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1 **CO₂ Emissions Embodied in International Migration from 1995 to 2015**

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20

21 ABSTRACT

22 Whilst present international CO₂ mitigation agreements account for the impact of
23 population composition and structure on emissions, the impact of international
24 migration is overlooked. This study quantifies the CO₂ footprint of international
25 immigrants and reveals their non-negligible impacts on global CO₂ emissions. Results
26 show that the CO₂ footprint of international immigrants has increased from 1.8
27 Gigatonnes (Gt) in 1995 to 2.9 Gt in 2015. In 2015, the U.S. had the largest total and
28 per capita CO₂ emissions caused by international immigrants. Oceania and the Middle
29 East are highlighted for their large portions of immigrant-caused CO₂ emissions in
30 total CO₂ emissions (around 20%). Changes in the population and structure of global
31 migration have kept increasing global CO₂ emissions during 1995–2015, while the
32 reduction of CO₂ emission intensity helped offset global CO₂ emissions. The global
33 CO₂ mitigation targets must consider the effects of global migration and demand-side
34 measures need to concern major immigrant influx nations.

35 **Keywords:** international migration, immigrant, climate change, CO₂ emissions, trade,
36 consumption.

37 **Synopsis:** This study links the population mobility with global CO₂ mitigation, which
38 evaluates the contribution of international immigrants to global CO₂ emissions.

39

40

41 INTRODUCTION

42 International migration is a phenomenon accompanying the process of human
43 civilization and globalization. In recent decades, the number of international
44 immigrants has proliferated and the destinations of immigrants have become
45 increasingly diversified. International migration has a variety of implications on the
46 place of destination including politics, economy, culture and welfare security issues.¹⁻

47 ³

48 Migration can be a critical demographic factor affecting the environment.⁴ Previous
49 studies have investigated the environmental impacts of regional migration (including
50 interregional migration, rural-rural migration, and rural-urban migration) on land
51 use,^{5, 6} forest cover,^{7, 8} air pollutant emissions,^{9, 10} and carbon emissions.¹¹⁻¹³

52 Population migration has implications for carbon emissions mainly because migration
53 flows affect population size and structure both at the origin and destination. Not only
54 does migration-induced population growth translates into higher energy consumption,
55 migration process can bring about lifestyle change which influences consumption
56 pattern and consequently CO₂ emissions¹⁴. This line of argument has been put
57 forward to campaign for restriction of immigration for example in the US because
58 population growth induced by migration coupled with the American lifestyle adopted
59 by immigrants will have consequential environmental impact^{15, 16}.

60 The evidence on the impact of migration on the environment however is inconclusive.
61 On the one hand, rural to urban migration within a country is typically found to be
62 associated with an increase in CO₂ emissions given a rise in the demand for
63 residential energy in the urban area and lifestyle change thanks to increased income
64 level^{13, 17}. On the other hand, studies on the environmental impact of immigration
65 measured by air quality and air pollutant emissions focusing on the US do not find
66 evidence that immigration contribute to heightened air pollution levels^{18, 19}. Ma and
67 Hofmann even find that the presence of immigrant population is associated with better
68 overall air quality²⁰ possibly because migrants express greater environmental
69 concerns and have lower energy consumption than the US native born. The
70 inconclusive nature of the evidence calls for further research using different indicators
71 of environmental impact²⁰ as well as cross-national comparisons between sending
72 countries with high and low emissions¹⁸.

73 Indeed, more accurate and objective studies about the migration–environment
74 relationship are needed since they have relevant policy implications. However, little
75 attention is paid to the impacts of international migration on environmental emissions
76 at the global scale. In the context of enormous challenges of global climate change,
77 the international community formulates active CO₂ mitigation agreements to keep the
78 temperature arisen within 2 degrees at the end of this century. However, these
79 agreements do not account for changing population structure and distribution which
80 can shift the global patterns of CO₂ emissions. A study of population mobility finds a

81 significant contribution of tourism on global CO₂ emission growth, especially in the
82 sectors such as transportation, food, and accommodations.²¹ If a short-term population
83 movement like tourism has a substantial impact on CO₂ emissions, this raises an
84 important question how migration as a long-term population movement will impact
85 the global emissions.²²⁻²⁴ Longer term population mobility involves comprehensive
86 consumption sectors (e.g., housing, infrastructure, energy use, health care, and
87 education) which would lead to long-term environmental impacts. Given the current
88 trends that international migration will continue to play a role in global population
89 dynamics coupled with the intensity of globalization and labor transfer, global CO₂
90 emissions caused by international migration are no doubt worthy of critical attention.
91 However, the impacts of international migration on global CO₂ emissions are not well
92 evaluated.

93 To that end, this study fulfills the above knowledge gap by analyzing the impacts of
94 international migration on global CO₂ emissions. We construct a set of international
95 migration matrixes to uncover the sources, destinations, and quantities of the migrant
96 population. Then we evaluate the CO₂ footprint of the international immigrants and
97 the impacts of international migration on global CO₂ emissions. Findings of this study
98 can contribute to the formulation of CO₂ mitigation strategies in different nations with
99 the consideration of future immigrants.

100

101 MATERIALS AND METHODS

102 **Constructing International Migration Matrixes.** This study constructs the
103 migration matrixes in 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015 to describe the international
104 migrant stock by destination and origin. Each row of the matrixes represents
105 emigrants from a country of origin, while each column denotes the immigrants to a
106 country of destination. Thus, the sum of each row equals the original population of a
107 nation, while the sum of each column equals the current population of a nation. The
108 diagonal elements of the matrixes represent the population which do not emigrate.
109 The migration matrixes are constructed with the international migration data and
110 national population data. The international migration data are from the dataset of the
111 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA)²⁵. This
112 dataset presents the estimates of international immigrants by ages, sexes, and origins,
113 based on official statistics on the foreign-born or foreign population. The national
114 population data are from the World Bank²⁶.

115 **CO₂ Footprint of Immigrants.** We use a global environmentally extended multi-
116 regional input-output (EE-MRIO) model to evaluate the CO₂ footprint of nations and
117 their immigrants. The EE-MRIO model has been widely used to investigate
118 environmental issues related to socioeconomic activities, such as CO₂ emissions,²⁷⁻²⁹
119 mercury emissions,^{30, 31} resource extraction and scarcity,³²⁻³⁴ and health risks^{35, 36}. We
120 construct a global EE-MRIO model by treating global CO₂ emissions as the satellite
121 account of the global MRIO table. We use the global MRIO tables from the Eora

122 database^{37,38}, mainly due to two reasons: (1) Eora covers 190 nations/regions, which
 123 is more than other global MRIO databases. Thus, it is suitable for investigating the
 124 issue of international migration. (2) Eora has a complete time series for 1990-2015,
 125 which covers all the time points in this study.^{37,38} This study groups all the nations
 126 into 13 sub-regions considering geographical factors and their significance for
 127 migration, including the U.S., Canada, Mexico, China, India, South America,
 128 European Union (EU), Russia and CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States)
 129 regions, Southeast Asia, Middle East, Africa, Oceania, and the Rest of the World
 130 (RoW). The list of nations and corresponding sub-regions are shown in SI Data S4.
 131 Data for the satellite account of global CO₂ emissions are also from the Eora database.
 132 We use the satellite account of CO₂ emissions generated from the PRIMAP-HIST
 133 dataset, as recommended by the Eora database. The selected satellite account is the
 134 National Total (CAT0) CO₂ emissions. It covers all the sources of CO₂ emissions,
 135 including the Total Energy, Industrial Processes, Land Use, Land Use Change, and
 136 Forestry (LULUCF), etc.

137 The CO₂ footprints of nations are calculated by the Leontief MRIO model, as shown
 138 in equation (1).

$$139 \quad cf_n = q(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1}y_n \quad (1)$$

140 The notation cf_n represents the CO₂ footprint of nation n . The row vector q indicates
 141 the CO₂ emission intensity, where each element q_i represents the CO₂ emissions for
 142 unitary output of nation sector i . The matrix \mathbf{A} is the direct input coefficient matrix,

143 where the element a_{ij} equals to the direct input from nation sector i to nation sector j
 144 divided by the total output of nation sector j . The matrix \mathbf{I} is an identify matrix. The
 145 matrix $(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1}$ is the *Leontief Inverse* matrix, where the element l_{ij} indicates
 146 both direct and indirect inputs from nation sector i to satisfy unitary final demand of
 147 sector j . The vector y_n represents the final demand of nation n .

148 The CO₂ footprint of immigrants in a nation is calculated with the CO₂ footprint of
 149 this nation and the proportion of immigrants in the current population of this nation,
 150 as shown in equation (2).

$$151 \quad cf_{m,n}^{immi} = cf_n \times \frac{p_{m,n}^{immi}}{p_n^{total}} \quad (2)$$

152 The notation $cf_{m,n}^{immi}$ indicates the CO₂ footprint in nation n caused by the immigrants
 153 from nation m ($m \neq n$). The notation $p_{m,n}^{immi}$ represents the population of immigrants
 154 from nation m to nation n , and the notation p_n^{total} denotes the total current population
 155 of nation n . Consequently, the CO₂ footprint of immigrants to nation n (cf_n^{immi}) and
 156 that of the world (cf^{immi}) are calculated by equations (3) and (4), respectively.

$$157 \quad cf_n^{immi} = \sum_m cf_{m,n}^{immi} \quad (3)$$

$$158 \quad cf^{immi} = \sum_n cf_n^{immi} \quad (4)$$

159 **Structural Decomposition Analysis.** We combine the structural decomposition
 160 analysis (SDA) with the EE-MRIO model to investigate the relative contribution of
 161 the international migration to global CO₂ emissions during 1995–2015. In this study,
 162 we decompose global CO₂ emission changes into the relative contributions of the

163 changes in CO₂ emission intensity, production structure, final demand structure, per
 164 capita final demand level of the current population, migration structure, and original
 165 population.

166 Global CO₂ emissions can be expressed with the global EE-MRIO model, as shown in
 167 equation (5)

$$168 \quad t = q \times (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1} \times y \quad (5)$$

169 The notation t denotes global CO₂ emissions, and q is a vector of CO₂ emission
 170 intensity of nation sectors. The matrix $(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1}$ is the *Leontief Inverse* matrix, and
 171 y is a vector of the final demand.

172 The final demand vector y can be further decomposed into the final demand structure,
 173 per capita final demand level, and population, as shown in equation (6).

$$174 \quad y = y_s \times \hat{y}_v \times p \quad (6)$$

175 The notation y_s represents the final demand structure, which is the proportion of the
 176 nation sectors in the total final demand. The notation y_v denotes the per capita final
 177 demand level, and p represents the current population of nations. The hat notation $\hat{}$
 178 denotes the diagonalization of a vector.

179 To investigate the relative contribution of the international migration, we further
 180 decompose the population into vector e , migration structure matrix \mathbf{B} , and original
 181 population m , as shown in equation (7).

$$182 \quad p = (e \times \hat{m} \times \mathbf{B})^T \quad (7)$$

183 The elements of the row vector e are all 1. The notation m represents a vector of the
 184 original population of nations. The matrix \mathbf{B} indicates the migration structure, where
 185 the element b_{ij} equals to the number of immigrants from nation i to nation j divided
 186 by the original population of nation i . The hat notation $\hat{\cdot}$ and the notation T denote the
 187 diagonalization and transposition of a vector, respectively. Consequently, global CO₂
 188 emissions can be expressed by equation (8).

$$189 \quad t = q \times (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1} \times y_s \times \hat{y}_v \times \mathbf{B}^T \times \hat{m}^T \times e^T \quad (8)$$

190 We use \mathbf{L} to represent the *Leontief Inverse* matrix $(\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1}$. The changes in global
 191 CO₂ emissions can be expressed by equation (9). Items in the right-hand side of
 192 equation (9) represent the relative contributions of the changes in CO₂ emission
 193 intensity Δq , production structure $\Delta \mathbf{L}$, final demand structure Δy_s , per capita final
 194 demand level of the current population $\Delta \hat{y}_v$, migration structure $\Delta \mathbf{B}^T$, and the
 195 original population $\Delta \hat{m}^T$ to global CO₂ emission changes Δt .

$$196 \quad \Delta t = \Delta q \times \mathbf{L} \times y_s \times \hat{y}_v \times \mathbf{B}^T \times \hat{m}^T \times e^T$$

$$197 \quad + q \times \Delta \mathbf{L} \times y_s \times \hat{y}_v \times \mathbf{B}^T \times \hat{m}^T \times e^T$$

$$198 \quad + q \times \mathbf{L} \times \Delta y_s \times \hat{y}_v \times \mathbf{B}^T \times \hat{m}^T \times e^T \quad (9)$$

$$199 \quad + q \times \mathbf{L} \times y_s \times \Delta \hat{y}_v \times \mathbf{B}^T \times \hat{m}^T \times e^T$$

$$200 \quad + q \times \mathbf{L} \times y_s \times \hat{y}_v \times \Delta \mathbf{B}^T \times \hat{m}^T \times e^T$$

$$201 \quad + q \times \mathbf{L} \times y_s \times \hat{y}_v \times \mathbf{B}^T \times \Delta \hat{m}^T \times e^T$$

202 We have 6 decomposition forms, and we average all the 6 decompositions to calculate
203 the relative contributions of the decomposed factors. Moreover, to make the indicators
204 in different time points comparable, we convert the current-price global MRIO tables
205 (in U.S. dollars) to ones in 1995 constant prices (in U.S. dollars) using methods of
206 previous studies^{39, 40}. Such a conversion can eliminate the effects of price changes
207 caused by inflation or deflation. Producer Price Index (PPI) is an economic index
208 reflecting the price changes during a time period. It is typically used to convert
209 comparable prices. The PPIs used for the conversion in this study are from the United
210 States Bureau of Labor Statistics⁴¹.

211


212 **RESULTS**

213 **International Migration During 1995–2015.** The number of international
214 immigrants are 161 million (2.8% of the total global population) in 1995. This
215 percentage has shown an upward trend from 1995 to 2015 with slight fluctuations.
216 International immigrants reach 248 million (3.4% of the total global population) in
217 2015. The quantity of international immigrants has increased by 54% during 1995–
218 2015 (more results in SI Data S1).

219 Figure 1a shows that, in 2015, the most significant international migration corridors
220 are from Mexico to the U.S., from Africa to the European Union (EU), and from India
221 to the Middle East. The migration corridors highlighted in Figure 1a can be generally

222 classified into three types: from developing regions to developed nations (e.g., from
223 Mexico to the U.S., from South America to EU countries,), labour exports (e.g., from
224 India and Southeast Asia to the Middle East, and from Southeast Asia to the U.S.),
225 and refugee flows (e.g., from Africa and Middle East to the EU). The U.S. is a
226 primary destination for migrants from Mexico, India, and China (including Chinese
227 Mainland, Hongkong, Macao, and Taiwan). The number of immigrants in the U.S.
228 exceed 320 million in 2015 (SI Figure S1).

229 Figure 1b shows the changes in the migration population from 1995 to 2015.
230 Migration to the U.S. expanded the most. During 1995–2015, immigrants from
231 Mexico, Southeast Asia, South America, India, and China to the U.S. increased
232 dramatically. Meanwhile, immigrants from India to the Middle East presented the
233 most substantial increments. In contrast, the migrant population in Russia, Ukraine,
234 and India decreased remarkably. In Asia, the number of migrants from India in United
235 Arab Emirates (labour exports) increased substantially, while the number of migrants
236 from Iraq in Iran decreased (SI Figure S1).



237

238 **Figure 1.** Global migration population in 2015 and migration changes during 1995–

239 2015. Panel (a) shows global migration in 2015 (million), and panel (b) shows

240 changes in the number of global migration during 1995–2015 (million). The colour of

241 nations in the world maps shows the number of migrant population (a) and changes in

242 migrant population (b). The arrows start from the origins of immigrants and end at

243 their destinations (at the sub-regional scale). The red arrows indicate an increased

244 population of immigrants, while the blue ones represent a decrease. The numbers and

245 width of the arrows indicate the migrant population (a) and the migrant population
246 changes (b).

247 **CO₂ Footprint of International Immigrants.** The CO₂ footprint of international
248 immigrants is 1.8 Gigatonnes (Gt), occupying 6% of the global total CO₂ emissions in
249 1995. It has shown an upward trend during 1995–2015 with slight fluctuations, and
250 reaches 2.9 Gt (8%) in 2015. The CO₂ footprint of international immigrants has
251 increased by 65% during 1995–2015 (more results in SI Data S2).

252 Figure 2a shows global CO₂ emissions caused by international migration (hereinafter
253 called immiCO₂, which is part of the CO₂ footprint of the migrants receiving nation)
254 in 2015. The developing regions are generally net exporter of immiCO₂, while the
255 developed regions mostly act as net importers of immiCO₂.

256 The U.S. has the highest immiCO₂ in 2015 (947 million ton, Mt). The immigrants
257 from Mexico contribute the most (25% of the immiCO₂ in the U.S.), followed by
258 Southeast Asia (9%), the EU (8%), and South America (6%). The immiCO₂ flows are
259 in consistent with typical migration corridors such as corridors from developing
260 regions to developed regions and labour export corridors. For instance, Mexico, a
261 developing economy, has been one of the largest origins of immigrant population in
262 the U.S. The immigrants from Mexico move to the U.S. for job opportunities and
263 better living conditions (e.g., better healthcare and education). The improvement of
264 personal income and living conditions promote the consumption of immigrants. This

265 can drive larger CO₂ emissions from the upstream regions/sectors in the supply
266 chains, and hence increases CO₂ footprint of the U.S. The U.S. is the primary
267 migration destination with a diverse migrant composition, which leads to enormous
268 effects of the immigrants on global CO₂ emissions.

269 The immiCO₂ of the Middle East (513 Mt) rank second, mainly induced by
270 immigrants from India (leading to 38% of the immiCO₂ in the Middle East) and
271 Southeast Asia (13%). In particular, immigrants from India to the United Arab
272 Emirates and Qatar are the most critical causes of immiCO₂ in the Middle East (SI
273 Figure S2). The United Arab Emirates and Qatar have small populations, with
274 immigrant populations accounting for the majority (SI Data S1). Their prosperous
275 economic development requires large amounts of labour forces. These nations attract
276 overseas labour forces, especially immigrants from India. This reveals that labour
277 export to the Middle East results in large amounts of global CO₂ emissions. For the
278 EU, the immiCO₂ reaches 274 Mt, with Africa, South America, and Russia and CIS
279 (Commonwealth of Independent States) contributing significantly. The refugee flows
280 from Africa to EU lead to large amounts of immiCO₂. The political unrest and severe
281 natural disaster in Africa bring about lots of refugees, and EU becomes the main
282 destination of African refugees. CO₂ emissions driven by immigrant refugees cannot
283 be neglected.

284 From 1995 to 2015, the migration flows from India to the Middle East lead to the
285 most massive global CO₂ emissions (Figure 2b). Notably, the immiCO₂ flows from

286 India to Qatar and the United Arab Emirates significantly increased immiCO₂ of the
287 Middle East (SI Figure S2). The immiCO₂ of the U.S. has increased and then declined
288 slightly during 1995–2015, while its portion in total CO₂ emissions of the U.S.
289 steadily has increased from 11% in 1995 to 15% in 2015 (more results in SI Data S3).
290 Figure 2b also shows that all the immiCO₂ flows from Mexico, Southeast Asia, India,
291 China, South America, and Africa to the U.S. have increased. This finding is in
292 accordance with the changes in migration trends. On the other hand, immiCO₂ flows
293 from the EU to the U.S., South America, and Russia and CIS have shown a small
294 decrease.

295 In 2015, the per capita immiCO₂ of the U.S. reached 20 ton/capita, followed by
296 Oceania (12 ton/capita) and the EU (8 ton/capita). Although the U.S. and the EU are
297 both major destinations of immigrants, they are evidently different in terms of per
298 capita immiCO₂. The value of the U.S. is approximately 2.5 times as that of the EU
299 (Figure 2c). In Africa and India, the per capita immiCO₂ is the lowest. At the national
300 level, nations with the highest per capita immiCO₂ include Qatar (48 ton/capita) and
301 San Marino (41 ton/capita), which have small populations. Moreover, the immiCO₂ in
302 Luxembourg, United Arab Emirates, and Singapore all exceeded 30 ton/capita (SI
303 Figure S2).

304 Oceania and the Middle East are highlighted for their large portions of immiCO₂ in
305 their total CO₂ emissions, with the percentages of 22% and 20%, respectively. The
306 immiCO₂ in the U.S. and EU, which are major migration destinations, account for


307 15% and 7% of their total CO₂ emissions, respectively (Figure 2d). At the national
308 level, the percentages in the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar all exceeded
309 65%, which were the highest in 2015 (SI Figure S2). CO₂ emissions of the
310 emphasized areas are more greatly influenced by international migration. Prospect
311 CO₂ reduction strategies in these areas are suggested to take the quantity and structure
312 of population movement into account.

314 **Figure 2.** Global immiCO₂ and immiCO₂ flows. Panel (a) illustrates the global immiCO₂ and the critical sub-regional flows in 2015 (Mt). Panel
315 (b) shows the changes in immiCO₂ and the critical sub-regional flows during 1995–2015 (Mt). The colour of nations in the world maps shows
316 their immiCO₂ (a) and immiCO₂ changes (b). The arrows start from the origins of immigrants and end at their destinations (at the sub-regional
317 scale). The numbers and width of the arrows indicate the immiCO₂ (a) and the changes in immiCO₂ (b). The red arrows indicate an increased
318 immiCO₂ caused by the migration flows, while the blue ones represent a decrease. Panel (c) illustrates the per capita immiCO₂ in each sub-
319 region in 2015 (ton per capita), where the colour of the sub-regions in the world maps shows their per capita immiCO₂. Panel (d) shows the
320 portion of immiCO₂ in total CO₂ footprint for each sub-region in 2015, where the colour of the sub-regions in the world maps shows their
321 proportions of immiCO₂ in total CO₂ footprint.

322 **Impacts of International Migration on Global CO₂ Emissions.** We evaluate the
323 relative contribution of the international migration to global CO₂ emissions, by
324 decomposing global CO₂ emissions into six socioeconomic determinants (i.e., CO₂
325 emission intensity, production structure, final demand structure, per capita final
326 demand, original population, and migration structure). Figure 3 reveals that global
327 CO₂ emissions have increased steadily during 1995–2015, with the increasing per
328 capita final demand being the largest contributor. The reduction of CO₂ emission
329 intensity has the most significant contribution to global CO₂ mitigation. The changes
330 in the original population and international migrants structure have kept increasing
331 global CO₂ emissions during 1995–2015. Natural population growth, which is the
332 second largest contributor to global CO₂ emissions, contributes to an increase in
333 global CO₂ emissions by over 4% every five years while changes in the international
334 migration structure act as the third largest contributor. The pushing effects of
335 migration structure changes vary across different time periods, with the highest being
336 0.7% during 2005–2010 and the lowest being 0.1% during 2010–2015. The impacts
337 of international migration structure changes on global CO₂ emissions are expected to
338 be lower in recent years, because the migration structures of major migration
339 destinations have been plateaued. The changes in the final demand structure have
340 relatively small impacts on global CO₂ emissions during 1995–2015. In general,
341 changes in the quantity, structure, and affluence of international immigrants have
342 contributed to global CO₂ emissions increase during 1995–2015, while final demand

343 structure changes of international immigrants have little effects on global CO₂

344 emissions during this time period.



345

346 **Figure 3.** Impacts of socioeconomic transition and migration trend on changes in

347 global CO₂ emissions during 1995–2015. The positive values indicate that

348 socioeconomic factor changes contribute to the increase of CO₂ emissions, while the

349 negative values mean that the socioeconomic factor changes lead to the mitigation of

350 CO₂ emissions, if other factors remain constant.

351

352 DISCUSSION

353 This study for the first time examined the CO₂ footprint of international immigrants.

354 The CO₂ footprint of international immigrants has increased by 65% during 1995–

355 2015, while that of the global population (i.e., global total CO₂ emissions) has

356 increased by 33% during the same period. Meanwhile, the portion of the CO₂

357 footprint of international immigrants in global total CO₂ emissions has also increased.
358 International migrants accounted for 3.4% of the total population in 2015, but its CO₂
359 footprint was as high as 7.9%. However, in 1995 the portion of international
360 immigrants and their CO₂ footprint was only 2.8% and 6.3%, respectively. Since
361 migration is generally from relatively poorer regions to richer regions, immigrants
362 would typically live in more advanced economies with significant lifestyle change.
363 Their consumption of living necessities (e.g., foods and clothes), housing,
364 infrastructures, health care, and education would be more CO₂ intensified, and cause
365 more massive CO₂ emissions. This finding facilitates policy makers to reconsider the
366 role and status of global population mobility in CO₂ emissions. Population mobility
367 will accompany the development and transformation of human society for a long
368 time. The understanding of the CO₂ footprint of human migration in this study will
369 contribute to current efforts and routes to tackle climate changes. At the same time,
370 this study reveals that migration structure tends to be stable in recent years, and the
371 changes in the number of immigrants are the main factor influencing migration-
372 related CO₂ emissions.

373 **Policy implication I: CO₂ reduction targets of the Paris Agreement and**
374 **subsequent agreements must consider the effects of global migration.** Many
375 nations have set their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) since the Paris
376 Agreement in 2016⁴². However, CO₂ emission changes caused by global population
377 movements have not been fully considered in current targets. The allocation of

378 responsibilities for global CO₂ emission reduction can be different when considering
379 the impact of international migration. For net immiCO₂ importers, immigrants
380 contribute to CO₂ emissions in these nations, which increases the challenges of CO₂
381 emission reduction. Based on our results, the U.S. is still a primary destination of
382 global migrants. It is likely to maintain this trend for a long time to come. Thus, the
383 pressure for CO₂ emission reduction in the U.S. will be more severe in the future. The
384 U.S., as the second largest CO₂ emitter in the world, has withdrawn from the Paris
385 Agreement. This situation will pose great challenges to global climate changes.
386 Among other major signatories, developed nations such as those in the EU are also
387 major migration destinations. They need to consider future changes in the number and
388 structure of population movements when setting their NDCs.

389 **Policy implication II: Both production-side and demand-side measures are**
390 **required to curb CO₂ emissions caused by international migration.**

391 On one hand, production-side measures are important to offset the impacts of
392 international migration on global CO₂ emissions. For producers, decreasing their CO₂
393 emission intensity is beneficial to lowering CO₂ footprint of the whole supply chain.
394 Although international migration affects the consumption, the decreased CO₂
395 emission intensity can offset the impact of consumption pattern changes on CO₂
396 emissions to some extent. Since migration restriction is not a desirable option for
397 economic development, immigrant inflow nations should accelerate both the
398 reduction of CO₂ emission intensity of their own economic systems and the transition

399 to the post-fossil energy era. In this way, even if the migration pushes up the overall
400 population, it will not cause a significant increase in CO₂ emissions.

401 Compared with the U.S., the overall CO₂ footprint of immigrants in Europe
402 (especially in Nordic countries such as Denmark and Sweden) is much lower. Nordic
403 countries have made significant efforts to reduce CO₂ emissions. Their own CO₂
404 footprint is relatively low, despite immigrant inflows. Subsequently, there is no
405 significant promotion of their own CO₂ emissions. This fully illustrates that reducing
406 the intensity of CO₂ emissions in their economies can significantly reduce the
407 boosting effects of CO₂ emissions brought by immigrants.

408 The individual CO₂ footprint will have a downward trend, if immigrants move from
409 high CO₂ emitting nations to low CO₂ emitters. In some Middle East energy-
410 dependent nations, immigrants from India and other major nations can significantly
411 boost their CO₂ emissions. How to accelerate the transition to a post-fossil energy era
412 in relevant nations will be a major challenge.

413 On the other hand, demand-side measures need to focus on major immigrant inflow
414 nations, and sustainable consumption strategies of major immigrant inflow nations
415 need to consider the trade-off effects of future migration. Major immigrant inflow
416 nations should fully consider CO₂ boosting effects of future migration, especially in
417 nations with high CO₂ emissions (e.g., the U.S. identified in this study). Since
418 international migration is inevitable in the context of globalization, it is crucial for
419 immigrant inflow nations to optimize consumption behaviors (e.g., guiding the

420 consumption through carbon tax on finished goods and services) and accelerate
421 technology improvements. In particular, consumption behaviors of immigrants should
422 be guided through tax or financial incentives to decrease immiCO₂. Moreover,
423 industries should be encouraged to choose upstream inputs with lower CO₂ emission
424 intensities. In this way, the immigrant inflow nations may not suffer huge rises in CO₂
425 emissions under the impact of international migration.

426 **Limitations.** This study focuses on the macro-scale analyses. We assume that the
427 consumption structure of immigrants is the same as that of native people in immigrant
428 destination. The ratio of immigrants to total population is used to analyze the impact
429 of international migration on global CO₂ emissions. Other underlying factors
430 influencing CO₂ emissions through international migration are not considered due to
431 data unavailability. These factors (e.g., lifestyles in different immigrant destinations,
432 destination selection of immigrants, and consumption custom of different ethnic
433 groups) can be further considered in future studies based on micro-level databases and
434 social surveys.

435 In this study, we only calculated the CO₂ emission effects of global migration,
436 without considering other effects caused by the migration (e.g., economic and social
437 impacts). The primary cause of immigrants' CO₂ emissions is also related to the high-
438 carbon economic systems of destination nations. The relevant policies should focus on
439 how to reduce the CO₂ footprint of their own economic systems. Meanwhile, there is
440 also a trend of international migration to low-income or low-carbon nations. In the

441 future, global migration will become more diversified, and thus the CO₂ footprint of
442 immigrants will be more diversified.

443 **Uncertainty.** The MRIO tables and global CO₂ emissions in this study are from the
444 Eora database^{37, 38}. Data of other global MRIO databases (e.g., GTAP⁴³, WIOD⁴⁴,
445 EXIOBASE⁴⁵⁻⁴⁷) are not identical with that of Eora, which may lead to differences in
446 results. Moreover, the international migration data are based on the number of
447 documented immigrants. The undocumented immigrants, which also draw
448 international attention, are not considered in this study due to data unavailability.
449 These issues can be further addressed when the databases and statistical accuracy are
450 improved.

451

452 **ASSOCIATED CONTENT**

453 **Supporting Information**

454 The supporting information provides supplemental Figures and Data supporting the
455 main text. In the SI, Figure S1 for the international migration population and
456 migration change; and Figure S2 for the national immi CO₂ and immiCO₂ flows. In
457 the Supporting Data, Data S1 for the immigrant population and total population of
458 nations; Data S2 for the immiCO₂ of nations; Data S3 for the proportions of immiCO₂
459 in total CO₂ footprint of nations; and Data S4 for the list of nations and associated
460 sub-regions.

461

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494 **Notes**

495 The authors declare no competing financial interests.

496

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
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