individual parameters. The overall composite score comprised of persistence, engagement, users, and messaging/norms (context and sentiment are not 'scaled' and therefore cannot be used in a regression analysis).

<u>Conclusion</u>

In sum, the selected variables (detailed in Appendices 1 and 5) and null hypotheses can now be added to the overall map of research:

Table 2.3: Research Map

Critique/Risk	Independent variable(s)	Null hypothesis (that which this research sets out disprove)
Lack of focus on domestic actors/overemphasis on Western approaches; social media is elite-driven and non-neutral; campaigns may be dominated and/or driven by elite international actors	Twitter profiles of 100 most prolific users in each campaign	Campaigns dominated by foreign actors will be more successful.
Potential government backlash; lack of message tempering due to organic nature of medium	Content analysis	Consistency of messaging in Tweets will not affect campaign outcomes.
Lack of long-term progression; 'fickleness' and speed of social media	Persistence (Tweets per day)	Persistence of Tweets in Twitter driven campaigns do not affect campaign outcomes.
Ignores domestic capacity issues; lack of knowledge of domestic context	Context (various indicators of domestic political context and situation for women)	Domestic context has no impact on campaign success.
Ignores material or nuanced incentives; does not present enough incentive for change to domestic government	Engagement (reply, retweet, and like data)	Campaigns driven by 'likes' will have the same impact as campaigns driven by replies (replies used as a proxy for engagement/ investment/risk in campaign, as opposed to a simple click to like)
Weaknesses in spiral model are amplified in social media driven campaigns	Combined quantified variables	Twitter variables have no relationship to campaign outcomes.

This chapter has served to provide a full account of the development of the research framework, starting from theory and moving into methodology and execution. This chapter has shown the theoretical grounding of the research design, deeply rooted in social empirical constructivism (conventional) and building upon the body of literature which critiques the spiral model of human rights change. These critiques, alongside the academic concerns with social media campaigning and media effects literature, provide the lynchpin of this research,

informing methodological choices, variable selection, and research questions throughout the entire process. At every stage, the research is tied back to these critiques to frame the understanding of whether and how international Twitter-driven campaigns affect domestic legal change for women's rights. The chapter then illustrated exactly how these critiques were studied in the selected campaigns through a detailed assessment of decisions made regarding design and analysis. Decision-making was both ever-prevalent and fundamental to the success of the research. At each stage, decisions were based on these critiques. The chapters which follow present each campaign in detail, exploring the context, legal outcomes, and Twitter characteristics.

Chapter 3 : Negative Outcomes: #stopstoning, #letwomengotostadium

Introduction

Two of the eight campaigns in this research showed negative outcomes after the social media activity - #stopstoning and #letwomengotostadium. Both targeted legal change in Iran. After the #stopstoning campaign there was a change in the law which allows judges to hand down a sentence of stoning more easily than before the campaign started. Analysis of government statements and legislative reports uncover indications that the changes to the law were made, at least in part, in response to the Western media attention. Reliable reports show that more women have been stoned to death since the campaign started than before. #letwomengotostadium saw no changes to the law while activists appear to be more rigorously targeted for arbitrary arrests and unnecessarily lengthy detentions, again more so after the campaign started than before. This chapter begins by giving an overview of the two campaigns and their goals. The context of Iran is presented in a comparative approach to the other countries in the study. The chapter then presents the findings of the analysis of the law before and after the campaign, and finally turns to the key findings in the characteristics of the Twitter campaign.

It is of the utmost importance to lay out, at the outset, the *differences* in outcomes. At first blush, it could very easily have been concluded that the regressive results were not related to the characteristics of the Twitter campaigns, but were simply down to the closed and authoritative nature of the target domestic government – Iran. However, two findings disprove this theory and allow for the continued examination of the Twitter campaigns. First, there were differences in degrees of regression *between* the two Iranian campaigns. If the only influencing variable were the target country itself, then the outcomes of the two campaigns would have been much more similar. Although both campaigns showed regressive outcomes, there were very important differences in the degree and range of regressive outcomes that indicates that something *else* is at play other than just the closed nature of the target Iranian government. Second, Iran shows domestic context which is similar, and in some instances even better, than other countries in the study. This again underscores that, while of course the nature of the target government is an important variable, other variables are needed to explain the full breadth of differences.

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#stopstoning campaign overview

Stoning is a type of judicial execution condoned by the majority of states and NGOs.[1]   A small number of countries continue to use this practice, primarily through religious doctrine justifications. As these executions are considered unlawful internationally, reports and statistics are difficult to obtain.[2] These cases also bring up issues around access to justice and judicial reform.[3] The law in Iran allows for death by stoning for a handful of crimes, mostly involving adultery. The story that sparked the international hashtag campaign was that of Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani. Sakineh was found guilty of adultery in 2006 and sentenced to death. Whilst she confessed on television to adultery and involvement in her husband's murder, the confession is highly contested. It is argued that Sakineh was under duress at the time.[4] Sakineh's case, like many others, was compounded when her defence attorneys were also arrested and held in detention.[5] Iranian officials have a 'track record' of bringing criminal charges against anyone attempting to defend individuals such as Sakineh.[6] Her case was brought to international attention when it was taken up by Amnesty International. Although Amnesty regularly releases reports and calls to action for women at risk of stoning, this particular case sparked international outrage and the hashtag campaign emerged. Domestic activists, repressed on the ground, turned to social media and social networks to organise and progress the cause.[7]

While Sakineh herself was eventually released and then acquitted, other women were not so lucky. Many Iranian women are sentenced under false accusations and more women are sentenced to stoning than men.[8] The majority of stonings are for women, who are generally more vulnerable due to systemic discrimination, illiteracy, economic injustices, and social injustices.[9] Differences in stoning sentences based on gender is listed as one of the laws

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[1] Amnesty International, 'Iran End Executions by Stoning' (2008) MDE 13/001/2008; Amnesty International, 'Iran Executions by Stoning' (2010) MDE 13/095/2010.

[2] Amnesty International, 'Stoning: Global Summary'.

[3] Amnesty International, 'Iran End Executions by Stoning' (n 1); National Council of Resistance of Iran, 'Women in Pursuit of Justice: Arbitrary Trends and Illegal Proceedings Victimizing Female Political Prisoners in Iran' (2017).

[4] Amnesty International, 'Iran Stoning Sentence Suspension Not Enough' (8 September 2010).

[5] Amnesty International, 'Fears Grow for Iran Stoning Case Lawyer and Son' (3 November 2010); Amnesty International, 'Iran Must End Harassment of Stoning Case Lawyer' (28 July 2010).

[6] Amnesty International, 'Fears Grow for Iran Stoning Case Lawyer and Son' (n 5).

[7] Mahboubeh Abbasgholizadeh, '"To Do Something We Are Unable to Do in Iran": Cyberspace, the Public Sphere, and the Iranian Women's Movement' (2014) 39 Signs 831.

[8] For a dramatic interpretation of a harrowing true story, the documentary film The Stoning of Soraya M.

[9] See, e.g. Amnesty International, 'Iran End Executions by Stoning' (n 1) 6–7; Amnesty International, 'Iran Executions by Stoning' (n 1) 3; Mohammad Nayyeri, 'Gender Inequality and Discrimination: The Case of Iranian Women' (Iranian Human Rights Documentation Center 2013) 11; Maryam Hosseinkhah, 'The

which contradicts the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women ('CEDAW') as per Iranian authorities.[10] Because men are legally and religiously allowed to engage in polygamy and temporary marriage, they have mitigating factors to excuse what otherwise would be charged as adultery. Women are not afforded these allowances.[11]

The impression left is that Sakineh was spared specifically because of the international attention, but that this left the hard-line conservatives and religious clerics angry at the foreign interference. Reports of clandestine local stonings carried out under provincial judges' sentences have increased since the campaign, seemingly in response. Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam, the spokesperson of Iran Human Rights, said: 'we hope that the international attention that Mrs. Ashtiani's case has received, will also be directed towards all the others sentenced to death by stoning and will continue until this barbaric punishment is removed from the penal law'.[12] This quote summarises very well the overall campaign and the effect that was had on the law in Iran.

#letwomengotostadium campaign overview

Women in Iran have not been allowed to attend certain male sporting events since the revolution. A particular ban on attending men's football matches was put in place in 1979. That ban was then extended in 2012 to men's volleyball matches. The ban is intended to protect women from foul language and the potentially uncouth environment in sporting events. However, volleyball had always been seen as quite a family friendly sport and the ban sparked outrage among women.

The #letwomengotostadium campaign began in 2014, just before a large international volleyball tournament was to be held in Tehran. No women were allowed in the stadium in

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Execution of Women in Iranian Criminal Law: An Examination of the Impact of Gender on Laws Concerning Capital Punishment in the New Islamic Penal Code' (IHR 2012); ibid; Rochelle Terman and Mufuliat Fijabi, 'Stoning Is Not Our Culture: A Comparative Analysis of Human Rights and Religious Discourses in Iran and Nigeria' (The Global Campaign to Stop Killing and Stoning Women 2010) 8; International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), 'Iran/Death Penalty: A State Terror Policy' (2009); Justice for Iran, 'Gender Discrimination at Its Worst: An Overview of the Discriminatory Laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Family Life: Submission to the United Nations Working Group on Discrimination against Women in Law and in Practice' (2014).

[10] National Council of Resistance of Iran, 'CEDAW: Why the Iranian Regime Does Not Join CEDAW? A Study by the Women's Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran' (2016) 3.

[11] ibid 4.

[12] Iran Human Rights, 'At Least 7 Stonings Implemented by the Iranian Authorities in the Past 4 Years. 14 More Sentenced to Stoning' <https://iranhr.net/en/articles/603/> accessed 13 April 2017.

2014; amidst several arrests of women attempting to enter was one British Iranian woman who was later imprisoned. Her case garnered much international attention. Although the President and the Vice President for Women's Affairs announced in early 2015 that the ban would be lifted for the summer tournament, just days before the event the sporting authorities reneged and said that women would not be allowed in. Some foreign women were allowed in the stadium, but no Iranian women. The ban was again tested in February 2016 when another international tournament was held in Kush. The international volleyball association (The Fédération Internationale de Volleybal/FIVB) had stated that they would cease awarding tournaments to Iran if women were not allowed in, but again in the eleventh hour the Iranian authorities announced that women would continue to be banned and the FIVB backed off claiming that cultural issues were outside its remit. Women were allowed to watch from a rooftop café for a time, but even that was closed off by the end of the tournament. The FIVB came under pressure again in 2017 before the February tournament; this time it took a hard line and said that they would cancel all international tournaments in Iran if women were not allowed. Women were thus allowed into the stadium for the February tournament on Kush Island in 2017. However, since that time no women have been allowed to attend any tournaments, including the major summer tournament in Tehran. This campaign was characterised with slightly less backlash than #stopstoning but overall negative outcomes.[13]

Context

As introduced earlier, it must be first explored whether the negative outcome of these campaigns was based on context of the target domestic country, both being Iran. The initial thought would be that as the two campaigns with negative outcomes were targeting the same domestic government, it would be the domestic context that explained the negative outcomes. However, an in-depth exploration of the context variables indicate the Iran is not significantly different from other countries in the study which showed more positive change. Although the context for Iran is not particularly good, the important aspect for this study is that the context is not significantly *different* from more successful countries. This does not indicate that the

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[13] Since the initial submission of this thesis, a woman who was arrested attempting to attend a football match in Iran set herself on fire before her trial and tragically died. While to some, attending a sporting event may seem trivial, to the women in Iran it is a life and death matter. See, e.g. Minky Worden, 'Woman Banned from Stadiums in Iran Attempts Suicide' (*Human Rights Watch*, 9 September 2019) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/09/woman-banned-stadiums-iran-attempts-suicide> accessed 23 October 2019.

poor outcomes were based on the target government or domestic political situation alone. It is also worth noting that, technically, Twitter is banned in Iran, although most individuals who want to use Twitter are able to through workarounds.[14] This is also clear from the number of Tweets and Twitter accounts which are from Iran.

The World Justice Project index of openness does have a statistically significant relationship to outcomes. Here, Iran showed the lowest scores. This indicates that governments which are more 'open' and transparent in general are more likely to respond positively to social media campaigns. However, as will be seen throughout this thesis, the campaigns themselves do matter *in addition* to the openness of the government. It is possible that had the Twitter campaign behaved differently, more positive, or at least less negative, changes could have been seen.

Iran is also the only country in the study that has not signed or ratified CEDAW and has only ratified six international human rights treaties. This was less than other countries in the study. As seen in the exploration of the dialogue with UN treaty bodies later in this chapter, Iran exhibits scepticism of the (perceived) Western-driven nature of the international human rights regime. The anti-Western rhetoric and discourse seen in reaction to the social media campaigns was certainly echoed in the dialogue with treaty bodies.

Therefore, the contextual picture does not significantly set Iran apart from other countries in the study. We can see that the lack of openness of the government most likely played a part, but again it is not likely that this was the sole reason for the negative legal outcomes, nor the degree of regression. Although Iran does stand out for its lack of engagement with the UN human rights mechanisms, this alone does not explain why the campaigns in this country were less successful than the others. Rather, it more an indication of Iran's reticence towards what are perceived as Western-driven norms and foreign intervention, a finding that is in line with the critique of the spiral model and the overall impressions of the campaigns.

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[14] Sheera Frenkel, 'Iranian Authorities Block Access to Social Media Tools' *The New York Times* (3 January 2018) <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/technology/iran-protests-social-media.html> accessed 28 December 2018.

Legal Outcomes

These two campaigns showed the poorest legal outcomes. #stopstoning showed substantial regression in legislation, law enforcement, and the representation of women's rights norms in UN dialogue. #letwomengotostadium led to no changes in the law coupled with evidence of regression in institutionalisation and law enforcement. Both campaigns brought out conservative hard-liners and exposed government discourse which is hostile to 'Western' influences, the perceived goals of the Twitter driven campaigns. Law enforcement was likely used as a tool to re-assert domestic power.

Legislation

Although neither campaign showed positive change in legislation, #stopstoning showed more distinct regression. Before the #stopstoning campaign, stoning to death was a penalty prescribed for adultery while married.[15] Under *Shari'a* law, which came into force after the 1979 Islamic Revolution,[16] sexual activity outside of marriage is considered to be *hadd* crime; sexual intercourse between a man and a woman who are not married is *zina*. *Zina* is punished as a *hadd* crime which is 100 lashes or death by stoning.[17] The Islamic Penal Code was officially adopted in 1991, and explicitly allowed for death by stoning.[18] Guilt must be proved by confession four times in front of a judge, or testimony by four male eyewitnesses or three men and two women, or the 'knowledge' of the judge.[19] A moratorium on stoning was passed in 2002, but it was ignored by many judges, and the moratorium did not affect the written law.[20] In September 2003, a law was passed which appeared to undermine the moratorium.[21] The practice came back into being more acutely after the defeat of the

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[15] See, e.g. Amnesty International, 'Iran End Executions by Stoning' (n 1); Amnesty International, 'Iran Executions by Stoning' (n 1); Extra-Legal Executions in Iran, 'Capital Offenses in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Submission to the UPR' (2009); Hosseinkhah (n 9); Nayyeri, Mohammad, 'The Question of "Stoning to Death" in the New Penal Code of the IRI' (IHR 2012).

[16] Hosseinkhah (n 9).

[17] Nayyeri (n 9) 10.

[18] Islamic Penal Code 1991 Articles 83 – prescription of punishment, 63 - crimes, 102/104 - methods, 68/71/74/81/105 - burden of proof; See, e.g. Hosseinkhah (n 9); Terman and Fijabi (n 9) 18–19; Justice for Iran, 'Mapping Stoning in Muslim Context' (The Global Campaign to Stop violence against women in the name of culture 2012).

[19] Amnesty International, 'Iran: New Executions Demonstrate Need for Unequivocal Legal Ban of Stoning'; Amnesty International, 'Iran End Executions by Stoning' (n 1) 3; Nayyeri, Mohammad (n 15); Hosseinkhah (n 9); Terman and Fijabi (n 9).

[20] See, e.g. Amnesty International, 'Iran: New Executions Demonstrate Need for Unequivocal Legal Ban of Stoning' (n 19); International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) (n 9); Justice for Iran (n 18).

[21] Amnesty International, 'Death Penalty/Stoning: Mokarrameh Ebrahimi'.

reformist party and the election of President Ahmadinejad.[22] Amnesty reports that the Deputy Head of the Judiciary has made highly anti-Western remarks in defence of stoning as an appropriate punishment based on religious law and beliefs.[23]

Although the Penal Code has been reformed since the start of the campaign, it still allows for execution by stoning. The drafting of the New Islamic Penal Code began in 2007, in anticipation of the 2012 expiry date for the 1991 Code. It was approved in 2011. Whilst stoning has been explicitly removed from the new penal code, this does not mean that stoning is outlawed. Rather, the code is silent on the matter, which therefore allows judges to interpret *Shari'a* law as they choose. Article 167 of Iran's Constitution gives this power: 'In case of the absence of any such law, [the judge] has to deliver his judgment on the basis of authoritative Islamic sources and authentic fatwa.' Therefore the silence in the Constitution means that execution by stoning is still legal in Iran. The crime of adultery is still considered *hadd* within the Penal code, although the crime of *zina* is no longer specifically mentioned.[24] Stoning is also referenced in other Articles (172 and 198) of the new code which again adds to the clarity that it is indeed allowable under the new code.[25]

Note 4 of Article 221.5 of the 2007 draft stated: '[if] the enforcement of stoning should create disturbance and prove damaging to the regime, the verdict of stoning…could be changed to execution.' This was completely removed from later drafts, notably after the campaign began.[26] Ali Shahrokhi, Head of the Judicial and Legal Commission of the Islamic Consultative Council has stated: 'it is in the best interest of the regime if certain [penalties] under the law of Hudud, namely stoning, are not *referenced* in the Code.' (emphasis added) [27] Officials have since stated that the reference to stoning was removed specifically in response to the negative international attention:

> Some people in the international arena have a very biased view of stoning and used it
> against Iran. They meant that stoning is a violation of human rights. Stoning is only

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[22] Terman and Fijabi (n 9) 20.
[23] Amnesty International, 'Iran End Executions by Stoning' (n 1) 4.
[24] Hosseinkhah (n 9); Nayyeri, Mohammad (n 15); Human Rights Watch, 'Iran: UPR Submission' (2014); Justice for Iran (n 9); 'Iran's New Penal Code Retains the Punishment of Stoning' <http://justice4iran.org/publication/call-for-action/iran-new-penal-code-stoning/> accessed 13 April 2017; National Council of Resistance of Iran, 'Iranian Regime's 20-Year Conduct since Beijing Platform for Action and Accountability to International Community' (2015) 30.
[25] Hosseinkhah (n 9); Justice for Iran (n 9); Human Rights Watch, 'Iran: Proposed Penal Code Retains Stoning' (3 June 2013).
[26] Hosseinkhah (n 9).
[27] ibid.

removed from the law but it still exists in Sharia and cannot be removed from the Sharia.[28]

#letwomengotostadium campaigned for a different kind of legal change – lifting a ban which technically is not legally binding. However, there are some policing regulations which are in place which treat the ban as law and therefore, in practice, is takes on a legally binding nature. On only one occasion since the campaign began has the ban been overridden to allow women into a stadium. The ban is still very much in effect and it seems that neither the domestic nor the international pressure was enough to push the government to legislative change.

Institutionalisation

Neither campaign showed positive change in the evaluation of institutionalisation. In both campaigns, there is ample evidence of the government rejecting the perceived Western ideals. Though this represented no change from before the campaign in #stopstoning, in #letwomengotostadium it was the campaign itself which brought out the reactions from hard line religious conservatives, at times in opposition to the ruling government. Again, this seems to be a reaction to 'foreign' social media activism, highlighting and even aggravating the fissure between elected government and powerful religious leaders.

Prior to the #stopstoning campaign, officials were already vocally disparaging of the 'Western' perspective on stoning: 'The real and fabricated images of stoning in the foreign media and their destructive impact on Islam and Iran are well-known.'[29] It was also reported that just after the UN General Assembly passed a moratorium on the death penalty, Iranian officials said it was 'part of the West's wanton attempts to export to other countries ideological issues of their own particular interest.'[30] It has been suggested that central Iranian government had instructed provincial courts to remain silent on the use of stoning since 2001.[31]

Government discourse was similar once the campaign began, exposing the tensions between foreign relations and provincial authorities. As one example, the Iranian Embassy in London

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[28] Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, 'Annual Death Penalty Report 2012' (2012) 17.
[29] 'Emad Baghi's "The Bloodied Stone"' (*Center for Human Rights in Iran*, 2 August 2008) <https://www.iranhumanrights.org/2008/08/baghibloodiedstone/> accessed 13 April 2017.
[30] Extra-Legal Executions in Iran (n 15).
[31] US State Dept, 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016' (2016) <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper> accessed 13 April 2017.

issued a statement specifically aimed at the international community stating that Sakineh would not be stoned; just a few days later the head of the provincial judiciary said that the sentence of stoning was still in place.[32] Quotes from religious leaders continued to show this rejection of so-called 'Western' influence. For example, the head of Iran's Human Rights Committee dismissed the focus on the stoning sentence as Western 'propaganda'.[33]

The lack of institutionalisation of international women's rights norms was quite evident in the government's report on the 20-year review of the implementation of the Beijing Platform for Women. In listing identified obstacles to eliminating violence against women, the State proffered reasons such as victim reluctance to report incidence to the police, lack of women's awareness, women's avoidance of pursuing cases due to 'personal views and family culture', and the 'promotion of violence and using "women" as a "means" through foreign media…'.[34] This kind of rhetoric places the blame on women victim/survivors and completely avoids any suggestion of underlying root causes, discrimination, or inequalities. Similarly, in relation to the refusal to sign and ratify CEDAW, the State holds that too many rights contained within the treaty are in contradiction to Islam.[35] This kind of discourse and approach shows a complete rejection of international women's rights norms, even when those norms seem to be accepted and desired by domestic women.[36] This rejection appears to be similarly exhibited both before and after the campaign, showing no change.

#letwomengotostadium appears to show a negative change in government discourse and institutionalisation in response to the campaign itself. There is very little evidence of the government's approach to women attending men's volleyball matches before the ban came into effect, although it can be speculated that it was not seen as problematic given that football matches had been banned since 1979, but volleyball was not banned until 2012. What is known is that the ban was 'designed to shield women from men's rowdiness in sport

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[32] Amnesty International, 'Action Appeal'.

[33] Hugh Tomlinson, 'Ashtiani Freed after 9 Years on Death Row' (*The Times*, 2014) <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ashtiani-freed-after-9-years-on-death-row-5gk8c3nnds7> accessed 13 April 2017.

[34] The Vice Presidency for Women & Family Affairs, 'National Review on Women's Status in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Beijing+20)' (2015) 29.

[35] One NGO goes so far as to hold that the regime "say CEDAW is an attempt by the West to globalize its culture and that western standards of human rights and women's rights could not be accepted and implemented by the World of Islam. Denying universality of human rights, Ali Khamenei, the mullahs' supreme leader, believes that acceptance of such western prescriptions are against Islamic dignity and are counter-productive, because the regime would have to surrender to the instructions of "Arrogant Powers" and endorse them." (NCRI, CEDAW, 2).

[36] National Council of Resistance of Iran, 'CEDAW: Why the Iranian Regime Does Not Join CEDAW? A Study by the Women's Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran' (n 10).

stadia and to pre-empt the temptation of genders mixing.'[37] This kind of statement shows a highly paternalistic and stereotyped approach to women. Just before the campaign began, Ayatollah Khamenei stated that:

> [T]he westerners have, for a variety of reasons, misunderstood the issues of women, but have succeeded through their propaganda machine to promote their incorrect and destructive understanding of women throughout the world while suppressing any opposite voice.[38]

The campaign itself seemed to open the door for exposing the tensions between elected government officials, particularly those in charge of foreign relations, and domestically focussed male religious leaders. In June 2014, the (then) Minister for Women's Affairs Molaverdi announced in an interview that the ban was *not* actually socially accepted and that the government would review its legality.[39] In April 2015, government official Abdolhamid Ahmadi, Iran's Deputy Minister of Sports and Youth Ministry, told the Islamic Republic News Agency that plans were in place to lift the ban. This was seemingly confirmed by Molaverdi. Opposition in government, Babak Dinparast, then immediately stated that there were no plans in place to lift or change the ban. This back and forth continued throughout 2015.[40] In June of that year, a law enforcement spokesperson confirmed the ban was still in place and had legal status.[41] The chairman of Tehran Islamic seminaries council, Ayatollah Rashad, said that 'given the improper physical and moral conditions of stadiums for women, their presence is not in the interest of society'.[42] In the week leading up to the June 2015 tournament, religious groups produced fliers which called women attempting to attend the event 'sluts' and 'prostitutes' and claimed that 'on Friday there will be blood'. Similar

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[37] James M Dorsey, 'Bowing To Pressure: Iran Grants Women Spectators Access To Sporting Event' (*Huffington Post*, 19 February 2017) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/bowing-to-pressure-iran-grants-women-spectators-access_us_58a92da2e4b0fa149f9ac73d> accessed 27 April 2017.

[38] 'West's Approach to Women Issues "Profoundly Deviant": Leader' (*The Iran Project*, 20 April 2014) <http://theiranproject.com/blog/2014/04/20/wests-approach-to-women-issues-profoundly-deviant-leader/> accessed 25 April 2017.

[39] Leila Mouri, 'My Share, Half of Azadi: Let Iranian Women Go to Stadium' (*Huffington Post*, 19 June 2014) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/leila-mouri/my-share-half-of-azadi-le_b_5508962.html> accessed 27 April 2017; 'دستور حسن روحانی برای بررسی حضور بانوان در سالن مسابقات والیبال' *Mehr News Agency* (17 June 2014) <http://www.mehrnews.com/news/2313394/دستور-حسن-روحانی-برای-بررسی-حضور-بانوان-در-سالن-مسابقات-والیبال> accessed 25 April 2017.

[40] 'Rouhani Minister Expresses Outrage That Women Were Banned from Attending Iran-US Volleyball Match' (*Center for Human Rights in Iran*, 23 June 2015) <http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2015/06/rouhani-minister-women-volleyball/> accessed 28 December 2018.

[41] ibid.

[42] 'Senior Cleric Opposes Women's Presence in Sports Stadiums' (*The Iran Project*, 13 June 2015) <http://theiranproject.com/blog/2015/06/13/senior-cleric-opposes-womens-presence-in-sports-stadiums/> accessed 25 April 2017.

sentiments were posted on social media sites as well.[43] The fissure between the elected government officials and the male religious leaders was excruciatingly clear, with the religious power seeming to dominate.

Molaverdi was very public with her reaction to this particular incident, notably taking to Facebook to state that the government had been pressured by the religious leaders, claiming that the hard line conservative pressure came 'from those who were denounced two years ago by voters, and who had crawled into their cave of oblivion for eight years'. [44] The post was confirmed as her own. Molaverdi said (also on Facebook) that the publication of the fliers was by:

> [T]hose who call themselves followers of God... and which used words that one
> loathes to repeat, clearly constitute several offences under the law…Even if one day
> our beloved girls and women forgive this crowd, they will never forget them and keep
> these days in their historical memory.[45]

An interview with the FIVB in November 2015 seemed to indicate the support from central government to lift the ban was strong, and noted that resistance was instead from the religious hardliners.[46] A women's rights activist summed up the situation and the lack of institutionalisation in September 2016:

> So the ban exists for one reason only and that reason is neither cultural nor historical,
> but political. Ali Khamenei and his regime want to curtail women′s rights further and
> further, in accordance with their religious convictions…With regards to women′s
> rights, Rouhani′s term has indeed been a huge disappointment, especially because he
> made many promises in 2013, which included the potential easing of the stadium
> ban…In July, the regime promised that women could purchase tickets and attend the

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[43] 'Female Iran VP Scolds Hardliners over Volleyball Ban' (*Middle East Eye*)
<http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/female-iran-vp-scolds-hardliners-over-volleyball-ban-411944926>
accessed 25 April 2017.

[44] ibid; See also Human Rights Watch, 'Iran: Volleyball Federation Should Penalize Ban on Women' (*Human Rights Watch*, 2 July 2015) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/07/02/iran-volleyball-federation-should-penalize-ban-women> accessed 28 December 2018.

[45] 'Female Iran VP Scolds Hardliners over Volleyball Ban' (n 43).

[46] "Convincing Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, a relative moderate who has notably improved Iran's relations with the Western world and has also enhanced women's rights by appointing female Foreign Ministry spokespersons since he assumed office in 2013, is unlikely to prove too difficult. The situation is complicated by the power still held by conservative religious figures, including the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei."
'Exclusive: FIVB "Hopeful" Ban on Women Attending Volleyball Matches in Iran Will Be Lifted by February' (1448634240) <http://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1032038/exclusive-fivb-hopeful-ban-on-women-attending-volleyball-matches-in-iran-will-be-lifted-by-february> accessed 25 April 2017.

international volleyball matches again, but when the online sale began, a 'sold out' alert appeared. So the problems have not changed.[47]

Law Enforcement

These campaigns both led to highly regressive tactics used by law enforcement officials, both front-line and in the judiciary. In #stopstoning, there were reported increases in the number of stoning sentences handed down after the campaign, while in #letwomengotostadium there were ample reports, some quite egregious, of increases in arbitrary arrests and detentions.

Collecting information about stoning sentences is difficult given the clandestine nature of how they are carried out, particularly in rural settings. However, three organisations are considered reliable for reporting on stonings. Their findings are summarised in the following table:

Table 3.1: Reliable reports of stoning in Iran, 2001-2017

Year	Amnesty International Reports: Stonings	Iran Human Rights Annual Reports: Stonings	NCRI reports
2001	**2 or 3 women stoned**		
2006	**1 woman** and 1 man stoned		
2008			
2009			
2010			
TOTAL	*4 women stoned over a 10-year period*		
	CAMPAIGN STARTS		
2011			
2012		**4 women stoned**	
2013			**2 women stoned**
2014			
2015			
2016			
2017			
TOTAL	*6 women stoned over a 7-year period*		

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[47] Quantara, 'Iran's Stadium Ban on Women: Excluding the People' <https://en.qantara.de/content/irans-stadium-ban-on-women-excluding-the-people> accessed 27 April 2017.

Although these are relatively small numbers, this does indicate a 115% increase from before to after the campaign, notably in the years closer to the campaign's height. While it cannot be said with any certainty that the increases were a reaction against the social media campaign, what is clear is that the campaign did not achieve its goal of ceasing the use of stoning as a punishment. Before the campaign, Stop Stoning Forever reported that they have saved 13 women and 2 men from executions by stoning.[48] Amnesty and activists both pointed to strategic domestic and international pressures as important in securing successful appeals, acquittals, or pardons in some individual cases.[49] The social media campaign, however, was a different kind of campaign which, arguably, saw less positive results. The stoning sentence for Sakineh herself was eventually lifted, however activists were sceptical, concerned that her case would be treated differently than others.[50]

The most regressive outcome of the #letwomengotostadium campaign was the arrest of British Iranian Ghoncheh Ghavami. She attempted to enter the June 2014 tournament and was temporarily detained but released. She was then called back to the police station, purportedly to collect her phone, and was re-arrested. She was kept in solitary confinement for over a month where she was allegedly interrogated and mistreated with significant failings in due process.[51] She was eventually released in November 2014, after six months of detainment without charge. It has not gone unnoticed that the woman targeted for arrest and detention relating to the activism was a *British* Iranian national, perhaps sending a message about foreign involvement in issues deemed to be solely of domestic concern.[52] The lengthy detainment showed a marked change in law enforcement, which can be correlated in time to the climax of the campaign. Since then, at most major volleyball tournaments (and other sports for that matter), there are usually a small number of women arrested for attempted to enter the stadium, however they are generally detained for a short amount of time and are released.

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[48] Amnesty International, 'Iran Executions by Stoning' (n 1) 7.
[49] ibid 8; 'A Rare Victory for Women's Rights in Iran' (*openDemocracy*) <http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/dg_asg> accessed 13 April 2017.
[50] Amnesty International, 'Iran Stoning Sentence Suspension Not Enough' (n 4).
[51] Human Rights Watch, 'Ghoncheh Ghavami: The Shifting Goal Posts of Iran's Hardliners' (*Human Rights Watch*, 21 October 2014) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/21/ghoncheh-ghavami-shifting-goal-posts-irans-hardliners> accessed 18 October 2017.
[52] Although space does not allow for a full discussion, it is important to note the complex political history of the British-Iranian relationship. See, e.g. Īraj Pizishkzād and Dick Davis, *My Uncle Napoleon: A Novel* (1st ed, Mage Publishers 1996).

UN Dialogue

Both campaigns revealed a negative relationship between the State and the UN human rights mechanisms. There seemed to be some movement from the Iranian government towards international women's rights norms in the early 2000s, however this changed dramatically after the stoning issue garnered international attention. The government's response was highly defensive and anti-Western. As relating to equality principles and the #letwomengotostadium campaign, little to no change was detected. It is also important to keep in mind that Iran has not signed or ratified CEDAW, is only party to six human rights treaties, does not allow for any individual complaints, and has several reservations lodged around the supremacy of Islam.

As early as 1991 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ('CESCR') began inquiring about the treatment of women in the penal system. As expected, the State response was that the penal code was in accordance with Islam.[53] The committee in a later report stated the government submission (in general) was not sufficient and oral arguments and replies were relied upon. As part of the oral statements the Iranian representative then called into question the independence and activity of the Committee itself and made remarks concerning the targeting of Iran in political warfare and exaggerated accusations.[54] This does not indicate a good relationship with international human rights mechanisms. Most of the reports through the 1990s and early 2000s continued this pattern of Iran relying on the supremacy of Islam and the Committees pointing out the State's lack of meaningful engagement with the processes. This includes a 1993 Human Rights Committee ('HRC') dialogue specifically raising concerns about the use of the death penalty in cases of adultery.[55]

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[53] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Report on the 5th Session' (1991) UN Doc E/1991/23.

[54] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Summary Record of the 8th Meeting' (1993) UN Doc E/C.12/1993/SR.8; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Concluding Observations: Iran' (1993) UN Doc E/C.12/1993/7.

[55] Human Rights Committee, 'Comments of the Human Rights Committee: Iran (Islamic Republic Of)' (1993) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.25 para 8. Again in 1999 in dialogue with Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ('CERD') evidence of lack of engagement is present. The Committee questioned the lack of ratification of international instruments into domestic law, bringing again into question Iran's rule consistent behaviour with human rights institutions. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 'Summary Record of the 1339th Meeting' (1999) UN Doc CERD/C/SR.1339. The state's response again deferred to Islam and went so far as to say 'the Committee's task was to examine racial discrimination and not to discuss whether Islam was fair or unfair' ibid 9. A similar back and forth was present in the Committee on the Rights of thee Child ('CRC') 2000 reporting cycle. The CRC report drew specific attention to concerns over the use of stoning. Committee on the Rights of the Child, 'Concluding Observations: Iran' (2000) UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.123 para 38.

Many of the State reports rely on things like workshops or events to show implementation, with references to aims and goals, but no indication of outcomes.

The 2003 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ('CERD') State report raised some positive points about women's rights in Iran, albeit with a focus on employment, education, and health.[56] The government in fact dedicated several paragraphs to discussing equality of women, seemingly recognising that empowerment of women was an issue.[57] However, later on the committee expressed regret that Iran had not become a party to the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women ('CEDAW').[58] This generally positive trend continued in the 2003 CRC reporting cycle, where the State voluntarily provided ample information about tackling domestic violence, improving education for women, and increasing opportunities for employment. The committee continued to raise concerns about implementation, discrimination against girls/women, and Iran's general reservation to the convention.[59]

Of particular note is the 2005 Mission to Iran by the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women ('SRVAW').[60] She confirmed what discourse tended to indicate in other reports – that women do have access to education, employment, and health, but that it is very much under 'strict surveillance and within well-defined boundaries'.[61] She specifically addressed the issue of stoning:

> The death penalty, particularly by stoning, has been a major area of concern. The Special Rapporteur received numerous reports of women on the death row, sentenced mainly for sexually or morally oriented offences such as adultery…Their stories reflect gender biases in the attitudinal and institutional structure of the country within which they, some still children, have become labelled criminals.[62]

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[56] Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 'Seventeenth Periodic Reports of States Parties: Islamic Republic of Iran' (2003) UN Doc CERD/C/431/Add.6.
[57] ibid 33–35.
[58] Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 'Summary Record of the 1597th Meeting' (2003) UN Doc CERD/C/SR.1597 para 57.
[59] Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 'Summary Record of the 1015th Meeting' (2003) UN Doc CRC/C/SR.1015.
[60] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences: Mission to the Islamic Republic of Iran' (2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/61/Add.3.
[61] ibid 25.
[62] ibid 41.

She went on to raise concerns that despite the moratorium, stoning remained legal and was still handed down as a sentence.[63]

By 2008, the Special Rapporteur began issuing urgent appeals for women sentenced to death by stoning.[64] The Iranian government replied that stoning was an important deterrent which was fundamental to Islam. Stoning is seen as different from execution, serving a more specific religious purpose and therefore sufficiently justified to maintain the sanctity of the family.[65] The government also stated that three stoning sentences had been overturned but did not address the other four cases in the SRVAW's appeal.

It is worth noting that, after the #stopstoning campaign, Iran joined the Commission on the Status of Women ('CSW') in 2011 and was appointed to the committee in 2014. Generally, after the campaign started, the reports show a regression in dialogue, with more open defensiveness and antagonism towards the West. The first reporting cycle after Sakineh's case rose to international prominence was with CERD in 2010. The Committee specifically asked Iran to address the issue of Sakineh's case.[66] After the State outlined the myriad ways in which her case was legitimate, the Iranian representative went on to say 'that the case did not fall within the scope of the Committee's mandate. The media had politicized the case and used it as an opportunity to disseminate negative propaganda about his country.'[67]

Concerns about violence against women, the death penalty, and stoning were all raised in the 2011 HRC report.[68] The State replied with a significant amount of information about how far Iran had come in improving the status of women.[69] When asked directly about the death penalty, the government seemed to dodge the question. The government did address the situation of women human rights defenders, reporting that many of their activities were in fact illegal and contributed to public disorder. Iran defended state action which they

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[63] ibid 43.
[64] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Yakin Ertürk Addendum Communications to and from Governments' (2008) UN Doc A/HRC/7/6/Add.1.
[65] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Yakin Ertürk Addendum Communications to and from Governments' (2009) UN Doc A/HRC/11/6/Add.1 para 302.
[66] Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 'Summary Record of the 2016th Meeting' (2011) UN Doc CERD/C/SR.2016 paras 38, 47, 50.
[67] Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 'Summary Record of the 2017th Meeting' (2010) UN Doc CERD/C/SR/2017 para 25.
[68] Human Rights Committee, 'Summary Record of the 2834th Meeting' (2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2834 paras 24–28.
[69] ibid 49–50.

characterised as 'soft', 'tolerant', and 'constructive'.[70] This is a chilling account of how Iran deals with activists, saying that the government is being soft, tolerant, and constructive when they arrest, detain, and allegedly physically harm arrested activists. In their concluding observations, the Committee continued to have concerns over women's rights (in particular women in decision making and women activists) and the ongoing use of the death penalty.[71] In the 2012 follow up report, the Committee raised concern that the government had, in fact, not answered some of the questions about the death penalty, in particular issues around stoning and the number of executions, and the use of death penalty for crimes not considered serious internationally.[72] This upholds the analysis that the government was evading these questions.

The most egregious evidence of the State's hostility towards the UN human rights mechanisms was in the 2013 State reply to CESCR's list of issues. The State wrote that one of the Committee's questions was 'a fictitious and irrelevant claim'[73] and went on to say 'We believe question 4 goes beyond the content of the Covenant, and are amazed to see this question.'[74] Later, in relation to marital rape, the State reports that '"Marital rape" is a concept that goes beyond commitments of the State party to the Covenant. Moreover, there is no international agreement or consensus on the wording of this concept and the "marital rape" is beyond the scope of the Covenant.'[75] Further on, when discussing divorce, one of the acceptable grounds used as an example by the government was 'beating or other forms of continuous abuse by the husband that is not normally tolerable by the wife are examples of undesirable conditions.'[76] These public, recorded statements taken together do not reflect discourse from a State which is institutionalising international norms on women's rights and eliminating all forms of violence against women. If this is the kind of dialogue that the State uses to defend its human rights record, one can imagine what the situation is like on the ground. The open and blatant antagonism towards the UN system and its 'Western' values was made very clear in these examples.

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[70] Human Rights Committee, 'Replies from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the List of Issues' (2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/IRN/Q/3/Add.1 para 102.
[71] Human Rights Committee, 'Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee Islamic Republic of Iran' (2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/IRN/CO/3.
[72] Human Rights Committee, 'Summary Record of the 2835th Meeting' (2012) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2835.
[73] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Replies of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the List of Issues' (2013) UN Doc E/C.12/IRN/Q/2/Add.1 para 5.
[74] ibid 7 referring to issues around SOGI.
[75] ibid 39.
[76] ibid.

The Special Rapporteur on the Situation in Iran[77] in March 2014 writes that, in an interview with an Iranian lawyer,

> The lawyer recalled that Iranian law allows for women who report rape to be prosecuted of adultery [and a possible sentence of stoning] in cases where they are unable to convince a judge of their charges, given that the allegations imply that the women had engaged in extra-marital relations. The lawyer also pointed out that rape cases were very difficult to prove and put women wishing to report the crime at risk of being prosecuted for a capital offence, which likely deterred women victims from coming forward.[78]

The report then brings to light the increases in executions more generally, and specifically notes that in 2013 at least 28 women were publicly hanged. The report also corroborates that the new penal code still allows for the death penalty, specifically stoning, in crimes of adultery.[79] The 2015 report raised similar concerns.[80] The 2016 report specifically mentions that the new penal code still allows for stoning, and that there was a stoning sentence for adultery handed down in 2015. The government claimed that the sentence had been commuted, while continuing to argue that stoning is perfectly legitimate to uphold the tenets and values of Islam.[81]

The 2015 Universal Periodic Review ('UPR') State report attempts to paint women's rights in a very positive light,[82] yet the antagonism between the State and the international community was again rife:

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[77] In 2011, the UN approval and appointed a SR in the situation of human rights in the Islamic republic of Iran. Human Rights Council, 'Resolution Adopted by the Human Rights Council' (2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/16/9. The first report was published in September of that year. The SR drew specific attention to the rights of women, citing issues around the worth of women, family and marriage laws, targeting of women's rights activists, and notably referring to government statements which seemed to blame women's dress for incidents of VAW. UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran' (2011) UN Doc A/66/374 para 56. The SR also drew attention to the widespread use and increase in executions, many done in secret or without due process. Notably, however, no mention is made of stoning or the death penalty as applied to women in particular.

[78] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran' (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/25/61 para 79.

[79] ibid 16.

[80] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran' (2015) UN Doc A/HRC/28/70.

[81] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran' (2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/69 para 15.

[82] Human Rights Council, 'Universal Periodic Review National Report Iran' (2014) UN Doc HRC/WG.6/20/IRN/1 para 77.

> Iran views the "Resolution on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran" and the appointment of the Special Rapporteur, as a political, discriminatory and unfair process that is based on double standards. Unfortunately, this process is being pursued by certain Western countries as a means to achieve their political wills. Such a biased approach, visibly contradicts human rights principles and norms that were drafted to promote and protect these ideals.[83]

While the State report is silent on the matter of the death penalty, both the compilation report and the stakeholder report reiterated previous concerns. Iran rejected recommendations calling for in-country visits, and rejected all 38 recommendations to repeal or change the death penalty.

#letwomengotostadium draws from many of the same reports, albeit with a different issue focus. The same overarching findings apply, whereby Iran does not exhibit full engagement with the international human rights mechanisms or norms, though some promising progress was seen in the early to mid-2000s. More recent reports show a regression in engagement and a re-emergence of nationalistic, religious norms.

Issues relating to women's rights to enter stadiums and participate in sporting events as supporters were raised as far back as 1993, when the HRC raised concerns about a prohibition on women practicing sport in public.[84] Nearly a decade later, in 2010, the State report to the HRC was still using language which reinforced traditional gender stereotypes and the primacy of women's roles in the family.[85] Notably, there was also much government discussion about encouraging women to participate in sports. This focus on women's access to sport is reiterated in the 2010 UPR State report.[86]

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[83] ibid 118.

[84] Comments of the Human Rights Committee 1993 (CCPR/C/79/Add25) para 13.

[85] Human Rights Committee, 'Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: Iran' (2010) UN Doc CCPR/C/IRRN/3 paras 217, 219, 225. Another good example (though just one of many) of Iran's approach to placing women within the context of the family comes in the 2011 CESCR state report: "Based on the provisions of paragraph 3 of its terms of reference stressing the importance of 'policy making and planning for the consolidation of sacred family unit through facilitating the formation of family, protecting its sanctity and basing family relations on the Islamic law and ethics' and also benefiting from the teachings of the Holy Quran and the traditions of the Holy Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him), the provisions of the Constitution of the State and other laws and regulations in force in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the women's social and cultural council has formulated policies on the formation, consolidation and elevation of family." Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Second Periodic Report Submitted by States Parties Islamic Republic of Iran' (2011) UN Doc E/C.12/IRN/2 para 148.

[86] Human Rights Council, 'Universal Periodic Report National Report Iran' (2009) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/7/IRN/1 paras 97, 101.

Concerns were not raised again until the 2011 HRC cycle, where the committee again expressed concern around the ban on women practicing sport in public.[87] The government replied that women were enjoying success in national and international sports, which seemed to be a careful avoidance of a direct answer.[88] A similar approach was seen in the government's replies to the 2013 CESCR list of issues, where the Iranian State noted that it was making efforts in the area of sports for women, whilst staying silent on the specific bans in question.[89]

Once the campaign began, the dialogue changed. The 2015 HRC summary report specifically addresses the issue of Ghavami's arrest and detention.[90] Again in 2016 the CRC raises the issue of women's access to sports.[91] Notably, the 2015 UPR reports do not give the issue much attention.[92] Although access to sport for women was raised as a concern, it was about women's *participation*, not equality in access as a fan.

Across all four legal variables, the situation is the same or worse after the social media attention. The disparaging remarks about the West and foreign media seem to indicate a strong backlash against these campaigns. In particular, removing stoning from the Penal Code and making it more subjective, with direct reference to Western media attention as the driving force behind this decision, goes some way to showing a correlation between social media activity and regression for women's rights. For #letwomengotostadium, the arrest and detention of Ghavami, a British Iranian, at the climax of the campaign again sends a message about the Iranian government's reaction to Western interference. At the very least, it is clear that neither campaign made a positive difference as stonings continue and women are still not allowed to enter stadiums.

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[87] Human Rights Committee, 'Summary Record of the 2834th Meeting' (n 68) para 19.
[88] ibid 50.
[89] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Replies of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the List of Issues' (n 73) paras 10, 16.
[90] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran' (n 80) para 150.
[91] Committee on the Rights of the Child, 'Concluding Observations on the Combined Third and Fourth Periodic Reports of the Islamic Republic of Iran' (2016) UN Doc CRC/C/IRN/CO/3-4 para 79.
[92] Human Rights Council, 'Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Islamic Republic of Iran' (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/28/12.

Twitter Characteristics

These were the two smallest campaigns in the study, with 1,093 (#stopstoning) and 7,173 (#letwomengotostadium) total Tweets analysed. Analysis indicates that the campaigns were just big enough to garner a baseline level of international attention which appeared to lead to backlash against foreign interference, but not big enough to rise to the level of combined foreign and domestic pressure needed to push for positive change. These campaigns showed high proportions of non-domestic users and, given that these are not English-speaking countries, a relatively high proportion of Tweets in English. Across all of the Twitter variables, these two campaigns showed a marked lack of persistence, low levels of engagement, and high proportions of non-domestic users. These characteristics opened the door to backlash (against the foreign intervention) without repercussions, with the lack of domestic drive providing no incentives or pressure.

It is therefore possible that the negative foreign attention combined with the lack of domestic pressure created an environment conducive to government backlash, contributing to the regressive outcomes explored above. This is one of the key critiques of the spiral model. The model does not allow any room for the very real risk that governments may exhibit a negative backlash against the transnational pressure, leading to outcomes which can be more negative than positive. These campaigns seem to provide empirical evidence of this risk. This is also one of the major risks inherent in social media campaigns. There is no control over who will and who will not participate in a campaign. It is impossible when a campaign starts in earnest to predict whether there will be enough domestic pressure alongside a balanced amount of transnational pressure. These campaigns very much illustrate these risks.

Persistence (Tweets per day)

#stopstoning and #letwomengotostadium showed poor indicators of persistence. These campaigns did not have the long-term investment that the other campaigns had, despite the fact that #stopstoning was the longest running campaign in the study. #stopstoning showed a very low variation in the number of Tweets per day, with an average of 0.46 (indicating the high number of days with 0 Tweets) and a standard deviation of 5.09 – meaning that across the campaign the majority of days had somewhere between zero and five Tweets per day. This, compared to other campaigns, is very low. Of note, the only two #stopstoning peaks were organisationally driven by Women Living Under Muslim Law ('WLUML'). The first

occurred when WLUML started a change.org petition for Sakineh and again when WLUML organised a 'Thunderclap' social media event to gather support and attention. Other days with small peaks revolved around landmarks in Sakineh's case. Interestingly, there was only Tweet when she was released and pardoned for good behaviour. #stopstoning simply did not attract the levels of sustained attention as the other campaigns. It may be because it started fairly early, in 2010. This was only four years after Twitter began. Other campaigns which started after Twitter had become more popular may have seen better success in gathering supporters.

#letwomengotostadium had higher peaks and more fluctuation in both domestic and international attention, indicating interest and involvement, but overall the campaign did not sustain the peak levels. There were only two peak days and one peak period, centred around the annual tournament in Tehran. The rest of the campaign was relatively quiet, with just a handful of Tweets keeping the momentum, exhibiting similar characteristics to #stopstoning. Also of note, there was very little social media attention when the British Iranian woman was released, although some international media outlets did pick up the story. Both campaigns showed very long periods of complete inactivity.

Figure 3.1: Timeline of Tweets in #stopstoning and #letwomengotostadium

Two of the most prominent variables in this study are the number of days in the campaign with more than zero Tweets and the number with more than five Tweets. Campaigns with more 'active' days throughout showed much more positive legal change. Overall, this tells us that while peaks may matter in gathering attention, continued and sustained activity matters too. The Iranian campaigns showed the greatest numbers and proportions of inactive days, thus not showing the kind of pressure needed for the government to institute change.

Engagement (Retweets, Likes, and Replies)

The #stopstoning campaign had an exceptionally low reply to Tweet ratio; it did not therefore spark much dialogue or inter-user engagement. Very few users replied to Tweets in the campaign. There was a higher ratio of Retweets to Tweets, at 1.55. This means that for every Tweet there were between one and two Retweets. These ratios show a general lack of engagement with the campaign. #letwomengotostadium produced a different but equally important engagement metric in the extraordinarily high ratio of likes to Tweets at 6.78. This was consistently high during both peak and non-peak periods. For comparison, other

campaigns ranged from 0.2 to 2.7, thus underscoring the exceptional nature of this campaign's level of like activity.

Another method of measuring engagement is the log(n) log(s) plot, explained fully in Appendix 5. The two Iranian campaigns' behavioural patterns are as follows:

Figure 3.2: log(n) log(s) plot for #stopstoning

Figure 3.3:log(n) log(s) plot for #letwomengotostadium

These are very different patterns. Although there are far fewer engagements in the #stopstoning campaign due to the small number of overall Tweets, a pattern can still be seen, with a sharp gradient in likes and a more moderate gradient in replies and Retweets. This shows that there are comparable numbers of Tweets being liked many times, but far fewer Tweets being liked only a few times. Contrast #letwomengotostadium, where, as expected given the above discussion, the gradient for likes is much less steep, indicating that while there are expected numbers of Tweets being liked many times, there are also very high numbers of Tweets being liked just a few times. #letwomengotostadium showed the most gradual slope for likes in the entire study. We also see in #letwomengotostadium an even steeper slope for replies, showing again that while there are the expected low numbers of Tweets being replied to many times, there is equally a low number of Tweets being replied to a few times. This reflects the overall lack of dialogue in this campaign.

The striking level of likes in #letwomengotostadium errs towards Gladwell or Morovoz's theories on slactivism.[93] Similarly, #stopstoning showed very low levels of replies. Neither campaign produced dialogue or debate, indicative of the lack of sustained attention and engagement. Again, these factors all remove any pressure or incentive on governments to institute change. If the campaign does not spark attention or engagement with followers, then the drivers of change are not likely strong enough to pressurise the government.

Users (profiles of 100 most active users)

These campaigns showed the lowest percentages of domestic users, one of the central critiques to the spiral model. Here, the lack of domestic drive (alongside the lack of persistence and engagement) likely allowed the government backlash without repercussion. Having such low percentages of domestic users in the top 100 (1% and 32% respectively) rendered these campaigns particularly foreign. These campaigns were not driven or 'owned' by Iranian women. This lack of domestic voice is likely associated with a negative impact on the end result. These campaigns are striking examples of the harm that can result from a campaign which is perceived as 'Western' pushing for change in a non-Western setting, coupled with an absence of domestic voices. Quotes and actions from the Iranian

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[93] Malcolm Gladwell, 'Small Change' [2010] *The New Yorker*
<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/04/small-change-malcolm-gladwell> accessed 14 March 2016; Malcolm Gladwell and Clay Shirky, 'From Innovation to Revolution: Do Social Media Make Protests Possible?' (2011) 90 *Foreign Affairs* 153; Evgeny Morovoz, 'The Internet' (2010) 179 *Foreign Policy* 40; Evgeny Morozov, *The Net Delusion: How Not to Liberate the World* (Allen Lane 2011).

governments, both in relation to these campaigns and on women's rights in general, showed a very clear backlash against foreign interventions. Had these campaigns been more domestically driven, *and* had they garnered inescapable international attention which rose to the level of incentivising change, then perhaps the legal outcomes would have been different. However, they ended up sitting in a void of sorts, with just enough foreign voices to spark backlash from the Iranian government, but not enough domestic and international attention to necessitate change.

Digging deeper into the profiles of the 100 most active users, there is another interesting, and perhaps damaging, aspect. In both campaigns, Tweets from the 100 most active users made up a larger proportion of the total campaign than seen in other, more successful, campaigns. Although this is partially due to the smaller number of Tweets and users overall, it still indicates that the campaign was driven by a relatively small user group, which we now know was also foreign.

Coding the profiles into broad categories showed some interesting results in both campaigns, though particularly in #stopstoning. This campaign was overwhelmingly foreign-driven; most of the foreign users were individuals or organisations (i.e. WLUML). Non-domestic individuals accounted for 51% of the Tweets sent from the 100 most active users and 24% of the reach. Non-domestic organisations came in at 28% and 36%. Notably, there was a group of European Union politicians who became very active in the campaign. However, as we have seen in reactions from the Iranian government, this Western involvement was not particularly well received. It can be speculated, given the Iranian government's discourse and rhetoric, that social media from EU MEPs would not be the kind of pressure that would lead to positive legal change.

#letwomengotostadium was also heavily non-domestic, though not as striking as #stopstoning. The largest category of users in the top 100 were non-domestic individuals. Although there were numerically fewer domestic individuals (16 compared to 28), they were far more prolific in their campaign activity, accounting for 34% of the Tweets from the 100 most active users. #letwomengotostadium did show less regressive results than #stopstoning, perhaps because of the stronger representation of domestic individuals in the campaign. It is possible that this drive from individuals prevented #letwomengotostadium from the level of regression seen with #stopstoning. In other words, this level of individual activity perhaps

did succeed in putting some pressure on the government – not enough to warrant change, but enough to curb some of the potential backlash seen in #stopstoning.

The active organisations in the #stopstoning campaign notably had further reach (i.e. more followers) than active organisations in any other campaign – 380,814 compared to the other campaigns which ranged from 3,681 (#women2drive) on the lowest end to the high end at 132,943 from #niunamenos. This indicates that high levels of activity from organisations with far reach does not equate to higher levels of positive change. These organisations were also more active, proportionally, in #stopstoning than in other campaigns (responsible for 28% of the most active users' Tweets as compared to 1-19% in other campaigns). Perhaps as the active organisations in #stopstoning were overwhelmingly foreign, this reach and activity level actually worked against the campaign, promulgating the saviour savage dichotomy which sparked regressive backlash from the Iranian government.[94]

Content Analysis (Sentiment, Personalisation, Framing, Messaging, and Norms)

The analysis of content paints a varied but interesting picture. Both campaigns showed very little reference to female or male pronouns, with average presence of first-person pronouns. Most campaigns in this study show more references to 'her' or 'she', indicating a personalisation of the campaign and a focus on (usually) a female victim. However these backlash campaigns showed almost no female pronouns. Equally, other campaigns show at least some presence of male pronouns such as 'he' or 'his'. Generally, this also indicates personalisation, albeit against a perpetrator. In these campaigns, there were no male pronouns in the analysis. These campaigns may therefore have had a less 'personal' approach, focussing on population level changes not individual cases.

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[94] Makau W Mutua, 'Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights' <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1525547> accessed 21 October 2018.

Both campaigns showed a fairly high presence of organically emerging but consistent framing and messaging. The figure below is a visual representation of the words most oft-used across the whole of the campaign; the larger the font the more the word appeared in Tweets.

Figure 3.4: Consistently used words, #stopstoning

Figure 3.5: Consistently used words, #letwomengotostadium

As seen earlier in this chapter, many of the peaks in #stopstoning related to organisationally driven activities, such as Thunderclaps. It is interesting to see that so many of the Tweets in this campaign contained words such as please, sign, today, and petition.   It is also notable that the hashtags #VAW and #humanrights and the word countries were consistent in the campaign, showing perhaps the high level of non-domestic users (these are very 'global' terms). #letwomengotostadium showed very subject specific words, such as stadiums, volleyball, enter, gym, game, and ban or banned. The consistent messages in these two campaigns were very different from each other. #stopstoning overall showed a more global campaign focus, while #letwomengotostadium was very focussed on the domestic issue.

Organic framing and messaging, as defined in this study (see also Appendix 5), are those words which emerge from the campaign but come and go based on time periods. In other words, they are the topics which everyone 'talks about' for a few days, then they wither away. High presence of these organic messages are negatively associated with government backlash specifically in dialogue with UN treaty bodies. #stopstoning showed the highest presence of organic framing and the most government backlash of any campaign. It is likely that this relationship emerges from the lack of controlled messaging on social media.

Content tables (Appendix 4) show the ebb and flow of the campaigns over the event-defined time periods. Interestingly, #stopstoning began domestically focussed, with many specific cases and women referenced. Over time, it appears that the campaign took on a more 'global' tone, which may relate to the findings earlier in this chapter regarding the lack of domestic focus and the lack of domestic drive in this campaign. It appears that the Tweet contents reflect this characteristic of this campaign, which is likely to have contributed to the backsliding effect.

#letwomengotostadium told a more domestic story, at times with reference to the religious fundamentalism against which the campaigners were fighting and specific domestic politics (i.e. 'Rouhani'). This may be why there were some positive outcomes in the campaign. However, the overall messaging seems very 'factual' relating to sporting events themselves. Perhaps the lack of strong framing and messaging in this campaign contributed to the overall lack of change.

Across all the campaigns, the percent of international norms which are present to any extent is statistically significant. These campaigns, unsurprisingly, showed very little representation of international women's rights norms. #stopstoning in fact showed the least number of

international norms at just 23%. By way of comparison, #women2drive showed 86%. This lack of invoking international norms seems to relate to a lack of success.

<u>Conclusion</u>

In short, these two campaigns illustrate the critique of the spiral model on the risk of government backlash. The characteristics of the Twitter campaigns opened the door to this risk which was manifested in the regressive outcomes, albeit to different degrees. Both campaigns lacked in persistence and engagement, and the low levels of activity that did occur were non-domestically driven. Although consistent messaging was exhibited, without persistence, engagement, or domestic pressure, in essence, it did not matter. The #stopstoning campaign is associated with a change in the penal code which now allows for stoning to be used at the discretion of local judges, and evidence indicates that more women have been stoned since the campaign began than before. The dialogue with UN treaty bodies manifested hostility towards Westernism, thus unsurprising that a campaign which is perceived as Western-driven would not be associated with positive outcomes. Similarly, #letwomengotostadium has not led to changes in the ban bar one isolated incident, yet more egregious examples of arbitrary arrest and detention have been seen in reaction to the campaign.

Chapter 4 : Status Quo: #farkhunda, #sendeanlat, #mydressmychoice

Introduction

The next group of campaigns showed, on balance, little to no change. There were gains in some areas and losses in others, rendering the situation for women and girls on the ground no different than before the campaigns. While the gains and losses differed in each campaign, these campaigns showed striking similarities in Twitter behaviours. They all gained significant attention in the time frame immediately after the spark incidents, but very quickly faded from public consciousness. It appears as though this initial mass interest led to some small changes but without continued public pressure or interest the governments were free to ignore the long-term goals of the campaigns.

#farkhunda campaign overview

On 19 March, 2015, an Afghan mob attacked and killed Farkhunda Malikzada in the streets of Kabul. She had been in an altercation with a caretaker at a shrine, and he loudly accused her of burning the Koran. He was illiterate and it later emerged was selling illegal items from the shrine. She was, in fact, a religious scholar. A mob of men formed and beat her, stoned her, threw her off a building, drove over her body, burned her, and left her in the dry river bed. Police were present but were unable to stop the mob. The incident was caught on video and shared online. Some officials, believing her guilt, endorsed the incident in the aftermath. It quickly became clear that she was innocent, and the resulting outrage led to one of the largest protests ever in Afghanistan. It did not go unnoticed that the attack was not carried out by Taliban, but rather by 'normal' Afghan men, wearing jeans and T-shirts.[1] One news commentator shared this insightful perspective on the protests and their portrayal on social media: 'an extremely disturbing selfie mania, the narcissistic tradition of our generation, found its way among the crowd. Pictures with the signs. Pictures with the crowd. Tweet. Tweet. Tweet. It all became about "me, myself, and I."'[2]

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[1] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 'Report to the United States Congress' (2016) 10; Zarghuna Kargar, 'Farkhunda: The Making of a Martyr' *BBC News* (11 August 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-33810338> accessed 23 May 2017.

[2] 'Farkhunda's Murder: A National Tragedy' (*TOLOnews*) <https://www.tolonews.com/opinion/farkhundas-murder-national-tragedy> accessed 29 December 2018.

The focus of the campaign was on the lack of law enforcement, including police and their perceived impunity, as well as a call for proper and transparent trials of those involved.[3] Unfortunately, the international public pressure led to hasty trials, the verdicts of which were then overturned. Criticism of the government's approach was rife:[4]

> When we began speaking out along with thousands of Afghans around the world, we hoped that Farkhunda's murderers would be brought to justice and that her case would set a precedent for the legal system to protect the safety and rights of Afghan women. But a year later, the lack of justice has had significant implications for women's rights in Afghanistan, where the majority of perpetrators of violence against women never face legal repercussions. The government's failure to maintain justice has emboldened criminals and left Afghan women more vulnerable to violence.[5]

#sendeanlat campaign overview

On 11 February, 2015, Turkish student Ozgelan Aslan was murdered. A bus driver attempted to rape her, and when she fought back, he killed her. He called his father and a friend who both then attempted to assist the driver in covering up the murder and disposing of the body. Her body was not found until the 13th. No lawyer would agree to defend the perpetrators, and all three were convicted and given aggravated life sentences without the possibility of parole. The driver was given additional time but was subsequently murdered in prison.

The hashtag #sendeanlat emerged, which means 'share your story', as a way for women to show how many have been affected by violence or femicide in Turkey.[6] The hashtag led to

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[3] 'Thousands March in Kabul Demanding Justice for Woman Killed by Mob' *The Guardian* (24 March 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/24/farkhunda-thousands-march-in-kabul-demanding-justice-for-woman-killed-by-mob> accessed 23 May 2017; 'Afghan Woman Lynched by Mob Becomes Rights Symbol' *CBS News* <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/afghan-woman-farkhunda-lynched-mob-rights-symbol/> accessed 29 December 2018.

[4] Human Rights Watch expressed concern over the quick trial: "This trial leaves the impression that the Afghan government wants a quick and dirty process to get this case out of the headlines and move on -- rather than real justice and a real examination of how such a terrible attack could have happened," 'Farkhunda Murder: 4 Sentenced To Death' (*TOLOnews*) <https://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/farkhunda-murder-4-sentenced-death> accessed 29 December 2018.

[5] 'A Year Later, Still No Justice for Farkhunda' (*Foreign Policy*) <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/01/a-year-later-still-no-justice-for-farkhunda/> accessed 23 May 2017.

[6] Helen Davidson, 'Rape and Murder of Young Woman Sparks Mass Twitter Protest in Turkey' *The Guardian* (17 February 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/17/turkish-woman-ozgecan-aslans-sparks-anti-violence-campaign-sendeanlat> accessed 3 August 2017; Mustafa Akyol, 'The Monsters among Us' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-monsters-among-us.aspx?pageID=449&nID=78486&NewsCatID=411> accessed 3 August 2017; 'Turkey Women Share Harassment Stories after Grim Murder' *Al Jazeera*

several protests and rallies in Turkey and around the world to raise awareness of the high rates of violence against women in Turkey.[7] Ozgecan's murder and the hashtag campaign became flashpoints of anger about the rising levels of femicide, the lack of prosecutions, and the loopholes in the Turkish laws that allowed many perpetrators to secure reduced sentences or easy appeals. Laws were in place to address the issue of femicide, but they were not being implemented or making a difference on the ground. Stemming from the hashtag campaign, 'Ozgecan's Law' was proposed, which was intended to prevent the reduction of sentences of perpetrators but was never passed into law. The campaign seems to have led to prosecution in this particular case, but no reduction in the numbers of femicide victims nor a meaningful change in the law.[8] Deeply rooted patriarchy and push back against the West were also exposed in the government's discourse around women and equality.[9]

#mydressmychoice campaign overview

On 7 November, 2014, a woman was publicly stripped and beaten at a bus stop in Nairobi, Kenya. She was called 'jezebel' and was accused of 'tempting' men in the area, based on a perception of the clothing she was wearing. The attack was videotaped, and the video quickly went viral online. In the aftermath, more public strippings took place.[10] It became

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<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/150216101649506.html> accessed 3 August 2017; Jim Roberts, 'Turkish Women Launch Twitter Campaign against Sexual Violence' (*Mashable*) <http://mashable.com/2015/02/16/ozgecan-aslan-sparks-sexual-violence-hashtag/> accessed 3 August 2017; 'Turkish Women Relate Sexual Harassment Stories via Social Media' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-women-relate-sexual-harassment-stories-via-social-media-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78413&NewsCatID=341> accessed 3 August 2017; 'Turkish Women Share Stories of Abuse' *BBC News* (17 February 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-31504416> accessed 3 August 2017; Charlotte Alfred, 'Women In Turkey Share Devastating Stories Of Sexual Harassment In #Sendeanlat Twitter Campaign' *Huffington Post* (17 February 2015) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/17/turkey-sendeanlat-twitter-campaign_n_6699702.html>.

[7] Davidson (n 6); 'Attacks on Women Continue In Turkey Despite Protests Over Student's Brutal Murder' (*VICE News*) <https://news.vice.com/article/attacks-on-women-continue-in-turkey-despite-protests-over-students-brutal-murder> accessed 3 August 2017; 'Protests Across Turkey Denounce Violence Against Women After Student's Brutal Murder' (*VICE News*) <https://news.vice.com/article/protests-across-turkey-denounce-violence-against-women-after-students-brutal-murder> accessed 3 August 2017; 'Thousands Protest Murder of Özgecan Aslan' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/thousands-protest-murder-of-ozgecan-aslan-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78520&NewsCatID=341> accessed 3 August 2017.

[8] Caitlinrose Fisher, 'Legislation Is Not Enough: Turkey Fails to Enforce Its Violence Against Women Laws' (*Global Rights for Women*, 10 April 2015) <http://globalrightsforwomen.org/2015/04/10/legislation-is-not-enough-turkey-fails-to-enforce-its-violence-against-women-laws/> accessed 3 August 2017.

[9] Mehmet Yilmaz, 'Why the Insistence on "Turkish-Style" Rules?' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/why-the-insistence-on-turkish-style-rules.aspx?pageID=449&nID=96240&NewsCatID=503> accessed 3 August 2017; 'Explained: How Özgecan"s Murder United, Divided Turkey' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/explained-how-ozgecans-murder-united-divided-turkey.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78414&NewsCatID=509> accessed 3 August 2017.

[10] '#Mydressmychoice v #Nudityisnotmychoice' (*Go Woman Africa*) <http://gowomanafrica.com/mydressmychoice-vs-nudityisnotmychoice/> accessed 6 November 2017.

clear that this type of incident was not new in Kenya, but in this case posting the video on social media pushed people to take action.[11] The hashtag resulted in a large scale public protest in Nairobi, with both women and men turning out to say no to violence against women.[12] On the one side, activists saw this as an act of violence against women, calling for stronger enforcement of existing laws. On the other side, conservatives used the incident to call for new 'decency' laws to be passed, to control what women can and cannot wear in public.[13] The counter-narrative in this campaign was very strong, and though male-dominated it was not solely men who were advocating for decency laws.[14] A similar issue was then deliberated in neighbouring countries Uganda and Namibia.[15] Although extensive debate in the government ensued, it seems that none of the campaign goals were fully realised.

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[11] Indhira Santos, '#MyDressMyChoice: Tackling Gender Discrimination and Violence in Kenya One Tweet at a Time' (16 March 2015) <http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/mydressmychoice-tackling-gender-discrimination-and-violence-kenya-one-tweet-time> accessed 3 October 2017.

[12] '#MyDressMyChoice: Kenyans Hold Rally to Support Woman Beaten for Wearing Miniskirt' <http://www.dw.com/en/mydressmychoice-kenyans-hold-rally-to-support-woman-beaten-for-wearing-miniskirt/a-18069645> accessed 11 October 2017.

The campaign officially called for the following:

- "Immediately investigating and arresting all perpetrators of the attacks; urgently deploying police squads to public bus stations to prevent gender violence, including harassment.
- More aggressively cracking down on those inciting violence and similar attacks on women, whether in public or on social media, pursuant to Section 96 of the Penal Code.
- Comprehensively and urgently addressing the Kenyan Government's obligation to combat violence against women, including: community sensitization and awareness campaigns, regulatory action to ensure accountability of bus operators, and necessary legal reforms to strengthen the 2006 Sexual Offenses Act in light of these offenses.
- Urging the media to exercise caution in sharing the graphic videos of the women being attacked and stripped, as the videos re-victimize and stigmatize the survivors and are emboldening copycat criminals. Ultimately, these videos should be treated as evidence of criminal activity." 'Stop the Violent Attacks on Women: #MyDressMyChoice' (*Equality Now*) <https://www.equalitynow.org/stop_the_violent_attacks_on_women_mydressmychoice?locale=en> accessed 29 December 2018.

[13] '#MyDressMyChoice - Protests in Kenya after a Woman Is Publicly Stripped' <https://www.globalcitizen.org/es/content/mydressmychoice-protests-in-kenya-after-a-woman-is/> accessed 6 November 2017; '#MyDressMyChoice' (14 November 2014) <http://africasacountry.com/2014/11/mydressmychoice/> accessed 3 October 2017; 'My Dress, Whose Choice?' <http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/africa/2014/11/99751.html> accessed 6 November 2017.

[14] Basia Cummings, 'Kenyans Protest after Woman Is Beaten and Stripped in Public' *The Guardian* (17 November 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/17/kenya-mydressmychoice-protest-woman-stripped> accessed 11 October 2017; 'Stop the Violent Attacks on Women: #MyDressMyChoice' (n 12).

[15] Cummings (n 14); 'My Dress, Whose Choice?' (n 13).

Context

This group covers a very wide range of geo-political, socio-economic, and demographic environments. It is also important to note the delicate political situations in Afghanistan and Turkey in particular – Afghanistan's post-Taliban relationship with the US is complex and intricate, and Turkey's ongoing relationship with the EU is equally fragile. Generally, there are no discernible patterns in looking at the basic context variables for these three countries. Turkey and Kenya showed some of the highest gender equality indices of all eight campaigns, outranked only by Argentina. This indicates that simply having a more equal society does not necessarily indicate that a women's rights campaign will be successful. Afghanistan reported worse indicators of baseline gender equality than Iran yet showed more positive outcomes.[16] This is an interesting finding, as it could have been hypothesised that countries with a better starting point for women would be more inclined to move towards more positive change. However, this group of countries disproves that hypothesis on both ends – the countries with better indicators of gender equality did not show positive change, and the country with indicators showing the highest level of gender inequality did not show the most negative legal outcomes. Another finding of note is the presence of women's rights civil society organisations in these countries. These countries all have a strong domestic movement with a healthy level of civil society activity. Perhaps this prevented the countries from more negative legal outcomes.

Legal Outcomes

These campaigns showed, on average, little to no legal change. Gains made in some areas were counter-balanced by negative outcomes in other areas. #farkhunda showed particularly poor judicial outcomes but with somewhat positive legislative changes, #sendeanlat showed

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[16] One day before her murder, Amnesty International issued a statement concerning the risks of violence against women in public in Afghanistan and the lack of law enforcement available to protect them. Amnesty International, 'UNAMA Mandate Extension a Clear Reminder to Prioritise Human Rights in Afghanistan' (2015) 3. The roots of violence against women in Afghanistan are deep and troubling. See, e.g. 'Farkhunda, Victim of a Society of Oppressors and the Oppressed' (*Radio Salam Watandar*) <http://salamwatandar.com/english/Article.aspx?a=19458> accessed 1 June 2017. Women were often targeted during the civil wars in the 1980s and 1990s, and when the Taliban took control the plight of women was even worse. After the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, violence against women was widely practiced and tolerated. Amnesty International, 'Afghanistan Women Still under Attack - a Systematic Failure to Protect' (2005); Human Rights Watch, 'The "Ten-Dollar Talib" and Women's Rights Afghan Women and the Risks of Reintegration and Reconciliation' (2010). The attack on Farkhunda was 14 years into the new regime, less time than the entirety of the Taliban rule.

almost no change with the law proposed by the campaign never even voted on by the government, and #mydressmychoice showed slightly poor outcomes in the courts with slightly positive indications in the institutionalisation of ending violence against women. On the whole, very little changed for women and girls living in Afghanistan, Turkey, or Kenya.

Legislative Change

Current legislative frameworks in Afghanistan are generally quite new, many passed since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. While the Constitution continues to prioritise Islam, it also has several articles protecting women's equality and bodily integrity.[17] Afghanistan passed a progressive law to end violence against women in 2009 ('EVAW'),[18] however there is a large divide between legislating and implementation on the ground.[19] Amnesty International found that the government was under international pressure to legislatively address violence against women, but that simply passing the law did not translate into changes on the ground.[20] The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan ('UNAMA') reports also cite many weaknesses of the law.[21] Major problems exist with the categorisation of cases and the continued use of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms.[22] Using EVAW as a basis for judgment in court happened in just 4% of relevant total reported cases.[23]

The law is legally binding as it was passed by the President, but it never went before Parliament. Efforts to later strengthen the law then put it to Parliament where it was met with

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[17] Islamic Republic of Afghanistan The Constitution of Afghanistan 2004 ss 22, 24, 44.

[18] Law on Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW) 2009.

[19] Human Rights Watch, '"I Had to Run Away" The Imprisonment of Women and Girls for "Moral Crimes" in Afghanistan' (2012) 104.

[20] Amnesty International, 'UNAMA Mandate Extension a Clear Reminder to Prioritise Human Rights in Afghanistan' (n 16) 4; Amnesty International, 'Too Many Missed Opportunities: Human Rights in Afghanistan under the Karzai Administration' (2014) 2; Amnesty International, 'Back-Tracking, Compromises, and Failed Pledges - Human Rights Sidelined in Afghanistan. Amnesty International Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review' (2014) 7.

[21] United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 'Still a Long Way to Go: Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence against Women in Afghanistan' (2012) 11–12. As also reported by SIGAR, "Many elements of the 2009 law seek to terminate the customs, traditions, and practices that allow or encourage violence against women. However, UNAMA found that many law enforcement authorities were either unaware of the law or were unwilling to enforce it, resulting in the persistence of acute gender inequity" Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 'Report to the United States Congress' (2011) 84.

[22] United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 'A Long Way to Go: Implementation of the Elimination of Violence against Women Law in Afghanistan' (2011) 21–26; United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 'Still a Long Way to Go: Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence against Women in Afghanistan' (n 21) 48; United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 'A Way to Go: An Update on Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence against Women in Afghanistan' (2013) 21–22.

[23] United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 'A Long Way to Go: Implementation of the Elimination of Violence against Women Law in Afghanistan' (n 22) 10.

heated conservative backlash.[24] One MP stated that he was 'surprised that the president had issued the decree in the first place and hinted that the law was an attempt by foreigners to impose western values on Afghan society'. [25] Before the law could be overturned or overruled, it was sent back to Commissions for redrafting and clarifying. This is a good indication of the tensions in the Afghani government, with one side driven by international pressures and incentives and the other supported by domestic religious conservatives. This makes progress in the area of women's rights and violence against women particularly difficult, not entirely dissimilar from Iran (though with a more complex relationship to the West), where tensions between central government and hard-line conservatives are palpable.

After the attention the campaign brought to the issue, efforts to implement a new draft law on harassment of women intensified, intended to clarify some of the identified ambiguities in the EVAW law.[26] The new law was passed by Parliament, but has not yet been signed by the President.[27] However, within Afghan procedural law this means it is actually still applicable. This particular Act was apparently met with far less debate than the EVAW. However, some are lobbying for the president *not* to sign it.[28] Activists feel that the new law, rather than clarifying the EVAW, is actually duplicative and perhaps contradictory, covering some of the same crimes but in two different pieces of legislation.[29]   The laws are in flux, with strong groups lobbying for progressive and supportive laws and conservative groups lobbying for more traditional laws which are, arguably, less favourable for women.[30] Therefore there is a potentially positive change in the efforts of the government, at least to some extent, to improve the existing law. However, these improvements are not always in agreement with

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[24] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 'Report to the United States Congress' (2013) 139; Amnesty International, 'Too Many Missed Opportunities: Human Rights in Afghanistan under the Karzai Administration' (n 20) 3; Afghan Women's Network, 'Beijing+20 Afghanistan Civil Society Progress Report' (2015) 21.

[25] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 'Report to the United States Congress' (n 24) 139.

[26] 'Harassment of Women in Afghanistan: A Hidden Phenomenon Addressed in Too Many Laws | Afghanistan Analysts Network' <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/harassment-of-women-in-afghanistan-a-hidden-phenomenon-addressed-in-too-many-laws/> accessed 1 June 2017.

[27] ibid; 'Senate Approves Anti-Harassment Of Women And Children's Act' (*TOLOnews*) </afghanistan/senate-approves-anti-harassment-women-and-childrens-act> accessed 1 June 2017.

[28] 'New Afghan Law Targets Sexual Harassment' (*Institute for War and Peace Reporting*) <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/new-afghan-law-targets-sexual-harassment> accessed 1 June 2017.

[29] 'Harassment of Women in Afghanistan: A Hidden Phenomenon Addressed in Too Many Laws | Afghanistan Analysts Network' (n 26).

[30] AWN Shadow report in 2016 stated: "The implementation of gender sensitive laws and policies remains limited, hindered by conservative forces, which consider women's empowerment against the traditional values of Afghanistan as a country. There is a growing fear among women's rights activists for the roll back of women's rights that have been gained in the 15 years, as commitments made by the government continues to remain on paper alone" (AWN shadow, para 23).

the recommendations of women's rights groups, nor are they being implemented properly by the authorities or the courts.[31]

Moving to Turkey and the issues in the #sendeanlat campaign, there is a similar situation with legislative outcomes. Turkey had been praised for legislating on violence against women.[32] However, in a 2011 Human Rights Watch report, the government's response to domestic violence was seen as contradictory and full of gaps.[33] This included a penal code provision which allowed for sentence mitigation based on 'provocation' or 'incitement.'[34] The report goes on to highlight the mistrust most women feel towards the police and the relevant authorities.[35] This is echoed in a quote from a woman in Afghanistan when told about the new Harassment Law and the ability to lodge complaints: 'That would make me happy. But what would really be a big help is if the policemen themselves didn't harass me.'[36]

The problem therefore, similar to Afghanistan, is in implementation, particularly by authorities and the courts.[37] For example, the Turkish law (Law No. 6284) provides for restraining orders and temporary protective measures, but the statistics show that many of the femicides occurred despite these mechanisms being in place. In 2016, 6% of femicides were of women with existing protection orders, and 9% were killed despite asking for protection

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[31] United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 'Justice through the Eyes of Afghan Women: Cases of Violence against Women Addressed through Mediation and Court Adjudication' (2015).

[32] "the last decade has witnessed a ground-breaking shift in the legal approach to violence against women in Turkey, as almost all the inadequate or discriminatory provisions mentioned above have been changed. The primary driving force for these reforms has been the advocacy and lobbying efforts of a strong women's movement in Turkey. These reforms have not only brought forth significant legislative advances, but also have led to a visible shift in terms of public discussion and attention to violence against women and challenging prevalent attitudes and constructs." Good Practices in Legislation on Violence against Women in Turkey and Problems of Implementation 2008 (EGM/GPLVAW/2008/EP13) 2.

[33] Human Rights Watch, '"He Loves You, He Beats You" Family Violence in Turkey and Access to Protection' (2011).

[34] ibid.

[35] "Law enforcement officers often prioritize preserving family unity, and push battered women to reconcile with abusers rather than pursuing criminal investigations or assisting women in getting protection orders." ibid 31.

[36] 'New Afghan Law Targets Sexual Harassment' (n 28).

[37] Republic of Turkey, 'Report Submitted by Turkey Pursuant to Article 68, Paragraph 1 of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Baseline Report)' (2017); 'Fighting for Women's Rights in Turkey - International Viewpoint - Online Socialist Magazine' <http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article3891> accessed 15 September 2017.

orders or when the orders expired – 15% in total.[38] The same was true in the past with 10% in 2015,[39] 8.9% in 2014,[40] and 13.5% in 2013.[41]

Again, very similar to the situation in Afghanistan, a new law was proposed in the aftermath of the #sendeanlat campaign which was never passed. It was known as 'Ozgecan's law' and would have amended the Turkish Criminal Law Article 82 to specify gender-based killing, as well as amending articles 85-86 and 106 to reflect gender-based killing.[42] The proposed law changed the permissibility of postponing punishment in the Execution Act, particularly on the grounds of mental illness as statistics show this is abused as a justification in femicides.[43] Finally, the law called for changes to sentencing to ensure that perpetrators are not released early.[44] The government promised to pass the law in 2015 but it was delayed on more than one occasion, and in fact has never been passed.[45]

Finally turning to Kenya, once again a very similar legislative picture exists. Fairly robust laws were in place to protect women from violence, yet violence continued. After the campaign, a new law was proposed to bolster existing legislation, but it was rejected by Parliament. Prior to the campaign, in 2006, Kenya had enacted the Sexual Offences Act, the first legislation in Kenya to recognise sexual harassment as a crime. It covers a wide range of sexual offences, importantly with commensurate minimum sentences, an improvement over

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[38] 'Men Kill At Least 261 Women, Girls in 2016' (*Bianet - Bagimsiz Iletisim Agi*)
<http://www.bianet.org/english/women/183255-men-kill-at-least-261-women-girls-in-2016> accessed 7 August 2017.
[39] 'Men Kill over 284 Women in 2015' (*Bianet - Bagimsiz Iletisim Agi*) 284
<http://www.bianet.org/english/women/172165-men-kill-over-284-women-in-2015> accessed 7 August 2017.
[40] 'Men Kill 281 Women in 2014' (*Bianet - Bagimsiz Iletisim Agi*)
<http://www.bianet.org/english/women/161678-men-kill-281-women-in-2014> accessed 7 August 2017.
[41] 'Men Kill 214 Women in 2013' (*Bianet - Bagimsiz Iletisim Agi*) 214
<http://www.bianet.org/english/women/152706-men-kill-214-women-in-2013> accessed 7 August 2017.
[42] 'Platform Law Proposal Full Text to Stop the Murder of Women'
<https://kadincinayetlerinidurduracagiz.net/haklarimiz/2251/kadin-cinayetlerini-durduracagiz-platformu-yasa-teklifi-tam-metni> accessed 15 September 2017.
[43] ibid.
[44] ibid; Agence France-Presse, 'Three Men Get Life Sentence for Murder and Attempted Rape of Student in Turkey' *The Guardian* (4 December 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/04/three-men-life-sentence-murder-student-turkey-ozgecan-aslan>; 'Femicides on the Rise as Watchdog Releases First Quarter Figures' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/femicides-on-the-rise-as-watchdog-releases-first-quarter-figures.aspx?pageID=238&nID=97398&NewsCatID=339> accessed 3 August 2017; Christina Asquith, 'Ozgecan Aslan and Violence Against Women in Turkey' *The New York Times* (23 February 2015) <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/opinion/ozgecan-aslan-and-violence-against-women-in-turkey.html>.
[45] 'Sign the Petition' (*Change.org*) <https://www.change.org/p/özgecanyasası-çıksın-yasalar-kadınları-korusun-ba-yildirim> accessed 15 September 2017; 'Sadece 2016'da 236 Kadın #25Kasım' (*Change.org*)
<https://www.change.org/p/%C3%B6zgecanyasas%C4%B1-%C3%A7%C4%B1ks%C4%B1n-yasalar-kad%C4%B1nlar%C4%B1-korusun-ba-yildirim/u/18584990> accessed 15 September 2017.

the discretion previously allowed under the Penal Code.[46] The Sexual Offense Act of 2006 was intended to be a major improvement over previous laws. It took many iterations and debates to reach a point of majority support.[47] Yet, once again, problems in implementation by authorities and judges allowed violence against women to continue.[48]

After the campaign, some progress was initially made with a handful of legislative updates to protect women passed by Parliament.[49] But a new proposed law, the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Bill 2016 was rejected by MPs in February 2017.[50] The amendments were intended to criminalise unwanted contact and bargaining around sexual attacks.[51] The bill was supported by women's rights groups. It was reported that mostly male ministers rejected the amendments, claiming that the amendments could be easily misinterpreted. Although there were parts that had support, such as establishing specialised units in police stations, the bill was thrown out in its entirety.[52]

The issue of decency laws is still ripe. Of note, before #mydressmychoice, there was a proposed bill in a Kenyan county to 'ban the miniskirt'.[53] Then in 2015, not long after the campaign, some universities in Kenya began to pass and enforce dress codes on campus

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[46] (Kenya Law: Situational Analysis and the Legal Framework on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Kenya: Challenges and Opportunities http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=4512 (last visited Nov 6, 2017).

[47] 'Choike - Legislating against Sexual Violence: The Kenyan Experience' <http://www.choike.org/nuevo_eng/informes/4717.html> accessed 11 October 2017; Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development, 'Making the Law Count: Kenya: An Audit of Legal Practice on Sexual Violence' (2009) 17.

[48] "The novel provisions within the SOA may lead one to conclude that all loopholes in the law have been sealed, that SGBV cases are now easily prosecuted in the Kenyan legal system and that survivors are now benefitting from a gender and survivor friendly judicial process in Kenya. However, the law still has some challenges in applicability." Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (n 47) 17.

[49] "There has been some progress to get justice for women being publicly assaulted in Kenya. In late December 2014, the Security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014 became law. While there are serious issues surrounding provisions in the law that run counter to protecting human rights, Article 17 criminalizes these strippings." 'Stop the Violent Attacks on Women: #MyDressMyChoice' (n 12).

[50] Daniel Psirmoi, 'MPs Reject Changes to Sex Offences Law' (*The Standard*) <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001229527/mps-reject-changes-to-sex-offences-law> accessed 11 October 2017.

[51] The Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2016 included the following amendments:

- Defining "indecent act" more broadly, including unwanted touching or exposure
- Increasing fines
- A provision whereby perpetrators are excluded from care work
- Tightens provisions for plea bargaining, so that individuals who sought to cover up their crime have a minimum sentence
- More special units and training for law enforcement
- Sex education in schools

[52] Psirmoi (n 50).

[53] 'Kenyan Politician Wants to Ban Miniskirts and Tight Trousers' (*Index on Censorship*, 12 March 2014) <https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/03/kenya-county-wants-ban-miniskirts-tight-trousers/> accessed 6 November 2017.

which called for 'decent' dressing.[54] One commentator posited that 'Perhaps these schools are "protecting" their students from self-styled "fashion police" who have attacked and stripped women on the streets of Nairobi and other major towns in Kenya…in the-not-so-distant past over what they consider "inappropriate dressing".'[55] In September 2017, county employees in two counties in Kenya were ordered to 'dress decently'.[56] Similar tactics were used in neighbouring Uganda, where a dress code was passed in 2017 for civil servants.[57] Also in Uganda, an anti-pornography bill (which is also known to be used as a decency law to regulate women's attire) was also then reviewed but passed muster and is still in force.[58]

There were very similar legislative outcomes across all three of these campaigns. Fairly robust and modern laws on violence against women existed prior to the incidents which sparked the campaigns. However, significant problems in implementation of these laws were identified in all three countries which allowed for the spark incidents of violence against women to occur. The attention these campaigns brought to the issues seemed to result in proposed changes to the existing laws, intended to fill gaps and improve implementation. In Afghanistan, the new law is in effect (though not officially passed) but has been met with criticism from advocates and thus far has not made much difference on the ground. Issues in implementation, particularly dealing with authorities and the courts, have not changed. In both Turkey and Kenya, the proposed new laws failed in Parliament. These campaigns did not achieve the desired legislative changes.

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[54] ArtMattersInfo, 'Kenyan Universities Call for "Decent" Dressing and Grooming' (*ArtMatters.Info*, 18 November 2015) <http://artmatters.info/2015/11/kenyan-universities-call-for-decent-dressing-and-grooming/> accessed 6 November 2017.

[55] ibid.

[56] 'County Staff Asked to Dress Decently' (*Daily Nation*) <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Nakuru--Nyandarua-counties-ask-staff-to-dress-decently/1056-4081652-11cjwvdz/index.html> accessed 6 November 2017; 'Understanding Africa's "Fashion Gestapo": Miniskirts, Maxi Skirts Make-up and Long Beards' (*MG Africa*, 5 December 2014) <http://mgafrica.com/article/2014-12-04-understanding-africas-fashion-police/> accessed 6 November 2017.

[57] Patience Atuhaire, 'Mini-Skirts and Morals in Uganda' *BBC News* (9 July 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-40507843> accessed 6 November 2017; Anneeth Kaur Hundle, 'Uganda's Colonial-Style Dress Code' <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/08/uganda-colonial-style-dress-code-170808072148083.html> accessed 6 November 2017.

[58] 'Uganda Bans Miniskirts as MPs Pass Anti-Pornography Bill' *The Independent* (19 December 2013) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/no-thighs-please-uganda-bans-miniskirts-as-mps-pass-anti-pornography-bill-9016686.html> accessed 6 November 2017; But see 'Women Free to Wear Miniskirts - Lokodo' (*Daily Monitor*) <http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Women-free-to-wear-miniskirts---Lokodo/688334-2148738-v2a1ai/index.html> accessed 6 November 2017.

Institutionalisation

Starting again with Afghanistan and #farkhunda, some positive changes were seen in the institutionalisation of women's rights norms after the attention drawn to the issue by social media. In the years leading up to her murder, the Afghan government was continually criticised for not doing enough to protect women. In 2011, Trust found that Afghanistan was the world's most dangerous place for women.[59] In 2012, the Afghan Women's Network stated they were 'concerned that there is a lack of genuine commitment by the government to protect women's rights.'[60] According to Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction ('SIGAR'), there were warnings that women's rights could face serious challenges and backsliding with the withdrawal of US troops in 2014.[61] Then just four days before her murder, President Ghani was in Washington D.C. giving a speech to US Congress in which he spent significant time emphasising the importance of equality for women.[62] Given the complex history and delicate relations with the West, and the US in particular, Ghani's speech may very well have been an act of lip service rather than an actual indication of domestic political will to change. It could also be indicative of the domestic tensions in Afghanistan, between elected government officials determining foreign policies and religious leaders focussed domestically, similar to Iran, and reflecting the critiques of the spiral model identified by Borzel and Risse regarding lack of domestic capacity.[63] Either way, the government had not made efforts to improve women's rights in the years leading up to Farkhunda's death.

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[59] 'The World's Most Dangerous Countries for Women 2011' <http://news.trust.org/spotlight/the-worlds-most-dangerous-countries-for-women-2011> accessed 19 June 2017.

[60] Afghan Women's Network, 'Afghanistan CEDAW Shadow (NGO) Report' (2012) 27–28.

[61] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 'Report to the United States Congress' (n 24) 140; Amnesty International, 'Strengthening the Rule of Law and Protection of Human Rights, Including Women's Rights, Is Key to Any Development Plan for Afghanistan: Open Letter to Participants in the International Donors Conference on Afghanistan in Tokyo' (2012).

[62] "A mental and cultural revolution must take place over the treatment of women in and by our society. There is no point talking about how much we respect women's honour, if we let it go unpunished or allow harassment in our streets. We've signed the global conventions to end discrimination again women and we will implement them vigorously but work is still need to convince our [people?] that protection of women's' rights is part and parcel of their own quest for social justice. I as the leader of Afghanistan am personally committed to work with the mullah, activists, and top leaders of our country to bring about this mental change." John Boehner, *President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan's Address to a Joint Meeting of Congress* <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cgqc7MO9zl0>.

[63] Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse, 'Human Rights in Areas of Limited Statehood: The New Agenda' in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), *The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013).

The #farkhunda incident therefore was, sadly, not surprising. The government did make some attempts after the campaign to make progress in the institutionalisation of the elimination of violence against women. For example, the High Commission and Commissions for the Elimination of Violence Against Women 'increased' from 2014-2016, a 'trust fund' was established to deal with cases of violence against women, a department in the Attorney General Office was created to combat violence against women, and there was the adoption of a regulation for the prevention of sexual harassment.[64] The government spoke about the importance of awareness raising, stating they were using schools and media outlets to reach the general population.[65]

However once again frontline change did not seem to follow. SIGAR undertook interviews with Afghan women in 2016 to learn more about progress and challenges. Security was the main challenge that women reported. Interviewees reported that there was 'backlash' and that violence was on the rise.[66]

> Several women recalled the murder of Farkhunda Malikzada, pointing out that the men who beat Farkhunda to death were not Taliban. These were young guys in jeans with iPhones. The hatred and the grudge they had against women is very powerful.[67]

Since the campaign, women recounted feeling less secure, with the knowledge of what Afghan men are capable of.[68] On one positive note, interviewees also felt that violence against women was being reported more because of the media attention the campaign brought.[69]

Similar findings were presented in an Afghan Women's Network ('AWN') 2015 report, highlighting that violence against women was still a major problem in the country, despite the laws and advances in other areas of women's rights.[70] In particular, harassment of women on the streets (similar to Farkunda) and in the workplace was cited as a specific and major

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[64] Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 'Progress Report on Women's Status and Empowerment and National Action Plan (NAP 1325)' (2016) 7.
[65] ibid 27.
[66] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 'Report to the United States Congress' (n 1) 9.
[67] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 'Report to the United States Congress' (n 1).
[68] ibid 10.
[69] ibid 16.
[70] Afghan Women's Network, 'Afghan Women's Network Annual Report 2015: "Steps Toward Quality"' (2015) 8.

issue.[71] AWN reported numerous instances of lobbying the government to address issues around violence against women, with what appeared to be little to no progress.[72]

Turkey showed a similar pattern. While Afghanistan is balancing a delicate relationship with the US, Turkey is balancing a delicate relationship with Western Europe based on its desire to integrate with the EU. Therefore we see government lip service to 'Western' issues such as women's rights and eliminating gender equality, however little to no effort to institutionalise norms.[73] Discourse analysis can uncover the 'true' approach of those in power, with the Prime Minister himself having been quoted as saying that men and women cannot be in equal positions.[74] He also made comments about women's duty as mothers, disparaging feminists.[75] These underlying and harmful stereotypes of women used by the government have been labelled as 'anti-female' by women's groups and were in fact blamed for the rising incidents of femicide.[76]

Officially, there were two national action plans to combat violence against women in Turkey.[77] Although these action plans called for the establishment of many support services and shelters, civil society criticised the continued lack of implementation and institutionalisation.[78] Some went so far as to find that the policies created overly bureaucratic

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[71] ibid 18.

[72] Another example: "Once again, Afghanistan's government has shown the world that this country is hell for women. We knew Afghanistan's judicial system, law and order would never work in favour of women in Afghanistan, and we were proven right after all the accused in Farkhunda's case were not punished. I don't trust the government any more. We are on our own." 'Afghanistan: "Farkhunda Will Not Be Forgotten"' <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/03/afghanistan-farkhunda-forgotten-160317115433960.html> accessed 29 December 2018.

[73] 'Fight against Domestic Violence Stalls in "Patriarchal" Turkey' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/fight-against-domestic-violence-stalls-in-patriarchal-turkey.aspx?pageID=238&nID=69455&NewsCatID=339> accessed 3 August 2017.

[74] 'Özgecan'ın Ölümü Kadına Yönelik Şiddette Milat Olur Mu?' *BBC Türkçe* <http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/02/150220_ozgecan_aslan> accessed 15 September 2017; 'Erdoğan"s Remarks on Gender Equality Stir Fury' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogans-remarks-on-gender-equality-stir-fury-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=74820&NewsCatID=338> accessed 3 August 2017; Davidson (n 6); 'Turkey President Erdogan: Women Are Not Equal to Men' *BBC News* (24 November 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30183711> accessed 3 August 2017; 'Turkish President Erdoğan Says Gender Equality "against Nature"' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-president-erdogan-says-gender-equality-against-nature.aspx?pageID=238&nID=74726&NewsCatID=338> accessed 3 August 2017.

[75] "Our religion regards motherhood very highly. Feminists don't understand that, they reject motherhood." 'Turkey President Erdogan: Women Are Not Equal to Men' (n 74); 'Turkish President Erdoğan Says Gender Equality "against Nature"' (n 74).

[76] 'Turkey's Femicide Problem' <http://harvardpolitics.com/world/turkeys-femicide-problem/> accessed 3 August 2017; Bianet, 'BİANET (Independent Communication Network) Shadow Report to GREVIO' (2017).

[77] Çiğdem Tozlu and Asuman Göksel, 'WAVE Violence against Women Country Report Turkey' (2016).

[78] ibid 39.

systems which made more problems than were solved.[79] The government also replaced the

Ministry for Women and Family with the Ministry of Family and Social Policies in 2011,

removing women's issues from the ministry.[80] Again, this shows the underlying lack of

political will to engage with women's rights issues.

Just days after Ozgecan's murder, the Ministry of Family and Social Policies announced a

series of actions to renew and implement the national action plan on the fight against violence

against women, including the establishment of more women's shelters and an impact analysis

of the focus of the campaign, Law No. 6284.[81] However, a recent report found that the

national action plan has not, in fact, been renewed.[82] There appears to continue to be

significant lip service from both ruling party and opposition parties on eliminating violence

against women, verbally addressing both prevention and prosecutions.[83] Time has shown that

these discussions were and continue to be short lived and lacking in teeth.[84] There is also

some indication that the government may have taken action against the media in the

aftermath of the incident, attempting to quell the negative attention.[85]

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[79] ibid.

[80] 'Turkish Women Rising' (*Ms. Magazine Blog*, 23 March 2017)
<http://msmagazine.com/blog/2017/03/23/turkish-women-rising/> accessed 7 August 2017; Human Rights
Watch, 'Turkey: Backward Step for Women's Rights' (*Human Rights Watch*, 2011)
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/09/turkey-backward-step-womens-rights> accessed 3 August 2017.

[81] Law to Protect Family and Prevent Violence Against Women 2012 (6284); 'Turkish Family Ministry Plans
Stronger Action Plan to Combat Violence against Women' (*Hürriyet Daily News*)
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-family-ministry-plans-stronger-action-plan-to-combat-violence-
against-women-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78548&NewsCatID=341> accessed 3 August 2017.

[82] Bianet (n 76) 9.

[83] 'Turkish PM Pledges to Act on Women Killings' (*Hürriyet Daily News*)
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-pledges-to-act-on-women-
killings.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78388&NewsCatID=338> accessed 3 August 2017; Emily Feldman, 'Violence
against Women in Turkey: Erdogan Takes a Surprising Stand' (*Mashable*)
<http://mashable.com/2015/02/19/erdogan-violence-against-women/> accessed 3 August 2017.

[84] 'Turkey's Femicide Problem' (n 76); US State Dept, 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016'
(2016) <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper> accessed 13 April 2017;
Bianet (n 76) 8; 'Turkish Leaders Celebrate International Women's Day' (*Hürriyet Daily News*)
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-leaders-celebrate-international-womens-day------
.aspx?pageID=238&nID=79370&NewsCatID=338> accessed 3 August 2017; 'Erdoğan Says Turkey's Main
Opposition Leader "Politicizes" Murder of Özgecan' (*Hürriyet Daily News*)
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-says-turkeys-main-opposition-leader-politicizes-murder-of-
ozgecan.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78483&NewsCatID=338> accessed 3 August 2017; 'Erdoğan Urges Muhtars
to Protect Women from Violence' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-urges-
muhtars-to-protect-women-from-violence-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=79480&NewsCatID=338> accessed 3
August 2017; 'Is Life Getting Worse for Women in Erdogan's Turkey?' *BBC News* (4 March 2015)
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-31709887> accessed 3 August 2017.

[85] There were 50% fewer reports on violence against in the first 100 days of 2017 than there had been in 2016.
"This fall in press reports, even as violence against women was increasing, is another sign of violence against
women. The closure of a number of media outlets and restrictions in press freedom in Turkey likely played a
role in this situation," stated the report." '173 Women Killed in Turkey in First Five Months of 2017: Report'

Finally moving to Kenya and #mydressmychoice the commonalities in legal outcomes for this group of campaigns continue. Yet again, there were policies and programmes in place intended to address the issue of violence against women but implementation and governmental institutionalisation were lacking. A poll from 2010 underscored how little these laws and policies were changing experiences for women and girls, with 48.2% of women fearing sexual harassment from a household member.[86]

National guidelines on the management of sexual violence were intended to ensure a rights-based, multi-agency holistic approach to supporting victims of sexual violence, in particular addressing a dignified procedure for the collection of evidence.[87] But again, gaps between policy and implementation were significant. One NGO attempted to identify why this gap is so problematic in Kenya, and found a range of challenges and barriers, including many issues around inadequate resourcing, limited capacity, and socio-cultural issues.[88] This was echoed in the work produced by a Task Force set up to oversee the implementation of the Sexual Offences Act.[89]

The President did take some action in the immediate aftermath of the spark incident, launching a new national framework towards response and prevention of gender based violence, which was intended to coordinate efforts across sectors towards a more effective and efficient approach.[90] Of note, the framework specifically draws down from international norms found in the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Beijing Platform for Action, and the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategy.[91] This coincided with the country's first 16 days against violence against women national campaign.

The #mydressmychoice campaign, similar to the other status quo campaigns, clearly pushed government officials to address the issue and denounce the incident[92] including a Tweet from the President.[93] However, in this particular campaign, the attention also prompted the

(*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/173-women-killed-in-turkey-in-first-five-months-of-2017-report.aspx?pageID=238&nID=113936&NewsCatID=509> accessed 3 August 2017.

[86] Santos (n 11).

[87] 'Kenya Law: Situational Analysis and the Legal Framework on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Kenya: Challenges and Opportunities' <http://kenyalaw.org/kl/index.php?id=4512> accessed 6 November 2017.

[88] Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (n 47); 'Kenya Law: Situational Analysis and the Legal Framework on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Kenya: Challenges and Opportunities' (n 87).

[89] Human Rights Center, 'Sexual Offences Act: Implementation Workshop' (2012) 13.

[90] 'Kenya Law: Situational Analysis and the Legal Framework on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Kenya: Challenges and Opportunities' (n 87).

[91] ibid.

[92] Santos (n 11).

[93] Emmanuel Igunza, 'Stripping Videos Outrage Kenyans' *BBC News* (26 November 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-30217462> accessed 6 November 2017.

counter-narrative to address the issue, where 'local news reported various interviews with local men who think that the mobs did the right thing,' arguing that there is 'moral decay in society' and that the victim learned a lesson. Others were critical of the movement out of a belief that a woman wearing a miniskirt lacks 'decency.' [94]

Despite all the attention to both sides of the decency debate, it seems little has changed.[95] In 2017 a commentator reported that, upon interviewing women, seven out of ten were still worried about what they wore based on where they were going.[96] In other words, women still feel as though they need to dress more conservatively in the cities where the perceived risk of harassment is higher.

Across all three countries, again, we see a very similar picture in the institutionalisation of women's rights before and after the hashtag campaigns. Policies and programmes were in place, but with the government lacking either the will or the capacity to prioritise meaningful change. Violence against women was rampant in these countries despite the various action plans, frameworks, and strategies. Discourse from government officials and other political parties shows endemic harmful stereotyping of women. The campaigns attracted enough attention to push government officials to publicly denounce violence against women, and perhaps make a small token gesture to introduce a new, non-binding policy or programme, but with little to no impact on the epidemic.

Law Enforcement

Law enforcement in Afghanistan was one of the main concerns of the campaign, particularly given that there were police on site when Farkhunda was murdered and that the perpetrators' sentences were commuted or acquitted altogether due to the rushed trials. Some

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[94] Santos (n 11).

[95] On November 16, 2016, two Nairobi gubernatorial candidates appeared on television for a live debate. The male candidate not only called the female candidate a "socialite bimbo" but also stated "You are so beautiful, everybody wants to rape you." A few days later, the same female candidate attended an event wearing a black dress which showed her thighs, sparking debate on social media: "One Twitter commentator posted: "Her mode of dressing is alarming. Why behave like a teenage girl?" The candidate replied "My great grandmother walked with less than I do. So did Eve. No apologies to make". Twitter reactions from the counter-narrative included the words 'Bimbo', '…spreading your womanhood', '…dresses like she's in a brothel', 'My dress my choice makes some people walk half naked', 'As much as we condemn Miguna (male candidate), let our women carry themselves in an unquestionable manner'." 'Life after "My Dress My Choice"' (*Daily Nation*) <http://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/saturday/Is-your-dress-really-your-choice/1216-3835390-c1h5aj/index.html> accessed 6 November 2017.

[96] ibid.

improvements had been seen in the years leading up the campaign.[97] However, the same

reports also found that many cases never made it to the official judicial process with many

referrals still being made to traditional resolution mechanisms.[98] A 2012 shadow report also

pointed to informal dispute resolution as problematic to women's access to justice.[99] It was

reported that only 7% of cases of violence under EVAW go through a judicial process.[100] In

the 2013, UNAMA found that while EVAW is being used for more registration of reported

incidents, it is not being used in more cases for indictment.[101] Taken together, this all

indicates that the courts themselves might have been showing improvements in prosecutions,

which is a significant step for Afghanistan, but that local barriers still existed which kept

cases out of the system.

One of the most negative outcomes from this campaign was the prosecution of the

perpetrators, where 11 police officers were sentenced to one year in prison, eight individuals

were sentenced to 16 years, and four were sentenced to death, including the caretaker who

started the mob and a young man who was seen on tape throwing stones.[102] The police

officers were released on bail after an appeal, and four were acquitted. All continue to work

for the government.[103] On appeal, three of the men sentenced to death had their sentences

commuted to 20 years in prison, and the youth had his sentence commuted to ten years.[104]

The appeal trial was notably held behind closed doors.[105] Human Rights Watch identified

vast problems with these court cases:

> At every stage of this case the Afghan criminal justice system failed to adequately
>
> investigate, hold to account or appropriately punish those responsible. The trials

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[97] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 'Report to the United States Congress' (2012) 123; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 'Report to the United States Congress' (n 24).
[98] Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 'Report to the United States Congress' (n 24) 121.
[99] Afghan Women's Network, 'Afghanistan CEDAW Shadow (NGO) Report' (n 60) paras 23–25.
[100] 'A Year Later, Still No Justice for Farkhunda' (n 5).
[101] United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, 'A Way to Go: An Update on Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence against Women in Afghanistan' (n 22) 3–4.
[102] Kargar (n 1).
[103] Alissa J Rubin, 'Flawed Justice After a Mob Killed an Afghan Woman' *The New York Times* (26 December 2015) <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/world/asia/flawed-justice-after-a-mob-killed-an-afghan-woman.html> accessed 23 May 2017.
[104] Human Rights Watch, 'Dispatches: Afghanistan's Legal System Fails Farkhunda, Again' (*Human Rights Watch*, 9 March 2016) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/09/dispatches-afghanistans-legal-system-fails-farkhunda-again> accessed 5 June 2017; Kargar (n 1); Rubin (n 103); 'A Year Later, Still No Justice for Farkhunda' (n 5).
[105] Rubin (n 103).

of those originally accused were conducted in haste and riddled with procedural errors, with many defendants lacking legal counsel.[106]

The Afghan Women's Network also raised concerns about the trials.[107] More generally, the network comments that:

> Kabul City as the country capital is becoming day by day worse for women's social protection, these kinds of events without prosecution, arresting of the perpetrators and failure to implement justice become cause of the constraints against women's movement as their active presence in all fields.[108]

The network, through a study, found that the lack of prosecutions has led to a culture of impunity and weak governance.[109] This was echoed in a 2015 shadow report.[110] Other sources indicate that the lack of repercussions has emboldened men to harass women more often.[111] Most agree that the negative attention brought to the country through social media pressured the situation, leading to rushed trials which were then overturned, increasing the feeling of impunity.[112] All of this makes the situation *worse* for women and girls in Afghanistan.

The picture is somewhat similar in Turkey. Although prosecutions and convictions are not as rare, mitigating factors to reduce sentences are common. Very little is reported on the role of the courts prior to Ozgelan's murder, other than the low prosecution rates and the high use of mitigating factors for reduced sentences. The three men accused of involvement in the murder – the driver, his father, and his friend – were all found guilty and sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment.[113] The minibus driver was later killed in prison. President Erdogan stated that he would personally follow the case and that 'violence against women is

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[106] Human Rights Watch, 'Dispatches' (n 104).

[107] "it was further mentioned Civil society expected the Supreme Court to mete justice, but even after eight months, the unfair practices of the legal system and violations of law in connection the case of Martyr Farkhunda has not resulted in any fair outcome." Afghan Women's Network, 'Afghan Women's Network Annual Report 2015: "Steps Toward Quality"' (n 70) 20.

[108] ibid 22.

[109] ibid 23.

[110] ibid 17.

[111] 'A Year Later, Still No Justice for Farkhunda' (n 5).

[112] ibid; Rubin (n 103).

[113] 'Özgecan Aslan's Murderers Sentenced to Aggravated Life Imprisonment' (*Bianet - Bagimsiz Iletisim Agi*) <https://www.bianet.org/english/women/169845-ozgecan-aslan-s-murderers-sentenced-to-aggravated-life-imprisonment> accessed 15 September 2017; 'Turkish Court Jails Three to Life for College Girl"s Brutal Murder' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-court-jails-three-to-life-for-college-girls-brutal-murder.aspx?pageID=238&nID=92051&NewsCatID=509> accessed 3 August 2017.

the bleeding wound of our country.'[114] It is possible that his investment in this particular case and not others led to heavy prosecution here but not systematically for other cases of violence against women.[115] Activists identified that courts were continuing to use good behaviour and provocation as mitigating factors.[116]

Statistics show a slight decrease in the percentage of gender-based violence cases benefitting from mitigating factors after the campaign, from roughly 24% in 2015 to 22% in 2016. It seems that specifically for homicide, it may have reduced from 45% in 2014 to 28% across 2015-2016, but the statistics are difficult to pinpoint.[117] The number of reported cases was much higher in the later years, indicating that the raw number of mitigations is likely similar. It is also worth noting that cases involving a man and a woman in a pre-existing relationship are not eligible for aggravated sentences. In 2015, this excluded 67 out of 284 cases from potentially aggravated sentences.[118] Gülsüm Kav from the We Will Stop Femicide Platform said in July 2017:

> This year we have monitored 108 court cases in the first three months, half of which ended with reduced sentences due to good behavior. Recently we also see long trial periods. Any late arrival of justice is itself a form of injustice. What's

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[114] 'Violence against Women Is Turkey's "Bleeding Wound" - Erdogan' *Reuters* (16 February 2015) <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-women-violence-idUSKBN0LK1OH20150216>; 'Turkish President Erdoğan Slams Women Protesting Özgecan"s Murder by Dancing' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-president-erdogan-slams-women-protesting-ozgecans-murder-by-dancing-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=78423&NewsCatID=338> accessed 3 August 2017; 'Davutoğlu'ndan Bakanlar Kurulu Sonrası Flaş Açıklamalar' (*Sabah*) <http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/02/16/davutoglundan-bakanlar-kurulu-sonrasi-flas-aciklamalar> accessed 15 September 2017; 'Turkey's Introduction of Chemical Castration for Sex Offenders Prompts Mixed Reaction' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-introduction-of-chemical-castration-for-sex-offenders-prompts-mixed-reaction.aspx?pageID=238&nID=102147&NewsCatID=509> accessed 3 August 2017.
[115] 'Life Sentence Requested for Three Suspects in Özgecan Murder' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/life-sentence-requested-for-three-suspects-in-ozgecan-murder------.aspx?pageID=238&nID=88257&NewsCatID=509> accessed 3 August 2017.
[116] US State Dept (n 84); 'Violence against Women in Turkey Increases Both in Number and Brutality' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/violence-against-women-in-turkey-increases-both-in-number-and-brutality.aspx?pageID=238&nID=91880&NewsCatID=569> accessed 3 August 2017; 'Abated Sentence for Man Who Stabbed Wife to Death in Southeast' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/abated-sentence-for-man-who-stabbed-wife-to-death-in-southeast.aspx?pageID=238&nID=93694&NewsCatID=509> accessed 3 August 2017; 'Court Lessens Attacker's Sentence despite "no-Show" in Court' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/court-lessens-attackers-sentence-despite-no-show-in-court.aspx?pageID=238&nID=91762&NewsCatID=509> accessed 3 August 2017.
[117] Bianet (n 76).
[118] ibid.

more, we have also started seeing more postponements of sentences, especially in cases of sexual violence.[119]

In Kenya the courts have been attempting to deal with sexual and gender-based violence cases more positively in a victim-centered approach, although progress is slow.[120] This effort pre-dates the campaign. In a case in 2013, the Supreme Court found in favour of the petitioners, opining that the police failed to investigate claims of sexual violence adequately and thus violated fundamental freedoms and rights.[121] This was seen as a landmark case for gender-based violence, underscoring the unacceptable and indeed illegal nature of the lack of action taken by the police. However, this was a Supreme Court case and the approach of the lower courts is still patchy. Some statistics indicate that conviction rates in some areas are as low as 24%.[122] Research also shows that the Sexual Offences Act is used primarily to prosecute cases of defilement (underage sex), and not to tackle more violent crimes.[123]

One of the cornerstones of this campaign was the problematic requirement for victims to file a complaint at the police station. This was a major barrier for many women in Kenya. In the case that sparked #mydressmychoice, the victim did not file a complaint and therefore the police claimed, in the beginning, that they could not take any action.[124] However, once the campaign climaxed, as many as 200 men were arrested. The BBC has reported that 'mass arrests are often carried out by police in Kenya when they are under public pressure. It leads to the arrest of many innocent people who are later released.'[125] The government also set up an 'anti-stripping squad' in the police unit in Nairobi. They also arrested five men

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[119] 'Turkey Should Stick to Istanbul Convention on Violence against Women' (*Hürriyet Daily News*) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-should-stick-to-istanbul-convention-on-violence-against-women.aspx?pageID=238&nID=116127&NewsCatID=339> accessed 3 August 2017.

[120] 'Kenya Law: Situational Analysis and the Legal Framework on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Kenya: Challenges and Opportunities' (n 87).

[121] ibid.

[122] 'Sexual Offences on the Rise in Kenya » Capital News' <https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2014/06/sexual-offences-on-the-rise-in-kenya/> accessed 8 January 2019.

[123] Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (n 47) 24.

[124] Par Mk and eh, 'My Dress, My Choice Protest Sparks a Lot of Questions' (*World Pulse*, 23 November 2014) <https://www.worldpulse.com/fr/node/35187> accessed 11 October 2017; 'The #MyDressMyChoice Campaign Is The Only Positive Thing About The Video Of A Woman Stripped For Wearing A Miniskirt Going Viral' (*The Debrief*) <http://www.thedebrief.co.uk/news/opinion/the-mydressmychoice-campaign-is-the-only-positive-thing-about-the-video-of-a-woman-stripped-for-wearing-a-miniskirt-going-viral-20141125515> accessed 11 October 2017; Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com), '#MyDressMyChoice: Kenyans Hold Rally to Support Woman Beaten for Wearing Miniskirt | Africa | DW | 17.11.2014' (*DW.COM*) <http://www.dw.com/en/mydressmychoice-kenyans-hold-rally-to-support-woman-beaten-for-wearing-miniskirt/a-18069645> accessed 6 November 2017.

[125] Phumlani Pikoli, '#MyDressMyChoice Campaign Yields Results' <http://ewn.co.za/2014/11/19/MyDressMyChoice-campaign> accessed 6 November 2017; 'Kenya Arrests after Women "Stripped"' *BBC News* (18 November 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-30093816> accessed 6 November 2017.

specifically linked to the initial incident.[126] Impunity is another major challenge in Kenya. A statement endorsed by many Kenyan women's rights groups in March 2015 outlined several incidents of violence, many involving MPs or the police, who are often protected from prosecution.[127]

Since the campaign, the courts still vary in their treatment of gender-based violence cases. For example, in 2016, a judge overturned a 20 year sentence for a man who 'defiled' a young girl, finding that the girl had acted like an adult (sneaking into a man's house to engage in sexual activity) and therefore should be treated as an adult.[128] Women's groups publicly denounced the ruling as a set-back for women and efforts to end gender-based violence.[129] Little has changed in the judicial system in Kenya in its treatment of gender-based violence. It seems that for every landmark decision taking a step forward, another decision takes things a step back.

Across all three of the status quo campaigns, we therefore see similar patterns of poor handling of gender-based violence in law enforcement, particularly in the courts. In #farkhunda, the rushed trials have 'emboldened' criminals and contributed to an increase in the perception of impunity. For #sendeanlat, although some improvement may have been seen, for the most part mitigating factors of good behaviour and provocation are still widely used to reduce sentences for gender-based violence and femicide. In Kenya with #mydressmychoice, much variation is seen in the treatment of cases of gender-based

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[126] Fred Indimuli, '"Anti Stripping Squad" Arrests 5 in Kayole Swoop' (*Mpasho News*, 27 November 2014) <https://mpasho.co.ke/anti-stripping-squad-arrests-5-kayole-swoop/> accessed 6 November 2017; 'Kenya "Anti Stripping Squad" Formed' (*AGR NEWS*, 26 November 2014) <https://agrfm.wordpress.com/2014/11/26/kenya-anti-stripping-squad-formed/> accessed 6 November 2017; Pkemoi Ngenoh, 'Anti-Stripping Squad: We Will Hunt You down Perverts!' (*Standard Digital News*) <https://www.sde.co.ke/article/2000142730/anti-stripping-squad-we-will-hunt-you-down-perverts> accessed 6 November 2017.

[127] 'KHRC - Joint Press Statement by Kenyan Women & Civil Society Organizations on the Sexual Offences Against Women' <http://www.khrc.or.ke/2015-03-04-10-37-01/press-releases/375-joint-press-statement-by-kenyan-women-civil-society-organizations-on-the-sexual-offences-against-women.html> accessed 11 October 2017. The 2017 general elections saw continued widespread sexual violence with what appears to be little prosecution or law enforcement. Although not directly linked to public strippings, this is a good indicator of the government's treatment of gender-based violence. "It will be difficult to end the cycles of election-related sexual abuses—and more generally rape and other gender-based violence—until the government creates an environment in which victims are willing to come forward and it properly investigates and prosecutes complaints." Human Rights Watch, 'Election-Related Sexual Violence in Kenya' (*Human Rights Watch*, 7 September 2017) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/07/election-related-sexual-violence-kenya> accessed 11 October 2017.

[128] 'Kenya Rape Verdict World's "Worst Ever"' (*The East African*) <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Kenyan-judge-juma-chitembwe-shamed-for-worst-ruling/2558-3962770-kdwy1dz/index.html> accessed 11 October 2017.

[129] ibid; Plan International (lead organisation), 'Shadow Report in Response to the Eigth Periodic State Report by Kenya to CEDAW' (2017) 6.

violence, with some very positive and progressive examples alongside some very negative and regressive rulings.

UN Dialogue

Early UN reports from and to Afghanistan paint a complex picture, with clear impacts of war and religious tensions. Dialogue from the early 1990s was similar to other Islamic countries, with the treaty bodies raising concerns about situations on the ground, in particular for women and girls, and the government reporting on laws and systems, but not their implementation.[130] In 1995, there was a complete change of tone to reflect the horrors of the war and the decimation of infrastructure to support and protect women and girls.[131] State reports often said that the situation for women and girls could not be improved until the conflict ended.[132] By 1998, a Resolution was passed specifically addressing the rights of women and girls.[133] Reports also continued to illustrate the tension between the Taliban interpretation of Islam and the perception of threat from Western interference.[134]

With the fall of the Taliban and the implementation of the transitional government, there was evidence of hope for women and girls. A key pillar of the Bonn Agreement was gender equality.[135] However, the transition was not without risk to women and girls:

> Afghan women leaders face the threat of a violent backlash, and it is reported that
> in rural areas conservative women's groups are increasingly organizing

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[130] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Initial Reports Submitted by States Parties: Addendum' (1991) UN Doc E/1990/5/Add.8; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Report on the Sixth Session' (1992) UN Doc E/1992/23; Human Rights Committee, 'Second Periodic Reports of States Parties' (1992) UN Doc CCPR/C/57/Add.5.

[131] "The extremist forces had as their main tenets the total negation of all human values granted to women, the closing of schools for women in the areas under their control and the prohibition of access by women to jobs within the Government. Propaganda had been disseminated in the form of false documents claiming to represent the government position on the rights of women. Despite pressure from extremist forces, the resistance and will of the Government to encourage the continued participation of women in the affairs of State had been unshakeable." Human Rights Committee, 'Summary Record of the First Part of the 1462nd Meeting' (1995) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.1462 paras 7–8.

[132] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences: Mission to Pakistan and Afghanistan' (2000) UN Doc E/CN.4/2000/68/Add.4 para 39.

[133] Economic and Social Council, 'Situation of Women and Girls in Afghanistan' (1998) Resolution 1998/9.

[134] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences: Mission to Pakistan and Afghanistan' (n 132) para 78.

[135] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapportuer on the Situation in Afghanistan' (2002) UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/43 paras 45–47.

themselves against what is perceived to be an overly liberal women's movement in Kabul.[136]

The state continued to work towards reform and transition, ratifying CEDAW in 2003.[137] These efforts did not seem to have any impact on societal beliefs, particularly regarding customary law, access to justice, and incidents of violence against women.[138] In 2006, the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women ('SR on VAW') brought attention to a specific case which illustrated the realities for women in Afghanistan. A woman was allegedly murdered for 'her adoption of a Western attitude, her open interaction with her male colleagues on television and her choice of western music.'[139] Although the SR on VAW sent three communications to the state on this matter, there were no replies.

At this stage, it becomes abundantly clear that there are many, many reports *from* the UN on the situation in Afghanistan, but far fewer responses or reports from Afghanistan. Interventionism in the country was astoundingly high and seemed to cause pushback and potential resentment. The government finally did respond to the 2009 CESCR list of issues. In relation to gender equality, the Afghani government stated:

> The Government is firmly committed to mainstreaming gender issues across the country to help women realize equal participation and full involvement in Afghanistan's economic, social and cultural development. However, it takes far more number of years to reach gender-equal society in Afghanistan. It is due to many years of war and traditional society in Afghanistan as well as government's financial restrictions, gaps between policies and practices, and lack of strong civil society protecting and promoting women's rights.[140]

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[136] Commission on Human Rights, 'Report of the Secretary General on the Situation of Women and Girls in the Territories Occupied by Afghan Armed Groups' (2002) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/27 para 14.

[137] Secretary General, 'Situation of Women and Girls in Afghanistan' (2003) UN Doc A/58/421 paras 5, 16.

[138] Commission on Human Rights, 'Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan' (2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/122 paras 2, 31; Secretary General, 'Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan and on the Achievements of the Technical Assistance in the Field of Human Rights' (2005) UN Doc A/60/343; Commission on Human Rights, 'Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan and on the Achievements of Technical Assistance in the Field of Human Rights' (2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/108 paras 17–18, 22.

[139] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Yakin Ertürk Addendum Communications to and from Governments' (2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/61/Add.1 para 3.

[140] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Second to Fourth Periodic Reports Submitted by States Parties' (2009) UN Doc E/C.12/AFG/2-4 para 20.

In 2011, Afghanistan had its first reporting dialogue with CEDAW. Several pages of the state report dealt specifically with violence against women. The government acknowledged that violence targeting women 'even on the street' was a problem and they were seeking to address it in amendments to EVAW.[141] The 2013 report on the situation, yet again, raised concerns that the efforts made by the government were not actually reducing the risk or incidence of violence.[142] Of note, the report also stated: 'Those cases…[that] *receive public attention due to their egregious nature* represent the tip of the iceberg of incidents of violence against women throughout the country' (emphasis added).[143] Generally, the UN dialogue becomes extremely repetitive. The same issues and concerns are raised, and the same responses are given.[144] It seems Farkhunda's case and the attention it received did not lead to any change in approach or discourse, but rather served to highlight the ongoing problems seen in these reports for over a decade.

Turkey, on the other hand, is actively involved in the UN human rights system. As is true across all the status quo campaigns, concerns about violence against women were present in the UN dialogue both before and after the campaign with little perceptible change in approach, discourse, or content. Violence against women was first raised in the 1996 CEDAW state report; the hearing on this report noted that violence against women in the private domain was an issue.[145] The state party indicated that new legislation specifically addressing violence against women was necessary.[146] The Committee raised concerns about the growing fundamentalist movement and Turkey's continued reservations to the Convention, noting specifically the 'growing climate of violence against women and girls'[147] and that there were 'very serious attitudinal and behavioural patterns in Turkey, among both men and women.'[148]

The next CEDAW cycle took place in 2003. The state reported new domestic violence legislation, the lifting of CEDAW reservations, and the ratification of the Optional Protocol.

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[141] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record of the 1132nd Meeting' (2013) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.1132 para 15.

[142] Human Rights Council, 'Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan' (2013) UN Doc A/HRC/22/37 paras 37–38.

[143] ibid 39 emphasis added.

[144] See, e.g. Human Rights Council, 'Working Group Summary Report Afghanistan' (2013) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/12/AFG/3.

[145] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record of the 318th Meeting' (1998) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.318 para 18.

[146] ibid 43.

[147] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record of the 319th Meeting' (1998) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.319 para 11.

[148] ibid 28.

The report contained a whole section on violence against women, which shows how the issue had become more and more prominent. Interestingly, one of the barriers identified by the state to addressing violence against women was the 'provocative role the media continues to display in covering acts of violence.'[149] Several Committee members asked about violence against women, how the law was being implemented, and whether gaps were being identified and addressed.[150] The state relied heavily on their provision of awareness raising and educational training for authorities and the public.[151]

In 2009, a case was decided by the European Court of Human Rights, Opuz v. Turkey.[152] The court found that the failings of the criminal justice system 'undermined the deterrent effect' and that the state authorities did not do enough to protect the applicant from harm. The CEDAW Committee then raised the Opuz case, inquiring about specific measures taken to implement the decision. The state responded that they 'did not fully agree with the decision of the Court, as Turkey's legal framework was well developed and a great deal of work had gone into reforming legislation.'[153]

Similar shortcomings were identified in the 2009 CESCR dialogue, which led to a lengthy back and forth between the defensive position of the state and the probing position of the

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[149] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of States Parties Turkey' (2003) UN Doc CEDAW/C/TUR/4-5 para 14.

[150] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record of the 677th Meeting' (2005) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.677.

[151] ibid 48–53.

[152] *Opuz v Turkey* [2009] 33401/2 (European Court of Human rights).

[153] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record of the 937th Meeting' (2010) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.937 para 61. The ECtHR has heard several cases on violence against women in Turkey, uniformly finding in favour of the petitioners: (2013): Izci v. Turkey (42606/05), (2015) Durmaz v. Turkey (3621/07), (2016): Civek v Turkey (55354/11), (2016): Halime Kilic v Turkey (63034/11), (2016): MG v. Turkey (646/10). All events in question took place before the campaign, even though some decisions were handed down after the start of the campaign.

treaty body.[154] This process was echoed in the 2010 UPR process.[155] Again in 2011, the HRC

was very forthright in their list of issues, asking for a long list of statistics, examples, and

further information about how the various laws and institutions were actually working to

protect women.[156] In session, the issue was raised again and the state reluctantly replied that

amendments had been made to increase penalties for honour killings, that other changes had

been introduced, that there were more shelters, and pointed to Turkey as the first signatory of

the Istanbul Convention.[157] Time and time again, committees are probing Turkey to provide

evidence as to how the laws are *actually* protecting women and girls, and time and time again

the answers are lacking. Turkey continually relies on process indicators (activities

completed) as opposed to outcome indicators (the impact of said activities).

In 2014, Turkey submitted its 7th periodic report to CEDAW. Notably, this was the first time

Turkey clearly used the term 'femicide' in a state report to the UN.[158] This reporting cycle

concluded after the campaign began. After Ozgecan's murder, CEDAW raised serious

concerns about the 'judicial leniency' and the use of good behaviour and provocation as

mitigating factors.[159] The state defensively responded that:

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[154] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Initial Reports Submitted by States Parties Turkey' (2009) UN Doc E/C.12/TUR/1; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'List of Issues to the Government of Turkey' (2010) UN Doc E/C.12/TUR/Q/1. The state responded with "Significant developments with respect to legislation on equality between men and women have been achieved in Turkey since the early 2000s. However, several shortcomings have been observed in putting legislation into practice. With a view to combating those malfunctions awareness-raising activities in the fields such as combating violence against women and representation of women in decision-making mechanisms have been conducted." Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Replies by the Government of Turkey to the List of Issues' (2011) UN Doc E/C.12/TUR/Q/1/Add.1 para 42. The Committee in session specifically asked about the effects of these efforts and whether regular assessment was undertaken on national action plans. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Summary Record of the 3rd Meeting' (2011) UN Doc E/C.12/2011/SR.3 paras 25, 50. The state responded that laws were in place and provided some figures. However, the committee found the figures to be lacking and recommended better data collection. In the concluding observations, the committee stated they were "alarmed at the very high incidence of violence against women in the State party, despite the implementation of the 2007-2010 National Action Plan to Combat Violence against Women. The Committee is moreover concerned that domestic violence, including physical and psychological violence, is not criminalized in the State party and that the remedies available to victims of domestic violence are ineffective".Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Concluding Observations Turkey' (2011) UN Doc E/C.12/TUR/CO/1 para 23.
[155] Human Rights Council, 'Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Turkey' (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/15/13; Human Rights Council, 'National Report Turkey' (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/8/TUR/1.
[156] Human Rights Committee, 'List of Issues to Be Taken up in Connection with the Consideration of the Initial Report of Turkey' (2012) UN Doc CCPR/C/TUR/Q/1 para 14.
[157] Human Rights Committee, 'Summary Record of the 2928th Meeting' (2012) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2928 paras 30–31.
[158] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Turkey' (2014) UN Doc CEDAW/C/TUR/7 para 37.
[159] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record of the 1416th Meeting' (2016) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.1416 paras 4–5.

> Article 29 of the Criminal Code stipulated that unjust provocation could not be considered as a mitigating factor in cases of honour killings, rape or sexual assault. The determination of a defendant's good conduct as a mitigating factor, which was entirely at the discretion of the judge, was based on his or her record and behaviour and on the expected impact of the punishment on his or her future life.[160]

The concluding observations take a noticeably different approach to the issue of violence against women, placing far more emphasis on Turkey's shortcomings and problems.[161]

The second round UPR began in 2014 but did not conclude until the campaign was tapering off in April 2015. Notably, several countries in the Working Group 'welcomed' or 'took positive note of' work done to combat violence against women.[162] Many countries who had been positive about the steps Turkey had taken still made recommendations about implementation and enforcement. Therefore, although there are less reports available from the time period since the campaign began, initial evidence indicates that there is little to no change, showing both positive and negative interactions on the issue, as was the case with Afghanistan.

The final campaign to explore is #mydressmychoice. Again, the overall picture is much the same before the campaign as after the campaign, with little to no perceptible differences uncovered through analysing the dialogue with the UN human rights mechanisms. As early as 1981, the HRC raised concerns about the status of women in Kenya.[163] Concerns were raised again in 1993 by CESCR.[164] In the 2000 CEDAW cycle, the committee specifically raised concerns over the implementation of the domestic violence law.[165]

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[160] ibid 7.

[161] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Turkey' (2016) UN Doc CEDAW/C/TUR/CO/7. The Committee stated that "protection orders are rarely implemented and are insufficiently monitored, with such failure often resulting in prolonged gender-based violence against women or the killing of the women concerned" and that "lenient judgments are given to perpetrators of sexual violence, including those found guilty of the rape of girls, and reduced sentences are imposed owing to the perpetrator's "good behaviour" during trial;" (paragraph 32).

[162] Human Rights Council, 'Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Turkey' (2015) UN Doc A/HRC/29/15.

[163] Human Rights Committee, 'Summary Record of the 272nd Meeting' (1981) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.272 para 5.

[164] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Concluding Observations Kenya' (1993) UN Doc E/C.12/1993/6.

[165] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record of the 592nd Meeting' (2003) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.592 para 17.

The 2004 HRC dialogue uncovered an interesting statement made by the state: 'The police department had *even* allowed civil society groups, including women's rights advocates, to go to their training camps to conduct human rights training' (emphasis added).[166] This kind of language does not indicate political will or meaningful institutionalisation of gender equality, where the state in essence thinks it has done women's rights activists a 'favour' in allowing them to attend. This was echoed in the Committee's concluding observations.[167] In 2006 the CEDAW committee similarly found that 'There appears to be lack of political goodwill on the part of the legislators, a reason to explain the delay in having the [sexual violence and domestic violence] Bills discussed and passed into law.'[168] The government had an expectedly defensive response.[169]

The 2007 CESCR list of issues was very forthright in highlighting the problem of violence against women.[170] The government did reply to the question with information on the Sexual Offences Act, the Domestic Violence Bill, the associated task force, and educational and training efforts. The paragraphs were verbatim from the state replies to CEDAW the same year. The 2010 cycle was almost identical, with the Committee asking for information and the state deflecting on why the bills had not yet been passed into law.[171]

After #mydressmychoice began, the state submitted a report to CESCR writing: 'the government acknowledges that there is still a lot that needs to be done as the enforcement of this [violence against women] act is still very slow.'[172] Similar dialogue occurred in the 2016

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[166] Human Rights Committee, 'Summary Record of the 2256th Meeting' (2005) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2256 para 23 emphasis added.
[167] Human Rights Committee, 'Concluding Observations Kenya' (2005) UN Doc CCPR/CO/83/KEN para 11. "The Committee is disturbed by the fact, acknowledged by the delegation, that domestic violence against women remains a recurrent practice in Kenya and that women do not benefit from adequate legal protection against acts of sexual violence - another widespread phenomenon"
[168] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Combined Fifth and Sixth Periodic Reports Kenya' (2006) UN Doc CEDAW/C/KEN/6 para 192.
[169] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record of the 799th Meeting' (2007) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.799 para 31.
[170] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'List of Issues Kenya' (2007) UN Doc E/C.12/KEN/Q/1 para 22.
[171] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'List of Issues Kenya' (2010) UN Doc CEDAW/C/KEN/Q/7 paras 11–12; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Responses to the List of Issues and Questions with Regard to the Consideration of the Seventh Periodic Report Kenya' (2010) UN Doc CEDAW/C/KEN/Q/7/Add.1 paras 31–34. Similar concerns were raised in the CCPR dialogue.
[172] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Replies of Kenya to the List of Issues' (2016) UN Doc E/C.12/KEN/Q/2-5/Add.1 para 92.

and 2017 CEDAW reports.[173] The reports and dialogue therefore show absolutely no change after the campaign took off.

All three of these campaigns show extremely similar patterns in their interactions with the UN human rights mechanisms. Concerns around violence against women were raised both before and after the campaigns, often rooted in implementation and enforcement issues, and often pointing to a lack of political will or ability to address the issue. These patterns of discourse were almost identical before and after the campaign, showing no change.

Twitter Characteristics

These campaigns were quite average in many aspects, including overall participation, with #farkhunda at 8,600 Tweets, #sendeanlat at 38,407, and #mydressmychoice at 44,573. Interestingly though, the campaigns showed unusual variation in the number of non-English tweets. #mydressmychoice targeted an English-speaking country and thus the percent of non-English Tweets is expectedly low (5%). However, #farkhunda showed a similarly low percentage when the target country is not English speaking (9%), exactly the same as #stopstoning. Conversely, #sendeanlat had 76% of Tweets in languages other than English.

Overall, these hashtag campaigns illustrate many of the inherent risks in social media campaigning. They all garnered relatively large levels of attention in the immediate aftermath of the spark incidents but were unable to sustain any meaningful levels of attention or engagement. It is likely that this lack of persistence was responsible for the overall lack of legal change. In all campaigns, some effort was made to change laws, but there simply was not enough continued pressure to lead to long term positive or progressive changes. The

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[173] Of note, both before and after the campaign, at no point in any of the UN reports to or from the state are public strippings specifically addressed. However, a shadow report in 2017 stated: "acts of gender-based violence can include muggings, which occur daily, public stripping of women, for example on public transport, and there have even been cases of murder. Tradition and religion are often used as excuses for such treatment of women, demoralising them and providing a safeguard for their perpetrators." Franciscans International, Edmund Rice International and The Office of Justice Peace and Integrity of Creation Franciscans Africa, 'Civil Society Responses to the List of Issues in Relation to the Eighth Report of Kenya to CEDAW' (2017) para 13. Although lengthy, the report gives a very accurate and comprehensive view off gender-based violence in Kenya, from a domestic voice: "In Kenya, as in many other countries, victims of gender-based violence, particularly sexual violence, suffer from stigma and discrimination. As a result, the incidences of gender-based violence remain highly underreported….Moreover, it is reported that in some cases the police officers are reluctant to take up such cases, considering them as "private affairs." Even when they do respond, the procedures often take long, which has led to a mistrust of survivors on state institutions' response to resolve cases of gender-based violence" ibid 14–15.

capricious nature of social media struggled to maintain pressure on the governments long enough to implement meaningful legal change. Equally, this initial considerable attention led to the specific perpetrators in these cases facing charges, but the lack of sustained attention or activity meant that systematic changes have not been realised in any of the three countries. Impunity is thus a very real danger.

Persistence (Tweets per day)

These three campaigns showed very similar persistence behaviours. All three campaigns showed the same characteristics – extreme peaks around the time of the spark incident followed by low numbers of Tweets for the remainder of the campaign. The spark incidents here all garnered enormous attention with initial peaks rising above 10,000 for both #sendeanlat and #mydressmychoice. All three campaigns had a very high percentage of Tweets in peak periods, 53% for #farkhunda, 89% for #sendeanlat, and 71% for #mydressmychoice. The figure below illustrates this similarity:

Figure 4.1: Number of Tweets per day, status quo campaigns

Here all three campaigns show their highest peaks at the very beginning, with little to no increase across the life of the campaign. #farkhunda showed a few small residual peaks, but not nearly as high as the initial spark incident and interest. These peaks were markedly different from the other campaigns, which showed more peaks spread throughout the lifespan of the campaigns or longer initial peak periods. It is plausible that the initial high level of interest provided the pressure needed to begin some areas of positive change, but the lack on ongoing or continued persistence and interest left the campaigns 'unfinished'. This would explain why these campaigns made positive strides in some areas but lack of progress in others for an overall status quo outcome.

This is also reflected in the percentage of days with more than five Tweets. Although higher than the two Iranian campaigns, these three campaigns did not see results nearly as high as the more successful campaigns.

Table 4.1: Number of active days, status quo campaigns

	#farkhunda	#sendeanlat	#mydressmychoice
Number of days Tweets > 0	366	382	487
Number of days Tweets > 5	121	84	119
Number of days Tweets > 100	20	10	29
Percent of days Tweets = 0	40%	42%	35%
Percent of days Tweets > 5	20%	13%	16%

More successful campaigns saw at least 25% of campaign days with more than five Tweets, while less successful campaigns were under 5%. Again, this could explain the status quo outcomes. There was enough attention at the very start of the campaign to push some changes through, but not enough sustained attention to carry the campaign on and drive through more long-term, meaningful changes. This differs from the tactical concessions campaigns which saw much more sustained attention through the campaigns and much higher peaks in the beginning.

Engagement (Retweets, Likes, and Replies)

In the engagement metrics, these campaigns showed very different behavioural patterns. #farkhunda showed a high proportion of Retweets. At first glance it may seem that this shows a lack of engagement, as simply Retweeting something does not take as much effort or involvement as replying or writing original content. However, having explored these campaigns in great detail, Retweeting can also be linked to consistent messaging. This may have been one of the more positive aspects of the #farkhunda campaign. #mydressmychoice was also a campaign driven by Retweets, though not to same extent as #farkhunda.

#sendeanlat, on the other hand, was a campaign dominated by likes. This in essence shows a lack of engagement as simply 'liking' a Tweet takes the least amount of effort and, arguably, contributes the least to the overall campaign. For every Tweet in the #sendeanlat campaign, there were nearly three Likes. In a negative sense, this lack of engagement could again be a reason why the campaign did not progress as far as it could have.

Across all of the campaigns, the level of replies during non-peak periods is a statistically significant indicator of positive legal change. These three status quo campaigns showed

expected mid-range performance, with more non-peak dialogue than the backsliding campaigns but not as much as the successful campaigns.

The final lens through which to interrogate the levels of engagement are the log(n) log(s) plots.

Figure 4.2: log(n) log(s) plot for #farkunda

Figure 4.3: log(n) log(s) plot for #sendeanlat

Figure 4.4: log(n) log(s) plot for #mydressmychoice

All three campaigns, across both peak and non-peak periods, showed a steep reply gradient, indicating that far fewer Tweets had low levels of replies. This mirrors the findings above. #farkhunda and #sendeanlat then show similarities in the gradients for Retweets and likes, both with likes having a slightly higher gradient than Retweets, but only slightly. #mydressmychoice had a similar difference in gradients, but with Retweets showing a higher initial intercept. This again underscores the findings above that #mydressmychoice was more driven by Retweets and that #sendeanlat in particular was driven by likes.

Users (Profiles of 100 most active users)

Coding the user profiles showed particularly interesting results in this group of campaigns. Nearly 25% of the 100 most active users in #farkhunda were non-domestic individuals. The next largest category was non-domestic activist. Together, the non-domestic individuals and non-domestic activists accounted for 37% of Tweets from the 100 most active users. Also of note, non-domestic news agencies accounted for 40% of the reach of the 100 most active users, significantly more than any other category. This indicates that the domestic voice was not seen nearly as much as the non-domestic voice, particularly when viewed alongside the low percentage of non-English Tweets. This may have been partially down to the algorithms, filter bubbles, and non-neutrality of Twitter discussed in Chapter 2.

This finding is consistent with the perception that foreign media pressured the government into forcing swift, and in the end erroneous, trials, which according to experts has now 'emboldened' criminals. The Afghan government is particularly sensitive to foreign media, as evidenced by US State Department reports and UN dialogue. Given the history and the current geo-political positioning this is not surprising. A campaign driven by foreign voices would, therefore, be associated with reactionary actions and not necessarily long-term meaningful change. On the other hand, #mydressmychoice was the most domestically driven campaign in the whole study, with 72% of the 100 most active users from Kenya. #mydressmychoice, although overall still a status quo campaign, did see more positive legal change than #farkhunda. It is very likely that this difference can be explained, at least in part, by the presence and strength of domestic drive and voice (or lack thereof).

#sendeanlat is the first campaign where we see the counter-narrative in the 100 most active users, with one domestic, Tweeting 19 times with a reach of 80, and one non-domestic, Tweeting 17 times with a reach of 2302. Although not particularly large in number, the presence of the counter-narrative in the 100 most active users could have an adverse impact on outcomes. Additionally, the counter-narrative voice in this campaign represented religious conservatives, a barrier to legal change that has been identified in many campaigns. In this sense, it was not *against* the goals of the campaign per se, but equally this was not a voice in favour of women's rights or international human rights norms for gender equality, as evidenced by the Tweets below. This kind of discourse presents an anti-Western view that is generally not conducive to protecting, respecting, or fulfilling women's rights.

'As Darwinist materialist education continues, lovelessness and ruthlessness prevail, violence does not come to an end. Adnan Oktar'
'The brutal assaults that women are jealous of their chastity, beauty, cleanliness. a.okt'
'When a man is left alone with a foreign woman, surely the third one is a satanic.'
'There is a painful punishment in the world and in the Hereafter for those who want to spread the illusion'

Similarly, #mydressmychoice opened the door to a strong counter-narrative around so-called decency laws. Rather than addressing the underlying issues allowing violence against women to run rampant (despite the name #mydressmychoice, the campaign's goals were about preventing violence against women regardless of what women do or don't wear), this

counter-narrative focussed on what women wear, arguing that women should be dressing 'decently' to end public strippings. In this campaign, three of the 100 most active users represented this perspective, all domestic, generally with a Christian profile.

'If interested in walking half naked then do it to yur bf & NOT to the world, it's embarassin'

 'ladies should mind thea dressing'

 '2 wrongs don't make a right. But the first wrong is a very bad wrong. Strip them up!'

 'Decency is absolute and not relative as most of you campaigners of scunty dressing are trying to make us believe.'

 'A wife of noble character is her husband's crown, but a disgraceful wife is like decay in his bones.'

'The righteous person is rescued from trouble, and it falls on the wicked instead.'

'Then out came a woman to meet him, dressed like a prostitute and with crafty intent.--Proverbs 7:10'

For these users to be in the top 100 most active users in the entire campaign certainly underscores the harmful distilling down of the issue to what women wear as opposed to the underlying conditions which allow violence against women. These users very much encapsulate what one activist said:

> Tragically, the conversation centred on the hemline of dresses instead of the sex gangs. Women blamed women for the indecent dressing that provoked the strippings. People of stature in the church said that if stripping was the only way to achieve decency, they would support it…Still more people said that the debate was about decency, and that was all. The Church leadership was silent…The President was silent. The First Lady was silent.[174]

Also interesting in #mydressmychoice was the emergence of 'entertainment industry' users. These accounted for 13% of 100 most active users, with 1,281 Tweets and a reach of over 1.5 million, primarily domestic.   It appears that these users were attempting to capitalise on the trending hashtag, with examples such as:

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[174] Meshack Yobby, 'Women, Gangs, and Silence' (26 November 2014)
<http://forum.ngeckenya.org/chat/women-gangs-and-silence> accessed 1 January 2019.

 'Young, Wild And Free! #MyDressMyChoice See More Photos On http://mpasho.co.ke/live #MpashoLive'

 'Ladies Displaying A LOT of LEG At The #MyDressMyChoice Protest. Visit http://mpasho.co.ke/live For More Photos'

 'FASHION OR CRAP ? MEN CAN YOU DATE SUCH A GIRL ? #MYDRESSMYCHOICE =>http://bit.ly/15W5eEe'

One account used the hashtag for clickbait articles about things like football, cooking, or scandalous stories. Another had a similar self-promoting approach:

 'New Music Alert : Nitampata Wapi By Diamond Platnumz-> http://bit.ly/11JilGY #mydressmychoice'

This use of the hashtag to promote the entertainment industry was prominent enough that it was noticed when Tweets were being manually collected. This was one of the primary impressions of the campaign from scrolling through the catalogue of Tweets. Club nights were even advertised using the hashtag:

 'This friday we be happening inside club legends thikaIts the #spinfridays with @DJSIRMIXX_254 and I#Mydressmychoice'

 'Join us Tonight @ClubTribeka, Come Dressed the way you want #YourDressYourChoice #MyDressMyChoice @AnotherKOT'

 'Karaoke Starz Takes Center Stage Tonight at Club Rumourz, With 20k at Stake http://nyumbanitv.com/karaoke-starz-takes-center-stage-tonight-club-rumourz-20k-stake … #MyDressMyChoice'

This kind of activity again underscores the risks inherent in using social media for campaigning. There is no way to control who uses the hashtag or how it is used. Counter-narratives and those seeking to exploit attention can easily co-opt a hashtag, in this case even quickly becoming the most active users, at times distorting, perverting, or even mocking the campaign's original goals to protect women's rights. Across all three campaigns, the user profiles may uncover some of the reasons behind the negative legal outcomes: #farkhunda was heavily driven by non-domestic users from Western countries, while the #sendeanlat and #mydressmychoice opened doors to counter-narratives, conservative voices, and off-topic messaging.

Content Analysis (Sentiment, Personalisation, Framing, Messaging, and Norms)

Although sentiment, overall, is not a statistically significant predictor of legal change, #sendeanlat showed the most negative scores out of all the campaigns, meaning that the content of the Tweets, on average, had a more negative tone. One hypothesis for this negative tone could have been the subject matter of femicide, however several other campaigns dealt with femicide, violence, and other harrowing events similar to this spark incident but did not show this level of negativity. Another hypothesis could be that the lack of positive outcomes and campaign stagnation could have had an effect on the Tweets themselves. It is difficult to say if this then perpetuated the lack of progress in the campaign. This too could be evidence of the damage that can be done to a campaign through the non-neutrality of social media platforms. The algorithms, filter bubbles, and 'personalisation' which is intended to improve user experience could have perpetuated the negative sentiment in this campaign, which could in turn have contributed to the lack of positive legal changes. In other words, if the Tweets became more negative with the government's lack of implementing change, but negative Tweets hold a campaign back, then perhaps the cycle was self-fulfilling. In order to investigate further, a plot over time can be helpful:

Figure 4.5: Sentiment over time, #sendeanlat

Here we see the sentiment score over time. Points below 0.5 are negative, and those above are positive, representing an average score per day plotted over time. Looking at the sentiment over time, it appears that there was a cluster of negative Tweets towards the beginning of the campaign with a few scattered very negative days throughout. On the whole, the somewhat chaotic nature of the positive and negative scores does not show any sort of definitive pattern. It is therefore not possible to conclude whether the negative Tweets influenced the lack of legal outcomes, equally it is not possible to conclude that they did not.

#farkhunda had the lowest percentage of first-person representation (total times first person pronouns were used divided by total number of Tweets), at just 15%. First person pronouns indicate ownership and action in the campaign, as in 'I am doing something' or 'I believe' or 'I stand up for…' The lack of first-person pronouns in this campaign could indicate an 'othering' effect. On the opposite end, #sendeanlat showed 79% of Tweets including a first-person pronoun. This shows an enormous amount of personal investment in the campaign. As the hashtag roughly translates to 'tell your story', it seems that many individuals participating in the campaign did tell a personal story, stories which may have been very negative given the finding above. #sendeanlat also showed the highest percent of second person pronouns at 48%. This may indicate that those Tweeting with the hashtag were encouraging others to do the same, or perhaps placing blame on a general 'you'.

#farkhunda showed more consistent framing, with messaging staying constant and uniform across the event-based time periods (this echoes the high proportion of Retweets). Due to the nature of the campaign, #sendeanlat had just two event-based time periods. Again, there were more consistent messages than variable, although the variable framing in the non-peak period did send a coherent and clear message. #mydressmychoice had fewer consistent messages than variable, though the variable content across different event-based time periods was very similar. The following figures visually represent the number of times each word was used in a Tweet.

Figure 4.6: Consistently used words, #farkhunda

Figure 4.7: Consistently used words, #sendeanlat

Figure 4.8: Consistently used words, #mydressmychoice

There was very consistent framing and messaging present in #farkhunda, whereas #sendeanlat and #mydressmychoice showed far less consistency. #farkhunda also showed significant focus on the court case and the legal system. #sendeanlat, while still focussing on Ozgecan Aslan throughout the campaign, was far less specific. The other consistently used words could have been part of any campaign. #mydressmychoice was more akin to #letwomengotostadium, with a factual focus on the issue in the campaign, namely public strippings of women by men. Interestingly, the words 'should' and 'dress/dresses/dressed' both appear in the consistent messaging. This may be, to some extent, representing the strong counter-narrative which used the hashtag to advocate for women dressing more conservatively.

The variable framing and messaging in these three campaigns show differences. #farkhunda stayed quite reflective of the trials and sentencing, a core part of the overall goals of the campaign. #sendeanlat did not tend to show a clear focus or messaging, although emotional words in the non-peak period were very prevalent. #mydressmychoice remained focussed on the incident with very factual words, with the exception of the potential prevalence of the counter-narrative. This inconsistency and variation may have contributed to the lack of change; without clear, consistent, on point framing and messaging, the campaigns were not likely to achieve the desired change.

Finally, looking at the presence of international norms in these campaigns (statistically significant), as expected there is a very average representation across all three campaigns, ranging from 54% to 72% of international norms present. Interestingly, these campaigns

showed the lowest rates of Tweets with international norms, with only 23%, 24%, and 29% respectively. This means that even though the international norms were mentioned, they were not mentioned very often. This may have contributed to the lack of change seen in these campaigns. Perhaps had the international norms been used *more* the campaigns would have seen higher success levels.

Conclusion

These campaigns most exemplify the chaotic and unmanaged risks of social media, though each campaign showed different aspects of the spiral model critiques. All three campaigns showed a marked lack of persistence, with very high peaks around spark events but very little continued or sustained attention or dialogue. #sendeanlat in particular showed a lack of engagement. #farkhunda lacked in domestic voices, while #sendeanlat and #mydressmychoice opened doors for counter-narratives. These characteristics combined show very little incentive for the governments to make or implement meaningful changes. This is then represented in the legal outcomes, where these campaigns, overall, left women and girls in much the same situations as they were before the campaigns started.

Chapter 5 : Tactical Concessions: #delhigangrape and #niunamenos

Introduction

The next set of campaigns showed very similar outcomes as well as Twitter campaign behaviours. Both climaxed in close proximity to domestic, democratic elections with the possibility of regime change, and in both cases the government in power implemented legislative change extremely quickly. The legislative changes were generally seen as responses to the public attention driven by social media and indeed met many of the goals of the campaigns regarding the letter of the law. However, likely due to the speed with which the changes were made and the governments' lack of long-term attention to the issues, little to no change has been seen on the ground. Metrics of institutionalisation, in particular in India, underscore the short-term, reactionary nature of the changes.

#delhigangrape overview

On December 16, 2012, a young woman and a male companion boarded a minibus in Delhi. The bus driver and a group of men beat the man unconscious and raped the woman. The victims were left by the side of the road and it took several hours for someone to find and help them. The woman died two weeks later, on 29th December, after being transferred to a hospital in Singapore. Her death sparked a massive outcry about violence against women in India and the lack of protections afforded to them. Large scale protests took place in India and around the world in solidarity.[1]

The hashtag campaign sought better legal protections and law enforcement for violence against women and sexual violence. Some felt that the campaign was successful in raising awareness domestically.[2] However awareness raising is usually not enough, and most feel that much, much more needs to be done to protect women and girls.[3] This case also brought

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[1] Niharika Mandhana and Anjani Trivedi, 'Indians Outraged Over Rape on Moving Bus in New Delhi' *The New York Times - India Ink* (18 December 2012) <https://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/18/outrage-in-delhi-after-latest-gang-rape-case/>; 'Key Events in the Delhi Gang Rape Case' (*news.trust.org*) <http://news.trust.org/item/20130909143244-h09lu/> accessed 13 March 2018.

[2] 'A Year after the Delhi Gang Rape, What Has Changed?' <http://www.dw.com/en/a-year-after-the-delhi-gang-rape-what-has-changed/a-17293325> accessed 20 February 2018.

[3] ibid.

the impact of class based discrimination on sexual violence to the forefront.[4] The hashtag campaign is best summed up by this quote:

> The fierce debate in the weeks after the attack – setting conservatives who blamed westernisation against liberals blaming reactionary sexist and patriarchal attitudes – has faded. A package of laws increasing punishments for sexual assault and redefining a range of offences may do some good, campaigners concede, if enforcement is simultaneously improved, but dozens of men accused of rape remain members of local and national parliamentary assemblies…It is a few weeks of outrage against hundreds of years of tradition.[5]

#niunamenos overview

Ni Una Menos ('not one less') began as a small collective of activists a few months before the hashtag took off, in response to high levels of femicide in Argentina. A few months later, a 14 year old girl was killed by her boyfriend and his mother when they discovered she was pregnant and wanted to keep the baby.[6] The first Tweet, from a journalist, turned the collective into a hashtag campaign in response to this murder.[7] The Tweet was shared by other journalists and together they decided to hold the first protest under the banner of #niunamenos; it is thought that celebrity participation in the campaign contributed to the

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[4] "of every 10 women raped in India, nine are afraid to speak up against their perpetrators or do not have access to the social media." Jasmine Bala, 'Behind the Curtain: On Unreported Rapes in India' (9 March 2013) <https://www.girlsglobe.org/2013/03/09/behind-the-curtain-on-unreported-rapes-in-india/> accessed 20 February 2018; 'Does the Delhi Gang Rape Sentence Bring Closure?' *BBC News* <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-24059601> accessed 20 February 2018.

[5] Jason Burke, 'Delhi Rape: How India's Other Half Lives' *The Guardian* (10 September 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/10/delhi-gang-rape-india-women> accessed 6 March 2018; See also Justin Rowlatt, 'Viewpoints: Has Delhi Rape Case Changed India?' *BBC News* (10 September 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-24012424> accessed 13 March 2018.

[6] 'Meet the Argentine Women Behind Ni Una Menos, the Feminist Collective Angela Davis Cites as Inspiration' (*Remezcla*, 9 March 2017) <http://remezcla.com/features/culture/ni-una-menos-collective-argentina-founders/> accessed 21 November 2017.

[7] Uki Goñi, 'Argentine Women Call Out Machismo' *The New York Times* (15 June 2015) <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/opinion/argentine-women-call-out-machismo.html>; Jamie Ballard, 'Battle Cry of #NiUnaMenos Echoes Through Latin America' (*Huffington Post*, 22 June 2015) <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jamie-ballard/battle-cry-of-niunamenos-_b_7631972.html>; Muireann O'Dwyer, '#NiUnaMenos; Standing up to Femicides and "Machismo" in Argentina' (*Gender and Politics*, 3 February 2016) <https://genderandpoliticsucd.wordpress.com/2016/02/03/niunamenos-standing-up-to-femicides-and-machismo-in-argentina/> accessed 21 November 2017.

large scale of the participation.[8] The campaign developed five clear legal demands.[9] There were then well attended protests in June 2015, June 2016, the 'Black Wednesday' protest and strike in October 2016, and June 2017. The June 2015 protest saw an estimated 200,000 women in Buenos Aires alone,[10] though some estimate it higher.[11] In general, many of the campaign's initial legislative goals were met, and fairly quickly. However, long term implementation is severely lacking.[12]

Context

Although the outcomes of these campaigns were very similar, the context is not. This finding continues to underscore earlier chapters where context shows to be less important than one might hypothesise.

Gender indices for these countries are particularly interesting, with Argentina showing very positive rankings.   These indices indicate that women enjoy a fairly equal status in Argentina, at least compared to the other countries in this study. India, on the other hand, showed very poor gender indices. The baseline for women in these two countries was therefore quite different. Perhaps reflecting the picture on the ground, India reported the highest number of civil society organisations working on women's rights in the study, with 560. This was significantly higher than the other countries, with the next highest being

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[8] Goñi (n 7); 'Femicide in Argentina' (*Women Across Frontiers Magazine*, 22 November 2015) <http://wafmag.org/2015/11/femicide-in-argentina/> accessed 13 November 2017; '"Ni Una Menos": Feminism and Politics in Argentina' <https://www.telesurtv.net/english/opinion/Ni-una-menos-Feminism-and-Politics-in-Argentina-20150706-0011.html> accessed 21 November 2017.

[9] Implement the National Plan of Action for the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of the violence against women, as established in the Law 26,485; Ensure victims' access to justice; Develop a Unique Official Register of violence victims; Guarantee and deepen a program of Comprehensive Sex Education at all educational levels for a life free of discrimination and gender-based ("machista") violence; guarantee the protection of the victims of violence '#NiUnaMenos | Not One Less' (*Vital Voices*, 1 July 2015) <https://www.vitalvoices.org/2015/07/niunamenos-not-one-less/> accessed 21 November 2017; Irene, '#niunamenos: A Combination of Offline and Online Feminist Activism' (*Decoding Digital Activism*, 4 October 2017) <http://wpmu.mah.se/nmict172group6/2017/10/04/niunamenos-feminist-activism/> accessed 21 November 2017.

[10] Goñi (n 7).

[11] 'Femicide in Argentina' (n 8).

[12] Some legislative results were achieved as a consequence, but there is still a lot that needs to be done. Judge Elena Highton de Nolasco launched the Femicide Registration Unit for the Supreme Court. Following this, the National Government, through the Human Rights Committee, formalised the Unit, as well as the Fiscal Specialised Unit on Violence against Women (UFEM). However big this progress may seem, between the first and second #NiUnaMenos protests (2015-2016) 275 women died as victims of gender violence. '#NiUnaMenos: Against Femicide in Latin America' (*openDemocracy*, 7 November 2016) <https://www.opendemocracy.net/democraciaabierta/andr-s-del-r-o/niunamenos-against-femicide-in-latin-america> accessed 21 November 2017.

Kenya at 115. There is clearly a vibrant, active, and internationally connected women's rights movement in India with this number of officially registered Civil Society Organisations ('CSOs'). Argentina had only 40. Data is not available to indicate the size or operating incomes of these CSOs, therefore it is possible that 560 small CSOs in India have the same potential impact as 40 large CSOs in Argentina. However, even if this is true, the sheer difference in numbers does indicate that the situation for women and girls is likely different in the two countries.

Engagement with international human rights mechanisms are quite different as well. Argentina showed the most formal engagement out of all countries in the study, with 13 treaties ratified, including CEDAW and the Optional Protocols. India has ratified eight treaties, also including CEDAW, but without the Optional Protocol and with three reservations. As will be seen later in this chapter, India's engagement with international human rights mechanisms for women is not ideal. Again, based on context alone, one would expect very different outcomes in these two countries.

The most interesting finding in these two campaigns was the proximity to potential regime change. #niunamenos peaked approximately six months before a presidential election. The election also included senate and local government seats. General elections of this nature take place every four years in Argentina (senate and local have mid-term elections every two years). As it turned out, there was a change in ruling party in the October 2015 election, just months after the largest peaks in the campaign. The role of the elections in the campaign was made clear by one activist:

> #NiUnaMenos presented a series of five pledges for fighting violence against women, asking each of the candidates to sign their names to them. Crucially, they did it over Twitter and copied each Tweet onto their website…several candidates used the slogan '#NiUnaMenos' directly in their campaign ads…[13]

Similarly, in India, the spark incident took place 16 months before an election, again closer in time than other campaigns in the study. Elections in India take place every five years. As with Argentina, there was a change in ruling party as a result of the election following the campaign. It can therefore begin to be seen that, perhaps, campaigns which peak in relatively

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[13] 'Four Months From #NiUnaMenos: Has Anything Changed?'
<http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/four-months-from-niunamenos-has-anything-changed/>
accessed 21 November 2017.

close proximity to elections may force ruling governments to implement reactionary, tactical concession changes as a strategic choice for re-election, but without any political will to address the issue long-term.

Legal Outcomes

#delhigangrape and #niunamenos showed strikingly similar legal changes. These are the first campaigns to show more positive than status quo or negative change, reporting very positive legislative outcomes in particular. However, as introduced earlier in this chapter, this legislative change has not translated into meaningful institutionalisation, more so for India. Law enforcement in both countries, particularly in prosecutions and convictions, is very poor, reflecting that the positive change in the law is not being implemented properly. Lack of implementation can lead to perceptions of impunity from potential and actual perpetrators. Additionally, as the governments have technically already addressed the campaigns' primary goals through legislative change, there is little incentive for continued work or change from the state. In this way, these campaigns can be seen as missed opportunities, where more work could have been done had the change not happened so quickly or reactively.

Legislative change

Sexual violence and rape in India were not a new phenomenon.[14] Some groups proffered statistics that in India there was one rape every hour, with socially vulnerable women and girls more at risk. A report by the BBC written after the #delhigangrape spark incident details the many similarly horrific stories of rape, violence, and murder in India, occurring before #delhigangrape, which were 'forgotten'.[15] Legislative reform had been at the forefront of activism for years, continually pointing to ongoing problems of low conviction rates, lack of political will, and problems with frontline unresponsiveness as obstacles to change.[16]

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[14] 'India Faces Rape Debate' *BBC News* (24 November 2002)
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2508929.stm> accessed 20 February 2018.
[15] "On most days, Indian newspapers report shocking new atrocities - a 10-month-old raped by a neighbour in Delhi; an 18-month-old raped and abandoned on the streets in Calcutta; a 14-year-old raped and murdered in a police station in Uttar Pradesh; a husband facilitating his own wife's gang rape in Howrah; a 65-year-old grandmother raped in Kharagpur. But in a country where a rape is reported every 21 minutes, even these most horrific of crimes soon get forgotten - except by the victims and their families. They are left to fight their long lonely battles for justice which, more often than not, is denied to them. Justin Rowlatt, 'The Rapes That India Forgot' *BBC News* (5 January 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-20907755> accessed 13 March 2018.
[16] 'India Faces Rape Debate' (n 14); Gethin Chamberlain, 'Five Years after the Gang-Rape and Murder of Jyoti Singh, What Has Changed for Women in India?' *The Guardian* (3 December 2017)

Some changes before #delhigangrape had been achieved. After the rape of a 16 year old tribal girl in a police station, in 1983 the law was amended to say that if the victim says she does not consent, the court will believe her.[17] An incident in 2009 led to 47 days of protests in Kashmir.[18] The Attorney General at the time stated that simply a change in the law would not have an impact, as the rape culture was so ingrained in society.[19] Disappointingly, an incident in 2010 which made headlines led to legislative changes not dissimilar to #delhigangrape. The changes were intended to protect women using public transportation.[20]

Many women's groups found the legislative actions taken by the government to be lacking. Activists felt that the reforms tackled superficial issues and not underlying social issues, which they predicted would not lead to meaningful change.[21] Even the report commissioned in the aftermath of the #delhigangrape found shortcomings in the government's previous legislative efforts, with many promises left unfulfilled and policies left unimplemented.[22]

After the #delhigangrape incident, the government appointed a legal commission, under Justice Verma (a former chief justice), to review laws on sex crimes and make recommendations. The commission was given just 30 days to complete its work, which included a national public consultation. Over 70,000 responses were received.[23] The resulting report was published at the end of January 2013, only one month after her death. The committee identified 'failure of governance' as the root cause for the high incidence of sexual violence, blaming the government and the police for their 'apathy.'[24] The report called for broadening legal definitions, establishing special courts with women judges, allowing faster appeals, as well as more accountability and uniform forensic protocols.[25]

<http://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/dec/03/five-years-after-gang-murder-jyoti-singh-how-has-delhi-changed> accessed 6 March 2018.

[17] Rowlatt (n 15).

[18] ibid.

[19] ibid.

[20] 'Delhi Police Move to Protect Women Workers after Rapes' *BBC News* (10 December 2010) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-south-asia-11966664> accessed 20 February 2018.

[21] Working Group on Human Rights in India and the UN, 'Human Rights in India: Status Report 2012' (2012) 119–120.

[22] Justice JS Verma, Justice Leila Seth and Gopal Subramanium, 'Report on the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law' (2013) iii.

[23] Human Rights Watch, '"Everyone Blames Me" Barriers to Justice and Support Services for Sexual Assault Survivors in India' (2017) 68.

[24] Chamberlain (n 16).

[25] 'India Urged to Reform Rape Trials' *BBC News* (23 January 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-21156283> accessed 20 February 2018; Chamberlain (n 16); Verma, Seth and Subramanium (n 22) 416.

The Indian government took several steps in the aftermath of the protests:[26]

1. Fast track courts were set up specifically for cases of sexual violence; trials 'as far as possible' are meant to be completed within two months[27]

2. Criminal punishment was specified for police who fail to properly record a report of sexual assault[28]

3. There is now a 20 year minimum prison sentence for rape which causes death or vegetative state with the possibility of life in prison or death penalty,[29] with heightened sentencing for other sexual assault crimes[30]

4. Heightened sentencing for repeat offenders[31]

5. Rape definition now includes penetration by objects,[32] other definitions are expanded[33]

6. Stalking and voyeurism are now crimes[34]

7. Changes were made to the laws around consent; the absence of physical struggle no longer equates to consent[35]

8. The age of consent has changed to 18 which means that two teenagers engaging in consensual sexual activity could result in the male being charged with rape with no leniency[36]

After the initial legislative changes were made, activists continued to lobby for changes to the way juveniles are treated in the Indian criminal justice system. The main perpetrator in this case was just shy of his 18th birthday, meaning he was treated as a juvenile and received a far

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[26] 'One Year After Horrific New Delhi Gang Rape, India Still Struggles With Rape Culture' <https://thinkprogress.org/one-year-after-horrific-new-delhi-gang-rape-india-still-struggles-with-rape-culture-5d0d0f1ff404/> accessed 20 February 2018.

[27] 'Explaining India's New Anti-Rape Laws' *BBC News* (28 March 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-21950197> accessed 6 March 2018.

[28] The Criminal Law Amendment Bill 2013 (Bill No 63-C) ss 166A, 166B.

[29] ibid 376A.

[30] ibid 376.

[31] ibid 376E.

[32] 'A Year after the Delhi Gang Rape, What Has Changed?' (n 2); Betwa Sharma, 'A Year Later, Family of Delhi Gang Rape Victim Press for "Full Justice"' *The New York Times* (2013) <//india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/16/a-year-later-family-of-delhi-gang-rape-victim-press-for-full-justice/> accessed 20 February 2018; Nilanjana Bhowmick, 'Death Sentences Handed Down in India's Delhi Gang Rape Case' *Time* <http://world.time.com/2013/09/13/death-sentences-handed-down-in-indias-delhi-gang-rape-case/> accessed 20 February 2018.

[33] The Criminal Law Amendment Bill ss 354A/B, 375.

[34] ibid 354C, 354D; 'Explaining India's New Anti-Rape Laws' (n 27).

[35] The Criminal Law Amendment Bill s 114A; 'Explaining India's New Anti-Rape Laws' (n 27).

[36] 'Explaining India's New Anti-Rape Laws' (n 27); 'Recommendations of the Justice Verma Committee: 10-Point Cheat-Sheet' <https://www.ndtv.com/cheat-sheet/recommendations-of-the-justice-verma-committee-10-point-cheat-sheet-511292> accessed 20 February 2018; 'Justice Verma Committee Report Summary' <http://www.prsindia.org/parliamenttrack/report-summaries/justice-verma-committee-report-summary-2628/> accessed 20 February 2018; Verma, Seth and Subramanium (n 22).

more lenient sentence than the others. This caused outrage in the campaign.[37] In December 2015, the government passed The Juvenile Justice Bill which meant that 16 year olds involved in particularly serious or heinous crimes would be tried as adults.[38] This may have been a more positive legal outcome of the campaign, whereby the government took time and effort in debating and drafting the changes. It is notable that the more long-term meaningful change seen in India is not specifically related to violence against women. Although this is an important outcome for the Indian criminal justice system, it will not specifically benefit women and girls.

Since the sexual violence legislative changes were passed, many have highlighted the shortcomings of the government's actions. Some campaigners feel that while the laws have changed and rapes are being reported, investigated, and perhaps prosecuted more, nothing has been done to prevent them from happening in the first place.[39] The UN criticised India for not addressing the underlying societal causes of violence against women and sexual violence.[40] Activists were concerned from the start at the use of the death penalty in sexual crimes: 'if sentences are thought of as too harsh by the judges, the already high acquittal rate in cases of sexual violence will rise further.'[41] Human Rights Watch found that there were still serious issues with poor police response and stigma, poor access to sensitive medical care, and lack of access to effective legal assistance, including continued delays even with the fast track courts.[42] It appears that the public pressure of the campaign pushed the government to commission the report far too quickly and implement arguably superficial legislative changes. In the strictest regard, the campaign was successful in lobbying for changes in the law, the goals of which were indeed met. However it can be seen now that the changes were made too quickly to allow for any sort of meaningful implementation. The evidence also suggests that the changes were specifically made prior to the elections, perhaps as a tactic by the ruling party to try to ensure re-election.

A nearly identical picture comes through in Argentina. The government had taken legislative steps to address violence against women, passing the first gender violence law in 1994,[43]

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[37] 'A Year after the Delhi Gang Rape, What Has Changed?' (n 2).
[38] 'Rajya Sabha Passes Juvenile Justice Bill, Nirbhaya's Mother "satisfied" - Times of India ►' <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Rajya-Sabha-passes-Juvenile-Justice-Bill-Nirbhayas-mother-satisfied/articleshow/50285328.cms> accessed 20 February 2018.
[39] Chamberlain (n 16).
[40] 'One Year After Horrific New Delhi Gang Rape, India Still Struggles With Rape Culture' (n 26).
[41] 'Explaining India's New Anti-Rape Laws' (n 27).
[42] Human Rights Watch (n 23).
[43] Ley No. 24.417: Proteccion Contra la Violencia Familiar 1994.

which was broadened and improved a few years later (Law 26.485).[44] In 2012, the government passed a law specifically addressing femicide.[45] As seen in India, however, women's groups in Argentina noted that the laws alone did not have the desired impact.[46] Before #niunamenos, only eight of the 45 articles in Law 26.485 had been properly or fully implemented.[47]

Shortcomings in the law were noted as a lack of education on the issue of violence against women, no national hotline, not enough shelters, no free legal assistance, and a lack of appropriate budget.[48] One of the focal points of #niunamenos was the inaction in establishing the official register to collect information on femicides. Activists agreed that having access to such data would reveal the magnitude of the problem and provide an important evidence-base for future work. The lack of such data also indicated that the relevant government agencies were not fulfilling their responsibilities.[49]

#niunamenos sought to address these shortcomings. Within days of the protests which erupted from #niunamenos, the government announced steps to realise the implementation of Law 26.485.[50] The first aspect to be addressed was the data collection issue and the establishment of the federal registry. When announcing the registry, the vice president of the Federal Supreme Court of Argentina, Elena Highton de Nolasco, cited jurisdictional problems as the reason for the lack of previous progress and shifted blame to the provinces.[51] The government then claimed that the large scale protest driven by social media forced *the*

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[44] Ley No. 26.485: Ley de protección integral para prevenir, sancionar y erradicar la violencia contra las mujeres en los ámbitos en que desarrollen sus relaciones interpersonales 2009; O'Dwyer (n 7).

[45] O'Dwyer (n 7); Graciela Rodriguez-Ferrand, 'Argentina: Criminal Code Amendment to Include Femicide | Global Legal Monitor' (3 May 2012) <//www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/argentina-criminal-code-amendment-to-include-femicide/> accessed 21 November 2017; 'El Femicidio Fue Aprobado En Diputados y Está Cerca de Ser Ley' <https://www.clarin.com/sociedad/femicidio-aprobado-diputados-cerca-ley_0_r1xDWS3vQx.html> accessed 1 January 2019.

[46] O'Dwyer (n 7).

[47] '#NiUnaMenos: Not One Woman Less, Not One More Death!' (*NACLA*) </news/2016/11/01/niunamenos-not-one-woman-less-not-one-more-death> accessed 21 November 2017; 'Casi No Se Aplica La Ley Contra Los Femicidios' <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1799664-casi-no-se-aplica-la-ley-contra-los-femicidios> accessed 21 November 2017. "In April 2009, law 26.485 on Violence Against Women was enacted. When the law was promulgated, several active feminist groups took it as a very good start. Three years later, one can say that law 26,485 is a great legal tool with no use. The law itself is complete, though extremely long, not fully regulated, and most importantly, very difficult to implement." 'Women's Rights: An Unfinished Business' <http://www.argentinaindependent.com/socialissues/development/womens-rights-an-unfinished-business/> accessed 21 November 2017.

[48] 'Women's Rights: An Unfinished Business' (n 47).

[49] 'Femicide in Argentina' (n 8).

[50] '60% of Femicides Committed by Partners' <http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/215488/> accessed 13 November 2017.

[51] 'Femicide in Argentina' (n 8).

provinces to change their perspective and agree to the registry.[52] Shortly thereafter, Argentina's attorney general, Alejandra Gils Carbó, also set up a special prosecution unit for violence against women and confirmed the enactment of the registry.[53] The registry's first report was published just months later in September, corroborating the work previously done by women's groups illustrating the magnitude of the problem. Some provinces took action to improve legislation as well. [54] In October following the first wave of protests, the National Women's Council also released an Action Plan, another demand of the campaign, including the establishment of a national hotline.[55] Again, it is important to note that all of these changes were made before the pending national and regional elections.

Sadly, even with the establishment of a registry, a national action plan, a hotline, a special prosecution unit, and local legislative efforts, little change is seen in the incidence of femicide. As will be seen later in this chapter, there has been a particular lack of impact in the courts. These changes were seemingly implemented in a 'knee jerk' fashion in reaction to the combination of public pressure in the sheer scale of the campaign and the pending elections. The changes were not accompanied by any meaningful institutionalisation or efforts to address underlying, root causes of violence against women in Argentina.

Institutionalisation

For many years before #delhigangrape, the Indian government had not prioritised the elimination of violence against women, generally seen as paying lip service when incidents were reported in the media but not following up with action or investment.[56]

> In a 2010 survey, nearly 80% of women in New Delhi reported being worried about their safety, and a quick glance at any paper in the morning will offer some insight as to why. Let's take last Thursday. On April 26, the Times of India covered the following stories: an alleged rape by a Delhi cop, two separate cases

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[52] "the demonstration was extremely useful for us since so many of the jurisdictions that hadn't signed the agreements to be part of the registry finally agreed to sign up on June 4," (Mariana Gras, president of the Council)."

[53] 'Femicide in Argentina' (n 8).

[54] ibid.

[55] ibid.

[56] Debolina Dutta and Oishik Sircar, 'India's Winter of Discontent: Some Feminist Dilemmas in the Wake of a Rape' (2013) 39 Feminist Studies 293; Burke (n 5).

of naked and mutilated female corpses being dumped in different parts of the city, and a husband who murdered his wife whom he suspected of infidelity.[57]

With the government not being seen to take the issue seriously, neither did the general public. Polls showed that most men in Delhi thought that harassing women on the street in public was acceptable behaviour and that many police felt the victims of sexual violence were to blame.[58] Local politicians equally gave little importance to the issue.[59] Interestingly, the government's first reaction when #delhigangrape social media led to widespread protests was to crack down on the protesters themselves, assumingly to shut down the criticism of the government which allowed this violent act against a woman to occur. [60] It took a whole week before the government's reaction became sympathetic.[61] This capricious approach did not sit well with the public, being 'dismissed as too little, too late.'[62] It was this environment which spurred the government to set up the commission. [63]

With elections in the near future, it was not long before the opposition party took up the issue, asking what the current government had done to protect women and calling for stricter laws.[64] Many politicians joined in the public dialogue, pointing fingers, issuing blame, inciting anger, and calling for change.[65] One of India's most high ranking police officers joined in, notably on Twitter, blaming a failure of governance.[66] Judges in turn blamed the police for letting the perpetrators slip through.[67]

Public discourse ranged from defensive to aggressive, with some voices even exposing deep seated misogyny.[68] This continued for quite some time. Nearly a year later, a government

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[57] 'New Delhi's Women Problem: What Does It Take to Make a City, and Society, Safe?' <http://world.time.com/2012/05/02/new-delhis-women-problem-what-does-it-take-to-make-a-city-and-society-safe/> accessed 20 February 2018.
[58] Burke (n 5); 'Student "Gang-Raped on Delhi Bus"' *BBC News* (17 December 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-20753075> accessed 20 February 2018.
[59] Burke (n 5).
[60] Gardiner Harris, '5 in New Delhi Rape Case Face Murder Charges' *The New York Times* (3 January 2013) <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/04/world/asia/murder-charges-filed-against-5-men-in-india-gang-rape.html> accessed 20 February 2018.
[61] Burke (n 5).
[62] ibid.
[63] 'Delhi Gang Rape: Parliamentary Panel Summons Union Home Secretary, Delhi Police Chief - Times of India' <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Delhi-gang-rape-Parliamentary-panel-summons-Union-home-secretary-Delhi-police-chief/articleshow/17707153.cms> accessed 20 February 2018.
[64] 'Parliament Uproar over Delhi Rape' *BBC News* (18 December 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-20765869> accessed 20 February 2018.
[65] ibid.
[66] Mandhana and Trivedi (n 1).
[67] 'Delhi Gang-Rape: What Was the Police Doing, Asks Angry High Court' <https://www.ndtv.com/cheat-sheet/delhi-gang-rape-what-was-the-police-doing-asks-angry-high-court-507939> accessed 20 February 2018.
[68] Chamberlain (n 16).

official publicly stated 'if you can't prevent rape, enjoy it', reigniting the Twitter debate about attitudes towards rape in India, in particular the culture of victim-blaming.[69] Language and attitudes expressed by those in power continued to show a lack of understanding of the seriousness of the epidemic of violence against women in India.[70] Another high profile case occurred in 2014, when two girls aged 12 and 14 in a rural area where raped and hanged on their way to use a field for a toilet. It was alleged that the police ridiculed and ignored the family when they reported trouble, apparently due to caste discrimination.[71] In 2017, a Thomson Reuters research poll found that Delhi was seen as the 'world's worst megacity for sexual violence against women,' though some saw this as more of a perception than a reality.[72] Regardless, this evidence does not show that the government worked toward meaningful institutionalisation of women's rights or to implement changes in the laws after the hashtag campaign.[73]

The situation in Argentina is similar – all the right discourse in all the right places, but the truth of a lack of meaningful institutionalisation emerges when looking a bit deeper. Even the President at the time of #niunamenos, back when he was a governor, was quoted as saying:

> Deep inside, all women like to hear a piropo (catcall), even women who say they don't. I don't believe them. There can't be anything nicer than being told how pretty you are, even if it comes along with vulgarity, like being told what a nice ass you have.[74]

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[69] Miriam Berger, 'India's Top Police Official: "If You Can't Prevent Rape, Enjoy It"' <https://www.buzzfeed.com/miriamberger/indias-top-police-official-if-you-cant-prevent-rape-enjoy-it> accessed 6 March 2018.

[70] 'One Year After Horrific New Delhi Gang Rape, India Still Struggles With Rape Culture' (n 26).

[71] 'The Village Where Cousins Were Raped and Hanged' *BBC News* (30 May 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-27622236> accessed 20 February 2018.

[72] 'Delhi, Sao Paulo Seen as Worst Megacities for Sex Attacks on Women' <https://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL4N1M14XB> accessed 20 February 2018.

[73] Although for an unrelated cause, in April 2017, the governments in Jammu and Kashmir banned 22 social media sites, including Twitter, to curb protest. The governments "felt that continued misuse of social networking sites and instant messaging services is likely to be detrimental to the interests of peace and tranquillity in the state." 'J&K Government Bans 22 Social Networking Sites Citing Their Misuse - Times of India' <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jk-government-bans-22-social-networking-sites-citing-their-misuse/articleshow/58382769.cms> accessed 23 February 2018. This adds yet another dimension to the evidence of the lack of institutionalisation of international human rights norms.

[74] Goñi (n 7); '"Ni Una Menos": Feminism and Politics in Argentina' (n 8); 'Feminism Around the World: #NiUnaMenos Protest in Argentina Highlights Epidemic of Violence Against Women' <https://www.themarysue.com/feminism-around-the-world-argentina-ni-una-menos/> accessed 21 November 2017.

This statement is very illustrative of the South American 'machismo' or 'machista' culture.[75] Street harassment is common, even socially acceptable as an expression of masculinity to some.[76] Argentina is identified as a deeply patriarchal country, 'plagued with sexist stereotypes.'[77] Almost identical to India, for some time women's groups have raised concerns about institutionalised apathy to violence against women, particularly through police victim-blaming and a lack of convictions in the courts.[78]

Publicly, government officials seemed to address this perceived apathy in the aftermath of the #niunamenos protests. Many politicians attended the protests for photo opportunities, using the images in their election campaigns.[79] Although to some this was political opportunism, to many it was an important step forward in accountability and agenda setting.[80] There was some evidence that the hashtag campaign influenced local elections, in a positive way (a known misogynist lost his seat).[81] Front-line workers noted that more women used shelters and national helplines.[82] A new national action plan specifically addressing violence against women was announced, continuing to address the goals of the campaign, particularly in terms of education and increases to available services.[83] Additionally, the government 'elevated' the National Women's Council within the government to give the agency more autonomy.[84]

Notably, many female legislators introduced bills to protect women from violence in the months following the campaign (Dirección de Información Parlamentaria, Honorable Cámera de Diputados de la Nación, República Argentina).[85] Some experts posit that perhaps there

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[75] O'Dwyer (n 7); '#NiUnaMenos: Against Femicide in Latin America' (n 12); Sarah Gordon, 'NiUnaMenos: How the Brutal Gang Rape and Murder of a Schoolgirl United the Furious Women of Latin America' *The Telegraph* (10:22) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/life/niunamenos-how-a-schoolgirls-brutal-gang-rape-and-murder-united/> accessed 21 November 2017.
[76] Goñi (n 7).
[77] 'Women's Rights: An Unfinished Business' (n 47).
[78] US State Dept, 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015' (2015) 13.
[79] '"Ni Una Menos": Feminism and Politics in Argentina' (n 8).
[80] 'Four Months From #NiUnaMenos: Has Anything Changed?' (n 13).
[81] '"Ni Una Menos": Feminism and Politics in Argentina' (n 8).
[82] 'Feminism Around the World: #NiUnaMenos Protest in Argentina Highlights Epidemic of Violence Against Women' (n 74); '#NiUnaMenos | Not One Less' (n 9); 'Four Months From #NiUnaMenos: Has Anything Changed?' (n 13).
[83] 'Argentina Has New Gender Violence Plan' *BBC News* (27 July 2016) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-36901113> accessed 13 November 2017; US State Dept, 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016' (2016) 15 <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper> accessed 13 April 2017.
[84] Karla Zabludovsky, 'This Woman Devoted Her Life To Keeping Women Safe. And Then A Man Killed Her.' <https://www.buzzfeed.com/karlazabludovsky/these-women-tried-to-take-hashtag-activism-into-the-streets> accessed 21 November 2017.
[85] Madeline Gannon, 'At What Cost? Discrepancies between Women's Legislative Representation and Effective Policy to Protect Women from Violence in Argentina' (2016) 33 SIGMA Journal of Political and International Studies 81, 82.

was success because there are quota systems in place in Argentina, and although the female politicians had not made much change prior to the movement, the protests may have enabled the female politicians already in post to take more drastic action.[86]

It seems, however, that for every positive and perhaps meaningful action the government took to institutionalise a commitment to women, there was an equal negative action. In one instance, the government was accused of being 'incompetent' when they publicly announced the location of three new safe houses for victims of domestic violence.[87] The fact that the protests continued alone gives credence to the lack of political will and investment in women. Femicides themselves have likely increased in the years since the campaign.[88] In short:

> activists in Argentina fear that, for all the efforts they made, for all the noise they created, women's rights have barely inched forward — with new laws largely ignored, few safe havens for victims of abuse, and a justice system that remains dominated by men.[89]

Law Enforcement

The Verma Report was very clear in its findings about the role of the courts in allowing the epidemic of violence against women in India prior to the #delhigangrape case and campaign.[90] Myriad cases of failures in the justice system for victims of gender based violence existed before the #delhigangrape incidents.[91] The case of the perpetrators of the #delhigangrape caught and held the attention of the public. As explored later in this chapter, many of the peak days in the campaign related to milestones in the progression of the legal case. On January 3, 2013, murder charges were filed against the five alleged perpetrators as well as charges of destruction of evidence and attempted murder of her male companion. The

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[86] Gannon (n 85).

[87] '#NiUnaMenos: Fighting Femicide In Argentina | The Mary Sue' <https://www.themarysue.com/niunamenos-fighting-femicide-in-argentina/> accessed 21 November 2017; Zabludovsky (n 84).

[88] 'Argentina: Paro Contra Feminicidios y Maltrato a Las Mujeres' <http://www.dw.com/es/argentina-paro-contra-feminicidios-y-maltrato-a-las-mujeres/a-36094088> accessed 13 November 2017.

[89] Zabludovsky (n 84).

[90] "full justice continues to elude the victim of sexual harassment and sexual assault even after two decades (after a landmark case)…The mindset of the judiciary also needs to be improved by their education in gender sensitivity. The women's tragedy is to face the compounding of gender and social injustice contrary to the constitutional promise to 'secure a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of national life', and the State's obligation 'to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals but also amongst groups of people'" Verma, Seth and Subramanium (n 22) 15.

[91] Verma, Seth and Subramanium (n 22).

sixth suspect was treated as a juvenile.[92] The case was referred to the new fast track courts, set up in just days in response to the protests.[93] One of the accused died in jail, in a questionable suicide.[94] The four remaining men were found guilty.[95] They were given the death penalty in September 2013.[96] A front line worker aptly described the situation:

> This decision will have a positive effect on patriarchal and reactionary societal attitudes because they only understand the language of fear. However, the full effect of this verdict will be felt only when it fast-tracks all other pending rape trials in the country and other rape victims get their justice too.[97]

Others were not as positive about the sentence, finding that while authorities needed to take action on this case given the public attention driven by social media, the death penalty is also a violation of international human rights norms: 'authorities must avoid using the death penalty as a quick-fix solution.'[98]

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[92] Harris (n 60).

[93] '5 Special Fast Track Courts by January 3 - Hindustan Times' (25 September 2013) <https://web.archive.org/web/20130925062509/http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/5-special-fast-track-courts-by-January-3/Article1-982169.aspx> accessed 20 February 2018.

[94] 'A Year after the Delhi Gang Rape, What Has Changed?' (n 2); 'Delhi Rape Accused Is Found Dead' *BBC News* <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21737748> accessed 20 February 2018; 'India Gang-Rape: Accused Ram Singh "Commits Suicide"' (11 March 2013) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/9921621/India-gang-rape-accused-Ram-Singh-commits-suicide.html> accessed 20 February 2018; Niharika Mandhana and Heather Timmons, 'Suspect in India Gang Rape Found Dead in Jail' *The New York Times* (1362973748) <///india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/suspect-in-india-gang-rape-found-dead-in-jail/> accessed 20 February 2018.

[95] 'Anger and Calls for Justice in Delhi' *BBC News* (10 September 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-24031909> accessed 20 February 2018.

[96] *State v Ram Singh and another* (ASJ (Special Fast Track Court), Saket Courts, New Delhi); Bhowmick (n 32); 'Delhi Gang-Rape: Four Men Sentenced to Death' <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/delhi-gang-rape-four-men-sentenced-to-death-732920> accessed 20 February 2018; ibid.

[97] Bhowmick (n 32).

[98] 'Death Penalties for Delhi Gang Rape' *BBC News* (13 September 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-24078339> accessed 20 February 2018.

The death penalties were upheld upon appeal in March 2014.[99] However, the following day two of the sentences were put on hold for another appeal.[100] The sentences were again upheld in May 2017, seen as an unusual move by the court given that a high percentage of death sentences are overturned or commuted.[101] A recent study had found that death sentences in India are often handed down but rarely carried out.[102] As is necessary for the death penalty in India, the judges found this to be the 'rarest of rare cases.'[103] In upholding the sentences, the judge opined:

> I hope that this gruesome incident in the capital and death of this young woman will be an eye-opener for a mass movement "to end violence against women" and "respect for women and her dignity" and sensitizing public at large on gender justice…The battle for gender justice can be won only with strict implementation of legislative provisions, sensitization of public, taking other pro-active steps at all levels for combating violence against women and ensuring widespread attitudinal changes and comprehensive change in the existing mind set.[104]

Many believe that because this level of punishment is not doled out equally for all sexual assault cases, it will not serve as a deterrent. Rather, it was the public outrage sparked by the social media attention and expressed in both online and offline activities which led to these extreme sentences, not the nature of the crime itself.[105] A young woman who lived near the

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[99] *Vinay Sharma and Anr v State* [2014] High Court of Delhi 1398/2013. "the shocking incident left an indelible scar on the social order and became a burning societal issue. An enraged and infuriated society took to the streets to avenge the affront inflicted upon it. Social abhorrence could not have been more manifest nor the national shock at the incident more perceptible. It would be no exaggeration or hyperbole to state that the shocking incident had ramifications which crossed the national borders into international terrain." (para 397). "we are of the considered view that the instant case without a shadow of doubt falls in the category of the rarest of rare cases where culpability has assumed the proportion of extreme depravity" (para 398). The opinion also stated "the appetite for sex, the hunger for violence, the position of the empowered and the attitude of perversity, to say the least, are bound to shock the collective conscience which knows not what to do. It is manifest that the wanton lust, the servility to absolutely unchained carnal desire and slavery to the loathsome beastility of passion ruled the mindset of the appellants to commit a crime which can summon with immediacy "tsunami" of shock in the mind of the collective and destroy the civilised marrows of the milieu in entirety." (para 356)

[100] 'Delhi Gang Rape: Death Penalty for Two Men Put on Hold' *BBC News* <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-26593587> accessed 20 February 2018.

[101] 'In Rare Move, Death Sentence in Delhi Gang Rape Case Is Upheld' *The New York Times* <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/world/asia/death-sentence-delhi-gang-rape.html> accessed 20 February 2018; 'Delhi Gang Rapists' Death Penalty Upheld' *BBC News* (5 May 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-39814910> accessed 20 February 2018.

[102] 'Death Sentences in India Usually End in Question Marks, Study Finds' *The New York Times* <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/07/world/asia/india-death-sentences-executions.html> accessed 20 February 2018.

[103] *Mukesh & Anr v State for NCT of Delhi & Others* [2017] Supreme Court of India 607–608 [146].

[104] ibid 19.

[105] 'In Rare Move, Death Sentence in Delhi Gang Rape Case Is Upheld' (n 101).

families of the perpetrators was quoted as saying, 'the court should not give special preference to this case and must decide like it does in other cases. They should be punished within the law.' [106] Another local woman felt instead that all rapists should be given the death penalty, including the rich and famous.[107] Some even felt that there would have been more protests if the perpetrators had *not* been given the death penalty.[108]

Other high profile cases have been decided since, with varying results. Those cases where the government 'feared' public backlash led to harsh penalties, while those which garnered less attention were given softer sentences.[109] The role of the courts is highly questionable, appearing to hand down death penalties when the media is involved, but releasing other perpetrators when it does not gain any attention.

Indian crime statistics are publicly available, and, according to the official reports, the crime statistics on sexual violence paint a very telling picture.[110] By 2016, conviction rates remained between 25-30% for rape and around 20% for sexual harassment. As expected, there were minor improvements in the year immediately following the campaign, but as the echo of the campaign dwindled, so did the attention to violence against women. Conviction rates of merely 25% for cases of rape are extremely low. It is also interesting to note that in 2013, one third of cases were labelled as false charges. This could possibly indicate that police do not take cases of rape seriously (as stated by activists and victims over the years). Additionally, despite the establishment of fast track courts, the number of backlog cases does not seem to have changed much over the past decade. At the end of 2016, 133,373 rape cases were still pending. Over 30,000 sexual harassment cases were pending.

The one positive to take from these statistics has nothing to do with law and order, but rather women themselves. There was a marked increase in the number of rapes reported after the campaign which has been maintained since. Given all the evidence, it is highly likely that

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[106] 'Anger and Calls for Justice in Delhi' (n 95).
[107] ibid.
[108] 'Understanding India's Rape Crisis' (20 September 2013) <https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2013/09/understanding-indias-rape-crisis/> accessed 20 February 2018.
[109] Amy Kazmin and Kiran Stacey, 'Violence Erupts in India after Guru Is Convicted of Rape' (*Financial Times*, 25 August 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/9f04b77c-896f-11e7-bf50-e1c239b45787> accessed 13 March 2018; 'Rapist Indian Guru Jailed for 20 Years' *BBC News* (28 August 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-41070764> accessed 20 February 2018; Michael Safi, '"A Feeble No May Mean Yes": Indian Court Overturns Rape Conviction' *The Guardian* (26 September 2017) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/26/a-feeble-no-may-mean-yes-indian-court-overturns-conviction> accessed 20 February 2018.
[110] 'National Crime Records Bureau' <http://ncrb.gov.in/> accessed 2 January 2019.

this number is much more representative than the lower number reported before the campaign, indicating that women are more empowered to come forward and report the crime.

The combination of attention paid only to high profile cases with the persistently low and unchanging conviction rates shows that the situation is worse in India following the campaign. A chance was created to make real improvements, but these were never realised.

In Argentina, again there is a nearly identical picture, with persistently low conviction rates before and after the campaign. In many cases of femicide, again both before and after the campaign, the victims had already sought the protection of the state.[111] There were, and continue to be, many reports of incidents of violence when there was already a court restraining or protection order in place. [112] This is also not dissimilar to the situation around femicide in Turkey.

According to the Argentinian Attorney General's office, in 2010, complaints were filed in only three out of every ten suspected rape cases, and only one of those three was then prosecuted.[113] Prior to the campaign there were also reports of judicial leniency and acceptance of the machismo culture. One judge cited 'violent emotion' as a mitigating circumstance in one femicide case which led to a reduced sentence for the perpetrator.[114] Public outcry over that particular case did lead the government to pass legislation imposing stricter sentences. The change, however, did not have the desired deterrent effect as femicides continued to increase.[115]

After the campaign, these patterns continued. In 2015, Human Rights Watch found that out of a reported 235 femicides, there were only seven convictions.[116] Compiled statistics from the federal registry (set up in response to the campaign) shows the following:[117]

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[111] 'El Mapa de Los Femicidios En La Argentina' <http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1794148-el-mapa-de-los-femicidios-en-la-argentina> accessed 21 November 2017.
[112] 'Femicide in Argentina' (n 8); 'Argentines Protest Violence against Women' <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/6/4/Thousands-of-Argentines-rally-against-femicide.html> accessed 21 November 2017.
[113] US State Dept, 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2010' (2010) 20.
[114] 'How One Woman's Murder Made Argentina Rethink the Idea of "Crimes of Passion"' <https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/observations/2017/04/how-one-woman-s-murder-made-argentina-rethink-idea-crimes-passion> accessed 21 November 2017.
[115] ibid.
[116] Human Rights Watch, 'World Report 2017: Rights Trends in Argentina' (2017) <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/argentina> accessed 2 January 2019.
[117] Registro Nacional de Femicidios de la Justicia Argentina, 'Datos Estadisticos Del Poder Judicial Sobre: Femicidios'.

Table 5.1: Convictions rates of femicides, Argentina, 2014-2016

Year	Total victims	Convictions	%	Previous complaints	%
2014	225	27	13%	30	13%
2015	235	7	3%	46	20%
2016	254	22	9%	60	24%

These statistics show that conviction rates have, in fact, *decreased* since the campaign. These statistics also show the relatively high percentage of femicides where a previous complaint has been recorded. This also confirms that femicides are increasing, from 225 in 2014 to 254 in 2016. One journalist summed up the situation: 'However big this progress [the legislative achievements] may seem, between the first and second #NiUnaMenos protests (2015-2016) 275 women died as victims of gender violence.'[118]

Conviction rates in both countries are therefore shockingly low, hovering around 25% for sexual violence in India and 10% for femicide in Argentina. These rates are consistent both before and after the hashtag campaigns. With the legislative changes introduced, one would expect to see any meaningful change work its way to the courts with a resulting positive change in conviction rates by now. Given the time that has passed since the legislative changes in both countries, it is reasonable to expect to see improvements in the judicial system. However, this research indicates that the speed of the legislative changes was not an indication of meaningful state commitment and political will to address violence against women, but rather a reactionary tactical concession to appease the public's visible anger driven by social media, most likely related to pending elections.

UN Dialogue

The final area to explore evidencing legal change is the catalogue of reports with UN human rights treaty bodies. This dialogue, when examined closely, provides a wealth of information about the true situation for women and girls on the ground. It also provides an in depth insight into the government's perspective, uncovering truths about commitment and investment in women. In this legal aspect, India and Argentina actually differed greatly in their relationship with the UN human rights mechanisms. India showed rather surprising

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[118] '#NiUnaMenos: Against Femicide in Latin America' (n 12); See also '5 Things I Learned at Argentina's #NiUnaMenos March against Femicide' (*Amnesty International USA*, 14 July 2016) <https://www.amnestyusa.org/5-things-i-learned-at-argentinas-niunamenos-march-against-femicide/> accessed 21 November 2017.

aggression, defensiveness, and at times outright rejection of engagement with international human rights mechanisms. Argentina, on the other hand, exhibited what could be an honest recognition of the problem of violence against women with evidence of some meaningful commitment to change. This area is the primary reason Argentina overall scored better than India in legal outcomes.

In early UN reports to and from India, there is a clear focus on marriage and women's roles as mothers. Although it seems some small steps were being taken towards liberalisation, the overall rhetoric fell squarely within traditional gender roles.[119] When pushed on the government's supposed commitment to improve the status of women,[120] India responded: '…that the macho image did not exist in India, where women were traditionally accorded a high degree of respect.'[121] The Human Rights Committee raised similar concerns in the early 1990s as well.[122] There, India claimed that the 'difficulty in reaching the goal of equality was more a social than a law enforcement problem.'[123]

In 1999, India submitted a report to CEDAW citing legislative reform, awareness raising campaigns, and institutional restructuring as efforts undertaken by the state to address violence against women.[124] Deeply rooted gender bias was again used by the State as an explanation for slow change.[125] These kinds of statements are very similar to statements made by government officials during the #delhigangrape public outcry, nearly 20 years later. The next CEDAW state report, submitted in 2005, still talked about 'pending' changes to rape laws and 'consideration' of implementing suggestions from the national women's machinery.[126] Violence against women and girls featured high on the list of issues from the Committee and in dialogue with the state.[127] The State again replied with challenges between

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[119] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. State Report from India' (1983) UN Doc E/1980/6/Add.34.

[120] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Summary Record of the 6th Meeting' (1984) UN Doc E/1984/WG.1/SR.6 para 50.

[121] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Summary Record of the 8th Meeting' (1984) UN Doc E/l984/WG.l/SR.8 para 37.

[122] Human Rights Committee, 'Report of the Human Rights Committee' (1991) UN Doc Supplement No. 40 (A/46/40) paras 272–3.

[123] ibid 304.

[124] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Initial Reports of States Parties India' (1999) UN Doc CEDAW/IND/1 para 93.

[125] ibid 113.

[126] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Combined Second and Third Periodic Reports of States Parties India' (2005) UN Doc CEDAW/C/IND/2-3 paras 347, 363.

[127] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'List of Issues and Questions with Regard to the Consideration of Periodic Reports India' (2006) UN Doc CEDAW/C/IND/Q/3; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record of the 761st Meeting' (2007) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.761 (A) para 24.

legislation and implementation.[128] The cycles read very similarly, indicating little to no change in approach, impact, or effect had taken place.

In 2001, the Special Rapporteur ('SR on VAW') on Violence Against Women had several communications with the government of India regarding allegations of rape, many of which dealt with police or armed forces.[129] The government stated that six out of the ten cases raised were false or unsubstantiated accusations. This indicates a rather dismissive state attitude towards the work of the SR on VAW and the issues raised in her communications. Similarly, in 2002 the SR on VAW communicated with the government on 11 cases dealing with serious allegations of rape and violence, many of which involved police inaction, intimidation, and death threats.[130] India did not respond to any communications on allegations of cases of VAW from the SR in 2006.[131] In 2007 the government only replied to one allegation, and claimed that after their investigation they could not substantiate the claim.[132] In 2008, the government replied to a 2007 allegation, again finding that it was fabricated.[133] Two additional allegations from 2008 led the government to ask for more information; according to the State's response one was being investigated, three had no response, and the government found another to be false.[134] In 2009, the SR received an allegation of serious government threats to a woman who had given a statement to the HRC about the situation of VAWG in India. The government denied this.[135] A further two responses were sent to previous communications where, unsurprisingly, the government found no basis or were unable to substantiate the claims.[136] This dialogue is very indicative of the state not taking these issues seriously, over quite a lengthy time period.

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[128] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record of the 761st Meeting' (n 127) para 52.
[129] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences Addendum Communications to and from Governments' (2001) UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/73/Add.1 paras 23–34.
[130] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Addendum Communications to and from Governments' (2002) UN Doc E/CN.4/2002/83/Add.1 paras 27–39.
[131] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Yakin Ertürk Addendum Communications to and from Governments' (2007) UN Doc A/HRC/4/34/Add.1 paras 272–297.
[132] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Yakin Ertürk Addendum Communications to and from Governments' (2008) UN Doc A/HRC/7/6/Add.1 paras 169–191.
[133] Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Yakin Ertürk* Addendum Communications to and from Governments 2009 (A/HRC/11/6/Add1) para 192.
[134] ibid 185–246.
[135] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Rashida Manjoo Addendum Communications to and from Governments' (2010) UN Doc A/HRC/14/22/Add.1 paras 152–3.
[136] ibid 154–8.

The next engagement with international human rights mechanisms occurred while the campaign was reaching its climax. In early 2013, the SR on VAW was invited to undertake a mission to India.[137] This was clearly in response to the spark incident. The SR found that sexual violence was widespread, affecting women's feeling of security particularly in public urban spaces. She also identified shame and stigma as barriers to justice, at times even leading to victim suicide.[138] She then went on to highlight the lack of effective implementation of existing legislation, pointing to the exclusion of women's participation in society as a primary underlying cause of the epidemic of violence.[139] The SR specifically addressed #delhigangrape. She found that:

> The laws that were adopted did not fully reflect the recommendations of the Verma Committee. The opportunity to adopt a holistic approach to violence against women, including addressing the root causes and consequences of such violence, was lost…Serious concerns were expressed with regard to the insensitive and taunting attitude of some members of Parliament with regard to the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act. The Special Rapporteur regrets that some political leaders are not fully committed to the process of legal and social change as regards women's human rights.[140]

The SR continued to draw attention to gaps in legislation, lack of redress, lack of holistic approach, and patriarchal norms as root causes of violence against women which were not being adequately addressed by the state.[141]

Amnesty International also submitted a report in response to the SR's mission, clearly supporting her findings and agreeing that the legislative reforms were not enough.[142] The state's response provides significant insight into the lack of institutionalisation of women's rights norms and the resistance to engage with international human rights mechanisms and, although lengthy, is critical to this study:

> India is constrained to make certain observations on the Report of the Special Rapporteur as there are too many instances in the Report that leads a conclusion

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[137] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Rashida Manjoo Addendum Mission to India' (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/38/Add.1.
[138] ibid 12.
[139] ibid 45.
[140] ibid 49–51.
[141] ibid 75–6.
[142] Amnesty International, 'Written Statement Submitted by Amnesty International, a Non-Governmental Organization in Special Consultative Status' (2013) UN Doc A/HRC/23/NGO/102 2.

that the Report lacks full objectivity and exhibits a tendency to over-simplify the issues at hand. **It is rather difficult to comprehend the reasons for the Special Rapporteur, who despite her learned experience, has taken rather a simplistic approach while drawing conclusions, and thereafter present them as her findings. The proclivity for making unsubstantiated yet sweeping generalizations is very high in the Report, which tends to point to either a lack of understanding of issues or a high degree of prejudice playing a predominant role while arriving at such conclusions**. We do not agree with the labeling of 'violence against women in India as systematic', as noted in Paragraph 8. Such a sweeping remark smacks of a highly prejudiced state of mind. It also fails to recognize that India, the world's largest democracy, values and respects the rule of law as one of its major strengths.[143]

The government then asked for specific evidence for 14 statements made by the SR.[144] Having read several hundred UN periodic reports for this study, this statement was by far the most openly antagonistic, dismissive, and disappointing of all the reports. For the State to so blatantly defend the government's rejection of the magnitude of these issues, after the campaign, goes quite some way to affirming the significant lack of institutionalisation across the country.

In the next CEDAW reporting cycle, similar discourse was exhibited by the State.[145] Despite two follow up letters, the government of India did not submit its follow up report on the recommendations.[146] These interactions, both before and after the campaign, are markedly different from the others analysed in this study. Although Iran at times exhibited hostility, the depth and breadth of India's continued aggression and rejection of the work of the international human rights mechanisms surpassed any other country studied. The State's lack of acceptance of the concerns and issues raised by both treaty bodies and, in particular, the

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[143] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Rashida Manjoo Addendum Mission to India: Comments by the State on the Report of the Special Rapporteur' (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/38/Add.4 paras 2–3 emphasis added.

[144] ibid 12.

[145] "In the absence of any comparative international data, it is rather unclear as to the basis on which the Committee chose to frame the question starting with the phrase "Given the high prevalence of violence against women in the State Party"." Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'List of Issues and Questions in Relation to the Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Reports of India Addendum Replies of India' (2014) UN Doc CEDAW/C/IND/Q/4-5/Add.1 para 9.

[146] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Letter to India' (2016) UN Doc DB/follow-up/India/65; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Letter to India' (2017) UN doc DB/follow-up/India/67.

SR on VAW, is palpable. The express dismissal of the problems indicates a serious lack of political will or even recognition of the continuing epidemic of sexual violence in India. Additionally, the communications from the government was more openly hostile after the campaign, indicating a decline in engagement.

Argentina, on the other hand, showed an improvement in dialogue. The State, at least in words, seemed to recognise the problems with femicide and violence against women, and, to some extent at least, was open to discussing the human rights implications with the international mechanisms. There was evidence of more willingness to change after the campaign than before.

The 1988 CEDAW report noted that while democracy had opened doors for women, much more needed to be done to fully integrate them.[147] However, even in these very early reporting cycles, the committee was already noting that reforms indicated the government's intention to address equality.[148] The 1992 CEDAW state report includes a large section on VAW and the steps the government at national and provincial level had or was taking to prevent and address the issue.[149] Again in the 1996 CEDAW State report there was a large section on work done to combat domestic violence, with a focus on victim treatment.[150] In its summary, CEDAW continued to praise the government for their work on domestic violence.[151]

Concerns first began to emerge with the 1999 CESCR session, where the committee felt that perhaps there were 'inadequate mechanisms' and 'slowness of justice' for women.[152] In its concluding observations, the committee also highlighted the increase in incidents of violence against women, particularly domestic violence. During the 1999-2000 reporting cycle with HRC, there was some back and forth about national and provincial legislation on domestic violence and violence against women. However, the Committee still raised this as an area of concern in its concluding observations.[153] It is also important to note that as far back as 1999,

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[147] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record of the 112th Meeting' (1988) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.112 para 7.
[148] ibid 9, 17.
[149] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Second Periodic Reports of States Parties: Argentina' (1992) UN Doc CEDAW/C/ARG/2 paras 81–86.
[150] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: Argentina' (1996) UN Doc CEDAW/C/ARG/3 18–20.
[151] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record of the 356th Meeting' (1998) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.356 para 34.
[152] Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 'Summary Record of the 35th Meeting' (1999) UN Doc E/C.12/1999/SR.35 para 42.
[153] Human Rights Committee, 'Concluding Observations Argentina' (2000) UN Doc CCPR/CO/70/ARG.

concerns were being raised over the lack of data collection, which became one of the focal points of #niunamenos.

Nearly 10 pages of the 2002 CEDAW state report were dedicated to the work and programmes of the government in reducing domestic violence and violence against women, though mostly covering training, awareness raising, plans for the future, and interagency working. Of note, the government still talked about the need to collect better statistics and the pilot domestic violence register.[154] In the follow up CEDAW session, the committee stated 'the follow-up report was rather disappointing with respect to Argentina's efforts to eliminate violence against women,' raising concerns over proper investigation of complaints and issues with persistently low conviction rates and barriers to accessing justice for victims.[155] These concerns then featured highly in the 2008 UPR cycle for Argentina, in both the compilation report and the stakeholder report.[156]

The 2008 CEDAW State report detailed legislation, the telephone hotline, shelters, specialised police services for women, and the work of the National Women's Council.[157] The focus seemed to be very much on victim support, treatment, and services, but not as much about prevention. Again, while important, a focus on process indicators at the expense of outcome indicators only shows part of the picture. By the time the state replied to the Committee's list of issues (2010), Law No 26.485 had been passed, including the 'observatory' for collecting statistics.[158] Although the State responded with lots of additional information, statistics on femicide were not included.[159] In session, although many issues around VAW were discussed, the committee again asked for information on women murdered and the question was not answered.[160] The issue thus remained an area of concern

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[154] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Fifth Periodic Reports of States Parties: Argentina' (2002) UN Doc CEDAW/C/ARG/5.

[155] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record of the 660th Meeting' (2004) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.660 para 8.

[156] Human Rights Council, 'Compilation Report Argentina' (2008) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/1/ARG/2 para 31; Human Rights Council, 'Summary Report Argentina' (2008) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/1/ARG/3.

[157] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Sixth Periodic Report of States Parties Argentina' (2008) UN Doc CEDAW/C/ARG/6.

[158] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Responses to the List of Issues and Questions with Regard to the Consideration of the Sixth Periodic Report Argentina' (2010) UN Doc CEDAW/C/ARG/Q/6/Add.1 2–3.

[159] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Responses to the List of Issues and Questions with Regard to the Consideration of the Sixth Periodic Report Argentina' (n 158).

[160] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record of the 926th Meeting' (2010) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.926 para 29.

in the concluding observations.[161] Similar dialogue was evidenced in the 2008 HRC reporting cycle.[162]

In its 2015 report to CEDAW, just months before #niunamenos, the government stated:

> Argentina joins the eight Latin American countries that have incorporated the concept of femicide into their legislation. Article 80 of the Argentine Penal Code, on homicide, includes femicide as an aggravating factor, carrying a sentence of life imprisonment.[163]

Very little seemed to have progressed in those ten years, although the language was at the very least open to dialogue, which differs from the Indian discussions.

CEDAW's next list of issues in 2016 (after the campaign), once again, inquire about data collection.[164] Finally, the state was able to provide official, federal statistics.[165] In session, the government said:

> After a string of demonstrations across the country in which Argentinians had, for the third time in two years, expressed their outrage at femicide, the Government had taken note of the strength of public feeling and had for the first time placed the elimination of gender-based violence at the top of the political agenda.[166]

The exchange which followed shows that the campaign, made so visible through the social media attention, did present enough pressure on the government to force action.[167] This

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[161] The Concluding Observations stated: "While welcoming the Comprehensive Law on the Prevention, Punishment and Elimination of Violence against Women in their Interpersonal Relations, Law 26,485 (2009), the Committee is concerned that, a year after its adoption, there has been no implementing legislation or sufficient allocation of financial resources to implement that law…The Committee encourages the State party to strengthen its system of data collection in regard to all forms of violence against women and to include such information under the Committee's follow-up procedure referred to in paragraph 51 of the present concluding observations." Concluding Observations Argentina 2010 paras 23–24.

[162] Human Rights Committee, 'Fourth Periodic Report Argentina' (2008) UN Doc CCPR/C/ARG/4 paras 113–128; Human Rights Committee, 'List of Issues Argentina' (2009) UN Doc CCPR/C/ARG/Q/4 para 5; Human Rights Committee, 'Summary Record of the 2691st Meeting' (2010) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2691 paras 23, 33; Human Rights Committee, 'Summary Record of the 2690th Meeting' (2010) UN Doc CCPR/C/SR.2690 para 57; Human Rights Committee, 'Concluding Observations Argentina' (2010) UN Doc CCPR/C/ARG/CO/4 para 11.

[163] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Seventh Periodic Reports of States Parties Argentina' (2015) UN Doc CEDAW/C/ARG/7 2–3.

[164] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Replies by the Government of Argentina to the List of Issues' (2016) UN Doc CEDAW/C/ARG/Q/7/Add.1 para 9.

[165] ibid 49.

[166] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record of the 1443rd Meeting' (2016) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.1443 para 2.

[167] The Committee responded, "while the information provided about the State party's efforts to combat gender stereotypes through education was very helpful, she would like to hear more about the issue of femicide and the role of the communication media. She had been particularly struck by the extraordinary #NiUnaMenos ("Not

dialogue is also quite positive, certainly compared to India. The Argentinian government at the very least speaks about the issue with importance and priority. However, the evidence presented earlier in this chapter does show that the government's actions have not had any impact on the ground for women or in the courts with convictions. In fact, this lack of impact was raised as an area of concern in the next HRC reporting cycle, even using the word 'deplore' to describe the lack of implementation of existing legislation.[168]

The SR on VAW visited Argentina in 2016 and found that 'machismo culture' was a key reason for persistent gender based violence, and that 'systems to prevent attacks were not fully functional.'[169] She went on to point out that the data, while helpful in understanding the scope of the problem, showed that very little had changed for women in Argentina, particularly the low conviction rates.[170]

Therefore, the impact of the actions of both the Indian and the Argentinian government were very similar. In fact, neither country has seen a meaningful improvement in reducing violence against women, despite legislative changes introduced in response to the campaigns. India's engagement with the international human rights mechanisms was far less positive than that of Argentina. The language displayed in the reports showed India's hostility towards the international mechanisms, while Argentina, at least on the surface, appeared to have a much more engaged and open approach.

Twitter Characteristics

#niunamenos was the largest campaign in the study, with 410, 858 Tweets analysed, 63% of which were non-English. #delhigangrape was the second largest campaign with 144,867 Tweets analysed, with 7% non-English (as expected from an English-speaking country).

One Woman Less") social movement sweeping Argentina and Latin America as a whole. Thousands of women had been protesting against macho behaviour and gender-based violence and in favour of greater equality and autonomy for women. She wondered to what extent the National Women's Council envisaged aligning itself with that movement so that more far-reaching, more continuous campaigns against deep-rooted stereotypes and cultural attitudes might be launched." ibid 63. The government replied with "while the #NiUnaMenos movement had initially emerged from online social networks, it was now an intrinsic part of Argentine culture: all of society was engaged in the fight to end femicide." ibid 66.

[168] Human Rights Committee, 'Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Argentina' (2016) UN Doc CCPR/C/ARG/CO/5 paras 9–10.

[169] 'UN Special Rapporteur Challenges Argentina to Step up Protection of Women in "Machismo Culture"' (21 November 2016) <https://www.ohchr.org/fr/newsevents/pages/displaynews.aspx?newsid=20903&langid=e> accessed 2 January 2019.

[170] UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, on Her Mission to Argentina' (2017) UN Doc A/HRC/35/30/Add.3 paras 10–11.

These two campaigns showed very large peaks on many occasions, indicating a huge public following. The significant public attention of these campaigns, combined in some part with the proximity of elections and related political interest, seemed to push the governments to engage in tactical concessions in the form the legislative change far too quickly, with little to no chance of long-term, meaningful change. This reflects one of the core critiques of the spiral model, the lack of progression, where countries mapped along the spiral have gotten 'stuck' at tactical concessions without moving fully to rule-consistent behaviour. This was manifested in these campaigns, and likely exacerbated by the use of social media.

Persistence (Tweets per day)

These campaigns showed incredibly similar patterns of persistence, highlighting the large and sustained online public attention on the campaigns. Although this led to increased public pressure on the governments, this pressure in some ways had a potentially negative impact, contributing to tactical concessions but losing potency to continue campaigning for institutionalisation and rule consistent behaviour.

These two campaigns showed the highest averages of Tweets per day, with 100 for #delhigangrape and 589 for #niunamenos. The two campaigns also showed the most peak days and peak periods. #delhigangrape had 12 peak days over seven peak periods, with 28 days having over 1,000 Tweets, and #niunamenos had 87 peak days over 21 peak periods, with 101 days with more than 1,000 Tweets. The longest peak period in #delhigangrape was 22 days, 34 in #niunamenos. These numbers are far higher than other campaigns, and again paint a clear picture of the height of the public attention and pressure.

Figure 5.1: Number of Tweets per day, #delhigangrape and #niunamenos

The chart above visualises the persistence of the campaigns over the active period (roughly 600 days). The backlash campaigns did not show nearly the same heights or lengths of peaks, and the status quo campaigns showed huge peaks but only the immediate aftermath of the spark incident. These tactical concessions campaigns show far more persistence, with higher and more consistent peaks, longer peak periods, and peaks further into the life span of the campaigns. However, as we see this persistence may have been *too* much, in that the online pressure which then triggered offline protests may have forced governments into premature action.

Engagement (Retweets, Likes, Replies)

Engagement metrics show less similarities between these two campaigns than measures of persistence. #niunamenos was a campaign very much driven by Retweets and likes. Throughout the life of the campaign, the ratio of Retweets to Tweets was 3.07, meaning that for every Tweet in the campaign there were at least 3 Retweets (on average). Although in some campaigns this might indicate a lack of engagement, in #niunamenos it appears that this very high level of Retweeting resulted in consistent messaging. Particularly around the times of protests and rallies, similar images and notices about the upcoming protests were shared and Retweeted many times. Surprisingly, however, #niunamenos also showed a very high ratio of likes to Tweets, second only to #letwomengotostadium. This tends to indicate a low

level of engagement, i.e. simply clicking "like" to a Tweet involves the least effort and the lowest level of participation. Perhaps this is one of the campaign behaviours that contributed to less positive outcomes, particularly in the areas of institutionalisation and law enforcement. More online dialogue tends to be associated with better outcomes, and a high proportion of likes shows a negative directionality in the correlation to legal outcomes (explained fully in Chapter 7). In other words, more likes lead to less positive outcomes. #delhigangrape showed a more evenly distributed behavioural pattern of engagement, driven by Retweets (and therefore consistent messaging) but not with such stark differences.

Interestingly, this behaviour in #niunamenos differed from peak to non-peak periods. One of the strongest statistical correlations in this study is the reply to Tweet ratio specifically during non-peak periods, showing the importance of ongoing and consistent levels of dialogue and engagement. For #niunamenos, the reply to Tweet ratio during non-peak periods was much more in line with the other campaigns. The campaign with the most positive ratio of replies to Tweets was #delhigangrape. Here we see a point of similarity between the two campaigns, showing a positive and consistent level of conversation during non-peak time periods.

Figure 5.2: log(n) log(s) plot, #delhigangrape

Chart titled "#delhigangrape" with axes log(n) – occurrences (vertical) and log(s) – parameter (horizontal).

Replies: $y = 13593x^{-2.162}$

Retweets: $y = 23571x^{-1.927}$

Likes: $y = 8856.7x^{-2.257}$

Legend: ○ Replies, ● Retweets, · Likes

Figure 5.3: log(n) log(s) plot, #niunamenos

In the log(n) log(s) plots, the differences between the two campaigns are clear. The gradient for Retweets is similar across the two campaigns at -1.927 for #delhigangrape and -1.91 for #niunamenos. However the gradient for likes is far higher in #niunamenos at -1.948 as compared to -2.257. This again underscores the high level of likes in this campaign, both in the number of Tweets that are liked many times and in the high number of Tweets that are liked a small number of times. The steep gradient for replies indicates less engagement in this metric, in other words there are similarly a low number of Tweets which instigate many replies, but equally a fairly low number of Tweets that instigate a low number of replies. #delhigangrape shows a different overall pattern, driven by Retweets but with more reply-engagements than likes.

Users (profiles of the 100 most active users)

#delhigangrape and #niunamenos were again very similar in user profiles. As the two largest campaigns, it is not surprising that these campaigns attracted a larger number of unique users. In total, 46,487 users participated in the #delhigangrape campaign with 185,883 unique users in #niunamenos. Users in #delhigangrape Tweeted on average three times, with users in #niunamenos Tweeting twice. Overall, nearly 40 million Twitter users were reached by the active campaigners in #delhigangrape and 11.2 million in #niunamenos. This reach was considerably more than the other campaigns, again underscoring the online public pressure on the governments to take visible action quickly.

Both campaigns showed a high proportion of domestic users driving the campaign, and of those users most were individuals or news agencies. Out of the 100 most active users in #delhigangrape, domestic individuals, non-domestic individuals, and domestic news agencies drove the campaign. #niunamenos was also driven by domestic individuals and news agencies, but this was followed by domestic organisations. These campaigns therefore showed a fair amount of interest from domestic news agencies. In both campaigns, the domestic news agencies Tweeted enough times to be in this top 100 category. What is also interesting is the reach of the domestic news agencies. In India, the combined number of followers of the domestic news agencies accounted for 94% of the reach of these top 100. In raw numbers, these active domestic news agencies reached over 37 million Twitter users. Again, it is very likely that this reach and public pressure was part of the motivation for the government's reactionary legislative change.

As indicated earlier in this chapter, #niunamenos also attracted the attention of government officials and politicians. Although the numbers are fairly small, it should be noted that this means that, in raw numbers, four out of the most 100 active users in this campaign were involved in politics. That is actually quite meaningful, given that this metric explores the *most active* users out of over 185,000 users. The only other campaign showing a similar level of political involvement was #stopstoning where EU ministers became active in the campaign. Proximity to election is likely the reason there is more political activity in #niunamenos than the other campaigns. As evidenced earlier, targeting politicians and candidates was a specific campaign strategy.

Content analysis

Here the two tactical concessions campaigns differ. Looking at sentiment, #delhigangrape was dominated by positive Tweets with very little polarity. Conversely, #niunamenos was a far more negative campaign, second only to #sendeanlat, showing large variation in sentiment over time. In other words, #niunamenos was a far more volatile campaign as opposed to the generally positive sentiment in #delhigangrape.

Figure 5.4: Positivity and Peaks, #niunamenos

This chart plots the number of Tweets per day against the average positivity score. For #niunamenos, there were clear patterns in the sentiment, indicating a potential relationship to peak events. The sentiment appears to become more positive when peak events occurs, particularly later in the campaign. The baseline is a slightly positive sentiment, ranging around 0.6 (0.5 being neutral). However, around peak times the sentiment becomes more positive, ranging from 0.7 to 0.8. This is particularly evident in the final two peak periods, which relate to two large protests. Tweets became much more positive in the days just before, during, and after the protests. The campaign was clearly buoyed up by the face to face activism of the protests, the excitement of the protest drawing closer, and reporting the large numbers of people attending the protests. This certainly presents an interesting dimension when looked at through the lens of social media literature which finds that online activism is stronger when there are offline ties as well. This clustering pattern was more distinct in #niunamenos than in other campaigns.

Figure 5.5: Positivity and Peaks, #delhigangrape

Conversely, the pattern in #delhigangrape is steadier and consistently positive. The sentiment does not appear to be as affected by peak events as it was in #niunamenos. The average sentiment over the life of this campaign is 0.75. As peaks in #delhigangrape tend to occur around milestones in the court cases it follows that there would be less positive sentiment. On the contrary, peak events in #niunamenos are almost always around the organisation of protests. It also follows that, as seen above, Tweets about protests would be more positive than Tweets about prosecution and sentencing of perpetrators. The campaigns, in terms of sentiment, are almost mirror images of each other.

Normatively, these campaigns showed very intriguing, but somewhat different, findings. #delhigangrape Tweets showed both high levels of consistency with, on average, more consistent organic framing present in each time period than variable, as well as extremely clear messaging. The variable content paints an incredibly clear picture of the campaign's focus and mood in almost all time periods. #niunamenos, on the other hand, had less consistent and less focused framing and messaging, despite the high proportion of retweets around the time of protests. The analysis of the Tweets seem to confirm some of the other evidence which indicated that the #niunamenos campaign lost focus over time.

#delhigangrape showed another notable finding in the presence of a high number of legal words. This campaign manifested and kept a focus on the law, the cases, and the overall involvement of the judicial system far more than any other campaign. This appears to be a connection to the tactical concession outcome for this campaign. The campaign clearly demanded a change in the law, so the government reacted with an immediate change in the law. 45% of the consistent words and 18% of the variable words were of a legal nature. This did not appear to be the case in #niunamenos, where the emerging frames and messages, both consistent and variable, did not have a clear legal focus.

Figure 5.6: Consistently used words, #delhigangrape

Figure 5.7: Consistently used words, #niunamenos

These visualisations of consistent words shows in detail the overall focus of the campaigns. #delhigangrape Tweets consistently used words and ideas relating to justice. Words such as 'victim', 'case', 'government', 'justice', 'accused', 'sentence', and 'law' remained prevalent throughout the lifespan of the campaign. In #niunamenos, the one focus which remained clear was the organisation of marches and protests, with words such as 'march', the prevalence of the dates of the big marches, and words like 'join'.

An unusual finding was a trend where #niunamenos was connected to the Argentinian version of Big Brother. Across several months, Tweets were consistently referencing an incident in the Big Brother house which many felt was exemplary of the epidemic of violence against women and machismo in Argentina. Although Big Brother is a reality television show, this shows an interesting 'pop culture' connection between social media users and reality TV audiences. This kind of pop culture reference was not prevalent in the other campaigns.

Overall, the Tweets in #delhigangrape show clear, focussed messaging.   There was a consistent emphasis on justice, the judicial system, and the law, with many consistent messages of a legal nature and many of the organic content showing reactions to milestones in the cases. #niunamenos had a much more varied approach, with fewer consistent messages sending a coherent message and much less focus in the variable organic content. #niunamenos did lose its campaign focus over time, which may have contributed to the tactical concessions outcome with less long term implementation. It is perhaps surprising then that the clear legal focus of #delhigangrape did not lead to more positive long-term outcomes. Even though #delhigangrape was generally persistent, there was a tail-off of Tweets over the life of the campaign. Perhaps had the campaign maintained a higher level of participation and visibility over a longer period of time, the focussed nature of the Tweets themselves could have had a greater impact on implementation of legal changes. The lack of visibility in the later months of the campaign may have rendered the consistent messaging less impactful.

These campaigns both showed a good presence of international norms, with 84% of international norms analysed present in #delhigangrape and 87% in #niunamenos. #niunamenos also showed the highest percentage of consistent and organic norms which are also international norms at 10%. Inclusion of international norms is linked to campaign success.

Conclusion

These two campaigns exemplified the lack of progression critique of the spiral model, with both countries engaging in tactical concessions but with little to no movement towards rule-consistent behaviour. It appears that the large public attention, driven by domestic users, in close proximity to potential regime change, could run the risk of stalling the process. Both campaigns showed extremely positive persistence parameters and very similar users driving the campaigns. Differences were seen in the engagement metrics and content analysis, which may have impacted in some of the differences in the components of legal change.

Chapter 6 : Possible Success: #women2drive

Introduction

One campaign showed potentially positive results and can, tentatively, be categorised as a possible success. It is still a tentative finding as the legislative change is yet to be fully implemented. It is also not complete change as there are still lingering (and significant) problems around institutionalisation and the role of the courts. However, the campaign may provide critical insight into what an 'ideal' hashtag campaign might look like.

#women2drive overview

For decades, Saudi Arabia has enforced a ban on women driving. In modern times, Saudi was the only country to enforce such a ban. Beginning in 1990, women activists began to protest the ban by driving themselves.[1] The first major driving protest resulted in the arrest of 47 women.[2] In 2011, a prominent Saudi activist Manal al-Sharif filmed herself driving and used social media (YouTube) to share, leading to her arrest and detention. The hashtag campaign went 'viral'. Driving protests first took place annually 17th June and then on 26th October, with the 2013 October protest seeing the largest turn out.[3] Some activists point out that it was in the middle of the Arab spring, giving a unique opportunity to reignite the protest movement.[4] In September 2017, the new King of Saudi announced that the ban would be lifted, starting in June 2018.

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[1] 'Saudi Women Rejoice at End of Driving Ban' *BBC News* (27 September 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-41411799> accessed 12 February 2018; Human Rights Watch, 'Saudi Arabia: As Women's Driving Ban Ends, Provide Parity' (27 September 2017) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/27/saudi-arabia-womens-driving-ban-ends-provide-parity> accessed 12 February 2018; Daily Mail, 'Saudi Women Protest Driving Ban in 1990' <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-4924266/Saudi-women-protest-driving-ban-1990.html> accessed 14 February 2018.

[2] Center for Security Policy, 'Saudi Women Gain the Right to Drive' <https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2017/10/02/saudi-women-gain-the-right-to-drive/> accessed 11 February 2018.

[3] Human Rights Watch, 'Saudi Arabia: As Women's Driving Ban Ends, Provide Parity' (n 1); 'Dozens of Saudi Arabian Women Drive Cars on Day of Protest against Ban' *The Guardian* (October 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/26/saudi-arabia-woman-driving-car-ban> accessed 13 February 2018.

[4] 'How I Got There: Manal al-Sharif' *Huffington Post* <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/lan-anh-vu/how-i-got-there-manal-als_b_12650652.html> accessed 14 February 2018; Jason Burke, 'Saudi Arabia Women Test Driving Ban' *The Guardian* (17 June 2011) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/17/saudi-arabia-women-drivers-protest> accessed 14 February 2018; Neil MacFarquhar, 'Saudis Arrest Woman Leading Right-to-Drive Campaign' *The New York Times* (23 May 2011) <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/world/middleeast/24saudi.html> accessed 15 February 2018.

Many activists are said to have 'met' over Twitter through the hashtag campaign.[5] Nearly all media articles about #women2drive focus on Tweets.[6] '[Twitter] has proved to be a potent tool in many respects and is a constant reminder to the Government of the importance of public engagement, especially in relation to social and economic policies'[7] and 'social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook have been key for the women drivers, providing support networks and, crucially, publicity outside the kingdom.'[8]

The domestic activists driving this campaign publicly noted the importance of foreign pressure, in particular from the US.[9] Many reports on the hashtag campaign focus on the role of US foreign policy.[10] Notably, at one point, Hillary Clinton stated that the US was not actively involved in the campaign given Saudi's 'suspicion of foreign influence, especially Western influence', but she did note that the US engaged in 'quiet diplomacy' on the issue.[11] Manal al-Sharif claims that it was pressure from Hillary Clinton and international NGOs, fuelled by social media, which led to her release.[12] Leaked cables indicate that the US did put some pressure on Saudi officials to lift the ban.[13] Of note, the lifting of the ban was

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[5] 'Saudia Arabian Women Launch Campaign For Right To Drive -- But Will It Make A Difference?' *HuffPost UK* (17 June 2011) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/17/saudi-arabia-women-drive_n_878884.html> accessed 14 February 2018; 'Saudi Authorities Detain Six Women for Driving' (*ArabianBusiness.com*) <http://www.arabianbusiness.com/saudi-authorities-detain-six-women-for-driving-404597.html> accessed 14 February 2018.

[6] See, e.g. Robert Mackey, 'Saudi Women Drive, Despite Ban, and Find Some Support on the Kingdom's Roads' *The New York Times* (10 October 2013) <//thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/10/saudi-women-drive-despite-ban-and-find-some-support-on-the-kingdoms-roads/> accessed 14 February 2018; 'Social Media Fuels #Women2Drive Campaign' (29 June 2011) <https://blogs.position2.com/social-media-fuels-women2drive-campaign> accessed 14 February 2018.

[7] 'End of Mission Statement Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Professor Philip Alston on His Visit to Saudi Arabia' <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21094> accessed 15 February 2018.

[8] Burke (n 4).

[9] 'What Overturning the Ban on Female Drivers Means for Saudi Arabia and the World' <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-overturning-the-ban-on-female-drivers-means-for-saudi-arabia-and-the-world> accessed 13 February 2018.

[10] 'Hillary Clinton Backs Saudi Women Defying Driving Ban | GulfNews.Com' <http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/hillary-clinton-backs-saudi-women-defying-driving-ban-1.1242231> accessed 13 February 2018.

[11] 'Clinton Adds Her Voice in Support of Saudi Women' *The New York Times* <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/world/middleeast/22clinton.html> accessed 13 February 2018.

[12] 'How I Got There: Manal al-Sharif' (n 4); 'Saudi Women Defy Ban to Take Driver's Seat' *Al Jazeera* <http://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2011/06/201161713200141723.html> accessed 14 February 2018; 'The Woman Who Defied Saudi's Driving Ban and Put It on YouTube' *CNN* <https://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/10/world/meast/sharif-saudi-women-drive/index.html> accessed 14 February 2018; 'Freedom House Shows Solidarity with Saudi #Women2Drive Campaign' (25 October 2013) <https://freedomhouse.org/article/freedom-house-shows-solidarity-saudi-women2drive-campaign> accessed 15 February 2018.

[13] David Leigh, 'US Put Pressure on Saudi Arabia to Let Women Drive, Leaked Cables Reveal' *The Guardian* (27 May 2011) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/27/us-pressurised-saudis-let-women-drive> accessed 14 February 2018; 'Is This the Year Saudi Women Drive?' (Saudi Arabia Riyadh 2009) Wikileaks

announced via state television in Saudi as well as a media event in Washington, D.C.[14] This clearly indicates a desire to speak to and engage with Western influences.[15]

<u>Context</u>

While the general measures of context in this study show that Saudi is neither the best nor the worst place for women and activism, some context which is not captured in the basic metrics is important to this campaign. As introduced above, #women2drive particularly and specifically used Twitter to reach and include Westerners as a strategic pressure point. A similar strategy was adopted around the 1990 protests: 'the drivers had intentionally looked to attract attention from the high number of foreign journalists who were in the kingdom covering the buildup to the first Gulf War.'[16] It seems that the first attempt to campaign with such a strategy did not work. Social media, however, opened a new door. This campaign was therefore more strategically driven from the outset.

Many think that the legal changes resulting from this campaign are also part of a wider programme of modernisation by the new, young, modern King who came to power in 2015 and, more importantly, the Crown Prince who came into power in 2017 just months before the ban was lifted.[17] That the campaign spanned regime change may indeed be important to its success. Given a whole range of changes that could have been made, activists agree that the social media attention this particular campaign garnered was a primary reason the Crown Prince chose to make *this* reform. Saudi women activists celebrated the move and largely attributed the lifting of the ban to the protest efforts over the years and the hashtag campaign.[18]

Public Library of US Diplomacy 09RIYADH357_a
<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RIYADH357_a.html>.

[14] 'Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive' *The New York Times*
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-women-drive.html> accessed 11 February 2018.

[15] 'What Overturning the Ban on Female Drivers Means for Saudi Arabia and the World' (n 9).

[16] ibid.

[17] 'Saudi Women Can Drive at Last but Some Say Price Is Silence' <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-saudi-women-driving-politics/saudi-women-can-drive-at-last-but-some-say-price-is-silence-idUKKCN1C71TJ> accessed 12 February 2018; 'Opinion: Give Saudi Women the Right to Drive'
<https://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/24/opinion/begum-saudi-women-driving/index.html> accessed 14 February 2018.

[18] Chris Bell and Lina Shaikhouni, 'Saudi Women Driving Reform: "We Did It"' *BBC News* (27 September 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-41412237> accessed 12 February 2018.

Legal Outcomes

This campaign showed the most positive successes, not just in the change in legislation, as this was also seen in the tactical concessions campaigns, but also in institutionalisation and dialogue with UN human rights mechanisms. #women2drive showed poor outcomes in law enforcement, particularly as women activists continue to be arrested, detained, and charged for unrelated activities. Additionally, guardianship laws remain in place which call into question the true status of women in the country.

Legislative Change

Since 1957, women have been legally banned from driving, unable to obtain a licence and risking arrest for being caught driving. Women relied on male guardians or chauffeurs for transportation.[19] Although it is technically a royal decree and more recently a fatwa (not a law per se), several administrative laws brought it into force, such as traffic laws which did not allow the issuing of licenses to women.[20] The original rationale behind the introduction of the ban was of a religious, cultural, and social nature. One piece of evidence stated that 'the grand mufti claimed that allowing women to drive would result in public mixing of women, put women into dangerous situations because they could be alone in cars, and therefore result in social chaos.'[21] Activists also refer to it as a 'societal norm'.[22] Some commentators are of the view that the ban came less from the royal family and more as a means to appease hard line clerics over the years.[23] Again, this is a story that was seen across several of the legal issues in this study.

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[19] Center for Security Policy (n 2).

[20] 'Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive' (n 14); 'Saudi Arabia to Allow Women to Drive in Major Milestone for Country' <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/26/saudi-arabia-allow-women-drive/> accessed 11 February 2018.

[21] 'Saudi Arabian Women Banned from Driving Because of Fatwa against Gender "Mixing"' *The Washington Post* <https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/fatwa-against-gender-mixing-prevents-saudi-women-from-driving-according-to-wikileaks-cable/2011/06/06/AGVVTDKH_blog.html?utm_term=.b836f08b6f24> accessed 12 February 2018.

[22] 'How I Got There: Manal al-Sharif' (n 4).

[23] Jane Kinninmont, 'End of Saudi Women Driving Ban Reflects Deep Changes in Society' *BBC News* (27 September 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-41412022> accessed 11 February 2018; 'Saudi Women Rejoice at End of Driving Ban' (n 1); 'Dozens of Saudi Arabian Women Drive Cars on Day of Protest against Ban' (n 3); Burke (n 4).

Protests against the ban started in 1990.[24] After the 1990 protest, rather than lifting or easing the ban, the religious conservatives expressed backlash and in fact strengthened the ban with a religious fatwa. In response, the government then issued a decree to solidify the ban.[25]

In 2008, a similar protest effort emerged from women but with much less following and much less success. The activists had been encouraged by what they thought was a softening of the government.[26] In November 2007, the foreign minister told the press that he thought women should be allowed to drive and that the ban was a social, not political, issue for 'the people to decide.'[27] Yet no progress was made. In 2010, reports again emerged that the ban might be lifted.[28] The #women2drive hashtag rose to international prominence in 2011.

Discussions around lifting the ban started in November 2014, after a full three years of online campaigning driving offline activities. Many felt that the conversation started because of the 'feminist cyber-activism.'[29] At the time, the contemplation over lifting the ban was limited to women over the age of 30, only during the day, and with a male guardian. [30] Some local news outlets even outright denied that discussions were taking place.[31]

Interestingly, just a year earlier, Prince Saud told local media outlets that the Saudi community 'is not convinced about women driving' and 'women driving is not a religious issue as much as it is an issue that relates to the community itself that either accepts it or refuses it.'[32] This very much reflects the discourse from before the campaign. This indicates that, if the government truly thought of this as a social issue for the people to decide, then the social media campaign in particular would be well positioned to see success.

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[24] 'Saudi Women Rejoice at End of Driving Ban' (n 1); Human Rights Watch, 'Saudi Arabia: As Women's Driving Ban Ends, Provide Parity' (n 1); Daily Mail (n 1).
[25] 'Opinion: Give Saudi Women the Right to Drive' (n 17).
[26] Faiza Saleh Ambah, 'Saudi Women See a Brighter Road on Rights' *Washington Post* (31 January 2008) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/AR2008013003805.html> accessed 14 February 2018.
[27] ibid.
[28] Fahad Faruqui, 'Saudi Women Get in the Driver's Seat' *The Guardian* <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/may/05/saudi-women-drivers-seat> accessed 14 February 2018.
[29] 'Cyberactivism: the case of the Women2Drive movement in Saudi Arabia' <http://www.fcome.org/portfolio-view/cyberactivism-the-case-of-the-women2drive-movement-in-saudi-arabia/> accessed 13 February 2018.
[30] 'Saudi Activists Call for the Release of Women Detained for Driving' *The New York Times* <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/09/world/middleeast/saudi-activists-call-for-the-release-of-women-detained-for-driving.html> accessed 14 February 2018.
[31] ibid.
[32] 'Saudi Arabia Is "not Ready" for Women Drivers, Says Deputy Crown Prince' *The Independent* <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-is-not-ready-for-women-drivers-says-deputy-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-a7004611.html> accessed 15 February 2018.

In September 2017, the new King announced that the ban would be lifted and women could apply for driving licenses from June 2018.[33] Although some sceptics see it as a concession used by the Saudi government to divert attention away from other human rights abuses, [34] it is more generally felt that the strength of the campaign likely led to the decision to lift the ban as part of the larger programme of modernisation and moving away from the stronghold of the hard line conservative clerics.[35] In other words, had it not been for #women2drive and the social media pressure and attention, perhaps other issues would have benefitted from the programme of modernisation.[36] Saudi women activists celebrated the move and largely attributed the lifting of the ban to the protest efforts over the years and the hashtag campaign.[37] 'Brave women's driving activists were the tip of the iceberg.'[38] One female activist called it a 'great victory', while another said things would 'never be the same again'.[39]

Institutionalisation

Discourse from those in power in Saudi Arabia had indicated for many years a lack of institutionalisation of women's rights norms, with religious clerics being particularly outspoken and derogatory towards women.[40] However, in more recent years the split between hard-line conservatives and those looking to move towards a more liberal way of life became apparent. In 2005, in an interview with American reporter Barbara Walters, King Abdullah then said 'I believe strongly in the rights of women, my mother is a woman, my

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[33] Center for Security Policy (n 2); 'Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive' (n 14); 'Saudi Arabia to Allow Women to Drive' *Al Jazeera* <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/saudi-arabia-women-drive-170926190857109.html> accessed 11 February 2018; Human Rights Watch, 'Saudi Arabia: As Women's Driving Ban Ends, Provide Parity' (n 1).

[34] Human Rights Watch, 'Saudi Arabia: As Women's Driving Ban Ends, Provide Parity' (n 1); 'What Overturning the Ban on Female Drivers Means for Saudi Arabia and the World' (n 9); Human Rights Watch, 'Human Rights Abuses Stemming from Male Guardianship and Sex Segregation in Saudi Arabia' (2008) <https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/04/19/perpetual-minors/human-rights-abuses-stemming-male-guardianship-and-sex> accessed 15 February 2018; Human Rights Watch, 'Saudi Arabia: Repression Overshadows Women's Reforms' (2018) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/saudi-arabia-repression-overshadows-womens-reforms> accessed 15 February 2018; 'What Overturning the Ban on Female Drivers Means for Saudi Arabia and the World' (n 9); '"Battle of the Sexes": Saudi Men React to Women Driving' (*Dhaka Tribune*, 4 October 2017) <http://www.dhakatribune.com/world/middle-east/2017/10/04/saudi-men-react-women-driving/> accessed 13 February 2018.

[35] Kinninmont (n 23); 'Saudi Arabia to Allow Women to Drive' (n 33); 'Saudi Arabia's Driving Ban and the Pioneering Women Who Got It Lifted' *The Independent* <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-driving-ban-women-protestors-who-lifted-fought-against-sexist-law-a7993306.html> accessed 12 February 2018.

[36] Kinninmont (n 23).

[37] Shaikhouni (n 18).

[38] Kinninmont (n 23).

[39] 'Saudi Women Rejoice at End of Driving Ban' (n 1).

[40] 'Saudi Arabia's Driving Ban and the Pioneering Women Who Got It Lifted' (n 35).

sister is a woman, my daughter is a woman, my wife is a woman. I believe the day will come when women drive.'[41] Four years later in 2009, Saudi royal Prince Waleed made statements that seemed to indicate the ban would be overturned. However, shortly thereafter when King Abdullah appointed a woman to a governmental position of power and opened a mixed sex university, there was significant backlash. [42] Quotes from clerics included denouncing 'the King's teaching of deviant ideas such as evolution,' 'mixing with women ... [would] open the field for them to undertake jobs for which they were not created,' and that women had 'abandoned their basic duties such as housekeeping, bringing up children ... and replaced this by beautifying themselves and wantonness.' [43] This tension continued into and throughout the campaign, and is still palpable now that the ban has been lifted. Yet it appears that, while before the campaign the religious conservatives had the dominant discourse, now the pendulum has swung and the more liberal, arguably Western, voices have more of a say, perhaps influenced by the voice of society on social media.

Before the October 26 driving protest in 2013, the government made it clear that protests would not be tolerated.[44] Specifically referring to the protests organised over social networks, the government said that demonstrations of such nature were legally prohibited in the Kingdom. [45] Amnesty International responded and called upon the government to allow the public protests.[46] After the 2013 Oct 26th driving protest, the #women2drive website was shut down in Saudi Arabia, but an online petition fuelled by the hashtag still managed to collect somewhere between 14,000 and 16,000 signatures.[47]

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[41] 'One Day Women Will Drive, Saudi King Says' *ABC News* (14 October 2005) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2005-10-14/one-day-women-will-drive-saudi-king-says/2124474> accessed 14 February 2018; See also 'Opinion: Give Saudi Women the Right to Drive' (n 17).

[42] 'Saudi Arabian Women Banned from Driving Because of Fatwa against Gender "Mixing"' (n 21).

[43] ibid.

[44] 'Saudi Arabia Issues Warning against Women's Driving Campaign' *Foreign Policy* <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/25/saudi-arabia-issues-warning-against-womens-driving-campaign/> accessed 14 February 2018; 'Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – Statement on Female Driving Protest | Genius' <https://genius.com/Kingdom-of-saudi-arabia-statement-on-female-driving-protest-annotated> accessed 15 February 2018; Mohammed Jamjoor, 'Saudi Arabia Issues Warning to Women Drivers, Protesters' *CNN* <https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/24/world/meast/saudi-arabia-women-drivers/index.html> accessed 15 February 2018.

[45] 'Saudi Government Says Laws Will Be Enforced on "female Driving" Day' *CNN* <https://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/23/world/meast/saudi-arabia-women-drivers/index.html> accessed 12 February 2018.

[46] 'Saudi Arabia Must Not Thwart Campaign for Women Drivers' <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/10/saudi-arabia-must-not-thwart-campaign-women-drivers/> accessed 15 February 2018.

[47] Jasmine Bager, 'Forbidden to Drive: A Saudi Woman On Life Inside the Kingdom' *Time* <http://ideas.time.com/2013/10/25/forbidden-to-drive-a-saudi-woman-on-life-inside-the-kingdom/> accessed 14 February 2018.

After a loosening on women's ability to sit on the Shura Council (the country's legislative assembly), three women on the council just before the Oct 2013 driving protest publicly stated that women should be allowed to drive.[48] The Council, however, rejected this, claiming that since only three members of the Shura brought the proposal it was considered an individual recommendation which is not part of the Council's remit. The same year, after another major driving protest, clerics organised a counter-protest outside the royal palace.[49] 150 clerics gathered to protest *against* women driving.[50] 'We came here for many issues, most importantly to combat Westernization and particularly women,' claimed one cleric, notably using YouTube to convey his message.[51] Another cleric accused the campaign of being driven by the US as the protest was advertised with a Western date and not an Islamic one.[52] One cleric went so far as to state that driving would harm women's ovaries and would lead to birth defects.[53] As late as 2017, a cleric was quoted as saying that women have only 'half the brains of men,' adding that the figure drops to one quarter 'when they go to market,' claiming that allowing them to drive would therefore be unsafe.[54] However, this time the cleric was suspended from preaching and all religious activity after his comments.[55] Unsurprisingly, Twitter users reacted to his statement, using an Arabic hashtag 'Al-Hijri-women-quarter-brain.' [56]

The royal family and the government began showing signs of change as the campaign progressed. In 2016, Prince Alwaleed bin Talal released a lengthy statement titled 'it is high

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[48] '3 Saudi Shura Council Women Urge Female Drive Ban Lifted - Daily Nation' <https://www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/women/3-Saudi-Shura-Council-women-urge-female-drive-ban-lifted/1950830-2024144-12mi5dsz/index.html> accessed 14 February 2018.
[49] 'Saudi Arabia to Allow Women to Drive in Major Milestone for Country' (n 20).
[50] 'Saudi Clerics Protest Outside King's Palace, Blame US for Women Driving' *Mehr News Agency* <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/56993/Saudi-clerics-protest-outside-king-s-palace-blame-US-for-women> accessed 15 February 2018.
[51] Ahmed, 'Saudi Clerics Protest Women Driving at the Royal Court' <https://riyadhbureau.wordpress.com/tag/royal-court/> accessed 14 February 2018.
[52] 'Saudi Clerics Protest Outside King's Palace, Blame US for Women Driving' (n 50).
[53] 'Driving Damages Women's Ovaries: Saudi Cleric' (*Al Akhbar English*) <http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/driving-damages-womens-ovaries-saudi-cleric> accessed 13 February 2018; 'Cleric Says Driving Risk to Ovaries' *BBC News* (29 September 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24323934> accessed 14 February 2018.
[54] Manal Al-Sharif, 'Opinion | I Can't Wait to Drive in Saudi Arabia Again' *The New York Times* (27 September 2017) <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/opinion/saudi-arabia-women-driving-.html> accessed 14 February 2018.
[55] Nadia Khomami, 'Saudi Cleric Banned for Saying Women's Brains "a Quarter the Size" of Men's' *The Guardian* (23 September 2017) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/23/saudi-cleric-saad-al-hijri-banned-woman-driving-cars-quarter-brain> accessed 15 February 2018.
[56] ibid.

time that Saudi women started driving their cars.'[57] He likened the ban to restrictions on access to education or employment, both of which are rights which Saudi women already had. He detailed several factors, including financial, economic, social, religious, and political.[58] Bin Talal's wife, Princess Ameerah Al-Taweel, was also outspoken about women's rights, stating in a US interview that she saw nothing in religion that forbid women from driving.[59] Both the Council of Senior Scholars (the top clerical body) and the head of the morality police eventually agreed that allowing women to drive could be done in accordance with Sharia Law and that driving per se was not a religious violation.[60]

The delay between announcing the lifting of the ban and the implementation was seen to be to make it easier to adjust for the clerics.[61] This delay is, however, a major difference between the tactical concessions campaigns and this potential success campaign, as it indicates the regime's intention to properly implement the change over time, rather than a reactionary and hasty legislative move to quell waves of public outrage.

Unfortunately, the move towards institutionalisation is far from complete. Some rumours circulated after the ban was lifted claiming that the government had contacted activists telling them to keep silent, to downplay the role of activism in the lifting of the ban.[62] This was denied by the government.[63] Additionally, what many see as the biggest barrier to institutionalisation of women's rights is the guardianship system, which still remains.[64] The government has pledged to take special measures to ensure that women will be free to take driving lessons, take driving tests, and receive their license, but it will be quite some time before true implementation can be measured.[65]

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[57] 'It's High Time That Saudi Woman Started Driving Their Cars' <http://www.alwaleed.com.sa/news-and-media/news/driving/> accessed 15 February 2018.

[58] ibid.

[59] 'Saudi Princess Lobbies For Women's Right To Drive' (*NPR.org*) <https://www.npr.org/2011/07/14/137840538/saudi-princess-lobbies-for-womens-right-to-drive> accessed 15 February 2018.

[60] 'Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive' (n 14); 'Saudi Arabia to Allow Women to Drive' (n 33); See also '"Battle of the Sexes": Saudi Men React to Women Driving' (n 34); Human Rights Watch, 'Saudi Arabia: As Women's Driving Ban Ends, Provide Parity' (n 1); 'Saudi Women Driving Ban Not Part of Sharia-Morality Police Chief' *Reuters* (19 September 2013) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-women-driving/saudi-women-driving-ban-not-part-of-sharia-morality-police-chief-idUSBRE98I0LJ20130919>.

[61] Kinninmont (n 23).

[62] 'Saudi Arabia's Driving Ban and the Pioneering Women Who Got It Lifted' (n 35); See also 'Saudi Women Can Drive at Last but Some Say Price Is Silence' (n 17); 'Saudi Arabia's Driving Ban and the Pioneering Women Who Got It Lifted' (n 35).

[63] 'Saudi Women Can Drive at Last but Some Say Price Is Silence' (n 17).

[64] Kinninmont (n 23); See also '"Battle of the Sexes": Saudi Men React to Women Driving' (n 34); Human Rights Watch, 'Human Rights Abuses Stemming from Male Guardianship and Sex Segregation in Saudi Arabia' (n 34).

[65] '"Battle of the Sexes": Saudi Men React to Women Driving' (n 34).

Law Enforcement

As soon as women began the driving protests many years ago, there were arrests, detentions, and confiscation of passports.[66] 47 women were arrested at the 1990 driving protest. They were not released from custody until their male guardians signed statements confirming that the women would not drive again.[67] This practice continued for years throughout the country. In 2010, American female drivers were hired to drive the Saudi royal family on a visit in Minnesota in the US. The women were fired from that job for being female.[68] Notably, the drivers brought a case of discrimination in the US, and won, but damages from the Saudis have not emerged.[69]

Arrests carried on once the hashtag campaign took off. [70] The first major protest drive from the hashtag campaign took place in 2011, leading to the documenting of 70 women who once again had to sign statements that they would not drive again.[71] Most famously, after Manal al-Sharif filmed herself driving and posted it on YouTube, she was arrested and detained for more than a week.[72] According to Amnesty International, she was only released when she pledged to not participate in any more driving protests. The official headline after the arrest was to underscore that driving was illegal for women.[73] Some women when arrested for driving as part of the protests were asked not only sign a statement that they would not drive again, but also that they would not film themselves or any other women driving.[74] Prominent activist Wajiha Howeidar stated in response:

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[66] Center for Security Policy (n 2); 'Saudi Arabia's Driving Ban and the Pioneering Women Who Got It Lifted' (n 35).

[67] Human Rights Watch, 'Saudi Arabia: As Women's Driving Ban Ends, Provide Parity' (n 1); See also 'Saudi Arabia's Driving Ban and the Pioneering Women Who Got It Lifted' (n 35).

[68] 'Driving Out Oppression' (*Gender Justice*) <http://www.genderjustice.us/driving-out-oppression/> accessed 13 February 2018.

[69] ibid.

[70] 'Saudi Religious Police Clamp Down on Rural Women Drivers' *Huffington Post* <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/sabria-jawhar/saudi-religious-police-cl_b_320071.html> accessed 14 February 2018; 'Five Saudi Women Drivers Arrested, Says Activist' *The Guardian* (29 June 2011) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/29/saudi-women-drivers-arrested-jiddah> accessed 14 February 2018.

[71] 'Saudi Arabia to Allow Women to Drive in Major Milestone for Country' (n 20); Center for Security Policy (n 2); 'Opinion: Give Saudi Women the Right to Drive' (n 17).

[72] 'A Saudi Activist, in Her Own Words' (*The Lede - The New York Times*) <https://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/31/a-saudi-activist-in-her-own-words/> accessed 13 February 2018.

[73] 'Saudia Arabian Women Launch Campaign For Right To Drive -- But Will It Make A Difference?' (n 5).

[74] Mohammed Jamjoor, 'Saudi Blogger Detained, but Hopeful about Push to Let Women Drive' *CNN* <https://www.cnn.com/2013/10/11/world/meast/saudi-arabia-women-drivers/index.html> accessed 14 February 2018.

> Usually they just make you sign a paper that you will not do it again and let you
> go. They don't want anybody to think that they can get away with something like
> that. It is a clear message that you cannot organize anything on Facebook.[75]

Then in September 2011, between the June 17 and Oct 26 driving protests, a woman was
sentenced to ten lashes, the first time this kind of legal punishment was used against women
for driving.[76] Many found the sentence surprising, given that it came just one day after the
announcement that women would have the right to vote and run in the next general election.[77]
At the time, activists saw the sentencing as evidence of the power of the hard line
conservatives over the courts and the police in Saudi.[78] Human Rights Watch officials stated
that the courts were being used 'to send a message that they won't tolerate any attempt to
alleviate the dismal status of women's rights in the kingdom.'[79] Her sentence was eventually
overturned by the King.[80]

In 2014, an activist was arrested attempting to drive into Saudi from UAE.[81] She used
Twitter to keep followers updated as she attempted to cross.[82] She was arrested and detained
for 73 days, alongside another activist who came to help her.[83] Their initial detention was
then extended by 25 days.[84] This was the longest detention for driving in recent years.[85] She
was released only when she signed a statement that she would never speak out 'in videos'
again; she claims she negotiated this specific wording so that she could continue to use

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[75] MacFarquhar (n 4).

[76] 'Saudi Woman to Get 10 Lashes for Driving a Car' *CBS News* <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/saudi-woman-to-get-10-lashes-for-driving-a-car/> accessed 14 February 2018; See also 'Saudi Woman "spared Lashing" in Driving Case' *Al Jazeera* <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/09/201192820341050915.html> accessed 15 February 2018.

[77] 'Saudi Woman "spared Lashing" in Driving Case' (n 76).

[78] 'Saudi Woman to Get 10 Lashes for Driving a Car' (n 76).

[79] Human Rights Watch, 'Saudi Arabia: Activists Convicted for Answering Call for Help' (*Human Rights Watch*, 17 June 2013) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/17/saudi-arabia-activists-convicted-answering-call-help> accessed 14 February 2018.

[80] 'Saudi Woman's Lashing "Revoked"' *BBC News* (29 September 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15102190> accessed 14 February 2018.

[81] 'Saudi Woman "arrested" for Driving' *Al Jazeera* <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/12/saudi-woman-arrested-driving-2014121165739368209.html> accessed 14 February 2018.

[82] 'Saudi Woman Driving Blog "Arrest"' *BBC News* (3 December 2014) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-trending-30316837> accessed 13 February 2018.

[83] 'Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive' (n 14); 'Saudi Woman Driving Blog "Arrest"' (n 82).

[84] 'Saudi Arabia Extends Detention of Women Driving Activists: Amnesty' (*The Express Tribune*, 9 December 2014) <https://tribune.com.pk/story/804221/saudi-arabia-extends-detention-of-women-driving-activists-amnesty/> accessed 14 February 2018.

[85] ibid.

Twitter to campaign for women's rights in Saudi.[86] Notably, she also announced her release on Twitter.[87]

Since the lifting of the ban, but before it came into effect, there has been one report of a woman being 'penalised', though not arrested, for driving.[88] It appears that while the courts were instrumental in attempting to quash the campaign, both before and immediately after the hashtag went viral, in recent years there has been much improvement. There were no major incidents or reports of major arrests or detentions from 2014 – 2017.

UN Dialogue

Saudi Arabia is party to several international treaties, though notably not CCPR or CESCR, ratifying CEDAW in 2000. As expected, Saudi submitted a reservation of the primacy of Islamic law. The first CEDAW report was submitted in 2007, where the State claimed that 'generally, there is no discrimination against women in the laws of the Kingdom.'[89] The report is filled with references to and framing of rights in Islam. The word Islam or Islamic is used 46 times in the report. In response, the Committee specifically addressed the lack of discussion of the driving ban.[90] The driving ban was brought up in session as well.[91] The government responded:

> In the early days of Islam, women had ridden donkeys and camels; the question
> of their right to drive cars was not covered by sharia or secular law, but rather by
> traditional mentalities that influenced decision makers…When those attitudes
> changed…women would be able to drive…the Government needed to study the

[86] Roula Khalaf, 'Loujain Alhathloul on How Saudi Women Won the Right to Drive' (*Financial Times*, 7 December 2017) <https://www.ft.com/content/b4186c36-da18-11e7-a039-c64b1c09b482> accessed 14 February 2018.

[87] Robert Mackey, 'Saudi Women Free After 73 Days in Jail for Driving' *The New York Times* (12 February 2015) <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/world/middleeast/saudi-women-free-after-73-days-in-jail-for-driving.html> accessed 14 February 2018.

[88] 'Saudi Woman Penalised for Driving Car before Ban Is Lifted' *The Guardian* <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/09/saudi-arabia-woman-penalised-driving-car-before-ban-lifted> accessed 15 February 2018.

[89] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Combined Initial and Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Saudi Arabia' (2007) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SAU/2.

[90] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'List of Issues Saudi Arabia' (2007) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SAU/Q/2 para 7.

[91] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Summary Record of the 816th Meeting' (2008) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SR.816 para 70.

> issue and to deal with it quietly so that the people would not think that the
>
> nation's sovereignty was being threatened.[92]

The Committee included the issue in concluding observations.[93] This discourse seems to indicate a willingness to change, but in a way that could be properly institutionalised over time. This reads as a positive indication of the government's approach to the issue, especially when compared to other State reports from countries such as Iran and India.

The 2008 UPR Working Group report called attention specifically to the ban on driving on four occasions.[94] Saudi Arabia accepted all recommendations relating to women, including the driving ban, however with a caveat that in accordance with Sharia law and respect for religious doctrine. On several occasions, the State noted that any issues with women's inequality was not a legal matter for the State to decide, but rather a societal matter.[95] This is not necessarily untrue, and in some ways could be a more progressive approach to change in sensitive areas such as this. It is certainly an improvement over defensiveness or simply thinking that changing the law itself will solve all of the problems.

After the campaign, there was some movement in the dialogue with the UN, particularly around the time the announcement was made that the ban would be lifted. Although again not a complete shift, positive change can be detected. However, it did take time. After the election of Saudi to the Human Rights Council in 2013, there was much controversy. In 2015, Amnesty International submitted a statement to the Human Rights Council on Saudi's participation as a member.[96] In a second report they specifically referred to the campaign.[97]

Shifts, however, were reported by Special Rapporteur Philip Alston after his 2017 mission to Saudi. After pointing out areas of progress and problems, he went on to state: 'As in almost every country today, societal change is driven by both external and internal factors, and Saudi

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[92] ibid 78.

[93] Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 'Concluding Comments Saudi Arabia' (2008) UN Doc CEDAW/C/SAU/CO/2 para 15.

[94] Human Rights Council, 'Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review Saudi Arabia' (2009) UN Doc A/HRC/11/23.

[95] ibid; Human Rights Council, 'Views on Conclusions and/or Recommendations, Voluntary Commitments and Replies Presented by the State under Review Saudi Arabia' (2009) UN Doc A/HRC/11/23/Add.1 paras 33–34.

[96] Amnesty International, 'Written Statement Submitted by Amnesty International, a Non-Governmental Organization in Special Consultative Status' (2015) UN Doc A/HRC/28/NGO/19.

[97] Amnesty International, 'Saudi Arabia: Is This What Is to Be Expected of a UN Human Rights Council Member (Part 2)?' "Women who supported the Women2Drive campaign, launched in 2011 to challenge the prohibition on women driving vehicles, faced harassment and intimidation by the authorities, and were threatened with arrest and detention. Some were arrested but released after a short period."

Arabia is now an integral and deeply connected part of the global system.'[98] Upon the lifting of the ban, Alston commented:

> In January, I praised Vision 2030, the country's change agenda, as an ambitious and deeply transformative plan that could be a catalyst for women's rights. The end of the driving ban is of crucial importance for Vision 2030 because it unlocks the economic potential of women in the Kingdom, especially those women living in poverty.[99]

The work recently undertaken by Alston shows a possible change in the dialogue and engagement with international human rights mechanisms. There are still concerns, but the general discourse and agendas seem to cautiously indicate some positive progress.

Twitter Characteristics

#women2drive was the third largest campaign with 88,100 Tweets analysed. 38% of those were in a language other than English, which is fairly representative of the target audience given the strategy outlined above.

Persistence (Tweets per day)

This was the second longest running campaign, shorter only to #stopstoning. In total, 2,033 days were analysed. What this campaign exhibited was not necessarily the highest or the most peaks, but the most sustained and consistent activity. 61% of the total days in the campaign showed at least one Tweet. #women2drive also showed the second highest percentage of days with more than five Tweets at 26% (#niunamenos was significantly higher at 84%). Notably, a comparatively small percentage of Tweets were in peaks – 32%.

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[98] 'End of Mission Statement Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Professor Philip Alston on His Visit to Saudi Arabia' (n 7); UNHRC, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights on His Mission to Saudi Arabia' (2017) UN Doc A/HRC/35/26/Add.3.   'Most officials suggest that the Government is not opposed to abolishing the ban on driving or eliminating many of the guardianship restrictions, but they quickly add that important elements in society remain opposed. However, the Government cannot just remove itself from those debates. It has obligations to respect and promote the human rights of women, as acknowledged in the context of the universal periodic review, and it should seek to educate and inform the general public, especially in relation to any traditional and community practices that seek to deny basic rights to any group. It is also important to note that when systematic surveys of public opinion have been undertaken, a clear majority has in fact favoured letting women drive.' (para 49)

[99] OHCHR, 'End to Saudi Driving Ban for Women Should Be Just the First Step' <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22179&LangID=E> accessed 15 February 2018.

Figure 6.1: Number of Tweets per day, up to 1,000, #women2drive

As compared to other campaigns, this chart shows a high level of persistence, with mid to high peaks continuing long into the campaign. The kinds of events which correlate to the peaks change over time as well. The first driving protests resulted in peaks, followed by the arrest of an activist for driving. The next peak was the lashing sentence for another activist. Another large-scale driving protest resulted in a peak two years into the campaign. This study did not collect any data after November 2016 which pre-dated the announcement of the lifting of the ban and the changes to the law. It is very much expected that there would be large peaks at that time.

Figure 6.2: Number of Tweet per day up to 200, #women2drive

Looking at the Tweets over time in more detail (up to 200 Tweets as opposed to 1,000 in Figure 6.1), it becomes very clear that this campaign was extremely persistent, with very consistent, albeit low levels, of Tweeting throughout the campaign. This is one aspect of this campaign that is markedly different from the others. The other campaigns did not show the same levels of consistency. Although this campaign did not show many extreme metrics in persistence, it was a very low-level persistent campaign, which could be one of the reasons behind its success. This campaign overcame the lack of progression critique of the spiral model, proving that social media campaigns *can* exert long-term and sustained pressure on decision-makers.

Engagement (Retweets, Likes, and Replies)

As might be hypothesised based on the level of consistency seen above, #women2drive showed very high levels of uniform engagement across the campaign. #women2drive had the lowest like to Tweet ratio, indicating that very few individuals participating in the online campaign simply clicked 'like' to engage. More individuals Retweeted than other engagement metrics which again shows consistent messaging. The ratios of replies,

Retweets, and likes to Tweets were extremely similar in peak and non-peak periods, showing very little variation. One could say that this campaign was 'slow and steady' to win the race.

Figure 6.3: log(n) log(s), #women2drive

Looking at these engagement metrics on the log(n) log(s) plot once again the consistent behaviour of the campaign is evident. This was a campaign clearly driven by Retweets, indicating consistent messaging. The Retweet and reply gradients here are not particularly steep compared to other campaigns, however the like gradient for #women2drive was the steepest of all the campaigns in this study. This indicates that there was not much activity simply liking Tweets, suggesting more involved activity and behaviour of individuals participating in the campaign.

Users (Profiles of the 100 most active users)

As seen earlier in this chapter, attracting foreign users was a strategic cornerstone of this campaign. This strategy, given the political context of Saudi Arabia, may have contributed to some of the campaign's success. Also as noted earlier, #women2drive was a very *consistent* campaign. This is reflected in some of the user metrics as well. #women2drive was one of only two campaigns with more unique users in non-peak periods than in peak periods. This is a good indication of the stability of #women2drive, where the campaign itself was less volatile around peak periods. Having more unique users in non-peak periods shows the

ongoing nature of the campaign, attracting continued, if lower levels, of attention throughout the campaign. This was not just a campaign which gained participants during high coverage events, but rather individuals show continued and ongoing interest in the campaign by participating outside of peak, viral events. Adding to these campaign characteristics, #women2drive showed the second highest average Tweets per user at 3.81 (#letwomengotostadium was top with 4.28). Those who were involved in this campaign were very involved, Tweeting on average almost 4 times.

One of the most prominent activists in #women2drive was Manal al-Sharif. She herself accounted for 15% of the Tweets from the 100 most active users. She sent out a total of 290 Tweets, placing her in the top ten of the most active. This is an important finding in this campaign, showing that while there was a strategic choice to appeal to foreigners, the campaign was still primarily driven by domestic activists who had the knowledge and experience to accurately represent the situation of women living in Saudi Arabia. The most active user is a Saudi individual who Tweeted 1,802 times in this campaign. Interestingly, the second most prolific user in #women2drive self-labelled as a 'Saudi-American', living in the US but Tweeting in both English and Arabic.

Overall, 44% of the 100 most active users were from Saudi Arabia, accounting for 48% of the Tweets from the most active users. Having a strong domestic individual voice is statistically significant for positive legal outcomes. Non-domestic users had more reach, however, accounting for 61%. This is line with the strategic goals of the campaign, where it seems Saudi women themselves were steering the campaign but achieving a global reach to increase foreign pressure.

Figure 6.4: Profiles of the 100 most active users, #women2drive

The figure above shows the percentage share of users, campaign Tweets, and reach of the top 100 most active accounts, disaggregated across domestic and non-domestic locations. #women2drive was clearly a campaign driven by activists and individuals, both domestic and non-domestic. There were a small number of counter-narrative accounts in the top 100, primarily from religious individuals who did not approve of women driving. What is interesting to note here is where the percentage share differs from users to Tweets to reach. For example, while domestic activists make up 2% of the users, they account for 15% of the reach. Equally, domestic individuals are 30% of the users, 38% of the Tweets, and 13% of the reach, indicating that they are more active but with less followers. Also of note is that foreign independent journalists take 3% of the users but 33% of the reach. Overall, this chart shows that domestic users are very active but, generally, foreign users have more followers and thus more reach (with the exception of the domestic activists).

Content analysis (Sentiment, Personalisation, Framing, Messaging, and Norms)

#women2drive was a generally positive campaign. In the beginning of the campaign, there was a very consistent picture painted with the sentiment scores. Unlike most of the other campaigns, there was very little variation or volatility in the sentiment. Over the life of the campaign, for days with at least ten Tweets, the standard deviation in average positivity score was only 0.06, demonstrating again the consistency in this campaign.

Figure 6.5: Positivity over time, #women2drive

As the campaign progressed, however, spikes in positive sentiment were seen. Interestingly, the spikes in positivity do not correspond to peak events. The highest positive days surrounded praise for a Human Rights Watch video about the campaign and women driving in Saudi Arabia (December 2013). Another extremely positive day was on the 1st anniversary of #women2drive where a Twibbon campaign was launched (June 22, 2012). Another small peak in positivity occurred when two more activists were arrested for driving (December 2014). While this may not seem like a particularly 'positive' event, the sentiment of activism and purpose was high on these days, which resulted in a higher positive sentiment.

Notably, #women2drive showed very high prevalence of pronouns. 52% of Tweets contained a first-person pronoun, 24% a second person pronoun, and 8% a female pronoun, the second highest across all three categories. 4% used a male pronoun and 17% used a third person plural pronoun, the highest in these two categories across all campaigns studied. This finding indicates that the campaign had a very personal tone, with users speaking in the first person often, speaking 'to' others, and referring to a specific 'her', 'him', or 'them'. In the early days of the campaign, some event-based time periods saw 76-79% of Tweets with a first-person pronoun. This kind of ownership and personal investment in the issue and the campaign may very well have contributed to its success, as this level of personalisation was not seen in the other campaigns.

Overall, as seen in many other Twitter variables, this campaign showed great consistency in the normative analysis. #women2drive had the highest proportion of consistent organic messaging compared to variable organic messaging of any of the campaigns studied; 37% of the words analysed were consistent. Although this clearly is not a majority, it is higher than any other campaign, where the percentages ranged from 16% to 33%. Similarly, #women2drive also showed the highest ratio of average number of consistent words to variable words per event-based time period. Also contributing to its success is likely the presence of international norms, with 86% of the international norms analysed mentioned over the course of the campaign.

The consistent frames and messages appear to stay focussed on the campaign itself, with continued reference to activist and campaign leader Manal al Sharif, uniform use of words such as 'rights' and 'support', and references to Twibbons and the campaign itself. Although perhaps outdated now, at the time of the campaign, Twibbons (a combination of Twitter + Ribbon, as in wearing a specific coloured ribbon to participate in a campaign) were a popular tool. There was also a clear and consistent focus on the issue, with derivatives of the word 'drive' in nearly 30% of all Tweets, as well words such as 'ban' and 'car' appearing consistently throughout the lifespan of the campaign. It is also interesting to note that God was mentioned in 5% of all Tweets across the campaign. Spot checking shows that this comes from both activists *and* counter-narratives both using religion as a point of persuasion. The analysis of this campaign has time and time again pointed to the consistency as a positive force behind its success. This framing and messaging continue to underscore that point.

Figure 6.6: Consistently used words, #women2drive

There are some interesting findings in the analysis of variable content. The most intriguing result, perhaps of any campaign, was the emergence of the word 'Clinton' in the middle of the campaign. Hillary Clinton was the foreign secretary at the time and, as seen earlier in this chapter, was very involved in 'quiet diplomacy' on the matter. It is extremely interesting that her name emerged in the 100 most words used in that specific time period, being mentioned 294 times, or in 3% of all Tweets in the time period. That Clinton's name emerged so clearly is a fascinating outcome – both in the representation of the strategic campaign choices in the Tweets and in the prevalence of her role in the Twitter campaign. It was also very interesting to see a shift in focus to the royal family after the campaign took off. This was true in English and Arabic, again underscoring the strategic drive of the campaign to tap into transnational networks as well as domestic to exert pressure.

Conclusion

#women2drive was a fascinating campaign. Although all the campaigns were deeply rooted in Twitter, this campaign used social media more as a strategic choice, tapping into both domestic and non-domestic pressures. It was a campaign steered by domestic activists, but

the non-domestic attention and participation was strong. The Twitter characteristics again and again exhibited clear consistency, with long-term persistence, uniformity in engagement, and maintained focus in the content of Tweets. This persistence and consistency are likely associated with the high levels of success, particularly in the parameters of institutionalisation and UN dialogue, setting it apart from the partially successful campaigns #delhigangrape and #niunamenos.

Chapter 7 : Aggregated Analysis

Introduction

Given the in-depth analysis of the legal changes and Twitter characteristics for each campaign and outcome group, this chapter now sets out to explore any overarching findings, beginning to build statistical models to understand in more detail the role of Twitter in legal change. To frame the work presented in this chapter, the table below builds upon the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 2. This shows the various statistical tests that have been performed to investigate the overarching research questions and to identify patterns and trends in Twitter-driven campaigns which could help to understand legal outcomes. The research questions in this thesis, to reiterate, are:

5. Can international campaigns originating in and driven by Twitter contribute to domestic legal change in women's rights?
6. If so, which campaign behaviours are associated with change?

It is also critical to reiterate the selection criteria for the campaigns in the study:

5. International attention
6. More than 1,000 Tweets
7. Seeking specific domestic legal change in the area of women's rights
8. Originating in, and continuing to be driven by, Twitter

Returning now to the research map, the next elements to add are the statistical tests chosen to analyse each independent variable:

Table 7.1: Overview of statistical tests

Critique/Risk	Independent variable(s)	Null hypothesis (that which this research sets out disprove)	Test
Lack of focus on domestic actors/overemphasis on Western approaches; Social media is elite-driven and non-neutral; campaigns may be dominated and/or driven by elite international actors	Twitter profiles of 100 most prolific users in each campaign	Campaigns dominated by foreign actors will be more successful.	Geo-mapping exercise of campaign drivers. Correlate domestic and non-domestic user variables to outcomes.
Potential government backlash; lack of message tempering due to organic nature of medium	Content analysis	Consistency of messaging in Tweets will not affect campaign outcomes.	Correlate consistency variables to outcomes. Compare to correlations of organic content.
Lack of long-term progression; 'fickleness' and speed of social media	Persistence (Tweets per day)	Persistence of Tweets in Twitter driven campaigns do not affect campaign outcomes.	Correlate persistence variables to outcomes.
Ignores domestic capacity issues; lack of knowledge of domestic context	Context (various indicators of domestic political context and situation for women)	Domestic context has no impact on campaign success.	Analysis of variance (ANOVA) test based on domestic political capacity scores.
Ignores material or nuanced incentives; does not present	Engagement (reply, retweet, and like data)	Campaigns driven by 'likes' will have the same impact as	Correlate likes versus replies to outcomes.

enough incentive for change to domestic government		campaigns driven by replies (replies used as a proxy for engagement/ investment/risk in campaign, as opposed to a simple click to like)	
Weaknesses in spiral model are amplified in social media driven campaigns	Combined quantified variables	Twitter variables have no relationship to campaign outcomes.	Testing composite scores

This chapter will work through these tests sequentially, culminating in testing the aggregated model.

Lack of focus on domestic actors

A key critique of the spiral model is its overemphasis on foreign (Western) actors and its lack of focus on domestic actors.[1] Social media is statistically dominated by the Global North and is constructed in a way that favours the elite, however the domestic targets for change in this research are predominantly located in the Global South.[2] The critique of the spiral model is that there is not enough emphasis on domestic actors, and the overemphasis on foreign influence

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[1] Alison Brysk, 'Communicative Action and Human Rights in Colombia: When Words Fail' [2009] Colombia Internacional 36; Anthony Tirado Chase, 'The State and Human Rights: Governance and Sustainable Human Development in Yemen' [2003] International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 213; Isabelle Cheng and Lara Momesso, 'Look, the World Is Watching How We Treat Migrants! The Making of the Anti-Trafficking Legislation during the Ma Administration' (2017) 46 Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 61; Umit Cizre, 'The Truth and Fiction About (Turkey's) Human Rights Politics' (2001) 3 Human Rights Review 55; Xinyuan Dai, 'The "Compliance Gap" and the Efficacy of International Human Rights Institutions' in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), *The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013); Man-ho Heo, 'Mongolia's Political Change and Human Rights in Five-Phase Spiral Model: Implications for North Korea: Mongolia's Political Change and HR' (2014) 29 Pacific Focus 413; Andreas Laursen, 'Israel's Supreme Court and International Human Rights Law: The Judgement on "Moderate Physical Pressure"' (2000) 69 Nordic Journal of International Law 413; Alejandro Anaya Muñoz, 'Transnational and Domestic Processes in the Definition of Human Rights Policies in Mexico' (2009) 31 Human Rights Quarterly 35; Rolf Schwarz, 'The Paradox of Sovereignty, Regime Type and Human Rights Compliance' (2004) 8 The International Journal of Human Rights 199; Beth A Simmons, 'From Ratification to Compliance: Quantitative Evidence on the Spiral Model' in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), *The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013).
[2] Simon Kemp, 'Global Digital & Social Media Stats: 2015 | Social Media Today' (2015) <http://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/global-digital-social-media-stats-2015> accessed 14 March 2016; ITU, ''Key ICT Indicators for Developed and Developing Countries and the World (Totals and Penetration Rates)' (2014) <http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2014-e.pdf> accessed 14 March 2016; Maeve Duggan and Aaron Smith, 'Social Media Update 2013' (*Pew Research Center: Internet, Science & Tech*, 30 December 2013) <http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/12/30/social-media-update-2013/> accessed 14 March 2016.

can contribute to unintended and indeed negative domestic outcomes. If this is a risk in a campaign which is not driven by social media, this risk is even more prevalent and concerning in a social media environment, dominated by elite, usually Western users.[3] This variable is therefore crucial to understanding the impact of international social media campaigns on domestic law.

The hypothesis in this area is that campaigns which are driven by domestic actors and voices, as opposed to being overshadowed by foreign actors, will be more likely to influence domestic governments to change. If social media campaigns continue to be dominated by Western influences, the hypothesis is that it is very unlikely that they will contribute to long term meaningful legal change.

As discussed in Chapter 2, for each campaign an in-depth analysis was conducted of the 100 most active users in each campaign, in other words, the 100 users who Tweeted the most in the hashtag campaign. Data for each of these 100 users was collected on location (self-identified), profile description, number of followers, number of Tweets sent in the campaign, and total number of Tweets ever sent by the user. It is important to note that this information was collected at the time of the research, not at the time of the campaign. It is therefore used as a proxy but it not representative of the user's followers or reach while Tweeting with the hashtag. Relevant to this test, location was coded as domestic or non-domestic based on the users' own description of their location. This data provides an indicator of the location of the drivers of the campaign – domestic or non-domestic. A geo-mapping exercise shows the differences in locations based on legal outcomes.

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[3] 'Digital in 2018: World's Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion Mark' (*We Are Social UK*, 30 January 2018) <https://wearesocial.com/uk/blog/2018/01/global-digital-report-2018> accessed 4 October 2018; Kate Ott, 'Social Media and Feminist Values: Aligned or Maligned?' (2018) 39 Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies 93.

Figure 7.1: Map of 100 most active users, #stopstoning

Figure 7.2: Map of 100 most active users, #letwomengotostadium

Figure 7.3: Map of 100 most active users, #farkhunda

Figure 7.4: Map of 100 most active users, #sendeanlat

Figure 7.5: Map of 100 most active users, #mydressmychoice

Figure 7.6: Map of 100 most active users, #delhigangrape

Figure 7.7: Map of 100 most active users, #ninunamenos

Figure 7.8: Map of 100 most active users, #women2drive

As the maps progress from least successful through to more successful, the concentration of users in the domestic country and surrounding region tends to increase. It is of particular interest that #niunamenos was the first campaign to show no drivers from the US. Although not a perfect model, there is a general identifiable trend for campaigns with a larger geographic spread of driving users to be associated with less long-term success. Even though #women2drive was strategically designed to utilise foreign pressures, there is still a strong

concentration of Saudi users *driving* the campaign – the most active users. On the contrary, #stopstoning and #farkunda showed a large geographic spread of most active users.

Another interesting point may be a diaspora effect, whereby domestic nationals are currently located in non-domestic locations.[4] This could show as 'foreign' influence when in fact it is more closely linked to the domestic interests. However the users still do not have any domestic power as they do not currently reside in the target country, under the target government. Therefore they cannot be classified as true domestic voices either. While it is not possible to specifically identify a possible diaspora effect given the availability of information on Twitter profiles, the mapping exercise may indicate this phenomenon in #sendeanlat (Germany) and #delhigangrape (UK) in particular.

These maps therefore do indicate, visually, that there may be an association between the presence of domestic drivers in Twitter campaigns and legal change. Again, this is certainly not a perfect model, but as an initial indicator of a possible trend the maps do show some patterns. A critical challenge in this area is the user provided information itself. Not all users provide a location, and of those that do, they may simply indicate a region or an unspecified location (i.e. 'planet earth'). It is not always possible to identify a location for users.

To explore this theory further, correlations between some of the key user variables against outcome variables were run.[5] The full results are presented in the table below. *Italics* indicate a statistically significant relationship at $p < 0.05$ level and ***bold italics*** indicate a $p < 0.01$ level. In other words, the relationships with R closer to 1.00 and a p-value < 0.01 indicate that the independent variable explains a statistically significant amount of variation in the dependent variable. As the independent variable moves up or down (ordinally) the dependent variable will likely do the same. The higher the R, the stronger the relationship, and the lower the p-value, the more statistically significant.

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[4] Response from Dr. Sebastian Peyer to Reilly Dempsey Willis, 'Evaluating the Impact of Global Twitter Campaigns on Domestic Women's Rights: Statistical Modelling and Analysis' (Research Seminar, University of East Anglia School of Law, 6 June 2018).

[5] Pearson correlations measure the relationship between two variables, looking at both strength and directionality. In the simplest terms, changes in one variable will result in changes to the other. A value of 1 means a perfect linear relationship, a value of 0 means there is no relationship at all, and a value of -1 is a perfect negative relationship.

Table 7.2: Statistically significant correlations, user profiles

		Overall legal change	**Legislative change**	**Institutionalisation**	**Law enforcement**	**UN dialogue**
Of the 100 most active users in the campaign, the number clearly identified as being domestic	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	*.719**	.671	.406	.503	.481
	Significance (p-value)	.044	.068	.318	.204	.228
Number of Tweets in the campaign sent by the most active users who clearly identified as being domestic	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	*.813**	***.900***	.558	.273	.504
	Significance (p-value)	.014	***.002***	.150	.513	.203
Number of Tweets in the campaign sent by the most active users who identified as being non-domestic	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	***.873***	***.944***	.611	.259	.605
	Significance (p-value)	***.005***	***.000***	.108	.536	.112
Percent of Tweets sent by the most active users from those who identified as being non-domestic	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	*-.710**	-.632	-.417	-.488	-.523
	Significance (p-value)	.049	.093	.304	.220	.183
Of the 100 most active users in the campaign, the percent who clearly identified as being domestic individuals	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	.605	.383	.230	***.852***	.389
	Significance (p-value)	.112	.349	.583	***.007***	.340
Percent of Tweets sent by the most active users from those who clearly identified as being domestic individuals	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	.546	.386	.030	*.725**	.490
	Significance (p-value)	.161	.345	.943	*.042*	.218

The initial tests therefore show statistically significant correlations between:

Table 7.3: Summary of significant relationships, user profiles

	Strong correlation (0.01)	Correlation (0.05)
Of the 100 most active users in the campaign, the number clearly identified as being domestic		Overall legal change
Number of Tweets in the campaign sent by the most active users who clearly identified as being domestic	Legislative change^	Overall legal change^
Number of Tweets in the campaign sent by the most active users who identified as being non-domestic	Overall legal change^, Legislative change	
Percent of Tweets sent by the most active users from those who identified as being non-domestic		Overall legal change
Of the 100 most active users in the campaign, the percent who clearly identified as being domestic individuals	Law enforcement	
Percent of Tweets sent by the most active users from those who clearly identified as being domestic individuals		Law enforcement

^ relationships which change when running partial correlations

As it is not logical that the number of Tweets from domestic users and the number of Tweets from non-domestic users can both be significant, there is likely a confounding factor at play, possibly the overall number of Tweets in the campaign. In other words, it is not whether the Tweets are domestic or non-domestic that is showing significance, but just the raw number of Tweets influencing the relationship. This is underscored by the correlation shown between the percentage of campaign Tweets which are from non-domestic users to changes in legislation. Partial correlations, which control for other variables, are necessary to exclude the possible confounding factor of total number of Tweets. Running this test shows that there is, actually, no strong relationship between the number of Tweets sent by domestic campaign

drivers (R= 0.807, p=0.028), but there remains a significant correlation between the number of Tweets sent by non-domestic campaign drivers and changes in legislative change (R= 0.900, p=0.006).

The initial significance between domestic campaign Tweets and overall legal change is removed completely when controlling for total number of Tweets (R= 0.642, p=0.120). The strong correlation between non-domestic campaign Tweets and overall legal change is also weakened in the partial correlation. However, the strong relationship between non-domestic campaign Tweets and legislative change remains. This is contrary to the hypothesis and in fact *upholds*, in part, the role of international actors in the spiral model. This may indicate that some level of online foreign pressure is indeed necessary to push a government to change the law. This was certainly seen in #women2drive and these statistics further prove the relationship.

This is tempered to some extent by the relationship between the strength of the voice of domestic individuals and law enforcement. There is a strong statistical relationship between the percent of campaign drivers who self-identify as domestic individuals and law enforcement (R=0.852, p=.007) and the percent of campaign Tweets from drivers sent by domestic individuals (R=0.725, p=0.042). This indicates that the voice of 'ordinary' domestic individuals may have an influence on how seriously law enforcement takes the issue. For example, #delhigangrape and #niunamenos had particular problems in law enforcement outcomes, and these campaigns showed only 27% and 14% domestic drivers respectively. Conversely, #mydressmychoice and #women2drive showed more positive outcomes in law enforcement and reported higher levels of domestic individuals at 32% and 30% respectively. Although the differences may not seem large, the patterns are still informative and statistically significant. The campaigns with the poorest outcomes in law enforcement, #stopstoning and #farkhunda, showed the lowest levels of domestic individuals at 0% and 6% respectively.

As seen below, the Saudi campaign on this particular variable is of interest. Campaign analysis showed that foreign pressure, given foreign relations and the domestic political situation, was actively sought. No other campaign visibly or vocally used this strategy.

Figure 7.9: Relationship between domestic users and overall legal change

This could indicate that for *most* campaigns, domestic voices are indeed critical to success, however there may be exceptions where it is both appropriate and necessary to draw upon foreign pressure. As discussed earlier, it could also be the strength and importance of the domestic voices that matters more than the number. In the case of #women2drive, using social media to tap into transnational advocacy networks and specifically American public opinion was a strategic choice, yet the campaign was still very much driven by the domestic activists. Other campaigns which saw success (albeit limited), such as #niunamenos and #delhigangrape, also had domestic drive to the campaign, greater in number but perhaps not in strength. In other words, it is always important to understand what is going on behind the numbers. At the opposite end of the scale, with campaigns such as #stopstoning and #farkhunda, it appears that the foreign involvement was associated with poorer outcomes.

Therefore there are three important findings in these tests: that there is a relationship between the number of domestic drivers and overall legal change (both in the correlations and the mapping trends), that there is a strong relationship between the number of Tweets sent by non-domestic drivers and legislative change, and that there is a strong relationship between the voice of 'ordinary' domestic individuals and law enforcement. Taken as a whole, this may show that the spiral model holds true for legislative change (i.e. Phase 3 tactical

concessions), but that more emphasis on domestic voices, influence, and power is needed to see long term, on the ground implementation and societal change. This finding also links to the critique on the lack of progression seen in the spiral model case studies. It may be that the emphasis on foreign influence is also to blame for the lack of long-term progression. Perhaps a more correct assessment would see foreign influence curtailed and limited to early phase legislative work, but a complete shift to domestic pressure to move from tactical concessions towards rule consistent behaviour.

Potential government backlash

Critiques of the spiral model highlight that the model 'ignores' the potential for governments to lash out against what can be interpreted as foreign interference in domestic matters. Critics point out that the model's emphasis on the role and power of foreign actors could have a negative impact on domestic matters if the State reacts to foreign 'meddling'. [6] Given the possibility of both *actual* foreign involvement in social media campaigns and the *perception* of over-involvement from foreigners/Westerners in social media, this risk is potentially greater. The legal and discourse analysis showed on multiple occasions and in multiple countries a distrust of Western influences and Western-driven media. Statistics also show that social media tends to be Western driven.[7] In a structured, strategically designed and driven advocacy campaign, messages can be tempered and carefully constructed so as to avoid this impression. Messaging can also be designed to ensure a focus on the domestic aspects, again in the hopes of avoiding potential backlash. Framing and messaging on social media, however, is by definition unstructured and unfiltered. Additionally, the non-neutrality of Twitter may contribute to the lack of control over messaging as the algorithms working in the background which allow some messages to thrive and some to become supressed will contribute to the perception of the campaign.[8] There is little strategic design to what is said, repeated, or reported as social media content is user defined, even if activists and organisations attempt to steer the campaign. They still cannot control what individuals Tweet

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[6] Brysk (n 1); Omar G Encarnación, 'International Influence, Domestic Activism, and Gay Rights in Argentina' (2013) 128 Political Science Quarterly 687; Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, 'How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law' (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 621; Kathryn Sikkink, 'The United States and Torture: Does the Spiral Model Work?' in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), *The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013); Anja Jetschke, 'The Power of Human Rights a Decade after: From Euphoria to Contestation?' in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), *The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013).
[7] 'Digital in 2018: World's Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion Mark' (n 3).
[8] Ott (n 3).

or what Twitter promotes. This could indicate that the lack of controlled, consistent messaging on social media may increase the risk of government backlash. Although difficult to assess, as a proxy for the content of Tweets two tests were run. Each campaign was divided into event-driven time periods (as opposed to peak and non-peak time periods which are defined by the number of Tweets on a given day). For each time period, the 100 most used words were collected and the number of instances of words which relate to international norms on women's rights were counted. From these tests, four distinct areas of interest emerged: the use of pronouns, the content of consistent yet still user-defined framing and messaging, variable framing and messaging which was strong but differed across time periods, and the presence of international norms. The use of pronouns does not relate to the content of messaging and is discussed later in this chapter.

The hypothesis here is that more consistent and 'structured' messaging will lead to less government backlash and therefore more likely to see positive legal change. Campaigns with less consistent messaging and more variable (and potentially volatile or perceived as Western-driven) organic messaging which may stray from the overarching goals are hypothesised to see less success and run a greater risk of alienating government inroads for change. Again, the first step in testing this hypothesis is to look at correlations between relevant variables and legal outcomes:

Table 7.4: Statistically significant correlations, messaging content

		Overall legal change	Legislative change	Institutionalisation	Law enforcement	UN dialogue
Percent of tweets with variable messaging	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	*-.746**	-.562	-.223	-.567	***-.874****
	Significance (p-value)	*.033*	.147	.595	.142	***.004***
Highest percent of Tweets in a given time period with a given variable word [9]	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	-.376	-.019	.064	*-.750**	-.601
	Significance (p-value)	.358	.965	.881	*.032*	.115
Ratio of consistent to variable words	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	.659	.645	.595	-.071	*.731**
	Significance (p-value)	.076	.084	.120	.867	*.039*
Percent of international women's rights norms present	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	***.926****	*.826**	.501	.637	*.719**
	Significance (p-value)	***.001***	*.011*	.206	.090	*.045*

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[9] In other words, the number of times a variable norm was used divided by the number of total Tweets in the given time period. This test looked at the highest value across each time period. This shows the presence and strength of the variable norms. The higher the number the more prevalent the variable norm was in the given time period.

With the following significant summary:

Table 7.5: Summary of significant relationships, messaging content

	Strong correlation (0.01)	Correlation (0.05)
Percent of tweets with variable messaging	UN dialogue (negative relationship)	Overall legal change (negative relationship)
Highest percent of Tweets in a given time period with a given variable word		Law enforcement (negative relationship)
Ratio of consistent to variable words		UN dialogue
Percent of international women's rights norms present	Overall legal change	Legislative change, UN dialogue

These correlations show a potentially significant relationship between messaging and outcomes. As hypothesised, campaigns which have more variable, erratic, and irregular content, specific to time periods and not the overarching campaign, are correlated to less positive outcomes, while campaigns with consistent messaging which draw heavily from women's rights norms are associated with more positive outcomes.

To explore these relationships further, scatter plots were created and regression equations generated. The presence of organically emerging messages in Tweets continues to show a negative relationship with dialogue with UN international human rights mechanisms in particular:

Figure 7.10: Relationship between changing messaging and UN dialogue

This plot shows the negative relationship between the presence of variable (unstructured and changing) messaging and legal outcomes, looking in more detail at UN dialogue. Of critical importance, UN dialogue is the legal variable that most clearly shows government backlash. In particular in the Iranian campaigns, dialogue with the UN treaty bodies was where State backlash against the campaigns was most clearly evidenced. Although not as strong as the percent of Tweets, the continued *negative* statistical relationship between the presence of variable framing to law enforcement supports the findings. The presence of variable framing shows the percentage of times that one particular organically emerging word or phrase was used for each campaign. This is another indicator of the strength and visibility of the changing, variable messaging across event-based time periods as opposed to the consistent campaign driven framing and messaging which are evidenced across the lifespan of the campaign and international norms which reflect a focus on women's rights norms.

This relationship therefore begins to give credence to the hypothesis that less controlled social media messaging is more likely to see a hostile government response, and less likely to be associated with positive legal outcomes. This is underscored by the additional, though less strong, relationship between the ratio of consistent messaging to organic messaging and UN

dialogue. The less consistent the campaign Tweets are, the more likely it is to show backlash in UN dialogue.

Lack of long-term progression

Some of the case studies used to develop the spiral model, even after years of strategic advocacy work, never progressed to full rule consistent behaviour and institutionalisation of human rights change. Critics of the model point to this risk of lack of long-term progression as a major fault in the model.[10] When used in a social media context which is quite renowned for being short-term and short-lived, the risk is potentially increased. To explore this further, several variables to measure campaign persistence were examined. Although the clearest indicator of persistence would be the total number of days in the campaign, given the selection criteria for the campaigns in this study total days is not necessarily a comparable variable (i.e. campaigns were not selected to be matched in length of time). Additionally, a cut-off date for data collection was practically necessary to complete this research, while some of the campaigns were still in an active phase. However, an initial look at the relationship between the total number of days analysed and the legal outcomes shows that this is not a statistically significant predictor. This chart plots the number of Tweets against the number of days of the campaign (log scale for comparability). As can be seen, there is no discernible pattern and certainly no linear relationship to indicate that simply being a 'bigger' campaign means the campaign will see more success.

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[10] Raed A Alhargan, 'The Impact of the UN Human Rights System and Human Rights INGOs on the Saudi Government with Special Reference to the Spiral Model' (2012) 16 The International Journal of Human Rights 598; Brysk (n 1); Jetschke (n 6); Eran Shor, 'Conflict, Terrorism, and the Socialization of Human Rights Norms: The Spiral Model Revisited' (2008) 55 Social Problems 117.

Figure 7.11: Relationship between total number of days of campaign and overall legal outcomes (log scale)

Therefore, other indicators of a hashtag campaign's persistence need to be explored. The hypothesis here is that campaigns which show more persistence will be more likely to see to legal change; in other words, campaigns which are more sensitive to the whims of social media that 'die out' of public interest quicker are far less likely to achieve meaningful success. Given that most hashtags on Twitter trend for a short amount of time, it is very likely that most social media campaigns will lack the persistence necessary for long term change, particularly given that some critiques of the spiral model point to the lack of persistence of traditional advocacy campaigns which may take several years.

Persistence in these tests is therefore measured not by the simple length of a campaign, but rather the *ongoing activity* in the campaign. More days with more Tweets are therefore defined as persistent, for example #women2drive. Higher numbers of days with fewer Tweets and completely inactive days (no Tweets) are defined as lacking persistence as was the case with #stopstoning. The number of peaks (numerically defined) are also included as indicators of persistence; in other words, days with a very high number of Tweets. Campaigns which have more peak days over time are also defined as more persistent, and it is hypothesised are more likely to contribute to long term meaningful change. Fewer peaks

are indicative of campaigns which lack persistence - those that grab attention for short periods of time but do not engage users to participate over a longer time span, for example the status quo campaigns #farkhunda, #sendeanlat, and #mydressmychoice. Based on the critique of the spiral model around lack of progression, the hypothesis follows that social media campaigns with less persistence will see less change, and equally campaigns with more persistence will be associated with more positive change.

To test the hypothesis, starting from correlations, the following significant relationships were found:

Table 7.6: Statistically significant correlations, Tweets per day

		Overall legal change	Legislative change	Institutionalisation	Law enforcement	UN dialogue
Persistence composite score[11]	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	**.869******	*.827**	.639	.450	.578
	Significance (p-value)	**.005**	*.011*	.088	.263	.134
Number of Tweets in non-peak periods	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	.706	*.738**	.483	.112	.646
	Significance (p-value)	.051	*.037*	.226	.792	.084
Number of days with at least one Tweet	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	**.865******	*.814**	*.772**	.360	.557
	Significance (p-value)	**.006**	*.014*	*.025*	.382	.151
Number of days with at least five Tweets	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	**.912******	**.926******	.701	.230	*.724**
	Significance (p-value)	**.002**	**.001**	.053	.584	*.042*
Percent of days with no Tweets	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	-.778*	-.655	-.590	-.380	-.678
	Significance (p-value)	.023	.078	.124	.353	.064

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[11] An average of the number of peaks, the number of peak periods, the longest peak period (merged), the number of days with at least one Tweet, the number of days with at least five Tweets, the number of days at least 100 Tweets, the number of days with at least 1,000 Tweets, the percentage of days with at least five Tweets, and the number of days with Tweets above the average for the campaign, based on quintiles to create an index ranging from 1.00 – 5.00).

Which can be summarised as follows:

Table 7.7: Summary of significant relationships, Tweets per day

	Strong Correlation (0.01)	Correlation (0.05)
Persistence composite score	Overall legal change^	Legislative change^
Number of Tweets in non-peak periods		Legislative change
Number of days with at least one Tweet	Overall legal change	Legislative change, Institutionalisation
Number of days with at least five Tweets	Overall legal change, legislative change	UN dialogue
Percent of days with no Tweets		Overall legal change (negative)

^ relationships which change when running partial correlations

In order to verify the strength of the relationship between the number of days with more than zero Tweets and the number of days with more than five Tweets, it is necessary to run a partial correlation controlling for the total number of days in the campaign. The partial correlation test confirms that the relationship stands when controlling for total days:

Table 7.8: Partial correlations, Tweets per day

Control Variables			Overall legal change
Total days of campaign	Number of days with at least one Tweet	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	**.949**
		Significance (p-value)	**.001**
	Number of days with at least five Tweets	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	**.931**
		Significance (p-value)	**.002**

Taking the above correlations with the negative directionality of the correlations of percent of days with no Tweets, there is a strong relationship between the number of 'active' days in a campaign to outcomes, regardless of the total length of the campaign. A campaign therefore could be ongoing for years, but with very few days with more than just a handful of, if any, Tweets (i.e. #stopstoning), whereas a campaign could be relatively short but with mostly very active days (i.e. #niunamenos). The latter is much more likely to be associated with success. The status quo campaigns tended to show very high activity levels in the early days but

lacked in persistence over the long-term course of the campaign. These campaigns therefore were not statistically likely to see positive change.

It is also important to control for the total number of days in the persistence composite score as well. That partial correlation produces the following results:

Table 7.9: Summary of significant relationships, Tweets per days, after partial correlations

Control Variables			Overall legal change	Legislative change
Total days of campaign	Persistence composite score	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	*0.868*	*0.831*
		Significance (p-value)	*0.011*	*0.020*

This shows that the relationship between persistence and overall legal change and legislative change is weakened, though only slightly, when controlling for total number of days of the campaign. The significance level for both shifts to the 0.05 level.

To therefore explore the strong relationship between active days and outcomes, a scatter plot shows:

Figure 7.12: Relationship between number of active days and overall legal change

The hypothesis that campaigns exhibiting higher levels of persistence would lead to more positive legal change is therefore tentatively supported. The most important component part is the number of active days of the campaign. Campaigns with a high number of inactive days are not likely to be associated with positive legal change. This is a challenging finding for social media campaigns, as they generally tend to come and go quite quickly. In this study alone, the majority of campaigns lacked in persistence.

<u>Domestic Capacity Issues</u>

The spiral model itself recognises that the capacity and ability of the domestic government to implement change could be an issue, but some scholars critique the model in that it does not pay *enough* attention to the potential barrier of domestic capacity.[12] This critique holds that governments may have the will to change, but lack the practical capacity to initiate and implement change. Measuring capacity is challenging. Only two useful indices, produced by researchers at Harvard, were found for this research. Both measure relative political capacity, one which approximates the ability of governments to appropriate portions of the national output to advance public goals and one which gauges the capacity of governments to mobilise populations under their control. Indices such as these are never perfect and are based on many assumptions, however as a proxy for estimating a government's ability to implement legal change (based on the campaign goals), these indices will suffice. Each campaign was then grouped into low, medium, and high capacity to compare.

The domestic capacity issue could be a potentially major barrier to success in social media campaigns. As opposed to more structured and strategically planned campaigns which can work within the bounds of capacity for change, social media campaigns lack this strategic direction. While some domestic activists participating in social media campaigns may be aware of government capacity issues, it can at least be speculated that most hashtag participants will be relatively unaware of a State's capacity to implement change. In practical terms, this means that it is possible that a hashtag campaign is asking a government to do something that it is not capable of doing.

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[12] Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse, 'Human Rights in Areas of Limited Statehood: The New Agenda' in Thomas Risse-Kappen and Stephen C Ropp (eds), *The persistent power of human rights: from commitment to compliance* (Cambridge University Press 2013); Jack Goldsmith and Stephen D Krasner, 'The Limits of Idealism' (2003) 132 Daedalus 47; Shor (n 10).

The primary statistical test to explore this hypothesis is a one-way ANOVA (Analysis of Variance). This tests for statistically significant differences in the dependent variable average for different groups. A statistically significant difference between the groups would indicate that capacity is critical to change. ANOVAs were performed for both capacity measures against the overall legal change score and all its component parts. There were no statistically significant differences between capacity groups across any of the outcomes, although the small number of campaigns in this study does mean that the finding must be interpreted with caution.

Still, this is a particularly interesting, and perhaps tentatively positive, finding for social media campaigns. If the above assumptions are correct, then it matters not whether or not a government has political capacity. Campaign success, including institutionalisation, does not vary significantly across countries with different domestic capacities. For example, India ranks relatively low in capacity, yet this research shows at least some change resulting from the Twitter-driven campaign. The government was able to commission a judicial report and pass legislative change relatively quickly once the campaign took hold. Similarly, Saudi Arabia scored quite low on the capacity measures, yet seems to exhibit the most ability to implement and institutionalise change. Perhaps the public nature of social media campaigns somehow *help* a government to overcome capacity issues, at least those relating to mobilisation. It is important to note that this may be based on the measures chosen, however it is a challenge across the field finding ways to accurately measure capacity. It is hoped that by using more than one measure, and finding a lack of statistical difference in both, will at least go some way to overcoming this challenge.

However, this does not mean that context does not matter at all. This research also uses the World Justice Project Open Government Index to understand the domestic context. The Open Government Index looks at four indicators of the openness of a government: publicised laws and government data, right to information, civic participation, and complaint mechanisms.[13] The spiral model itself specifies some conditions of the openness of a government as a scope condition for success. While this is a very useful measurement of domestic governments, it must be looked at with significant caution as there is no index

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[13] 'WJP Open Government Index 2015' (*World Justice Project*) <https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-open-government-index-2015> accessed 20 October 2018.

available for Saudi Arabia. Although pure conjecture, one could assume that Saudi would not likely rank high on the openness scale but has shown responsiveness to the campaign.

The other campaigns have all been ranked by the World Justice Project, and within this group the variable has proven to be significant:

Figure 7.13: Relationship between World Justice Project rankings and overall legal change, excluding Saudi Arabia

This scatter plot shows three distinct groupings; these groupings directly map onto the legal outcome groups. This indicates, to some extent, that governments which are more open are more likely to respond to online campaigns. It does not mean that this is the only predictor of success; the level of success within the grouping is still dependent on the other variables discussed in this chapter. However it does appear that the openness of a government is an important factor in social media campaigning. Again this must be interpreted with caution as it excludes Saudi Arabia and the inclusion of Saudi Arabia most likely would change the significance rendering it less important.

Ignores material or nuanced incentives

Yet another critique of the spiral model is that is it based almost exclusively on the concept of naming and shaming, using international reputational harm as the primary incentive for governments to change.[14] Critics highlight that, in many cases, material incentives are actually at play in pressuring a State to change. Social media campaigns not only rely solely on naming and shaming but can even fall below that level of incentive as users are not necessarily in a position to put themselves at risk or present any incentive at all for a government to change. Although this is an extension of the critique of the spiral model, it bears exploration. The hypothesis is that campaigns with lower levels of user engagement will be less likely to lead to positive change; the lack of engagement equates to a lack of pressure on the government which is linked to lack of incentives. In other words, if the online campaign participants are not properly engaged with the issue and the campaign, then there is no compulsion for the government to implement change; essentially even *less so* than traditional campaigns on which the spiral model was developed and on which the critique rests.

To test this hypothesis, several engagement metrics were explored to determine both the level and type of engagement linked to each campaign. Replies are deemed the highest level of engagement; users are engaged in dialogue and debate on the issue, taking the time and effort to write original thoughts and responses in conversation with other campaign users. Replying is also the best proxy for a user putting themselves at any sort of risk, which is usually a necessary component for a protest-driven campaign.[15] By putting their own thoughts, words, images, and responses in the public sphere, users take a much more risky and active part in the campaign. A campaign with more replies is therefore categorised as showing higher levels of engagement, and therefore more likely to contribute to positive legal change. Likes are seen as the least engaged form of Twitter campaigning. Users show their support and participation by simply clicking like, showing the least level of risk, time, effort, and

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[14] Goldsmith and Krasner (n 12); Jérôme Y Bachelard, 'The Anglo-Leasing Corruption Scandal in Kenya: The Politics of International and Domestic Pressures and Counter-Pressures' (2010) 37 Review of African Political Economy 187; Ronald R Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 'Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric' (2007) 13 European Journal of International Relations 35; Robyn Linde, 'Statelessness and Roma Communities in the Czech Republic: Competing Theories of State Compliance' (2006) 13 International Journal on Minority & Group Rights 341; Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, 'Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice' (2003) 28 International Security 5.
[15] Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, *Social Movements: An Introduction* (2nd edn, Blackwell Publishing 2006); Malcolm Gladwell, 'Small Change' [2010] *The New Yorker* <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/10/04/small-change-malcolm-gladwell> accessed 14 March 2016.

participation – otherwise defined as 'slactivism'. This type of engagement brings the least incentives to domestic governments to change. The final type of engagement is Retweeting. While this may not show a high level of engagement, it shows more ownership and participation than liking a Tweet. In a different vein, a campaign driven by Retweets may in fact show consistent messaging, which could also lead to positive legal outcomes. Therefore, it is expected that replies would be associated with the most success, Retweets somewhere in the middle, and likes the least amount of legal change.

Again, starting from a series of correlations the following variables emerged as potentially significant:

Table 7.10: Statistically significant correlations, engagement metrics

		Overall legal change	Legislative change	Institutionalisation	Law enforcement	UN dialogue
Ratio of total number of replies to total number of Tweets	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	.689	***.836****	.581	-.028	.463
	Significance (p-value)	.059	***.010***	.131	.947	.248
Ratio of total number of likes to total number of Tweets	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	-.202	-.174	*-.712**	.055	.186
	Significance (p-value)	.631	.680	*.048*	.896	.660
Ratio of total number of replies to total number of Tweets during non-peak periods	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	***.854****	***.928****	.430	.352	.635
	Significance (p-value)	***.007***	***.001***	.288	.393	.091
Ratio of total number of likes to total number of Tweets during non-peak periods	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	-.208	-.171	*-.712**	.048	.165
	Significance (p-value)	.621	.686	*.048*	.910	.696
Total number of replies in non-peak periods	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	.679	*.727**	.452	.092	.619
	Significance (p-value)	.064	.041	.261	.829	.102

These results can be summarised as follows:

Table 7.11: Summary of significant relationships, engagement metrics

	Strong correlation (0.01)	Correlation (0.05)
Ratio of total number of replies to total number of Tweets	Legislative change	
Ratio of total number of likes to total number of Tweets		Institutionalisation (negative)
Ratio of total number of replies to total number of Tweets during non-peak periods	Overall legal change, legislative change	
Ratio of total number of likes to total number of Tweets during non-peak periods		Institutionalisation (negative)
Total number of replies in non-peak periods		Legislative change^

^ relationship which changes when running partial correlation

Initially, these results seem to support the hypothesis – replies look to be positively associated with legal change, while likes seems to be negatively associated (less likely to lead to positive change). It also appears that, closely linked to persistence metrics, having that dialogue and debate continue in non-peak periods is also potentially important for positive change. It is necessary to run a partial correlation on the non-peak total replies, as again this significance could simply be reflecting the overall number of Tweets in the campaign. Controlling for total Tweets, the significance is no longer present (R=0.484, p=0.271). This eliminates this variable from having any statistical significance.

There are no other identified potential confounders for the remaining significant variables. It appears that campaigns with high levels of dialogue and debate are linked to more positive outcomes, and in particular legislative change. Producing a scatter plot further clarifies the relationships:

Figure 7.14: Relationship between replies and legal outcomes

The role of dialogue, debate, and indeed user engagement in non-peak periods appears to be even more important than that during the campaign overall. This relates to the spiral model critique in that it shows the highest level of engagement and therefore, by extension, risk to the user and incentive to the government.

Equally, looking at the relationship of likes to campaign outcomes, a similar finding can be seen:

Figure 7.15: Relationship between likes and institutionalisation

Although a weaker relationship, the trend can still be identified. Campaigns with more likes, and therefore the least level of engagement, risk, and incentive, are correlated with less positive change in the institutionalisation of legal change. The incentives for the State to work towards institutionalisation simply are not present in campaigns where the users are less engaged.

Overall Models

The final piece of analysis attempts to put all the variables and hypotheses together into composite models. The first test to explore a composite, aggregated view of the research is to look at the relationship between the overall legal change and an overall composite campaign score. The overall campaign composite score in essence distils down over 500 potential parameters of interest into one summary number. It is an average of four composite scores: users, engagement, persistence, and content (the full list of variables included in the composite scores is in Appendix 3). Context and sentiment are excluded as these are not

continuous, ordinal scales on which to build a linear regression. The composite scores include a selection of parameters chosen as the most illustrative of the variable. Therefore, a higher score indicates: 1) a more domestically driven campaign, 2) with high levels of ongoing dialogue and debate from users, 3) with high levels of activity in both peak and non-peak periods, and 4) consistent messaging which draws down from international norms on women's rights.

Starting with a correlation:

Table 7.12: Correlation between overall campaign score and legal change

		Overall legal change	Legislative change	Institutionalisation	Law enforcement	UN dialogue
Overall Twitter driven campaign composite score	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	*.907***	*.850***	*.732**	.444	.594
	Significance (p-value)	*.002*	*.008*	*.039*	.271	.121

The above table shows that the overall composite score does show a statistically significant relationship with the overall legal change, and in particular with changes in legislation and to a lesser but still important extent, institutionalisation. Running a partial correlation controlling for the total number of days of the campaign (which could play a part in the persistence component), the relationship remains significant with overall legal change at the 0.01 level (R=0.907, p=0.005), while the relationship remains but slightly weaker for legislative change (R=0.851, p=0.015) and institutionalisation (R=0.784, p=0.037).

Looking at a simple linear regression between the overall composite campaign score and the overall legal change may show some summary insight. It is important to note that aggregated models do tend to lose some of the nuances of more complex or disaggregated models but can be useful as a simple way to summarise a large amount of information. At this stage, it is also worth noting that the outcome variable is normally distributed (analysed with a histogram and P-P plot).

Plotting the relationship shows the following:

Figure 7.16: Relationship between overall campaign score and overall legal change

This shows that there does appear to be a linear relationship between the overall composite score and the overall legal change. As this is a relatively small sample size (N = 8), any extrapolation of these findings to the entire 'population' of campaigns meeting the selection criteria must be thought of with caution. Additionally, the variance appears to show heteroscedasticity, meaning that the spread of outcomes is larger at the successful end of the range and less varied at the unsuccessful end (although a preliminary test using a weighted estimate regression which corrects for this kind of variation returned the same results). Future work may need to make adjustments to overcome these potential biases. However, we can apply this model with confidence to *this* data, and therefore draw some tentative conclusions about next steps to develop models which may apply outside of the data set.

The full analysis shows that this is a statistically significant relationship (R = 0.907, R^2 = 0.822, R^2Adj = 0.792, p=0.002). This means that 82% of the changes in the overall legal score are explained by the Twitter driven campaign's composite score, or 79% in the model adjusted for the small sample size. This also means that 18% (or 21%) of the variance is due

to other factors. However, explaining 82% of the variance is a fairly good fit. Examining the output further, the model produces a B value of 0.686. This means that for each increase of 1 in the overall campaign composite, it is likely that the legal change will improve by 0.686. Again, this is a statistically significant result. It can therefore be concluded, albeit tentatively, that there is a meaningful relationship between the characteristics of the hashtag campaign and the legal outcome. Although it would have been desirable to look at the relationship while controlling for the WJP index, without a value for #women2drive this runs the risk of presenting false results. At this stage, it will just be said that openness of a government may be a scope condition for success, but without full data it cannot be explored further.

Of note, correlations were run between all component parts of both the dependent composite score and the independent composite score:

Table 7.13: Correlations, composite scores

		Overall legal change	Legislative change	Institutionalisation	Law enforcement	UN dialogue
Persistence composite score	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	**.869****	.827*	.639	.450	.578
	Significance (p-value)	**.005**	.011	.088	.263	.134
Engagement composite score	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	.647	.584	.601	.512	.191
	Significance (p-value)	.083	.129	.115	.195	.651
User composite score	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	.658	.619	.508	.329	.439
	Significance (p-value)	.076	.101	.199	.426	.276
Content composite score	*Correlation coefficient (R)*	.624	.588	.556	-.031	.705
	Significance (p-value)	.098	.126	.152	.942	.051

These correlations show that, while some of the elements of the composite scores on their own hold statistical significance, the composites themselves (with the exception of persistence) do not have a strong relationship with legal outcomes. This harkens back to the Rubik's Cube finding in some of the legal analysis. This may be interpreted as showing that it is the combination of the critical elements that lead to more successful outcomes, discussed more fully in Chapter 8.

Conclusion

Taking all of the foregoing analyses into account, the following summarises the statistically significant parameters. It is important to keep in mind that these 11 parameters are out of a possible range of 513.

Table 7.14: Summary of all significant relationships

Parameter	Controlling for	p-value < 0.01	Correlation coefficient (R)
World justice project		Overall legal change	0.899
Number of days with at least one Tweet	Total days	Overall legal change	0.949
Number of days with at least five Tweets	Total days	Overall legal change	0.931
Non-peak reply : Tweet ratio		Overall legal change	0.854
Percent of international norms present		Overall legal change	0.926
Reply : Tweet ratio		Legislative change	0.836
Number of Tweets from non-domestic users in the most 100 active users	Total Tweets	Legislative change	0.900
Percent of the most 100 active users who clearly identify as domestic individuals		Law enforcement	0.852
Weighted negativity mean in peak periods	Total Tweets	Law enforcement	0.927
Percent of Tweets using first person pronouns		Law enforcement	0.842
Percent of Tweets with a variable message present		UN dialogue	-0.874

In sum, the above parameters show that:

1. Open governments, active days, dialogue during 'down' times, and invocation of international norms with a consistent focus on women's rights are all associated with overall positive legal change.

2. Ongoing dialogue including foreign actors is associated with legislative changes

3. 'Ordinary' domestic citizens vocalising their personal anger (negative sentiment and first-person pronouns) are associated with better outcomes in the courts

4. Lack of consistent messaging and more volatile, reactive Tweets are associated with poorer outcomes evidenced in UN dialogue, mostly likely the expression of government backlash

A set of ideal campaign characteristics and behaviours that are associated with different aspects of legal change can also begin to be seen. Complete legal change is defined as spanning legislation, soft law, government discourse, implementation by authorities including the courts, and ultimately rule consistent behaviour (as evidenced by UN dialogue). The empirical evidence in this study now shows that the campaigns showing the most legal change exhibit a high level of ongoing activity. This does not simply mean the length of time that the hashtag is used, but rather the proportion of days with at least one, and ideally more than five, Tweets. Interestingly, having days with more than 1,000 Tweets did not impact on the overall outcome. This indicates that continued focus and support on the issue is more important than huge peaks of attention which taper off. This was clearly seen in #women2drive, which did not have the height, length, or number of peaks seen in #niunamenos or #delhigangrape, but which did have a high number of days with more than five Tweets. Conversely, although #stopstoning was the longest running campaign in the study, there were a large number of completely inactive days with no Twitter activity at all.

In a related vein, campaigns which encourage dialogue through replies are also associated with more positive outcomes. This is particularly true in time periods which do not include large spikes in Tweets or events which draw social media attention. It is the ongoing dialogue and debate throughout the lifespan of the campaign which matters, not just sheer numbers of users Tweeting, Retweeting, or clicking like when the hashtag trends. This is an interesting finding, as it is not a typical exhibition of public pressure which would traditionally be associated with positive change, and certainly as specified by the spiral model. This shows that governments are perhaps more willing to respond when campaigners show higher levels of engagement, and, therefore personal investment and even risk.

Finally, the presence of international norms on women's rights in the content of Tweets is associated with more positive overall change. This may indicate a level of consistency, with messaging staying focussed on women's rights. The invocation of international norms shows a connection to external pressures. It may be that, combined with domestic drivers, this indicates that the domestic campaign is being supported and buoyed by foreign actors. This ties into the critique of the spiral model that emphasis needs to be shifted from the external to the internal. This finding may indicate that external influence is still critical, but perhaps more so when invoked or used by domestic voices. As seen earlier in this chapter, there is a significant relationship between the number of domestic drivers of the campaign (the most prolific users) and overall legal outcomes. This, in the future, can be tested by exploring the combined effect of international norm usage with domestic users and activity.

Disaggregating further, the data also shows particular aspects which are related to legislative changes, namely ongoing campaign dialogue and activity levels from non-domestic campaign drivers. This indicates that governments may respond legislatively to a campaign which sparks some level of personal investment from participants. This may be a type of 'petition' concept, where if enough people voice their opinion on a matter (through replying to Tweets in a campaign), the government will listen. It may be that Twitter replies are more powerful than online petitions as the time, effort, and personal risk is greater when replying to a Tweet than electronically adding one's name to a petition. Personal risk is greater as the user is allowing their own opinion to be permanently memorialised in their online profile through the publication of the reply. It also seems that this dialogue and debate needs to include a certain level of activity from non-domestic users, though in balance with domestic. It is not the *number* of non-domestic users driving the campaign that matters, conversely it looks like a combination of a high *number* of domestic users with a high *activity level* of a smaller yet perhaps more dedicated group of non-domestic users is associated with higher levels of change.

Next, and possibly one of the most striking findings in the data, are the parameters associated with better law enforcement. The data seems to indicate that a high prevalence of first-person pronouns ('I', 'we', 'our'), a high proportion of domestic individuals driving the campaign, and a high presence of negative sentiment combined see more positive implementation of change in law enforcement. In plain language, this means that angry domestic citizens voicing their personal opinion can perhaps contribute to more justice. Again, it is always important to reassert that this does not mean the judges are sitting at their PCs reading Tweets

and deciding how to proceed in any related cases, but that the characteristics of the campaign influence the media, on the ground activities, and the general feeling of 'pressure' exerted by social media. In this area, it is the combination of factors which has produced what are such interesting results. Perhaps any of these parameters on their own might not paint such a clear picture – domestic individuals, first person pronouns, or negative sentiment – yet when the elements are combined the results show a fascinating dynamic – angry citizens voicing their opinions.

Finally, and discussed at length earlier in this chapter, is the role of messaging. The data has also shown that campaigns which are less consistent and less focussed on women's rights norms are more likely to lead to negative outcomes in UN dialogue. UN dialogue has shown to be the site of the manifestation of government backlash, particularly in the Iranian campaigns. It appears that campaigns which remain consistent and invoke, even to a small extent, international norms around women's rights are more likely to lead to positive dialogue with the UN system.

Chapter 8 : Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Work

Introduction

This thesis has set out to answer the following research questions:

1. Can international campaigns originating in and driven by Twitter contribute to domestic legal change in women's rights?
2. If so, which campaign behaviours are associated with change?

This chapter will summarise the findings presented throughout the thesis to answer these questions. In short,

1. Yes, international Twitter-driven campaigns can contribute to domestic legal change; however the changes can be both positive and negative.
2. Twitter-driven campaigns which are domestically-driven but with a high level of foreign interest, where users continue to Tweet regularly over the lifespan of the campaign, with evidence of dialogue and debate through the reply function, and which show consistent messaging drawing down from international women's rights norms are associated with more positive legal outcomes.

Campaign 'groupings' based on outcomes

An initial important finding in this research was the general 'grouping' of campaigns by outcome. Campaigns primarily fell into four different categories: negative outcomes (government backlash), status quo (no overall change), tactical concessions (legislative change but lacking institutionalisation), and possible success (some indication of overall positive legal change). In the section below, broad conclusions are drawn about the different categories of potential outcomes. It is worth noting that this aspect will be explored in greater statistical detail in future work with an ordinal logistic regression (discussed later in this chapter).

Backlash Campaigns: Lack of domestic drive

At first, it may seem that the common characteristic of the backlash campaigns was simply the target country: Iran. However, this assumption failed when tested further. First and foremost, there were important differences in legal outcomes between the two Iranian campaigns themselves. Although they both overall showed negative outcomes, the gradient and degree were different. This indicates that something other than simply context in the target country was likely influencing outcomes. Second, context variables across all of the campaigns in the study were collected specifically to ensure that the domestic situation could be tested as a control factor. In this case, the context variables in Iran were not different from context variables in other target countries. This indicates, at least to some extent, that it was not solely the target country of Iran that pre-determined the negative legal outcomes. Although this may have *contributed* to the outcomes, it was not a *sufficient* factor to explain all of the differences. In particular, countries such as Afghanistan, Turkey, India, and Saudi Arabia had some similar domestic characteristics. A wide variety of context variables were examined in order to ensure that it was not down to researcher choice. Therefore, other factors are likely at play. In other words, while the target country of course matters in a pre-determined way, characteristics in the Twitter campaigns themselves can still influence the outcome, making it worse or better.

Twitter behaviours across #stopstoning and #letwomengotostadium were fairly similar but did show enough differences to tentatively draw some conclusions. Both showed high levels of non-domestic involvement with low levels of domestic drive, lacked in persistence and engagement, and lacked focus on international women's rights norms. It is likely the combination of these factors led to the similarly regressive outcomes. However, these behaviours were seen to a *greater* degree in #stopstoning, particularly the lack of domestic drive and voice in the campaign. Government responses were driven primarily from hard-line religious conservatives expressing deep hostility towards 'Western' propaganda. It also appeared that law enforcement was used as a tool to re-assert domestic power and prominence over foreign influences, adversely affecting the lives of women and girls in Iran. These campaigns are a stark example of the potential dangers of social media driven advocacy campaigns and the very real potential for destructive domestic government backlash and regression.

Status Quo Campaigns: Lack of persistence

Three campaigns showed no meaningful overall legal change - #farkhunda, #sendeanlat, and #mydressmychoice. These campaigns may have shown some aspects of positive legal change, but there were equally some negative aspects. As seen with the backlash campaigns, the geo-political and socio-economic contexts of the countries in this category (Afghanistan, Turkey, and Kenya) were markedly different and thus not likely a sufficient explanation for the similarity in lack of legal changes. This group also underscores how a country can have a relatively decent baseline status for women and girls but not necessarily be primed for meaningful change.

The three campaigns did, however, show remarkable similarities in aspects of the Twitter behaviours. All three campaigns showed almost identical timelines with very large peaks around the initial viral spread of the campaign but little to no activity in the long term. All three spark incidents – Farkhunda's mob murder video, the death of Ozgeclan, and the video of the public stripping in Nairobi – gathered enormous social media attention in the immediate aftermath. Peaks of more than 10,000 Tweets per day were recorded for #sendeanlat and #mydressmychoice. This attention however quickly waned with these three campaigns showing very little activity after the reaction to the initial incident faded. It is likely that this initial interest contributed to some of the positive legal outcomes, but that the lack of sustained interest left the campaigns 'unfinished' with no pressure to implement meaningful long-term change.

Campaigns which showed higher levels of success showed far more persistence in the level of Twitter activity. This tends to indicate that campaigns which show high levels of attention that quickly fade are less likely to lead to long term change. Although this may seem like an obvious conclusion, this study now provides empirical evidence for what many may have assumed.

Tactical Concession Campaigns: Extremely high level of domestic attention in close proximity to election

These two campaigns - #delhigangrape and #niunamenos - appeared to gather extreme levels of attention around the spark incident, primarily from domestic users, *and* began fairly close to elections and potential regime change. They were the largest campaigns in the study at

144,867 and 410,858 Tweets respectively. Legal outcomes showed quick, reactionary tactical concessions but lacked in moving to institutionalisation or rule-consistent behaviour. In Argentina, the campaign peaked approximately six months before national elections, where a change in ruling party occurred. #delhigangrape peaked 16 months before a national election that also saw a change in the ruling party. Candidates in #niunamenos openly used the hashtag in their campaigning.[1]

The evidence suggests that these kind of high-profile online campaigns could push governments to implement changes in reaction to the mass negative public attention fuelled by social media rather than a more considered long term decision. Both campaigns scored high in legislative change but low in law enforcement, showing the wide gap between legislating and implementation and enforcement. Although they were only two campaigns in this study which showed this relationship, it was quite strong and striking how similar the two were. The mass online public attention brought about the large scale 'naming and shaming' and reputational damage on which the spiral model relies. However, as some critics of the spiral model warned, this push to tactical concessions did not then translate to long-term efforts to move towards institutionalisation and rule-consistent behaviour. This can be seen as a missed opportunity, perhaps even closing doors to future advocacy work. If the government feels that they have 'done their bit' and addressed the campaign's concerns through the legislative changes, then continuing advocacy work could be hampered or seriously impeded.

Potential Success Campaign: Consistency across all Twitter behaviours

One campaign in the study appeared to be associated with a tentative level of success. #women2drive, after years of online advocacy and campaigning, finally saw the Saudi government change the law to allow women to drive in July 2018.[2] This campaign did not

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[1] 'Four Months From #NiUnaMenos: Has Anything Changed?'
<http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/four-months-from-niunamenos-has-anything-changed/> accessed 21 November 2017.

[2] Center for Security Policy, 'Saudi Women Gain the Right to Drive'
<https://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2017/10/02/saudi-women-gain-the-right-to-drive/> accessed 11 February 2018; 'Saudi Arabia Agrees to Let Women Drive' *The New York Times*
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-women-drive.html> accessed 11 February 2018; 'Saudi Arabia to Allow Women to Drive' *Al Jazeera*
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/saudi-arabia-women-drive-170926190857109.html> accessed 11 February 2018; Human Rights Watch, 'Saudi Arabia: As Women's Driving Ban Ends, Provide Parity' (27

see perfect outcomes, however, as there are still issues around institutionalisation and law enforcement, particularly around the lack of change to guardianship laws.[3] It also remains to be seen how the change in the law will be fully implemented and how, in practice, it will impact the rights and freedoms of women. However, at this stage, the campaign *does* show association with success and therefore it is worthwhile to identify the key characteristics that may have led to the positive legal changes.

On the whole, this campaign showed a much higher level of consistency across all variables than the other campaigns. It did not show the fluctuation in peaks and troughs of the other campaigns, and the framing, messaging, and norms tended to be both internationally driven and consistent. The driving users remained domestic but there was a well-executed strategic choice to ensure that the campaign tapped into foreign pressure, particularly from the US.[4] This pattern of consistency, domestic drive, and strategically selected foreign pressure appears to have combined to see positive legal outcomes. Although international actors were potentially central to its success, this was not at the expense of the domestic drive. The critiques of the spiral model were less prominent, if present at all, in this campaign.

Ideal Twitter Campaign Behaviours

This research has provided strong evidence of Twitter campaign behaviours that are associated with positive legal outcomes. The ultimate aim from a research impact perspective is to understand if there is a 'package' of elements which, taken together, are more likely to contribute to positive legal change for women and girls. The 'package' of elements for an ideal Twitter-driven campaign are variables which are drawn from the critiques of the spiral model and overcome some of the potential risks of campaigning in social media. Keeping in mind the overall scores of legal change, not a single campaign

September 2017) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/27/saudi-arabia-womens-driving-ban-ends-provide-parity> accessed 12 February 2018.

[3] Jane Kinninmont, 'End of Saudi Women Driving Ban Reflects Deep Changes in Society' *BBC News* (27 September 2017) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-41412022> accessed 11 February 2018; See also '"Battle of the Sexes": Saudi Men React to Women Driving' (*Dhaka Tribune*, 4 October 2017) <http://www.dhakatribune.com/world/middle-east/2017/10/04/saudi-men-react-women-driving/> accessed 13 February 2018.

[4] 'What Overturning the Ban on Female Drivers Means for Saudi Arabia and the World' <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/what-overturning-the-ban-on-female-drivers-means-for-saudi-arabia-and-the-world> accessed 13 February 2018.

reached a level of perfect change, nor even breaching the 4th bracket.[5] The best campaign came in at 3.88 out of a possible 5.00. While this still shows a range of outcomes, it is not necessarily a range of successful outcomes, but rather a range of *less than* successful outcomes. Even #women2drive with its success in lifting the ban on women driving has major issues around the continuation of guardianship laws and the role of the courts in arbitrary arrests and detentions of women activists.

The ideal Twitter-driven campaign would be steered in the direction presented below, as much as possible (with full understanding that the organic, user-driven and non-neutral nature of social media in and of itself presents challenges):

Variable	Indicators of success
Context	Target governments which are considered more 'open'[6] It may also be advisable to avoid social media campaigning in close proximity to elections and potential regime change
Size of campaign	Try to ensure that the campaign is big enough to exert pressure (as in #women2drive), but not so big that it pushes the government into reactionary change (as evidenced by #delhigangrape and #niunamenos)
Persistence	Avoid days with no Tweets and aim for at least five Tweets per day. Equally, huge peak days with more than 10,000 Tweets may have a 'tactical concession' effect. Slow and steady campaigns are linked to more positive outcomes, as seen in #women2drive.
Users	While the campaign needs to be domestically driven, there *also* needs to be a baseline level of foreign pressure, most importantly to move towards legislative change. Falling below the baseline of foreign pressure, particularly without domestic groundswell, runs the risk of government backlash, as seen in #stopstoning. The voice of ordinary domestic individuals (as opposed to activists or organisations) is important.

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[5] 5.00 being perfect change and 1.00 representing total regression.

[6] Campaigns which target more 'open' governments may be associated with better outcomes, however this finding must be qualified as it does not include Saudi Arabia. Given that #women2drive saw the highest level of legal success, but that it might be speculated that Saudi Arabia would *not* have scored positively in the world justice project scores, the overall relationship may very well change with the inclusion of Saudi.

Engagement	Higher levels of replies, particularly in non-peak periods, show higher levels of engagement and are linked to more positive outcomes. Retweeting indicates consistent messaging and has some positive effects. Campaigns with high proportions of likes without the dialogue of replies or the consistent messaging of retweets are likely to lead to less positive outcomes.
Sentiment	Negative sentiment is linked with more *positive* outcomes in law enforcement.
Framing, Messaging, and Norms	The consistent presence of international norms around women's rights is one of the most important elements of a campaign's success. Volatile and changing framing and messaging is linked with government backlash, particularly evident in dialogue with UN treaty bodies.

Deconstructing the Research Map

Here, it is also important to engage in 'deconstructing' the construction of the research map which framed this study. It was an important exercise to identify theoretically grounded variables, linking the critiques of the spiral model through the media effects literature with the risks of campaigning in Twitter. However, the findings of the study have born much more complex, nuanced, and intertwined results that cannot be distilled down into a two column, binary table. Equally, the overly simplistic unidirectionality of the spiral model does not map onto a social media driven campaign, where the directionality of both influence and change is multi-lateral.

The first area of critique which this research explored was the lack of focus on domestic actors the overemphasis on Western approaches. This was linked to the evidence showing that social media continues to be dominated by users from Global North and is technically built on platforms which are non-neutral and tend to favour the global elite. This risk was initially matched to the drivers of the campaigns (users). The concern that traditional advocacy campaigns may place too much emphasis on the role of transnational/Western actors is potentially greater in a social media environment where campaigns are more likely to be dominated and/or driven by elite and foreign/Western participants. The overemphasis on foreign actors is problematic in that it reinforces the potential victim/saviour dichotomy, can result in a campaign which exports Western ideals without due regard to domestic culture

and values, and could result in silencing an already silenced domestic population. The last concern is of particular prominence with the functionality of social media which brings some Tweets to the fore and sends others to the background. The cycle created by this algorithm and filter-bubble driven effect can dramatically influence the direction of influence of a campaign.

This research, taking cognisance of the above, has shown that the presence (or lack thereof) of domestic drive is actually intimately linked to nearly all the spiral model critiques: the potential for government backlash, the lack of knowledge of the domestic context, and a lack of incentive for the domestic government to change (a predominantly foreign driven campaign may not have any power over a domestic government as compared to voting domestic citizens). The outcomes therefore clearly break the binary relationship and instead show that a campaign which is dominated and driven by foreign users cuts across many of the critiques and risks, not just one.

The organic and chaotic nature of social media was initially linked to potential government backlash. The lack of complete organisational or hierarchical ability to temper, control, or strategically frame messaging was hypothesised to open the door to government backlash, another of the main critiques of the spiral model. The relationship, however, is also much more complex than the initial binary mapping. There *is* a correlation between the variability of messaging and government backlash as evidenced primarily in state dialogue with UN Treaty Bodies. Government backlash was also, as seen above, the result of an overly foreign driven campaign. Equally, messaging was seen to significantly affect long term implementation in law enforcement, and is also influenced by the non-neutrality of Twitter. Again, the relationships between the theory, risks, and variables of interest are more inter-related and interdependent than the initial research map.

The short attention span of social media campaigns was identified as problematic in that these Twitter driven campaigns generally do not last long enough to properly affect long-term, meaningful, institutionalised change – even more so than traditional campaigns. This was matched with persistence variables which measured the number of Tweets per day over the lifespan of the campaigns. Yet again, while the binary relationship did hold true when tested, the lack of long-term progression through to rule consistent behaviour or meaningful implementation was also correlated to the level of engagement of the users and the variability of messaging. While persistence was most closely linked to a lack of long-term progression

as hypothesised, it was also important to note that domestic drive and user engagement were also important in moving target countries through to full implementation and institutionalisation.

The final piece of the research map to 'deconstruct' is the hypothesised binary relationship between lack of incentives and engagement metrics.   The incentives for domestic government to change were heavily influenced by the level of domestic drive in the campaign as measured by users, not just how they engaged with the campaign. While engagement levels did appear to affect governments' willingness to change, as seen above this campaign behaviour also affected institutionalisation. It was not possible to clearly link engagement to incentives, but the results do show that higher levels of user engagement are associated with more positive change. It thus follows that the engagement is a proxy for how much individuals are willing to risk for a campaign, and higher risk presents more intense incentives for governments to change. Campaigns which had high levels of 'likes' seemed to embody the scholarly positions on 'slactivism', which do not carry the levels of risks or incentives needed to exert enough pressure on the domestic state. Beyond this relationship, the study also found that Retweets became aligned with consistent messaging, rather than an indicator of participant engagement. This was a notable finding which was not within the scope of the initial hypotheses.

Therefore, this study has shown that the critiques of the spiral model and the risks of social media campaigning rooted in media effect theories are intertwined, multidirectional, and cyclical. All of the variables stemming from the theoretical framework cut across the binary and unidirectional lines to contribute to outcomes, both positive and negative. With this deconstructed approach, this chapter now turns to the major findings of the study, cognisant of the interconnected and interdependent relationships between the spiral model critiques, the social media risks, the variables of interest, and the analytical findings.

Major findings

1. The first important finding was that campaigns *are* associated with a variety of legal outcomes. When the research began, it was a very real possibility that all campaigns would have had similar legal outcomes, neither positive nor negative. The overall legal change scores ranged from 2.00 to 3.88 (out of 1.00 – 5.00) and individual legal

component[7] scores ranged from 1.00 through to 5.00. The poorest results were seen in #stopstoning, where not only did the law change in what activists see as a negative way, but reliable reports women being stoned to death increased after the campaign began.[8] The most positive campaign was #women2drive. Although the driving ban has now been lifted in Saudi, it is not a perfect 5.00 score as guardianship laws remain and the government still uses law enforcement to control activists.[9] The fact that the campaigns do differ in legal outcomes is an important initial finding in and of itself, as it allowed the research to then delve into discovering the differences in the online campaigns themselves that may be associated with or correlated to different outcomes.

2. There is threshold above which non-domestic participation becomes 'pressure' and is associated with positive change, but below which can be seen as 'foreign meddling' potentially opening the door to government backlash. Although with such a small sample size it is not yet possible to determine where that threshold sits, there are indications that some level of foreign pressure is needed to change the legal landscape. For example, #women2drive strategically chose to use Twitter in order to draw down from Western influences.[10] Additionally, the presence of non-domestic users in the 100 most active in a campaign is strongly correlated with positive legislative change. Conversely, #stopstoning showed a high percentage of foreign influence but low raw numbers. This appeared to open the door to government backlash and negative outcomes.[11] Therefore, it can be deduced from these sets of results that, if foreign pressure is a strategic campaign choice, it needs to reach a level to actually 'work'; falling below that level runs the risk of being viewed more as foreign meddling and less as an exertion of foreign pressure. This finding tends to, in some ways, support many of the critiques of the spiral model, in that a blanket

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[7] Legislative change, Institutionalisation, Law enforcement, and UN dialogue

[8] Reilly Dempsey Willis, 'Can Twitter Change the Iranian Legal Landscape for Women?' (2018) 0 International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 1.

[9] Human Rights Watch, 'Saudi Arabia: Repression Overshadows Women's Reforms' (2018) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/saudi-arabia-repression-overshadows-womens-reforms> accessed 15 February 2018; Human Rights Watch (n 2).

[10] Jason Burke, 'Saudi Arabia Women Test Driving Ban' *The Guardian* (17 June 2011) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/17/saudi-arabia-women-drivers-protest> accessed 14 February 2018; 'What Overturning the Ban on Female Drivers Means for Saudi Arabia and the World' (n 4).

[11] Maryam Hosseinkhah, 'The Execution of Women in Iranian Criminal Law: An Examination of the Impact of Gender on Laws Concerning Capital Punishment in the New Islamic Penal Code' (IHR 2012).

reliance on international actors is *not* sufficient to move a government to meaningful human rights change. It indicates that foreign pressure may work, but in a way that starts from the domestic actors first, as was the strategy in #women2drive.

3. Drawing down from international norms on women's rights appears to be linked with more successful campaigns. Using a deductive list of 93 key words and phrases derived from international women's rights norms, those online campaigns which showed higher use of these words were more successful. The relationship was one of the strongest in the study, with a correlation coefficient of 0.926 and an R^2 of 0.858. This tends to indicate that campaigns which are more closely linked to internationally accepted norms will likely see a greater chance of positive legal change. This also indicates a level of consistency, showing that the messaging in Tweets stays 'on target' rather than organically and chaotically veering off course or shifting focus over the course of the campaign. The variable of interest was the percent of international norms which were present. Less important was the relationship between the number of Tweets and the number of times international norms were mentioned. It was the level of reflection of international women's rights norms which was statistically significant. In other words, the number of times the international norms were used was not as important as the number of international norms that were used, even if only a small number of times. For example, only 23% of the international norms were present in #stopstoning, while 87% of the international norms were mentioned at least once in #women2drive (in translated Tweets overcoming any language concerns). This finding is one that will be explored in greater detail in future work.

4. Looking at specific legal outcome components (i.e. legislative change, institutionalisation, law enforcement, and UN dialogue as opposed to overall legal change) additional findings emerged. Positive legislative change is associated with a higher ratio of replies to Tweets across both peak and non-peak periods and more Tweets from non-domestic campaign drivers (controlling for total Tweets in the campaign). This indicates that dialogue (more replies) which includes non-domestic users may lead to positive legislative changes. This is the one finding in the study that *upholds* the role of international actors in the spiral model. Here, the data suggests that pressure from foreign influences (including organisations, media outlets, and individuals) could help a campaign in achieving positive legislative change. It is

important to note that this finding does not apply to overall legal change, institutionalisation, law enforcement, or UN dialogue. The only statistically significant relationship is with legislative change. Here, foreign pressure may be needed to force a government to change the law, but it is not relevant when it comes to implementing or institutionalising the changes. The power then shifts (or needs to shift) to the domestic voice.

5. 'Ordinary' domestic citizens vocalising their personal anger (negative sentiment) are associated with improvements in law enforcement. Three separate variables show statistical significance for law enforcement – the percent of the 100 most active users who self-identify as domestic individuals (*not* activists or campaigners), the weighted negativity average during peak times, and the percent of Tweets with a first-person pronoun. Future work will need to explore how these variables interact with each other to paint a more accurate picture of these behaviours. However, at this initial stage, this seems to indicate that campaigns with your average, ordinary, domestic user, using first person pronouns and negative language, particularly during peak times, are associated with positive changes in law enforcement. Law enforcement covers the entire process from front line police involvement to charging to prosecution and appeals. It seems that campaigns which spark vocal anger in citizens may see better police and judicial enforcement of laws which are intended to protect women and girls. One researcher has suggested that this may be due to a wider phenomenon where the most difficult issues facing the courts are often 'worked out' in the public sphere.[12] In these Twitter-driven campaigns, the opinion of the public is voiced on social media. The more present the domestic voice is, the more likely the campaign is to see meaningful change in law enforcement. From the legal research undertaken in this study, law enforcement seemed to be one of the more challenging aspects of human rights change. It therefore makes sense that a strong domestic voice would be necessary to overcome this challenge.

6. Lack of consistent framing and messaging and more volatile, reactive Tweets are associated with poorer outcomes evidenced in dialogue with UN treaty bodies, mostly

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[12] Response from Tola Amodu to Reilly Dempsey Willis, 'Evaluating the Impact of Global Twitter Campaigns on Domestic Women's Rights: Statistical Modelling and Analysis' (Research Seminar, University of East Anglia School of Law, 6 June 2018).

the expression of government backlash. Here, the higher the percentage of Tweets with variable, organically emerging messaging the *less* likely there is to be positive change evidenced in state dialogue with UN human rights mechanisms. This was the only negative-direction strong statistically significant relationship. Here, variable, organically emerging framing and messaging are used a large number of times, but only across one or two time periods. This can be interpreted as campaign volatility, inconsistent framing, and changing messaging. This volatility is then statistically associated with poorer outcomes in the UN dialogue. As the UN dialogue tended to be the site of most of the manifestations of government backlash, as seen clearly in #stopstoning and #delhigangrape, this may indicate that more volatile campaigns, with less tempered messaging or inconsistent foci, are more likely to open the door to government backlash.

Impact

Campaigners will use social media. Individuals will use hashtags. This is without a doubt. There is nothing in this study that suggests that advocates should stop using social media tools. What this study shows is that there are ways in which activists could perhaps harness the power of social media in more meaningful ways, at least when it comes to international campaigns targeting domestic legal change for women's rights. The study also cannot compare the legal outcomes given the existence of the Twitter-driven campaigns to what might have happened if the campaigns had not started to trend or go 'viral.' It could be that the situation would be worse for women and girls if the issues had never made it into the public social media conscious at all. What this study aims to provide is, rather, empirical insight into how campaigns can be more successful once they 'take off', and how, to whatever extent possible, to avoid the Twitter behaviours which bring an element of risk for women and girls. Although social media is by definition chaotic, unpredictable, and elite user-driven, there may be ways for activists and even organisations to creatively work to avoid these risky social media behaviours that potentially lead to negative outcomes. Some of these efforts may already be underway, but it is hoped that the level of comparative, empirical evidence in this thesis will help to inform advocacy in the future. Conversely, if it proves impossible to 'control' Twitter-driven campaigns, then this research may serve as a caution to activists over the potential for unanticipated and unintentional negative outcomes.

Limitations

This study had a number of limitations, many of which were explored in detail in Chapter 2 and the methodological Appendices of this thesis.[13] For the most part, these limitations and challenges in the end provided opportunities for strengthening the research design. As this study in some ways can act as a pilot, limitations have been clearly identified for future work.

The first, and perhaps greatest, limitation of this study was the 'sample size' – the number of campaigns. Ideally, the full set of ten originally selected campaigns would have been included in the final list. Having eight campaigns certainly allowed for in depth exploration with many different parameters, but the small number limits the applicability of the findings outside of the study. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the statistical findings are reliable and significant within the confines of the study, but the small 'n' means the findings cannot, at this stage, be extrapolated further to other campaigns. There are ways to work with the data set, statistically, to build predictive models. This will be explored in future work.

A second limitation to the study was the availability of Twitter data. Adjustments have been made where necessary to overcome this challenge, however it was a significant hurdle in the study design.[14] For some campaigns, upwards of 10,000 tweets per day were accessible while for others it ranged from 4,000-8,000. While this is still a healthy sample size for those days, due to the nature of Twitter data collection it may mean that for a small number of days for some of the campaigns Tweets from a specific time of day may not be included in the study. Wherever possible, steps have been taken to overcome this challenge, primarily through double collection via 'Top' and 'Latest' tabs so as to avoid skipping a particular time of day. However this was not possible for every day in every campaign as outlined in Chapter 2. This could have impacted some of the analysis, although it is likely to not be significant.

Thirdly, the non-neutrality of social media and Twitter in particular is a major challenge to any social media research. The algorithms which reward selected Tweets and users with visibility are difficult to overcome, and most certainly influence the trajectory and directionality of the online campaigns. The filter bubbles which are meant to create a more personalised user experience may have a homogenising effect and have undoubtedly moulded

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[13] Reilly Dempsey Willis, 'Exploring the Relationship between Global Twitter Campaigns and Domestic Law: Methodological Challenges and Solutions' (2020) Forthcoming Information and Communications Technology Law.

[14] ibid.

the behaviours of the online campaigns from within. Messaging, framing, and Retweeting in particularly will be intimately affected by the platforms' functionality. Remaining cognisant of this non-neutrality is critical when reading and interpreting these results.

The next limitation to explore in these concluding thoughts is the challenge of quantifying qualitative data. Again, steps have been taken to maintain a level of consistency, objectivity, and reliability. With any study of this nature, the researcher has to make choices and decisions on how to quantify the data and how to determine what *is* legal change. Wherever possible, subjectivity has been removed through careful process documentation and consistent application of set rules. It may be that a different researcher with different experiences and understandings may have come to different quantified conclusions. Consistency was used as the main tool to address this challenge, attempting to ensure that the results were comparable.[15]

The final limitation to note is the ever-present correlation – causation debate. At no point in this thesis is it argued that the campaign behaviours can be pinpointed as *direct causes* of change. With this kind of data, it is just not possible to prove causation.[16] Nor is it prudent to try. What this study is designed to do is show correlations, associations, trends, directionalities, and patterns. Timelines, discourse, reports, and other pieces of information certainly provide enough evidence to make connections between the Twitter-driven campaigns and the legal outcomes. There is ample evidence throughout this thesis which allows for these correlations to be made.[17] However, it is not possible to begin to make any claims about *causation*.

<u>Future Work</u>

This research has much potential for future work, and in many ways became almost a pilot study where research design challenges and issues were identified and worked out. The next

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[15] ibid.

[16] ibid.

[17] For example, the specific references to 'Western' interference in #stopstoning, campaign peaks in #letwomengotostadium just before government reactions, the evidence from Human Rights Watch linking social media attention to the rushed trials in #farkhunda, references to the hashtag campaign in both the Verma Report and the court opinions in #delhigangrape, politicians using the hashtag to announce legislative changes in Argentina, and ample evidence from activists themselves of the role of Twitter in the success of #women2drive. These are just a handful of examples to underscore the strength of the relationship between the Twitter-driven campaigns and the legal outcomes.

step the researcher would like to take is in the area of statistical analysis. The data is ripe for in depth, potentially experimental, statistical work. In particular, the researcher would like to explore the following work:

1. Multivariate regression analysis – at this stage, only a simple, condensed single linear regression was performed. While this produced insightful and meaningful results, it would be extremely useful to build a much more sensitive multivariate regression to better understand the interaction and interplay between variables of interest.

2. Data transformation – there are some ways in which the data can be transformed to address the small sample size to still allow for predictive models to be created. This is one area where the thesis's impact could be greatly increased, providing a more predictive model to apply to other Twitter campaigns.

3. Ordinal logistic regression – this statistical test looks at groups of outcomes. In this test, the regression would not scale for each individual campaign outcomes, but rather for 'backsliding', 'status quo', 'tactical concessions', and 'possible success'. This test would allow exploration of statistically significant variables and combinations of variables to predict *group* outcomes, not individual campaigns.

4. Finally, interesting work is being done using principle component analysis on Twitter data.[18] This statistical analysis looks at a large number of parameters (~ 500 in this study) and identifies the most significant components for explaining variance in outcomes. In this way, rather than looking at individual variables or selecting variables in a regression model, all variables can be taken into account and distilled down to the most statistically significant. This is used to clearly identify trends in the data and understand variability.

Future work could also extend the research into new and emerging campaigns and other forms of social media. This work quantifying and modelling the legal impact of social media campaigns has much potential for growth, development, and extension.

A fascinating finding in this research which bears further study and development is the presence of the counter-narrative. This was a surprising but overwhelming observation when

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[18] Andrew Chadwick, Cristian Vaccari and Ben O'Loughlin, 'Do Tabloids Poison the Well of Social Media? Explaining Democratically Dysfunctional News Sharing' [2018] New Media & Society 4255.

collecting Tweets. Further, in depth, and theory-based work is needed to understand the role and impact of counter-narratives in these campaigns.[19]

Finally, there is scope for a pure theory study, specifically focussing on the utility and applicability of the spiral model in a social media environment. This would fall more under the scholarship which 'tests' the spiral model in different countries, with different rights, and under different conditions. A pure spiral model study would take this thesis and proffer specific changes and modifications to improve its use when applied to social media campaigning. This thesis has focussed more on using the spiral model and its critiques to inform methodological choices and research questions. Further work could take a much more theory-based approach.

Conclusions

In short, this research has shown that international Twitter-driven campaigns can and do have relationship with domestic legal changes, specifically looking at rights for women and girls. This is a unique, important, and substantial contribution to academia across areas of international human rights, women's rights, activism, international relations, and social media. Studying nearly one million Tweets across eight campaigns targeting seven countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South America brings an important comparative approach to the study of Twitter and social media campaigning. The approach to understanding norms from both an inductive and deductive process is novel, innovative, and important in the development of understanding of norms and norm institutionalisation.

From an impact perspective, this research provides crucial evidence-based insight for activists and campaigners around the world working to improve the lives of women and girls. The data shows that there are certain campaign behaviours which are associated with more positive legal outcomes and characteristics which are linked to negative legal outcomes. Campaigns which are domestically-driven, with a high level of foreign-attention, showing persistence, engagement, and consistency are more likely to lead to positive legal outcomes. Conversely, campaigns which lack in domestic drive, can be seen as 'foreign meddling', and fail to achieve persistence, engagement, or consistency are more likely to lead to negative

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[19] Willis, Reilly Dempsey, 'Habermasian Utopia or Sunstein's Echo Chamber? The "Dark Side" of Hashtag Hijacking and Women's Rights' [Forthcoming] TBD.

outcomes. It is hoped that these findings can help campaigning in the future to, at the very least, attempt to avoid social media campaigns that could lead to more harm than good.

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Appendix 1: Full list of parameters with definitions

Parameter	Description
LEGAL	
Legislation	Quantified on a scale from : 1. The law has actively been changed in a way that is against the goals of the campaign 2. The law has been somewhat modified in a way that is against the goal of the campaign 3. The law has not changed at all 4. The law has been somewhat modified in a way that aligns with the campaign 5. The law has been changed to completely align with the goals of the campaign
Institutionalisation	Quantified on a scale from: 1. Government discourse is actively hostile against the goals of the campaign, there is no evidence of soft law and/or budget allocations to support the goals of the campaign. 2. Government discourse does not align with the goals of the campaign, little evidence of soft law and/or budget allocations to support the goals of the campaign 3. No change in government discourse, soft law, and/or budget allocations 4. Some evidence of positive change in government discourse, soft law, and/or budget allocation to align with the goals of the campaign 5. Complete positive change evidenced in government discourse, soft law, and/or budget allocations to align with the goals of the campaign
Law enforcement	Quantified on a scale from: 1. Evidence of arbitrary arrest and detention of activists, and/or significant lack of police or judicial enforcement or prosecution of perpetrators 2. Some evidence of arbitrary arrest and detention of activists, and/or some lack of police of judicial enforcement or prosecution of perpetrators 3. No evidence of any change, positive or negative, in the involvement from the police or judiciary in any way 4. Some positive changes in law enforcement, in particular prosecution of perpetrators 5. High levels of positive changes in law enforcement, in particular prosecution of perpetrators
UN dialogue	Quantified on a scale from: 1. The language used by the government in their submissions is highly defensive, denies issues, or does not reflect the expected language of the norm 2. The language used by the government in their submissions is somewhat defensive, denies issues, or does not reflect the expected language of the norm

	3. The language and dialogue shows no perceptible change 4. The language used by the government gives some indication of institutionalisation but is lacking in some way 5. The language and content submitted by the government is indicative of full institutionalisation of the norm in question
CONTEXT	
Months to regime change	The number of months between the start of the campaign and the next election, collected from publically available information
Gender Dev Index	Gender Development Index, as developed from UNDP. This score looks at health, knowledge, and living standards. Index is from the year the campaign started. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-development-index-gdi
Gender Inequality Index	The Gender Inequality Index is also UNDP and measures differences between men and women in reproductive health, empowerment, and economic status. Index is from the year the campaign started. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii
Gender Gap Index	The Gender Gap Index is produced by the World Economic Forum and uses parameters in Economic Participation and Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival, and Political Empowerment. Index is from the year when the campaign started. https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-gender-gap-report-2018
Political terror scale AI	The Political Terror Scale measures political terror as violations of basic human rights to the physical integrity of the person by agents of the state within the territorial boundaries of the state in question. The AI indicator uses information taken from Amnesty International's State of the Worlds' Human Rights Report. The score is taken from the year the campaign started. http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/
Political terror scale US State	The Political Terror Scale measures political terror as violations of basic human rights to the physical integrity of the person by agents of the state within the territorial boundaries of the state in question. The US State indicator uses the information published by the United States Department of State in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The score is taken from the year the campaign started. http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/
Gender equality CSOs	The number of national 'civil society organisations' registered with ECOSOC that specify work on MDG3 (gender equality). Due to availability of data, this variable is from 2017. https://esango.un.org/civilsociety/login.do
Treaty status	The number of International Human Rights Treaties, including Optional Protocols, that have been signed and ratified by the country before 2017. The score is out of 13. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx
CEDAW Status	Specifically measures engagement with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and its

	two Optional Protocols. Score is from 2017 and is out of a possible 3.
CEDAW Decl/Reserv	The total number of declarations and reservations to CEDAW as of 2017. The higher the number the less engaged the country is with CEDAW.
Relative capacity score, agri	The relative capacity score is somewhat experimental and aims to measure government performance from a social science perspective. The relative capacity score 'agri' approximates the ability of governments to appropriate portions of the national output to advance public goals, using mining and agriculture. The score for all countries is from 2013 due to the availability of data. http://transresearchconsortium.com/
Relative capacity score, work	The relative capacity score is somewhat experimental and aims to measure government performance from a social science perspective. The relative capacity score 'work' gauges the capacity of governments to mobilize populations under their control using activity rate of population. The score for all countries is from 2013 due to the availability of data. http://transresearchconsortium.com/
World justice project Open Government Index	The Open Government Index aims to measure how 'open' a government is based on the perspective of the people. It measures across publicized laws and government data, the right to information, civic participation, and complaint mechanisms. The data available is from 2015. https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-open-government-index-2015
Internet access	Captured by the World Bank, this measures the number of individuals using the internet as a percentage of the total population. This measure is from the year the campaign started. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS
DESCRIPTIVE	
Number of tweets	Number of Tweets in each campaign (duplicates removed)
Number non-English	The number of Tweets which are not in English.
% non-English	The percent of Tweets which are not in English.
PERSISTENCE	
Total days of campaign	The total number of days between when the campaign started and the 30th November, 2016.
SD of tweets per day	The standard deviation of number of Tweets per day.
Mean tweets per day	The average number of Tweets per day.
Median tweets per day	The median number of Tweets per day.
Mode tweets per day	The mode of Tweets per day.
Days > 2 SDs	The number of days where the number of Tweets was greater than two standard deviations.
Days > 3 SDs	The number of days where the number of Tweets was greater than three standard deviations.
Highest peak	The number of Tweets on the most active day of the campaign (i.e. the highest number of Tweets per day).

Number of peaks	The number of days where the number of Tweets was above a specified threshold (specific to each campaign).
Number of peak periods	The number of 'groups' of peak days.
Tweets in peak periods	The total number of Tweets in all peak days added together.
% tweets in peak	The percent of Tweets which occurred on peak days.
No. peak events (timelines)	The number of events during the campaign which resulted in peaks in the number of Tweets.
Longest peak period (merged)	The number of days in the longest peak period.
Tweets in non-peak periods	The total number of Tweets from non-peak days.
SD of peaks	The standard deviation of the number of Tweets on peak days.
Mean of peaks	The average number of Tweets on peak days.
Median of peaks	The median of Tweets on peak days.
Days tweets > 0	The number of days in the campaign with at least 1 Tweet.
Days tweets >5	The number of days with more than five Tweets.
Days tweets >100	The number of days with more than 100 Tweets.
Days tweets >1,000	The number of days with more than 1,000 Tweets.
% Days at 0	The percent of days with no Tweets.
% Days > 5	The percent of days with more than 5 Tweets.
Days above 75% peak	The number of days where the number of Tweets is more than 75% of the highest peak.
Days above 50% peak	The number of days where the number of Tweets is more than 50% of the highest peak.
Days above 25% peak	The number of days where the number of Tweets is more than 25% of the highest peak.
Days above average	The number of days where the number of Tweets is more than the overall average.
ENGAGEMENT METRICS	
Reply: tweet ratio	The total number of replies divided by the total number of Tweets. Replies are the total number of times a collected Tweet was replied to. For example, a score of 0.5 would mean that, on average, one out of every two Tweets was replied to.
Retweet: tweet ratio	The total number of Retweets divided by the total number of Tweets. Retweets are the total number of times a collected Tweet was Retweeted. For example, a score of 2 would mean that, on average, each Tweet was Retweeted twice.
Like: tweet ratio	The total number of Likes divided by the total number of Tweets. Likes are the total number of times a collected Tweet was Liked. For example, a score of 6 would mean that, on average, each Tweet was liked six times.
Total replies	The total number of times Tweets were replied to across the entire campaign.

Total retweets	The total number of times Tweets were Retweeted across the entire campaign.
Total likes	The total number of times Tweets were liked across the entire campaign.
Reply alpha	Derived from the log(n) log(s) plot, the alpha shows the gradient of the relationship between the parameter and the occurrences. The lower the number (alphas are negative), the steeper the gradient. For example, a reply alpha of -2.827 indicates that while there may have been a small number of Tweets which were replied to many times, there were not many Tweets that were replied to a small number of times. A steep gradient would indicate that there is not much replying activity in the campaign. Conversely, a higher alpha of -1.45 would indicate that there are lots of Tweet which spark a few replies.
Retweet alpha	See above but for Retweets.
Likes alpha	See above but for likes.
RT-Like Diff	The difference between the Retweet and Like alphas.
Reply A	The 'A' is taken from the log(n) log(s) plot represents the Y axis intercept and indicates the highest number of times a single Tweet was replied to. For example, a reply A of 758 would mean that 1 Tweet in the campaign was replied to 758 times.
Retweet A	See above but for Retweets.
Like A	See above but for likes.
Non-peak Reply: tweet ratio	All of the above but specific to non-peak periods.
Non-peak Retweet: tweet ratio	
Non-peak Like: tweet ratio	
Non-peak Total replies	
Non-peak Total retweets	
Non-peak Total likes	
Non-peak Reply alpha	
Non-peak Retweet alpha	
Non-peak Likes alpha	
Non-peak RT-Like Diff	
Non-peak Reply A	
Non-peak Retweet A	
Non-peak Like A	
Peak Reply: tweet ratio	All of the above but specific to peak periods.

Peak Retweet: tweet ratio	
Peak Like: tweet ratio	
Peak Total replies	
Peak Total retweets	
Peak Total likes	
Peak Reply alpha	
Peak Retweet alpha	
Peak Likes alpha	
Peak RT-Like Diff	
Peak Reply A	
Peak Retweet A	
Peak Like A	
USERS	
Unique users	The total number of unique users who Tweeted using the hashtag during the time period measured.
Unique users in peak periods	The total number of unique users who Tweeted using the hashtag during peak days only.
Unique users in non-peak periods	The total number of unique users who Tweeted using the hashtag during non-peak days only.
Unique users diff peak non-peak	The difference between the number of unique users in peak times to the number of users in non-peak times.
Average tweets per user	The total number of Tweets divided by the total number of unique users, as a proxy for how many times users Tweets, on average.
Average tweets per user peak	Above but for peak days only.
Average tweets per user non-peak	Above but for non-peak days only.
Tweet per user diff peak non-peak	The difference between the average number of Tweets per user during peak times and non-peak times. This is used to gauge if there is a difference in activity levels *per user* between peak and non-peak times.
% tweets from Top 100 users	The percent of total Tweets which came from the 100 most active users.
top 100 dom users	Of the 100 most active users, the number who clearly identify as living in the target country.
top 100 non-dom users	Of the 100 most active users, the number who do not clearly identify as living in the target country.
Top 100 dom reach	The total number of followers of the 100 most active users who clearly identify as living in the target country.
Top 100 non-dom reach	The total number of followers of the 100 most active users who do not clearly identify as living in the target country.
Top 100 dom campaign tweets	The total number of Tweets in the campaign sent by the 100 most active users who clearly identify as living in the target country.

Appendix 1: Full list of parameters with definitions

Top 100 non-dom campaign tweets	The total number of Tweets in the campaign sent by the 100 most active users who do not clearly identify as living in the target country.
Top 100 % dom	Of the 100 most active users, the percent who clearly identify as living in the target country.
Top 100 % non-dom	Of the 100 most active users, the percent who clearly identify as living in the target country.
Top 100 % dom reach	Of the total number of followers of the 100 most active users, the percent which follow users who clearly identify as being from the target country.
Top 100 % non-dom reach	Of the total number of followers of the 100 most active users, the percent which follow users who do not clearly identify as being from the target country.
Top 100 % dom campaign tweets	Of the campaign Tweets sent from the 100 most active users, the percent which are from users who clearly identify as living in the target country.
Top 100 % non-dom campaign tweets	Of the campaign Tweets sent from the 100 most active users, the percent which are from users who do not clearly identify as living in the target country.
No. Tweets from most active user	The number of campaign Tweets sent from the single most active user.
Top 100 less active	Of the 100 most active users, those who have sent less than 5,000 Tweets ever.
Top 100 active	Of the 100 most active users, those who have sent more than 5,000 Tweets ever.
Top 100 very active	Of the 100 most active users, those who have sent more than 10,000 Tweets ever.
Top 100 highly active	Of the 100 most active users, those who have sent more than 100,000 Tweets ever.
Top 100 small reach	Of the 100 most active users, those who have less than 1,000 followers.
Top 100 average reach	Of the 100 most active users, those who have more than 1,000 followers.
Top 100 good reach	Of the 100 most active users, those who have more than 10,000 followers.
Top 100 large reach	Of the 100 most active users, those who have more than 100,000 followers.
Top 100 extreme reach	Of the 100 most active users, those who have more than 1,000,000 followers.
Top 100 dom less active	As above, disaggregated by those who clearly identify as living in the target country and those who do not.
Top 100 dom active	
Top 100 dom very active	
Top 100 dom highly active	
Top 100 dom small reach	

Top 100 dom average reach	
Top 100 dom good reach	
Top 100 dom large reach	
Top 100 dom extreme reach	
Top 100 non-dom less active	
Top 100 non-dom active	
Top 100 non-dom very active	
Top 100 non-dom highly active	
Top 100 non-dom small reach	
Top 100 non-dom average reach	
Top 100 non-dom good reach	
Top 100 non-dom large reach	
Top 100 non-dom extreme reach	
Top 100 users: academic	Of the 100 most active users, those who self-identify as an academic in their profile.
Top 100 users: activists	Of the 100 most active users, those who self-identify as an activist in their profile; the word 'activist' must be present in the profile.
Top 100 users: artist	Of the 100 most active users, those who self-identify as an artist in their profile.
Top 100 users: business	Of the 100 most active users, those accounts which are from a business, not an individual.
Top 100 users: counter narrative	Of the 100 most active users, those who represent the counter-narrative.
Top 100 users: entertainment industry	Of the 100 most active users, those accounts that represent the entertainment industry, i.e. nightclubs.
Top 100 users: government	Of the 100 most active users, those accounts that are officially representing some part of government.
Top 100 users: independent Journalist	Of the 100 most active users, those who self-identify as a journalist but are not officially affiliated with a news outlet in their profile.
Top 100 users: individual	Of the 100 most active users, those who self-identify as an individual but not one of the other categories in their profile, i.e. 'I like long walks on beach, coffee, and dogs.'
Top 100 users: journalist	Of the 100 most active users, those who self-identify as a journalist and are officially affiliated with a news outlet in their profile.

Appendix 1: Full list of parameters with definitions

Top 100 users: news agencies	Of the 100 most active users, those accounts which report news.
Top 100 users: organisation	Of the 100 most active users, those accounts that are from NGOs or CSOs.
Top 100 users: politician	Of the 100 most active users, those accounts which are officially from a politician.
Top 100 users: selling	Of the 100 most active users, those accounts which are using the hashtag to promote sales.
Top 100 users: trending topic accounts	Of the 100 most active users, those accounts that Tweet out trending topics.
Top 100 users: writer	Of the 100 most active users, those who self-identify as a writer in their profile.
Top 100 users: unknown	Of the 100 most active users, those who's profiles are blank.
Campaign tweets from Top 100 academics	Of the campaign Tweets sent from the 100 most active users, those which are sent by [insert profile category]
Campaign tweets from Top 100 activists	
Campaign tweets from Top 100 artists	
Campaign tweets from Top 100 business	
Campaign tweets from Top 100 counter narrative	
Campaign tweets from Top 100 entertainment industry	
Campaign tweets from Top 100 government	
Campaign tweets from Top 100 indepdendent journalist	
Campaign tweets from Top 100 individuals	
Campaign tweets from Top 100 journalist	
Campaign tweets from Top 100 news agency	

Campaign tweets from Top 100 organisation	
Campaign tweets from Top 100 politician	
Campaign tweets from Top 100 selling	
Campaign tweets from Top 100 trendtopic	
Campaign tweets from Top 100 writer	
Campaign tweets from Top 100 unknown	
Reach Top 100 users: academic	Of the total number of followers from the 100 most active users, those that follow [insert profile category]
Reach Top 100 users: activists	
Reach Top 100 users: artist	
Reach Top 100 users: business	
Reach Top 100 users: counter narrative	
Reach Top 100 users: entertainment industry	
Reach Top 100 users: government	
Reach Top 100 users: independent Journalist	
Reach Top 100 users: individual	
Reach Top 100 users: journalist	
Reach Top 100 users: news agencies	
Reach Top 100 users: organisation	
Reach Top 100 users: politician	
Reach Top 100 users: selling	

Reach Top 100 users: trending topic accounts	
Reach Top 100 users: writer	
Reach Top 100 users: unknown	
Top 100 users: dom academic	Of the 100 most active users, [insert profile category] who clearly identify as living in the target country.
Top 100 users: dom activists	
Top 100 users: dom artist	
Top 100 users: dom business	
Top 100 users: dom counter narrative	
Top 100 users: dom entertainment industry	
Top 100 users: dom government	
Top 100 users: dom independent Journalist	
Top 100 users: dom individual	
Top 100 users: dom journalist	
Top 100 users: dom news agencies	
Top 100 users: dom organisation	
Top 100 users: dom politician	
Top 100 users: dom selling	
Top 100 users: dom trending topic accounts	
Top 100 users: dom writer	
Top 100 users: dom unknown	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom academics	Of the campaign Tweets sent from the 100 most active users, those Tweets sent from [insert profile category] who clearly identify as living in the target country.

Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom activists	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom artists	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom business	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom counter narrative	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom entertainment industry	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: domgovernment	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom indepdendent journalist	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom individuals	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom journalist	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom news agency	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom organisation	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom politician	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom selling	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom trendtopic	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom writer	

Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom unknown	
Reach Top 100 users: dom academic	Of the total number of followers of the 100 most active users, those that follow [insert profile category] who clearly identify as living in target country.
Reach Top 100 users: dom activists	
Reach Top 100 users: dom artist	
Reach Top 100 users: dom business	
Reach Top 100 users: dom counter narrative	
Reach Top 100 users: dom entertainment industry	
Reach Top 100 users: dom government	
Reach Top 100 users: dom independent Journalist	
Reach Top 100 users: dom individual	
Reach Top 100 users: dom journalist	
Reach Top 100 users: dom news agencies	
Reach Top 100 users: dom organisation	
Reach Top 100 users: dom politician	
Reach Top 100 users: dom selling	
Reach Top 100 users: dom trending topic accounts	
Reach Top 100 users: dom writer	
Reach Top 100 users: dom unknown	
Top 100 users: non-dom academic	Of the 100 most active users, [insert profile category] who do not clearly identify as living in the target country.

Top 100 users: non-dom activists	
Top 100 users: non-dom artist	
Top 100 users: non-dom business	
Top 100 users: non-dom counter narrative	
Top 100 users: non-dom entertainment industry	
Top 100 users: non-dom government	
Top 100 users: non-dom independent Journalist	
Top 100 users: non-dom individual	
Top 100 users: non-dom journalist	
Top 100 users: non-dom news agencies	
Top 100 users: non-dom organisation	
Top 100 users: non-dom politician	
Top 100 users: non-dom selling	
Top 100 users: non-dom trending topic accounts	
Top 100 users: non-dom writer	
Top 100 users: non-dom unknown	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom academics	Of the campaign Tweets sent from the 100 most active users, those Tweets sent from [insert profile category] who do not clearly identify as living in the target country.
Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom activists	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom artists	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom business	

Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom counter narrative	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom entertainment industry	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom government	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom indepdendent journalist	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom individuals	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom journalist	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom news agency	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom organisation	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom politician	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom selling	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom trendtopic	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom writer	
Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom unknown	
Reach Top 100 users: non-dom academic	Of the total number of followers of the 100 most active users, those that follow [insert profile category] who do not clearly identify as living in target country.
Reach Top 100 users: non-dom activists	

Reach Top 100 users: non-dom artist	
Reach Top 100 users: non-dom business	
Reach Top 100 users: non-dom counter narrative	
Reach Top 100 users: non-dom entertainment industry	
Reach Top 100 users: non-dom government	
Reach Top 100 users: non-dom independent Journalist	
Reach Top 100 users: non-dom individual	
Reach Top 100 users: non-dom journalist	
Reach Top 100 users: non-dom news agencies	
Reach Top 100 users: non-dom organisation	
Reach Top 100 users: non-dom politician	
Reach Top 100 users: non-dom selling	
Reach Top 100 users: non-dom trending topic accounts	
Reach Top 100 users: non-dom writer	
Reach Top 100 users: non-dom unknown	
% Top 100 users: academic	As above as a percent.

Appendix 1: Full list of parameters with definitions

% Top 100 users: activists	
% Top 100 users: artist	
% Top 100 users: business	
% Top 100 users: counter narrative	
% Top 100 users: entertainment industry	
% Top 100 users: government	
% Top 100 users: independent Journalist	
% Top 100 users: individual	
% Top 100 users: journalist	
% Top 100 users: news agencies	
% Top 100 users: organisation	
% Top 100 users: politician	
% Top 100 users: selling	
% Top 100 users: trending topic accounts	
% Top 100 users: writer	
% Top 100 users: unknown	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100 academics	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100 activists	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100 artists	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100 business	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100 counter narrative	

% Campaign tweets from Top 100 entertainment industry	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100 government	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100 indepdendent journalist	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100 individuals	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100 journalist	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100 news agency	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100 organisation	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100 politician	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100 selling	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100 trendtopic	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100 writer	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100 unknown	
% Reach Top 100 users: academic	
% Reach Top 100 users: activists	
% Reach Top 100 users: artist	
% Reach Top 100 users: business	
%Reach Top 100 users: counter narrative	

% Reach Top 100 users: entertainment industry	
% Reach Top 100 users: government	
% Reach Top 100 users: independent Journalist	
% Reach Top 100 users: individual	
% Reach Top 100 users: journalist	
% Reach Top 100 users: news agencies	
% Reach Top 100 users: organisation	
% Reach Top 100 users: politician	
% Reach Top 100 users: selling	
% Reach Top 100 users: trending topic accounts	
% Reach Top 100 users: writer	
% Reach Top 100 users: unknown	
% Top 100 users: dom academic	
% Top 100 users: dom activists	
% Top 100 users: dom artist	
% Top 100 users: dom business	
% Top 100 users: dom counter narrative	
% Top 100 users: dom entertainment industry	
% Top 100 users: dom government	
% Top 100 users: dom independent Journalist	
% Top 100 users: dom individual	

% Top 100 users: dom journalist	
% Top 100 users: dom news agencies	
% Top 100 users: dom organisation	
% Top 100 users: dom politician	
% Top 100 users: dom selling	
% Top 100 users: dom trending topic accounts	
% Top 100 users: dom writer	
% Top 100 users: dom unknown	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom academics	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom activists	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom artists	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom business	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom counter narrative	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom entertainment industry	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: domgovernment	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom indepdendent journalist	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom individuals	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom journalist	

% Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom news agency	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom organisation	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom politician	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom selling	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom trendtopic	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom writer	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: dom unknown	
% Reach Top 100 users: dom academic	
% Reach Top 100 users: dom activists	
% Reach Top 100 users: dom artist	
% Reach Top 100 users: dom business	
% Reach Top 100 users: dom counter narrative	
% Reach Top 100 users: dom entertainment industry	
% Reach Top 100 users: dom government	
% Reach Top 100 users: dom independent Journalist	
% Reach Top 100 users: dom individual	
% Reach Top 100 users: dom journalist	

% Reach Top 100 users: dom news agencies	
% Reach Top 100 users: dom organisation	
% Reach Top 100 users: dom politician	
% Reach Top 100 users: dom selling	
% Reach Top 100 users: dom trending topic accounts	
% Reach Top 100 users: dom writer	
% Reach Top 100 users: dom unknown	
% Top 100 users: non-dom academic	
% Top 100 users: non-dom activists	
% Top 100 users: non-dom artist	
% Top 100 users: non-dom business	
% Top 100 users: non-dom counter narrative	
% Top 100 users: non-dom entertainment industry	
% Top 100 users: non-dom government	
% Top 100 users: non-dom independent Journalist	
% Top 100 users: non-dom individual	
% Top 100 users: non-dom journalist	
% Top 100 users: non-dom news agencies	
% Top 100 users: non-dom organisation	

% Top 100 users: non-dom politician	
% Top 100 users: non-dom selling	
% Top 100 users: non-dom trending % Topic accounts	
% Top 100 users: non-dom writer	
% Top 100 users: non-dom unknown	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom academics	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom activists	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom artists	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom business	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom counter narrative	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom entertainment industry	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom government	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom indepdendent journalist	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom individuals	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom journalist	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom news agency	

% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom organisation	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom politician	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom selling	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom trendtopic	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom writer	
% Campaign tweets from Top 100: non-dom unknown	
% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom academic	
% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom activists	
% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom artist	
% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom business	
% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom counter narrative	
% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom entertainment industry	
% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom government	
% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom independent Journalist	
% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom individual	
% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom journalist	

Appendix 1: Full list of parameters with definitions

% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom news agencies	
% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom organisation	
% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom politician	
% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom selling	
% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom trending topic accounts	
% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom writer	
% Reach Top 100 users: non-dom unknown	
Activity/Reach (log) c	The relationship between followers and activity levels of the 100 most active users.
Activity/Reach (log) b	
CONTENT	
Total words	The total number of unique words in all of the Tweets analysed in each campaign.
Words : Tweets ratio	The total number of unique words divided by the total number of Tweets.
Total hashtags	The total number of unique hashtags used in all of the Tweets analysed in each campaign.
Most used word length	The most commonly used word length.
Most used tweet length	The most common Tweet length (characters).
Total words non-peak	As above, disaggregated across peak and non-peak days.
Total hashtags non-peak	
Most used word length non-peak	
Most used tweet length non-peak	
Total words peak	
Total hashtags in peaks	

Most used word length peak	
Most used tweet length peak	
Positivity Mean	From the sentiment analysis, the average positivity score (per day).
Negativity Mean	From the sentiment analysis, the average negativity score (per day).
Polarity[1] Mean	From the sentiment analysis, the average polarity score (per day).
Subjectivity[2] Mean	From the sentiment analysis, the average subjectivity score (per day).
Weighted positivity mean	From the sentiment analysis, the average positivity score weighted by the number of Tweets per day.
Weighted negativity mean	From the sentiment analysis, the average negativity score weighted by the number of Tweets per day.
Weighted polarity mean	From the sentiment analysis, the average polarity score weighted by the number of Tweets per day.
Weighted subjectivity mean	From the sentiment analysis, the average subjectivity score weighted by the number of Tweets per day.
Non-peak Positivity Mean	As above, disaggregated across peak and non-peak periods.
Non-peak Negativity Mean	
Non-peak Polarity Mean	
Non-peak Subjectivity Mean	
Non-peak Weighted positivity mean	
Non-peak Weighted negativity mean	
Non-peak Weighted polarity mean	
Non-peak Weighted subjectivity mean	
Peak Positivity Mean	
Peak Negativity Mean	
Peak Polarity Mean	
Peak Subjectivity Mean	
Peak Weighted positivity mean	
Peak Weighted negativity mean	
Peak Weighted polarity mean	

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[1] Polarity compares positive and negative scores.
[2] Subjectivity looks at objectivity and subjectivity.

Peak Weighted subjectivity mean	
Peak to non-peak difference Positivity Mean	The difference between peak and non-peak sentiment metrics.
Peak to non-peak difference Negativity Mean	
Peak to non-peak difference Polarity Mean	
Peak to non-peak difference Subjectivity Mean	
Peak to non-peak difference Weighted positivity mean	
Peak to non-peak difference Weighted negativity mean	
Peak to non-peak difference Weighted polarity mean	
Peak to non-peak difference Weighted subjectivity mean	
Highest positivity score (>= 10 Tweets)	The highest positivity score from days with at least 10 Tweets.
Highest negativity score (>=10 Tweets)	The highest negativity (the most negative) score from days with at least 10 Tweets.
Highest polarity score (>=10 Tweets)	The highest polarity score from days with at least 10 Tweets.
Highest subjectivity score (>=10 Tweets)	The highest subjectivity score from days with at least 10 Tweets.
Highest weighted positivity score (>= 10 Tweets)	The highest weighted positivity score from days with at least 10 Tweets.
Highest weighted negativity score (>= 10 Tweets)	The highest weighted negativity score from days with at least 10 Tweets.
Highest weighted polarity score (>= 10 Tweets)	The highest weighted polarity score from days with at least 10 Tweets.
Highest weighted subjectivity score (>= 10 Tweets)	The highest weighted subjectivity score from days with at least 10 Tweets.
Lowest positivity score (>= 10 Tweets)	The lowest positivity score from days with at least 10 Tweets.

Appendix 1: Full list of parameters with definitions

Lowest negativity score (>= 10 Tweets)	The lowest negativity (least negative) score from days with at least 10 Tweets.
Lowest polarity score (>= 10 Tweets)	The lowest polarity score from days with at least 10 Tweets.
Lowest subjectivity score (>= 10 Tweets)	The lowest subjectivity score from days with at least 10 Tweets.
Lowest weighted positivity score (>= 10 Tweets)	The lowest weighted positivity score from days with at least 10 Tweets.
Lowest weighted negativity score (>= 10 Tweets)	The lowest weighted negativity (least negative) score from days with at least 10 Tweets.
Lowest weighted polarity score (>= 10 Tweets)	The lowest weighted polarity score from days with at least 10 Tweets.
Lowest weighted subjectivity score (>= 10 Tweets)	The lowest weighted subjectivity score from days with at least 10 Tweets.
Highest to lowest difference positivity (>= 10 Tweets)	The difference between the most positive and the least positive scores from days with at least 10 days.
Highest to lowest difference negativity (>= 10 Tweets)	The difference between the most negative and the least negative scores from days with at least 10 days.
Highest to lowest difference polarity (>= 10 Tweets)	The difference between the most polar and the least polar scores from days with at least 10 days.
Highest to lowest difference subjectivity (>= 10 Tweets)	The difference between the most subjective and the least subjective scores from days with at least 10 days.
Highest to lowest difference weighted positivity (>= 10 Tweets)	The difference between the most positive and the least positive scores, weighted, from days with at least 10 days.
Highest to lowest difference weighted negativity (>= 10 Tweets)	The difference between the most negative and the least negative scores, weighted, from days with at least 10 days.
Highest to lowest difference weighted polarity (>= 10 Tweets)	The difference between the most polar and the least polar scores, weighted, from days with at least 10 days.
Highest to lowest difference weighted subjectivity (>= 10 Tweets)	The difference between the most subjective and the least subjective scores, weighted, from days with at least 10 days.
Tweets - Weighted positive slope	The gradient of the relationship between the number of Tweets and the weighted positivity scores.

% 1st person	The number of instances of a first person pronoun divided by the total number of Tweets.
% 2nd person	The number of instances of a second person pronoun divided by the total number of Tweets.
% 3rd person female	The number of instances of a third person female pronoun divided by the total number of Tweets.
% 3rd person male	The number of instances of a third person female pronoun divided by the total number of Tweets.
% 3rd person plural	The number of instances of a third person plural pronoun divided by the total number of Tweets.
% top 100 cons	The percent of the 100 most commonly used words that are used consistently across three or more epochs.
% tweets with cons	The total number of times an organic but consistent word is used divided by the total number of Tweets.
% cons norms legal	The percent of consistently used words that are of a legal nature.
highest cons norm	The number of times the most often used consistent (three or more epochs) word is used.
no. cons norms in majority of epochs	The number of consistent words which occur in a majority of epochs.
% top 100 org	The percent of the 100 most often words which do not appear in three or more epochs.
% tweets with org norm	The total number of times an often used but not consistent word is used divided by the total number of Tweets.
highest org norm	From the 100 most often used words, the number of times the most used non-consistent word was used.
ratio cons:org norms	Of the 100 most often used words, the number of consistently used words divided by the number of inconsistent.
% org norms legal	The percentage of inconsistent but highly used words that are of a legal nature.
% tweets with int'l norms	The number of times an international norm is mentioned divided by the total number of Tweets.
no. consistent norms = intl	Of the 100 most often used words, those that appear in three or more epochs which are also international norms.
no. organic norms = intl	Of the 100 most often used words, those that appear in less than three epochs which are also international norms.
% intl norms present	The percentage of international norms which appear at all across the whole campaign.
% top 100 = intl norms	The percent of the 100 most used words which are also international norms.
highest % intl norm	The number of times an international norm appears divided by the total number of Tweets per epoch.

Appendix 2: Deductive list of international norms

Campaign	Issue	Normative language	Sources
#stopstoning #women2drive	Equality in law	Non-discrimination Discrimination Equality Inequality Women's rights Human rights Repeal Impunity Decriminalisation Prejudice Fair trial Procedural fairness Abolish Dignity Privacy Fundamental freedoms Dignity Empower Obligations Gender Protect Prohibit discrimination Equal rights Gender bias Effective protection Gender equality Accountability Status of women Implementation Equal participation Guardianship Advancement of women Women's movement	UNHRC, 'Adultery as a Criminal Offence Violates Women's Human Rights' (2012) 'Beijing Platform for Action', Fourth World Conference on Women, (1995) 'Beijing +20', UN Women (2015) UN Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 'General Recommendation No 21' (1994) The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) AWID, 'The Devil is in the Detail' (2016) UNHRC, Working Group Report on Discrimination in law and practice (2015) UN Doc A/HRC/29/40 Commission on the Status of Women, Agreed Conclusions III from the 42nd Session (1998) UN Doc E/1998/27

		Religious fundamentalisms Marginalization Structural inequality Oppressive practices Effective legal remedies Gender-sensitive Gender-responsive	
#stopstoning	Access to justice	Redress Legal aid Access Gender-sensitive Status of women Implementation Effective access Obstacles Barriers Stigma Patriarchy Empowerment Redress Impartiality Impunity Prevention Investigation Prosecution Provision of remedies Safe Effective Accessible Women's movement Marginalization	'Beijing Platform for Action', Fourth World Conference on Women, (1995) 'Beijing +20', UN Women (2015) UN Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 'General Recommendation No 33' (2015) The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979)
#letwomengotostadium #women2drive	Gender equality	Non-discrimination Discrimination Equality Inequality Gender stereotyping Harmful stereotypes/ing Fundamental freedoms Women's rights	OHCHR, 'Gender stereotyping as a human rights violation' (2013) 'Beijing Platform for Action', Fourth World Conference on Women, (1995) 'Beijing +20', UN Women (2015) The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979)

		Human rights Social Cultural Equal rights Patriarchy Dignity Empower Status of women Right to participate Advancement of women Women's movement Marginalization Eliminate gender stereotypes	OHCHR, 'Gender stereotypes and stereotyping and women's rights' (2014)
#farkhunda #sendeanlat #mydressmychoice #delhigangrape #niunamenos	VAWG Sexual violence	Violence against women Gender based violence Discrimination Harmful traditional practices Protection Victim/survivor Prevent Eliminate violence Protect Protect victims Prosecute Punish perpetrators Access to justice Effective implementation Status of women Exploitation Power Vulnerable Obligations Prejudice Adequate resources Enforce/ment Dignity Status of women Sexual violence	'Beijing Platform for Action', Fourth World Conference on Women, (1995) 'Beijing +20', UN Women (2015) The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women and Elimination of Violence Against Children in ASEAN. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2013) The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women "Convention of Belem do Para" (1994) UN Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 'General Recommendation No 12' (1989) UN Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 'General Recommendation No 19' (1992) UN Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against

		Implementation Recourse Subordination Eradicate violence against women Effective remedies Prevent Prohibit Impunity Respect Rehabilitation Support services Protect women Data collection Statistical data Advancement of women Subordinate Free from violence Disaggregated data Conviction rates Integrity Dignity Equal protection Due diligence National plan of action Subjected to violence Re-victimization Root causes Root factors Women's movement Bodily integrity Failure to protect women Accountability mechanisms Oppression Oppressive behaviour State responsibility Reparations Marginalization Hypermasculinity	Women, 'General Recommendation No 35' (2017) Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention) (2011) Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, General Assembly (1993) Equality Now, 'The Global Rape Epidemic' (2017) AWID, 'The Devil is in the Detail' (2016) UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo (2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/38 SG, Adequacy of the international legal framework on violence against women (2017) UN doc A/72/134 UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Yakin Ertürk: Intersections between culture and violence against women (2007) UN Doc A/HRC/4/34 UNHRC, Towards an effective implementation of international norms to end violence against women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Yakin Ertürk (2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/66 *("Concern over these trends has caused further alarm with the more recent threats to reproductive health and rights as well as the failure of the Commission on the Status of Women at its forty-seventh session in 2003 to reach a consensus on the draft agreed conclusions on women's human*

		Misogyny Root causes Documentation of complaints Mandatory reporting Bodily integrity Reparation Judicial stereotyping Perpetuating harmful stereotypes Helplines Crisis centers Support services Counselling services Strengthen legal mechanisms Economic support	*rights and the elimination of all forms of violence against women and girls, the first time in the history of the Commission that agreed conclusions have not been adopted on one of its themes. Similarly, the same year, the General Assembly had to abandon an omnibus resolution on violence against women, replacing it with a narrower text on domestic violence against women only")* UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo (2013) UN Doc A/HRC/23/49 Cusack, S. 'Eliminating judicial stereotyping: Equal access to justice for women in gender-based violence cases (2014) Womankind Worldwide, 'Tackling Violence against Women and Girls in the International Context ' (2013) Commission on the Status of Women Agreed Conclusions from the 51st Session (2007) UN Doc E/2007/27 Commission on the Status of Women Agreed Conclusions from the 42nd Session (1998) UN Doc E/1998/27 Commission on the Status of Women Agreed Conclusions from the 57th Session (2013) No UN Doc number available.
#sendeanlat #niunamenos	Femicide	Femicide Feminicide Gender-based violence Violence against women Status of women Implementation Impunity Gender	'Beijing Platform for Action', Fourth World Conference on Women, (1995) 'Beijing +20', UN Women (2015) The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979)

		Unequal power relations Crime of passion Diminished responsibility Access to justice Root causes Women's movement Disempowerment Honour-related killing Structural discrimination Eradication of harmful stereotypes Good quality data Adequate enforcement Adequate provision of services Femicide watch Gender-related killing Gender-motivated killing Right to life Continuum of violence Observatory Intimate partner violence Intimate partner femicide Effective measures Statistics Domestic violence Disaggregated by sex Disaggregated by gender Battered women Protection orders Structural discrimination Misogyny	Organisation of American States, Inter-American Commission of Women, Committee of Experts of the Follow-up Mechanism to the Belém do Pará Convention: Declaration on Femicide (2008) OHCHR, Gender-related killings of women and girls (2013) UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences (2016) UN Doc A/71/398 UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo (2016) UN Doc A/HRC/20/16 UN Women, Latin American Model Protocol for the investigation of gender-related killings of women (femicide/feminicide) (2014)

		Misogynist killing Ownership over women Condemn violence against women Gender-based murder Sexist Sexism Sexist culture	

Appendix 3: Components of composite scores

Composite Score	Components
Context	Gender Development Index
	Gender Inequality Index
	Political Terror Scale
	Gender equality CSOs
	Number of treaties ratified
	CEDAW status
	Relative capacity scores
	Internet access
Persistence	Number of peaks
	Number of peak periods
	Longest peak period (merged)
	Days tweets > 0
	Days tweets >5
	Days tweets >100
	Days tweets >1,000
	% Days > 5
	Days above average
Engagement	Reply: tweet ratio
	Like: tweet ratio (reverse)
	Non-peak Reply: tweet ratio
	Non-peak Like: tweet ratio (reverse)
	Peak Reply: tweet ratio
	Peak Like: tweet ratio (reverse)
Users	Top 100 % domestic
	Top 100 % non-domestic (reverse)
	Top 100 % domestic reach
	Top 100 % non-domestic reach (reverse)
	Top 100 % domestic campaign tweets
	Top 100 % non-domestic campaign tweets (reverse)
Sentiment	Positivity Mean
	Peak positivity mean
	Peak to non-peak difference Positivity Mean
	Highest positivity score (>= 10 Tweets)
	Lowest positivity score (>= 10 Tweets) (reverse)
Norms	% tweets with consistent norms
	% tweets with variable norms (reverse)
	Ratio consistent : variable norms
	% international norms present
	% tweets with international norms

Appendix 5: Data collection

Appendix 4: Of the 100 most commonly used words, those that appear in *less than* three epochs

#stopstoning variable norms

15/05/10-25/06/13	26/06/13-26/06/13	27/06/13-24/07/13	25/07/13-25/07/13	26/07/13-09/12/13	10/12/13-10/12/13	11/12/13-24/10/16
Sakineh's case first garners attention	WLUML change.org	Non-peak	WLUML Thunderclap 1	Non-peak	WLUML Thunderclap 2	Non-peak
#IranElection	Torture	global	Join	#16days	#16days	EU
Iran/ian	Cares	Join	Thunderclap	Join	control	Stop Stoning (Italian)
#StopExecutions	Victims	Thunderclap	global	UN	women's	Zullo
Sakineh	violence	Make	#Orangeday	global	freedom	#pakistan
sentence/d	#UN	action	#WomensRights	#Brunei	Call	
adultery	Stoning (Arabic)	message		call	Ban	
Ashtiani	together	Screening		legal	Ki-moon	
barbaric	#Stopstoning (Arabic)	Shroud		Thunderclap		
Executions	International	still		code		
International	form	difference		penal		
#hrw	say			rights		
#StopChildExecutions	Stoning (Persian)			Iran		
Azar	action			form		
Bagheri	cruel			voice		
#Amnesty	General					
Mohammadi	Secretary					

Appendix 5: Data collection

15/05/10-25/06/13	26/06/13-26/06/13	27/06/13-24/07/13	25/07/13-25/07/13	26/07/13-09/12/13	10/12/13-10/12/13	11/12/13-24/10/16
Sakineh's case first garners attention	WLUML change.org	Non-peak	WLUML Thunderclap 1	Non-peak	WLUML Thunderclap 2	Non-peak
#queennoor						
#SaveMaryam						
Stoning (Persian)						
#FreeSakineh						
#Afghanistan						
SUMMARY						
Focussed on executions, Sakineh, specific cases	Stoning in several languages, shift to focus on the act	Thunderclap		International campaign, changing the law	More positive empowerment approach	EU/non-domestic involvement

Appendix 5: Data collection

#letwomengotostadium Variable Norms

15/06/14-18/06/15	19/06/15-19/06/15	20/06/15-25/06/15	26/06/15-26/06/15	27/06/15-15/11/16
Build up	Tehran tournament (peak)	Tehran tournament (non-peak)	Tehran tournament (2nd peak)	Non-peak
ask	go/ing	against	Poland	Poland
attend	League	front	set	set
Azadi	WorldLeague2015	united	people	watch
storm	freely	fundamentalism	say	authorities
night	citizenship	#iranfreedom	sports	#KishOpen
WorldLeague2015	say	go	just	must
front	team	Tehran	public	say
watch		team	Rouhani	safely
allow		Response		freely
sports		people		World
gov		national		
match				
team				
evening				
#Tehran				
support				
arrested				
gather				
police				
SUMMARY				
Tells story of campaign	Rights-based approach	Some religious rooted language	Notable: Rouhani	Return to rights-based approach

Appendix 5: Data collection

#farkhunda variable norms

19/03/15-20/03/15	21/03/15-27/03/15	28/03/15-01/05/15	02/05/15-08/05/15	09/05/15-18/05/15	19/05/15-19/05/15	20/05/15-01/07/15	02/07/15-02/07/15	03/07/15-10/08/15	11/08/15-11/08/15	12/08/15-17/11/16
Spark incident	Video goes viral	Non-peak	Televised trial	Non-peak	Sentencing	Non-peak	Sentences quashed	Non-peak	BBC Documentary	Non-peak
#KabulMob	coffin	today	suspects	prison	Jail/ed	Release/d	overturned/s	please	Newsnight	#Islam
Quran	carry/ing	London	begins	jail	protect/ing	Appeals	quashes	human	film	innocent
beaten	all	shrine		duty	prison	bail	cancels	ask	just	film
candles	beaten	media		others	duty	just	decision	join	martyr	
fire	funeral			bile	exposes	quashes	convicted	documentary	world	
angry	Quran			civil	report	defining	stoned	killers	making	
mentally	innocent			clerics	role	moment	run	just	shocking	
should	bury			free	violence	#womensrights	secret	World	words	

19/03/15-20/03/15	21/03/15-27/03/15	28/03/15-01/05/15	02/05/15-08/05/15	09/05/15-18/05/15	19/05/15-19/05/15	20/05/15-01/07/15	02/07/15-02/07/15	03/07/15-10/08/15	11/08/15-11/08/15	12/08/15-17/11/16
Spark incident	Video goes viral	Non-peak	Televised trial	Non-peak	Sentencing	Non-peak	Sentences quashed	Non-peak	BBC Documentary	Non-peak
ashamed	tradition			protect	think	fear	fire	should	documentary	
claimed				postpones	thoughts	killers	system	religion	report	
country				released			acquits	state	heartbreaking	
ill							shrine		moving	
religion							transparency		must	
allegedly							world		powerful	
involved							March		violence	
light							ruling		horrific	
barbaric									News	
must									barbaric	

Appendix 5: Data collection

19/03/15-20/03/15	21/03/15-27/03/15	28/03/15 - 01/05/15	02/05/15 - 08/05/15	09/05/15 - 18/05/15	19/05/15-19/05/15	20/05/15-01/07/15	02/07/15-02/07/15	03/07/15-10/08/15	11/08/15-11/08/15	12/08/15 - 17/11/16
Spark incident	Video goes viral	Non-peak	Televised trial	Non-peak	Sentencing	Non-peak	Sentences quashed	Non-peak	BBC Documentary	Non-peak
stop									human	
									piece	
									coffin	
SUMMARY										
Clear anger about the incident	Reflecting Farkhunda's funeral	Foreign focus	Clear reaction to trial	No clear focus	Reflecting sentencing	Continued reflection of sentencing and trial	Continued reflection of sentencing and trial	No clear focus	Foreign documentary	No clear focus

Appendix 5: Data collection

#sendeanlat variable norms

14/02/15-19/02/15	20/02/15-29/11/16
Spark incident	Non-peak
girl/s	Turkey/ish
because	murder
Turkey	harassment
#Specialist	Be together (French)
afraid	Do not forget (French)
think	Friends (French)
day	Never (French)
want	Protest (French)
been	love
	all
	violence
	brutal
	Sign
	simple
SUMMARY	
No clear focus	Exhibiting high emotions

Appendix 5: Data collection

#mydressmychoice variable norms

12/11/14-13/11/14	14/11/14-20/11/14	21/11/14-27/11/16
Spark incident	Goes viral	Non-peak
naked	Lady/ies	word
Lady/ies	naked	spoken
Video	#NudityIsNotMyChoice	discrimination/harassment
support	protest	choice
wear	wear	risk
protest	#strippingshame	#CrossDressers
want	support	Cross
people	right	public
right	people	Stop
sparks	see	Check
touts	mob	face
think	assault	undress
walk		Jobs
		#QueerArtist4LGBTRights
SUMMARY		
Reflecting the facts of the incident	Some reaction to counter-narrative, though still mainly focussed on facts	More variation, though still incident-focussed

Appendix 5: Data collection

Appendix 5: Data collection

#delhigangrape variable norms

16/12/12 - 19/12/12	20/12/12-23/12/12	24/12/12-09/01/13	10/01/13-09/03/13	10/03/13-11/03/13	12/03/13-30/08/13	31/08/13-31/08/13	01/09/13-09/09/13	10/09/13-14/09/13	15/09/13-27/11/16
Spark incident	Peak	Aftermath	Non-peak	Ram Singh dies	Non-peak	Juvenile convicted	Non-peak	Other convictions	Non-peak
people	protest/ers/s	end	end	Ram Singh	NEVER	years	today	penalty	year
time	people	impunity	Uprising	suicide	FORGET	crime	hope	convicts	change/d
need	PM	Sign	Sign	commit/ted/s	gangrape	home	year	lawyer	16
country	#IndiaGate	email	petition	Jail	Singh	system	10	Finally	Dec
	time	petition	Pls	Tihar	#Maldives	murder	#Asaram	defence	questions
	Rashtrapati	stop	sexual	suspect/s	#VAW	minor	17	guilty	convicts
	need	Stand	#VAW	hang/s/ed	old	guilty	day	life	still
	Bhavan	sexual	protests	prison	#PhotoShow	age	consider	Friday	since
		send	men	found	Uprising	18	crime	hanged	Supreme
		acabar	trial	Prime	changed	#PMChorHai	Citizen'	murder	
		war	send	main	5	jail	'Senior	day	
		urging	email	say/s	trial	country	expected	men	
		RIP	impunity	reports	16			Singh	
		agresiones	honor	news					
		sexuales	stop	Lawyer					
		Apoya	#Maldives	confirms					
			Singh	cell					
			war	security					
			urging						
SUMMARY									

Appendix 5: Data collection

16/12/12 - 19/12/12	20/12/12- 23/12/12	24/12/12- 09/01/13	10/01/13- 09/03/13	10/03/13- 11/03/13	12/03/13- 30/08/13	31/08/13- 31/08/13	01/09/13- 09/09/13	10/09/13- 14/09/13	15/09/13- 27/11/16
Spark incident	Peak	Aftermath	Non-peak	Ram Singh dies	Non-peak	Juvenile convicted	Non-peak	Other convictions	Non-peak
Small number indicates that focus was on consistent norms which remained prevalent throughout the campaign	Reflecting on the ground protests in reaction	Focus on ensuring that perpetrators are brought to justice	Call to sign petition and protest	Twitter reacts to perpetrator's alleged suicide	Emotional reaction during non-peak event time	Twitter reacts to the conviction of the juvenile perpetrator	No clear focus	Twitter continues to follow and react to outcomes of the trials	Lack of satisfying end or closure

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Appendix 5: Data collection

#niunamenos variable norms (As many of the time periods had no organic norms or no clear focus, time periods with fewer than four organic norms have not been included)

03/01/15-10/05/15	11/05/15-11/05/15	12/05/15-20/06/15	15/07/15-15/07/15	13/10/15-17/10/15	07/11/15-26/11/15	08/03/16-08/03/16	20/07/16-24/07/16	08/08/16-16/08/16	28/09/16-28/09/16
Build up	Spark incident	First protest/ laws changed	Facebook post of VAW goes viral	Second protest	Third protest	International Women's Day	Campaign moves to other South American countries	Marches in Peru	Marches in Argentina
deaths	#MeCuesta	#BastaDeViolencia	Angeles Rawson (victim)	Diana (victim)	#NoalaViolenciadeGenero	Intl Women's Day	country	Cordera (accused musician)	ask
marathon	call	campaign	life imprisonment	family	fight	beautiful	CR Women's Desk	people	everything
Mexico	Chiara	media	Mangieri (perpetrator)	involved	Plaza	continue	support	should	Mendoza
Museum	country	Plaza	case	issues		equality	touch		people
National	leaves	Song	crime	matters		Fatmagul (Turkish rape drama)			
reading/s	love		jail			fight			
society	marks		last			flowers			
State			little			Happy			

Appendix 5: Data collection

03/01/15-10/05/15	11/05/15-11/05/15	12/05/15-20/06/15	15/07/15-15/07/15	13/10/15-17/10/15	07/11/15-26/11/15	08/03/16-08/03/16	20/07/16-24/07/16	08/08/16-16/08/16	28/09/16-28/09/16
Build up	Spark incident	First protest/ laws changed	Facebook post of VAW goes viral	Second protest	Third protest	International Women's Day	Campaign moves to other South American countries	Marches in Peru	Marches in Argentina
			peace			love			
			prison			respect			
			rest			rights			
			sentence/d						
SUMMARY									
	Focus on spark incident		Reaction to case	Individual stories		International Women's Day			

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Appendix 5: Data collection

#women2drive variable norms

05/05/11-20/05/11	21/05/11-30/05/11	31/05/11-15/06/11	16/06/11-18/06/11	19/06/11-23/08/11	24/08/11-25/08/11	26/08/11-26/09/11	27/09/11-28/09/11	29/09/11-26/10/11	27/10/11-27/10/11	28/10/13-24/10/13	25/10/13-30/10/13	31/10/13-27/11/16
Build up	Spark incident	Non-peak	Driving protest	Non-peak	Arrest	Non-peak	Lashing sentence	Non-peak	Unknown peak	Non-peak	Driving protest	Non-peak
#Hariridrive	#Hariridrive	#WomenRights	all	Clinton	police		lashes	King	Prince Nayef	road	oct26driving	oct26driving
lead	issue		go		arrested		skin		Prince Nayef (Arabic)		protest	female
shopping			police		license		King		Crown		freedom	against
market					lead		rule		dream/s		video	law
					pledge		vote		shopping		defy	allowed
							news		love		wheel	
							judge		Manal al Sharif (Arabic)		#BeepBeep	
							decision		market			
							Right2Dignity		long			
							sentenced		ambition			
							ten		appointment			

Appendix 5: Data collection

05/05/11-20/05/11	21/05/11-30/05/11	31/05/11-15/06/11	16/06/11-18/06/11	19/06/11-23/08/11	24/08/11-25/08/11	26/08/11-26/09/11	27/09/11-28/09/11	29/09/11-26/10/11	27/10/11-27/10/11	28/10/11-24/10/13	25/10/13-30/10/13	31/10/13-27/11/16
Build up	Spark incident	Non-peak	Driving protest	Non-peak	Arrest	Non-peak	Lashing sentence	Non-peak	Unknown peak	Non-peak	Driving protest	Non-peak
									buy			
SUMMARY												
Practical, factual focus				Explicit foreign connection	Reflecting arrest		Reacting to lashing sentence		Notable focus on royal family		Continued push for protests	

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Appendix 5: Data collection

Collection of Tweets

The process for collecting the Tweets manually was as follows. First, the researcher used the Twitter advanced search function to search by hashtag, over a given time period based on the campaign timelines. Google Chrome was used consistently, from two different work station PCs. The Tweets were first loaded under the 'Latest' tab. In most cases, with well-defined time periods, all Tweets were able to be loaded into one batch using scrolling. When reaching the end of the available Tweets, they were copied and pasted into a plain text format and saved as individual files. The process was repeated using the 'Top' tab to ensure that the highest number of Tweets were collected and that any collection errors would be rectified through the dual process.

Difficulties arose when there were more than roughly 8,000 Tweets during one 24-hour period. The smallest possible search is one calendar day and the Tweets are always loaded in reverse time order (the most recent first). While attempting to load more than approximately 8,000 Tweets in the same page, Chrome would 'crash' and the Tweets that had been loading via scrolling were lost; it was not possible to cut down or re-order the search parameters to avoid the crash or collect the Tweets differently. After extensive trial and error, it was determined that the source of the limitation was the memory available in the browser. By monitoring the memory usage in Chrome while loading Tweets, it was possible to anticipate a potential crash and save progress. Then more Tweets could be loaded onto the page, saving every time approximately 100 additional Tweets had been loaded, until Chrome crashed. This meant that there were a small number of incomplete days where it was not possible to access the full range of Tweets over approximately 8,000. It also meant that for some of these very high activity days, it was not feasible to repeat the process using both 'Latest' and 'Top' tabs. There were therefore the following incomplete days:

Number of 'incomplete' days analysed, by campaign

Campaign	Incomplete days	Total days	% incomplete
#stopstoning	No incomplete days	2,354	0%
#letwomengotostadium	No incomplete days	884	0%
#farkhunda	No incomplete days	609	0%

#sendeanlat	2 incomplete days, gathered via *both* Latest and Top tabs	654	< 1%
#mydressmychoice	1 incomplete day, gathered via *both* Latest and Top tabs	746	< 1%
#delhigangrape	4 incomplete days, gathered via *both* Latest and Top tabs	1,442	< 1%
#niunamenos	33 incomplete days, 13 gathered via both Latest and Top, and 20 gathered via Top *only*	696	5%
#women2drive	1 incomplete day, gathered via *both* Latest and Top	2,033	< 1%

Additionally, the initial data collection phase took place from December 2016 to March 2017. In the initial phase, the hashtag #niunamas was used to collect data on the Argentinian campaign. However, during the legal data collection and analysis, it was determined that the more widely used hashtag was #niunamenos. Therefore, in December 2017 and January 2018, data collection on this hashtag was undertaken. It appeared that either Google Chrome or Twitter had changed memory allocations and fewer Tweets per day were accessible. Chrome crashed at approximately 4,000 Tweets. This explains the higher number of incomplete days in the #niunamenos campaign. However, as this campaign was also the largest by quite some margin, there were still ample Tweets available for analysis and it was decided that the campaign could therefore still be included in the study.[1]

In total, it took approximately five months to collect the Tweets manually. Including the two campaigns which were eventually excluded, 1,051,525 unique Tweets were collected. After #malala and #notacriminal/#repealthe8th were excluded, a total of 743,671 Tweets were analysed.

Cleaning the Twitter Data

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[1] Additionally, if the Latest tab could not be fully loaded, it would be the earlier Tweets that would be missing. This could have meant that for those days Tweets from a specific time of day would consistently be missing. However, as many days were complete and a third of the incomplete days were able to be gathered via Latest and Top tabs, it was determined any gaps in specific time periods on the incomplete days gathered via Latest only would be overcome. As it took several hours to load just one day of Tweets, practical realities were taken into consideration.

Appendix 5: Data collection

Once the Tweets for all campaigns were collected and saved in plain text formats, technical assistance was provided in programmatically writing a simple script to format the data and remove duplicates.[2] Given that Tweets were collected via Latest and Top tabs, removing the duplicates was important. The Tweets were then in tab-delineated format (.csv) and could easily be imported into Excel. Simple descriptive statistics were generated during this process as well, including the most 100 used words, the most 100 used hashtags, word length (i.e. number of two letter words used, number of four letter words used, etc.), Tweet length (i.e. number of 140 character Tweets, etc.), 100 most prolific users, numbers of Retweets, Replies, and Likes, and Tweets per day. The data was then disaggregated over peak and non-peak time periods, determined by the number of Tweets per day (the bar for peak was set for each campaign based on the average number of Tweets per day).

A small set of Tweets generated unreadable content only. Something was lost in translation in the process of copying and pasting. These were therefore included in the persistence, engagement, and user analysis, but were excluded from the sentiment and content analysis. As a small percentage of total Tweets, this was deemed an acceptable level of loss.

Number of content-excluded Tweets

Campaign	Number of content-excluded Tweets	% of Total Tweets
#stopstoning	10	< 1%
#letwomengotostadium	81	1%
#farkhunda	177	2%
#sendeanlat	1,728	4%
#mydressmychoice	204	<1%
#delhigangrape	627	<1%
#niunamenos	0	0%
#women2drive	12	<1%

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[2] Dr. David Willis, a research associate and clinical scientist in UEA's Medical School, with senior expertise in computer programming and data analysis, provided this assistance. As a matter of disclosure, he is also the researcher's husband.

Appendix 5: Data collection

Quality assurance was undertaken by spot checking various randomly selected data points against the original text files and against live data on Twitter.com. This process provided all the data needed to continue on to analysis.

Initial Analysis of Twitter Data

Once the data was collected and cleaned, analysis could begin. When looking at persistence across the campaigns, various parameters were derived from the basic data. The clearest parameter was simply the number of Tweets each day, which was used to generate timelines and overall peaks for the campaigns. In more detail, this data was also broken down to look at the standard deviation of Tweets per day and the mean Tweets per day. These provide information about the variability of the campaign's popularity. Additional information on peaks was also produced, such as the number of peak periods, the number of individual peaks, the number of Tweets on peak days, and the breakdown of the campaign across peak and non-peak periods. The data was explored to look at the number of days with no Tweets, with five or more Tweets, with 10 or more Tweets, and with 1,000 or more Tweets. Where possible, these figures were converted into percentages for comparability. Some of this data was explored but not included in statistical tests given the issue with incomplete days explained above. For example, even though the highest peak for #niunamenos was 4,809, this is not comparable to the other campaigns given the differences in maximum Tweets collected per day. Equally, although the highest peak for #delhigangrape is 13,136, for #sendeanlat is 12,993, and for #women2drive is 12,055, these are not accurate representations of the peaks themselves but rather the ability to load as many Tweets as possible given the browser memory constraints. Therefore raw numbers in this vein are interesting, but not comparable.

The engagement metrics are drawn from the number of times each Tweet in the data set was retweeted, replied to, or liked. These numbers were then tallied up and used to generate ratios to compare the incidence of the different kinds of engagement to the total number of Tweets and to each other. The process was then repeated for peak versus non-peak periods. This was done in order to characterise the kind of engagements most prominent in each campaign. Additionally, a scientific tool called a log(n) log(s) plot was generated for each campaign, and again repeated for peak and non-peak periods.[3] This shows the number of

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[3] This process was recommended by Dr. David Willis after seeing the data.

occurrences for a given parameter. For example, how many Tweets are Retweeted once (which is likely a very high number) up to how many Tweets are Retweeted 10,000 times (which is likely a very low number). The plot then shows the number of occurrences and the number of Tweets (on a log scale). Retweets, replies, and likes can then be plotted on the same graph. This helps to visualise the engagement metrics for each campaign.

From manually accessing the profile pages of the 100 most prolific users in each campaign, information was collected to measure their campaign activity, reach (number of followers), overall activity (number of Tweets ever sent), location, and profile category. Note that these profiles reflect the current number of followers and Tweets, and thus are a proxy for what the profile may have looked like at the time of the campaign. Users' reach and activity levels were then categorised into the following broad groups:

Range	Group
> 100,000 Tweets	Highly active
100,000 > Tweets > 10,000	Very active
10,000 > Tweets > 5,000	Active
< 5,000 Tweets	Less active
> 1,000,000 Followers	Extreme reach
1,000,000 > Followers > 100,000	Large reach
100,000 > Followers > 10,000	Good reach
10,000 > Followers > 1,000	Average reach
< 1,000	Small reach

Profile categories were inductively coded, using a free coding method which was then standardised and used as a code book for re-coding the profiles.[4] Users were categorised into

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[4] Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods* (Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press 2016).

the following profile codes: academic, activist, artist, business, counter-narrative, entertainment industry, government party, independent journalist, individual, official journalist, news agency, organisation, individual politician, sales/product account, trending topics, writer, or unknown (definitions are provided in Appendix 1). The code was determined based on what the users wrote themselves in their profile description. Therefore, to be coded as an activist, this word must have been used in their self-written profile. To be considered an independent journalist, the user self-identified as a journalist but was clear that they were not associated with an official outlet. News agencies were the official Twitter accounts for local, national, or international news outlets. Individuals were Twitter users who did not self-identify as a specific category and clearly identified as unaffiliated users. Unknown were profiles that had been left blank or were otherwise nonsensical. The profiles were also used to identify locations. As these also are generated by the users themselves, the location was not always accurate or included. If a location was listed but unknown to the researcher, Google maps was used to pinpoint a country. Locations were coded as domestic or non-domestic, as it was clear whether a user was in the target country, but when the location was unclear it was more accurate to label the user as 'non-domestic' as opposed to 'foreign' as they may not have been foreign, but equally could not clearly be classed as domestic. These groups could then be 'sliced and diced' to look at relationships across the different metrics as percentages.

Content analysis started with basic information, such as most used word length, most used Tweet length, and total hashtags (apart from the campaign hashtag) used. Sentiment analysis was performed programmatically with Python, using TextBlob to generate positivity, negativity, polarity, and subjectivity scores.[5] The process also has a built-in system for translation, using Google Translate. It was not possible to translate all non-English Tweets into English, but it was possible to translate discrete sets of Tweets. The following translations were run:

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[5] TextBlob, 'TextBlob: Simplified Text Processing' <https://textblob.readthedocs.io/en/dev/> accessed 18 September 2018. TextBlob uses the natural language processing (NLP) through the 'Natural Language Toolkit' (NLTK) and the pattern.en module to classify the Tweets. The process removes 'stopwords' such as I, am, you, are, etc. and then classifies words based on their part of speech (adjective, noun, adverb, etc.). Only those parts of speech which can be classified as positive or negative are passed through to the sentiment analysis. The TextBlob sentiment analysis uses a Naïve Bayes Classification system on a known dataset to score the Tweets.

Appendix 5: Data collection

Overview of translated Tweets

Campaign	% non-English	Language translated to English
#stopstoning	1%	No translation
#letwomengotostadium	60%	Persian
#farkhunda	9%	No translation
#sendeanlat	76%	Turkish
#mydressmychoice	5%	No translation
#delhigangrape	7%	No translation
#niunamenos	63%	Spanish
#women2drive	38%	Arabic

The translated Tweets were analysed for sentiment. Spot checks were undertaken to ensure that, to the extent possible, the sentiment score was reflective of the Tweets. This was particularly undertaken for days which showed either extremely positive or extremely negative average scores. Various parameters were generated using these scores, looking at the differences between peak and non-peak periods, weighted scores (based on the number of Tweets), highest and lowest scores, and differences. Again, full explanations are provided in Appendix 1.

The final piece of initial Twitter analysis was to explore framing and messaging and to proxy the presence of norms in Tweets. This process took two forms: one inductive and one deductive. The inductive process used a script to programmatically search for the 100 most used words across a set of event-based epochs (time periods). The deductive process used a pre-defined set of 93 words to measure the presence of international norms in each campaign. The list was derived from a survey of international instruments and reports on women's rights and violence against women, utilising both UN and NGO documents to have a rounded approach, included in full in Appendix 2.

From the list of most 100 used words from each epoch, words which could not be used to interpret a norm or message were removed (i.e. and, are, were, the, etc.)   All pronouns were grouped into categories of first person, second person, third person female, third person male, and third person plural. Although most sentiment analysis will remove these pronouns, they were quite prevalent and could, in fact, be used to characterise the content and messaging of the Tweets. It was determined that these words actually provided important insight and

should be included in the normative analysis. The remaining list of inductive words were then divided into those that appeared in three or more epochs and those that appeared in less than three epochs. This showed the difference between organically emerging but consistent framing and messaging (more than three epochs) and organically emerging but variable and short-lived framing and messaging (less than three). This process emerged through the initial cleaning and analysis of the data and was then applied to all campaigns. Finally, each epoch was scanned for the number of times each of the deductive international norm key words were used. Inductive frames were also matched against deductive international norms to see how many of the most used words were also representative of international norms. Frames, messages, and norms which were legal in nature were also identified to see how much of a legal focus was taken on by the campaign users.

Collection and Analysis of Legal Data

The collection of legal evidence was much more straightforward. Additionally, collection and analysis were undertaken simultaneously for each campaign, rather than bulk collection followed by bulk analysis (as done for the Twitter data). This approach was adopted as it was a cyclical and snowballing process of collection, analysis, further collection and cross-referencing, analysis, and so on. While the collection process was unique and specific for each campaign, a few general principles were applied. The collection began with a simple internet search of the hashtag. This provided the starting point for research. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch materials were searched for all campaigns, as well as the BBC and NY Times. Where possible, NGOs actively supporting the campaigns were identified and their websites were thoroughly searched for any and all relevant reports, statistics, or press releases. Government websites were searched for relevant materials, including crime statistics. Case law was accessed where possible, after identification of relevant cases. An extensive process of cross referencing was undertaken to ensure that a wide range of materials were sourced. Once the initial round was completed, analysis began. Tables were created to collect information and quotes, and to help identify gaps in evidence. The collection process was then repeated to fill gaps and follow up on additional referenced sources or involved NGOs. This carried on until the table was as complete as possible. Each campaign generated a table of 10-15 pages of analysis to ensure a comparable level of information gathered for each. The quantification was done as an ongoing process during the

analysis, reviewed regularly and ultimately when all campaigns were completed to ensure consistency and comparability. An overview of the evidence collected is presented:

Legal evidence examined, by campaign

	#stopstoning	#letwomengotostadium	#farkhunda	#sendeanlat	#mydressmychoice	#delhigangrape	#niunamenos	#women2drive
Total pieces of legal evidence analysed	**248**	**208**	**169**	**204**	**149**	**186**	**169**	**187**
Academic articles				4				4
Amnesty International	38	2	9	1				7
Case law				8	8	4	2	
EU reports				5				
Freedom of the Internet reports	6	6						
Government documents (legislation, Constitutions, reports, documents, policies, crime statistics and press releases)	35	20	13	12	50	13	8	2
Human Rights Watch		11	5	8				6
Media reports		61	21	95	21	76	54	134
NGO reports	69	7	21	16	4	7	16	7
UN Reports	93	94	85	55	66	86	89	27
US State Department Reports	7	7	15					

Grand total: 1,520 documents or reports

Statistical Analysis

The breadth of the statistical methodology is presented in Chapter 8. However, a broad brush stroke overview is given here to frame the discussion in the chapters which follow.

All of the parameters collected and cleaned were collated into one 'master data set' spreadsheet. Here it was possible to compare the campaigns side-by-side, identify key characteristics (very high or very low scores in any given parameter), and begin to gain an

overview into overall trends or patterns. From this exercise and the in depth legal analysis, it became clear that the campaigns fell into broad groupings based on legal outcomes.[6]

As an initial test of the hypotheses, simple correlations were run between all parameters and the overall legal outcomes. To explore further, coefficients of determination (R^2) were produced to identify parameters with a strong linear relationship with the overall legal change. These were initially done quite simply in Excel in the master data set. These tests provided excellent insight into which parameters may be of interest overall, and which parameters, while important to explore in each campaign, may have less of a linear and therefore predictive relationship with legal outcomes. SPSS was used to run more extensive tests. The information contained in the master data set, including all of the parameters, the composite scores, and the initial associative tests were then used to analyse the results. This is the information contained in the remaining chapters in this thesis.

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[6] #stopstoning and #letwomengotostadium showed many signs of government backlash, and scored at 2.5 or less (1.0 being the worst and 5.0 being the best) in legal outcomes. Not one of the components showed any positive change above 3.0 and but did show more than two parameters at 2.0 or less. Although both targeted Iran, the campaigns were different enough to see that this grouping was based on the legal outcomes more than the context. #farkhunda, #sendeanlat, and #mydressmychoice all broadly showed no overall legal change, categorised as status quo. Each of the campaigns had two or more parameters that scored 3.0 or greater, and no campaign scored less than 2.5 in more than one category. Although #farkhunda showed a particularly negative score in law enforcement, this was balanced out by some positive change in legislation, placing this campaign in the status quo grouping. #farkhunda was a borderline campaign, but the positive change in legislation set it apart from the two Iranian campaigns which showed no positive change. #delhigangrape and #niunamenos showed extremely similar legal results, with full marks in legislative change but poorer scores in law enforcement. They also showed a lack of progress in institutionalisation (at 3.0 and 3.5 respectively). These campaigns showed very clear signs of tactical concessions but lacked long term implementation or institutionalisation. Finally, #women2drive stood apart from the other campaigns as showing the most positive signs of change, particularly in institutionalisation.